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The Impact of the Public Sphere on Decision-Making: Is More European More Democratic?

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ABSTRACT

This study grasps the impact of the public sphere on the decision-making process in the European Union. In doing so, it takes the process of Europeanisation of the public spheres in Europe as the basis for measuring its effect on the democratisation of the decision-making process while elite-led bureaucratic mechanisms in the EU prevail. By differing from the previous studies concerning the public sphere in the EU, this study gives more importance to social movements than media and claims that social movements can form public discourses in which politicisation of the European politics is better realised. Through adopting the arena and actor bifurcation in the place and space distinction, the public sphere is approached as a process instead of a stable concept. In this process, it is argued that social movements foster contentious politics which consequently leads to the creation of collective identities in Europe. Where public places where bureaucratic structures of the EU are subjected to the active control of the public space, social movements revitalise democracy in the EU. In this study, democratic development in the EU has been perceived from the perspective of transnationalization of the national public spheres and thus has been approached as the immanent concept in European integration. In Chapter 2, Habermas and Arendt's conceptual analyses of the public sphere are revisited. In Chapter 3, departing from these analyses the public sphere is framed in the context of the EU. In Chapter 4, the thesis of this study puts is presented, and it is tried to be understand better through the case studies of protests across the Europe.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1
EUROPEAN UNION BUREAUCRATISED

1.1 Introduction

One of the greatest tragedy writers of Ancient Athens, Sophocles, tells the story of Ajax who refuses the decision of judges on who possesses the armor and shield of Achilles, a tremendous Greek warrior who died in the Trojan War. As a result of voting, judges decide to give them to Odysseus, making Ajax rebel against the Greek army and leading him to kill himself in the end. The play stages the story of the Archaic warrior, Ajax, who is stuck in a modern political system as he is not able to cope with the newly flourishing notion in the polis, namely democracy. But there is a more important thing Sophocles offers for Athenians of the 5th century BCE and us of the 21st century in his play. In deciding how Ajax's body should be treated, Odysseus calls for a joint decision in which debate among the community would have reached. As the chorus in the play represents the audience, Sophocles catches the attention of Athenian society in theatre by pushing the viewers to think from the window of the characters. By asking questions and posing problems, it creates an environment in which those who saw the play debate it among themselves. The concept of the public sphere thus shows the first sparkles as democracy and theatre thrive hand in hand. Nearly 2400 years later than Athenians headed to theatres to see the tragedies, democracy continues to be understood scarcely and weakly; and continues to muddy the reasons of people as it happened to Ajax. This thesis, therefore, will grasp the relationship between the public sphere and democracy in its broadest sense. More specifically, the thesis will find out the impact of the public sphere on decisionmaking mechanisms and will construct its argument within the framework of the European Union. The investigation of whether a more Europeanized/integrated (European) public sphere creates a more democratic decision-making process will form the backbone of the paper. The research will 1) focus on the conceptual analysis of the public sphere as it is accounted for by thinkers such as Habermas and Arendt; 2) scrutinize the democratization and integration process of the European Union; 3) bridge these two with each other and then by turning its lens towards democratic deficit caused by the lack of deliberative democracy and participation in public sphere it will examine the role of social movements. The aim is to embed the concept of the public sphere that has often been approached philosophically into the political area through the categorization of political notions.

While the concept of Europeanisation has been studied in its broadest definition as addressing “domestic adaptation of regional integration”, its account of the notion of the public sphere has little been shed light. The very institutional feature of the integration and its transformative power at the domestic level only coined high-level political debates like economic development or institutional democratization under the prevailing literature. Conversely, mapping the Europeanization process within cultural and sociologic dimensions such as media studies, social movements or civil society remained less touched fields. However, it is quite a difficult task to identify and measure the Europeanization of the public sphere(s) as alternative theories that conceive Europeanization in different definitions bring several approaches to apply methodological design. While some theories take the transnationalisation of public spheres onto their centre, others focus on the relevance of the contents (European) of the public debates at the national level. Whichever approach is considered by scholars, the involvement of communication is the key notion to embark upon such a study. Existing methods used under different theories will be explained in more detail in the first part of this paper. Although focusing on the role of communication/media as a tool for measuring the level of Europeanization is a prevailing way, it does not help us to understand the relation with the decision-making process. Therefore, what this study aims is to shift the level of analysis of the Europeanization of public spheres to a more political basis so we can figure out the direct impact of it on decision-making. This political dimension consists of analyses at both institutional and socio-economic levels. At the institutional level, it adopts a normative model that measures the inclusiveness of the politics (and policies) and investigates the bureaucratic mechanism of the EU institutions as well as undertakes to understand the role of elites and the effect of populism. At the socioeconomic level, the focus is on social movements and participation since social inequality and representation constitute a problem of democratic deficit in Europe. Therefore, a qualitative method in which a case study is applied will be the research design for this thesis. By constructing categorizations on mainly two explanatory levels (institutional and socioeconomic), research proposes an inquiry for in-depth discourse analysis. After the cases are selected and the data collected, the comparative method seems as the best way to make a meaningful interpretation of data. Additionally, the selected cases must diversify among themselves toward representing the Europeanized –at least showing a trend- and nonEuropeanized political spheres based on this categorization.

What this study suggests by the Europeanization of the public sphere(s) in this study is beyond the engagement of individuals in public debates with mere reason and will to reach the

public good. Here “Europeanized” adds another layer to this basic premise of the Habermesian public sphere. The values of the European Union as it is a to-be-legitimate actor promote much freer and more inclusive debates while the representation should transcend the efforts of elites and become socially reachable. Thus, the study does not take the public sphere for granted as it is ideally defined by Habermas but highlights those variables that lead to the Europeanization of national public spheres by including also the public sphere itself in the process. The public sphere does not stand only as the consequential space but becomes a part of this process through the widening of its understanding. Since a national public sphere is made of already structured interactions (actors, institutions, etc.), we can measure the level of Europeanization by looking at the influence of the European set of values over these interactions.

1.2 Tragedy of the EU

Europe stands at a crossroads leading it to significant divergence. For more than a decade, it has found itself amidst multi-dimensional crises, and now faces a crucial turning point threatening its founding principles. The democratic deficit of the European Union has come to the surface as the impacts of the crises started to concern not only decision-makers but also citizens. Despite the emerging problems being seen as the simple reorientation of the balance of power around the globe, they bear different and much deeper agendas for the EU. The quality of democracy has been showing a downward trend for almost ten years globally (V-Dem, 2022), and the member states of the EU have not fallen behind. While the “democratic deficit” describes the umbrella phrase for all other problems regarding the normative definition of impairment of liberal democracies, reasons for this trend remain effortless to touch upon or very limited on the dimension of communication. Among the studies on the European Union, the democratic deficit has been the most addressed for almost three decades. Thus, addressing these problems underlying the degrading of democracy in Europe opens a window for a broader analysis. The external crises that caused the questioning of the legitimacy of the EU institutions and the lack of the expected democratization process for the new member countries within the borders created direct consequences in which doubts about the future of Europe were raised to voice. The Union’s stability is shaken due to the rising distrust in political elites and scepticism of European values as a result of social inequality and economic problems. Moreover, during the last decade residues of past burials that were once thought of as dead were recalled and made visible by national loyalties (After Europe). Before anything else, such a defect in Europe is followed by two major trends that are also underlined by Brussels (2006): alienation of

citizens from the European project by which electoral participation witnessed the lowest levels and the increase in the votes of right-wing extremist parties. What European politics found itself was the sequential realization of those trends by which the latter followed the former. Normative approaches to democratic theories assume that legitimacy is an a priori condition provided by inclusive and well-functioning public spheres in which public opinions are affected through the press (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018). Traditional liberal democracies of post-World War II enjoyed what these theories brought and could make it possible to steer public support by giving the voters the power to intervene in the market. This was possible for the centre parties of Europe, especially through the implementation of effective mechanisms of the welfare state. Democratic development of the EU halted as the gap between political elites and citizens expanded. Although the gap is reflected through the mistrust directed towards decision-makers, altering conditions and newly emerging problems brought up another dimension. The relationship between the people and elites, while problems at the global level affected the Union's people, started to lean on resistance and to some extent hatred developed against each other. Therefore, handling the concept of democratic deficit with the different meanings it carries helps us to clarify and better understand what is the basis of debates so far.

As we make an effort to describe what democratic deficit is, we find ourselves amid the notions that seem withdrawn from the basket of words of political science. Legitimacy, democratic accountability, legislative process and so on form some of the lexicon that a student of political science comes across when he or she turns interest into the problem of democratic deficit. It is the most fundamental norm of democracy that opinion apart from the governmental actors must flourish and influence the outcomes where the system through this exposition and participation becomes subjected to democratic accountability and legitimacy. Thus, either be it institutional efficiency in which the EU is argued as not being able to establish a sufficient liberal-democratic structure or ideological perception that raises the shortfall of democracy due to its impossibility inherent to politics; the fact is that democratic deficit stands out there. So, when one embarks upon the task of drawing a conceptual framework for the democratic deficit in the EU, the controversy and difference show themselves at the point of institutional setup and the policymaking system of the Union. Such a divergence originates essentially in the differentiation of perspectives both in diagnosing the problems and recommending cures. The former camp deals with the role of institutions in explaining the democratic deficit and prioritising the weakness of legislative bodies. More specifically, despite having strengthened in recent years, this first view pays more attention to the weakness of the European Parliament.

On the other hand, the second or alternative perspective is concerned with the democratic accountability projected through the glass of transfer of power and its domestic results for the Member States (Newman. 1997). By considering the assumptions of the first view on the diagnosis valid, those who turn their lenses to the domestic plane are more inclined to assess the problem in the functioning of the EU policy-making system. Before diving into these perspectives in a deeper sense, it would be better to nail on the wall what we should understand about the democratic deficit in the European context.

When France was preparing to take over the presidency of the European Union in the past, the key themes prioritised by Prime Minister Jospin in his speech to the National Assembly were not quite different from today's issues. Unlike President Jacques Chirac's very unexpected initiative that foresees the forming of a complete federation for Europe, what he had pointed out was not much different than previous presidencies. A Europe pursuing growth and full employment, a Europe that was closer to its citizens and a more efficient and stronger Europe were told to be given greater importance during the French presidency. The volume in tone between President Chirac and PM Jospin, as it is not unexpected in French politics, had brought some division with it. Different agendas from the two roadrunners of politics have proved also that visions set out quite unsimilar to each other. President Chirac's design for Europe was a core group that would include those who took the lead towards deeper integration. His initiative has caused debates as soon as it was supported by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Eurosceptics were alarmed with a great dose of worrying for the future of Europe while others had doubts about national sovereignties. To some leaders of non-member states back then, for example, Viktor Orban, such a grand design would have a risk of putting those candidates into a position of never catching far-reaching reforms on their process of membership which those in the core already would have achieved. Before the forthcoming eastward enlargement of the European Union, the vision set out by Chirac and Fischer was a European federation that leans on the categoric distinction of the core and periphery. The logic of Fischer's model for deeper integration was based on the ability of some advanced states to excel in integration more determined and reach the restructuring of the EU towards federation. Those Western European countries as a centre of gravity are considered the vanguard of the course towards more federal Union and they have shown more willingness for the future of such a federation. It should be remarked that the time this plan was voiced expressed strong meaning for those who joined debates at that time. What was on the agenda was the enlargement process of the Union and it multiplied the magnitude of the debates. For the advocates and supporters of the plan,

integration might have faded away and lost its meaning by the enlargement. According to them -as Fischer was a pioneer- integration should have been saved from the threat of the paralysation of institutions as a result of enlargement. As it implies by logic, such a core group -however, Fischer avoids using this name and puts it as a centre of gravity instead- brings peripheral status together which consists of post-communist states. Therefore, such a two-sided concept puts the Eastern European countries at the periphery of the decision-making process where they were thought unable to join the core. Although Fischer argued that such exclusion of Eastern European states is a temporary solution for the end of federal Europe, and never mentioned any obstacle to the joining of those in the periphery; the question inevitably queries the necessity and rationality of its existence (Zielonka 2000).

However, amidst of these debates, the real problem of the European Union seemed like to be forgotten for a long time. The European integration could not pass the borders of the eliteled project and has remained inadequate in creating an effective public sphere for citizens to feel themselves as part of the politics. Either people have often been ignored by the bureaucratic apparatus of the EU institutions or they did not feel themselves as contributors to European politics. Hence, the deficits the EU has been witnessing for a long time must be understood within the framework of the public sphere, and then it must be analysed how it comes to be impactful on the decision-making process.

CHAPTER 2
FRAMING THE PUBLIC SPHERE

What most people think of when they hear the public sphere is the concept that includes spatial aspects of everyday life. If you mention it to your classmate or one of your parents who asks you about the topic of your thesis (so this thesis), what they do without realizing is reduce the notion to a seemingly less important dimension. Gardens and parks, pubs and coffee shops, or train stations and public transportation (as the name implies) are the first words that come to their minds. A more intellectual one may assume libraries university campuses, or police headquarters that she heads to every day or suffers in the queue to have her residence permit. Despite sounding like less important notions, they can not be considered totally misleading for what the public sphere actually refers to. And even though these places or spatial places at all are not the public sphere which is framed as a scholarly concept, to think about the reasons why those people have a glimpse of such spaces lets us draw a picture explaining the roots of it.
These spatial spaces share one thing in common. Most of them are the places constructed by

the state for citizens to conduct their official or daily issues but not all. Pubs or coffee shops are excluded from this categorization, therefore it is not common for each of them to have been built by the state. Then, people must take something else into account when they think of them. This common feature of these places is communication. When workers come across each other by going to offices or students have coffee just before a lecture, there is one thing shared in common: they communicate with each other. Of course, it is quite a simplified understanding for reaching the roots of the public sphere and does not reflect anything close to what political thinkers addressed by it. Still, taking the road from far but quintessential delineation on one hand is effective for linking the considerations of everyday life to the accounts of political and philosophical debates. On the other hand, it makes it obvious how vague semantically term is.

Since it was first conceptualized by German political scientist Jurgen Habermas in his *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* in 1962, the term public sphere became a focal point for researchers in various studies. Even being the central theme for philosophical discussions to a great extent, also those who work on democracy have sought a relationship between them. Especially by approaching the concept through its normative assumptions, they founded a basis The salience of arguments claimed by many political theorists today is gathered around the view of seeing the public sphere sine qua non for strong democracies (Adut 2012; Dahlberg 2005; Eriksen & Fossum 2002). Habermas's work bears an important difference from his previous counterparts such as Hannah Arendt not only in the way of distinguishing the private and public but also in establishing a relation with democratic theory. In his book, Habermas brings the concept of the public sphere to modern politics once solely belonging to ancient politics (Benhabib 1997). Historical analysis of the public sphere by Habermas observed a transformation where private individuals of the Enlightenment came together to form a public opinion regarding general interests, and then another transformation in which industrial capitalism caused degeneration of it. However, he did it with a crucial theoretical distinction which he held normative assumptions on deliberative democracy. This view of him that overly leans on the idealized picture of early bourgeois society flourished first in cafes, reading clubs, or saloons.

Based on the criticisms toward normative assumptions of the Habermesian understanding of the concept, scholarly interest in the public sphere has shown an increase and variety. Having reflected on what core features the concept includes, some of them have read it over the canon of democracy in which its normatively assumed potential of legitimizing for

those decision-makers through rational deliberation and communication; some others turned their lenses onto the inclusive role of the public sphere which is overlooked by Habermas in a way that he did not take a marginalizing role into consideration but drew homogenizing boundary (Dahlberg 2005). Despite the impossibility of categorizing the existing research and criticism toward Habermesian handling of concepts in such a strict way, they share one common feature that gives us a chance to separate them from another field of research concentration. All these studies grasped the concept on a national level which makes it difficult to measure the impact of globalization. Either be it the account of Habermas's own conceptualization or subsequent studies that criticized it in various approaches, the problematization of the public sphere theory has been only assumed in the Westphalian underpinning (Fraser 2014). Thus standing with the research on the Europeanization process and striving to find an alternative explanation for the democratic deficit in Europe, this once-remained untouched or little-looked dimension of the public sphere, namely the transnationalised public sphere derived.

