

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, LAW, AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Master's degree in
European and Global Studies



TO SAVE THE REPUBLIC OR TO SAVE A MAN?
The question of negotiating with terrorists and media coverage
during the Affair Moro

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A.Y. 2023/2024

Table of Contents

<i>INDEX OF FIGURES</i>	2
<i>INTRODUCTION</i>	3
<i>CHAPTER I - DEFINING TERRORISM</i>	9
1.1 WHAT IS TERRORISM?.....	9
1.2 ITALIAN TERRORISM: THE YEARS OF LEAD	26
1.2.2 THE RED BRIGADES.....	38
<i>CHAPTER II - NEGOTIATING WITH STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS: DO WE NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS?</i>	53
2.1 WHAT IS NEGOTIATION?	53
2.2 HOW DOES NEGOTIATION WORK?.....	62
2.3 WHAT ABOUT NEGOTIATING WITH NON-STATE AND TERRORIST ENTITIES?	71
2.3.1 HOSTAGE CRISIS	79
2.4 THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT LINE OF ACTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SCHOOL OF THOUGHT	82
<i>CHAPTER III - ALDO MORO: EVENTS, NEGOTIATION AND MEDIA'S ROLE IN THE AFFAIR</i>	85
3.1 THE AFFAIR MORO: THE EVENTS OF MARCH 16 TH , 1978.....	85
3.1.1 COULD THE ATTACK HAVE BEEN PREVENTED?	91
3.2 PROPAGANDA AND PROVOCATION: THE RED BRIGADES' COMMUNIQUÉS	94
3.3 NEGOTIATION OR "FERMEZZA": THE CONTINUATION OF THE AFFAIRE, POLITICAL DEBATE, AND MEDIA CONTRIBUTION	100
3.3.1 MARCH 17 TH - APRIL 20 TH : THE LINE OF FIRMNESS THROUGH THE MEDIA	104
3.3.2 APRIL 21 ST - MAY 8 TH : THE SOCIALIST BREAK. A POSSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATION?	124
3.4. MAY 9 TH : OUTCOME OF THE AFFAIR AND AFTERMATH	137
<i>UNDERSTANDING THE PAST TO IMPROVE THE FUTURE: A STARTING POINT FOR FUTURE RESEARCH</i>	143
4.1 BRIEF EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERTERRORISM AND NEGOTIATION	143
4.2 EU ROLE: COUNTERTERRORISM AND INFLUENCE ON THE MEMBER STATES	148
<i>CONCLUSION - KILL ONE TO SAVE MANY?</i>	155
<i>BIBLIOGRAPHY</i>	162

INDEX OF FIGURES

Fig. 1.1, Frequencies of definitional elements (Schmid, 1983)	13
Fig. 1.2, state versus non-state actors (Schmid, 1988)	17
Fig. 1.3, levels of state involvement (Yamamoto, 2017)	18
Fig. 1.4, La Stampa on the kidnapping of judge Sossi, 19/04/1974	48
Fig. 2.1, Glasl's Escalation Levels	61
Fig. 2.2, Zone of Possible Agreement (Caputo, 2012)	64
Fig. 2.3, Reasons for failures in negotiations (Helmold, 2020)	67
Fig. 2.4, Distinction between kidnapping and hostage-taking, Schmid and Flemming in Negotiating with terrorists: <i>strategy, tactics, and politics</i> (Faure and Zartman 2010) ...	79
Fig. 3.1, La Stampa, special edition, 16/03/1978	103
Fig. 3.2, Il Messaggero, special edition, 16/03/1978	103
Fig. 3.3, "Avanti!", 19-20/03/1978, "It has been proven that Aldo Moro is in the hands of the BR"	107
Fig. 3.4, "Corriere della Sera", 31/03/1978, "The answer of the Christian Democracy: it is not possible to accept the Red Brigades' blackmail"	113
Fig. 3.5, "Avanti!", 16-17/04/1978, "Moro's assassination decided yesterday evening by the Red Brigades"	119
Fig. 3.6, "Corriere della Sera", 19/04/1978, "A message announces: Aldo Moro was killed. Corpse's research is in vain. A hideout discovered in Rome"	122
Fig. 3.7, "Avanti!", 21/04/1978, "Moro is alive: there's a picture"	124
Fig. 3.8, "Corriere della Sera", 21/04/1978, "Moro is alive, ultimatum of the Red Brigades. Asked to the Christian Democracy and to the government a prisoner exchange"	125
Fig. 3.9, "Corriere della Sera", 19/05/1978, "Moro's murder"	138

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation poses an ambitious and challenging question: is it more reasonable to let a man die in order to preserve a State's integrity, or is it better to save a life and face the political and social consequences of that decision? As this is a question that pertains to the realm of human emotions and psyche, there is not a factual or one-word answer. In addition, the affair here analyzed presents an enormous moral dilemma, reminiscent of the "kill or let die" dilemma and thus the "double effect theory", according to which an action can have a double effect: one intentional, and one foreseeable but not intended. In this sense, killing someone or letting them die can be either seen as equivalent actions or as two incomparable things, depending on one's point of view. To some, letting a man die to save the Republic is virtually the same as killing him; to others it is not, since bloodshed was not caused by them personally and, although the person's death was foreseeable, it was not desired. The dissertation also intends to offer a fairly less explored perspective on Moro's affair by reconstructing the events through the analysis of the contribution of Italian media. The research was carried out by operating a broad literature review on the topics of terrorism, negotiation, and the Red Brigades, more specifically in the context of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro. In particular, for what concerns the media coverage section, as will be further explained later in this introduction, I based my analysis on two newspapers: the "*Avanti!*", the Socialist Party's newspaper, and the "*Corriere della Sera*", which was directed at a larger section of Italian society and public opinion. The topic was chosen in light of my interest in the matters of negotiation and terrorism, which stems from the classes provided by this master's degree and other degrees offered by the department. Moreover, I believe that the matter is particularly relevant nowadays, due to the prominence of both domestic and international terrorism in our lives, and to the necessity of dealing with terrorist entities, either through dialogue - which does not necessarily mean compromise - or through counterterrorist actions. In addition, it is important to analyze past experiences to understand how to put in place effective measures in the present, thus avoiding a waste of already limited human and economic resources. Every chapter will address a different research question: in the first, I will try to uncover the issue of defining terrorism. In fact, understanding terrorism is essential in order to be able to produce a widely accepted definition, which should allow

countries to address the issue properly through the creation and implementation of effective policies. An agreement on a definition should also promote cooperation among states and hinder the terrorists' abilities to operate, regardless of the country they choose to act in or from. The main steps that characterized the evolution of the definition of terrorism and some Conventions that tried to deal with the topic will be mentioned - such as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism of 1937 and Resolution 1373 - and the main challenges in reaching a comprehensive definition will be discussed, especially considering the differences between state- and non-state terrorism. Finally, causes, motivations, methods, and tactics of terrorism will be explored. In the second section, I will dive into the historical period in which the events of this dissertation take place: the Years of Lead. Particular attention will be paid to the socioeconomic and political conditions that characterized the "economic miracle" which affected Italy in the 1950s and that started to decay around the 1960s, leading to widespread unrest and terrorist acts. However, Italy was not the only country affected by such unrests: indeed, the whole world faced similar issues and the idea of a revolution - often cultural and pervaded with ideological components - spread almost everywhere. Precipitants can be found in the Vietnam War, the Chinese cultural revolution, and guerrillas in Latin America. A significant aspect of this period is the so-called "Strategy of Tension", which involved indiscriminate terrorist attacks aimed at instilling fear into civil society. Such attacks were almost always blamed on the far left, but investigations revealed that they actually came from the far right, often with the support of the State as well as domestic and foreign secret services. Furthermore, the Italian political landscape will be discussed to prepare the ground for the events of Moro's kidnapping. I will then analyze in depth the most active organization of this dissertation's reference period: the Red Brigades. The origins of the Organization, the role of Soviet training camps in Czechoslovakia, the organizational structure, and the group's ideology will be uncovered through the analysis of the Strategic Resolutions produced by the brigadists and their code of conduct. The Red Brigades' activities will be divided in three phases: the first going from 1970 to 1974; the second ranging from 1974 to 1976; and the third from 1977 onward, culminating with their most known action: the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro. In the second chapter, the pillars of domestic and international negotiation will be addressed: the main question to which I will try to find an answer will concern the

topic of whether negotiations with terrorists should be pursued or not. As in the previous chapter, some definitions of negotiation will be presented, as well as the theoretical analysis elaborated by scholars such as Iklé and Zartman. The Game Theory Approach, the four main “games” that can be attributed to it, and the possible outcomes of negotiation - such as the “win-win” or the “win-lose” situations - will also be covered, in order to provide a broader context for the analysis. Afterwards, some rules and preconditions to negotiation will be displayed, and particular attention will be paid to different models of negotiation, as for example those elaborated by Zartman and O’Neill. It should be noted that biases can deeply affect the outcome of bargaining, and thus they deserve to be mentioned as well. To complete Zartman and O’Neill’s analyses, Glasl’s nine-stage model of conflict escalation and resolution - according to which conflicts can be solved up to a certain stage, after which they start to degenerate - will also be presented. After such a comprehensive introduction on the topic, the second section will focus on negotiation between States: the concepts of BATNA and ZOMA (or Zopa) will be discussed. Negotiations generally follow two main strategies of bargaining: accommodation and confrontation. However, it should not be forgotten that globalization has a profound impact not only on the bargaining object— terrorism – but also on the negotiation process itself. The analysis of tactics and tricks will provide an interesting and more practical take on the topic, always keeping in mind that failures and obstacles, such as the hurdles that come with intercultural negotiation, might affect the outcome of the process. Subsequently, I will move on to explore the type of negotiation that concerns the chosen case study the most: that with terrorist or nonrecognized entities. A definition of both will be provided, as well as a clarification of the distinction between absolute and relative terrorists. As already mentioned, the main question that arises from the topic of negotiating with terrorists is whether or not to do it. Among scholars, the reason that might lead to negotiate is believed to be saving the lives of the hostages, while the issue of granting legitimacy is the one that most often prevents governments from pursuing a negotiation. Interestingly, it has been found that negotiating can trigger some paradoxes, which may complicate the issue even more. An overview of the negotiation process, demands, concessions, and the role of third parties and backchannel talks will be also provided. A particular problem arises in the case of hostage crisis: elements to be taken into consideration in such a case are the value of the hostages themselves and the main

strategies to be adopted by bargainers. To conclude on the issue of negotiation, I will briefly look at the approach of the Italian and international community to the topic, and examples of both negotiation and non-negotiation carried out by some States will be described, such as the Boko Haram case and the Achille Lauro hijacking. The third chapter, the core of the whole dissertation, will address the events of Aldo Moro's kidnapping and the government's reaction to it: the no-concession policy was applied perfectly, but at what cost? Two main reasons led the Red Brigades to think the time was ripe to conduct an attack at the heart of the state: the evolution of the political situation and the reopening of the trial against some members of the Organization in Turin. The fact that the kidnapping occurred on March 16th, the same day of the new government's approval, was considered significant by some and just a coincidence by others: arguments supporting both options will be provided. The preparation of the attack included Costa's kidnapping, carried out with the aim of gathering money to finance the operation, and the preparation of Moro's hideout in via Montalcini, 8. I will trace the Red Brigades' plan concerning the kidnapping, which had originally to be carried out while Moro was in church; however, due to possible hurdles, the plan was changed, and the ambush was carried out via Fani. The moments of the kidnapping, the way Moro was transferred to the hideout, and the police reaction - which was characterized by inefficiencies and confusion, as the call for a "Plan Zero", unknown in most of Italy, demonstrates - will be carefully analyzed. Many mistakes and inefficiencies prevented Moro's escort team from reacting adequately to the ambush, such as the fact that their weapons were not within their reach. However, there is to consider that many gray areas still encompass the events of that day, making it difficult to know for sure what happened. In the second section of the chapter, the communiqués issued by the Red Brigades during Moro's kidnapping will be summarized and briefly commented, allowing a further analysis of their ideology. The third section will dive into the reconstruction of the affair by using the press and Moro's missives. Most of the time, this will lead me to consider the events one or two days after they actually happened, due to a logical delay in the reception and publishing of the news by the media. In light of the fact that the Socialist Party - after initially strongly supporting the policy of firmness - was the one that tried to find a way to negotiate with the Red Brigades, it seemed interesting to me to choose their newspaper, the "*Avanti!*", as one of the sources of analysis for this chapter. The choice of the "*Corriere della Sera*", on the

other hand, rests on different bases. One of them is the involvement of the Masonic Lodge P2 in the management of Moro's crisis, especially since the publishing company of the "*Corriere della Sera*" had been acquired by P2 with the intent of - as it can be read in the related Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry - "*coordinating all the provincial and local press [...] in order to control the public opinion of the country*", through the "*elimination of inconvenient journalists, focused coverage and assignment of tasks and positions to people belonging to the Lodge*"¹. It should also be noted that the newspaper was highly popular, and was able to reach a nationwide audience, with a total of 691.916 printed copies in 1978², making it a primary source of information for the citizens. These two reasons led me to believe it could be interesting to analyze the coverage of this specific newspaper instead of the Christian Democracy's newspaper. It should also be noted that the "*Corriere della Sera*", although it is not formally affiliated to a political party, represents the most important pro-government newspaper circulating in the country. In addition, it is important to highlight that, when quoting Moro's missives, I decided to report his own exact wording and sentence structure - even when there were easier and clearer ways to translate them in English – in order to convey his messages in the most faithful and realistic way possible. Indeed, very often his sentences were extremely complex in Italian as well. Two subsections will follow: in the first, the general line of firmness adopted by all parties at the beginning of the affair will be highlighted, while in the second I will display the Socialist break which started from April 21st, when Moro was confirmed to be alive after the false seventh communiqué was released. The fourth section of the chapter will cover the events of May 9th, when Moro's body was found in the trunk of a car close to the headquarters of the Christian Democracy and the Communist Party. To conclude the chapter, I will briefly explain the end of the Red Brigades as an organization, especially considering Dalla Chiesa's work and the role of the so-called "pentiti". In the last section, preceding the conclusion, I will try to understand whether the Italian approach to counterterrorism and negotiation with terrorist actors has changed over time or not. In this respect, although a "no-negotiation" approach has been maintained since the time of Moro's affair, there are several cases in which the Italian government actually negotiated with terrorist entities, and it should be noted that

¹https://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg09/lavori/stampati/pdf/p2/09%20Leg%20Doc%20XXIII%20n%202-1%20relatore%20ANSELMi-ocr.pdf

² <https://www.adsnotizie.it/Dati/DatiStorici#>

Italy is not the only country that makes exceptions to the rules. Concerning counterterrorism, between the 1970s and 1990s, Italy adopted many measures to contrast the phenomenon, such as safeguarding strategic objectives, promoting the cooperation of former terrorists with the judiciary, and introducing new terrorism-related offenses. Moreover, the country has improved its cooperation with the United Nations, the European Union, and more international organizations such as the G8 in order to make more effective efforts in the fight against terrorism, especially in light of the fact that the new threats are dynamic and global. However, as often happens, the measures adopted are not necessarily efficient and effective, and in some cases even risk leading to different but equally relevant problems. As for the cases in which Italy has negotiated with terrorists, the first will concern Judge D'urso and dates back to 1980. The second, on the other hand, is extremely recent and concerns the freeing of Italian woman Silvia Romano. Although it is not formally known whether a ransom was paid by the Italian government or not, it is fairly probable that it happened. I will report several different journal articles that discuss the issues that may arise from this behavior from part of our State. In the second paragraph of the last section, the research question will be explored through different lenses, namely the role of the European Union in creating and maintaining a more secure world. The European Security Strategy drafted in 2003 will be briefly discussed, as well as the main measures adopted by the Union to counter terrorism, such as the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant, Europol, and Eurojust. However, there are important variations in the perception of terrorist threats depending on the country considered, which can hinder the ability of the national governments to make the general public understand the collective importance of the policies adopted by the Union and fully implement them. The main policies of the European Union, and the framework based on four pillars - Protect, Prevent, Pursue, and Response - will be displayed. The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon gave a new boost to the cooperation between Member States, although obstacles still persist. To conclude, a last reflection will be advanced: did Moro's sacrifice ultimately contribute to saving lives?

CHAPTER I - DEFINING TERRORISM

1.1 WHAT IS TERRORISM?

It is frequently said that there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism, both at a scholarly level and in international law. This greatly challenges the attempts of States and international organizations to discuss and approve suitable solutions for an issue that severely affects almost every nation in the world, especially given the widespread current globalization. The importance of understanding terrorism lies in the compelling need for a definition which can cover a wide range of situations and that is acceptable for most people and governments, so that effective cooperation and actions can be taken to contain and possibly eliminate the phenomenon of terrorism. Moreover, it is also important to note that the lack of a universal definition allows terrorists to choose a country to operate in or from according to its own specific laws on terrorism, therefore potentially endangering even a foreign country with stricter legal provisions on the matter. In addition, anti-terrorism obligations imposed by the United Nations could be avoided or used to mask human rights abuses³: it is clear that at least a minimum common definition is needed to avoid such risks. Furthermore, such a definition is needed so that acts of violence can be measured and assessed against a given set of criteria in order to determine whether or not acts of violence constitute terrorism⁴: this would help to avoid abuses of the term. As Schmid highlighted, the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself: the same act, for example a bombing, can be terroristic or not depending on intentions and circumstances⁵.

Before looking into the definition of terrorism, or at least the most accepted ones, we should quickly cover the main steps that brought to the present-day ways to define the

³ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

⁴ Richards, A. (2014). Conceptualizing terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & terrorism*, 37(3), 213-236.

⁵ Schmid, A. P., Jongman, A. J., Documentatiecentrum, S. I. E., & Van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen, R. T. L. C. V. O. (1984). *Political terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, data bases, and literature*

concept. According to what Young stated in his “*Defining terrorism: the evolution of terrorism as a legal concept [..]*” (2006), the word “terrorism” gained its political connotations from its use during the French Revolution⁶, and - according to Crenshaw (1981) - it described the “*systematic inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population or to challenge the authority of the state*”⁷. It was initially associated with state-perpetrated violence until, following the applications of French and Russian anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s, it shifted to describe violence carried out by non-state actors. In 1937, in the context of the League of Nations, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was signed. It concerned only transnational terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors and defined “terrorism” as “[c]riminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public”⁸. Consequently, States were bound to adopt legislation which criminalized terrorism⁹. However, such a Convention never entered into force. Following the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, the urge to effectively confront terrorism emerged: an ad hoc committee was established, but no significant progress was made¹⁰. In the meantime, other Conventions were drafted, and exceptions were introduced to old ones, but they too failed to bring meaningful developments. The end of the Cold War allowed the General Assembly to more categorically declare the illegitimacy of terrorism under all circumstances¹¹. The so-called “second generation agreements”¹² contained wider prohibitions, and the United Nations’ resolutions were unequivocal in their condemnation¹³. Later on, in 1994 - as reported by

⁶ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

⁷ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

⁸ League Of Nations Author. (1937) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Geneva: League of Nations, -11-16. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, [https://www.loc.gov/item/2021667893/.1937_supranote 57, art. 2](https://www.loc.gov/item/2021667893/.1937_supranote_57,art.2).

⁹ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

¹⁰ See Nawaz & Singh, *supra*note 2, at 69.

¹¹ Flory, *supra* note 40, at 18.

¹² Alvarez, J. E. (2003). Hegemonic international law revisited. *American Journal of International Law*, 97(4), 873-888.

¹³ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

Young (2006) - the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism was signed, and it stated that “*Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may pose a threat to international peace and security, jeopardize friendly relations among States*” and that “*Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable*”¹⁴. After 9/11, terrorism shifted from an issue of concern for the General Assembly to an issue threatening international peace and security¹⁵, alarming enough to require the intervention of the Security Council. The organ was authorized to act and adopt binding resolutions by Articles 25¹⁶ and 48¹⁷ of the United Nations Charter. Following the call to action, it adopted Resolution 1368(2001), which condemned the attacks and encouraged the international community to “*redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorism conventions.*”¹⁸.

Resolution 1373 was then adopted: it represented the first use of Chapter VII powers to order States to take or refrain from specific actions other than when disciplining a specific country.¹⁹ The resolution reclaimed several of the already existing obligations, which derived from previous instruments. It also posed, *inter alia*, significant obligations on states to enact domestic legislation²⁰, and required states to tighten border controls to prevent the movement of terrorism, refrain from any kind of support to terrorists and prevent potential attacks, mutual assistance in criminal investigations, and the denial of safe haven. It also called upon states to exchange information, to cooperate on prevention and to ensure justice, and to become party to relevant Conventions and to implement their provisions²¹. Concurrently, the Resolution established a Counterterrorism Committee in

¹⁴ Perera, R. (2008). Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 1994, and the 1996 Supplementary Declaration thereto. *UN*.

¹⁵ Ibidem

¹⁶ <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art25.shtml>

¹⁷ <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art48.shtml>

¹⁸ S.C. Res. 1368, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).

¹⁹ Paul C. Szasz, *The Security Council Starts Legislating*, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 901 (2002).

²⁰ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

²¹ https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf

order to monitor the implementation of the above-listed provisions and, if needed, to provide assistance to the countries. Something that really stands out in this instrument is the adoption of a typically binding language. However, the text presented an important problem: as many other previously adopted instruments, it did not provide a definition of terrorism, but rather it delegated such a matter to each state. This clearly hinders the effectiveness and the implementation of a Resolution that is supposed to address such a topic. Furthermore, as already mentioned, a broad definition could be used to suppress political opposition or limit human rights: such actions could be justified with the excuse of fighting against terrorism. In 2004, Resolution 1566 tried to address the lack of definition which characterized the previous resolution. In it, it can be read: “*criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, [...], are under no circumstances justifiable [...], and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished [...]*”²². Although it is undeniable that this represented an important step forward, it is also clear that the Security Council tried to compromise between different approaches supported by different countries. For example, it did not directly address the issue of whether military targets can be subjects of terrorist attacks, and it endorses definitions ascertainable from previous conventions, adding very little to the debate on the subject.²³ Many other Conventions have been drafted both before and after the events of 9/11, such as the Punishment Conventions - that are intended to address terrorism - and the Prevention Conventions - which deny terrorists support and equipment. It is also interesting to mention that the European Union contributed to boosting efforts for the signing of new Conventions or Treaties on terrorism which were supposed to help create an effective framework, such as for example the so-called TREVI system of 1975, which ceased to exist after the entrance into force of the Maastricht agreement in 1993.

²²<https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n04/542/82/pdf/n0454282.pdf?token=5QR4q94ymoCtYp8Dje&fe=true>

²³ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

After having discussed the background concerning the definition of terrorism, we can move on to analyze its main definitions. Taking inspiration from what Begorre-Bret stated in his “*The definition of terrorism and the challenge of relativism*” (2006), there’s to say that while some believe that finding a definition is necessary in order to identify an act of violence and condemn it, some others believe that agreeing on one is nearly impossible and unnecessary. Moreover, the so-called definitions of terrorism can be interpreted as justifications or condemnations of certain forms of violence rather than adequate descriptions of the phenomenon.²⁴ In spite of these numerous challenges, countless theoretical reflections on terrorism and its definition have been conducted. In the 1980s, Schmid analyzed 109 definitions of terrorism and identified some definitional elements common to most statements²⁵.

<i>Element</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
1. Violence, force	83.5%
2. Political	65 %
3. Fear, terror emphasized	51 %
4. Threat	47 %
5. (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5%
6. Victim-target differentiation	37.5%
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32 %
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5%
9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30 %
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28 %
11. Publicity aspect	21.5%
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21 %
13. Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5%
14. Intimidation	17 %
15. Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5%
16. Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14 %
17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5%
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9 %
19. Clandestine, covert nature	9 %
20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7 %
21. Criminal	6 %
22. Demands made on third parties	4 %

Fig. 1.1, frequencies of definitional elements (Schmid, 1983)

²⁴ Begorre-Bret, C. (2006). The definition of terrorism and the challenge of relativism. *Cardozo Law Review*, 27(5), 1987-2004.

²⁵ Schmid, A. P. (1983). *Political terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, data bases and literature* (p. 76–77). North-Holland Publishing.

As can be seen in the table above, the element of violence is present in 83,3% of the considered definitions, the political character in 65%, fear in 51%, and intimidation in 17%. Similar features are pointed out by Begorre-Bret (2006). The first is violence: terrorism is a certain type of violence, whether lethal or not, and/or the threat of it. The second is that, since it aims to influence the decision-making process, it differs from other forms of violence in its political status. The third, more controversial, concerns the means employed by terrorists to reach their goal, such as instilling fear and targeting civilians. The final feature is the indiscriminate nature of such violence.²⁶ Following Schmid's analysis, the U.S. Vice President's 1986 task force defined terrorism as "*the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies*"²⁷. A year earlier, the German Federal Republic's Office for the Protection of the Constitution stated that "*terrorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes [...] or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such criminal acts.*"²⁸. Three common elements can be identified: the use of violence, the political objectives, and the intention of instilling fear in a target population²⁹.

Many other definitions - or features of a good definition - have been suggested. To begin with, according to Richards (2002), in academic literature, it seems that an agreement over the core essence of terrorism has been reached: terrorism entails the intent to generate a wider psychological impact beyond the immediate victims³⁰. Indeed, as stated by Crenshaw in "*The Causes of terrorism*" (1981), the victims or objects of the attacks have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group: they rather represent a larger human audience

²⁶ Begorre-Bret, C. (2006). The definition of terrorism and the challenge of relativism. *Cardozo Law Review*, 27(5), 1987-2004.

²⁷ Chaliand, G., Blin, A., Schneider, E., Pulver, K., & Browner, J. (2016). *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda*. <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA84250128>

²⁸ Amador, B. S. (2003). *The Federal Republic of Germany and left-wing terrorism*. <https://hdl.handle.net/10945/6236>

²⁹ Chaliand, G., Blin, A., Schneider, E., Pulver, K., & Browner, J. (2016). *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda*. <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA84250128>

³⁰ Richards, A. (2014). Conceptualizing terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & terrorism*, 37(3), 213-236.

whose reaction the perpetrators seek³¹. Sometimes, it is the aim of reaching publicity, rather than immediate change in the political system, that drives terrorist actions. Hoffman also argued that it presupposes “*the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. [...]. Terrorism is designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience” that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general*”³². In a somewhat similar but much-limited version contained in the introduction to the U.S. Department of State’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, terrorism is defined as “*politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups of clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience*”³³. As Ruby stated in “*The Definition of terrorism*” (2002), the definition includes three key criteria that distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence: the actions are politically motivated, are directed at noncombatants and they are characterized by a clandestine feature³⁴. However, this last element should be more carefully assessed due to the fact that state entities could operate in a clandestine manner as well. After having displayed many definitions, it is clear that a better definition of terrorism needs to incorporate the possibility of terrorism that one might sympathize with or even endorse, as well as “bad terrorism” and international approaches to the phenomenon should arguably reflect this. It is then a question as to *which forms of terrorism* should merit a more urgent response.³⁵

However, defining terrorism comes with numerous challenges. After 9/11, terrorism shifted from an issue of concern for the General Assembly to an issue threatening international peace and security, alarming enough to require the intervention of the Security Council. In 2001, the Security Council of the United Nations declared that “*acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace*

³¹Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

³² Hoffman, B. (1998). *Inside terrorism* (pp. 43–44). Columbia University Press.