2.1 Habermas

Without any doubt, the German political thinker, Jurgen Habermas, has been one of the most influential names of the 20th century by his numerous works. From deliberative democracy to communicative action to civil disobedience, his studies cover a broad range of subjects. Not only for his social-theoretical grasping of so many concepts but also for his contribution to critical theory which reflects the thought of the Frankfurt School, Habermas's influence continues to magnet contemporary debates around it and to shape most of them. Sometimes by being transcended and most of the time by being criticized, his works are recalled to discussions. However, there is one term that attracts more attention and scholarly interest than others in his lexicon: the public sphere. Yet again without any doubt, the public sphere forms the backbone of his research agenda and gathers all the related terms he developed around it (Mendietas 2019). In his book written in 1962, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas embarked upon the detailed analysis of the public sphere, or by its original name, *öffenlichkeit*. Throughout the work, Habermas analyses the historical process of the public sphere by approaching it from the canon of critical theory by which communication plays a crucial role in public opinion to be formed. As affected by the post-war situation of public life in Germany and influenced by the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School, Habermas's analyses tracked the historical decay of the public sphere which was based on the ideal of free and uncoerced discussion (Scheuerman, 1999). This normative ideal of Habermas assigned to the

public sphere perceives public opinion that has been formed through rational discussion as a political force. Intersubjectively shared space is what Habermas defines as the public sphere which is reproduced through communicative rationality. The formation of such a rationality renders participation shaped through critical deliberation and argumentation and this participation addresses the act of mutual understanding. Thus, the conception puts forward a "reflexive, impartial, reasoned exchange of validity claims where only the force of better argument wins out" (Dahlberg, 2005; 113). According to Habermas, such a public sphere made up of private individuals gathering to discuss public affairs among themselves offers the basket of norms that are used to draw an earlier model of the bourgeois public sphere. This idealized bourgeois public sphere, for Habermas, is taken as a model to attest to its later degeneration and to carry a democratic theory to ascertain the 'structural changes' within modern industrial societies. However he did not follow an 'obscurantist' attitude as much as Adorno and Horkheimer whose studies were based on the derailment of the Enlightenment, Habermas explains the structural transformation of the public sphere toward degeneration due to corruption of the reason in modern times. He argues that the reason transformed into the instrumental one as being emptied, alienated, and colonization of the lifeworld. At this point, he shares a very niche side of the thought of the Frankfurt School on the critique of the vision of Enlightenment that frames it as another form of oppression and domination. Whereas Adorno and Horkheimer attribute the negativity of modernity to the universalism of the Enlightenment, and subsequently explain the instrumentalisation of reason as a result of the domination men intend to establish over nature; Habermas does not reject the universalist understanding of the Enlightenment completely. What he did was to develop the theory of communicative action later on against totalitarian tendencies and the corrupt form of reason without allowing the devaluation of rationality. In fact, with being the topic of his later studies, Habermas gives the first nuclei of them in his historical reading of the public sphere. Built on the empirical findings extracted from the history itself, Habermas's idealisation of the early bourgeois society and early modern Europe was embodied in the public sphere, a realm of private individuals with rational and critical capacities coming together to discuss matters of deemed public importance. In this idealisation, such a deliberation of public matters regarded as the reflection on the general interest of common life originates public opinion that constitutes a political power to affect lawmakers (Habermas 1989 [1962]). Thus, the conceptualisation of the public sphere in this way provides a basis for Habermas's undertaking of a critique of welfare state democracy while explaining the impairment of the public sphere as a result of 'industrial capitalism, mass

democracy, and sensationalistic media' (Kellner 2013; Adut 2012). In his social-theoretical manifestation of early bourgeois society, the public sphere directly relates to liberal political theory concerning its democratic vision. This vision of liberal political theory by pursuing a hope for equal and inclusive participation inherently unfolds a straight relationship with rational deliberation occurring in the public sphere (Clemens 2010). Regarding its normatively assigned potential in democratic theory, the public sphere unearths between state and society foresees 'open, pluralistic, and critical public discourse' and has been approached as an intermediator between state and society by those observed it in a democratic theory (Risse, 2010). Therefore, before moving to the analysis of normative assumptions of the Habermasian public sphere, it is crucial to grasp its meaning for contemporary democratic theories for this thesis.

Whereas the first trend of literature is diverse in studies on the public sphere, and approaches it from the political theory perspective mainly (Calhoun, 2017; Bernstein, 2012; Eder 2010; Dahlberg, 2005; Scheuerman, 1999; Benhabib, 1997; Goodman, 1992; Hohendahl & Silberman 1979); more recent scholarly works have turned their lenses to the postnational constellations of the public sphere and focused on adaptability of the concept in transnational dimension (Bourne 2017; Salvatore et al. 2013; Fraser 2007; van de Steeg 2002). The early flow of the studies followed a baseline that handled the concept in a socio-historical way and analyzed the public sphere through the validity of its normative presuppositions for the time of Habermas observed (Adut 2012; Fraser 1990). This large area of the studies has undergone to sociological analysis of those points Habermas assumed for the bourgeois public sphere and has been critical of his model. By being critical of Habermas's description of the bourgeois public sphere, those studies followed a line claiming that Habermas overlooked the formation of publicity in a very broad sense and failed to point out the exclusion and marginalization of some groups and identities. The second insurgence of interest in the public sphere gathered around the efforts of locating the concept onto a transnational frame as the new millennium brought new perspectives for the changing world (Gerhards & Hans 2014; Risse 2010). In their extensive comparative study, Ferree et al. analyse normative theories of the public sphere in the light of democratic theories. They make an empirical analysis of different issues in different countries on the basis that these two concepts - public sphere and democracy - are a process occurring within each other (democratic theories focus on accountability and responsiveness in the decision-making process, while public sphere theories focus on the role of public communication in facilitating and undermining this process) (Ferree et al. 2002).

Here, I deem it more concrete and accurate to concentrate on the literature that encompasses debates on the European context as the thesis is also rooted in the research of the transnationalization of the public sphere(s) in such perspective. The studies that specifically focus on a European public sphere have pointed out the democratizing role of public spheres (Eriksen & Fossum 2002; Gerhard 1993), more contested themes such as normative requirements concerning communication studies (Pfetsch & Heft 2015), looking at the role of press and media in both as framing the public sphere (Michailidou 2015) and also the function it has for filtering the flows (Bennett & Pfetsch 2018). Some other studies that can be considered in political theory tried analyzing the democratic deficit the European Union has been experiencing from the canon of participation and inclusiveness. These emphasize the citizens' participation as a significant aspect of establishing trust among citizens to foster bottom-up democratisation in the EU (, 2015). Habermas's formulation of the public sphere from his early theoretical works which he built the concept extracting through historical reading to recent writings of him giving answers to those who criticized what he underlined sustains within the very core premises of the concept. Democracy and rights with the separate autonomies of private and public spaces remain as underlying incorporated points for understanding the 'republican' and equally 'Kantian liberal' model that Habermas has drawn (Dukes et al. 2012). In the republican political tradition, Habermas was influenced by Arendt to a great extent in explaining the separation of the public realm from the private life. In her 'public space' Arendt argues that the rise of social realized as a consequence of the diffusion of economic affairs into the public matter by divorcing from the household (Benhabib, 1997). This breakaway leads to what she gave negative value in modern societies, and it comes out in a nation-state as a political form: the rise of the social, meaning that the public and private realms are intertwined as economic relations have moved to the public realm. Her distinction between private and public realms best finds its meaning in ancient Greece by which her argument is rooted. The separation of public and private realms existed in clearly drawn borders where both realms in polis were standing highly far away and contrasted from each other. Arendt grasps private and public realms by their concerns and affairs, thus she brings forth their difference in principle due to publicity that the private sphere does not include. Such publicity, and the term public means two things in Arendt's assertation: first, it means "that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody" and second, it comes to the meaning of a world which "is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place" (Arendt 1998). As Habermas would have done similar historical inquiry in his Structural Transformation later,

Hannah Arendt found the decline of the public space in modernity by the only difference than Habermas whereas he linked the origination of the publicity –captured by the different word- also in the modernity, namely in the Enlightenment. According to Arendt, in modernity, another kind of space emerges in which her account can be considered as negatively engaged and antimodernist (Benhabib 1997). The rise of social space, located between private and public space, has been considered by Arendt as the reason for borderlines once drawn in ancient Greece to have blurred. Distance between the private and public realms decreased as this new social space infused both of them and mixed these spaces up with each other. She writes as "the assumption that men behave and do not act with respect to each other, that lies at the root of the modern science of economics, whose birth coincided with the rise of society…" by framing it (the assumption) within the same conformism of esteeming the members of society equal in social status (Arendt 1998; 41). Her critique of modernity addresses the mass society and the changing patterns concerning production and all other activities. She gauges "society's victory" -by taking an ironic attitude- to explain the substitution of behaviour for action. The man whose action was preserved in the public realm through individuality in city-states made it possible to bring forward debates over public affairs. Before the distortion of the boundaries between two spaces in the modern age, affairs over the world would be taken by action as this public realm distinguished from private life by thick lines (Canovan 1985). Since people have different considerations in their private lives, they can come together in public spaces. At this point, it must be remarked that Arendt looks at this distinction between public and private from a moral perspective. In her Human Condition, she defines being human through being part of public life. A man who does not participate in public life –borrowing the word from Aristotle- is an idiot. It differs from the meaning of it which was described as a man who is not interested in politics by Aristotle. According to Arendt, only by being part of public life people can enrich their lives and self. Action in her regard, as a condition for participation in public life, constitutes the 'world' as it relates individuals to each other who come together to speak of common affairs. There is an effort to look for an answer to the question of "what should be done for a living together?" and this is only possible through action and labour. However, this action and labour need plurality to realize and plurality signifies also the indifference of people. Arendt builds an analogy by likening the world to the table which is possessed by those who sit around it and it connects them as well as separates them (Arendt 1998).

2.2 Arendt

Arendt's theory of political action within the canon that is historically rooted in Ancient Greece and the Greek hero thus refers to the strong distinction of polis from the household (Ring, 1991; 434). The space where political action is realized by the political actor holds significant freedoms from daily life and displays certain qualities on account of the political actor. In her portrait of such a "man", associated values such as reason, speech and creativity need to be displayed in public space where only made possible through the "sequestering of the household" and be present among others by distinguishing himself from others (ibid.). Her incline to draw stories from history and adapt them to contextual cases (as criticised by some for creating dilemmas and bifurcating contemporary political debates) shows no difference in her perspective on public space. Like it was a starting point for Habermas, Arendt also based on Kant and pointed out larger perspectives by transforming Kant's concept. As Lisa Disch observes, Arendt enlarged the way of thinking and brought a plurality of perspectives which for her peculiar characteristics of the peculiar people need to be visited. By expanding Kant's abstract and universal position, Arendt considers that better judgment is through more perspectives (Lane, 1997; 143). She likens public space to the stage of a theatre. According to her, the space where political action is realised is open and bright like a theatre stage. There, each person views the stage from where they sit and produces their own sentiments (doxa) from this location (Unlu, 2021; 310). What makes the politics happen on her account is the action that is a human capability. Thus, political action is not merely "being" human but the multiplicity that helps us to share the world as humans; however, it should not be understood as the plurality or diversity as in modern societies but as variety or muchness of conclusions. This, as Dana Villa puts it for Arendt, comes to mean that political action is nothing other than the variety of conversation about public matters (Villa, 1996; 31). She describes the action as "the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world" (Arendt, 1998; 7). She reads the action over its aspect of being a human condition that is related to politics and regards this human condition, action, as "the condition of all political life" (ibid.). In the centre of her theory located zoon politikon of Aristotle in which public activity is the only ethical value for a man to pursue human life and this is his most distinctive feature. She rejects the anti-politics of Plato who grasps politics over the question of "what is justice?" that reduces it to ethics on a larger scale. Instead, her understanding of politics overlaps with Aristotle's which relies on the view that does not look

at the polis as equal to the sum of individuals. However, both Aristotle and Plato draw a distinction between private and public, Plato's distinction leans on the notion of truth whereas for Aristotle politics is dependent on the issue of survival and only those who solve this should debate how they can live a better life, therefore leans on the notion of self-sufficiency. Politics, to Arendt, is a concept that is made of by only those who do not suffer economically and she approaches laws and politics as the products of the public sphere. Public speech or dialogue or "thinking" in a broader sense then holds a great portion in her theory while she both rejects Plato's isolationist view to acquire wisdom in society and Heidegger's problem of nothingness on dismissal of public reasoning. Arendt goes further in her analysis later on of the totalitarian societies in which she explains the dismantlement of the public political (zoon politikon with the words of Aristotle) as the basis for totalitarianism. Therefore, on the very basis of her philosophy, we find another rejection of Rousseau and the Enlightenment. Not over the principles of natural rights and immutability that the notion of nature includes within but over the law that cannot be thought of as free from the societal order her theory rises. Moreover, freedom happens to be possible only by laws which are not preceded by rights. Also from this perspective, she takes an Aristotelian attitude by being a constitutionalist. Here, Arendt's definition of freedom is what creates its relationship with the future, which is unforeseeable and therefore only realised through action in the political realm. The political realm in this sense is considered the place where the possibility of freedom originates because only there, the unpredictable character of the future is substituted with the absoluteness of nature, so people in this realm share their imagination of the future. So, the action should be inquired deeper to understand her theory of the political realm relatively seen as more difficult to distinguish from the public realm than the private realm.

Hannah Arendt's borrowed concept from Aristotle, zoon politikon, expands through another notion she stated in The Human Condition, "vita activa". The distinction between private and public spaces that Arendt deduces from Ancient Greece takes on a new meaning by the existence of the political realm. While public activity or being zoon-politikon did provide a sharp distinction in Aristotle's polis, it would not be easy to say it for Arendt's theory in regard to the distinction between the public realm and the political realm. In other words, while the separation of the private realm from the public and political realms draws much clearer lines, making the same inference for what consists of the distinction between public and political realms is more arduous. What unveils the difference between her theory and Aristotle's is this new definition of the political realm which Arendt describes through the perspective of human

actions. Being societal (bios politikos in Aristotle's words) in this regard does not refer to a sole characteristic of humans and hence is not distinctive for a man. For this reason, if we read bios politikos as the life per se in which man chooses by freewill beyond necessities in zoe (animal nature of human) and form the political formation at the end in a community, this is man's "lifestyle" that best fits his nature. Still, bios politikos does not give an answer for what humane life is but only defines the lifestyle of a man. At this point, Arendt stresses that a man can be attributed as a human through the life he pursues in bios politikos as zoon politikon, and puts human actions into the centre of her theory. So, the *vita activa*, or active life, comprises a threefold distinction and stands just opposite of the *vita contemplativa*, that refers to the life of philosophers (Hartford, 2012; 7). This threefold distinction addresses the "labour, work and action" as the latter (action) expressing the top of the hierarchy and considerably can be said to be the easiest in terms of the domain but the trickiest one in terms of what she claims by it. So before coming to action in the political realm in her lexicon, it is better to understand labour and work. In the Ancient Greek polis, private (oikos) and public (koine) life were separated from each other as the former points out the realm of exigencies or necessities whereas the latter frames the life in which people participate through their free wills. Such a division emerges where Arendt extracted her theory and what she embarked upon to remind us of their real meaning once we lost with modernisation by the emergence of a "social". Her view, as she warned, is "extraordinarily difficult" to understand (the meanings of private and public) since we lost the experience of a "genuine political life" (Pitkin, 1981; 328). This distinction in Ancient Greece held a basis on the exclusion regarding the way of life and the activities that would be realised in those realms. Polis would exclude barbarians and put an end to the domination of kings and masters, thus giving the real meaning of the public realm in the sense of setting men free. On the contrary, the private realm would express a complete contrast to life in the polis, thus bearing pre-political values both normatively and geographically. The household was one of the two lives or "beings" to which labour and work in Arendt's theory belong, namely the private realm. In this realm, labour was born out of necessities like for a man to feed the family and for a woman to give birth; and "necessity ruled over all activities performed in it" (Arendt, 1998; 30). However, to Arendt, the relationship between these realms is built over the notion of freedom and should not be thought of as independent from each other. Mastering necessities in the household in order to become free required force and violence and rendered the private sphere the subject of inequalities just to reach equality in the free world. Beyond being pre-political, it was also a prerequisite for a man to acquire citizenship, a means

to that end. The logic of ruling and being ruled was valid in the private realm and it justified the domination brought by violence. Therefore, Arendt supposes labour as a biological need of a human body. Work, in this respect, means to create a fictional world different from the natural environment of man which is pursued by labour. This is a material world of man-made things, thus different from natural surroundings (Arendt, 1998; 7). It should be underlined how in The Human Condition she tracked etymologically to find out and show readers the distinction between labour and work despite historically those words being used for the same activity. Necessities and freedom originate the fundamental bifurcation (however we should avoid reading Arendt's theory merely over the bifurcation and oppositions, it is valid for now) of her theory in presenting the distinction between the public and political sphere. Beyond what matters differently between labour and work, these concepts also compose the distinction between private and public realms; therefore, shed light on the first distinction in her theory. It may ease our job to understand Arendt's theory if we point them out and list them through the definitions within the framework of her definitions. Hannah Arendt speaks of two different distinctions covered in her theory: public vs. private realm and public vs. political realm. Regarding what she refers to as the public realm we observe two notions: the first one is that everything in public is observable by everyone, and the second is that this space is to be shared by everyone as it signifies a different world than our private place (Arendt, 1998; 50-52). The public appearance defines the public realm in which uncertainty, a haziness or in her words "shadowy kind of existence" is replaced with a deprivatised and deindividualized way of definite, clarity and collectivity. In this respect, the public realm is an intersubjective space which allows one to be heard and seen by others and makes objective relations possible via the gathering and breaking off in the world of joint things with others. This appearance provided by and in the public realm brings out the reality which one never experienced before, she writes;

> *"The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves, and while the intimacy of a fully developed private life, such as had never been known before the rise of the modern age and the concomitant decline of the public realm, will always greatly intensify and enrich the whole scale of subjective emotions and private feelings, this intensification will always come to pass at the expense of the assurance of the reality of the world and men."* (Arendt, 1998; 50).

According to Arendt, the word the public describes the world of man-made affairs and human artefacts, and it functions as an idea of relating and separating men as if "a table is

located between those who sit around it" (ibid.). Therefore, the public realm is a space of freedom where individuality and equality are rendered possible within this world for everyone. In this manner, labour and work in her *vita activa* cast no doubt for being in the possession of the private realm as we take basis from what signifies the public realm: publicity and commonality. Labour is what men pursue the biological life by meeting needs such as breeding and nourishment while men produce a different world than their natural surroundings through work. In her aspect of labour, it has to do with the primary consideration of sustaining their own lives and their families, and work brings artificial existence which is unnatural (Arendt, 1998; 7), Nevertheless, both are related to the very individual existence of a man and originate from the necessities. As she would later explain in her anti-modernist approach to modern societies, the "rise of the social" pushes the private and public realms into the narrow edges of the distinction. Her theory attributes the economy and the family on the one side of the distinction (private realm) and considers political action or politics in a broader sense on another hand (public realm). She argues that the rise of the social caused economic interactions and processes once confined to the realm of the household to be driven towards the public realm historically (Benhabib, 1997; 3). If we recall the backline of her theory is rooted, in Aristotle's view on how politics (being zoon-politikon in polis life) is regarded as a concept to be done only by those who overcome the matter of self-sufficiency. So clearly in this framework, Arendt sees no fallacy in understanding public appearance and being in public among other men is conditioned by the unequal relations in the household that are imposed over the slaves and women despotically. The action, when we try to catch its sense in this context, means the exclusion of violence to form equal relationships with other free citizens (or citizens straight as it is brought up by freedom in polis) in public. Freedom, on the other hand, is provided through domination over the labour of others (i.e. slaves), and exclusion of them from the public life. Her remark consistently points out how for the Romans word "to live" was synonymous with the word "to be among men", which reflects political life is conditioned by the plurality (Arendt, 1998; 7). To give another example, "hâmûşân" (a Persian word) is used instead of cemetery or deaths in the Mevlevi Order/Mawlawiyya which comes to the meaning of mute(s).

In the opposition between the public and political realms, we encounter more confused and blurred lines of distinction to be followed. Arendt defines politics by the idea of human plurality which she puts as "the basic condition of both action and speech" (Arendt, 1998; 175 & 2005; 93). Thus, labour and work -and any activity comprised of and realised under these- are forbidden to be practised in the political realm as politics merely belongs to the field of doers

as post-sustaining of life (Pitkin, 1981). Unlike this, action, although it remains an ambiguous concept as we shall see in her theory, generates the political realm for a man who appears in the public realm and privileges the freedom of revealing himself among his peers. Because for her only the action is what categorises the human capacity to make politics, and this capacity corresponds to the plurality. Plurality describes the situation of sharing the world as a human species equally but at the same time different and unique. Her theory makes an effort to explain and prove that the most distinctive and most human feature of men is being zoon-politikon, and hence takes a phenomenological side. Dialogue of solitude, she writes to show that even when by himself, a man cannot be separated from this plurality of humanity and becomes two-in-one as the plurality of humanity is carried within himself (Arendt, 2005; 22). Therefore, appearances hold a great portion of her "political phenomenology" which differs from Husserl and Heidegger. Hannah Arendt constructs her theory over human action in which straight focus is given to appearances. In the theories of Heidegger and even of Kant whose theory had a significant influence on Arendt's grasping of human plurality, freedom comes out as a missing concept. Action thus reflects freedom as it becomes present in politics which occurs in the activities that are done between others. To clarify it in other words, politics provides us the space for freedom to exist. Only through this freedom politics can emerge as a reason for it since for Arendt "politics deals with the coexistence and the association of different men" (Arendt, 2005; 93). Not being social but creating a public space where politics can be exercised for organizing the similarities and differences to appear is what holds weight in her theory. In this sense, such a situation of consciousness bears a great deal to do with freedom. Even can be said that by referring to a different appearance than in the household and by facilitating a different conception than family, freedom is also only possible in public space. Men by being distinct from their household and family and being present in the public space among their equal peers can be considered as proving their freedom. In this context, freedom receives dual meaning since firstly it can be said that freedom is only possible in public space but secondly, what forms this public space is freedom per se. At this point, we should be more elaborative and scrutinize her befuddling conceptualization in more detail.

To comprehend what she defined by action better, we would need that first understand and track where she found the decline or loss of public space in her theory similar to what Habermas has done. Diving into the essence of why her theory posits an anti-modernist attitude will be a good departure point for this turbulent flight. Hannah Arendt puts modern life onto the just opposite of the political realm, which was made of through action, through "to act". If so, what

does she mean by “the rise of the social”? By saying that it “blurred the old borderline between private and public”, what does her account stand for? Moreover, how does she project the effect of this “social” on politics? Looking for answers to these questions will guide us in grasping the quintessential part of her phenomenology. To find out what she diverts her analysis towards but more accurately why she embarks upon such research requires explanation here. This time, freedom which once defined the political realm and was defined through action finds a companion to understanding the rise of social: power. This power inherently including sovereignty over others or other places does not exclude violence and force. Hence, Arendt finds the historical break-off or dissolution of freedom in the idea of the nation and consequently the nation-state. According to her, the modern state inserts the power of ruling or sovereignty we can call in the public realm which was once embedded in the private realm and functioned as preparing the politics. The public realm was deprived of its ancient purpose in the polis and transformed into a marketplace in which producers and consumers buy and sell. The historical process of such a transformation of the public realm into the private realm or better to put it “losing its function and being reduced to the space for private needs were met” was a result of the fundamental substitution of action with violence. Consequently, this leads to the substitution of freedom which can only be revealed by action with force. Pretending in the borders of “as if” means the private realm’s seizure of the public realm. This process, on the other hand, overlaps with the tendency of the state formation of the 19th century in which nationstates of Europe “made citizens’ aggregate behaviour globally calculable and predictable” (Boltanski, 2014; 65). Now we could speak of the locus of power in the modern nation-state that has occurred because of “social”. Individuality and citizenship are now equalised in numerical figures, and society becomes the statistical sum of each individual having the same opinions and interests. This sameness transformed “the public space into a pseudospace of interaction in which individuals no longer “act” but “merely behave” (Benhabib, 1997; 4). If we think of the feature of action attributed by Arendt – unpredictability, behaviour addresses to a process beginning with the rise of the social in which economics was taken away from the household and placed into the public realm; and the public realm was rendered subject to predictable activities at the end of this process. For all that, behaviour bears the meaning of “to comply with” or “abide by” and for this reason public space becomes a strictly defined place only made free by the state. While the public space of interactions of equal and free men was converted to the political realm by the action in the polis, what created the multiplicity of the will to act was the sharp distinction between private and public realms. More precisely, if politics is defined by

the act of conceiving the dissimilitude, what leads to the emergence that otherness was the private realm and what leads to the expression of it was the public realm. Such an agonistic model of the public realm is rooted in the agora where moral greatness and heroism were sacred above all and revealed among others. Nevertheless, this agonistic conceptualisation of the public realm should not be thought of as a place where violence increases, instead as Sennett infers it prevents the ultimate explosion of violence (1970; 162). Chantal Mouffe perceives this functioning of the public space as what is required in postpolitical societies to revive democracy. According to her, the expression of diversity provided by the public space repels violence and hence converts antagonisms into agonisms (Mouffe, 2011). Like Mouffe, it is also possible to suggest an alternative lens to read Arendt's evermore complex theory. The associational view, nevertheless making the description of public space by Arendt quite contradictory, brings the concepts of freedom and power into the theory. The question of whether she means by public space a tangible, physical location or the locus of power created with the action - hence an intangible notion - remains central for both views. Her account firstly holds a physical location for public space where action can take place and clearly sets a link between public and private spaces. Thus, when she underlies such a physical distinction and some other lines between these spaces, her reading of the transformation the modern age caused can easily be comprehended through the loss of those boundaries. Notwithstanding, it becomes apparent that her theory neglects a crystal clear definition of public space when she inserts power into the theory and argues that "political action creates political power" (Ring, 1991: 437). Now, to Arendt, public space is an intangible site for power to come into sight. While the first grip of the public space is related to the agonistic model and ascribes the existence of physical space, the second view (associational) considers public space wherever power becomes apparent as a result of men acting together in concert. The agonistic model appertains to Ancient Greece in which the polis or agora provides a physical space per se for the heroic actor could show his moral greatness which he already earned in the private realm of the household. Here the appearance is more connected to show his *whoness* rather than *whatness* for a hero in which he displays his individuality. On the other hand, in the associational view of her theory, space of appearance was taken out due to fact that this place does not exist but is created where power is demonstrated through action in concert. This view rejects space in a topographical sense where for instance city hall is located but instead regards Montgomery bus boycott as it becomes the site for power to lay out. This second view of Arendt makes the concept highly confusing in a way that she now discredits the physical importance of political space. It can be said that the

associational view offers a perspective originating in the modern world in which the heroic actor of Ancient Greece was replaced by men acting in concert. Then, how can we explain the sudden loss of given importance to physical space? Can we simply say that Arendt contradicts herself or offers an alternative yet difficult-to-understand perspective?

Looking for answers to the questions above takes us back to the fundamental distinctions of Arendt's theory. In respect to these distinctions, on the other hand, one must focus on her phenomenology. According to Arendt, being social is not merely enough for human life to be considered different than animal life; yet this is its commonality with animal life. Her theory, as it is explained above, takes bios politikos into consideration to point out the difference between them. Furthermore, she not only sees the human capacity of being political (living a political life) as what creates difference but also puts it directly to the opposite of private life in terms of revealing a second life (Arendt, 1998; 24). Based on this outline, the physicality of the public realm should be exposed to another evaluation beyond simple dichotomies of agonistic and associational views. Two views looking at the public realm should not be grasped in a way that includes or excludes physicality but complementary to a broader analysis. Holding such a line of inquiry also makes it easier for us to understand the decline of action (or transformation to behaviour) and the crisis of democracy today. Although seems quite ambiguous at first, Arendt's complex and contradictory statements may make sense better when the basic distinction between the public realm and political realm is kept in mind. The public realm constitutes the relation of man with his most fundamental characteristic, which is being social. However, this situation of being social does not distinguish him from the animals but only provides and requires a physical space for those who in the community need to accommodate their appearances, otherwise existence and being are meant to be absent. "Nothing and nobody exist in this world whose very being does not presuppose a *spectator*" writes Arendt in The Life of the Mind (1978[1971]; 19) when she addresses the world as ontologically a priori commonality of human beings. Since the world is considered through its common physical spatiality to all people -therefore defined by plurality- it only sort of prepares the conditions in which the space of appearance takes place. When compared to the physical spatiality of the world that is common to all of us, space of appearance refers to a "political, contextual and fragile" spatiality (Debarbieux, 2017; 355). However presents itself differently than physical space, such a space of appearance is only possible in the common world. Similarly to what draws the line between private and public realms, that is to show up somewhere else than the household, the line between public and political realms is drawn through the power released

because of action when men come together by being aware of themselves and bearing the purpose of the arrangement. Simply put, while the physical space of the public realm is where men appear as human, this praxeological spatiality of the "political realm" points out to the communicative appearance as "fully human". It needs to be also remarked that the former's attribute to physical spatiality does not come without its basic reliance on necessity, therefore Arendt's phenomenology rejects the idea that sociality could be the basis of political community. Here (the public realm) sociality is merely perceived as corresponding to the physical and natural togetherness of the human species which was not established through human action but because of necessity. Making the same reasoning for the private realm holds a valid inference on the other hand. The private realm is framed with the necessities of the intimate life in which private property draws the borders of this realm. Unlike these two realms shaped by bodily and material necessities (i.e. labour and work), what forms the political realm is the action which men will to power with the desire of distinguishing themselves from others. This brings us now to turn our focus to the reason why she paid attention to the physical existence of life lived in private and public realms even though she did not theorise perspicuously. More importantly, it relies on her negative account of the social which was reduced to social togetherness by excluding the stress on politics and thus caused to the loss of uniqueness of human life. Her phenomenology, based on this viewpoint, embarks upon proving the need for founding a new public realm where those that purely belong to human life can be revealed. Such a realm that allows people to "make politics" through plurality is related to her phenomenological tradition of "saving appearances" (Borren, 2010; 18). If the public realm is a space for human beings to position their perspectives over the plurality, this space must be emancipated and revived. Her thought derives from this phenomenology and directs each human activity into certain spaces defined by the basic categories of human existence. In fact, at one point, her way of thinking gives us the signal that she seeks happiness that becomes unreachable with the loss of this common world. Highly related to what she regards as the displacement of politics in modernity and the transformation of action to behaviour; despite being socially conformist it cut off the intersubjectivity of the public sphere. Active publicity was replaced with the passive form of spectatorship while due to individuality and alienation public no longer corresponded to "coming together" but the notion of mass became more valid. Issues that were brought to the public realm in the polis of Ancient Greece have lost their features of communality and publicity in which private interests were left behind and consequently, the public realm has no longer been a space for individual uniqueness and

distinctiveness to lead to action; but became a place for defined goals by the state in private life are behaved to reach instead are acted in unforeseeable space. It is what she meant by the displacement of politics, that the loss of the plurality requires the coexistence of different perspectives for action arising there in unpredictability to create politics. More explicitly, her phenomenological approach develops on the strand of thinking about the "process of thinking" when this plurality of perspectives is considered to build the engaged understanding of others and self-reflexive judgment for finding what is absent of oneself (Borren, 2010).