³³ <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f>

³⁴ Ruby, C. L. (2002). The definition of terrorism. *Analyses of social issues and public policy*, 2(1), 9-14.

³⁵ Richards, A. (2014). Conceptualizing terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & terrorism*, 37(3), 213-236.

and security”³⁶. However, what these acts consist of is not specified. In fact, as noted by Young (2006), domestic and international legislations, instead of defining terrorism *in toto*, often prefer to recognize and prohibit specific acts that fall under the concept of terrorism. This approach was preferred due to the fact that many states supported the use of terrorism to advance political goals³⁷. Self-determination also played a role in making the reach of a common definition more difficult. However, today States ought to ensure that the definition of terrorism in their domestic legal systems is consistent with this minimum definition of terrorism in international law.³⁸ Nevertheless, one has to acknowledge that terrorism is a social construction: in theory, it can be whatever one says it is and - as Richards (2002) claimed - it comes down to who has the power to define or who “*is heard the loudest*”. Richards also highlighted that some might think that “*there is nothing intrinsically different about terrorism, that it is merely the violence perpetrated by those we disagree with, that it is [...] seen as illegitimate by the prevailing power holders*”³⁹. Achieving a common definition has thus been, and still is, extremely challenging. When it comes to reaching an agreement on the definition of complex concepts such as terrorism, a major obstacle is relativism: knowledge and truth are to be considered in relation to culture, and thus are not absolute. In this sense, the first problem lies in the fact that one single definition is supposed to fit all forms of terrorism, even those that have nothing in common⁴⁰: however, it is ascertained that the phenomenon has varied enormously over time, so such a feature of the definition is misleading. For example, Gayraud and Sénat highlighted that Cold War terrorism was limited and rationalized, used especially by countries which lacked diplomatic influence, while present-day terrorism is massive, “deterritorialized”, irrational, and can also come from sub-state organizations⁴¹. Another problem mentioned by Begorre-Bret (2006) is the semantic nature of the word: the notion of terrorism is not descriptive, but rather is

³⁶ S.C. Res. 1377, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).

³⁷ See Sofaer, A. D. (1986). Terrorism and the law. *Foreign Affairs*, 64(5), 901-903.

³⁸ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

³⁹ Richards, A. (2014). Conceptualizing terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & terrorism*, 37(3), 213-236.

⁴⁰ Begorre-Bret, C. (2006). The definition of terrorism and the challenge of relativism. *Cardozo Law Review*, 27(5), 1987-2004.

⁴¹ Gayraud, J. F., & Sénat, D. (2009). *Le terrorisme* (Vol. 2, No. 1768, pp. 12-47). Presses universitaires de France.

imprecisely used to condemn the act⁴², often from a well-defined and deep-rooted political point of view. Definitions draw a clear-cut distinction between “us” and “them”, justifying the former’s actions and condemning the latter’s: the “nominalistic fallacy” is thus intertwined with the “ideological fallacy”⁴³. Moreover, another distinction that complicates the definitional issue is the one between state terrorism and non-state terrorism. Since the state defines what crime is, there is a question of whether states can actually commit crimes and thus engage in terrorism⁴⁴. This is a problem, especially when considering national law. Furthermore, according to Crenshaw, terrorism can occur both in the context of violent resistance to the state as well as in the service of state interests⁴⁵. A distinction between actions carried out by state actors and those carried out by non-state actors can be found in Schmid’s work (1988).

State of peace	
State actor Conventional Politics	Non-state actor
I. Rule of law (routinized rule, legitimated by tradition, customs, constitutional procedures)	I. Opposition politics (lobbying among power holders, formation of opposition press and parties, rallies, electoral contest, litigation [use of courts for political struggle])
Unconventional Politics	
II. Oppression (manipulation of competitive electoral process, censorship, surveillance, harassment, discrimination, infiltration of opposition, misuse of emergency legislation)	II. Non-violent action (social protest for political persuasion of rulers and masses; demonstrations to show strength of public support; non-cooperation, civil disobedience, and other forms of non-violent action)
Violent Politics	
III. Violent repression for control of state power	III. Use of violence for contestation challenging state power
III.1. (political justice. political imprisonment)	III. 1. Material destruction
III. 2. Assassination	III. 2. Assassination. (individuated political murder)
III. 3. State-terrorism (torture, death squads, disappearances, concentration camps)	III. 3. Terrorism (de-individuated political murder)
III. 4. Massacres	III. 4. Massacres
III. 5. Internal war	III. 5. Guerrilla warfare
III. 6. Ethnocide/politicide/genocide	III. 6. Insurgency, revolution (if successful)
	State of war

Source: Alex P. Schmid. *Political Terrorism* (Amsterdam, North-Holland 1988) pp. 58–59.

Fig.1.2, state versus non-state actors (Schmid, 1988)

⁴² Begorre-Bret, C. (2006). The definition of terrorism and the challenge of relativism. *Cardozo Law Review*, 27(5), 1987-2004.

⁴³ Ibidem

⁴⁴ Alex P. Schmid, Alex P. (2004) Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16:2, 197-221, DOI: 10.1080/09546550490483134

⁴⁵ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

Some believe that acts of terrorism by non-state actors generally do not constitute a breach of international law - so only the ones carried out by the States do - and thus do not need to be addressed in this sense, although since the early twentieth century the international community has engaged with such issue⁴⁶, as the 1937 Terrorism Convention demonstrates. Some others, on the contrary, believe that until very recently, no one spoke of “state terrorism”. For example, Freedman (2007) reported that the traditional Weberian definition of a state is that it monopolizes legitimate and organized violence. For this reason, the most effective terror campaigns are those organized by states on their own behalf⁴⁷. State terrorism, as it is understood today, applies above all to the support provided by certain governments (for instance, Libya or Iran) to terrorist groups⁴⁸. However, as often happens when dealing with this topic, sometimes there is no clear distinction since terrorist actions can be carried out by the State itself or the State can simply sponsor attacks carried out by non-state agencies. State involvement in this matter can be divided into different levels. Yamamoto (2017), categorized it in the here-attached table⁴⁹:




Fig. 1.3, levels of state involvement (Yamamoto, 2017)

To sum up what has been said so far, it might be useful to look at Yamamoto’s Appendix C to his “*Terrorism against democracy*” (2017). Arguments against defining terrorism are that such a concept cannot be defined since a definition would be too limiting - due to disagreements and the evolving nature of the concept - and that there is no actual need for a definition. On the other hand, arguments in support of a definition are that it makes

⁴⁶ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

⁴⁷ Freedman, L. (2007). Terrorism as a Strategy. *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), 314-339.

⁴⁸ Chaliand, G., Blin, A., Schneider, E., Pulver, K., & Browner, J. (2016). *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda*. <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA84250128>

⁴⁹ Yamamoto, M. (2017). Terrorism against democracy, Appendix C.

counterterrorism efforts more effective and the related politics and research more productive and accurate, reduces terrorism and its associated costs, as well as the misuse of the term⁵⁰.

Before concluding on the definitional issue - and prior to diving into the analysis of causes and motivations of terrorism - it may be interesting to look at the definition of such a concept from a legal point of view, particularly in the framework of international law. Several steps can be identified in the drafting of the legal definition of terrorism. First of all, it should be stressed again that following several terrorist attacks conducted after World War II (such as the Munich Massacre of 1972), the international community felt the need to respond and drafted a series of treaties: these, however, were mostly ineffective, since they lacked enforcement and effective prevention strategies⁵¹. From a legal perspective, a definition must contain both the objective element - the commission of a crime - and the subjective element - the motivations and intentions of the perpetrators. An early legal definition of terrorism that takes these features into account probably dates back to 1931 and described it as “*The intentional use of means capable of producing a common danger that represents an act of terrorism on the part of anyone making use of crimes against life, liberty or physical integrity of persons or directed against private or state property with the purpose of expressing or executing political or social ideas*”⁵². A couple of years later, the Sixth Conference in Copenhagen defined terrorism as “*International acts directed against the life, physical integrity, health or freedom of a head of state or his spouse, or any person holding the prerogatives of a head of state, as well as crown princes, members of governments, people enjoying diplomatic immunity, and members of the constitutional, legislative or judicial bodies [...], or a state of terror that might incite a change or raise an obstacle to the functioning of public bodies or a disturbance to international relations*”⁵³

⁵⁰ Ibidem

⁵¹ Coll, A. R. (1987, January). The legal and moral adequacy of military responses to terrorism. In *Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting* (Vol. 81, pp. 297-307). Cambridge University

⁵² Zlaticaric, *supra*note 2, at 479, quoted in Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23, <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

⁵³ *Id.* at 481-82, quoted in Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23, <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

None of the two definitions considers attacks against civilians. As of today, among the most used definitions, even in legal contexts, are the one given in Resolution 1566 and the one contained in the 18 U.S. Code §2331. Sometimes, a distinction can be made between domestic and international terrorism, as the United States Congress frequently does. In the just-mentioned 18 U.S. Code §2331, international terrorism is defined as *“activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State [...], are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. It occurs primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcends national boundaries [...]. Domestic terrorism is separately described, although most of the definition remains the same: what changes is that the acts occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”*⁵⁴. According to Young (2006), terrorism as a legal concept in international law has a core content: it is the serious harming or killing of civilians and the damaging of property causing economic harm done for the purpose of intimidating a group of people or a population or to coerce a government or international organization. The act must be unlawful, intentional, and its consequences must be foreseen and desired. No particular motivation is needed to explain the act, which cannot be justified. Group action or involvement is not a requirement, but the act must be perpetrated by a sub-state actor. The act and/or its effects must be international in character.⁵⁵

While, according to the author, no particular motivation is needed to explain the act, over time causes and motivations for terrorism have been analyzed in depth, to the point that four waves of terrorism, in here just mentioned, have been identified by Rapoport (anarchist, anticolonial, new left, and religious).). First of all, in order to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding the context of terrorism, we need to distinguish between *“preconditions”*, factors that set the stage for terrorism in the long run, and *“precipitants”*, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of

⁵⁴ <https://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title18&edition=prelim>

⁵⁵ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

terrorism⁵⁶. Taking Crenshaw's work of 1981 as reference, another distinction about preconditions can be made: there are enabling or permissive factors - such as modernization, which generates opportunities and vulnerabilities - and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns. Facilitating factors are almost always the governments' inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism: such elements are worsened by the often-clandestine nature of terrorist organizations⁵⁷, as well as the costs of counterterrorism policies or, even worse, the costs of addressing the root causes of terrorism.

A condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism - but it is not a necessary or sufficient cause of it - is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population: a social movement develops to address such grievances, and it may resort to extremism and terrorism⁵⁸. Another important feature highlighted by many scholars and reported by Crenshaw (1981) is the perception that the suffered grievances are unjust: perception alone is sufficient to give rise to sentiments of frustration and, eventually, anger. This is often the case when talking about self-determination and emancipation: there is the idea that terrorism could be employed as a means to advance a progressive political project aimed at protecting marginalized and vulnerable populations from indiscriminate and oppressive forms of violence⁵⁹. A second condition enumerated by Crenshaw is the lack of opportunity for political participation: this can create a combination of feelings of apathy among the population and disaffection and dissatisfaction of the elite with the state's institutions. Such elites act on behalf of a minority, and the general population might not agree with their means and scopes. However, it is wrong to assume that where there is terrorism there is always oppression: some groups may just openly oppose nonviolent opposition methods, they may not be able to gather enough support for them to be effective, or they may simply be impatient and cannot resist the sense of urgency to act⁶⁰. It is not a case that terrorism often occurs

⁵⁶Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

⁵⁷ Ibidem

⁵⁸ Ibidem

⁵⁹ Jackson, R. (2008). An Argument for Terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2(2), 25–32. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26298330>

⁶⁰ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

around election times⁶¹. In fact, as affirmed by Hoffman, terrorism is more frequent in democracies than in non-democratic regimes⁶². Lastly, although it is commonly thought that precipitants are in large part unpredictable, there seems to be a pattern of government actions that act as catalysts for terrorism⁶³, such as the unexpected use of force in response to protests: a notable example is the tsarist regime's reaction in dealing with populist movements, which unwittingly became a factor in the development of Narodnaya Volya as a terrorist organization in 1879⁶⁴. Finally, sometimes terrorism might not be home-grown but rather be imported by other state- or non-state actors⁶⁵.

As for the motivations, although the ultimate goals of terrorists have varied over time, five have had enduring importance: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and maintenance of the status quo⁶⁶. Moreover, considering that sometimes publicity is the most immediate aim of terrorists, there is to take into consideration that violent actions can affect public attitude in both a positive and negative way, in order to impress both sympathizers and uncommitted while also instilling fear in the "enemy"⁶⁷. In this sense, terrorism can also be considered as a form of communication: as stated by Schmid, when non-state terrorism in its modern form was invented, in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was known as 'propaganda by the deed'⁶⁸. Some anarchist theorists affirmed that when violent methods are not effective, the use of terrorist propaganda could represent a solution. In fact, media and propaganda were also effectively used during Moro's kidnapping. Terrorism may also serve internal organizational functions of control, discipline, and morale building within the organization, or, on the contrary, it may become an instrument of rivalry among

⁶¹ Alex P. Schmid, Alex P. (2004) Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16:2, 197-221, DOI: 10.1080/09546550490483134

⁶² Hoffman, B. (1997). Terrorism and WMD: Some preliminary hypotheses. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 4(3), 45-53.

⁶³ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379-399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

⁶⁴ Ibidem

⁶⁵ Hoffman, B. (1997). Terrorism and WMD: Some preliminary hypotheses. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 4(3), 45-53.

⁶⁶ Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. *International security*, 31(1), 49-80.

⁶⁷ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379-399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

⁶⁸ Weimann, G., & Winn, C. (1994). *The theatre of terror: Mass media and international terrorism*. Longman.

factions⁶⁹. Policies and pressures within terrorist groups also play a role in determining whether a terrorist action will be carried out. To sum up, as Crenshaw (1981) affirmed, terrorism “*may be pursued in order to dramatize a cause, demoralize the government, gain popular support, provoke regime violence, inspire followers, or dominate a wider resistance movement*”. Obviously, individuals may also engage in terrorist activities: fully understanding the motivations underlying this choice would require a deep psychological and sociological analysis. However, interestingly enough, what seems to be a common characteristic of terrorists is their normality, with terrorism itself being the link among very different personalities⁷⁰. Scholars such as Merkl and Blumenthal have therefore tried to shift the focus to the level of political understanding⁷¹, and found that many terrorists were activists with prior political experience in nonviolent opposition to the state. Individuals engaging in terrorism are likely to be intensely committed to a cause, which leads to tolerating risks higher than normal, and may share values of solidarity with fellow members of the organization they are part of, strengthened by the rejection of society.

Once we have cleared the causes and motivations behind terrorism, the methods and tactics used to carry out terrorist attacks should also be analyzed. According to Kydd and Walter (2006), there are five strategies or techniques for terrorist action that can be identified: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. Attrition is designed to help a terrorist group to persuade the enemy that the group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that the enemy yields to the terrorists’ demands. Intimidation is aimed at preventing undesired behaviors by means of threats and costly signals: it is supposed to show that terrorists will punish those who disobey, and that the government cannot stop them. A provocation strategy is designed to persuade the domestic audience that the target of attacks is evil and must be resisted. Terrorists often try to induce the government to respond to their actions that harms civilians, in order to show that the terrorists’ scopes are justified and to shift citizens’ support on their side. A spoiling strategy aims to show and ensure that an agreement between moderate leaders on the terrorists’ side and the target government cannot be reached by playing on the

⁶⁹ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

⁷⁰ Ibidem

⁷¹ Merkl, P. (1974) Political Violence Under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis, pg. 33-34.

distrust between the two sides. Finally, outbidding arises when multiple groups compete for allegiance of a similar demographic base of support⁷². If we wish to be more specific on the methods employed, it is worth highlighting the fact that they have changed overtime, frequently in accordance with the vanishing of one wave and the beginning of another. According to the authors of “*The history of terrorism: from antiquity to Al-Qaeda*” (2016), when we talk about this topic, we have to keep in mind that terrorism is above all a tool or a technique⁷³. Rapoport, in his “*The four waves of modern terrorism*” (2013), conducted a deep analysis of the four waves of terrorism and the methods employed by terrorists in each of them. In the anarchist wave, bombing was a very common method of terror, due to the invention of dynamite. Consequently, crowds became the main target of the attacks. This tactic was combined with regicides, in particular between 1892 and 1901. In this period there is the rise of “Propaganda by Deed” and there is also to remember the 1881 International Congress of Anarchists, in which it was established that violence was to be used as a way of struggle along with policies of illegal acts. In fact, the 1890s are defined as the “Golden Age of Assassination”. In the second wave, assassinations and martyrdom were thought to be less effective. The targets grew in number, and it was important to strike them in a proper sequence. Guerrilla-like actions were widely used. The element of supranational organizations came into play, since most anticolonial terrorists sought to interest the UN in their struggles. The third wave resembles the first because of elements such as the role of women, who again became leaders and fighters after being overshadowed in the second wave. Hijacking became prominent, and hostage-taking turned out to be a characteristic of this wave. Moro’s kidnapping is surely the most memorable episode. Hostage negotiations were often used to gather money or with the purpose of “coercive bargaining”⁷⁴: this, as Price (1977) explained, refers to short-term demands made as conditions for the release of a kidnapped hostage. Those linked to the hostage are the so-called “identification group” - connected to the former by kinship, business, or political responsibility - from whom concessions are demanded, and the whole national population is the resonant mass.

⁷² Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. *International security*, 31(1), 49-80.

⁷³ Chaliand, G., Blin, A., Schneider, E., Pulver, K., & Browner, J. (2016). *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda*. <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA84250128>

⁷⁴ Price, H. E. (1977). The strategy and tactics of revolutionary terrorism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 19(1), 52–66. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0010417500008495>

Assassinating prominent figures came back into vogue. However, if in the first wave people were being assassinated because they held a public office, in the third the killings were seen as punishments for actions or omissions. States began to sponsor groups. Finally, in the fourth wave, religion acquired importance. Suicide bombings were the main tactical innovations. Unprotected civilians are often targeted, so the trademark appears to be maximizing casualties⁷⁵. The modern variety of terrorism comes from a mix of religious affiliation intertwined with geo-political ideology and goals (*Bassiouni, Multilateral Conventions*). It poses a greater threat to society, especially because modern terrorists are harder to deter than the terrorists of the 1960s⁷⁶. Moreover, the proliferation and greater availability of weapons of mass destruction⁷⁷, modern society's dependence on computer systems, and the emergence of cyber-terrorism⁷⁸ make it difficult to draft accurate regulations, due to the fact that many of these technologies are not yet fully developed and increase the likelihood of almost silent and large-scale attacks, which are also harder to prevent. Revolutionary ideologies have always crossed borders easily: examples are ideas stemming from the French and Bolshevik revolutions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries⁷⁹. Nowadays, due to globalization, the permeability of borders and state interdependence, the internationalization of terrorism, and other forms of political violence are a fact⁸⁰. To conclude this first part, there is to highlight that, as Crenshaw stated, “*we approach terrorism as a form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor*”. A comprehensive explanation, however, should also take into account the environment in which terrorism occurs and

⁷⁵ Rapoport, D. (2013). The four waves of modern terrorism. In *Routledge eBooks* (pp. 63–82). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203717622-11>

⁷⁶ Young, R. (2006). Defining terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3>

⁷⁷ Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction – a g8 declaration 1 (2003), *available at* http://www.g8.fr/eian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/nonproliferation_of_weapons_of_massdestruction_-_ag8_declaration.html.

⁷⁸ Brenner, S. W., & Goodman, M. D. (2002). In defense of cyberterrorism: Argument for anticipating cyber-attacks. *University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy*, 2002(1), 12-24, 27.

⁷⁹ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

⁸⁰ Alex P. Schmid, Alex P. (2004) Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16:2, 197-221, DOI: 10.1080/09546550490483134

address the question of whether broad political, social, and economic conditions make terrorism more likely to appear in some contexts than in others⁸¹.

1.2 ITALIAN TERRORISM: THE YEARS OF LEAD

The Years of Lead were characterized by extensive and recurring terrorist attacks, coming both from the far-right and the far-left. The beginning of such a period is generally identified with the attacks of Piazza Fontana in 1969 and conventionally ends around 1982, although sporadic attacks continued in the following years. In order to understand why the Years of Lead developed the way they did, it is important to look at the socioeconomic and political conditions that led to those years. From the 1950s, particularly from 1953, Italy passed from being almost entirely dependent on agriculture to being a major industrial power: this transformation is commonly known as an “economic miracle”. In the span of a few years, said Castronovo in his *“L’industria italiana dall’Ottocento a oggi”* (1982), Italian society adapted to the new needs of industrial production, whose added value between 1962 and 1963 was seven times that of 1913, the year that the first Italian industrial revolution ended. In 1962, the Italian rate of per capita production rose 5.6%, much greater than the growth rates of almost every other country in Western Europe. Between 1950 and 1960, Italy enjoyed a 5.9% average annual growth in its gross product against the 4.9 of the Netherlands, the 4.4 of France, and the 2.6% of Great Britain⁸². Moreover, it should be noted that Italian economic growth was also favored by its inclusion in the European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshall Plan, promoted by the United States in 1948. In exchange for such help, the Communist Party had to be excluded from the government, held by the Christian Democracy. In addition, Italy was included in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation as well as the European Economic Community, which fostered trading, market expansion, and improved life standards. However, there were also downsides to the economic miracle. During those years of intense industrialization, thousands of men and women moved from the south of the country to the north: it is estimated that between

⁸¹ Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421717>

⁸² See Castronovo, V. (1982). *L’industria italiana dall’Ottocento a oggi* (p. 275ff). Mondadori.

1955 and 1971, 9,140,000 Italians were involved in interregional migration⁸³. The first problem they faced was accommodation: in Milan, the answer to this problem was the so-called Koreas, defined by Orsini as “*illegal housing erected by night, probably named after similar buildings appearing during the Korean War*”⁸⁴. Building speculation was pervasive. Both State and local authorities failed to make timely and adequate plans to deal with such great change. Little was done to provide decent housing, transportation, health care, or other basic services to the urban immigrants. Housing tended to take the form of huge developments in the hinterlands of the cities, deprived of roads and other elementary services, where anonymity prevailed, and people were confined to concrete blocks and asphalt⁸⁵. The country people paid the highest price for this urbanization: personal isolation and disorientation, subjection to an environment that was often hostile, and conditions that strained the family⁸⁶. City life was entirely different from the one peasants knew: women were not to be housekeepers anymore, but rather had to work as much as men. As Orsini (2017) highlighted, the rural family “*founded on strong bonds of solidarity and kinship was profoundly affected by the collision with factory life*”. Men accustomed to the values of rural life, to a patriarchal concept of the family, lost contact with their roots⁸⁷. Thousands of men without any previous industrial and trade union socialization⁸⁸ had to face the “*brutal entrance into a degrading and oppressive work environment*”⁸⁹. Working relentlessly in a factory led to alienation, anomy, distress, and desperation. Another factor that cannot be left out in this analysis is the rise of television, which also contributed to alphabetizing the country: in 1951, 12.9%⁹⁰ of Italians were illiterate. It was only natural that such an instrument was to become the “*dominant medium,*” and “*one of the main long-term factors that was to mold our society’s moral*

⁸³ Ginsborg, P. (2006). *Storia d’Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi* (Vol. 2, p. 295). Piccola biblioteca Einaudi

⁸⁴ Orsini, A. (2017). *Anatomy of the red brigades: The religious mind-set of modern terrorists*. Cornell University Press

⁸⁵ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁸⁶ Ibidem

⁸⁷ Orsini, A. (2017). *Anatomy of the red brigades: The religious mind-set of modern terrorists*. Cornell University Press

⁸⁸ Reynieri, E. “Il maggio strisciante” in Pizzorno, A., Reynieri, E., Regini, M., & Regalia, I. (1978). *Lotte operaie e sindacato: il ciclo 1968-1972 in Italia*. Il mulino.

⁸⁹ Trentin, B. (1977). *Da sfruttati a produttori: lotte operaie e sviluppo capitalistico dal miracolo economico alla crisi*.

⁹⁰ https://seriestoriche.istat.it/index.php?id=1&no_cache=1&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcategoria%5D=7&tx_usercento_centofe%5Baction%5D=show&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcontroller%5D=Categoria&cHash=1b020e5419ca607971010a98271e3209

and mental attitudes”⁹¹. At the same time, especially in the decade prior to 1968, the student population expanded greatly, and the university ceased to be the preserve of an elite as the children of the middle and lower-middle classes started to enroll in the courses⁹². However, as students were rising in number, professors and facilities did not, leading to problems and discontent in the delivery of lectures.

In the mid-Sixties and Seventies, the situation worsened: growth rate declined, employment growth slowed down, and inflation began to jump up. Stagnation was right around the corner. Radicalism arose, but it was not a historical accident, as even in the international context the stimulants were many: the assassinations of Kennedy and Luther King, the Vietnam war, the Frankfurt school of philosophers, the student movements in Germany, the United States and France, activism in the Third World, the Cultural Revolution in China, South American revolutionary movements, the “myth of Che”, the “myth of the working class”, and so on⁹³. The Palestinian resistance was also highly regarded. However, as Meade (1989) reported, “*radicals were contradictory in their opinions: on the one hand, they despised the success of the capitalist economy, such as refrigerators, Fiats, and TV sets that ordinary families were beginning to be able to afford. On the other hand, the activists, many of whom were too young to have known the poverty of prewar Italy or the desperation of the postwar years, took the new Italy for granted and gave scant thought to the means by which the miracle had been achieved*”⁹⁴. Moreover, it was clear that the benefits of the economic boom had not been equal for everyone: the cleavage between rich and poor was growing, and the differences between the North and the South of Italy were also exponentially escalating. In this context of contradictions, characterized by extreme growth, social distress, and isolation, the Italian institutions were not able to lead social change and address the issues, and were subjected to “*aggressive and categorical criticism*”⁹⁵. The working masses were losing faith in the trade unions, considered too accommodating to the employers, responsible for “*repressive harshness inside the factory walls*”⁹⁶. Soon, “*civil society had become more*

⁹¹ Gorman, L., & McLean, D. (2011). *Media e società nel mondo contemporaneo* (p. 175). Il Mulino.