If we return to the Habermasian concept over Arendt's private-public separation, the public sphere has been approached in a historical plane by which a similar reading to Arendt's distinction can be seen. Habermas brings this separation of public and private back to the era of bourgeois society where for the first time in history such a distinction was evident. His grasping of the public sphere shows, therefore, a difference from in Middle Ages. To him, emergence of the publicity and the separation of private and public should not be considered in tandem. Despite the representation of the sovereign in the public sphere being a matter of European society of the Middle Ages, it is still not fair to talk about a distinction between private and public. At that time, what was considered public was nothing but the representation of power; hence existed only in the seal of the prince (Habermas, 1974; 50). This public sphere was a representative public sphere where the sovereign, be it a prince or other feudal authorities, was inherent to publicly represented power only through the functioning of it before the people. In the medieval ages, before the flourishing of the bourgeois society in which Habermas observed the first signs of a distinctly emerging public sphere in the eighteenth century, the representative public sphere was conditioned by the presence of the ruler. Unlike it, the concept of the public sphere idealized by Habermas refers to normatively assumed functions developed throughout the historical and social changes. Without any doubt, for him, before the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere, it is impossible to speak of any public sphere and public opinion. However, the separation of public and private was described on a normative basis on Arendt's account too, Habermas's historical background for that breakaway grasps the "structural transformation" of the public sphere better. Where Habermas traced back and found the disintegration of the feudal authorities thus corresponded to the eighteenth century. It was that time when the prince's seal or the church's divine authority became a bipolar imagination in which the public budget and the prince's own expendings were kept apart from each other and the church's existence as a public body corresponded whole different matter than religious freedom now people had privately. Consequently, public authorities, bureaucracy, the military,

and legal bodies partly became independent of the prince's palace. Changing structures of feudal estates made them happen in the meantime to move into a public sphere where they could maintain their existence apart from the private autonomy of the ruler henceforth (Habermas 1974; 51). Habermas grasps the public sphere as a result of a historical reading that subjects political power to democratic demands led by the bourgeoisie of eighteenth-century England. "Only when, he writes in 1974, "exercise of political control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand… does the political public sphere win an institutionalised influence over the government…" (Habermas 1974:49). This process of institutionalisation gains crucial meaning since he frames that "something close to public opinion" in terms of a public body that locates itself between society and state (ibid, 50). According to him, without calling such a process of institutionalisation into the equation the public sphere bears the risk of falling into the trap of being characterized as a crowd instead of specific forms of deliberation. Therefore, while he was historicizing the concept of the public sphere, Habermas highlights the peculiar way of occurrence of public reasoning which could only be purported in this process of institutionalization. Public reasoning has not been there always but shaped through the bourgeois constitutional state which was fought against monarchies. Then, what he calls the public sphere is a concept that made possible the subjection of the execution of the power of the state to the democratic control organized by the public itself. In such a way institutionalisation should not be overemphasized as if it is a formally founded body. Rather Habermas speaks about the informal expression of certain practices (like criticism and control) since these come out as the carrier of public opinion. The public sphere, to him, is what the public organizes itself through information something different from collective prejudices and opinions but instead presupposed public reasoning is exercised. Therefore, while Habermas locates this idealized bourgeois public sphere between society and state, his authentic view of the concept which extracted from the separation of public and private becomes more complex to understand. If we are to follow Habermas's reading of the authentic public sphere as Arendt did while she was highlighting the dual character of ancient Greece –where men had had private and public life- we reach the further theories of Habermas much easier. The concept of the public sphere is located between society and the state and thus normatively creates selfgovernance for democratic deliberation via rational and critical reasoning leading to opinion formation corresponding to the space belonging to the private realm. The difference can be defined through the difference of lexicons. While Arendt's philosophy refers to a physical or topographical aspect of the realms or spaces, Habermas took a radical departure from this and

on his account publicity as a "sphere" forms a social space relatively open (not confined to agora or city walls) where rational-critical deliberation can take place. In Habermas's ideal public sphere theory which he took as the basis for the later explanation of its decay, what encourages people to debate among themselves is their private affairs. These private concerns first in literature and then in the economy were reflected through gatherings in cafès and saloons promoting something out of the state's control (Clemens 2010). So it is accurate to say that the public sphere derives from the private realm and finds its meaning in being critical towards state actions. As we see more detail later in this chapter, the dual aspect in Arendt's ancient Greece which assumes different concerns in private and public realms becomes man and citizen in the lifeworld of Habermas's theory.[1] Thus, despite being

the subject of a further theory of Habermas, namely the "communicative action theory", it is important to stress what Habermas constructs his distinction of private and public over which makes tracing the history of the public sphere possible. Such publicity (if to refer concept by German translation) means to institutionalization of social relationships which are free from the direct effect of state and religious authorities. Therefore, what forms the public sphere under the institutional order of lifeworld is the public opinion in which communicative reason outruns the instrumental reason which exists in the system (in his lexicon it addresses to market economy and state and bureaucracy). However, not only the public sphere emerges in lifeworld but also the private sphere made up of family, neighbourhood relationships and free associations. This is the main problematization in Habermas's account when he grasps his theory for society, to know how lifeworld and system are distinguished and how they can be able to meet. Before that, it must be better understood how Habermas conceptualized the public sphere, so must be grasped his idealization of the concept –to some critics overly idealized- hand in hand with the historical observation.

In his book, *The Globalization Paradox,* Dani Rodrik shares an anecdote about the coffeehouse in London where shipowners, brokers, and merchants gathered at the end of the seventeenth century. The anecdote mentions an announcement regarding the sale of beaver fur

[1] Cited in: https://iletim.istanbul.edu.tr/index.php/2021/02/07/iletisimsel-eylem-kuramiuzerinehabermasdersleri/#_ftn3

for the time wakening the great interest of those customers at Garraway Coffeehouse (Rodrik, 2012; 3). When Larry Shiner goes on to inquiry about modern art in *The Invention of Art*, he finds the roots of the great schism in the eighteenth century which led to linguistic and philosophical differences between art/craft and fine art in the places where painting, music or poetry were debated independently from their traditional social functions. According to Shiner, discussions made by intellectuals first in the literary and then other fields of art (he argues that art and craft would be used in the same meaning throughout history, and moreover there was not a word for art in ancient Greece as it refers contemporary meaning) was the embodiment of the new opposition between them. Later these discussions and experiences would have a strong impact on settling of fine art as a distinct category (2001, 139). These are just two examples of some developments that happened quite close times to each other but more importantly to Habermas's indication of showing the structural changes in the public sphere. What I intend by giving examples different from the rise of the political public sphere is to demonstrate that even though it is argued by Habermas that the bourgeois public sphere first developed as a literary public sphere and is constituted parallel with the Westphalian state, one point should not be overlooked. Other sorts of spheres (e.g. fine art) emerged at the same time; and beyond the nation-state, the influence of globalization helped the development of a sphere where state actions are criticized. Moreover, following the marginalization and delimiting processes in those fields, we can better grasp what Calhoun called the transformation of the public sphere of Habermas's golden age becoming the bourgeois public sphere (2017). As this study will present in the next chapters, underestimating the impact of expelling certain groups or ignoring the limitations which set obstacles for propertyless workers to be included constituted the basis for critics towards Habermas's concept (Negt & Kluge 1972).

To be able to see the substance of what the public sphere is made up of in Habermas's conceptualization and to create a basket of normative values for what it includes, beginning by citing a relatively complex and middle-of-the-book quotation can provide a focal point for us:

> *"The model of the bourgeois public sphere presupposed strict separation of the public from the private realm in such a way that the public sphere, made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state, was itself considered part of the private realm. To the extent that the public and private became intermeshed realms, this model became inapplicable. That is to say, a repoliticised social sphere originated that could not be subsumed*

under the categories of public and private from either a sociological or a legal perspective. In this intermediate sphere, the sectors of society that had been absorbed by the state and the sectors of the state that had been taken over by society intermeshed without involving any rational-critical political debate on the part of private people. The public was largely relieved of this task by other institutions: on the one hand by associations in which collectively organized private interests directly attempted to take on the form of political agency: on the other hand by parties which, fused with organs of public authority, established themselves, as it were, above the public whose instruments they once were. The process of the politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power now takes place directly between the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties, and public administration. The public as such is included only sporadically in this circuit of power, and even then it is brought in only to contribute its acclamation." (Habermas 1962 [1989]; 175-176).

Having cited the chapter in which Habermas explains the disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere, we find a very essential principle of the notion which dissolved as mass media and state intervention expanded in a historical process. What dissolved at the end of this process or what happened to change structurally is the idea of the public sphere. This idea of rationalising power through the public debate among private individuals has come to face the risk of dissolution. With this, the substance of the idea that has been borne hand-in-hand with the modern state reflects its forming characteristic for democracy. When it comes to the subject of its relationship with democracy, what is impelled by the public sphere is a project of normatively shared principles in a forum practised through empirical modes; and that project bifurcates to provide a democratic framework for political power. Thus, from the critical theory canon of Habermas, such a bifurcation means normative legitimacy on the one hand, and political efficacy on the other. The former envisions a publicity which regards inclusiveness and participation by holding the principle of being open to all; whereas the latter one questions the effectiveness of what is produced as a result of the publicity, namely public opinion. Moreover, this bifurcation develops within a reciprocal relation in which democratic institutions of today under the pressure of impartiality open a field to be fulfilled by this idealized deliberative model. Of course, it must be remarked or questioned how strong democratic institutions all around the world feel such pressure. Yet claimed to be democratic institutions bear a presumption inherently to be fulfilled by the deliberation model which represents (or pretends to represent)

equal interests of all. Better to say "pretends to represent" because normative presumptions do not always match practices. However, those mismatches cannot be left to democracy completely but instead should be conceived over the effects that damage public opinion. Thus, not democracy per se is to be blamed but to read it over what it could not succeed would be right. Nancy Fraser (2007) offers us a good analysis of two aspects of the public sphere which Habermas used when he explained another transformation of the concept, from the bourgeois public sphere to the liberal model in which he proved the impairment of it. These two aspects, normative legitimacy and political efficacy, would later be the basis for Fraser's objection to the concept's Westphalian frame. First of all, Habermas's notion of the public sphere is limited to the Westphalian frame of the nation-state, yet its emancipatory potential serves as a project in the territorial state. The opinion formation as what the public sphere makes of, therefore, considers only the affairs of the bounded nation-state, as well as those who participate, are the inhabitants accordingly. In this context, it makes more sense when we recall what was said above; the concept's inherent idea is projected through the rationalisation of power. That, to make it clearer, overlaps with the emergence of the modern state as the nationally bounded society and the first sparks of democratic demands which was about to change the political structure of Europe. So, Habermas's model not only anticipates the future from the present (from the study revealed first in 1962) but also is built on the historical conceptualization. Among the political changes and democratic demands of the eighteenth-century bourgeois society in Habermas's historical reading, the public sphere burdens the role of an institutional component. At the core of this institutional component, when considering its function to bring state authority in front of people through rational-critical discussions in bourgeois society, selfgovernment or self-organization creates a solidarity-oriented democratic life (Salvatore et. al 2013). This means the embodiment of public opinion while it mobilizes towards the state as a political force (Fraser 2007). Here, emancipatory potential assumed from a normative perspective both justifies the claiming of private interests and legitimizes political decisionmaking. Such a normative perspective above all originates from the assumption of its openness to everyone by guaranteed free speech and participation (Kellner). It also includes another aspect that determines the forms of this participation in deliberation. This aspect is the regulative principle which functions to order of communication. From this, we reach the second feature of Habermas's idealization. The all-affected principle in which those who take a seat in debates are regulated, so to say participants, presupposes the notion of citizenry since they are fellow members of the society. The fundamental assumption is a unitary public sphere where

citizens in principle gather free from any coercion. The basic comprehension of Habermas is to reach the common good as its version disregards differences. Thus, the success of the argument leaves the individual interests with the aim of respectable opinion to reach the general good (Calhoun 2017). In this line of thought, the theory is approached with a salience vision of an engaged community coming together within the framework of egalitarian dialogical participation (Adut 2012). However, this second principle of Habermas's model, the principle of the participation of all those affected, basically involves a set of values that already belong to bourgeois society. In the baseline of this lies the autonomy of private individuals that are shaped through private property and bourgeois families as those provide the reason required for democracy (Clemens 2010). In the following years, Habermas would read this deterioration of the public sphere in the context of mass participation and the manipulation of the mass media that emerged with the neoliberal order. These first two normative assumptions of the public sphere led us to the third principle of Habermas' model. In the conceptualization of the public sphere, Habermas assumes the national economy as the primary focus of the bourgeois public. Although the emergence of the public sphere in this modern sense, i.e. the bourgeois public sphere, meant that at some point in history the "public reflection of private affairs", which first corresponded to literary life, was given new forms, this act of coming together in terms of creating a public consequence was made possible by the transfer of private economic issues to the public. To have such creation or transfer of private economic considerations to the public required a specific location where the primary focus for everyone would be those economic relations regulated in order to affect the public (Fraser, 2007; 10). Hence, the Westphalian state has been regarded as what Habermas' analysis has been taken as the basis for this transformation possible. It is to say that, where the Westphalian state in its classical model created a public sphere that made discussion and reflection of social problems (and economic relations in this regard) possible has caused another crisis. This is because the bourgeois once became the vanguard of the active participation based on property through the public sphere now internalized it for the sake of its class interests (Hohendahl & Silberman, 1979; 93). The fourth and fifth conceptualisation of the public sphere in Westphalian understanding is linked to each other. While one of them has come forward as what enabled the public sphere to exist territorially, the other one has helped (in fact made it happen) the conducting of it. The communication that is conducted through national press and media in which territorial publicity attributes common themes for those spatially dispersed happened to be a basis for the public sphere. For those now spatially diverse but together on a communicative basis it was only

comprehensible through being linguistically single, otherwise, it would render communication ineffective (Fraser, 2007; 10). This should not be understood as the ideologic position addressing anything to today's problems but should be thought of as a fact that reflects Habermas' key point to understand the transformation of the public sphere. Moreover, as it now does not hold any subjective argument in this chapter, communication and media will be important variables in grasping the transnational public sphere. The last principle in Habermas' theoretical presupposition is the cultural roots of the concept. Although it is seemingly an unimportant one among others, it is where Habermas found the bourgeois identity on the feeling of belonging to the public.

CHAPTER 3
THINKING THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT

3.1 Globalisation and The Public Sphere

After presenting a trace of the emergence of the concept of the public sphere in the historical process and making a normative analysis through Habermas and Arendt, in the third, i.e. this section, we will discuss a newer dimension of the concept. Although the number of people studying and discussing the subject, especially in the academic literature, has increased in recent years; the millennium has opened up a new space for the concept of the public sphere. Again, since the beginning of the 2000s, with globalisation studies gaining weight and penetrating issues outside its own disciplinary field, the public sphere has found a place for itself in comparative society studies. Names such as transnational or post-national public sphere expressed the direction in which the concept was heading with the phenomenon of globalisation that started at the end of the 20th century. Of course, beyond affecting almost all branches of social sciences, globalisation is the result of many developments and historical events that have occurred in the historical process. However, instead of opening a separate parenthesis to the phenomenon of globalisation, my aim here is to discuss the impact of some of the processes that gave the concept its meaning in the public sphere. More accurately, rather than considering this historical process as a single and complete phenomenon, as Giddens (2001) points out, I will approach globalization as the coming together of many complex processes. At this point, we can talk about many different globalizations before creating a basket of meanings that

constitute the concept of globalization. The concept, which generally expressed an economic integration process when it first emerged and was discussed, may have a history that is more distant to us. For example, economists argue that the phenomenon of globalization began in the 1820s as a result of the sudden drop in transportation costs that allowed prices of commodities to converge in Europe, North America and Asia. Historians, on the other hand, state that globalization in its modern sense is a process extending from the Industrial Revolution, which started in the nineteenth century, to the present day; although some say that it is the first example of trading made by hunter-gatherers among themselves (for example, the next village) in the archaic period. The main criterion here is whether integration has increased or not. Therefore, the point highlighted by Chomsky, who deals with integration from this perspective, is important. Although anti-globalization ideas are quite common today, the concept has gained a mythical dimension since the 1990s. Some attributions of value to globalization as the final point reached by the idea of Enlightenment and modernity have blessed globalization in terms of creating universal human and world citizenship. On the other hand, Chomsky mentions that if the concept is defined independently of these values, the resulting international integration may minimize this blessing and natural opposition (2003). While examining whether there is economic integration, he emphasizes that there is less globalization in technical terms by stating that the increase in goods and product prices is not in line with the wages workers receive. It should be emphasized that after the bipolar world order ended as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, capitalism and neoliberal policies began to adopt more pragmatic rationality in public policies and question the function of the state in technical decision-making mechanisms in the globalizing world order. Apart from the question of the existence of economic globalization, the issue that perhaps interests us more in this study is the examination of political and, accordingly, social globalization. Because all economic developments cause certain effects in all other processes and fields such as law, politics and culture. It should be emphasized that these new processes often create instability. It is clear that the new actors that emerge as a result of these processes bring with them some inequalities and contradictions. While these actors and processes cause national borders and international borders to become confused, the role of the state between the private sphere and the public sphere is also brought into question. While similarity and even uniformity at the cultural level become the reality of the globalizing world, identities that were once thought to belong only to the field of sociology are starting to become the essential element of politics. In this sense, identity politics creates an "electoral globalization" that results in the victories of populist parties and leaders all over the

world. Thus, the intricate relationships developing in the triangle of politics, economy and sociology are becoming the reality of the 21st century. While what we understand from globalization in the political sense is that neoliberal policies encourage free market economies and privatizations all over the world, social globalization is the spread of transnational civil society movements. At this point, it is of great importance to place the public sphere on a transnational level. If we accept that the problems are common to everyone in a certain but, in my opinion, a short period of time with the effect of globalization, it would not be wrong to expect the normative values of the public sphere, which we put forward in the second chapter, to become transnational. But we need to ask ourselves this question: do the problems we face globally still have a priority today, independent of some regional problems? Here the question makes no rhetorical sense, and the answer is beyond the normative necessity of these problems. For example, there is no doubt that climate change should be the top priority issue in the world today, but whether this is the case so points to another problem. The inequality created by globalization has caused global problems to remain in the background and nationalisms, which were once thought to have faded into the dusty pages of history, to come to light again.