⁹² Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁹³ Ibidem

⁹⁴ Ibidem

⁹⁵ Martinotti, G. (1966). Le caratteristiche dell'apatia politica. *Quaderni di Sociologia*, 15, (pg 297)

⁹⁶ Lanaro, P. (1997). *Storia dell'Italia repubblicana* (p. 234). Marsilio.

political while the political institutes were declining”⁹⁷, and events escalated during the so-called “Sessantotto”. The year 1968 saw protests developing all around the world, characterized by the rise of new collective actors and demands: they concerned the refusal of all kinds of repression, asking for freedom, and expressed strong disapproval for the individualist turn taken by society. Protests often also had a political stance: people manifested against war, such as the Vietnam War, and imperialism; feminist movements were rising and questioning traditional values. The whole value system was destined to change, and society was demonstrating to be much more complex than what the traditional system could handle. Class struggle became especially attractive for the younger generations of those years that were able to identify the new contradictions and inefficiencies arising in the political, economic, and social systems: the idea that the revolution was possible even in the Western world started to become convincing⁹⁸. Meanwhile, the far right believed that the Communists were aiming at destroying the West and that such a conflict could hide itself behind the facade of peaceful protests⁹⁹. Even so, it should be noted that very often the two sides agreed on the basis on which the critics of the system laid. In early 1968, clashes among students who identified themselves with the left and those who identified themselves with the right began, with the Communist Party and the Italian Social Movement supporting their sides and blaming the other¹⁰⁰. Universities were a fertile ground for the birth of movements which advocated for a deep system change. In little time, protests expanded towards marginalized social sectors and most of all towards the factories, where people protested because of the inequality the economic growth had generated and manifested for a reform of the system. Remonstrances gradually became more and more violent and involved clashes with the police. It is important to note that, already in 1967, the CIA had promoted the so-called “Chaos operation”, which was supposed to counter the pacifist movements protesting against the Vietnam war and any potential links to foreign communist influences, which were thought to be influencing the United States’ domestic public opinion¹⁰¹. One of the

⁹⁷ Teodori, M. (1976). *Storia delle nuove sinistre in Europa (1956–1976)* (p. 536). Il Mulino.

⁹⁸ Panvini, G. (2009). *Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa. La violenza politica nell'Italia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta (1966-1975)*, Einaudi, Torino 2010.

⁹⁹ Ibidem

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem

¹⁰¹ Robarge, D. (2024). US Intelligence, Domestic Surveillance, and the Time of Troubles. <https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/>• *Articles from 1955 through 2004 can be found at*, 68(2), 1.

most controversial aspects of such an operation was the infiltration of political groups by CIA operatives¹⁰². It seems that the operation was then implemented on an international scale: in Europe, it involved infiltrations in some far left extraparlimentary groups in order to create political and social tensions, eventually favoring the rise of right-wing parties. After the students' movements in 1968, 1969 saw an increase in workers' protests, and what is called "Hot Autumn" began. In that year, contract renewals were due, and workers wanted to have their complaints heard regarding salaries and working conditions. The Hot Autumn was initially supported by unqualified factory workers, especially those coming from the South of Italy, but later acquired broader support. In this environment, study groups and basic unitary committees were developed, intertwining workers and students. Trade unions were deemed incapable of accommodating their requests. A high turnover in factories made possible to build a communication network among workers¹⁰³. It can be said that the acquisition of workers' subjectivity was what ultimately determined the Hot Autumn, which led to the signing of a new Workers' statute that included norms concerning workers' rights and dignity. Nevertheless, the generally weak economy of the early 1970s became severely enfeebled in the mid-1970s. Violent inflation and deepening recession, exacerbated by the oil crisis of 1973, thoroughly transformed Italy's economic miracle from a reality to a memory¹⁰⁴. The beginning of the decline occurred while Italy was in the middle of industrializing its society; the timing could not have been worse, and the Italians were suspended between backwardness and modernity¹⁰⁵. In addition, the far right tried to instrumentalize the anxiety of the middle class, promoting an information campaign which made it seem like the country was on the edge of a cliff¹⁰⁶ due to the Communists' plot.

In the same years, violent episodes started to affect Italy. In fact, the workers and students' protests – to both tradical right-wing and communists - appeared as a "first episode of

¹⁰² Youvan, D. C. (2024). *Operation CHAOS: The CIA's Domestic Surveillance Program and Its Implications*. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.22789.77284>

¹⁰³ Bologna S. (2019). *Il lungo autunno. Le lotte operaie degli anni Settanta*, Milano, Feltrinelli, pp. 11-18

¹⁰⁴ Alexander, Y., & Myers, K. (Eds.). (1982). *Terrorism in Europe* (RLE: Terrorism & Insurgency) (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315697260>

¹⁰⁵ See Michael A. Ledeen, *Italy in Crisis* (1977), especially 'The Political Economy'. See also Sidney Tarrow, 'Italy: Crisis, Crises or Transition?' in Lange and Tarrow (eds.), *Italy in Transition*, who writes that 'Italy is going through the second industrial revolution without having fully completed the first'. (p. 176).

¹⁰⁶ G. Panvini, *Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa. La violenza politica nell'Italia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta (1966–1975)*, Einaudi, Torino 2009, pp. 76-106.

war”¹⁰⁷. In addition, the neo-fascists became extremely hostile toward the center-left governments¹⁰⁸. One episode, in particular, was destined to change the story of the Country: the Piazza Fontana massacre in 1969, which - with a bomb explosion in the Agricultural National Bank in Milan - caused the death of 16 people and the wounding of 87. Anarchist Pinelli was considered responsible for the attacks - even by the CIA¹⁰⁹, which also believed the attack was going to increase pressures on the government and on Italy in general - but he died in circumstances not yet fully clarified while under police custody. Later, the true - neofascist - origin of the attack was discovered. It was the beginning of the strategy of tension: with this attack, radical political violence, at times supported by the State, made its proper entrance into the Italian landscape. In addition, as Panvini noted, those who organized the terrorist attacks in said time frame knew that - as a reaction - they were probably going to accelerate the adoption of radical actions by groups that were already prone to violence¹¹⁰. Indeed, both the far left and the far right had already started to interpret international conflicts as a sign of imminent world deflagration of the system¹¹¹. It should be noted, however, that the crisis which invested the country in the ‘60s is merely a precipitant of the subsequent terrorism which affected Italy: indeed, preconditions can be traced back to structural elements of the Italian State and society, such as the clash between fascism and the resistance, the north-south cleavage, the images of fragile State institutions, and the presence of political terrorism traditions¹¹², which made violent actions more popular among civil society. Between 1969 and 1980, many attacks have been conducted, including - other than those already mentioned - the massacre near the Gioia Tauro station in 1970, the massacre of Piazza della Loggia and the Italicus train massacre in 1974, and the Bologna massacre in 1980. According to Casson, the best documented historical case in which the strategy of tension was implemented occurred in Peteano. On May 31st, 1972, three members of the Carabinieri were attracted to an abandoned Fiat 500 by an anonymous phone call and

¹⁰⁷ Ventrone A., 2019, “La strage di Piazza Fontana” da *Il Politico*, Università di Pavia, p. 105

¹⁰⁸ G. Panvini, *Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa. La violenza politica nell’Italia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta (1966–1975)*, Einaudi, Torino 2009, pp. 76-106.

¹⁰⁹ Ceci, G.M. (2019), *La CIA e il terrorismo italiano: dalla Strage di Piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986)*, Roma, Carocci editore

¹¹⁰ G. Panvini, *Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa. La violenza politica nell’Italia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta (1966–1975)*, Einaudi, Torino 2009, pp. 76-106.

¹¹¹ Ibidem

¹¹² Ceci, G. M. (2013). *Il terrorismo italiano: storia di un dibattito*. Carocci editore.

were killed when they opened the hood of the car, triggering a bomb. For many years, this terrorist attack was blamed on the Red Brigades, but after Casson reopened the case, he found that the Catholic neofascist Vincenzo Vinciguerra, a member of the neofascist organization Ordine Nuovo, had carried out the crime¹¹³ and had been protected by the Italian military intelligence service. This crime and other attacks being blamed on the Red Brigades helped in discrediting the Italian Communist Party, which was the primary political enemy. The directors of the military intelligence service and politicians argued after the crime that the “Communist danger” justified increased military spending and a reduction of civil liberties in the interest of state security. In this way, the strategy of tension spread fear across Italy, discredited a political opponent, and allowed for the implementation of conservative security policies¹¹⁴. Ordine Nuovo was fairly recently deemed responsible for the Piazza Fontana massacre as well.

When talking about the strategy of tension, we must not fail to mention the international context - especially considering the Cold War environment which characterized the period - surrounding the Years of Lead and its role in the development of the strategy itself. Something that surely deserves to be mentioned is the “*Gladio Organization*”, which was part of a broader operation. After Judge Casson had investigated the Peteano attack, in 1990 he was able to obtain permission to conduct further investigations and discovered the existence of a “secret army” that had been set up by the Italian military intelligence service in close collaboration with the CIA in the years after World War II. This secret army was to function as a guerrilla unit in the event of a Soviet invasion and occupation of Italy: in the absence of a Soviet invasion, it seems to have manipulated Italian politics in a number of covert action operations during the Cold War in order to weaken the Italian Communists¹¹⁵. It seemed that there were no limits to the interventions they would make to prevent radicalization in Western Europe¹¹⁶. Prime Minister Andreotti later confirmed these findings, adding that it was still active; it was also clear that many other political figures knew about it. Andreotti confirmed the findings of

¹¹³Ganser, D. (2014). The “Strategy of Tension” in the Cold War Period. *Journal of 9/11 Studies*, 39, 1-19.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem

¹¹⁵ Ibidem

¹¹⁶ Clement, M., & Scalia, V. (2021). The strategy of tension: Understanding state labeling processes and double-binds. *Critical Criminology*, 29(3), 569-588

Casson and explained that Gladio was the Italian branch of a secret stay-behind army that had been set up after World War II by the CIA and SIFAR as part of an international network of clandestine resistance within NATO countries. In case of a Soviet invasion, the stay-behind armies - supervised and coordinated by two secret unconventional-warfare centers of NATO named “Allied Clandestine Committee” and “Clandestine Planning Committee” - would set up a resistance movement and operate behind enemy lines¹¹⁷. Nevertheless, Andreotti claimed that such an organization had nothing to do with terrorism in the country. However, Vinciguerra - Peteano’s bomber - did not agree with such a statement and, already during his trial in 1984, spoke of a parallel secret force operating in Italy that was trying to avoid a shift to the left. In the U.S., the story was poorly covered: some defined it as “*solely an Italian operation*”¹¹⁸, some refused to talk about it completely, and some believed that “*overall responsibility laid within the government and intelligence services of the U.S.*”¹¹⁹. Former CIA agent Polgar confirmed that stay-behind armies were coordinated by “*a sort of unconventional warfare planning group linked to NATO.*” Polgar insisted that “*each national service did it with varying degrees of intensity*”, adding that “*in Italy in the 1970s some of the people went a little bit beyond the charter that NATO had put down*”¹²⁰. NATO itself initially denied all allegations, but later released a statement declaring that the denial was “incorrect”. Further investigations have been conducted over the years: for example, in 2000, the Democratic Left Party - which had replaced the Italian Communist Party - concluded that during the Cold War the secret Gladio army had - together with the CIA, the Italian military intelligence service, and selected Italian neo-fascists - fought the Italian Communists and Socialists for fear that they would betray NATO “*from within*”¹²¹.

Acceptance of the expression “Strategy of tension” often depended on the political side one was standing with. Among some leftist environments, the concept of Strategy of Tension started to take hold with the book “*La strage di stato*” (1970), which stated: “As

¹¹⁷ Ganser, D. (2014). The “Strategy of Tension” in the Cold War Period. *Journal of 9/11 Studies*, 39, 1-19.

¹¹⁸ *Washington Post* 14 November 1990

¹¹⁹ Philip P. Willan, *Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy* (London: Constable, 1991)

¹²⁰ Kwitny, J. (1992, April 6). The CIA’s secret armies in Europe. *The Nation*, 445.

¹²¹ *Senato della Repubblica: Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi: Stragi e terrorismo in Italia dal dopoguerra al 1974. Relazione del Gruppo Democratici di Sinistra l’Ulivo* (Rome, June 2000)

far as the Strategy of Tension is concerned, what counts is to induce in the minds of the moderate public opinion the image of a political void, to create a psychosis of fear, of constant threat, of the impending slow, yet inevitable, collapse of the State. In this context, alongside the terrorist attacks, violence, and provocations by the fascists and the police, can be found the political agiotage carried out especially by the Christian Democrats[...]. The aim is to make people think that we are on the brink of a new 1929 or of a Greek-style coup d'état [...] taking our attention away from a different, stealthier coup d'état”¹²²

As stated by Tobagi (2020), since 1972 the term denotes a range of violent political behaviors linked by the fact that: they were carried out by the extreme right; they were essentially provocations, carried out with the intention of placing the blame on the far left; they were often supported by the state apparatus, such as the police and secret services; they had an anti-communist aim and pursued a political shift to the right¹²³. From 1972 onward, the expression began to take hold even beyond the confines of the left. The Christian Democrats, for example, used it polemically as a defense against the accusation leveled at them of exploiting terrorist attacks and violence for their own ends¹²⁴. The Bologna massacre of 1980 was later interpreted as “*part of ‘the history of a “white putsch” attempted over a twenty-year period. [...] A single, tangible plan spanning several years intended to alter the course of Italian politics*”¹²⁵. After this, the strategy of tension was defined - at least in judicial circles - as “*The strategy for the material and psychological conditioning of the dynamics and interactions between our political system and society, which even goes as far as using political assassination and bombings, whilst hiding from the eyes of public opinion*”¹²⁶.

For what concerns the Italian political landscape during the Years of Lead, an interesting analysis can be found in “*Decline and dissolution of Italian terrorism: the case of the Brigade Rosse, 1970-2001*” by De Graaf (2010). According to the author, political

¹²² La strage di Stato: controinchiesta (Rome: Samonà e Savelli, 1970, repr. Odradek, 2006), p. 109.

¹²³ Tobagi, B. (2020). What are we talking about when we talk about the strategy of tension? *ISLG Bulletin: the Annual Newsletter of the Italian Studies Library Group*: 19, 2020/2021, 16-34.

¹²⁴ Ibidem

¹²⁵ Monti, V. ‘Per i giudici troppi indizi confermano: è Gelli il deus ex machina della strage’, *Corriere della sera*, 14 December 1985, p. 4. (footnote contained in Tobagi, 2020)

¹²⁶ La strategia delle stragi: dalla sentenza della Corte d'assise di Venezia per la strage di Peteano (1989), Editori Riuniti, p. 312.

polarization contributed to a climate of mistrust in the democratic system. Since the early Sixties, the Christian Democratic Party had governed in a center-left coalition with the Socialist Party. However, such an alliance did not bring the much-needed socioeconomic reforms. On the contrary, it contributed to the consolidation of corruption, further fueling distrust among political parties. Coalitions were starting to be perceived as less and less stable. Meanwhile, the Communist Party was gaining popular support thanks to its proposals on pluralism, constitutional rights, and reforms. However, many supporters felt that the Party was betraying its revolutionary purpose and, as a response, created extra-parliamentary movements such as Potere Operaio and Lotta Continua which - on the other hand - still believed in the possibility of a revolution¹²⁷. In fact, Potere Operaio regarded itself as an “insurrectional party” with the aim of directing the masses towards the armed struggle¹²⁸: indeed, the far left seemed to be driving such social unrest, particularly among factory workers and young people¹²⁹. Already in 1969, Potere Operaio dedicated particular attention to emerging movements, such as the Red Brigades and the Gruppi d’Azione Partigiana¹³⁰, and cooperated with them. Concurrently, Italy saw the presence of far-right movements which even tried to carry out violent coups d’état, such as the one conducted in 1970 by Borghese - leader of the “Fronte Nazionale” - which was called off for unknown reasons and of which the United States had knowledge and that apparently discouraged¹³¹. Moreover, some personalities in the U.S. believed that the military had started to be more active towards the political environment¹³². Considering such circumstances, antifascists and social-revolutionary groups felt that they had valid reasons to act and adopted more and more radical actions. Moreover, this demonstrates that the level of violence in Italy was already quite high, while the level of tolerance was low. Consequently, the neo-fascists saw in the extra-parliamentary left a branch of the

¹²⁷ de Graaf, B. (2010). Decline and dissolution of Italian terrorism: The case of the brigade rosse, 1970-2001. In *IV Jornadas internacionales sobre terrorismo los finales del terrorismo: lecciones desde la perspectiva comparada* (pp. 1-22). Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad de Estudios Parlamentarios y del Estado Autonómico.

¹²⁸ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

¹²⁹ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

¹³⁰ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

¹³¹ Ceci, G.M. (2019), *La CIA e il terrorismo italiano: dalla Strage di Piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986)*, Roma, Carocci editore

¹³² Ibidem

Communist Party, while the far left considered the neo-fascists as a part of the plan of the Christian Democracy to induce an authoritative turn in the country¹³³. Since 1964, but particularly since the attack of Piazza Fontana in 1969, the far right had conspired with the military security organizations to deploy what they called “Strategia della tensione”¹³⁴, which consisted of random terrorist attacks with the aim of instilling fear in the civil society and destabilizing the already precarious social and political equilibria. Already on the occasion of the 1968 elections, a political crisis affected the country, and the neo-fascists feared that the Communists could gain more power: from that moment on, such a fear became more important than the anti-system instances promoted by the students’ movements¹³⁵. Then, at the elections of 1975, the PCI registered an unprecedented success at the polls and became the largest Communist Party in a Western country: it was thus not wise to totally exclude it from the government, especially in light of the pervasive crisis that was affecting the country. In the meantime, the United States believed that that year’s elections would mark the inability of the Christian Democracy to rule without the cooperation of the Communists, and such a hypothesis fueled their questions about the possibility of a military coup¹³⁶. In addition, the U.S. - Kissinger in particular - firmly opposed the possibility of including the Italian Communist Party in a government coalition. They made it clear that if something like it were to happen, Italy would not have had access to the U.S. economic support. In spite of the U.S. warnings, Aldo Moro was one of the main promoters of openness toward the Italian Communist Party (in Italian, PCI), especially following Enrico Berlinguer’s proposal of the so-called “*Compromesso Storico*” (historic compromise): according to such an idea, the PCI should have followed a policy of cooperation among communists and socialists and the popular forces that voted for the Christian Democracy¹³⁷. Berlinguer’s idea originated from the coup d’état that took place in Chile under the leadership of Pinochet, which saw the killing

¹³³ Panvini, G. (2009). *Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa. La violenza politica nell'Italia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta (1966-1975)*, Einaudi, Torino 2010.

¹³⁴ de Graaf, B. (2010). Decline and dissolution of italian terrorism: The case of the brigade rosse, 1970-2001. In *IV Jornadas internacionales sobre terrorismo los finales del terrorismo: lecciones desde la perspectiva comparada* (pp. 1-22). Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad de Estudios Parlamentarios y del Estado Autonómico.

¹³⁵ G. Panvini, *Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa. La violenza politica nell'Italia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta (1966-1975)*, Einaudi, Torino 2009, pp. 76-106.

¹³⁶ Ceci, G.M. (2019), *La CIA e il terrorismo italiano: dalla Strage di Piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986)*, Roma, Carocci editore

¹³⁷ Berlinguer, E. (1975), reprinted from *Rinascita*, 28 September, 5, 9 October 1973, 609-39

of Marxist President Allende and the establishment of a military dictatorship, characterized by the repression of political opponents. This showed that winning the elections would not guarantee electoral stability, and therefore an alliance with the Catholics was necessary. After an unsuccessful attempt to form a government, an agreement was reached between Moro and Berlinguer: the proposed formula envisaged that the ministers would belong to the Christian Democracy, while the PCI would be part of the parliamentary majority sustaining the government¹³⁸, providing its confidence vote without practically taking part in the government. The Parliament's deliberation was set for March 16th, 1978. Such an idea - according to the Red Brigades - would scuttle every chance of revolution and therefore required a vast attack on the state and its institutions, in accordance with the ideas they had started to develop since 1974: the main target had to be the Christian Democracy. Moro was kidnapped the same day. Andreotti was originally identified as a target, but he was better protected than Moro, so he was ruled out. The events surrounding Moro's kidnapping will be dealt with in depth later in this dissertation.

To conclude this section, it might be interesting to briefly look at some of the main terrorist groups that operated in the Years of Lead. Indeed, the Red Brigades - which will be discussed more in depth in the next paragraph - are probably the most known organization of the period, but surely not the only one, as we already had the chance to mention. Ordine nuovo, which we already mentioned when we briefly talked about the Piazza Fontana massacre, was a movement that originated in 1954 as a study center within the Italian Social Movement. It split from it only two years later, due to opposition against the party leader's political line, seen as too moderate. During the first years of activity, it was supported by Spanish and Portuguese intelligence, and, during the '60s, it established contacts with the Italian secret services and military¹³⁹. Although formally disbanded in 1973, when its leaders were accused of reforming the National Fascist Party, its activities continued to be carried out clandestinely at least until 1977. The main attacks are the one on the Italicus train, the massacre of Piazza Fontana, and Piazza della Loggia. Another far-right organization was the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari, which operated from 1978

¹³⁸ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer, pg 98-99

¹³⁹ <https://www.memoria.san.beniculturali.it/organizzazioni/-/organization/detail/be3c59cc-71ff-4f64-a3e2-912d9595e559%233195faf8-6a92-4755-9e92-cf193d3d095c/Ordine+Nuovo+%28On%29>

and whose founders also came from sections of the Italian Social Movement. It acted through robberies, aggressions - especially towards leftist targets - and assassinations of state personnel which tried to counter right-wing terrorism. They defined themselves as a spontaneous movement, but they were more prone to action rather than theoretical elaboration. Their main attack was the Bologna massacre in 1980¹⁴⁰. For the far-left, apart from the Red Brigades, Prima Linea - active between 1976 and 1981 - can be mentioned. It is considered second in dimensions only to the Red Brigades, and it formed within the movement Autonomia Operaia Organizzata. After heightening tension through the wounding of some factory foremen, their first planned killing was the one of Pedenovi, provincial councilor of the Italian Social Movement. Prima Linea aspired to be a factor of radicalization operating within the movements, not a combatant party leading the masses. Moreover, it preferred to be more fluid in its organization. After Moro's kidnapping, the organization was forced to go into hiding and began to attack more and more, with the apparent purpose of gaining media attention. In 1979, discussions arose about whether to keep fighting or retreat. Violence continued until 1981 and the organization was officially disbanded in 1983¹⁴¹. To conclude, it might also be interesting to mention the "1977 movement", which was a spontaneous political and extra-parliamentary movement: it was supposed to be a development and transformation of the workers and students' movement which emerged in 1968. It had the characteristics of a cultural vanguard, and it opposed the dominant party system and the trade unions, as well as questioning the form of organizations students had imposed themselves up to that point. During 1977, the actions of the movement became more and more bloody.

1.2.2 THE RED BRIGADES

The Red Brigades were one of the main terrorist organizations active during the Years of Lead. According to Orsini (2017), the history of the Red Brigades is the history of a political movement operating with the typical words, thoughts, and dogmas of a religious

¹⁴⁰<https://www.memoria.san.beniculturali.it/organizzazioni/-/organization/detail/be3c59cc-71ff-4f64-a3e2-912d9595e559%237fb16505-d842-41bf-9472-278dd39db22a/Nuclei+armati+rivoluzionari+%28NAR%29>

¹⁴¹<https://www.memoria.san.beniculturali.it/organizzazioni/-/organization/detail/be3c59cc-71ff-4f64-a3e2-912d9595e559%23b58596cf-5042-4665-8a37-453e7325853e/Prima+linea+%28PL%29>

sect. The only plan for living they acknowledged is the political one¹⁴², and they extended the scope of politics to embrace all of human existence¹⁴³. Individuals who embraced the revolution were the “*Christ who sacrificed himself to redeem humanity*”¹⁴⁴. The members of the organization regarded themselves as “saviors”¹⁴⁵ and as guardians of the truth, which would eliminate every form of human suffering. A better world was to be achieved with violence, the use of which was forced by the oppressive capitalist system. However, violence has not always been the first resort of the members of the Organization: in fact, the large majority of them had participated in legal political experiences before joining the Red Brigades, such as activities in the Communist Party youth organization¹⁴⁶ or Potere Operaio in Morucci and Piperno’s cases¹⁴⁷. Their choice regarding the use of violence was not improvised, but rather was the outcome of a process of political maturation: clandestinity and armed struggle were, in this regard, the result of such maturation. According to Panvini, it can be said that the attack of Piazza Fontana contributed to the resort to the armed struggle¹⁴⁸. The Red Brigades surely deserve to be analyzed in depth, especially in light of the focus of the third chapter of this dissertation: Aldo Moro’s kidnapping.

According to many scholars, the first Red Brigades formation emerged from the ranks of the 1960s worker and student protest movements, where they claimed support for the local trade unions in their fight against right-wing political bourgeoisie¹⁴⁹. There is evidence that some members of the Red Brigades had started their training long before 1970 – the year of formal birth of the Organization –, and that external influences contributed to shape the organization as well as sometimes weaken it. In fact, Sejna, a defecting Czech general then allied with the CIA, provided proof that at least twelve

¹⁴² Orsini, A. (2017). *Anatomy of the red brigades: The religious mind-set of modern terrorists*. Cornell University Press

¹⁴³ Talmon, J. (1970). *The origins of totalitarian democracy* (p. 1). Shere books Ltd.

¹⁴⁴ Brigadist Enzo Fontana to G. Bocca, *Noi terroristi*, 42.

¹⁴⁵ Zavoli, S. (2017). *La notte della Repubblica* (p. 378). Mondadori.

¹⁴⁶ Rimanelli, M. (1989). Italian terrorism and society, 1940s–1980s: Roots, ideologies, evolution, and international connections. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 12(4), 249-296.

¹⁴⁷ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

¹⁴⁸ G. Panvini, *Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa. La violenza politica nell'Italia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta (1966–1975)*, Einaudi, Torino 2009, pp. 76-106.

¹⁴⁹ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

Italian citizens - among which Franceschini and Pelli - had been trained by the Soviets in Czechoslovakia, especially in the Doupov camp, at the end of the 1960s¹⁵⁰, before the Red Brigades were founded. Andreotti publicly admitted in a 1974 parliamentary hearing his full knowledge of Czechoslovakian involvement in training during the late 1960s, but later retracted his statement¹⁵¹. For what concerns the domestic context, the Red Brigades were forced to deal with infiltrators. In this regard, an important example of infiltration is the one of Dotti: he was provided by Cagol with the names of the first nucleus of future Brigades members, as it can be understood by reading Franceschini's auditions for the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry¹⁵². Later in the chapter, Girotto's infiltration will be covered as well. Concerning international contacts, several members of the Red Brigades affirmed that the Israeli secret services had attempted to contact the Organization around 1972, offering information, weapons, and training in exchange for an acceleration of the Red Brigades' activities in Italy. The Israeli's aim was supposedly to put pressure on the United States to increase its support for Israel by weakening Italy and consequently increasing Israel's relative importance to the maintenance of U.S. interests¹⁵³. In a similar fashion, former agents of the Italian Secret Services revealed that "*in each [Red Brigades'] cell there was a key figure directly in contact with the KGB*" (Arconte, 2005). The Red Brigades were also in touch with other communist groups, such as the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Palestine Liberation Organization¹⁵⁴. According to Ceci, the hypothesis of similar international connections gained support among scholars already in the 1970s and 1980s: some believed that foreign powers - especially the Soviets - only aimed at taking advantage of Italy's territory for their actions, while others thought that Italian terrorism was part of an international conspiracy¹⁵⁵. In this respect, Peci's confessions - while pinpointing foreign logistic support - always stressed also that no

¹⁵⁰ https://leg13.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/doc/xxiii/064v01t05p02_RS/00000003.pdf, pg. 4

¹⁵¹ Rimanelli, M. (1989). Italian terrorism and society, 1940s–1980s: Roots, ideologies, evolution, and international connections. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 12(4), 249-296.

¹⁵² <https://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/pdf/68/audiz2/audizione/2017/01/26/leg.17.stencomm.data20170126.U1.com68.audiz2.audizione.0120.pdf>

¹⁵³ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

¹⁵⁴ Irrera, D. (2014). Learning from the past: Case of the Red Brigades in Italy. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 6(6), 16-20.

¹⁵⁵ Ceci, G. M. (2013). *Il terrorismo italiano: storia di un dibattito*. Carocci editore.

foreign interferences directed or influenced the Red Brigades's strategy and ideology¹⁵⁶, which thus remained a domestically controlled movement.

Red Brigades leaders viewed themselves and their ideologies as the standard-bearers of the Marxist-Leninist Communist movement¹⁵⁷ and carried upon themselves an apocalyptic vision of history. They aimed at the creation of a socialist state that adhered to the socialism practiced by Lenin's government from 1917 to 1924 and that of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution¹⁵⁸. They - like Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao - believed that breaking the bureaucratic and military part of the state was the precondition of every true proletariat revolution¹⁵⁹. For what concerns external influences on both ideology and tactics, they included the model of urban guerrilla proposed by Marighella in his manual of 1969 and the one established by Tupamaros in Uruguay and the Palestinian nationalists' terrorism during the Six-Day War in 1967¹⁶⁰. For the organization, the revolution was a mission¹⁶¹. According to Ruggiero (2005), the Red Brigades regarded themselves as one active nucleus within a revolutionary process, which would have taken its own course irrespective of the Red Brigades' willingness to lead it. Violence - the means through which the revolution had to be carried out - on the one hand was meant to express the maximum concentration of political action; on the other hand, it was a response to state violence¹⁶². For them, the revolution was "*an immediate idea of radical change, of upturning the foundations*,"¹⁶³ and it was going to "*lead to the last war: the class war for a communist society*."¹⁶⁴ In 1975 the group published their first doctrine "manifesto" that contained the development of the Resolution of Strategic

¹⁵⁶ Rimanelli, M. (1989). Italian terrorism and society, 1940s–1980s: Roots, ideologies, evolution, and international connections. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 12(4), 249-296

¹⁵⁷ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

¹⁵⁸ Raufer, X. (1993). The red brigades: farewell to arms. *Stud. Confl. Terror.* 16(4), 315–325 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576109308435937>

¹⁵⁹ <https://www.bibliotecamarxista.org/brigade%20rosse/1975/ds%2075.htm>

¹⁶⁰ Al-Khoury, D. (2020). Radicalisation: old and new, a comparative analysis of the Red Brigades and the Islamic State. *Quality & Quantity*, 54(3), 867-885.

¹⁶¹ Orsini, A. (2017). *Anatomy of the red brigades: The religious mind-set of modern terrorists*. Cornell University Press

¹⁶² Ruggiero, V. (2005). Brigade Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. *Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289

¹⁶³ Novelli, G., & Tranfaglia, N. (2007). *Vite sospese* (p. 238). Dalai Editore.

¹⁶⁴ "Document of Internal Reflection", published in the periodical Brigade Rosse no.1, June 1975, in Dossier Brigade Rosse 1:372

Directorate, which helped to define the Organization's goals and objectives¹⁶⁵. It defined the concept of "imperialism" - a global dominion system guided by the United States, centered on the interests of large multinational enterprises' interests - and it highlighted the important strategic position occupied by Italy, especially because of the presence of a strong Communist Party and of a pervasive economic, political, and military crisis. The imperialist crisis meant, according to the authors, "global imperialist counterrevolution", which should have led to the reorganization of all aspects of society and institutions. It is interesting to note that similar concepts had already been developed in early 1974 by Negri, a member of Potere Operaio¹⁶⁶: his language has thus been greatly reused by the Red Brigades. The Christian Democracy was heavily criticized for its political project, seen as hostile towards the counterrevolutionary ideas and as a mediator for the capitalists' interests. The Communist party was also criticized for its inability to suggest alternatives to the status quo, and the "historic compromise" was deemed as a self-serving way to acquire privileges. Although the state should not be fully dismantled yet, actions such as urban guerrilla, breaking corporate bonds, and fighting against the Christian Democracy should be conducted¹⁶⁷. Eliminating political oppression was one of the most significant elements highlighted in the justification behind both the establishment of the organization¹⁶⁸ and it justified and made somewhat reasonable the targeting of police and legal authorities. The new doctrine also represented a major shift in the group's original ideology of supporting local political activities of the workers' movement. The group manifesto realigned the Red Brigades into a more nationalistic militant movement lined up against regional and national authorities¹⁶⁹. In 1977, Moretti took leadership of the Strategic Directorate. A new Strategic Resolution was released in 1978, in which the importance of using violent means to overthrow the state was highlighted. According to this Resolution, there was no such thing as "*national bourgeoisie*", but rather it was a "*local articulation of a larger imperialist bourgeoisie*". This gave to the class struggle

¹⁶⁵ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

¹⁶⁶ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.bibliotecamarxista.org/brigade%20rosse/1975/ds%2075.htm>

¹⁶⁸ Al-Khoury, D. (2020). Radicalisation: old and new a comparative analysis of the Red Brigades and the Islamic State. *Quality & Quantity*, 54(3), 867-885.

¹⁶⁹ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

the character of counterrevolutionary long-term class war. Considered that overproduction has been usually solved through war, the authors believe that the next one will see the U.S. against the USSR: class war is seen as the only way to avoid a Third World War. The Resolution was largely inspired by the words of Lenin on capitalism and imperialism, according to which the latter is a superstructure of the former. Similarly, the Multinational Imperialist State - an expression coined by the authors - is a national superstructure of multinational imperialism. The political personnel act in accordance with the Multinational Imperialist States' will: the Christian Democrats are an expression of it. At the same time, the state was seen as being progressively centralized in order to control socio-political struggles. A "preventive counterrevolution" against the state - here seen neither as fascist nor as social democratic - must be carried out. The Italian Communist Party was seen as an integral part of the Imperialist State, and the idea of a "historic compromise" was heavily criticized. The state apparatus, including politicians, judges, and security forces, had to be attacked and destroyed. Therefore, it was necessary to change from 'armed peace' to 'war'. It was necessary to develop the proletariat movement by fostering the creation of a "Combatant Communist Party", which however should not be identified as the Red Brigades¹⁷⁰.

For what concerns the organizational structure of the Red Brigades, which resembled the ones typically found in armies, according to Sundquist (2010) some information was contained in the Strategic Directorate developed in 1974. Such a structure consisted of an Executive Committee, urban and regional divisions (in Italian, *Colonne*), and brigade fronts (in Italian, *Fronti*). The Strategic Directorate acted as a military command, establishing protocols and guidelines to be followed by the entire organization. The Executive Committee functioned as a headquarters: it published said guidelines and ensured that day-to-day operations ran smoothly. Urban and regional divisions were designed to break down the command and control of the organization according to the instructions coming from above, in a hierarchical way. Finally, within each column there were the fronts, which were responsible for specific duties such as logistics, propaganda, and recruitment¹⁷¹. Each level responded to the Strategic Directorate. There were at least

¹⁷⁰ <http://www.sebbenchesiamodonne.it/risoluzione-della-direzione-strategica-febbraio-1978/>

¹⁷¹ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

six columns in cities such as Milan, Genoa, Turin, Rome, Naples, and the Veneto region¹⁷². Columns had different roles: in the northern part of the country, they were active around large factories, while in Rome the goal was to attack political leaders¹⁷³. The whole organization was characterized by a vertical chain of command, from the fronts up to the Strategic Directorate. This structure enabled all decision-making processes to originate at the highest level while maintaining a secretive wall division between the levels¹⁷⁴. Raufer, in an interview conducted with one of the leaders of the Red Brigades, reported some words that well explain on what basis recruiting was conducted and what it was like to be in the Organization:

*“Membership depended on [...] his ability to renounce a normal life, his family, his studies, his friends and sentimental liaisons. And naturally, on his moral capacity to take up arms, to embark on the path to revolution without the slightest guarantee that it would be victorious one day and with prison or death as more realistic outcomes. At the time, only someone endowed with powerful idealism, not just ideological convictions, and with an implacable desire to fight injustice to create a new society could be admitted to the organization”*¹⁷⁵.

In the so-called "Decalogo del brigatista"¹⁷⁶, a code of conduct is displayed. For example, it is stated that clandestinity is a fundamental condition for the survival of a political and military organization that acts within an Imperialist metropolis. Clandestinity gives an immense advantage, but for it to be effective it has to be intended in both a defensive and offensive manner. Talking about the organization in public or with people not involved in it is to be avoided. Phone calls must be brief, as there is the assumption that they are being controlled. A car will be provided by the organization: documents must be provided if requested by police agents and are to be regularly controlled to ensure nothing is wrong

¹⁷² Irrera, D. (2014). Learning from the past: Case of the Red Brigades in Italy. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 6(6), 16-20.

¹⁷³ Al-Khoury, D. (2020). Radicalisation: old and new a comparative analysis of the Red Brigades and the Islamic State. *Quality & Quantity*, 54(3), 867-885.

¹⁷⁴ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

¹⁷⁵ Raufer, X. (1993). "The Red Brigades: Farewell to Arms," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 16(4), pp. 317-318.

¹⁷⁶ Contained in Pintore, G. (2016). Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007: la lotta armata e le verità nascoste. *Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007*, 1-407, pg 227-238

with it in order to avoid unwanted attention. Parking near headquarters should be avoided. Houses will also be provided: only people belonging to the organization can hang around or know its location. People living there have to choose for themselves a social figure and a job and must act accordingly. Members of the organization must take care of themselves. They should have no more than two documents, which should be displayed if requested, and they should carry their weapon. Identity is to be disclosed only in front of a judge. Being photographed or appearing on TV is to be avoided. Notebooks with phone numbers are prohibited. Barriers should be put between oneself and the others, including family. Members of the organization should be able to scan the environment for anomalies, such as spies or unknown cars.

According to Ruggiero (2005), the origin of the Red Brigades is to be found in study groups set up in Milan factories such as Pirelli and Siemens. These groups included blue- and white-collar employees, and they were able to remain independent from the official trade unions¹⁷⁷. The study groups quickly became known as “autonomous assemblies”, in which the debate was open to everyone: such type of debate rapidly spread in universities and among secondary school students (Balestrini and Moroni, 1988), particularly in the University of Trento. Members of the autonomous groups would meet and share their daily lives, setting up communes. The new factory groups, outside activists, and university students constituted the foundations of the Collettivo Politico Metropolitano, which attracted university students and professors¹⁷⁸. According to most scholars, as said earlier, the precipitating factor in the decision to take up arms was the attack of Piazza Fontana in 1969¹⁷⁹. Four more attacks were conducted that same day. Among the formally yet-to-be-formed Red Brigades, the attack was perceived as a ‘state-sponsored massacre’, and violence started to be conceived as the only way to oppose the oppressive system. In the meantime, the founding group - composed of Alberto Franceschini, Renato Curcio, and Margherita (also known as Mara) Cagol - had met at an assembly of the Collettivo Politico Metropolitano in Milan. Mario Moretti also

¹⁷⁷ Ruggiero, V. (2005). Brigate Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. *Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289.

¹⁷⁸ Ibidem

¹⁷⁹ Tarantelli, C. B. (2010). The Italian Red Brigades and the structure and dynamics of terrorist groups. *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 91(3), 541-560

participated in the assembly. In 1970, many extremists reunited in Pecorile and decided to adopt the “armed struggle”. This was the official beginning of the Red Brigades. According to Franceschini, the events of Piazza Fontana were “*fundamental in determining the tense atmosphere*”¹⁸⁰ and in making the group decide to go for an “armed propaganda”, which was supposed to prepare the ground for the armed struggle: in this first phase, the Red Brigades were open to a dialogue with that left which defined itself as “revolutionary”¹⁸¹. At the beginning of 1970, the firsts leaflets - characterized by a five-pointed star - started to circulate and to spread the concept of “*self-organized proletariat*”, which had to fight against their masters with the same means that were being used against the workers’ class¹⁸². The group initially directed their efforts in large cities such as Milan and Turin, where they viewed themselves as offshoots of the *Autonomia Operaia* extra-parliamentary movement¹⁸³. It was the period of contracts renewal fights, and trade unions and the Communist Party were perceived as not competent enough. The Red Brigades acted mainly through burning factory foremen’s cars and targeted bombings. They also conducted brief kidnappings of such managers with the slogan “*Hit one in order to educate one hundred*”. Targets were immediately recognizable symbols, as they were related to specific arenas in which counter-power was being exercised¹⁸⁴. Between 1972 and 1973, these initial small attacks - partly carried out in cooperation with Potere Operaio thanks to the so-called “Partito Armato di Mirafiori”¹⁸⁵ and combined with the use of a new language - allowed them to take root among politicized workers¹⁸⁶. As stated by Moretti himself, “*the first actions of the Red Brigades did not differ much from the ones used by factory workers; what was new is that the attacks were claimed [...] it was not a sporadic action of an “angry person” anymore, it was an organized*

¹⁸⁰ Pintore, G. (2016). Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007: la lotta armata e le verità nascoste. *Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007*, 1-407, pg 21

¹⁸¹ Dogliotti, C. (2022). Come pesci nell'acqua: le Brigate rosse ei contesti della violenza politica.

¹⁸² *Sinistra Proletaria*, 20 ottobre 1970, “foglio di lotta”

¹⁸³ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

¹⁸⁴ Ruggiero, V. (2005). Brigade Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. *Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289.

¹⁸⁵ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

¹⁸⁶ Ruggiero, V. (2005). Brigade Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. *Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289.

group”¹⁸⁷. Meanwhile, the leaders advocated for the creation of a revolutionary state through the use of armed struggle in order to create a split between the Italian Government and other Western Alliances¹⁸⁸. The group mainly used firearms and explosives in their attacks: weapons were obtained from the international market¹⁸⁹, and money was gathered primarily through robberies.

A second phase in the Red Brigades’ activities can be identified between 1974 and 1976, when the Organization entered the path of militarism¹⁹⁰ and aimed at carrying out attacks at the heart of the state: the attacks were not to be conducted in factories anymore, but rather had to target representatives of the political and judicial world. There is a shift from class logic to clash logic¹⁹¹. Until this moment, the Red Brigades were not regarded as a primary matter of concern for the Italian Government. The phase began in a negative way, due to the arrest of the first generation of brigadists: indeed, Pisetta was arrested by the police and accepted to infiltrate back into the Organization. The information he provided led to the above-mentioned arrests, and the remaining members decided to hide in clandestinity¹⁹². In Pintore’s “*Dossier Brigade Rosse*” (2016), we learn that the Red Brigades reorganized themselves and took on the structure that was explained earlier, divided into Brigade and Colonne. Objectives were divided in “fronti”: the logistic one had to provide money through illegal activities; the factory one had to infiltrate the factories in order to recruit more people and spread propaganda; and the “counterrevolution” represented the armed militia, which had the task of carrying out terrorist attacks. In this phase, there was targeted violence against the opposition, as well as random violence against citizens: legitimate goals slowly came to be pursued through illegitimate means, and the growth of the Red Brigades started to gradually appear

¹⁸⁷ Moretti M., 2007, a cura di Mosca C. e Rossanda R., *Brigate rosse: una storia italiana*, Milano, Mondadori

¹⁸⁸ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

¹⁸⁹ Irrera, D. (2014). Learning from the past: Case of the Red Brigades in Italy. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 6(6), 16-20.

¹⁹⁰ Dogliotti, C. (2022). Come pesci nell'acqua: le Brigate rosse e i contesti della violenza politica.

¹⁹¹ Ibidem

¹⁹² Pintore, G. (2016). Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007: la lotta armata e le verità nascoste. *Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007*, 1-407, pg 28

independent of the social issues they addressed¹⁹³. The first act of the second phase was the kidnapping of Judge Sossi on April 16th, 1974, who was involved in some legal proceedings concerning left-wing extremists. The action generated an enormous echo in Italian society and media.



Fig. 1.4, La Stampa on the kidnapping of Judge Sossi, 19/04/1974

While Franceschini was interrogating Sossi in what was defined as “people’s prison”, the Italian government was deciding whether to negotiate with the Red Brigades or not (*Trattativa o Fermezza*), and ultimately tried to pursue a negotiation. The release of those under trial was the ransom required and officially accepted some days later, but, after Sossi was freed, the defendants remained in prison¹⁹⁴. What emerges from this event is that within the Organization there was not one single current of thought: some - including Franceschini and Cagol - wanted to free Sossi immediately after the kidnapping, since they thought that the government would never free the members of the “*Gruppo XXII Ottobre*”; some - like Moretti -, on the other hand, wanted to kill the judge. The event, among many others, also led to the loss of support from part of the workers’ movements:

¹⁹³ Ruggiero, V. (2005). *Brigate Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289.

¹⁹⁴ Ibidem

it can be said that the workers realized that the criminal and bloody actions of the Organization did not improve their working conditions or the balance of power equilibria, but rather seemed abstract and unnecessarily cruel, thus determining the end of their support¹⁹⁵. Almost two months later, some brigadists killed two neo-fascists in their office inside the provincial headquarters of the Italian Social Movement. The killing was most likely not intentional, but it still represented the first bloodshed attributable to the Red Brigades, which decided to claim the homicides¹⁹⁶ to demonstrate that “*if necessary, the Red Brigades would kill*”¹⁹⁷. In the meantime - as it can be read in the “*Dossier Brigate Rosse*” (Pintore, 2016) - in 1974, General of the Army Dalla Chiesa was appointed to lead a task force with the aim of investigating the Red Brigades. Investigative methods included subdividing tasks and considering the broader context surrounding the attacks, as well as carefully understanding the structure and thoughts of the Organization. Concurrently, Silvano Girotto, who was collaborating with the police against the armed struggle, infiltrated the Red Brigades and met Curcio and Franceschini. The group had to meet on September 8th along with Moretti, who was informed of Girotto’s real intentions and did not attend the meeting. However, he was not able to warn Curcio and Franceschini, who were arrested. Other scholars, differently, think that it is possible that Moretti intentionally did not warn the other two. A couple of months later, they were freed by an armed commando of their associates led by Cagol¹⁹⁸. In 1975, the first Strategic Resolution was published. The arrest of Curcio and Franceschini had left more space for Moretti, who started to strongly promote the armed struggle. During the same period, the Italian Communist Party won a relative majority in all major cities and an absolute majority in traditional “red” cities. The elections, according to the Red Brigades, had shown the political will to defeat the Christian Democracy, a will which was in itself revolutionary in nature. The party was portrayed as the hub of the Italian political system, and with the collapse of that hub, the whole equilibrium was deemed likely to go with it, opening up space for radical clashes and unprecedented conflict (Spazzali, 1996).

¹⁹⁵ Dogliotti, C. (2022). Come pesci nell'acqua: le Brigate rosse e i contesti della violenza politica.

¹⁹⁶ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

¹⁹⁷ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

¹⁹⁸ Ruggiero, V. (2005). Brigate Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. *Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289

Between 1974 and 1975 Dalla Chiesa, with his “Police anti-terrorism nucleus”, was able to arrest hundreds of terrorists, supporters, and sympathizers, and Cagol was killed. By one estimate, only twelve Red Brigades regulars remained at large; virtually the entire nucleus of founders and leaders was in custody awaiting trial¹⁹⁹. The state thought that the fight against the Organization had been won and it was decided to dismantle Dalla Chiesa’s task force, despite the General's disapproval. Yet again, the Red Brigades were reorganizing themselves under the leadership of Moretti, who advocated for an upsurge of violence. In some social corners, the expansion of violence carried out by the Red Brigades was seen as the result of the United States’ indirect involvement in anti-Communist destabilizing operations²⁰⁰. Meanwhile, the group was expanding its recruitment activities, moving from working middle-class areas to intellectuals in universities.

As a consequence of the political system atmosphere discussed above - in what can be considered the third phase of the Organization activity - the Red Brigades began to target leading figures of the Christian Democracy, presumptuously regarding their violent attacks as a mere extension of the popular will to get rid of that party²⁰¹. It was around this time that foreign secret services such as the CIA started to be concerned by the Organization's growth: if, before that moment, the CIA had known about its existence but thought that it was not going to represent an actor of radical violence, now and in the following years the concern kept growing, especially in light of the fear of international links among “red” movements²⁰². At the same time, even Aldo Moro greatly feared such a wave of political terrorism and supported the hypothesis of the presence of international links tied to the Red Brigades; concurrently, he called for a more prominent action from the United States. Andreotti, on the other hand, was still more cautious about the matter²⁰³.

¹⁹⁹ de Graaf, B. (2010). Decline and dissolution of italian terrorism: The case of the brigade rosse, 1970-2001. In *IV Jornadas internacionales sobre terrorismo los finales del terrorismo: lecciones desde la perspectiva comparada* (pp. 1-22). Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad de Estudios Parlamentarios y del Estado Autonómico.

²⁰⁰ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.

²⁰¹ Ruggiero, V. (2005). Brigade Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. *Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289

²⁰² Ceci, G.M. (2019), *La CIA e il terrorismo italiano: dalla Strage di Piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986)*, Roma, Carocci editore

²⁰³ Ibidem

In 1976 the first planned murder was carried out: the victim was judge Coco, who had not kept his promise to bail a number of political prisoners in exchange for the release of fellow Judge Sossi²⁰⁴. The killing was also fostered by the beginning of the process against the Red Brigades, and the reconstructed Organization wanted to prevent it from happening. The brigadists regarded themselves as political prisoners and threatened their own public defenders and the popular jury²⁰⁵: one by one, they either got killed or decided to abandon their task, and the process got suspended. The Red Brigades also started to accuse and attack journalists with the aim of stamping out their counterrevolutionary action carried out through the media²⁰⁶. Kneecapping was frequently used as an intimidation tactic. The process restarted in 1978 in an atmosphere of terror, generated by the serial killings, from part of the Organization, of those involved in it. Meanwhile, with the new Strategic Directorate under Moretti, in 1977 it was declared that the working-class avant-garde was effectively in place and that “*the time had come to set up the Communist Combatant Party*” in order to guide the working class to the next political level²⁰⁷. The attack that shook Italy the most was the kidnapping, and eventually the killing, of Aldo Moro in 1978. Such an event will be analyzed in depth in the third chapter of this dissertation. After Moro’s killing, the Red Brigades started to decline. Nevertheless, they still committed some more terrorist attacks, one of the most prominent being the kidnapping of NATO's Deputy Chief of Staff James Dozier in 1981. Such abduction represented a tactical and strategic shift for the Red Brigades, since it was the first time that the group had targeted a foreigner²⁰⁸. In exchange for his freedom, the group demanded reproach of U.S. military forces and NATO. It also called for all European revolutionary forces to join the struggle, which would then have acquired an international scale. Dozier was rescued alive by the police forty-two days later. After some years, a new organization called “New Red Brigades” emerged with the intent of continuing the struggle against capitalist imperialism. It acted mainly through assassinations and

²⁰⁴ Ruggiero, V. (2005). Brigade Rosse: Political violence, criminology and social movement theory. *Crime L. & Soc. Change*, 43, 289

²⁰⁵ Pintore, G. (2016). Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007: la lotta armata e le verità nascoste. *Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007*, 1-407, pg 46

²⁰⁶ Ibidem

²⁰⁷ Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-6

²⁰⁸ United States Department of Defense, Training and Doctrine Command-G2, *Kidnapping and Terror*, Number 1.06 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: TRISA-Threats, 2008).

bombings: the killing of Massimo D'Antona in 1999 is one of the most prominent actions of the organization. In response to this upsurge, the Italian government increased its counterterrorism campaigns, leading to the dismantlement of the organization in 2003.

CHAPTER II - NEGOTIATING WITH STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS: DO WE NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS?

2.1 WHAT IS NEGOTIATION?

To begin with this second chapter, some terminology should be clarified. In the English language, the terms “*bargaining*” and “*negotiation*” are similar but not exactly the same, although they are often used interchangeably. Indeed, bargaining means negotiating positions and not considering surrounding interests, alternative outcomes, or solutions to a conflict. It triggers a “win-lose” scenario, in which only one party can truly rip out the benefits from the outcome²⁰⁹. Negotiation, on the other hand, generally occurs in a “win-win” scenario and involves exploring the deeper motivations underlying the positions of the parties, it identifies potential tradeoffs and win-win opportunities more accurately and efficiently²¹⁰. During the course of this dissertation, I will consider the two terms as synonyms, despite their slight difference in meaning. After this premise, it might be interesting to look at two different points of view on negotiation: one is proposed by Iklé in his “*How nations negotiate*” (1964); the other is Zartman and Berman’s, extrapolated from their “*The practical negotiator*” (1982). However, before examining their definitions, it should be kept in mind that negotiation is an extremely complex matter, which involves taking into consideration a great number of factors. Therefore, as with terrorism, it is difficult to affirm that there exists a single definition that considers all stages of negotiation and that can be used in all situations. In other words, negotiation is everything but linear. To highlight this concept, Iklé, in his 1964 work, stated: “[...] *to resolve conflict and avoid the use of force, it is said, one must negotiate (Is this always the best way to settle conflict?). Negotiation requires a willingness to compromise (Why?), and both sides must make concessions (According to which law?). Neither side can expect to win all it wants (Not even if its objectives are modest?). If both sides negotiate in good faith (Who judges “good faith”?), they can always find a fair solution*

²⁰⁹<https://cbu.ecampus.edu.zm/bargaining-vs-negotiation-key-differences-and-important-intersections/>

²¹⁰ Ibidem

(and what is “fair”?)”²¹¹. According to the author, negotiation is “a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present”²¹². The other definition that could be considered, as already mentioned above, is that of Zartman and Berman. In their publication of 1982, the authors state that negotiation is “a process in which divergent values are combined into an agreed decision, and it is based on the idea that there are appropriate stages, sequences, behaviors, and tactics that can be identified and used to improve the conduct of negotiations and better the chances of success”²¹³.