We have said that the study of the transnationalisation of the concept of the public sphere cannot be separated from the phenomenon of globalisation. Nancy Fraser's academic studies in this field aim to overcome the Westphalian theoretical construct drawn by Habermas and conceptualise the public sphere in a post-Westphalian world (2007). Castells defines the public sphere through the communicative sphere and sees it as a space where social ideas are transferred to decision-makers. He states that global civil society is an organised expression of the values and interests of society, and in this context, its relationship with power constitutes the politics of society through interactions in the public sphere. By doing that he goes beyond only media and handles the public sphere in a global world by “diverse forms of civil society” (Castells, 2008; 79).

Studies analysing the public sphere in the context of the European Union have also increased with the enlargement process in the 2000s and the academic discussion of European integration. Stating that strong publics play an institutional role in providing justification for decision-making in modern democracies, some studies have shifted their focus to the European Parliament and the Charter Convention (Eriksen & Fossum 2002). Numerous studies have also analysed the European public sphere in terms of international communication (Pfetsch & Heft 2015; Kooopmans & Statham 2010). These studies are primarily theoretical endeavours concerned with the primary question of whether a "European public sphere" exists. It can be

argued that the limited capacity of European citizens to influence the legislative process and to hold European institutions accountable in the policy-making process is a problem resulting from the limited development of a European public sphere. Although the legislative process at the supranational level has strengthened over the years, the same cannot be said for citizens' participation in this process. Some studies explain this problem by the lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability (Garavoglia 2011). Even if the supranational mechanism has become more influential in political decision-making processes within the EU over time, especially after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, nation-states are still the dominant actors in the political sphere (Bijsmans & Altides 2007; Koopmans 2007). Consequently, the inconsistency between the EU's growing political competencies and political participation and, more importantly, political deliberation remaining within national borders is a reflection of the democratic and public sphere deficit of the EU today (Gerhards & Hans 2014). Another article written by Van de Steeg discusses the issue from a relatively ignored perspective of the media debates and focuses on a case to answer the question of whether the EU-wide public sphere can exist in spite of different media systems, cultures and languages (Van de Steeg, 2006).

The theories of the public sphere in the European context basically have two approaches, and one another can be counted other than these two. The first one is the general, supranational public sphere theory, which emphasises the necessity of a public sphere above the national level. The basis of this approach is to create a sphere of communication that corresponds to decisionmaking and legitimisation. The idea of a European-wide public sphere assumes a forum between institutions and actors at the European level, addressing transnational audiences around European themes (Neidhardt et al. 2000). This is possible through a mass media organised in a pan-European framework. The second prominent approach in the theory of the European public sphere is shaped around debates centred on the Europeanisation of national public spheres. In this theory, a public sphere in the European context is conceptualised as a gradual and multidimensional process of Europeanisation of communication flows across Europe. As we will see in detail later, researchers following this approach offer an assessment of the intensity of communication within national borders, rather than treating communication as a phenomenon that transcends national borders (as unlike the first approach’s emphasis on the transnational framework). Europeanisation is interpreted as an increase in transnational communication occurring within national publics (Pfetsch & Heft 2015). Apart from these two basic approaches, a third line can be mentioned. The third approach emphasises the content of public debate rather than a communication infrastructure as envisaged by the first approach.

Klaus Eder argues that the European public sphere can be formed regardless of national or transnational spatialities (2000, 176). The basis of this model is the idea that discussing issues of common concern in different countries at the same time will have positive or negative repercussions in European politics (Eder 2000, 177-81). These studies on the European public sphere constitute a different relevance within the functioning of modern democracies. Most studies discuss the public sphere through mass media in terms of reaching citizens with the politics that today's democracies provide (or fail to provide). In the mass democracies of the world we live in today, citizens' relationship and experience with politics, unlike the direct democracy of ancient Greece, highlights mass media in the public sphere (Adam 2015). Gerhard and Hans (2014) argue that the deficit in the public sphere has increased as a result of the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation and look at the issue from the point of transnationalisation of national public spheres. Using data from 27 European countries and comparing Eurobarometer surveys with other factors, especially interest in foreign media and participation in the public sphere of other countries, they argue that participation in a transnational public sphere is a problem of social inequality. In another study, how public participation shapes the debate environment in the European Union is discussed through online media. Eurosceptic arguments and national politics provide a paradigm that forms the outline of this debate environment in the European Union (Michailidou 2015). In a comprehensive analysis of content collected from print, television and online news before and after the Austrian elections to the European Parliament in 2014, Grill and Boomgaarden (2017) examine whether the mass media legitimises EU governmentality through its support, complication and sometimes ignoring of representatives on EU issues.

3.2 European or Europeanised?

In order to make more sense of the literature review and these studies in the first part of this chapter, it would be useful to attempt to find an answer to the question in the title. Nevertheless, the aim of this part of the thesis is not to seek an answer to the question but rather to determine whether the problem of a normative European public sphere or Europeanised public sphere, the discussions of which will be analysed in the next section, makes a practical contribution to the decision-making process. It will be important, then, both to analyse previous studies in more depth and to show what kind of public sphere we can and cannot talk about in the European context today. First, approaches to a monolithic supranational European public sphere will be discussed, and then the idea of the Europeanisation of national public spheres will be evaluated. Regarding both approaches' inherent problems, we find ourselves in a

difficult position to accept or reject one out of two. This inherent problem is related to how different concepts of a public sphere might change in different contexts and what regards a topic as a concern of the public. While years before universal suffrage had no impact on politics, what shocked kings or monarchs was the gatherings in cafes, after elections in the republics or democracies it became the results in the ballots. Then, can we say that electoral right has killed the public sphere and reduced it (or changed it) to a meaningless instrument in any case? Could not one argue that then, in the case of the EU, the parliamentary elections are the common theme (and maybe the only one for a while) for different national public spheres come around? This is why delimiting the public sphere is a tough challenge and an empty effort for one to embark upon.

If we had the means to go back to a not-too-distant time in history, we would be quite surprised to find ourselves in the midst of the debates caused by globalisation. Although today the nationstate and its definitions have returned to the political scene, there was a time when it was written that the nation-state as defined in the textbooks had come to an end. The debates revolved around the fact that globalisation had reduced the nation-state's ability to control the economy and that national policies were insufficient to respond to economic problems. While mass migration necessitated new openings in the definition of citizenship, it was emphasised that basic citizenship rights should be addressed beyond the national imagination. In the midst of these debates, it was clear that democracy also needed a new definition. Because this concept, which was once created for those living in Athens, contains many values that are difficult to realise for those living in Rome or Paris today. In this sense, it would be appropriate to start from the definitions of democracy and try to understand the public sphere on the level of democratic politics in Europe.

3.3 European Democracy

The question of the existence of a European public sphere cannot be separated from the question of democratic deficit in the European Union. In this context, the prevailing thought was that for Europe to be democratic, there was no need for a homogenous European nation, but a common and supranational public sphere. Today, the common argument is that national public spheres need to be more open to the EU and each other (Müller 2016). For many years, studies on European integration have sought to answer the question of what is needed for a democratic polity. These answers have changed over time as a result of the emerging crises.

Therefore, although the main approach today is the Europeanisation of national public spheres, it is not clear whether it can provide legitimacy for decisions taken in the light of major crises. The decline in the quality of democracy, especially since 2008, has for many years rendered legitimacy based on permissive consensus and Pareto-efficient outcomes inadequate (Pausch 2014). Furthermore, two important points should be emphasised. For too long, European politics has become too bureaucratic and remote (Müller 2016). In this sense, it is more difficult to talk about freedom of speech in Europe as a result of the bureaucratisation and distancing of politics from the people, which becomes clearer at points where the political situation excludes society. The process of suppression of freedom of speech, which occurs especially in times of crisis but also under normal conditions for a considerable period of time, remains the most important problem that Europe has to face. If individual thought diverges from popular thought, economic power (which is also the power that dominates popular thought) will asphyxiate this divergent individual thought. Just as in the eighteenth century, the public sphere was restricted to the wealth-based bourgeois society, today's decision-making mechanisms exclude democratic demands, freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, thus confining policymaking to a game among elites. The impression that citizens had control over politics and the market, which may have been true to some extent in the welfare states of the post-war period, has now been completely neutralised. It was clear that freedom of speech and participation had a legitimising role in decision-making processes that claimed to be democratic. Today we are witnessing two crucial things: the explicit rejection of faith in democracy as a result of the depoliticisation of politics, and the impossibility of finding a common good. Until the 2010s, when we witnessed the rise of populism, with the over-bureaucratisation of the European Union and most national states citizens lost faith in the ability to influence decision-making. With the imagining of a common good for both the EU and European states, participation was limited for those who had something to say. Societies remain too diverse to meet common themes if we do not count the negative themes that get around the anti-globalisation paradigm. By overlooking the fundamental difference between pluralism and multiculturalism, the most basic assumptions of the public sphere were invalidated. Polarisation, far from creating a space where ideas can be discussed, increases partisanship and the cohesion of these groups within themselves. Consequently, such polarisation leads to many undemocratic consequences. Efficacy, one of the issues Habermas focuses on more in his book Between Facts and Norms, problematises the law as democratic and undemocratic by defining it as the appropriate tool for transforming communicative power into administrative power. In the democratic circulation of

power, weak publics are able to influence strong publics to control the administrative instruments of the state. On the other hand, the influence of undemocratic power in this process allows private social forces and bureaucratic interests to control legislators and manipulate public opinion**.** If we evaluate whether the theory of the public sphere is valid both as a democratic concept in itself and as a norm for democracy, the issue of which groups are marginalised or which social groups'

interests are promoted by the mode of communication during its functioning becomes

important. Sükösd and Jakubowicz have remarked just at the beginning of their study, for further progress on European integration, and changing this topdown and elite-led process into a bottom-up project, communicative process, media, public opinion, and identity formation must be considered as important issues (2011; 1). Furthermore, they regard the changes in this line as to be achieved structurally and culturally for the functioning of democracy whereas constitutional patriotism has brought a fresh approach recently to democratic deficit. Since European integration did not happen in the way anticipated, which was thought nationalism was going to be transcended, the idea of uniting the people around the ultimate interests of the European Union came to be a mode that has been suggested (Dahlgren 2015; 6). The efforts made to find the reasons for a democratic deficit in the EU point out two different viewpoints that are closely related to each other. Moreover, it can be argued to some extent that those different perspectives are filling the holes which others left untouched. The very same dilemma that this study has burdened to explain on a European public sphere, or Europeanized public spheres becomes a paradox that explains another dimension of democratic deficit. Although the Union has already captured quasi-state qualities in the policymaking process, it is difficult to say that it succeeded in "transforming itself from democracies to democracy". Then, the first of these two different viewpoints that reveal the failure of democracy gathers around the view of structural inadequacy of democratic deficit in which institutional arrangements could not

provide enough parliamentary function. Such a view either stemming from institutional/parliamentary or from a federal/constitutional deficit remains insufficient to understand the socio-psychological side of a broader democratic deficit. This side of the shortfall -then comprises the second view- leans on "the absence of a self-conscious, civicminded and politically active 'transnational *demos*', whose members have developed a sense of 'belonging to' a European 'political community', and via, the central institutions" (Chryssochhoou 1998).

In his minimalist definition, Schumpeter (1962) describes democracy as the "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269). According to him, all conditions besides this definition remain unrelated to labelling a regime as democratic or not. What he raised objections towards a classical definition of democracy can be gathered in three topics. To Schumpeter, in the classical definition of democracy first of all it is never the all people in society to be represented. Age is a decisive barrier to depriving those who are below or above a certain limit. Second, as we just said, unless we are talking about fifth-century Athens, the concept of popular sovereignty does not clearly express the functions of the rulers. Thirdly, the impossibility of formulating the fact that the government represents the will of the people as a general will due to the abundance of beliefs and desires (Schumpeter 1962; 243256). Schumpeter thus excludes factors such as unfair and fraudulent elections, repression of civil rights, or sections of society deprived of the vote. Despite carrying similar definitions to Schumpeter's definition, Robert Dahl has found his consideration for democracy insufficient. Unlike to Schumpeter, Dahl's classification of democratic regime or democraticness of regime must satisfy eight conditions: "1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Right of political leaders to compete for support 5. Eligibility for public office 6. Alternative sources of information 7. Free and fair elections 8. Institutions for making government policies that depend on votes and other expressions of preference" (2006; p. 3). As addressing a different notion than Schumpeter's ideal of democracy which does not assume any political and scientific meaning, Dahl idealized it for measuring the democraticness of a regime (1971; p. 8). While Schumpeter's perception of democracy in this regard refers to nothing but a political method in which competitive leadership is subject to change without respect to any historical conditions, Dahl highlights the decision-making process in which leaders are rendered subject to the preferences of non-leaders (Chryssochoou 1998).

As it is argued by some, the European Union has walked a Schumpeterian line of democracy in which the gap between elites and citizens followed an upward trend (Pausch 2014).

3.4 European Integration

Theories of European integration have undoubtedly been one of the most important topics in EU studies since the late 1950s. Neo-functionalism can be considered the most important among these theories. However, before moving on to the theories underpinning

European integration, it would be easier for us to understand the studies on integration to answer the question of what the European Union means as a concept. Of course, the EU is first and foremost a legally designed entity with its own budget, institutions, staff and representation in the international arena. From this point of view, it may seem surprising to claim that the Union is a structure or concept open to debate. However, what makes the matter more complicated is the question of its conceptual structure and the theoretical framework within which it offers a paradigm. In this context, we can think of European integration as a theory developed between the answers to these questions. Those who think that it is (or should be) a federation and those who read it through a more realistic canon constitute two extreme poles in determining this structural entity of the European Union. The first approach finds its roots in the early campaign for the European Union by those with a federal vision of Europe. Altiero Spinelli –perhaps the most sophisticated champion of this vision- writes in 1941 that the first problem that must be solved is “the final abolition of the division of Europe into sovereign, national states.” Federalists along these lines believe that the EU is still in the process of becoming a federation. According to this vision, the governments of the member states remain very strong, while the supranational power of the EU remains weak. They are therefore not satisfied with the course of European integration to date. The fact that some important competencies have been devolved to the Union nevertheless shows that the old state-centred order has been overcome and that the EU's exercise of competencies at national and regional level, which is appropriate on democratic constitutional grounds, is a "way forward". Follesdal makes the definition of Federalism as “the final authority is divided between sub-units and a centre” by which power and rule are shared (Follesdal). In fact, academic studies influenced by the Federalist perspective argue that the EU is in the process of becoming a substitute for member states and in this sense needs strengthened democratic institutions. It must be underlined that this initial phenomenon of political integration foreseen by federalists has leaned on a strong idealism in which foreign policy after post-war was redefined. Yet again, while Spinelli pays attention to the “inevitable result of the desire to dominate” he directs the lens towards the problems the continent faced at that time. “... definition of the boundaries in areas of mixed populations, protection of rights of ethnic minorities, outlets to the sea for inland countries, Balkan question, the Irish question, etc.” Nevertheless, what aimed in order to establish something akin to a federal union was not implemented in policy formulations of governments except some independent minds’ efforts (Milward 2007). The second theory developed to give answers to the major changes in the political area by holding a realistic view, therefore forming the realist theory (Milward 2007;

Newman 1997). No need to say that the reflection of this theory has been highly influenced by the earlier theorists of political science. The fundamental approach of this theory finds its meaning in the view that states are the foremost actors of international politics and the conflicts are inherently the consequences of the will to seek more power, since these are self-interested and competitive (Morgenthau 1960; Carr 1962). Therefore, to put the European Union onto its position in history is perceived from this perspective, claiming that the EU can function to provide security. Yet realists do not approach the views of federalists as states are still after their own interests. Thus the EU is anything but never a federal entity which in any case should be perceived as making democratisation possible at a supranational level. Federalists' assumptions posit a normative basis for supranational ideals such as calling the democratisation of the EU as a whole, whereas realists regard it as an illusion. Therefore, it can be considered that theories beyond these two edges of the analysis of the EU show some resemblance with both edges and can be located somewhere between them. In this regard, while integration theories bear some ties with Federalism, international relations theories can be said to be rooted in realism (Newman 1997). Federalism stands as the encompassing framework for the European integration theories and so integration theories fall under the stratum of federalism. Therefore, it allows us to categorize integration theories in their linkage with the Federalist vision being neo-functionalism and with realist views that hold intergovernmentalism. Nevertheless, according to some, due to holding different perspectives and following different approaches, the EU does not serve as a unique organization despite being suggested as a complex structure. On framing the directionality of the European integration -even though conceived downer for international relations theory- those who are in this line of thought consider disintegration as a probable outcome of the further integration of the system. Whatever steps are taken for the enduring of the system, greater emphasis is put upon the nation-states. Thus, such a separation of approaches belongs to the understanding of the very nature of the system and helps to define the European Union. When we are to speak of the European Union and the integration theories which explain the past fifty years of changes applied to the EU, first we must acknowledge that we cannot label and treat it as a random international organization (Eriksen and Fossum, 2000; Newman, 1997).

And this different and unique character of the EU is what integration theories focused on so far. Such an entity has different types of interactions between the Member States, long developed and sophisticated institutional structure, to some extent provided supra-nationalism but still a mixture of transnational and intergovernmental structures with it, and the

competencies that are given at the EU level for different policy areas sought to be defined in specific notions as well. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice are classified as supranational, while the European Council and the Council of the European Union address as intergovernmental institutions. Secondly, and in fact, facilitates a more resemblance for the connection with Federalism that integration theories stress a directionality as federalists are the view of assuming the EU integration is still an ongoing process. The complexity of the Union as an entity tried to be described in this regard creates the multiplicity of the studies and theories. Nevertheless, it is quite a desperate effort to find objectivity in European integration studies. Among these theories, neo-functionalism conceives integration in the sense of occurring through functional and political adaptation (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). It remains the most important theory in explaining the integration process because the logic it framed proved to be a permanent paradigmatic change. The beginning of the vocaling of the neofunctional theories on integration process marks the period that nationstates are not the foremost actors in political organizations any longer. Even though it was not grasped as one and unanimous process, some quasi-federal traces of the European Union can be traced back. The academic and theoretical contributions in which integration laid down to the explanation have prioritized the functional side of the integration, and overlooked to the political and constitutional notions of the process (Kühnhardt 2008). Neo-functionalism sees the integration process as polity-building resulting from convergence. It is based on the understanding that actor behaviour, which is basically determined by instrumental interests, is done to meet the requirements of the system. Interests can be said to correspond largely to economic concepts. Although we cannot speak of a clear link between polity-building and convergence processes, they share a collective understanding of common interests in the transition from self-interest maximisation to integration (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Political integration in this context is characterised by a spillover effect. In part, economic, social and political developments and the interaction of actors in these areas make the political integration of these autonomous structures possible. The spillover effect can be explained as a functional interdependence or as the pressure on political actors to redefine their common tasks due to imbalances resulting from the correlations inherent in the tasks (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991). All this is representative of the discourse created by Carl Joachim Friedrich with a new course or paradigm shift in the study of federalism. It is a shift from analyses of federal structures based on authority, power and rule to federal functions and tendencies. In 1954 Friedrich wrote: "We have federalism only if a set of political communities coexist and interact as autonomous entities

united in a common order with an autonomy of its own."[2] These tendencies also find a place in integration theories influenced by a federal perspective, explicitly and especially in functionalism. Because the fact that the founders of the European Union attributed a political character to it actually provides us with clues in the prediction of a federation that will emerge as these structures are built in the process. Just as federalists see integration as something that occurs in the process, neofunctionalist theory envisages a supranational federation that will evolve with the increasing convergence in some key themes. These themes are the deepening debates today, especially on democracy, sovereignty and the new balances that such an exclusive system creates or could create. In his early work, Ernst Haas placed European integration on a theoretical basis, neofunctionalism. Neo-functionalism is based on the assumption that the integration process will move from low-policy co-operation, such as economic policies, to high-policy co-operation, such as foreign and defence policies. Accordingly, policies in the first area are easier to cooperate with because they are more technical and less contentious. A dependence and interdependence in economic and sectoral areas implies functional spillovers. Integration in these areas will affect other areas as well. The political spillover of such a leap indicates how supranational organisations create institutionbuilding. Led by institutions, supranational integration creates a space for the creation of an international community (Caporaso 1998). This process, driven by functional interdependence, is made possible by elites and interest groups pressurising supranational institutional actors in

an integrationist direction. In this sense, diffusion-induced integration requires the strengthening of supranational institutions at the EU level. Only in this way can actors independent of state actors spread in these networks and state power be diffused to these actors. In addition to this, regional integration in 50s and 60s implied jurisdictional reform in which startled and promoted by transnational actors (i.e. interest groups). Supranational organizations demanded by these actors in order to gain economic benefits would deepen the integration process and self-reinforce the will to intervene of these organizations other fields. Those other fields consequently would require the jurisdictional reform as transnational sectoral policies see pressure (Hooghe and

[2] Cited in: https://iletim.istanbul.edu.tr/index.php/2021/02/07/iletisimsel-eylem-kuramiuzerinehabermasdersleri/#_ftn3

Marks 2008). However, there are two points that the neo-functionalist theory overlooks here. The first one is the behavioural patterns to be determined at the point

where this behavioural effect turns into an identity and allegiance. The second is how this transformation can be passed through levels of governance. Whether it is the neo-functional theory of Ernst Haas in the classical sense or the contemporary supranational governmentality or multi-level governmentality approaches, the focus of these theories of integration is on the creation of European political space and the penetration of EU policies at the national and subnational levels (Vink and Graziano 2008). This is because the understanding or attribution of value to identities and loyalties has been of low importance in the process of integration, which is envisaged to spread from the low to the high political sphere. The question of why actors would accept such a diffusion model remains unanswered (Eriksen and Fossum 2000).

The second strand of the integration theories develops within the basic premise of the realist approach. Intergovernmentalism prioritizes power as political action is regarded as a clash of interests and thus politics becomes an area for struggle. What realist theory of international relations has put to understand the co-existence of states applies to the intergovernmentalist theory in which rationalism originates realpolitik. Yet this quite oversimplified picture used in explaining international relations has either overlooked the changes or could not comprehend the role of non-governmental organizations. However, those who read the European Union in this canon carry some realist elements in their baggage. Whereas neo-functionalists give strong importance to defining the very substance of the EU, so it is a unique entity, intergovernmental theory finds this as overemphasized. For sure the EU developed and gained different features more than any other international organization and became more complex than any other of them. However, it is not considered as independent from the conjunctural necessities of the international system. The complex structure of the EU is not *causa sui* but the reflection of a states' tendencies to fulfill the requirements of the international economy. As Milward (1994) highlights the relationship between supranational institutions that were about to be established and nation-states, his view reflects this: "The surrenders of national sovereignty after 1950 were one aspect of the successful reassertation of the nation-state as the basic organizational entity of Europe" (Milward 1994; 438). Again such revisionist accounts held by Milward and his associates read the EU over a design that is "to safeguard the nation-state rather than to transcend it" (Milward 1993 cited in Newman 1997). Recalling the words of Inis Levy Claude would be for the sake of better explanation of such

view. According to Claude, rather than seeing it as legitimate successor to sovereign states, international organisation should be seen as the statesmen's search for new arrangements to adapt their affairs to altered conditions and pursue their interests in this changing system (Claude). Another differentiation happens on the predictions over the future of the integration. Here, intergovernmentalists take the possibility of disintegration into consideration and pay less attention the ultimate destination of the EU. While this has been a debated case also for the neofunctionalists especially from 60s to 80s, when the process of integration came to be uneven and jagged and not smooth as it was expected, direction of the integration has been pronounced with the set-backs but still considered as a journey (Shonfield 1972). Therefore, such an attitude towards the integration process, absent from assumption of stable destination and from a belief in supranational actors, regards economic interdependence through "negotiated policy coordination" (Moravcsik 1993). Nonetheless, despite being extracted from the realist theory of international relations, intergovernmentalism flows out different reflections when it is rendered to subject of the EU framing. This framing of regarding the EU not a unique entity but still recognizing it as a different organisation than others, and moreover the efforts of finding a comprehensive perspective to proliferation of international organisations, new approaches have been incorporated. As this theory did not imagine any presuppositions for the structural entity of the EU, it should be always borne on mind that it was functional one corresponding to political developments of the mid-1960s. In this regard, we need to underline that both theories –if we are to picture the integration process in a broader sense- neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have been soared from a joint theory that shaped the way of thinking about political situation after the war. This theory is functionalism assumed to provide jurisdictional reform for the collision between "the territorial scale of human problems and of policitical authority" (Hooghe and Marks 2008; p. 3). It had strong relation with the altered conditions of the European integration which was until that time analyzed over the neofunctional assumption. Since neo-functionalism remained inadequate in giving answers to structure of the integration process because of the obvious reasons listed above, it could not have a coherent knowledge. Moreover, when Ernst Haas (1975) explained what theory was lacking as dependent variable, intergovernmentalism was offering convincing arguments. Nevertheless, for creating a theory that could make sense in the European context required better explanatory tools than just leaning on the realism of international theory. While rational instrumentalism of realism continued to feed the basic assumptions of intergovernmentalism, controversies over the determining what sort of an entity the EU was have paved the way for

"liberal intergovernmentalism" (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Andrew Moravcsik became influential figure on labelling the term such and directed further studies in this line of recognition. *The Choice for Europe* was highly essential work on drawing a frame for the European Community in which acknowledging the fact that it could not be considered through mere intergovernmental arrangements as national sovereignty had already been passed to European level (Kühnhardt 2008). Nevertheless, Moravcsik's argument has seen such a shift of decision-making powers to European institutions within the preferences and choices of sovereign governments where they could extract economic gains through (Vink and Graziano 2008; Kühnhard 2008). Moravcsik's conceptualization belongs to the same family lineages with abovementioned theorists of the intergovernmentalism who explain the regional integration from the nation-state paradigm. Stanley Hoffmann relates the illness of European integration to the competition pursued by leaders or Alan Milward draws a picture that he analyses integration as an exchange between economic modernity and social welfare by which citizens accepted the former in return for the latter. Moravcsik, on the other hand, reads the integration process from the institutionalist side of the intergovernmental coordination which he links it to the government preference theory of liberal approach (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Hoffmann conceived the integration process as incapable to manage state relations and directed a firm critique to neo-functionalism because he regarded it as apolitical. He writes in 1966 as following;

> *"The model of functional integration, a substitute for the kind of instant federation which governments had not been prepared to accept, shows its origins in important respects. One, it is essentially an administrative model, which relies on bureaucratic expertise for the promotion of a policy defined by the policy authorities, and for the definition of a policy that political decision-makers are technically incapable of shaping."* (Hoffmann 1966; p. 887).

In this context, treaties and agreements have expressed more meaning for intergovernmentalism.

If we sum up the process of integration and the theories developed throughout this process we can mention two subsequential stages: first, it all started with the reasoning and practicing on the shift of balance of power. The diffuse of power from decentralized to supranational polity by which the capacity of the self-regulating institutions were subject to debate; and second stage saw the spread of European institutional order in the

various sectors. While for the first wave it can be said that integration has been perceived in the borders of international relations, the second stage which emerged after 1980s, the weight on member states shifted to a structure that operationalized from Brussels by which laws and decisions are promoted and implemented by the EC. During the first wave of integration, the EU has been subjected to the efforts of national executives and ministers where the utmost aim was to coordinate in a decentralized balance of power system only with partial supranationalism. However, as this "integrationist" process had been passed by the 1980s EU has started to be analyzed from the perspective of domestic systems (Hix 1994). Thus, this second stage refers to institutionalization of Europe in which role of the member states has been downplayed and Brussels has embarked upon more and more decisions free from the initiatives or pushing from member states (Caporaso 2008).

CHAPTER 4

DISTINCTION BETWEEN *PLACE* AND *SPACE*

4.1 Methodology

This study brings up a new perspective to the works of the European public sphere by conceptualizing it through the *public place* and *public space*. *Public place* refers to the sociological category in which EU institutions, bureaucratic apparatus and elite politicians form the stable contextual dimension of such a sphere. On the other hand, *public space* addresses to a more transformative field which Europe-wide politics, social movements, transnational media and identities constitute more rapid changing structures compared to the former one. Based on this approach, this study aims to grasp the democraticness of the decision-making process from the impact of the *space* over the *place*, through the effect of the social movements in selected case studies over those actors and structures constituting the *place* is measured to find out whether they lead to a more democratic decision-making process. More precisely, when public discourse is defined as "the primary medium for the development of public knowledge, values, interpretations and self-understandings", and in the case of the absence of a common language or tool to generate such a public discourse in the EU; social movements can be attributed to great importance for fulfilling this gap. In other words, social movements facilitate common ground for European citizens in which they can reveal and reflect the most basic assumptions of the public sphere in its relationship with democracy. Those assumptions of the public sphere which constitutes the backbone for democracy serve in two ways: its informative function provided through the public debates makes the political process more transparent, and its

discursive function where the place for ideas and opinions to exchange is established (Peters, 2005). Therefore, social movements must be regarded as a stakeholder in European politics for their function to make issues transparent and to make those issues spoken transnational (ideally). While most of the studies about the European public sphere read the existence of the European public sphere through media studies (i.e. transnationalization of the media channels), this research perceives the public sphere as a playground where social movements' impact is calculable. In doing so, for the sake of the length of the study, its effect is observed only in one policy field, foreign policy. This holds for some reasons which make this choice plausible, nevertheless, it seems as the most distinct policy field a state executes. First of all, foreign policy is handled here including the enlargement and security policies as well as trade agreements affecting the EU citizens. Therefore, it consists of the issues that we expect to address the largest demography of the EU. The second reason emerges from its predominantly negative account of being a playfield for elite-level politics where citizens' concerns do not bear a strong driving force theoretically. Thirdly, as it is related to the previous supposition, foreign policy is the least expected policy field to be democratic in terms of accountability, hence withstanding the previous reason again they draw a backline for further studies. Simply put, if hypothetically we observe an impact of the Europeanized public sphere over the democraticness of the decisionmaking process in foreign policy, we can assume that other policy fields also will provide the same validation. Another, so fourth reason that puts foreign policy at its centre is that it is a more changing and challenging field while other policy areas such as agriculture are more stable. Moreover, we can find that ideologies and identities are now more apparent in international topics as regional conflicts have gained speed. The last but not the least reason is its relatively less interest-free and more ideal-wishing feature in which those participants of the movements are not driven by the economic interests for the speaking of the first two fields (enlargement and security) but more driven by their future ideals or doubts. Beyond all these reasons, foreign policy is the most important area for the EU to shape its "we" perception as the collective entity which has a lot to say in world politics. All those sub-policy fields are conducted with the "we" ideal of the decision-makers, and as the name says, those are mostly the fields where decisions are taken rather than policies are made.

However, it should be noted that we must separate Europeanization from Westernization or globalization in a broader sense to better understand the impact of Europeanization only, so helps us to focus on the "we" perception closer. Furthermore, by relying on the historical and philosophical analysis of the public sphere in the first chapter, this study holds a strong

normative side in which the politicization of European governance is a precondition for the emergence of the European public sphere. It leans on the view that perceives the public sphere through its creation of political action (see Arendt) and historical mission against the state (see Habermas), foreign policy realizes within the borders of the closest area for polities to transform into politics. Regarding the analysis of the social movements, we should be cautious in their categorization as well. Firstly, for the consistency of the study, we need to clarify that the primary concern of the public debates that trigger the social movements must be Europeanwide rather than national politics. Secondly, we need to narrow down the cases in reference to their simultaneity to find out communicative interaction across national borders. While the first category refers to vertical observation, the second one serves to horizontal. Thus, the main difference this study brings up is the decreasing intensity of media and increasing importance of social movements when the public sphere is debated. With not overlooking at the media analysis, social movements offer both direct action for politicization of European politics and also the channel (like media) where discourse analysis is possible.