The two definitions are fairly similar, although the former might seem more framed, while the latter appears to leave more room for factors varying from time to time. In other words, the former might convey the idea of negotiation as a fixed process, while the latter makes it seem like the evolution of the process varies depending on the situation. This difference could be due to the scopes and approaches of the authors’ works: in fact, Iklé was interested in the link between the negotiation process and its outcomes and did not aim to answer all the questions posed in his investigation. On the other hand, Zartman and Berman aimed at breaking down how negotiation has been conducted in the past, in order to understand how new actors might potentially improve the process so that better results can be achieved. What remains similar in both cases, however, is the intention to offer a discussion concerning the topic and not to propose, nor to impose, a fixed and universal theoretical argument. Problems in the negotiation process analysis consist of identifying the forces driving the observed, dynamics the reasons why the stages seem to be useful, as well as their roles and functions, and the way in which they are instrumental in solving the basic challenge of negotiation to reach a joint decision in situations where there were differences that preclude, at least temporarily, the use of alternative modes of decision-making²¹⁴.

²¹¹ Iklé, F. C. (1964). *How Nations Negotiate*. New York: Harper and Row, pg. 1-2.

²¹² Ibidem

²¹³ Zartman, W. and Berman, M.R. (1982), *The practical Negotiator*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

²¹⁴ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

When it comes to negotiation theory, an interesting perspective is the Game Theory Approach. Game theory is a field of study that uses mathematical models to analyze and explain how people choose between conflict and cooperation. The interactions between decision-makers are represented as "games," which consist of players, strategies, and payoffs²¹⁵. The basic idea is that players try to make choices that benefit themselves the most, while also taking into account what others might decide. In another interpretation, a "game" is a conflict situation in which the negotiators' opposing interests prevail²¹⁶. Four "games" are especially relevant when dealing with negotiations: Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. The prisoner's dilemma is a paradox in decision analysis and negotiations in which two individuals acting in their own self-interests do not result in the optimal outcome²¹⁷, if not even in self-harming decisions: often, both parties choose to protect themselves at the expense of the other participant²¹⁸, due to the risk of defection of the other party. It is considered a "zero-sum game". In the game of Trust, trust and reciprocity are critical because one side must often act first, exposing itself to the risk that the other will not respond fairly, hoping to influence the distribution of the reward and result in a better outcome²¹⁹. The Stag Hunt scenario emphasizes the conflict between cooperation and competition; it reflects a situation where the parties must decide whether to pursue ambitious shared benefits or sticking with safer individual gains²²⁰. Finally, Chicken is the most common game, and is often used by inexperienced negotiators: two players take part in an activity that will harm both parties unless one backs down. It is not a collaborative approach to negotiation, as it results in one party winning over the other and often creates a confrontational atmosphere²²¹: both players want to do the opposite of what the other player does²²². The game theory encourages negotiators to assess the credibility of the commitments of the other party and identify the potential consequences of pushing the situation to the brink. These, according to Gaffal

²¹⁵ <https://www.scotwork.com/negotiation-insights/applying-game-theory-in-negotiation/>

²¹⁶ Gaffal, M., Padilla Gálvez, J. (2023). Negotiation, Game Theory and Language Games. In: Dynamics of Rational Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49051-4_2

²¹⁷ <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prisoners-dilemma.asp>

²¹⁸ Helmold, M., Dathe, T., Hummel, F., Terry, B., & Pieper, J. (2020). *Successful international negotiations*. Springer International Publishing

²¹⁹ <https://www.scotwork.com/negotiation-insights/applying-game-theory-in-negotiation/>

²²⁰ <https://www.scotwork.com/negotiation-insights/applying-game-theory-in-negotiation/>

²²¹ <https://www.scotwork.com/negotiation-insights/applying-game-theory-in-negotiation/>

²²² <https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/game-theory/chicken.html>

et al. (2023), are all “symmetric games” since the strategy of a party depends solely on the strategy of the other. Differently, “asymmetric games” are those where there is no identical set of strategies for both players, as players develop their strategies depending on and in relation to the strategy of the respective other²²³. According to game theory, when two parties enter a bargaining process, a total of four possible outcomes arise. The optimal outcome reflects a situation in which both parties win equally—what the theory calls a “win–win game”—so that the maximum overall outcome is achieved. A win–win game is profitable because all participants can benefit from the deal and, in conflict resolution, the win–win strategy leaves everyone satisfied. The second and third possibilities are situations in which the participants either “win–lose” or “lose–win” such that one party wins and the other loses. The result is a zero-sum game in which the total gain remains stable, as one party wins at the expense of the other. Both strategies belong to the field of non-cooperative games²²⁴. The fourth variant is the lose–lose game, in which both negotiating partners lose and no gains exist. In this variant, the negotiation fails since neither partner is willing to make concessions²²⁵. As Zartman (1975) noted, negotiation does not involve simply receiving the other party's output and sending back a new input in return: each party's output has a complex, dual purpose: to bid and to persuade, to hit a target, and to induce the other party to hit it too²²⁶. In 1997, scholar claimed that negotiation is a “*positive-sum exercise, since by definition both parties prefer the agreed outcome to the status quo (i.e., to no agreement) or to any other mutually agreeable outcome*”. Negotiators need to think hypothetically, meaning that their decision on what to offer or accept depends on how well they would do if no deal was reached²²⁷. There are fixed parties and flexible values: a decision is made by changing the parties’ evaluation of their values, enabling them to be integrated into a single agreement, by persuasion, coercion, or force²²⁸.

²²³ Gaffal, M., Padilla Gálvez, J. (2023). Negotiation, Game Theory and Language Games. In: Dynamics of Rational Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49051-4_2

²²⁴ Nash, J. F. (1951). Non-cooperative games. *The Annals of Mathematics*, 54(2), 286–295. *Republished in*: Nash, 1996. 22–33.

²²⁵ Gaffal, M., Padilla Gálvez, J. (2023). Negotiation, Game Theory and Language Games. In: Dynamics of Rational Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49051-4_2

²²⁶ Zartman, W. (1975). Negotiations: Theory and reality. *Journal of international affairs*, 69-77

²²⁷ O'Neill, B. (2018). International negotiation: some conceptual developments. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21(1), 515-533.

²²⁸ Zartman, W. (1977). Negotiation as a joint decision-making process. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21(4), 619-638.

Some rules can be identified in the negotiation process, and bargainers should follow them in order to improve their chances of succeeding in achieving the desired result. However, it should be kept in mind that negotiation is carried out by human beings, and therefore conventional rules are hardly applicable since they are intertwined - among many other factors - with feelings, passions, context, interests at stake, mind games, and partial information: this range of situations cannot be properly understood by any analytical rule or definition. When examining the complex matter of negotiation, it is fundamental to make a distinction between substantive common interests and complementary interests. In the former case, the actors share the exact same final objective or want to benefit from the same thing: therefore, they will compete in order to gain control over the object of the dispute before the other does, and they will try to avoid the competitor ever gaining access to it. In a similar situation, the actors will be likely to fight against each other, since if one actor gains control over the disputed object, the other loses access to it: nobody wants to be in the loser's position. In other words, actors pursue a confrontational strategy. In the latter case, the actors are interested in obtaining certain results which can only be achieved with the cooperation of the other parties. Differently from the situation described above, actors will be more prone to cooperate with each other and to make concessions. Sometimes it can be almost a win-win situation: by coordinating a combined action, both will gain some degree of benefit from the disputed object. In the process, the parties exercise a threefold choice: yes, no, maybe, or keep on talking. The choice is not hierarchical: parties are equal and fixed, and both sides have power over each other. This latter characteristic is evident in two important ways: first, negotiation takes place when stalemate occurs, or when a decision is impossible by other means; second, negotiation is a joint decision-making process in which both parties have veto power²²⁹. As Zartman stated in his *"Negotiations: theory and reality"* (1975), "referents" are principles of justice on which both parties can agree. They can be philosophical principles such as equality, split-the-difference, compensation, or special rights. They could also be details raised to the level of principle, such as old or natural boundaries, sacred numbers, or irreducible minimums. When the referent principles fit together into a coherent, agreed ensemble, one can speak of a formula for agreement. In general, there is to keep in mind that details are never more important than the principles they prove,

²²⁹ Ibidem

and it is these principles that are the main subject of the negotiations²³⁰. Although some negotiations develop a distinctive pattern, it is often accepted by theoreticians and generally observed in practice, that most negotiations can be broken down into a number of phases that have specific functions²³¹. In “*The practical negotiator*”²³² by Zartman and Berman, a model that identifies three stages of negotiation is introduced. As often happens, such stages are not clear-cut; rather, they often overlap. The first is the diagnostic stage. In it, negotiators realize that the circumstances are already problematic and will only worsen in the future: negotiation is thus needed. All parties need to agree on this point and be willing to cooperate: in other words, they have to accept that a joint effort is the only way to solve the problem. The authors also suggest appropriate behaviors to adopt: in this phase, negotiators need to be informed about the problem, to be clear about perceptions and context, and to be able to think of alternative solutions. Subsequently, there is the formula stage, in which a common definition of the conflict must be drawn. To enter this stage, the conditions of the first stage must already be satisfied and the so-called turning point of seriousness must be reached: in other words, each party must recognize the seriousness of the other in negotiating and finding a solution to the problem. During this stage, parties need to maintain a flexible mindset, focus on the problem, and maintain open conversations. The last stage is the detail phase, where the implementation details of the agreed formula are discussed. Concessions are likely to have been made in the previous stages as well, but, during this stage, they become particularly important: bargainers should try to concede as little as possible while receiving as much as possible. Appropriate behaviors for this phase include being clear about the objectives, not losing the bigger picture, and valuing both sides’ abilities to carry on without the agreement²³³.

According to O’Neill, on the other hand, many negotiations follow what Thomson et al. (2006) call the two-stage model. At first, the parties talk freely, seeking information, making informal coalitions, and possibly coming to an agreement. The second stage solidifies the result by applying the organization’s rules, perhaps taking a vote, or

²³⁰ Zartman, W. (1975). Negotiations: Theory and reality. *Journal of international affairs*, 69-77

²³¹ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

²³² Zartman, W. and Berman, M.R (1982), *The practical Negotiator*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

²³³ Ibidem

resolving the differences left from the first stage. The first stage must take account of the parties' strengths in the second²³⁴. Zartman, in his analysis of 1975, went a bit further and identified some turning points in the process, which tend to increase the momentum in the direction of an agreement. One turning point is that moment when each side decides that negotiations toward a jointly agreeable outcome are realistic since both parties' expectations are perceived to be within range of each other²³⁵. A similar situation can occur even before negotiations actually begin, and it can be expressed as a declaration of intent or commitment to work toward the reach of an agreement. Alternatively, it can arise during the process of negotiation itself. A second turning point is the moment when agreement has been reached on the image or formula that gives a framework for the interpretation of the problem and its solution. After this point, negotiations shift to a search for the implementing details²³⁶: all the parties are willing to pursue an agreement and are interested in arranging both common and conflicting interests. Another turning point occurs when the party decides that benefits agreed on thus far outweigh the likely costs of the items still under discussion: thus, even the worst foreseeable agreement on them becomes acceptable. This turning point is particularly important because it marks the moment when the agreement itself enters the calculations of each party as in its interest. Up to this point, each had goals to defend; now they have an additional goal to reach the agreement negotiated thus far and anticipated in the light of these negotiations²³⁷. Another important matter is when to bring up the core questions of the negotiation: often it is recommended to start with less important matters in order to build trust and communication. After the first turning point, relevant concerns can be expressed, while details should be discussed after the main problem has been addressed. It is undeniable that bargainers are subjected to biases when negotiating. For example, it was found by Kray et al. (2001) that when gender stereotypes were made explicit, women were more likely to negotiate assertively. This was referred to as "stereotype reactance", suggesting that when (negative) stereotypes are made explicit, women utilize their

²³⁴ O'Neill, B. (2018). International negotiation: some conceptual developments. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21(1), 515-533.

²³⁵ Zartman, W. (1975). Negotiations: Theory and reality. *Journal of international affairs*, 69-77

²³⁶ Ibidem

²³⁷ Ibidem

cognitive and behavioral skills to overcome those limiting stereotypes²³⁸. Another interesting type of bias is the egocentric bias, due to which negotiators are likely to view themselves as entitled to more resources than their counterpart. For example, negotiators largely prefer an equitable division of outcomes, but if outcomes must be unequal, they favor themselves²³⁹.

In Iklé's work "*How nations negotiate?*"²⁴⁰, five purposes of negotiation are displayed, which lead to as many types of agreements: extension agreements (to prolong existing ones), normalization of agreements (to re-establish diplomatic relations), redistribution agreements (to redistribute resources), innovation agreements (to set new obligations) and effects not concerning agreements (for example propaganda). However, such divisions are not always present in real-life situations. During the negotiation process, parties have three choices: first, to accept an agreement at the terms the bargainer expects the opponent to settle for; second, to stop negotiations even if an agreement has not been reached; and third, to try to improve the opponent's position through further bargaining. Iklé also exposes some rules to improve the chances of success of the negotiation, including adhering to the agreed agenda, honoring partial agreements, maintaining flexibility, reciprocating concessions, being in good faith, and refraining from lying. Finally, it is interesting to look at Glasl's research, which led to the development of a nine-stages model to explain conflict escalation and resolution: from such model, it can be deduced that conflicts that have reached a certain point on the nine-step scale can no longer be resolved without outside help. If the parties are aware of the stage they are at, they have the opportunity to analyze their conflict and to react better during the course of the conflict²⁴¹.

²³⁸ Kray, L. J., Thompson, L., & Galinsky, A. (2001). Battle of the sexes: Gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80(6), 942–958.

²³⁹ Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57(3), 426–441.

²⁴⁰ Iklé, F. C. (1964). *How Nations Negotiate*. New York: Harper and Row

²⁴¹ Helmold, M., Dathe, T., Hummel, F., Terry, B., & Pieper, J. (2020). *Successful international negotiations*. Springer International Publishing.




Fig. 2.1, Glasl's Escalation Levels²⁴²

Summarizing Glasl's explanations of each phase²⁴³, we can see that in the first stage it is normal to encounter some tensions between bargainers: this is not perceived as a sign of conflict. In the Debate stage, strategies are elaborated in order to convince the opponent about the validity of an argument and to overcome tensions, although disputes may arise. The third stage is characterized by an increase in conflictual behaviors and pressure since both parties want their own opinions to prevail. Compassion towards the opponent is lost. Up to this point, the stages can be described as a "win-win" situation²⁴⁴. From the fourth to the sixth, they can be defined - according to Helmold - as "win-lose". In the Image and Coalition phase, the conflict hardens, and a black-versus-white vision of who is right and who is wrong is developed: the question is about who wins the conflict, not about the issue itself. The fifth stage is characterized by a complete loss of trust and moral credibility. In the sixth stage, the parties resort to threats in order to demonstrate their power. From now on, still quoting Helmold, we have what can be defined as a "lose-lose" situation. In the Limited destructive blows stage, the opponents try to damage each other, while in the Fragmentation stage the ultimate goal is the collapse of the entire system, and vital functions are attacked. Finally, in the last stage, even self-destruction is considered acceptable if one can drag the opponent down with himself.

²⁴² Available for consultation at https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Glasls-escalation-model-and-different-forms-of-conflict-capabilities_fig4_40105224

²⁴³ Glasl, F. (2004). *Konfliktmanagement—ein Handbuch für Führungskräfte, Beraterinnen und Berater*, 8. Auflage, Bern/Stuttgart/Wien: Haupt, *Freies Geistesleben*.

²⁴⁴ Helmold, M., Dathe, T., Hummel, F., Terry, B., & Pieper, J. (2020). *Successful international negotiations*. Springer International Publishing

2.2 HOW DOES NEGOTIATION WORK?

When investigating the concept of negotiation, it should be immediately clarified that such an activity does not exclusively concern State entities: indeed, a State may pursue a negotiation with terrorist entities or with social movements of other kinds. The former case will be covered in this section, while the latter will be dealt with in the next section of the present chapter. Negotiation between State entities happens every day in a variety of contexts: it may have to do with trade and business, public policy and regulation, or with international relations. For example, Druckman and Green (1995) find three situations favorable to negotiation: when the insurgents' power and legitimacy are decreasing, and the government's legitimacy is increasing; when the reverse obtains; and when the legitimacy of both is stable but the insurgents' power is increasing²⁴⁵. It can be conducted within the State institutions themselves or in a multi-actor forum, such as in International Organizations like the European Union. State entities are here used as a synonym for State, so an entity with a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and sovereignty, as well as the capacity to interact with other states. States can be recognized by others and therefore be fully-fledged actors in the international scenario; sometimes they are not recognized, or they may find themselves in a gray zone, in which some part of the international community recognizes them, and another part does not: this makes it harder for them to engage in negotiations or normal interstate relationships. For the purposes of this dissertation, I believe that the expression "State entities" can also indicate for example supranational organizations or organs, such as the European Union or the Security Council, since they are chaired by State personnel and operate within the law.

In international negotiation, the first phase happens even before the process itself starts: most encounters, especially in the diplomatic arenas, are preceded by preliminary contacts, either unofficial or informal. This is sometimes referred to as "Track II" talks (Putnam, 1988), while "Track I" talks represent official procedures. Social events, for example, are especially designed to encourage the dual development of contacts and

²⁴⁵ Zartman, I. W., Zartman, I. W., & Alfredson, T. (2019). Negotiating with terrorists and the tactical question. *I William Zartman: A Pioneer in Conflict Management and Area Studies: Essays on Contention and Governance*, 195-223.

negotiations²⁴⁶, in order to overcome possible hurdles and build relationships and trust among bargainers. State negotiations are often characterized by the presence of multiple actors and issues, and the parties usually explore the pros and cons of negotiating long before the meetings happen. In addition to the importance of the “formula” and “detail” phases - during which negotiable issues are selected and principles are agreed upon -, practitioners also mention the importance of the conference’s geographical settings, its agenda preparation and formulation, the role of a chairperson, and the pressure of constituencies as well as the “human setting” (Plantey, 1980). Negotiations usually follow a standard structure, composed of an introduction, a ritual phase followed by an information phase. Then the negotiators proceed to perform tests and adjustments in order to reach a concluding phase. When the states begin to negotiate, it is important for them to define a BATNA, which stands for “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”. It is defined by Fisher and Ury as “*the most advantageous alternative that a negotiating party can take if negotiations fail and an agreement cannot be made*”²⁴⁷. In other words, BATNA “*is the only standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept*”²⁴⁸. Another important element is the outside option of the parties, which is defined as its best situation if it deliberately leaves the negotiation. It is easy to confuse with the BATNA, which arises from either a choice to exit or an exogenous ending. When a better offer is on the table, threatening to leave lacks credibility and, indeed, experimental subjects responded less to it than to an exogenous ending²⁴⁹. Moreover, a zone of mutual agreement (Zoma) - or Zopa (zone of possible agreement), a common ground within which the agreement can be reached - can be identified and is critical for the success of the negotiation process. For the negotiating parties to reach an agreement, they must work toward a common goal and find an area that incorporates at least some of each party’s

²⁴⁶ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

²⁴⁷ Fisher, R., Ury, W. L., & Patton, B. (2011). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in*. Penguin.

²⁴⁸ Fisher and Ury (note 171) p. 104 contained in Miller, C. (2011). Is it possible and preferable to negotiate with terrorists? *Defence Studies*, 11(1), 145-185

²⁴⁹ O'Neill, B. (2018). International negotiation: some conceptual developments. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21(1), 515-533.

ideas²⁵⁰. Outside of it, and if states are unsure what other states will fight for, they may overshoot and end up in conflict²⁵¹.




Fig. 2.2, Zone of possible agreement, Caputo (2012)²⁵²

As mentioned earlier, in negotiation two main types of strategies can be identified: accommodation strategies - which are cooperative and favor the reaching of an agreement, corresponding to a varying-sum game - and confrontation strategies - which are competitive and aimed at maximizing the negotiator's gains, deriving from a zero-sum game²⁵³. When opening a negotiation, the first offer is critical: one can either start with an extreme demand, whether low or high, or play on neutral ground. Pruitt (1981) suggested that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the bargainer's demand and the outcome of the negotiation: low and very high demands lead more often to failure; moderate demands lead to an agreement at a satisfactory level of profit²⁵⁴. Concessions are also extremely important, and there are two ways to look at them: either as a sign of goodwill or as a sign of weakness. In the first case, the concession made requires reciprocation: some works show that reciprocation (or matching) takes place when there is a prominent solution or when the other party is viewed as firm. In the second case, it elicits tougher behavior, because it leaves space for a higher expectation²⁵⁵.

²⁵⁰ Helmold, M., Dathe, T., Hummel, F., Terry, B., & Pieper, J. (2020). *Successful international negotiations*. Springer International Publishing.

²⁵¹ Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. *International security*, 31(1), 49-80.

²⁵² Caputo, A. (2012). Integrative agreements in multilateral negotiations: the case of Fiat and Chrysler. *International Journal of Business and Social Sciences*, 3(12), 167-180.

²⁵³ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

²⁵⁴ Pruitt, D. G. (1981). *Negotiation Behavior*. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press.

²⁵⁵ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

Communication, verbal and nonverbal, is clearly fundamental as well, both in terms of language and in terms of mismatch of expressions among cultures. This aspect will be further analyzed later in this chapter. Moreover, there exist what are called “referential variables”: these are factors that the bargainers refer to when they negotiate. One of them is “face maintenance”, defined as the “*desire to project an image of capability and strength or conversely to avoid projecting an image of incapability, weakness, or foolishness*” (Druckman, 1977, p. 276). The negotiation process consists of discussions around issues, and two of them can be clearly identified: conflicts of values and conflicts of interest. A conflict of values is a situation in which the parties hold different or incompatible values and principles; both parties want their own view to prevail. A conflict of interest corresponds to a discrepancy between the parties’ preferences concerning, for example, the distribution of a scarce resource. A third common situation is a mix of both conflicts in a complex interplay²⁵⁶. Touzard (1977) showed that negotiations concerning values are the most difficult to bring to a positive end and thus very often avoided, since agreeing on principles is extremely hard. Moreover, the emotional basis sustaining ideological positions makes them hard to abandon²⁵⁷. Finally, an efficient negotiator needs information on the situation, the context, what is at stake, and the other party’s needs, goals, means of action, personality, and values. Information reduces uncertainty and may sometimes enable a bargainer to make a prediction about the behavior of the other and the evolution of the negotiation. Three different types of information can be distinguished: public, private, and secret. Private information allows a party to have more power in the relationship and opens many possibilities. Withholding secret information, the most sought-after type of information, puts the party in an even better bargaining position. Finally, public or shared information may also make a negotiation, in the case of a cooperative relationship, more efficient²⁵⁸.

It is now widely known that globalization led to an increase in issues and actors operating in the international system, and therefore an increase in negotiation. In order to deal with highly complex problems, bargainers develop simplified cognitive structures to facilitate

²⁵⁶ Ibidem

²⁵⁷ Touzard, H. (1977). *La médiation et la résolution des conflits* [Mediation and resolution of conflicts]. Paris: PUF.

²⁵⁸ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

their task²⁵⁹. Moreover, negotiations - both with new actors and with recurrent ones - are now frequent and the anticipation of the next meetings may play an important part in the bargainers' behavior. As mentioned, the negotiator, who keeps long-term interests in mind, may choose an anticipatory strategy that prioritize principles, which could place the bargainer in a better position for further negotiations²⁶⁰. Furthermore, there exist many tactics and tricks to be applied during a negotiation process, which have two objectives: to disguise a party's intention, and to mislead the other party about the value the first party has assigned to the object of negotiation²⁶¹. There's to remember, however, that not all tricks fall within the legality framework and are thus considered fraudulent and carried out in violation of the law: for this reason, many scholars – such as Padilla Galvez and Grice - conducted analysis on the topic. Often the tricks used will reflect the bargainer's style of negotiation. Lying is a common trick: a lie is a false statement that is deliberately made to deceive someone, and its object is usually the obtaining of unfair advantage²⁶². For lies to be effective, they must be plausibly expressed and appear accurate and truthful²⁶³. To expose such behavior, it is advisable to ask specific questions and inquire in depth. Similarly, false non-verbal messages - or pretending disinterest - could be conveyed to give the impression of impatience or disagreement in order to direct the negotiation in the desired way. Causing confusion and distraction can also be used as a trick: the aim is to overwhelm the other party with too much information so that it becomes impossible or too difficult to determine which information is relevant²⁶⁴ and it can also lead to the perception of the negotiation objectives as unclear. By doing so, a party may hide a weakness in a proposal or present several small demands towards the end of the negotiation to secure additional and unconsidered concessions²⁶⁵. Threats and intimidations are also used: the more credible a particular threat is, the more effective it

²⁵⁹ Winham, G. R. (1977a). Complexity in International Negotiation. In D. Druckman (ed.), *Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

²⁶⁰ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

²⁶¹ Gaffal, M., Padilla Gálvez, J. (2023). Negotiation, Game Theory and Language Games. In: Dynamics of Rational Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49051-4_2

²⁶² Padilla Gálvez, J. (2021). *El mentiroso. Genealogía de una paradoja sobre verdad y autorreferencia*. Valencia: Tirant humanidades, 340.

²⁶³ Grice, Paul H. (1989). *Studies in the way of words*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 92, 248, 55ff., 86ff.

²⁶⁴ Ibidem

²⁶⁵ Gaffal, M., Padilla Gálvez, J. (2023). Negotiation, Game Theory and Language Games. In: Dynamics of Rational Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49051-4_2

tends to be. Credibility depends on a party's previous experience with threat and on the question of who exercises it²⁶⁶. Threats can be compelling – and thus require an action to avoid punishment - or deterrent, which prevent the target from doing something²⁶⁷. Another widely used tactic, especially in countries which focus on the negotiation outcome, is the good cop versus bad cop strategy. Part of the delegation plays the role of the “bad cop”, associating high demands with hostile attitudes, while the rest of the team behaves as a “good cop”, in a cooperative way, in order to reach an agreement. When a first concession is made, the bad cop insists on further high demands until the team fully achieves the intended negotiation goal.

Negotiations usually end when an agreement is reached; however, failures in negotiation can occur for a variety of reasons, which have been summarized by Helmold in the here-attached table:

No.	Reason	Description of failure
1.	Illusionary anchoring	Requests must be grounded on facts
2.	Extremism in positions	Objectives must be realistic
3.	Overconfidence and arrogance	Negotiations must be respectful
4.	Intercultural unawareness	Cultural specifics must be known
5.	Unrealistic objectives	Reality is essential for negotiations
6.	Not relevant elements	Negotiation must focus on priorities
7.	Inadequate strategies	Appropriate strategies must be formulated
8.	Wrong tactics	Right tactics will lead to the success
9.	Threatening the other party	Threatening must be avoided
10.	Not understanding time and constraints	Culture and time must be understood

Fig. 2.3, Reasons for failures in negotiations, Helmold (2020)

Moreover, as we had the chance to see earlier in the analysis, negotiation between States does not come without obstacles. These include divergent national interests (which lead to conflicting priorities and goals), power asymmetries (for example, when a country from the “First World” and one from the “Third World” try to negotiate, it is reasonable to believe that the former will exert more power over the discussion) and domestic political pressures (which can impact the outcome of the bargaining process and can potentially

²⁶⁶ Ibidem

²⁶⁷ Dupont, C., & Faure, G. O. (1991). The negotiation process. *International negotiation*, 40-57.

represent an obstacle in the reaching of an agreement). Cultural and ideological differences, as well as communication barriers, can also represent obstacles in the negotiation process. For this reason, it might be interesting to briefly address the concept of intercultural negotiation. Intercultural negotiation is primarily important in the international bargaining context but can also find applications in a multicultural domestic context. Such a theory became particularly relevant with the emergence of globalization: people from different countries got to meet and negotiate on all kinds of issues. Consequently, they faced the fact that gestures and words have different meanings in different countries. Thus, in order to be effective negotiators, bargaining strategies need to be adapted, as well as their behavior. In fact, it has been shown that the negotiators' cultures affect their interests and priorities and the strategies that they will bring to the negotiation table²⁶⁸. When acting in such environments, there are some guidelines to be kept in mind: Meyer displayed and analyzed them in her article "*Getting to si, ja, oui, hai and da*" (2017). The first is to adapt the way disagreements are expressed²⁶⁹. It is not just about the words themselves, but also about the emotions paired with them. In some cultures, it is considered positive and advisable to openly disagree with something the interlocutor said and even to do so in a passionate and lively manner. In some other cultures, it is better to rescale the disagreement and express it in terms of further explaining the interlocutor's point of view. Depending on the culture, upgraders - used to strengthen one's point of view - and downgraders - used to soften the disagreement - have different meanings and are used in a different way. Thus, they should be analyzed not only in themselves, but also in relation to the culture of the interlocutor. A second important rule is to learn how the other culture builds trust²⁷⁰. This point is particularly relevant: some cultures may prefer to conclude deals based on personal trust, some others on mere objective facts. As effectively reported by Meyer, research on this topic divides trust into two categories: cognitive and affective. Cognitive trust is built through business interactions during which one needs to demonstrate its reliability and trustworthiness. Trust will be based on such characteristics of the interlocutor. In this case, there is no need to engage in deeper human relationships. It is said to be a trust that comes from the

²⁶⁸ Brett, J. M. (2017). Culture and negotiation strategy. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 32(4), 587-590

²⁶⁹ Meyer, E. (2015). Getting to si, ja, oui, hai, and da. *Harvard business review*, 93(12), 46-49.

²⁷⁰ Ibidem

head. In contrast, affective trust is built exactly on human interactions, stemming from empathy and emotional closeness. Interlocutors will want to interact not only in a business environment but also on a more personal level to effectively get to know each other. This kind of trust is believed to come from the heart. Which type of trust will be dominant depends on the interlocutors' cultures, as well as their personalities. For example, as noted by Brett²⁷¹, in Western cultures, people with no prior relationship tend to engage in swift trust: they trust each other unless and until one party's behavior betrays that trust. This leads to direct information sharing about interests and priorities, which affect the negotiation strategy. In Latin America, for comparison, cultures tend to be just as loose, but interpersonal trust is low. People in different cultures rely primarily on different negotiation strategies, which does not imply that everybody from the same culture follows the same rules²⁷². For example, American culture is more prone to firmly separate business and friendship, so that the cognitive approach prevails, while Chinese culture tends to promote an interplay of work and emotional closeness, making it more inclined toward the affective approach. The same can be said for Mediterranean and Middle Eastern cultures. These differences make negotiation a complex matter, since at least one of the interlocutors will have to adapt to the other's way of thinking. This point is strictly related to one rule that, in Western culture, might seem even unnecessary to specify: put the agreement in writing. In Western culture, writing down an agreement and signing it is a fundamental part of the negotiation process: it is often legally binding, and it gives guarantees to the parties that the contract is final and that it will be observed. Differently, in Asia and Africa, verbal agreements are enough, and a written recap will be seen as disrespectful and based on a lack of trust. Additionally, verbal agreements can be easily modified as the situation evolves, making them more flexible. These differences lead to the collapse of many deals. A fourth fundamental rule prescribes to avoid yes-or-no questions²⁷³. Such a general rule is deeply intertwined with the previous one, since a direct yes or no might be ambiguously interpreted: in some cases, a "yes" might actually indicate a negative response, especially if paired with negative body language or voice intonation; sometimes, a "no" might simply be aimed at encouraging further discussion: one might

²⁷¹ Brett, J. M. (2017). Culture and negotiation strategy. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 32(4), 587-590

²⁷² Ibidem

²⁷³ Meyer, E. (2015). Getting to si, ja, oui, hai, and da. *Harvard business review*, 93(12), 46-49

be prone to accept the proposed agreement as long as other concessions are made. In similar cases, a direct “yes” or “no” would thus not be an appropriate response, and negotiation requires further debate before an agreement is reached. Or, conversely, one might make concessions even though their promise cannot be fulfilled, due to the fact that a direct “no” could be seen as impolite in the interlocutor’s culture. Therefore, sometimes it is better to use vague language and vehicle one’s true intentions through non-verbal communication. However, body language clues can easily be missed or misinterpreted, which poses threats to the success of the negotiation process. Understanding the defining features of a culture is useful because those features describe what is normative in it and it helps the negotiator to adapt²⁷⁴. Another fundamental guideline is, using the author’s words, to “know when to bottle it up or let it all pour out”²⁷⁵. While some cultures may go all in when it comes to raising their voices, being passionate and engaging in physical contact, some others may prefer to keep some degree of detachment and to reduce self-expression to the minimum, in order to avoid conveying an idea of lack of respectability. It is interesting to note, however, that some particularly expressive cultures may also try to avoid expressing clear disagreement, which may be taken, often wrongly, on the personal level. Less expressive cultures, on the other hand, generally appreciate open disagreements as long as they are expressed objectively and calmly. It is thus necessary to fully understand whether being emotional and passionate is appreciated in the interlocutor’s culture or not and, if necessary, to adapt to it. One final suggestion concern looking for cultural bridges²⁷⁶: in other words, someone who knows the language and the culture well should, if possible, act as a bridge between the interlocutors, explaining the motivations behind certain behaviors and, consequently, suggesting the best way to act in response. However, as pointed out above, knowing the language is not enough: having a clear understanding of how things work in a specific culture is key to the success of the deal. Sometimes speaking the language perfectly but not being respectful of the culture might push things in the wrong direction even more, because the interlocutor or his team expects the person who serves as a bridge to know better. Finally, it is also important to look for connections between one another, not only on a cultural but also on a personal

²⁷⁴ Brett, J. M. (2017). Culture and negotiation strategy. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 32(4), 587-590

²⁷⁵ Meyer, E. (2015). Getting to si, ja, oui, hai, and da. *Harvard business review*, 93(12), 46-49

²⁷⁶ Ibidem

level. Although these rules are precisely drawn to suit intercultural negotiation, some of them might be suitable even in case of “*mono-cultural*” bargaining. Paying attention to the most suitable way to express a disagreement may be what allows the bargaining to be kept alive. The search for bridges with the interlocutor is essential: these bridges do not necessarily have to be necessarily culture-related; rather, they might concern anything that can help the negotiation process to proceed positively.

2.3 WHAT ABOUT NEGOTIATING WITH NON-STATE AND TERRORIST ENTITIES?

After seeing how negotiation between State entities works, it is necessary for the purposes of this analysis to look at the concept of negotiation with non-state entities. The expression non-state entities refers to organizations or groups that operate independently from established nation-states but still exert influence in international affairs. They can include multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and terrorist groups²⁷⁷. Terrorist entities - or organizations - are defined as “*organizations that a court finds are directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting, or fostering the doing of a terrorist act or that the government has listed as a terrorist organization by regulations*”²⁷⁸. According to Faure, negotiation with terrorists is a form of track-II diplomacy involving an asymmetric relationship because, on the one hand, there is a state and, on the other hand, there is a group that is often an evasive organization with no obvious territorial basis²⁷⁹. In fact, due to globalization, terrorist groups can be set up on transnational bases with no more territorial reference. Borders are no longer obstacles, and the sophistication of technology has greatly contributed to the development of multifunctional organizations operating at financial, social, and strategic levels. Terrorist groups can be informal and decentralized, in a context where communication is fast, anonymous, and effective²⁸⁰. Officially, the subject of negotiating with terrorists

²⁷⁷ <https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/ap-hug/non-state-entities>

²⁷⁸ <https://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/australias-counter-terrorism-laws/terrorist-organisations#:~:text=A%20terrorist%20organisation%20is%20an,a%20terrorist%20organisation%20by%20regulations.>

²⁷⁹ Faure, G. O. (2008). Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 3(2), 179-200

²⁸⁰ Ibidem

does not exist: we just do not do it. Practically, however, there are negotiations and negotiations, and terrorists and terrorists²⁸¹.

According to some scholars, when looking at ideologies driving terrorist activities, we can identify three major currents of thought: nationalist separatist groups - that aim at establishing secession or separation of a part of a pre-existent State based on political or ethnic criteria -, religious fundamentalists - which, in order to comply with a theological order, see terrorism as a necessary act -, and social revolutionists, which - as it can be read in "*Negotiating with terrorists*" (Zartman and Faure, 2010) - use terrorism as a way of drawing attention and applying pressure on the authorities to promise changes in social or economic order (such as the Red Brigades). They possess a degree of interdependence with the authorities because their goals focus on fighting for improvement or change in a system of which they are already part. Since one of their aims is to gain support for the "revolution," they are likely to tactically avoid levels of aggression that would lessen the public's sympathy, although this condition is not always met²⁸². Zartman (2003) claimed that terrorists can be classified as "absolute" or "relative". Absolute terrorists are those whose action is non-instrumentalist, a self-contained act that is completed when it has occurred and is not a means to obtain some other goal (not to be confused of course with some broader cause)²⁸³. They have what the scholar defined as an "unlimited cause", and negotiation with them is usually not possible. Differently, contingent terrorists are those who seek to exchange their victims for something else, such as the release of prisoners, publicity, or ransom. With such a counterpart, there is room for tradeoffs²⁸⁴. In other words, contingent terrorists try to overcome their essentially weak position by appropriating a part of something belonging to the other side and trying to get the best agreement out of the other side's efforts to get the part back. Absolute terrorists "*want society wounded and bleeding*"²⁸⁵. According to Zartman, in between the two groups are the conditional absolute terrorists, who do have something to negotiate about – territory,

²⁸¹ Zartman, I. W. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 443-450

²⁸² Wilson, M. A. 2000. "Toward a Model of Terrorist Behavior in Hostage-taking Incidents," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34 3: 403-424.

²⁸³ Zartman, I. W. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 443-450

²⁸⁴ Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

²⁸⁵ Zartman, I. W. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 443-450

independence, conditions – even if their suicidal tactics are absolute. Conditional absolutes are not contingent: they do not seek negotiation as part of their act, and their tactics are not divisible into two parts, grasping hostage capital and spending it. But their demands are potentially negotiable, leaving that potentiality to be developed by the negotiating partner²⁸⁶.

Much of the academic debate revolves around whether States should negotiate with terrorists or not, with the dominant school of thought claiming the second option. There are various reasons that justify such an approach. First of all, an often-encountered problem is that terrorism does not abide by laws and international rules, whereas governments are bound by them²⁸⁷: this creates problems in trying to deal with such actors and in finding suitable solutions. Moreover, the more incapable of reason that we think terrorist actors are, the more likely we are to resort to military solutions, and the less likely to try to employ diplomatic ones²⁸⁸. Negotiation with terrorist hostage-takers raises several types of problems: recognizing terrorists as acceptable counterparts; setting up precedents, encouraging terrorists to persist in their methods; and becoming trapped in a relationship that may elicit more concessions than necessary²⁸⁹. Therefore, the main argument against negotiation with terrorists is legitimacy. According to Neumann, “*democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talks can destabilize the negotiating government’s political systems, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent*”²⁹⁰. In other words, engaging with terrorists would translate their violence into a legitimate means to be heard, and thus lead other groups to engage in similar activities²⁹¹ within the territory of the nation-state. However,

²⁸⁶ Ibidem

²⁸⁷ Faure, G. O. (2008). Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 3(2), 179-200

²⁸⁸ Miller, C. (2011). Is it possible and preferable to negotiate with terrorists? *Defence Studies*, 11(1), 145-185

²⁸⁹ Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

²⁹⁰ Neumann, P.R. (2007). ‘Negotiating with Terrorists’, *Foreign Affairs* 86(1): 128–139.

²⁹¹ Toros, H. (2008). We don't negotiate with terrorists!: Legitimacy and complexity in terrorist conflicts. *Security Dialogue*, 39(4), 407-426.

avoiding any interaction with them can also lead to further radicalization. In fact, despite the “no negotiations” policy adopted and advocated by most states, most governments usually end up bargaining, often covertly, with terrorists. Another line of argument points out that there is nothing to negotiate about, as terrorists’ demands are unachievable or unfathomable²⁹², and no Zoma can be identified. Furthermore, negotiation implies meeting at least some of the terrorists’ demands, which frequently include the provision of weapons and money: governments thus risk providing them with the instruments needed to carry out further attacks.

On the other hand, there are some reasons that seem to justify the act of negotiating with such actors. The main argument in support of negotiations with terrorists is to save lives. Furthermore, it should be said that according to Mertes et al., some scholars believe that making no concessions does not actually stop terrorists from their actions - especially hostage taking - and thus refusing to meet their demands delays conflict resolution and jeopardizes hostages' lives. It is therefore reasonable to at least try to negotiate²⁹³. Zartamn, quoting Spector, stressed that “*to overcome the no-negotiation impediment, state leaders will need to respond in a special way, seek to understand terrorist interests, translate those interests into politically acceptable terms, and respond to them appropriately*”²⁹⁴. In fact, talking to terrorists or to representatives of so-called ‘rogue states’, which in fact means negotiating even if the wording is carefully avoided, has served different purposes for governments, such as resolving a hostage crisis, preventing a terrorist attack, exploring possibilities for a negotiated settlement with the terrorist group that would lead to relinquishing violence, and integrating into more conventional politics. In the case of ‘rogue states’, the purpose can be to regain influence over them and to redirect them towards normal international behavior²⁹⁵. It goes without saying that

²⁹² Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

²⁹³ Mertes, M., Mazei, J., & Hüffmeier, J. (2020). “We do not negotiate with terrorists!” But what if we did? *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 26(4), 437.

²⁹⁴ Zartman, I. W. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 443-450

²⁹⁵ Faure, G. O. (2008). Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 3(2), 179-200

concessions are almost always kept secret since making them public would create problems with other countries or with its own public opinion²⁹⁶.

However, Duyvesteyn and Schuurman, in their “*The paradoxes of negotiating with terrorist and insurgent organizations*” (2011) claimed that negotiating can trigger three paradoxes. The first is that negotiations can mask violent motives: talks appear to legitimize the aims and methods of terrorist groups, thus elevating their status from violent criminals to political activists. This paradox appears to come into play during the “middle stages” of a conflict, in particular when the government has demonstrated to be unable to repress the terrorists. In turn, the growing strength and confidence of terrorists makes them less inclined to commit to an actual peace process, using peace agreements to further expand their power. Negotiations, said Duyvesteyn and Schuurman, can be pursued in order to conceal the party’s true intentions, to gain enough time to recover from past exertions, to prepare for an upcoming attack, or to mask a temporary weakness²⁹⁷. The second paradox stemming from negotiation processes is that agreements can lead to more violence: for example, they can lead to the formation of splinter groups who view talks as a betrayal of principles or who fear that the outcomes of negotiations will limit their power. In 1977, Stephen Stedman labeled such groups as “spoilers”²⁹⁸: according to his article, some are part of the peace process and end up breaking the agreements that had been reached; some others are external and use violence in order to frustrate the endeavor. It is interesting to note that some governments have actively sought to fracture insurgent groups in order to control the largest factions, using them to combat the remaining opposition groups²⁹⁹. The last paradox concerns the fact that negotiated settlements often are limited in durability: negotiations seldom lead to clear-cut and uncontested results and can take the form of peace processes that can drag on for years. Moreover, even when negotiations are used as a method of conflict resolution, violent

²⁹⁶ Faure, G. O. and Shakun, M. F. (1988). 'Negotiating to Free Hostages: A Challenge for Negotiation Support Systems', in Shakun.

²⁹⁷ Duyvesteyn, I., & Schuurman, B. (2011). The paradoxes of negotiating with terrorist and insurgent organisations. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 39(4), 677-692.

²⁹⁸ Stedman, S.J. (1997) “‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’”. *International Security* 22, no. 2,

²⁹⁹ Johnston, P. (2007) ‘Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War: Evidence from Darfur’. *Civil Wars* 9, no. 4, 359–77.

methods are usually pursued parallel to dialogue³⁰⁰ and usually lead to more durable agreements. Moreover, Hayes and his colleagues also take a two-sided view of concessions to terrorists. According to these authors, while relatively small concessions - such as amnesty or freedom from persecution - do not seem to correspond with increases in violence, when politicians attempt to appease terrorist organizations by giving into significant political demands, “*the likelihood of more attacks of the same type rises significantly*”³⁰¹.

According to Faure (2008), in negotiation, two situations can be distinguished: those where discussions can take place immediately, and those where the preconditions have to be created. In the first case, we often have terrorists taking hostages and seeking to exchange them either for members of their organization who are detained in prison or for money or logistical assistance. When terrorists do not make requests and conceive their actions as punitive, negotiable issues need to be created: this can be done by trying to convince those who are ready to die for their cause that they can serve it more effectively by staying alive and that they can save the reputation of their organization by not killing their hostages³⁰². The first step consists of trying to find a Zoma. Demands - and related concessions - are usually thought to fall into two categories: in the first we can find demands of payment of a ransom, providing food, equipment, or information, the release of imprisoned fellow terrorists or sympathizers, and the provision of access to the media to publicize their cause. Later, when such original demands are dropped, terrorists often ask for provision of transport to another location, political asylum within a host country, or the promise of a fair trial³⁰³. In this situation, a useful approach is to assume that most terrorists and governments often start with extreme demands that the other side cannot quite meet, but that many of them tend to become more flexible as circumstances evolve³⁰⁴. On the government side, the trade term is the human lives of those held hostage.

³⁰⁰ Cronin, A. (2009) *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

³⁰¹ Kaminski, S., Beres, S., & Hayes, R. (2003). Negotiating the non-negotiable: Dealing with absolutist terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 451-467.

³⁰² Faure, G. O. (2008). Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 3(2), 179-200

³⁰³ Ibidem

³⁰⁴ Pruitt, D. (2006). Negotiation with terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 11(2), 371-394

Obviously, such a trade raises questions concerning the amount of money States want to spend to free their hostages. Ideally, every negotiator would love to end up with what is called a “Bangkok solution”, named after an event that occurred in 1972: four Black September militants took over the Israeli embassy in the capital of Thailand demanding the release of Arab guerrillas imprisoned in Israel. After eighteen hours of negotiation, the Thai authorities and the Egyptian ambassador, intervening as a mediator, persuaded the terrorists to drop their demand and release their twelve hostages in exchange for safe passage out of the country (Bass et al., 2005)³⁰⁵. Subsequently, this negotiation profile has been used as a reference and a model for similar situations³⁰⁶. Third parties are often believed to be important intermediaries between States and terrorist organizations: for example, they can transmit messages and coordinate concession-making, as well as help parties formulate the issues and suggest possible solutions or press parties to make concessions³⁰⁷. While having multiple third parties at work can be an obstacle more than helpful since they may hamper each other's work, it is also true that having only one can increase the risk of one party questioning the validity and trustworthiness of such an intermediary. Moreover, when the parties find themselves in a stalemate situation, a solution might be resorting to backchannel - secret - talks. According to Pruitt, there are two main forms of backchannel talks, direct and indirect: direct talks involve representatives of the two parties meeting each other in a secret location; alternatively, they can be accomplished indirectly through communication chains involving one or more intermediaries who pass messages back and forth³⁰⁸. Their nature of secrecy allows for States to avoid the question of granting legitimacy to terrorists.

Zartman’s three-stages model, elaborated for inter-State negotiations, can be applied in negotiations with terrorist entities as well. In the first stage, the idea of negotiation must be accepted by both parties and preconditions must be set. Subsequently, an agreement formula must be planned, and state negotiations must show trustworthiness as well as authority. Finally, details must be agreed on and the implementation stage must follow.

³⁰⁵ Quoted in Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

³⁰⁶ Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

³⁰⁷ Pruitt, D. (2006). Negotiation with terrorists. *International Negotiation*, 11(2), 371-394

³⁰⁸ Ibidem

A particular situation occurs when dealing with religious fundamentalists: negotiation unfolds at two different levels that never meet because whereas negotiators receive their instructions from their government or from legal authorities, terrorists consider that they receive their orders directly from God or indirectly through their spiritual or tactical leader. Such an imbalanced situation, especially when taking into account the sources on which they base their legitimacy, makes the interaction complex³⁰⁹ and hampers the negotiation process. If it is true that a Bangkok solution is the most desirable outcome, bargainers know that it is not always possible. Sometimes, especially if blood starts to be spilled, if the life of the hostages is clearly in danger, or because there seems to be no way to get any acceptable agreement from the terrorists, one has to think about other options than keeping the negotiation going. In such a case, negotiation is no longer used as a means to reach some kind of agreement, but it may be used as a tool for solving the situation by using force. The authorities may finally resort to what is usually called the “tactical solution”: the assault³¹⁰, which frequently leads to the neutralization of the perpetrators. This may also function as a deterrence for future terrorists.

Finally, as Zartman and Faure (2010) highlighted, sometimes negotiations fail even if there is a potential for mutual gains. In negotiations between states and terrorists, an obstacle is the perceived inability of terrorists to engage in credible commitments (Walter, 1997; Kydd and Walter, 2002). Moreover, governments usually distrust militants, consider them as criminals, and assume that they are totally unreliable. No enforcement mechanism exists to punish terrorists if they do not abide by their commitments: in this sense, if terrorists face no costs for breaking agreements, states have no reason to believe that the opponents will stick to their promises (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Leeds, 1999). Moreover, a much-discussed issue is that when abiding by some of the conditions laid by the terrorists, authorities may have sold off their long-term interests for short-term results. It is important not only to free the hostages but also to deter other groups from repeating the same operation³¹¹.

³⁰⁹ Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

³¹⁰ Ibidem

³¹¹ Ibidem

2.3.1 HOSTAGE CRISIS

Hostage-taking - which officially became illegal in the 18th century - is regarded as one of the most popular ways in which terrorist entities act. It can be defined as the detention of individuals whose release is conditional on the realization of certain conditions determined by their captors³¹². The moral duty of intervening in such cases was formalized by a UN resolution in 1987, which not only condemns hostage-taking, but also requires governments to take all necessary measures to put an immediate end to the confinement³¹³. First of all, there is to make a distinction between kidnapping and hostage-taking, perfectly illustrated by a table elaborated by Schmid and Flemming:

<i>Definition</i>	<i>Example</i>
<i>Kidnapping</i> Abduction of a person (sometimes several) and confinement at a secret location, for coercive bargaining about a ransom or another asset	The case of the Italian five-times Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who was seized by the Red Brigades on March 16 1978 and found dead on May 9, 1978
<i>Hostage-taking</i> Seizure of a group of persons and holding them, usually at a known location, in involuntary captivity, often as a bargaining tool to secure compliance with demands of adversary	The seizure of a school in Beslan, Russia, on September 1, 2004, where 331 people (out of more than 1,200 hostages), including 172 schoolchildren, died after a shoot-out on September 3, 2004

Fig. 2.4, Distinction between kidnapping and hostage-taking, Schmid and Flemming in *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics* (Faure and Zartman 2010).

Hostages, for the perpetrators, represent a paradox: they have no intrinsic value to their abductors, but they have a real extrinsic value. Terrorists tend to consider them so low as being dehumanized while the outside world may highly price their life as human beings and sometimes as symbols. Normally, hostages should be kept in decent shape, as they are to be used as exchangeable goods, and their well-being is generally the focal point of negotiations. The more hostages held, the greater the opportunity for the captors to

³¹² Faure, G. O. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists: The hostage case. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 469-494

³¹³ Faure, G. O. (2008). Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 3(2), 179-200

showcase their determination by selectively using violence against their victims. Hostage-takers thus enjoy enhanced powers of manipulation and can project an image of themselves as either tyrannical or benevolent in negotiations. For example, they can sacrifice some victims, demonstrating that they bargain from a position of strength, or, conversely, they can resort to the sequential release of their hostages as a sign of “goodwill”³¹⁴. For terrorists, the most desirable outcome would be to complete the exchange peacefully once they have received benefits from the authorities. Doing so, said Mertes et al. (2020), allow them to gain profits and establish a reputation as reliable negotiators, increasing the chances for their demands to be met in the future³¹⁵. For States, conversely, while the main goal for negotiators is the safe release of all hostages, additional concerns include minimizing material damage, monetary ransoms, and, in particular, denying terrorists the opportunity to use the affair as a propaganda tool or starting point for future activities³¹⁶. Offering an exit to the hostage-takers and to timing this offer at the right moment is also fundamental³¹⁷. Balancing the two things is complicated: if there is a gain and no negative consequences, hostage-takers will consider their actions worth the risk and may reiterate the crime. On the one hand, if concessions and exchanges are conceded, deterrence is not effective. Thus, the threat of police or army intervention can create a new equilibrium in the overall system. Conversely, if the target remains inflexible, the hostages may be killed, and the responsibility of such an outcome may fall on the authorities as much as on the hostage-takers³¹⁸.

As explained by Faure in his “*Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy*” (2008), when facing terrorist actions such as hostage-taking, four strategic options can be considered: no negotiation; secret negotiation; regular negotiation; and negotiation in order to prepare for an assault. The “no negotiation” policy aims to deter terrorists from

³¹⁴ Schmid and Flemming in Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

³¹⁵ Mertes, M., Mazei, J., & Hüffmeier, J. (2020). “We do not negotiate with terrorists!” But what if we did? *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 26(4), 437.

³¹⁶ Schmid and Flemming in Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

³¹⁷ Baldwin, D.A. (1976) “Bargaining with airline hijackers”. In I.W. Zartman (ed.), *The 50% Solution*. New York: Doubleday.

³¹⁸ Faure, G. O. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists: The hostage case. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 469-494

taking more hostages and represents the official policy adopted by most countries; however, it almost always leads to terrible consequences for the hostages. The “secret negotiation” strategy is quite commonly used and works by removing negotiators from the influence of public opinion and the media. The “regular negotiation” option is used when there is no way of hiding the situation from public audiences. “Negotiation in order to prepare for an assault” is a way to conduct the discussion in order to collect information about the terrorists, such as the number, details of their equipment, and their state of mind. It is also a means of exhausting them before launching an attack³¹⁹. Hostage-taking can create a moral gap between bargainers and terrorists and hamper the negotiation process as well as the implementation phase. Nevertheless, some guidelines are given to bargainers in order to achieve the desired result. These include avoiding getting into verbal conflict, actively listening, avoiding deadlines, giving nothing away but always making trade-offs, understanding that lies and deception are acceptable in such critical matters, gaining time, diverting the captors’ attention away from the hostages, reassuring hostage-takers that the site will not be attacked, minimizing the seriousness of the crime, not using the word ‘hostages’, not suggesting exchanging oneself for the hostages, and not exposing oneself physically³²⁰. Finally, as highlighted by Faure (2008), the media play a vital role in hostage negotiations, since they can be used by the terrorists to broadcast their propaganda. The media, especially television, may turn the hostage-taker from an anonymous individual among many others into a star, whose words and emotions are echoed all over the world, and a “*quasi-symbiotic relationship may thus be established between journalists and terrorists*”³²¹. TV viewers and newspaper readers may feel involved in the drama released by the media. Thus, public opinion can play an important role in the strategy adopted by governments. However, uncontrolled media intervention can lead to dramatic outcomes³²².