The European public sphere has been considered through the understanding that corresponds to the communication when and where citizens become a part of the rational and deliberative discussion. This sort of arena is found in the issues of societal importance is deemed (Jankowski and van Os, 2004). The studies on the existence of the European public sphere are shaped mainly through the common acknowledgement pointing out the lack of such a public sphere because of the absence of "common language, common European-wide media, and a consensus concerning the European project" (Risse, 2010). The literature consists of the many different approaches to the European public sphere while some main arguments can be taken away as holding a relative weight. Despite having different considerations and approaches, the debate on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union holds a great portion among the factors that drive scholars to think about the existence of the public sphere in the EU. The growing gap between the EU institutions and the citizens caused many scholars to divert their attention to what has come to be called today as "democratic deficit". While some scholars focus on the low level of turnout in the elections of European Parliament which is also far from a competitive environment (Marsh and Mihkhaylov, 2010), some others find the reason in the lack of transparency of the decision-making process. Some critiques approach this problem from the perspective of deliberation. According to those, the reason for such a problem originates because the public understanding remains in low level and the salience of most European issues is not strong enough (Eriksen and Fossum, 2000; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger,

2007). For those who hold an account for deliberative democracy, the reason-based collective will formation is what is missing and causes the democratic deficit (Habermas, 2009; Offe, 2011). They consider the will of the people a prerequisite to the effective functioning of democracy as people gain a meaningful way of thinking about what should be done (Fishkin et. al. 2014). Significant attention to the public sphere started to be given in the middle of the 1990s as European integration began to find itself a growing portion of scholarly debates (Nitoiu, 2013). By having quite affirmative perspective, the relationship of the notion of the public sphere with democracy has gained weight for the future of democracies in Europe. While it has been ascribed to what democracy must bear, the European public sphere has been perceived with a great tendency of seeing it as make the decision-making process more transparent and accountable. The presumption in its centre was that such a unified European public sphere would reveal the potential for citizens to make their voices heard by the decisionmakers through inclusive and equal public debates fostered. With respect to this assumption not only democracy would pass over the national borders but also it helps to establish the collective identity of the EU which has been struggling to form for a long time (Nitoiu, 2013). The studies that combine the democratic deficit of the EU as an actor of policy-making and political legitimacy as a political system meet on the communicative theory which the exchange of ideas and information across national borders and across citizens is given primary consideration. Political communication has been seen as the way for those overlapping crises of the EU to be overcome (Mazzoleni, 2010). Creating this sort of political communication shaped through the rational debate between citizens thus requires the existence of the European public sphere. Having extracted from the broader normative features of the public sphere, mass media is conceived to provide a channel. The public spheres in democracies are burdened with the function to build a bridge between citizens and politics which makes "elites' decisions and citizens' concerns transparent" (Silke, 2015; 1). Some studies in this context examine the development of information and communication technologies on whether digital media has contributed to the proliferation of public spheres and suggest that they may pave the way for more inclusive and deliberative political participation (Zúñiga, 2015). Certain studies turned their lens to more ontological inquiry to find the relationship between communicative space and collective identity in the EU (Eriksen, 2005). What these studies predominantly embarked upon and aimed to show gave excessive importance to communication through the media and often ignored the "political" side of it. Moreover, these communication and media studies most of the time failed to grasp power relations or skipped deeper analyses that would present the hegemony of the

states and elites over those channels. Transnationalization of the public spheres through the convergence of national media discourse has been prioritized in analyzing the European Public Sphere while relevant actors have most of the time been put in the background or missed (Nitoiu, 2013). As it is acknowledged by some, the communicative process must not only be understood as the discourse moving across national borders but also through the canon of creating "meaning structures" like social, political or cultural (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007; 10). Therefore, by offering a substitution for the prevailing approach to the European Public Sphere, I apply a theoretical framework in which social movements' capacity and capability to create a European public sphere will be discussed and based on the normative assumptions of the concept of the public sphere attained their (social movements) impact in affecting the decision-making process will be reflected.

Studies on the European Public Sphere (EPS) have emerged as a result of one broader development that has left European integration as an unfinished process. Globalization has brought economic interdependence and denationalization of capitalist production relations as it gave rise to market conditions to organize social life. The administrative power of the nation states over the economy at first but in other areas too has gradually decreased as the democratic premise of affecting the policy-making process became vague and lost its persuasiveness. The European Union has not been a marginal example of this transition and failed to realize what it offered when founded as a political entity. The popular sovereignty and legitimacy beyond the nation-states that were imagined to be formed in democratic principles fell behind due to institutional heaviness and the bureaucratization of the policymaking in which people saw no practical ground for reaching democratic aspirations. Despite all the efforts made to overcome these deficits by the EU governance, the inability to encompass a supranational dimension in the EU polity caused citizens not to prioritize European-level policymaking at heart. While for Eurosceptics a European government which is formed through constitutional polity is just a dream, federalists are just highlighting the inadequacy of the instruments created so far in this way (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007). Such an inadequacy in the democratic development of the Union has brought many questions with it, among them the public sphere became increasingly relevant for the normative assumptions it carries have been seen addressing the deficits. Once hoped ideal of transcending nationalism in Europe with the less cultural suggestions of constitutional patriotism seems failed (Dahlgren, 2015). Let alone be reached such a European-wide democratic designation, people of the old continent lost their belief to democracy itself. At this point, the public sphere has provided the vision to function democratic

mechanisms in Europe through the entitled to speak and participate, questioning and confirmation, and mobilizing the political support possible to flourish. Based on the classical liberal definition of the concept, Curran describes it as "the space between government and society, in which private individuals exercise formal (election of governments) and informal (pressure of public opinion) control over the state" (Curran, 1993; 36). It differs from Habermas' framing it as a political sphere in which citizens take positions for the relevantly same topics at the same time (1998). Departing from this difference, the conceptualizations of the European Public Sphere can be categorized under the two strands. The first theory departs from the requirement of the communicative space that has a shared identity and media as framed with a common language, thus holding a vision for a pan-European public sphere (Brodowska, 2020). The second approach draws a more realistic assumption and reads the European Public Sphere over the "Europeanized public spheres" where national public spheres follow the horizontal and vertical process of Europeanization (Koopmans and Statham, 2010). The first one supposes the existence of a single public sphere that needs to be built on a dynamic process where public debates can bring legitimacy to the EU (Zielonka, 2006). Such a supranational public sphere takes EU-level institutions and actors into its centre in which European themes are interacted among (Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). The second group, on the other hand, points out to the Europeanization of national public spheres where communicative linkages between those spheres covering the European topics are observed and reflected. Following what Habermas put forward, Eder and Kantner emphasize the visibility of such a sphere(s) "when the same (European) themes are discussed at the same time with the same criteria of relevance" (2000; 315). Regarding these conceptualizations, the emergence or the existence of the European Public Sphere at all have been controversial for being projected as giving a certain answer. As Valentini and Nesti clearly remark the complex nature of the EU can be better understood through multiple networks of communicative spaces (Valentini and Nesti, 2010; 4). By considering this very nature of the EU, studies began to focus on another notion called "public sphere light" which refers to the transnationalization of the national public spheres and consequently of the seemingly impossible existence of a monolithic European public sphere (de Vreese, 2007). Therefore, further conceptualizations of the EPS have regarded several aspects of aspects of Europeanization in terms of the communication process. The most recent concern of these studies gathered in the historical plate of the communication process covers the parallel developments with European integration. It should be noted that historical debates on the public sphere can be taken back to the point when communication networks were formed in the Middle

Ages but here it deems more recent analyses of the view. According to this view, such a communication process has been regarded as a basket of interactions and negotiations among society and individuals in which polities are rendered subject to the common discussions of common interests (Doria, 2020; Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007). Another line of studies is anchored in a structural viewpoint where the public sphere's institutional aspect has been highlighted. To this view, public opinion develops in the public space where equal and free access is provided and inherent to the concept. This is the idealization of an inclusive space where citizens' participation is encouraged by institutional structures and in this way would make them have a say in the decision-making process. It also plays a crucial role in transcending the domestic discourse as a result of discursive exchange by which foreign arguments construct a reference point for incorporating into other public spheres (Bruggemann et al. 2006). However, this presumption of the exchange of opinions bears the risk of remaining limited since they may be confined to the national interests (Russ-Moh, 2019) and the risk of domestication of arguments as languages form a different view (Schlesinger, 1995). On the other hand, the common ground of all the studies regarding the European public sphere on their account is the process that foresees the Europeanization of the communication networks towards transcending the national borders, public sphere has come to be used as a synonym for the media systems. As Marianne van de Steeg clearly puts it in her early study, the European public sphere has been found in the pan-European media systems which can form a single European agenda through newspapers and programs made available to a European-wide audience (van de Steeg, 2002). Although such a view can be considered as giving weight to the media system, we cannot reject its importance in constructing and spreading the values and interests of the European Union. Public perception is largely shaped through the delivery of information across nation states which otherwise would be limited to national borders. Nevertheless, when the impact of the communication flows across national borders in the EU is evaluated, one important point is forgotten to be touched upon. Communication networks do not construct a European identity per se but only help to form those underlying themes that would drive people to consider their Europeanness. As the Eurobarometer shows, to identify with being European has the lowest ratio in younger people with only fifty-four per cent.[3]

[3] https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC126943

If communication and media systems remain unable to build the capacity to create a European Public Sphere, what else could be considered? The answer to this question also reveals the theoretical attempt to bridge the main normative features of the public sphere theory to the contemporary debates on the European Union. In this respect, this chapter will present case studies and empirical findings as well as explain the theoretical basis for this conceptual study originates.

4.2 European Public Sphere

Albeit writing on the same topic, Habermas and Arendt show main differences in their approach. As analyzed in the second chapter, we do not find similar concepts in the lexicons by which they approach. However, the later works that take the public sphere into their centres have been far from reflecting the fundamental feature of it, which was the reason for the concept to emerge. This is, however, for most of the studies concerned with the perspective of democracy, what was missing in earlier studies, is the location of that public sphere occupies. Democracy was almost all the time found immanent in these public spheres which were tried to be created in Europe, and parallel to this, the process that makes democracy flourish was always overlooked. It was assumed that the public sphere inevitably leads to democracy which is highly embedded in the state theory. Thus, according to these studies based on the democratic theory, the public sphere is read over the communication networks that are supposed to set such a supranational organization (the EU) democratic. Therefore, it followed the same theoretical approach of democratic theory which is framed within the nation-states, and when searching for "a European Public Sphere", it was merely analyzed through EU institutions' allowance to the public sphere for citizens. If, on account of these studies, communication networks are built European-wide where citizens can be informed, criticize and speak between themselves in broader terms, then the public sphere can provide legitimacy for the EU and democracy for decision-makers. This approach excludes the process that is possible "in the public sphere" but not merely "through the public sphere". It was measured over the state's distance from the public sphere which was perceived as the only possible where and when citizens are subjected to free and equal public debates. It is grasped as if in the post-industrial societies of today, it would be possible to imagine the public sphere free from state intervention. Withstanding, the question of "being free from whom" was always ignored. To say it by the Foucauldian term, the *dispositif* nature of power relations on communication networks is not paid attention. Today, when we speak of a media tool that can give birth to a European Public Sphere, how can we be sure that it is free from the information structure which has been constructed by hegemony?

When conglomerate media companies are too big to give up their interests, how can one assume that they can help deliberative democracy to emerge? Even though it is accepted as true that they are helping in opinion formation, how can we say that this process is healthy and not leading to pragmatist behaviours in the public sphere? Moreover, communication networks do not provide what is needed for the continuation of the public sphere since cultural life has transformed into a consumption-based life in which the reproduction of any sort of activity is circumscribed. Concerning media networks, newspapers or television channels did not fall behind this transformation. Although perceiving them as key actors in opinion formation would not be wrong reading, such a consumerist media cannot overcome the polarised themes which only feed and amplify the identities of the citizens that are already held. These channels are far from being reflexive in which people intersubjectively meet on the common ground of the bare minimum action of "thinking on thinking" with the words of Arendt. Instead, media organs have become reflective channels where echo chambers do not let different opinions converge, and even to diverge. Even if European citizens become able to speak the same words in the same dictionary and alphabet one day, they would not be speaking the same "language". Moreover, these themes usually address low-key politics which most citizens do not find them having importance, or when they have, these themes are supported or rejected within strictly drawn borders of bureaucracy. The making of public policy as well as the choice of the leaders for certain seats are not realised in a political competition while decisions taken come out barely as a result of political participation (Hurrelmann, 2014). Not to see it in the bigger picture as it resulted in the break-off from the welfare state coming with the notorious saying of Margaret Thatcher, *there is no alternative*, would be a mistake. However, a special focus must be diverted to the bureaucratisation of the public sphere. This does not mean that the EU consists of a large bureaucratic system, the exact opposite it has a relatively small bureaucracy when compared to member states. What then produces the problem? As the EU's lack of competence per se precludes it from implementing its own legitimacy, it prefers to expand its administrative structure to reach citizens closer. Nevertheless, while the former reality stands as an obstacle to forming a sense of belonging among citizens, the latter shows a reverse effect on citizens' impact on decision-making. This holds different views from the perspective of the democratic ideal in which it is argued that the effect of the public sphere on the decision-making process in EU polity is inadequate due to either the absence of European-wide media (absolute view) or relatively imbalanced among member states and between member states and EU governance (relative view) (Beus, 2010; ed. Koopmans and Statham).

As the European Public Sphere has been debated over the challenges of creating European-wide mass media or diverting the attention of national ones to the EU issues, a deeper context has often been overlooked. The collective identity of Europe exists in this context in a quite close relationship with democratic development. However, when assessed through the media systems only, this side of the public sphere tends to be missed expectedly. Even if a European-wide media as normatively put by Habermas were to emerge, it cannot be ignored that "the media system has become more and more commercialized, fragmented, and elitist" (Della Porta, 2022; 53). On the other side, as Hallin and Mancini (2004) stress, in an effort to direct national media systems' attention to European themes, it should not be forgotten that not only territorially but also ideologically those systems are fragmented across member states (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Beyond that, the trend of the return of identities (ethnical, gender etc.) at the national level whereas belonging to Europeanness conversely shows a decline makes the emergence of the pan-European public sphere more difficult and leads to several public spheres. In this regard, the inadequacy of media systems in creating public discourse towards the decision-making mechanisms of the EU institutions must be filled by another process, that is, as this study claims, social movements. With respect to another aspect of the public sphere, social movements provide what communication and media networks lack in imagining the European Public Sphere. This aspect refers to political participation and inclusion which the notion of the public sphere consists of. Thus, by differentiating from the other notions of accountability and political legitimacy that have been focused on by the media studies so far, social movements open new democratic perspectives. Moreover, at the end of a process where focusing on communication and media contributes limited to comprehending the collective identities, social movements offer new viewpoints. That is to say, communication studies once developed hand in hand with globalisation and relative transnationalization in Europe have been reified in a frame of wishful thinking in which media was believed to ensure the public discourse that consequently would facilitate a European public sphere. What actually happened was that the media was unable to form opinions, but rather elitist and bureaucratic decision-making process has been rendered subject to the lobbying strategies in which media per se has been the playfield.

4.3 The Impact of the Public Sphere on Decision-Making: Theoretical Approach

Departing from this gap immanent to the European Union, this study develops on the basis of understanding the impact of social movements on the decision-making process in the

EU. What makes this study different from the previous works is its apprehension of the relationship between the public sphere and democracy beyond mere accountability and political legitimacy which those taken for granted in diagnosing the deficit of the EU. However, diagnosing other democratic challenges the EU faces brings other inherent features of the public sphere to light and helps us to expand the fields of solutions for the EU's deficits. Here, bureaucratization and depoliticization of the decision-making process in the EU institutions are prioritized and in this context effect of the social movements realized in the public sphere is ascertained.