³¹⁹ Faure, G. O. (2008). Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 3(2), 179-200

³²⁰ Faure, G. O., & Zartman, I. W. (2010). *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*. Routledge.

³²¹ Faure, G. O. (2008). Negotiating with terrorists: A discrete form of diplomacy. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 3(2), 179-200

³²² Ibidem

Two scenarios can result from the negotiation processes during the hostage crisis: either a settlement is found, which includes the release of the hostages and concessions to the terrorists, or no agreement is reached. Even when a settlement has been found, there are still two types of endings: either the terms of the agreement can be implemented faithfully, or they are abandoned. The non-implementation of the agreement by the captors may, for instance, lead to the murder of the hostages, as was the case with Aldo Moro. One reason for defection may be that the hostage-takers seek to suppress information that may be used to track them down later³²³.

2.4 THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT LINE OF ACTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

To conclude this chapter, it may be interesting to look at the general Italian approach to the topic of negotiating with terrorists, as well as the opinion of the international community. As already mentioned many times during the analysis, the standard policy on the matter is a “no-concessions” policy: in other words, negotiating with terrorists is forbidden under any circumstance. Italy is one of those countries that adopted such a policy. However, the reality of things is much different, and States frequently engage in bargaining with such actors. An interesting case of negotiation is that between Nigeria and the terrorist group Boko Haram. In 2014, the negotiation with the group was centered around the kidnapped Chibok girls: President Buhari, contrary to his pre-election manifesto against amnesty and negotiation, expressed willingness to negotiate with the group for the release of the girls. Negotiations focused mainly on smaller concessions that included the unconditional release of detained Boko Haram commandants³²⁴. On the other hand, an example of non-negotiation carried out by a member of the international community is the one of the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre. Eight Palestinians from the Black September group broke into the Olympic Village, killed two Israelis, and took nine

³²³ Faure, G. O. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists: The hostage case. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 469-494

³²⁴ Nwankpa, M. (2017). Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for Boko Haram? *Behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression*, 9(2), 106-124

more athletes hostage³²⁵. Many actors were initially asked to get involved as mediators, but either refused or were dropped. The terrorists demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in German and Israeli jails and free passage out of the country for themselves³²⁶, which was apparently provided by the German government. While the hostages remained inside the helicopters, two terrorists approached the Lufthansa 727 which was supposed to take them out of the country and realized they had been set up. Police snipers opened fire, and five terrorists and all hostages were killed, as well as a police officer³²⁷. The remaining terrorists were imprisoned and later released as currency of exchange in another hostage-taking operation³²⁸.

For what concerns Italy, as a case of negotiation - which involved the United States and had a questionable outcome - we can mention the Achille Lauro ship hijacking, which was thoroughly reported by Gooding in his *“Fighting terrorism in the 1980’s: the interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers”* (1987), as well as in Gerlini’s *“Il dirottamento dell’Achille Lauro ei suoi inattesi e sorprendenti risvolti”* (2016) and Lomellini’s *“The Italian State and International Terrorism, 1969–1986: The Lodo Moro”* (2024). In 1985, four armed Palestinians seized the Italian cruise in the proximity of the Egyptian coast, demanding that Israel free fifty jailed Palestinians. After initial difficulties due to Egypt’s refusal to share the news of the hijacking and wiretaps which affected the Italian government. Concurrently, there was some discontent between Italy and the United States and confusion regarding the terrorists’ affiliation; moreover, the U.S. blocked initial Italian actions³²⁹. Finally, the hijackers - after having moved across countries such as Syria and Libya - were able to negotiate with Italy and West Germany, as well as an advisor of the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization Arafat and the leader of the pro-Arafat faction of the Palestine Liberation Front. The hijackers eventually surrendered - in exchange for safe passage and immunity from prosecution - and the hostages were released. However, it was later discovered that an American

³²⁵ Faure, G. O. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists: The hostage case. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 469-494

³²⁶ Miller, R. R. (1993). Negotiating with terrorists: A comparative analysis of three cases. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 5(3), 78-105

³²⁷ Ibidem

³²⁸ Faure, G. O. (2003). Negotiating with terrorists: The hostage case. *International Negotiation*, 8(3), 469-494

³²⁹ Gerlini, M. (2016). *Il dirottamento dell’Achille Lauro ei suoi inattesi e sorprendenti risvolti* (Vol. 4).

passenger had been killed: this violated the negotiation conditions. Egypt claimed that terrorists had left the country, but the U.S. thought they had gone into hiding. The plane they meant to use to escape was intercepted by the U.S. and it was forced to land in a NATO base in Sicily³³⁰. Diplomatic tensions followed between Italy and the United States over who should keep the terrorists in custody and try them, with Italy eventually winning the dispute³³¹. Despite trying and sentencing the terrorists, one of them was allowed to leave, even though he was involved in the crime: such a decision that was harshly criticized by the U.S., and generated fractures within the Italian government as well³³². On the other hand, Italy's most emblematic case of no-concession policy is Moro's abduction and subsequent killing from part of the Red Brigades: the case will be extensively analyzed in the next chapter.

Finally, there is to point out that negotiation is just a part of multifaceted counter-terrorism strategies: the overall framework, including the civil society attitude, is what ultimately determines the effectiveness of concessions and dialogue on the struggle. For example, during Italy's experience with domestic terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, various counterterrorism methods were put into play. These ranged from a marked lack of a coordinated government response during the early stages of the fight against left- and right-wing extremism, to far-reaching legal reforms, the formation of specialized police inspectorates, and the use of special forces. Concessions were principally used in the so-called "Penitence Law" which made it possible for terrorists to be awarded reduced sentences in return for their cooperation with the authorities³³³: this measure helped to put an end to the phenomenon. Moreover, Moro's kidnapping and execution led to a loss of support - already largely affected - from part of the civil population, which worsened the terrorists' position even more.

³³⁰ Ibidem

³³¹ Lomellini, V. (2024). *The Italian State and International Terrorism, 1969–1986: The Lodo Moro*. Springer Nature.

³³² Ibidem

³³³ Duyvesteyn, I., & Schuurman, B. (2011). The paradoxes of negotiating with terrorist and insurgent organisations. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 39(4), 677-692.

CHAPTER III - ALDO MORO: EVENTS, NEGOTIATION AND MEDIA'S ROLE IN THE AFFAIR

3.1 THE AFFAIR MORO: THE EVENTS OF MARCH 16TH, 1978

The kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades was an even that shook all of Italy and left a lasting impression on those who followed the news daily throughout the fifty-five days of his captivity. Before starting, there is to note that the “Affaire Moro” could have been known as “Affaire Andreotti”: indeed, he was the original target of the operation since, as it can be read in Meade’s work of 1989, he was considered “*the demiurge of bourgeois power, present in the decisive moments, mediations, choice*”³³⁴. Andreotti represented the old, cynical Christian Democracy, the one of the countless factions, clientelism, and corruption. However, Franceschini’s arrest, and the fact that Andreotti was well protected, forced the project to stop. Moro, on the other hand, represented the cause of reform and of a serious effort to resolve the national crisis. To attack the Christian Democracy - the Red Brigades came to believe - meant to attack Aldo Moro³³⁵. For them, he was not a fully-fledged person, but rather represented the physical incarnation of the multinational capitalist system. Moro’s political career led him to become central to the Italian political landscape and Christian Democracy, to the point where he was considered the leading candidate to become President of the Republic. He first joined the party in 1944, and two years later he was elected in the Constituent Assembly to work on the drafting of the Italian Constitution. In the first legislature, in 1948, he was appointed undersecretary in the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, during the second legislature, he was officially elected President of the parliament group of the Christian Democracy. After some years of experience as a minister, he formed his first coalition government in 1963, and two more followed. After a succession of governments, during which he held important institutional roles, in 1974 he formed a fourth government with the Italian Republican Party and was supported by a majority from all the center-left parties, followed by another in 1976. In 1978, following the proposal of a historic

³³⁴ Mario Moretti (1984, p. 6).

³³⁵ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

compromise by Berlinguer, he gave a decisive speech during a joint meeting between the Christian Democracy's parliamentary groups of Chamber and Senate to obtain the necessary agreement for the birth of the new Andreotti's government, which would benefit from the programmatic and parliamentary, albeit not governmental, support of the Italian Communist Party³³⁶. There is to note that, already in 1997, the time for the attack against the State seemed ripe for two reasons: the first was the evolution in the political situation, particularly the emerging "historic compromise" that would represent the nadir of the Communist Party as the party of the working class; the second was the reopening of the thus-far aborted trial of the historic nucleus in Turin³³⁷. However, with regards to the first element, there is to highlight that the Red Brigades did not place the blame entirely on the Christian Democracy. Indeed, Faranda stated that "[...] Surely, although it was not the historic compromise itself - and thus the strategy promoted by Moro - the first reason that led to choose him as a target for the kidnapping, it was a political matter that, in our opinion, pushed the left, the workers' party, in a cul-de-sac [...] and paralyzed the Socialist Party. The government composition to be presented on March 16th demonstrated this. We saw it as a way to absorb the workers' and social antagonism, [...] and the switching off of all the stimuli for a change. We reproached the Communist Party for accepting such terms"³³⁸.

Questions arose among scholars also over the date the brigadists chose to kidnap Moro: indeed, many think that March 16th was chosen due to the concurrent approval of the new government. According to Casamassima (2016), the Red Brigades have always been sensitive to the evocative and symbolic element: under this assumption, kidnapping one of the physical embodiments of the historic compromise on the day it was to be approved must have sounded appealing. On the contrary, other scholars believe that if the Red Brigades really had wanted to stop the government formation with their action, they would have proceeded much earlier. Moreover, it should be noted that the soon-to-be government could count on almost 90% of consensus, and approving it was just a matter

³³⁶ <http://www.aldomoro.eu/biografia.php?lang=EN>

³³⁷ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

³³⁸ Original in Italian from Casamassima, P. (2016). Attacco al cuore dello Stato: le Brigate Rosse da Sossi a Moro. *Attacco al cuore dello Stato*, 1-206

of formality³³⁹: stopping the formation of such a widely supported government was a very unlikely outcome of Moro's kidnapping. Finally, according to Castronuovo (2007), the Red Brigades had taken into account the fact that the attack on that day could fail, and they might have had to go back to via Fani multiple times in the following days. This element in particular could discredit the theory that assigns a symbolic value to the date of March 16th. However, it is highly unlikely that we will ever know the true reason behind their choice, and thus we can just make assumptions.

Whether they carried out the action on the 16th to stop the formation of the new government or not, it does not affect the fact that Moro's kidnapping took a long time to plan and collect resources and, indeed, one of the very first operations regarded the gathering of money. In 1977, Pietro Costa – member of a very rich family, owner of the cruise line *Costa Crociere* - was kidnapped by the Genoese Column of the Red Brigades. He was abducted and kept hostage for eighty-one days in an apartment rented by a member of the Organization some weeks prior to the operation. The ransom was set at ten billion lire, but it was progressively lowered until an agreement was reached on one and a half billion. After the payment – interestingly, according to Moretti, the money was covered in a powder substance and required it to be washed in order to be usable³⁴⁰ - Costa was released with a leaflet containing their vindication of the action. In Rome, Germano Maccari - member of the Red Brigades - was instructed to build a “people's prison” inside an apartment in street Montalcini 8, bought with the ransom money. The room was situated behind a plasterboard hidden by a bookcase and contained a camp bed, a small table, and a camping chemical toilet³⁴¹. The Organization initially thought that Moro could be abducted while in church, where he went almost daily before starting his workday. During the time he spent inside the church, only two guards escorted him and often stayed at the back of the nave. Abducting him in such a situation would have allowed the Red Brigades to spare the bodyguards. Moro was to be led towards a secondary exit, where more brigadists would have waited, ready to escape with the

³³⁹ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁴⁰ Casamassima, P. (2016). Attacco al cuore dello Stato: le Brigate Rosse da Sossi a Moro. *Attacco al cuore dello Stato*, 1-206

³⁴¹ Pintore, G. (2016). Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969-2007: la lotta armata e le verità nascoste. *Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969-2007*, 1-407

hostage. However, such a secondary exit was not a feasible option since it actually belonged to a nearby school and since an escort agent used to walk in that direction, increasing the risk of being discovered. The eventuality of opening fire next to kids was of no appeal to the Organization, so they resorted to another option: via Fani. Such an option also posed several challenges: first of all, the target was going to be moving, and this made it harder to understand how to intercept him. Secondly, the Red Brigades knew that in such a situation they could not avoid a firefight and had to prevent the President's guards from reacting. Via Fani was chosen because, in the crossroad with via Stresa, it presented the only stop sign that Moro's convoy was going to encounter on its way.³⁴² For what concerned the guards, the brigadists hoped for a surprise effect that would allow them to act quickly. Another problem mentioned by Castronuovo (2007), regarded the presence of a flower peddler, which however was solved by cutting his van's tires, preventing him from reaching via Fani.

March 16th, 1978, can be considered as a watershed date for Italy. Although there are still gray areas on what happened that day, Meade, in his "*Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*" (1989), described the events as accurately as possible. The little caravan composed of Moro's car and another one with three more guards left Moro's home and headed towards Via della Camilluccia, which would take them to Piazza dei Giochi Delfici and the church of Santa Chiara. At about 8.55am the two vehicles were proceeding down Via Fani close together and approached the intersection with Via Stresa, preceded by a white Fiat 128 bearing diplomatic plates. At the corner, the 128 braked suddenly without reason or warning: driver Ricci tried to veer, but the president's car hit the rear right-hand corner of the diplomatic vehicle, and the escort car ran into the rear of Moro's. In an instant, the ambush unfolded from two directions simultaneously³⁴³: Moretti and another brigadist jumped out of the 128, while another commando was acting as a cover. A firefight started: all the escort agents were tied to their seats except for Officer Iozzino, who was able to grab his gun and fired two shots before being killed. The other guards - Leonardi, Ricci, Rivera, and Zizzi - were killed within minutes. Ballistic assessments established that ninety-one bullets were fired, and about 45 hit the escort team. During

³⁴² Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁴³ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

the shooting, machine-guns used by Valerio Morucci and one of the other “Alitalia pilots” - which the brigadists were dressed as - jammed and they had to use pistols but, despite this, their plan succeeded³⁴⁴. It is still uncertain how many people acted that morning, but legal proceedings established that it was not less than twelve: Mario Moretti (driving the white Fiat 128), Barbara Balzerani (blocking the crossroad with via Stresa), Bruno Seghetti (driving the Fiat 128 where Moro was first forced to enter), Rita Algranati (with a lookout role in via Fani), Alessio Casimirri e Alvaro Lojacono (on a car blocking the road behind the escort car), and Valerio Morucci, Raffaele Fiore, Prospero Gallinari, and Franco Bonisoli (who carried out the shooting). Moreover, it can be hypothesized that at least three more people with support roles played a role in the kidnapping³⁴⁵. On how Moro arrived at the hideout situated in via Montalcini there are still doubts. Castronuovo (2007) claimed that the brigadists had a two-phases plan for their getaway: firstly, they were to use the same cars used in the attack; then, the President was to be moved to other supporting vehicles and conducted to the “people’s prison”. The convoy of three cars, and probably a Honda motorbike, left helped by some stolen police forces warning paddles, and headed towards via Stresa. Testimonies allowed the investigators to identify the most plausible way the brigadists took after that: piazza Monte Gaudio, via Trionfale, via Carlo Belli, via Casale de' Bustis³⁴⁶, where they took a secondary and hidden street in order to mislead the investigators or anyone who might have decided to follow them. After that, Castronuovo reconstruction of 2007 states that they went through via Serranti, via Massimi, and possibly via Bitossi, where a van was waiting for them: Moro was forced to enter a wooden crate and was transferred inside it in Piazza Madonna del Cenacolo. The version accredited by the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry of 1983 is slightly different: it claims that Moro was indeed transferred inside a van, but this happened close to via Licinio Calvo - where the cars were abandoned - and the route taken afterwards by the brigadists is different from the one stated by Castronuovo. Differently, Flamigni claims that Moro was not transferred in Piazza Madonna del Cenacolo, but probably in via Massimi. Finally, according to Castronuovo, another relocation happened at Colli

³⁴⁴ Ibidem

³⁴⁵ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁴⁶ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

Portuensi: from there, Moretti took care of the transfer to the apartment situated in via Montalcini. It is interesting to note that in this last phase the brigadists used a legitimately owned car, which belonged to Braghetti, who also owned the apartment in via Montalcini: this allowed them to not arouse suspicion among the neighbors. It is also interesting to note that it seems that only two people in the commando that kidnapped Moro - Moretti and Gallinari - knew where to take him. Both of them faced the risk of being killed during the attack: what was going to happen next, when the brigadists had Moro in their custody but did not know where to transfer him? According to Faranda's testimony, two more people included in the commando, although they did not know the location of the prison, knew the place of the meeting with Maccari: Morucci and Seghetti, who were supposed to escort the van carrying Moro from Piazza Madonna del Cenacolo to via dei Colli Portuensi³⁴⁷. Maccari, on the other hand, claimed that he never left the hideout of via Montalcini and, moreover, stated that he did not know the identity of the hostage until Moro arrived there³⁴⁸. What is sure is that, due to the compartmentalization of information and tasks, only four people gravitated around the apartment during the fifty-five days of Moro's captivity: Moretti, Maccari, Braghetti, and Gallinari³⁴⁹.

It can be read in a document of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry that the police received the alarm at 9.03am, a couple of minutes after the event: several police cars were dispatched, and witnesses were questioned to understand the dynamics of the attack. Around 10.10am an anonymous message was delivered to the ANSA (National Association Press Agency), stating: "*this morning we kidnapped President of the Christian Democracy Aldo Moro and eliminated his bodyguards [...]. Red Brigades*"³⁵⁰. After the first news about Moro's kidnapping had leaked out, the police ordered the activation of the so-called "Plan Zero". What this Plan consists of, is still unknown. In fact, it is quite plausible that Plan Zero never existed. Better, some advanced the likely hypothesis that the person who ordered its activation did so because it was actually in use

³⁴⁷ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁴⁸ <https://www.parlamento.it/parlam/bicam/terror/stenografici/steno60a.htm>

³⁴⁹ <https://www.anniaffollati.it/01%20CONTENUTI/25%20Caso%20Moro/25%20immagini/08%20%20Nella%20prigione%20del%20popolo.html>

³⁵⁰ Original not accessible, a picture of the news is reported by ANSA in 2023 at following link https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/speciali/2023/03/16/moro-quel-drammatico-16-marzo-1978-fa-nelle-notizie-dellansa-_df03d38c-b081-40c0-b43c-30609027eb05.html

for the most severe crimes in the region where he worked, specifically the Province of Sassari, though it was unutilized in other parts of Italy. Some others even came to believe that such a name was actually a code name for “nobody does nothing”³⁵¹. Improta, an Ucigos agent - an organ in charge of contrasting terrorism -, stated that “*we were bombarded with phone calls from quaestors from all of Italy asking what Plan Zero was*” and that “*officers were thrown on the stress to perform roadblocks, and nobody investigated*”³⁵². The order to enforce the Plan Zero was withdrawn a couple of hours later³⁵³. Moreover, the Chief of Police ordered - as asked by the Minister of Interior - the implementation of special control operations all around Rome. That same morning, it was arranged to adopt roadblocks throughout the country, intensification of controls at airports, railroads, and harbors, searches of buildings and garages in the area surrounding the ambush, and surveillance of telephone booths. During the following days, more roadblocks were implemented, and two helicopters flew over Rome during daylight time. However, the 1983 Committee highlighted that such roadblocks were not adopted in the whole city, but just at crucial points and on routes arbitrarily chosen by the police forces themselves. In addition, examinations at the checkpoints were carried out on a random basis, thus many people were able to enter and leave the city without being checked³⁵⁴.

3.1.1 COULD THE ATTACK HAVE BEEN PREVENTED?

A question that many scholars asked themselves should be addressed: could the attack have been prevented? There is no real answer to it, but it is almost certain that some things could have been done better. It cannot be said whether more attention would have changed the outcome of this story or not. According to Castronuovo (2007), hints to a possible attack to be conducted in Rome toward a high-level politician had reached the Carabinieri.

³⁵¹ <https://www.sardegnaeliberia.it/sassari-e-il-piano-zero-prima-parte/>

³⁵² Casamassima, P. (2007). *Il libro nero delle Brigate Rosse: gli episodi e le azioni della più nota organizzazione armata dagli "anni di piombo" fino ai giorni nostri* (Vol. 159). Newton Compton editori, p. 150.

³⁵³ <https://www.quotidianolavoce.it/2021/03/16/16-marzo-1978-con-il-rapimento-di-aldo-moro-iniziano-i-55-giorni-piu-oscuri-della-repubblica/>

³⁵⁴ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

Said hints were reported to the Chief of Staff De Sena, who, however, minimized such possibility³⁵⁵. Moreover, on the morning of the attack, Rossellini - owner of the radio station Radio Città Futura - announced that in little time Moro was going to be abducted. He always denied having any contact with members of the Organization or with anyone who could confirm such a statement and affirmed that his was just a hypothesis drawn from a personal political analysis³⁵⁶. In addition, prior to March 16th several witnesses observed a white Fiat 128 with diplomatic plates making strange maneuvers in via Fani, like sudden departures at full speed and unnecessary braking and stopping³⁵⁷. As if that was not enough, Judge Priore stated that “*Moro’s case has been followed by many countries. Everybody knew of some plans for the kidnapping of a very important politician in Italy. [...] We got to know from French investigators that, in Paris, Moro’s kidnapping had been known since February. The Germans also knew it, as well as some countries of the Warsaw Pact*”³⁵⁸. Finally, Moro’s guards were not properly trained, and this was exactly one of the elements that led the Red Brigades to the decision to attack him. First of all, Marshall Leonardi was generally particularly attentive: however, he mainly regarded public events or appearances as likely occasions for an attack but discounted as a serious possibility an ambush directed at the president while traveling in his car. Additionally, the second car containing police officers escorting Moro was supposed to keep a certain distance from that of the person being guarded, in order to avoid being caught in a simultaneous attack: nevertheless, the two cars usually were located at a very close distance. On top of this, the president, instead of arbitrarily changing routes from day to day, always traveled through via Fani³⁵⁹. As reported by Castronuovo (2007), the guards’ weapons were not ready to be used. Leonardi’s weapon was in a bag under the front seat; the driver’s was in the glove compartment, wrapped in a plastic bag; and the only machine gun they were equipped with was in the trunk. Moro’s son, Giovanni, claimed that the guards were not militarily prepared due to bureaucratic and financial hurdles, which prevented them from attending frequent trainings and having adequately

³⁵⁵ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁵⁶ <https://patrimonio.archivio.senato.it/inventario/scheda/moro-viii-leg/IT-SEN-072-001005/terza-testimonianza-del-signor-renzo-rossellini-radio-citta-futura-p-62#lg=1&slide=0>

³⁵⁷ Sentenza, Moro I, pp. 766-71.

³⁵⁸ Quoted in Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁵⁹ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

maintained weapons. Moro himself, in a letter written during his captivity and directed to Zaccagnini, stated that “*if the escort had not been, for administrative reasons, far below the needs of the situation, maybe I would not be here*”³⁶⁰. There is also to note that one of the guards - Zizzi - that day was substituting one of Moro’s regular guards and did not have any specific training and had never taken part in a similar task. As Castronuovo stated, nobody thought of replacing an important member of the escort with an experienced person³⁶¹. Finally, the guards were not psychologically trained to hold a machine gun and shoot. The Parliamentary Committee of 1983 that looked into Moro’s Affair thus concluded that “*there did not exist a sufficient awareness of the precautions to adopt*” in order to protect the president adequately³⁶². Many other doubts have been advanced for what concerns warning signals and possible international infiltrations - many of which reported by Castronuovo (2007) - such as the presence in Italy of supposedly Russian or American spies or the delivery of documents requesting to contact Islamic terrorists in order to favor the freeing of Moro almost two weeks before the kidnapping. It is not clear whether these leads are reliable or not and whether many of them should be recognized as conspiracy theories instead. Finally, as was already said, there are still many gray areas in the affair, but mentioning all of them would require a whole dissertation, and my aim is not to shed light on such doubts. However, one that surely deserves to be mentioned before concluding the paragraph is the disappearance of some pictures taken that morning. A person living nearby the location of the attack, Mr. Nucci, was able to take some pictures almost immediately after the commando left via Fani. He gave the camera roll to his wife - a journalist - who, after having it developed, in turn gave the pictures to the judiciary. According to the magistrate, they were deemed not to be of any evidentiary value and thus the camera roll was handed back to Nucci’s wife. However, she claimed that only the negatives related to her husband’s job were returned to her. What really happened to those pictures, and what they showed, is still a mystery.

³⁶⁰https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/75/Moro_-_Le_lettere_di_Aldo_Moro_dalla_prigione_alla_storia%2C_Mura%2C_Roma_2013.pdf

³⁶¹ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁶² Relazione, Moro Comm., p. 29. See also Sentenza, Moro I, pp. 915-20.

3.2 PROPAGANDA AND PROVOCATION: THE RED BRIGADES' COMMUNIQUÉS

During the 55 days of Moro's kidnapping, the Red Brigades released nine communiqués. Moreover, a seventh false communiqué was released: it was drafted by Antonio Chichiarelli, a counterfeiter connected to the criminal organization Banda della Magliana. Even to these days, it is not clear who ordered such false communiqué: it might have been the Secret Services, but even if that was the case it is still undiscovered who asked them to do so. Before diving into an analysis of the communiqués' content, it is interesting to look at the length of the missives: they range from the 675 words of the fifth to the 1355 of the fourth. The counterfeited seventh communiqué, on the other hand, only counts 149 words, making it significantly different from the others: this is a sign of its false nature. However, it is not the only clue: Manna et al.³⁶³ accurately analyzed every communiqué and discovered many linguistic and stylistic differences between the originals and the false one. For example, the latter used neither the conjunction “e” (and) nor connectors such as “*quindi*” (so) as much or at all. In the original communiqués there is a tendency to write long and sometimes cumbersome sentences, while the fake one is made up of considerably shorter sentences. Furthermore, in the falsified communiqué there is no reference to the words – among many others - “movement”, “party”, “proletariat”, “government” and “multinationals”³⁶⁴, which are ubiquitous in the originals. In the first five communiqués the lexical choice is voted to the call out of the revolution against the State: there's the redundant use of words such as “revolution”, “proletariat”, “war” along with “regime”, “power”, “imperialist”, “Christian-democrats”. On the contrary, the remaining communiqués aim at blaming the ruling political establishment, described as “accomplice” of Moro's judgment and sentence, as well as proposing a compromise for his liberation³⁶⁵.