Theory is built on the difference between *place* and *space*, the concepts seem to refer to the same meaning at first glance. The distinction posited by Michel de Certeau offers us a new canon for conceiving how social movements affect decision-making. Thus, such a theory adaptation broadens the concept of public sphere theory which has been grasped normatively and often been overlooked to advert. It, moreover, opens up a new window for challenging the prevailing democratic theory which, in the words of Mouffe, holds a "post-political vision" (Mouffe, 2005). Democracy was taken for granted in studies of the public sphere theory in which the public sphere was perceived as a conditional of democracy. In doing so, the common view was to frame democracy within the borders of globalisation in which the presumption was held mainly in the collective identities' weakening. Albeit globalisation in fact brought such a change in collective identities, this has been reflected in a progressive camp of democracy through eliminating the political. This camp, according to Mouffe, understood democracy in consensual form by excluding the antagonistic scope which constitutes the political (Mouffe, 2005). Again, Mouffe remarks that the liberal rationalist view of democracy has considered those collective identities leaning on we/they discrimination disappeared through individualism and rational progress by which thus consensus was preferred to the confrontation on a democratic basis. However, what happened was the rejection of the political by reducing it to the moral ground of good versus evil, and instead of providing the conditions for the reconciliation of society it only amplified the antagonistic potential (ibid). The same liberal outlook in democratic theory held an anchor for public sphere theories as well. Perceiving it as a sphere for differences to transform into similarities made agonistic structures change towards antagonisms. Whereas the agonistic public sphere concerns the positive aspects of conflicts that confrontations have political features, the antagonistic public sphere consists of active hostility and moral reduction where the collective form of identities is negated, and thus depoliticised. Richard Sennett does a similar reading via urban life through the segregation of daily

confrontations deliberately and rationally planned by urbanists. According to him, the homogenisation of urban areas halts the emergence of conflicts where people lose their capability to confront others in an agonistic way. These segregated zones free from the mixed structure of diversity cause the ultimate explosion of violence since abandoning otherness in public space through "rational divisions". Thus, instead of solving the issues in an adult manner, without the opportunity to express antagonisms, it leads the violence (Sennett, 1970). Therefore, the notion of the public sphere that is normatively assumed by Habermas should be connected to Arendt's political action where individuals can be democratic actors in the democratic public sphere.

4.4 Social Movements as a Political Sphere

As many scholarly works indicate in the literature, the normative implications of the public sphere foreseeing the public debate in which equal interlocutors participate mostly have been made around the mass media. It has been considered the main tool for theoretical focus for understanding democratic legitimacy and transnationalization of the EU governance (Gerhards, 2001; Statham and Trenz, 2013). On the other hand, some other scholars have given credit for social movements and protests in which public communication and debates take place (Bourne, 2017). Tarrow describes social movements as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow, 2011 [1994]; p. 9. Italics in original). According to him, what gives social movements a feature of having a collective challenge is "action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes" (ibid. p. 9). In this regard, social movements should be conceived in the public space regarding two comprehensions they are attributed: first, they are "arenas" as venues for rational deliberations that allow togetherness of plural and different publics; and second, they are "actors" as carriers of the discourses to deliver them to the other arenas (Bourne, 2017). According to Fraser, as arenas, they create counter-publics for those who are excluded and provide circulation of the 'identities, interests, and needs' (1992, p.123). In this way, social movements form solidarity which consequently leads to the rise of European identity among citizens. Regarding their role as actors, despite not being a strong public that possesses an institutional structure (i.e. parliaments) and so not the direct part of the decisionmaking process, social movements can be seen as a door for activist citizenship in which through political struggle they influence strong publics (Balibar, 2004). Thus, such a new democratic practice comes out as a result of the citizenship gained in the process of raising voices for justice. Social movements in this regard are important to transform those who

participate in protests, meetings, etc. into citizens as they reflect identity within themselves and then take the role in the transformation of public spheres (Della Porta, 2013). These subaltern counter-publics by the term of Nancy Fraser contribute to the will formation since they are formed as actors in the "weak publics" and are formed at the point of political opportunities leading them to be effective in politics (Fraser, 1992; 134). In contrast to strong public spheres where discourses show unifying deliberative efforts in collective will formation where supranational institutions are expected to establish channels for "politicisation" of the governance such as the European Parliament (Eriksen, 2007; 32; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012), social movements were approached from the perspective of bottom-up political contestation in which public sphere stems from reflexive collective will formation that people deliberate about the public concern as equal peers (Eder, 2007). The self-reflection and reflexivity that social movements enable to flourish within are realised in the roles of arena and actor social movements deem. As arenas, they provide a venue for discursive exchange for an individual not only for joining the public debate in a manner of argumentation evolved around interests but also for forming self-identity. What comes after this reflexive process which social movements provide as arenas, individuals in these movements are loaded with an identity that views social movements as potentially affecting actors for broader universality and develops another aspect of the public sphere which constitutes a normative horizon for supranational identity. Thus, like Arendt's analysis that finds the conditions for political action to be begotten in the public sphere, social movements as an arena give birth to public discourse that can provide communication flows as an actor.

On the ground of these two features of social movements remarked on by the abovementioned scholars and studies, I deem it more concrete to adopt the bifurcation of *arena* and *actor* to *place* and *space* distinction. Social movements are in the *public space* and are the cumulative results of daily critiques directed at the elites in the *public place*. This means that social movements are fed politically where political action is used to utilise public space for creating change in public places. To simplify what it refers to, another example can be given as political parties. Political parties also take part in the public space but still differ from social movements since they are eventually confined to in-party politics where elites drive cadres in line with their confidential agendas. Also, despite joining parties being formally free, as Weber foresees as a requirement of the modern world, they transform into a bureaucratic mechanism where expertise is the inevitable result of the mass democracies, thus casting a shadow over the political parties. Conversely, social movements are formed so far from this bureaucratization

process of the modern age, and as we witness in many of the new social movements of the millennium, they are even leaderless. Therefore, social movements can be likened to avantgarde exhibitions where "participation is encouraged to form a model that spectators perform the agency that they ideally would display after leaving the exhibition" (Tymkiw, 2018). The actor role of the social movements thus is created by individuals' agency to construct a collective identity. With respect to affecting the decision-making process, as Statham and Trenz underlined, social movements can be regarded as stakeholders as they evaluate and monitor the EU polity by mobilizing the public claims as actors in a transnational scope where public debates are directed towards EU institutions at the end of this intensified communication process among other collective actors (2015; 293). The diagram below shows how participation in social movements develops in the public sphere and leads to the emergence of public discourse that further affects the decision-making process.



Figure 1: The Process of the Public Discourse

CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ACROSS EUROPE

5.1 Protests Against Immigration Policies

In September 2023, the residents of Lampedusa, the small island at the most south of the boot, went out to the streets to show their rage against the plan to build new camps for hosting the migrants mostly fleeing from Tunisia. In an interview that a protestor gave to Reuters, despite being far from even a national scope regarding its organization, we can observe how those participants in protests had a clear addressee. The protester said to the journalist "Lampedusa says stop! We don't want tent camps. This message is for Europe and for the Italian government. Lampedusa residents are tired".[4]

Other protests held around the migrant crisis in the capitals of Poland and Czechia were against welcoming the refugees and migrants and evolved around the strong theme against Islam in those countries. Organized by radical right-wingers, these protests show more national features and barely direct any claim against the EU. In Prague, for instance, on banners, it was read "I do not want refugees and Islam in Czech Republic".[5]

On the other hand, we observe that in pro-migrant protests the EU is taken as a more direct addressee of the critique. In Stockholm, protestors who demonstrated to ask for better support for refugees were pushing the EU to do more since they considered the EU responsible for the crisis in Syria with their country, Sweden. Thus, remarking on how protests differ from each other would be complementary to understanding the argument this study makes. Protests regarding the immigration policy of the EU form the common themes for the citizens of the member states in which the visibility and relevance -by Risse's (2010) framing- provide the transnationalization of the public spheres. Common European problems are debated across borders as the squares in the cities are marched not only as a form but also as a substance. This means that counter-public spaces in these cases reflect strong horizontal communication where contentious politics and conflicting discourses have the capacity to develop transnational connections. This is best reflected in the protests in Amsterdam in 2023 organised by MiGreat,

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/newborn-baby-found-dead-migrant-boat-off-italys-lampedusa-ansa-2023-0916/

[5] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34235673

a movement-based campaign organization. The activists gathered in Dam Square to protest against the EU's migration policies in which they aimed to change "narratives around migration across Europe"[6] and to stress that refuge is a human right. On its website, MiGreat defines its vision "as a world where migration is not deterred but facilitated" on the basis of a bigger understanding of the power structures over the imbalance between the global South and the global North. In this line, they also support and work with other organisations across the EU borders.[7]

5.2 Farmer Protests in Europe

In April of 2023, Polish Agriculture Minister Henryk Kowalczyk resigned amidst the protests organised by farmers who were affected by the inflows of grain imports from Ukraine. The tariff-free imports of the Ukrainian produce were at the centre of the decision of the minister. He stated that "farmers' basic demand will not be met by the European Commission" which the curb of agricultural imports from Ukraine was amplified with the Green Deal that prohibits some practices of farming to protect the environment.[7] However, the protests started by 2024 escalated with road blockages which trade unions led with other far-right political alliances such as confederations and parties. However, Polish farmers were not the only ones who protested against the agricultural policies of the Union.

French farmers, not surprisingly, held nationwide protests against the proposed trade deal by the European Commission, Mercosur. They were angry due environmental policies of the EU but more importantly the globalisation of the market. Led by the second biggest farmers' union in the country, Rural Coordination, the protests were even joined by those who are not unionised.[4] A strong account has evolved around the impacts of the globalised market on local markets while it would cause prices to lower and imperil local farmers concerning social and environmental aspects. With Paris, Berlin as well has been the stage for the protests where the European Parliament was the addressee of protestors.[8]

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[6] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/hundreds-gather-in-amsterdam-to-protest-against-eu-migrantpolicies/2925559

[7] https://migreat.org/en/about-us

[7] https://www.politico.eu/article/polish-farm-minister-quits-amid-protests-over-ukrainian-grain-imports/ [4] https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240130-french-agriculture-bartered-away-farmers-protest-free-tradeeuregulations

[8] https://www.foei.org/wto-as-protests-erupt-time-to-end-eu-mercosur-deal/

These protests showed the Europeanization process of the social movements in two ways in Della Porta's (2022) classification: first, they followed the process of domestication where protests targeted the EU decisions as anchored at the national level; second, transnationalisation of the issues were provided through the EU-wide protests where social movements organisations extended them to EU institutions.

5.3 War on Gaza

A more recent focus of protestors directing their anger towards the EU is Israel's war on Gaza in which the EU institutions and politicians have been either silent or justified Israel's actions. In Brussels, people took part in a protest in support of Palestine just a week before the elections for the European Parliament in 2024. Another example, again in Brussels, was a demonstration organised by civil society organisations of Beitna, CNCD-11.11.11, and the Union of Jewish Progressives of Belgium (UPJB)[9] . The march aimed to make the EU put economic and diplomatic pressure on Israel, especially during Belgium's presidency.[10] The protest not only took place in the participation of those who lived in Belgium but also representatives from France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. Among the demands were the legal action to be taken by the International Criminal Court and a ban on trade with Israel.

There was an interesting protest regarding the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The civil servants working in the EU institutions organised a demonstration in which they called for the responsibility that the EU needed to take and contribute to international efforts for peace in Gaza. They stated that the EU must act in line with the peace and the rule of law, the values which they "were hired to uphold".[3] Without having any flags of political affiliation, a symbolic funeral was sorted representing the death of the EU treaties and the Genocide Convention. One of the protestors and the EU officials told Euronews that "… the EU cannot be a better place if the world is not a better place" and urged for EU leaders to go further.[11]

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[9] CNCD-11.11.11 is an umbrella organisation in Brussels for NGOs and a citizen movement that "coordinates campaigns to raise awareness among the Belgian population of the issues of global and united citizenship" (https://www.cncd.be/-cncd-11-11-11-en-bref-?lang=fr); and UPJB describes itself as an association which is progressive in terms of defending the values of the left and also Jewish in terms of not basing its identity on allegiance to the State of Israel. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they take sides in giving an end to Israel's occupation and colonization of the Palestinian territories (https://upjb.be/qui-sommes-nous).

[10] https://www.brusselstimes.com/1048243/sixth-major-european-march-for-gaza-ceasefire-on-sunday-inbrussels

[11] ibid.

These protests on the issue of Gaza represent one another category in Della Porta's classification of Europeanisation of social movements. Here, we witness a bottom-up approach in which protests aim to put pressure on their national governments by calling the EU into action. The scope of the protests is transnational where social movement actors mobilize other protests and movements in other countries. Moreover, those movements are quite aware of the responsibility that the EU must undertake, hence policy areas such as a ban on trade or prohibiting arms selling to Israel have been targeted.

For setting a bridge between the theory and the cases, the impact of the social movements can be analysed through the social intercourse they bring to affect the decision-making process in the EU. Against the deficit of the EU in meeting the demands of the citizens as a result of strong bureaucratisation, social movements sought strategies to politicise it. As the action creates the political sphere within the public sphere in Arendt's theory, protests as a public discourse between the public place and public space in this study lead to the politicisation of the public place. By being in the public space where movement, change and active control are dominant, social movements first provide arenas for those who are already in the public sphere as citizens to raise their voices, and second social movements become actors in spreading the themes and issues in transnational scope which consequently democratizes the decision-making process in the EU. At this point, it should be highlighted that the process of transnationalization has been perceived as democratization in the EU since European integration is subject to the cohesion of domestic policies as much as possible. As different publics converge with each other in terms of transnationalization of the problems and issues that are nationally held through the social movements as actors affect each other, contentious politics emerge which further has an impact on decision-making. This is now turning the lens to the outside of the theatre where Sophocles' tragedy is played and caring about the demands of those who marched outside of the amphitheatre. The diagram below represents social movements' capacity to affect each other in different public spheres and create contentious politics in order to affect bureaucratic mechanisms.



Figure 2 The Process of the Contentious Politics

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: DISCURSIVE EXCHANGE

Social movements offer a broad field of study for further research areas on the public sphere. Specifically, where this study is rooted was the initial wondering about the relationship between the public sphere and the decision-making process in the EU. By drawing from the more philosophical concept, this analysis covered its impact on decision-making through social movements where more tangible cases can be found. By grasping the public sphere as a process created at the end of participation through political action, social movements are profoundly regarded in this study as the tool for understanding public discourse directed to bureaucratic mechanisms of the European Union. The literature of research focusing on the public sphere in the EU mostly approached the issue of the public sphere over the communication in which media was seen as the carrier of the public discourse. Moreover, democracy has been often reflected in accountability and political legitimacy which are most of the time taken as given in the public sphere. What makes this study different from others is the focus on social movements. In this way, it allows us to focus on the public sphere as a process instead of a cluster that is always stable. Social movements have the capacity to affect the decision-making process in a few important aspects. First of all, they provide Europeanisation through vertical and horizontal observations where national public spheres can converge each other by protesting for the same issues and problems. Second, the agonistic public spaces created by the social movements facilitate arenas for participants to debate as equal peers. Furthermore, social movements are

important as they open the way for identity formation as European "we". Third, these movements are important in democratising European politics by being actors and leading to the transnationalisation of the national public spheres. Then, concerning them in the public space as in constant change allows us to measure their impact on public places where bureaucratic structures of the EU are located. Since the public sphere's conceptualisation by Habermas remains limited to conceiving the multi-level polity of the EU, communicative networks cannot facilitate effective public discourse inflow towards the bureaucratic form of the EU. Hence, the public sphere should be grasped not as in Habermas' account but as in Arendt's. Whereas Habermas' analysis deems public sphere as the rational deliberation among equal peers in which public opinion emerging here is directed to the state, Arendt finds it in a different place from private life is lived. But Arendt adds another aspect to the public sphere by political action which is possible only in the public sphere. As the bureaucratic apparatuses of the EU get more apparent in the society, we cannot draw sharp distinctions between society and state and thus public sphere becomes difficult concept to understand in Habermasian terms. On the other hand, Arendt's analysis offers a chance to make a distinction between place and space in the public sphere where social movements facilitate more effective public discourse towards bureaucracy. The political thought that Arendt relies on thus fits better for analysing the power relations in a state where control most of the time leaves out the governance. This means that when the polity of the EU is controlled by private aggregations, social movements are important to open new spaces for contentious politics to revitalise and foster democratic participation.

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