Moving on to the content, as Re highlighted in his work, in the Red Brigades' communiqués there is a wide use of the pronoun “*noi*” (we), which is supposed to convey

³⁶³ Manna, R., Pascucci, A., & Monti, J. (2023). La misurazione stilistica della Falsificazione: I comunicati delle Brigate Rosse. *Book series Studi AISV*, 10, 125-137

³⁶⁴ Ibidem, pg 132.

³⁶⁵ Ibidem, pg 135-136

an idea of cohesion and unity of the group. However, there is to note that sometimes the organization talks about itself in third person, as it happened in the first communique released after Moro's kidnapping:

*"[...] an armed nucleus of the Red Brigades kidnapped and locked up in a People's Prison Aldo Moro, president of the Christian Democracy [...]"*³⁶⁶.

At the same time, the style wants to create a sense of impersonality and objectivity³⁶⁷. In similar fashion to many other extremist groups - and nowadays even populist political personalities - the Organization frequently uses the dichotomy between "*noi*" (we) and "*loro*" (they), which is intended to create polarization between the two factions and convey a positive meaning to the former and a negative connotation to the latter³⁶⁸. The way the communiqués are written is intended to leverage emotions and prompt people to act, while also inducing to doubt the State institution. Most of the time, the State's action is referred to by using words related to the criminal environment.

In their first communiqué³⁶⁹, the Red Brigades put forward their view of the world and its functioning. The target of this first message was neither the State nor the people, but the "*compagni*": the intention was to mobilize like-minded people, to incite them to act. The Organization mentioned the "*Tribunale del Popolo*" (People's Tribunal) - which will judge Moro - that was meant to convey an image of justice coming from below.

With the second communiqué³⁷⁰ the tones sharpened, particularly towards the Italian Communist Party, which was identified almost as quisling and a spy for the regime carried on by the Christian Democracy. The main phases of Moro's career were analyzed, and it was affirmed that he was going to be judged for his responsibilities by the Proletariat justice's criteria, which however were not further explained. The communiqué also

³⁶⁶ Re, M. (2013). Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro. *Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro*, pg 259

³⁶⁷ Ibidem, pg 257.

³⁶⁸ Ibidem, pg 264

³⁶⁹ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=47>

³⁷⁰ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=48>

included an overview of the here-defined “*Internazionale del Terrorismo*”, seen as a proof of Italy’s subordination to the “*Stati Imperialisti Multinazionali*” (Multinational Imperialist States, frequently mentioned in the communiqué). In the Organization’s opinion, the true terrorists were western governments, which were attempting to stop the proletariat revolution. All this had to be fought by creating and enforcing a “Fighting Communist Party”. There were multiple targets in this communiqué: the government, media, and the Red Brigades’ supporters³⁷¹.

The third communiqué³⁷² opened by saying that the prisoner’s interrogation was starting to bring out interesting matters. It was stressed that his kidnapping was just a moment in the process of class war, which retained the Imperialist State as a primary target, as well as the liquidation of the corrupted Christian Democrat regime. Aldo Moro was seen as the main responsible for the anti-proletariat policies, unemployment, and generalized misery. Once again, a call to action can be found in the second part of the communiqué, and the target of the speech became the “*compagni*”. The revolution is not created, rather it is seen as the natural evolution of imperialism itself. It is interesting to stress the use of the word “prisoner”, which suggest a reference to the military world: shifting the lexicon to this sphere aimed at giving some legitimization to the Red Brigades’ actions³⁷³.

A new reference to the People’s Tribunal was made in the fourth communiqué³⁷⁴: according to the Organization, the process against the regime - directed at destroying the machine of imperialist oppression - was taking place in the whole country, and it was going to have no doubts in its judgment. In this communiqué, the Red Brigades distanced themselves from what they perceived to be an attempt on the part of the regime to impose secret negotiations and intermediaries. They also foretell a possible future ransom request, which concerns the freeing of all communist prisoners. The Organization – closely resembling Marx’s writings - affirmed that “*overcoming the crisis means communism*”:

³⁷¹ Re, M. (2013). Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro. *Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro*, pg 262

³⁷² <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=49>

³⁷³ Re, M. (2013). Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro. *Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro*, pg 263

³⁷⁴ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=50>

this was a feasible and necessary step. The missive moved on to explain the relationship between Proletarian Resistance Movement and Fighting Communist Party: they are in a dialectical relationship, but don't overlap. Furthermore, the armed action must have two functions: destroy the State and, at the same time, give guidance to the anti-imperialist war. It was also underlined that clandestinity is the fundamental condition of class war in the imperialist state. In addition, it is interesting to notice that while referring to the state's action against the proletariat, the Organization mentioned the so-called "armed peace", creating a peculiar metaphor.

What is interesting in the fifth communiqué's³⁷⁵ opening is the way Christian Democrats are referred as: the Red Brigades used the term "bosses", in a clear reference to the mafia, thus identifying the party and its members as criminals to be opposed and eradicated. There was a new reference to the attempt on the State's part to conduct secret deals: the Organization made it explicit that nothing was going to be done undercover, since nothing can be hidden from the people. The Multinational Imperialist State has declared war against the proletariat. The communiqué ended with a renovated plea to people's emotions: it is not the time to be intimidated by State's brutal repression; it's time to act.

By the time the sixth communiqué³⁷⁶ was released, Moro's interrogation was over. According to who wrote, terror was the way in which the Christian Democrat regime intended to bury the proletariat and its judgment. State's media were here criticized, and it is said that the information collected during the interrogation will be released through clandestine means. The communiqué underlined again that Moro's trial was just a phase in a vastest inquiry which concerned the whole State. In conclusion of this missive, the Red Brigades declared that Moro was found guilty and was thus condemned to death.

At this point there was the fake seventh communiqué³⁷⁷, which affirmed that the Christian democrat dictatorial period has come to an end and, along with it, Moro's "suicide". The exact position of his body was given. According to the Organization this was just the first

³⁷⁵ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=51>

³⁷⁶ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=52>

³⁷⁷ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=53>

of a series of “suicides”: the brief message was concluded with a threat to other members of the Christian Democracy and to those who support the regime.

In the real seventh communiqué³⁷⁸, released two days after the falsified one, it was stated that during the past month everyone was able to see the Christian Democracy's real nature and its tendency to offload its own responsibilities. It was said that in Italy, as well as in other democracies of Europe, there are people sentenced to death: communist fighters. This was defined as “political genocide”. The Red Brigades were not willing to make a plea to anybody but to the Revolutionary Movement, for it to fight against the State and destroy it, in addition to the liberation of the imprisoned communists. Moro was sentenced to death because of his role in the demo-Cristian state management and what that has meant to the proletariat. Moro's release could only be taken into consideration in exchange for the release of communist prisoners. An ultimatum was given: the government had forty-eight hours to decide the actions to be taken: if they refused, the Red Brigades would take their responsibility and execute Moro. The Organization also addressed the fake communiqué, and it affirmed that even though the State's media can try to construct a sense of support and solidarity towards the Christian Democracy, the people's feelings of anger and disgust will not change.

The second-to-last communiqué³⁷⁹ opened with an analysis of the Christian Democrats answer to the ultimatum: in the first sentence, the party affirmed its loyalty to the State and its laws. This, however, had nothing to do with the request submitted through the previous communiqué. The organization thus relaunched its proposal of exchange one last time and gave a list of thirteen prisoners' names to be freed, bearing in mind that all prisoners will have to be freed at some point. The Organization then condemned the attempt by the government to instruct the *Caritas Internationalis* to mediate. As far as “humanitarian pleas” coming from religious authorities and bourgeoisie personalities were concerned, the Red Brigades expressed doubts on their genuineness.

³⁷⁸ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=54>

³⁷⁹ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=55>

The ninth communiqué³⁸⁰ was the last one to be released by the Red Brigades. It was anew directed at the “*compagni*”. The Christian Democracy didn’t accept the proposal, so Moro was going to be executed. According to the Organization, the party – with its actions against the proletariat - was following the path of the Nazi’s SS, allowing torture and murders of communist people. During the fifty-one days of Moro’s kidnapping, the party hadn’t been able to hide what the event really was: a victory of the Revolutionary Movement. In order to completely destroy the Imperialist state and build a communist society, the path to take was to extend the armed activity and fight for the tearing down of “special jails” in which communists were imprisoned: the Red Brigades will not only ideally support these struggles but will also give practical aid. The only language imperialists knew was the one of arms, and the proletariat was learning to use and master it. Moro’s sentence will be carried out.

What stands out from the communiqués is that, often, the Organization considers itself to be an advocate for the totality of the Italian people³⁸¹. However, it is quite safe to say that the ideas expressed in the Red Brigades communiques are not considered normal, reasonable, or acceptable by most people: it is hard to imagine that this was the case. In fact, Adriana Faranda’s testimony of the moment in which the Red Brigades decided to kill Aldo Moro confirms that such decision was not unanimous even within the Organization itself, let alone among the rest of the population: “*I still can’t accept the idea of killing a defenseless prisoner [...]. On May 8th the final decision is made. There’s no chance of any opposition. I feel desperate, but I have to adhere to the decisions of the Organization. I’ve accepted this discipline; how can I pull back at this point?*”³⁸²

³⁸⁰ <http://www.archivio900.it/it/documenti/doc.aspx?id=56>

³⁸¹ Re, M. (2013). Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro. *Il linguaggio dei 55 giorni che cambiarono l'Italia: analisi dei documenti scritti dalle Brigate Rosse durante il sequestro di Aldo Moro*, pg 258

³⁸² Orsini, A. (2017). *Anatomy of the Red Brigades: the religious mind-set of modern terrorists*. Cornell University Press

3.3 NEGOTIATION OR “*FERMEZZA*”: THE CONTINUATION OF THE AFFAIRE, POLITICAL DEBATE, AND MEDIA CONTRIBUTION

The news concerning the attack reached the Prime Minister when the swearing-in ceremony of the new government at Palazzo Chigi had just started. The ceremony was immediately suspended, and Andreotti summoned an extra-ordinary Council of Ministers to discuss the importance of appropriate political behaviors - with which they meant refusing any prisoner exchange between Moro and any inmate charged with terrorism and avoiding any act that implied political recognition of the Red Brigades - and of maximum police coordination³⁸³. The swearing-in ceremony resumed at about 12.40pm: Andreotti immediately condemned the act and called for a vigorous psychological and technical action, in order to prevent Italy's downfall in a spiral of insecurity and ungovernability³⁸⁴. Zaccagnini - party secretary of the Christian Democracy - expressed solidarity to Moro, his family, and to the families of the murdered members of the escort team. He deemed the events as the biggest attack on the State and its institution, and it must stimulate the government to do all that is in its power to safeguard the democratic order. As Andreotti did, he claimed that such terrorist actions aim at making the country ungovernable and undermining the foundations of democracy, which are best expressed by the Christian Democracy - hence why its President was targeted³⁸⁵. La Malfa - president of the Republican Party - interpreted the act as an act of war against the State - collecting De Marzio's support, who was a member of the Italian Social Movement - which should respond accordingly. He asked for the state of emergency to be proclaimed, which included the death penalty: such a proposal was quickly rejected³⁸⁶. Craxi claimed that the State, up to that day, had been helpless in the fight against terrorism, and he feared that such a condition would continue. He explicitly talked about terrorism and wondered

³⁸³ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

³⁸⁴ https://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0257/sed0257.pdf, pg 14503

³⁸⁵ Ibidem, pg 14514-14516

³⁸⁶ Casamassima, P. (2016). Attacco al cuore dello Stato: le Brigate Rosse da Sossi a Moro. *Attacco al cuore dello Stato*, 1-206

how he was protecting them and who wanted Italy to become another version of Latin America³⁸⁷. The party secretary of the Communist Party Berlinguer joined the outrage for the events and called for firmness in rejecting such a large attack and adopting every possible measure to defend the institutions³⁸⁸. Among many other interventions, Almirante proposed to adopt a special law against terrorism within the following forty-eight hours³⁸⁹. It thus seems that the soon-to-be government - which obtained the confidence that same day - was cohesive in its response to such a dramatic event. According to Castronuovo, an encrypted message titled “PAPA” (which stood for “absolute precedence over the absolute precedences”) was forwarded to the police forces³⁹⁰ and the already-mentioned Plan Zero was activated, only to be aborted a couple of hours later due to the majority of Italy’s police forces not knowing what it was. Meanwhile, Cossiga presided over an Operative-technical-political Committee and formed a Crisis management committee with the purpose of deciding the operative and strategic lines of action. According to Silvestri, a professor who was asked to participate, it was not a formally instituted Committee, but rather a handful of experts in various fields that assisted the Minister³⁹¹. Dissimilarly, Castronuovo, in his “*Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l’uccisione di Aldo Moro*” (2007), claims that such Committee was composed of many men coming from strategic sectors - such as economics, politics, journalism, and military -, who belonged to a Masonic Lodge called “P2”, which acted in an anti-communist logic and was controlled by the CIA³⁹². It should be noted that - although it has been proved that many members of the Crisis Management Committee were indeed part of P2 - there is no proof of the above-mentioned Silvestri being part of such a Lodge. While all transcripts from the Committee meetings vanished, a partial reconstruction indicates that the groups mostly adopted military measures and no effective investigations were carried out³⁹³. Alongside it, an Experts Committee was

³⁸⁷ https://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0257/sed0257.pdf, pg 14520

³⁸⁸ Ibidem, pg, 14521

³⁸⁹ Ibidem, pg 14527

³⁹⁰ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l’uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁹¹ <https://www.parlamento.it/parlam/bicam/terror/stenografici/steno34.htm>

³⁹² Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l’uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁹³ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l’uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

also set up, which was composed of many personalities, including Ferracuti - a psychiatrist - and an American expert in mediation: Pieczenik. His involvement was initially denied, and his role is nowadays still a subject of discussion. In particular, there is to mention an interview of his released by the “*Italy Daily*” in 2000: in it, he claimed that his mission was “*to stabilize Italy, such that the Christian Democracy would not yield and make sure that the kidnapping would not lead to a Communist takeover of the government [...], which was already close to obtaining the majority. An unpleasant consequence was that Moro had to die. The decision of not negotiating was taken. Politically, there was no other choice*”³⁹⁴. It seems that Pieczenik realized that he could not save Moro while also destroying the Red Brigades: it was thus necessary to simulate a negotiation aimed at trapping the Organization by heightening its expectation and leading the brigadists to believe that they could obtain something in exchange for Moro³⁹⁵. It is also necessary to mention what according to some was Pieczenik’s idea, while according to other scholars, it was Cossiga’s: the so-called Plan Victor and Plan Mike. The first was to enter into force if Moro was rescued alive: according to Cossiga himself, he would have been taken to a psychiatric hospital and isolated from the external world, excluding contacts with judges and his family. Plan Mike, on the other hand, was to be activated immediately after Moro’s death: the State was to react with widespread arrests of anyone suspected of having contacts with the Red Brigades. Apparently, the plan did not enter into force after May 9th due to the opposition of some political forces³⁹⁶.

Due to the magnitude of the event, some newspapers released special editions in addition to their regular publications to cover the news. “*La Stampa*” said “*The terrorist attack to which Moro has fallen victim is the most severe of the postwar era [...]. We still don’t know if the Red Brigades [...] will propose a vile exchange between Moro and the so-called political prisoners [...]. However, in such a case, the State will have to reject any negotiation [...]. The attackers [...] acted with the help of bodies, Italian and foreign, which are capable of anything*”³⁹⁷

³⁹⁴ https://luigiboschi.it/argomenti/opinioni_interviste_inchieste/Cossiga-Steve-Pieczenik-e-il-caso-Moro/

³⁹⁵ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

³⁹⁶ https://dati.camera.it/ocd/aic.rdf/aic4_20487_11

³⁹⁷ “*La Stampa*”, special edition, 16/03/1978, first page available at <https://www.camera.it/pictures/gallerie/rapimentoMoro/>



Fig. 3.1, La Stampa, special edition, 16/03/1978



Fig. 3.2, Il Messaggero, special edition, 16/03/1978

“*Il Messaggero*” talked about “war against the State” and said: “*Behind the actions that led to Moro’s kidnapping [...] a broad and dangerous political background can be identified*”. I found it interesting that the article also mentioned the presence of Moro’s bag lying on the asphalt, especially considering that there are still gray areas surrounding the bags that Moro had with him that day and the possibility that someone subtracted classified documents from them. “*La Repubblica*” and “*L’unità*” also published special editions. On the same day the police shared the first pictures of the suspects: however, it was then realized that among the 20 wanted people, two were abroad, other two were already in jail, two more were Gallinari’s disguises, and one was Pisetta, a former police informant³⁹⁸. For what concerns the first international reactions, it is interesting to consider the CIA report issued just a couple of hours after the kidnapping. As reported by Ceci in his “*La CIA e il terrorismo italiano. Dalla strage di piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986)*” (2019), according to the Agency, the event was going to have a profound psychological impact on Italy as a whole and contributed to the feeling of a

³⁹⁸ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

crumbling State, which was not even able to protect its leaders anymore; moreover, Moro was described as an almost indispensable man. In the report, it was said that if he was to be killed by the brigadists, the worst effects would have concerned the Christian Democracy, since he was the only man to be trusted by both the left and the right, as well as the only one to be able to manage the Party's inner tensions. Moreover, the Americans thought that the kidnapping was going to lead to a direct participation of the Communists in the government since, in both the long and the short period, the crisis could have the effect of bringing the parties closer together³⁹⁹.

3.3.1 MARCH 17TH - APRIL 20TH: THE LINE OF FIRMNESS THROUGH THE MEDIA

On March 17th, an editor of the newspaper "*Il Messaggero*" received a phone call which instructed him to go to an underpass located in Largo Argentina to retrieve a vindication communiqué and a picture of Moro. They were initially not found, but after another phone call the editor went back to the indicated place and finally the two objects reached the press. Moreover, on the 17th, an anonymous report informed the Minister of Interior of the existence of a brigadist base in via Gradoli, and police inspections started immediately: after ringing the bell multiple times without anybody answering, the police left without neither arranging new checks nor verifying the identity of the tenant⁴⁰⁰. This represented a big mistake on the part of the police: indeed, the tenant was Moretti himself.

That day's newspapers all reported the news of the kidnapping. The "*Avanti!*", a socialist newspaper, wrote that democracy must be defended with sternness, mobilizing against terrorism every available means without showing weakness. It reported in detail the events of the morning of 16th and, on page 5, Craxi's interview was reported: he stated that the chosen line of action was to defend democracy and the state, as well as mobilize resources to free Moro. When asked if hypotheses had been made regarding potential

³⁹⁹ Ceci, G.M. (2019), *La CIA e il terrorismo italiano: dalla Strage di Piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986)*, Roma, Carocci editore

⁴⁰⁰ Casamassima, P. (2016). *Attacco al cuore dello Stato: le Brigate Rosse da Sossi a Moro. Attacco al cuore dello Stato*, 1-206

terrorist demands, he affirmed that the problem had not been addressed. The newspaper also specified in another article that, at that point, external influences could not be excluded, and that the blackmail carried out by Moro's kidnappers was unacceptable⁴⁰¹. The "*Corriere della Sera*" reported that some of the attackers had a foreign accent and that it was now necessary to react strongly. The Red Brigades had demonstrated a high level of capacity and targeted the most difficult man to replace in the political environment. The article also doubted the efficiency of the secret services. Moreover, it is stated that "*an attack against an important political figure was in the air [...]. Italy has been [...] a battlefield for foreign secret services*". The first half of the sentence, to me, is a little suspicious, considering that - as already mentioned - it seems that other countries knew of the attacks way before it happened. A similar wording can at least make us wonder if the news had reached Italy as well. The second half of the sentence stressed the hypothesis of foreign involvement, as similarly reported by the "*Avanti!*". The article continued by saying "*If the Red Brigades were to subordinate Moro's liberation to the release of Curcio [...] these conditions could not be acceptable*", thus already posing a limit to the government action. In any case, no contact with the terrorists was mentioned by the newspaper. Another article reported that an emergency plan was activated immediately after the ambush, and the Minister of Interior had the power, if necessary, to call for the state of public hazard. While reading that day's newspaper, I found it interesting that an addendum specified that there was the "*willingness to provide correct information which does not fuel fear, exasperation, and emotionalism*"⁴⁰².

The next day, the newspapers were still very much focused on the affair: the "*Avanti!*" reported that the Christian Democracy had decided to adopt measures within the already existing laws, and once again emphasized the possible involvement of international secret services. The Christian Democracy's attitude was to save the Republic, since "*we cannot*

⁴⁰¹ "Avanti!", 17/03/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?F%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780317.82-64_0001_d.pdf

⁴⁰² "Corriere della Sera", 17/03/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NjovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyODE2MA%3D%3D>

bend to the will of subversion”⁴⁰³. The “*Corriere della Sera*”, on the other hand, harshly criticized the inefficiency of the State’s apparatus and the lack of equipment of Moro’s escort, as well as the refusal to understand the nature of the terrorist phenomenon. Moreover, the newspaper stressed that while it was possible that there had been external influences, this was not enough to explain the complexity of the circumstance, which should be investigated in the context of the Italian society and political environment. In another article titled “*There are secret negotiations, but the Viminale denies*”, such a possibility was mentioned but - as the title said - it was strongly denied; moreover, it was mentioned that the German secret services had anticipated an attack to an important politician, but such a news was also denied. When asked about the reaction of the Communist Party after a summit between the parties, it was said that “*there hasn’t been an attempt of political instrumentalization*” and, when affirming that in case of ransom the State would react with firmness, someone said “*I think it is the best tribute to Moro*”. To conclude, the newspaper reported an editorial in the “*Washington Post*” that concluded with these words, “*It seems to us that the old Italian tradition of weak governments [...] is about to come to a dramatic end. This crime may now precipitate in Italy the kind of crisis from which a very different style of government will have to emerge*”⁴⁰⁴. It has been proven, as reported by Ceci (2019), that the Italian government had almost immediately asked for the United States’ help in the affair, but in vain. In fact, there were two reasons why they did not pursue any firm action: the first was that in the ‘70s a law had been approved which forbade the American government to intervene in foreign domestic police activities; the second was that some years before the CIA had endured a reform which narrowed its ability to conduct clandestine operations abroad. The only way the U.S. could have intervened was by highlighting the international links of the Red Brigades, making it a case of international - rather than domestic - terrorism. However, the

⁴⁰³ “Avanti!”, 18/03/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?F%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780317.82-64_0001_d.pdf

⁴⁰⁴ “Corriere della Sera”, 18/03/1978 retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyODE2MA%3D%3D>

hypothesis concerning the existence of such links was considered to be extremely weak, and thus no actions were carried out⁴⁰⁵.

The morning of the 19th, Italy woke up with the news that the first communiqué had been issued by the Red Brigades, and Moro's picture was published everywhere.



Fig. 3.3, “Avanti!”, 19-20/03/1978, “It has been proven that Aldo Moro is in the hands of the BR”

The “Avanti!” reported that the Christian Democracy’s President was physically fine and that the terrorists intended to subject him to a fake trial. Moreover, they did not ask for any ransom, although - as affirmed some pages later - everybody expected the brigadistas to ask for the freeing of those subjected to the trial that was happening in Turin. The analysis of the communiqué conducted by the newspaper put forward the hypothesis that, although the linguistic mastery was the one of a native speaker, the missive was written by a non-Italian speaker due to some details. The newspaper also revealed that no step forward was made in the investigation. According to the information provided, it can be affirmed that legislative measures to be adopted with urgency, particularly concerning the strengthening of police forces, were decided. However, it is interesting to note a consideration that can be found on page 2, which highlighted that “it is not by crushing

⁴⁰⁵ Ceci, G.M. (2019), La CIA e il terrorismo italiano: dalla Strage di Piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986), Roma, Carocci editore

*protests that democracy is saved: [doing so], at best, postpones its end*⁴⁰⁶. The “*Corriere della Sera*” announced that some German special agents were participating in the research of the people’s prison, which was thought to be in Rome’s urban circle. After having analyzed the communiqué, the newspaper concluded that the brigadists did not kidnap Moro to achieve Curcio’s liberation, as previously thought, and this heightened the anguish even more⁴⁰⁷. Two days later, on March 21st - as Almirante had proposed immediately after the news was broken on the 16th - the Committee adopted what was probably its most important measure: the counterterrorism decree no. 59, which offered a time reduction for those who provided useful information to free seized people, the possibility for the police to arrest those who refuse to provide identity documents, and the obligation for landlords to communicate renting and selling contracts concerning their properties⁴⁰⁸. Two days later, Cossiga took on the role of coordinator of all police forces. Meanwhile, false reports on hideouts and brigadists names were piling up.

The second communiqué was published by the newspapers between the 26th and the 27th. The “*Avanti!*” highlighted that the missive clearly showed that the State was not dealing with a group of desperate and crazy young people, but rather with an organized and lucid group. Considering the content of the missive, the State’s helplessness seemed even more humiliating: hidden behind the concept of “confidentiality” there seemed to be only the State’s inability to realize the seriousness of the situation. To make things worse, the communiqué clearly stated that Moro’s kidnapping was just the first step of a bigger fight against the State. The newspaper reports the maoist reference made by the brigadists - “*rely on one’s own strengths*” - which was intended to claim that there had been no foreign involvement in their action. It is interesting to me to note an answer given by Ambrosini which can be found on page 4: after having been asked about the foreign secret services help, he replied “*I was shocked by the help given by England and Germany. I think this*

⁴⁰⁶ “Avanti!”, 19/03/1978, available for consultation at http://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?F%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780319.82-66_0001_d.pdf

⁴⁰⁷ “Corriere della Sera”, 19/03/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NDovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyODMzOQ%3D%3D>

⁴⁰⁸ <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1978/03/22/078U0059/sg>

*extra-territorial protection is useless because we know how to democratically defeat terrorism. We already demonstrated it by defeating the first phase of the strategy of tension. I don't think other countries have proven firmness as much as we did*⁴⁰⁹. Personally, I find this answer peculiar to say the least: in a context where the life of a man was in danger and terrorism was threatening the whole country, I would expect any help that did not seem to be an interference in domestic affairs to be highly appreciated, even if it was coming from abroad. The “*Corriere della Sera*” stressed that, in the communiqué, while the considerations are abundant, the information are not: in fact, the brigadists meant to interrogate Moro and extort State secrets out of him, but - considering that they limited themselves to say that “the interrogation is ongoing” - he seemed to not have met their expectations. Moreover, it was highlighted that the brigadists strongly denied any foreign interference in the operation, but also affirmed that they will “*calibrate the strategy from a European perspective, looking for cooperation with foreign forces*”. The “*Corriere*” thus wrote: “*euroterrorism is about to be born*”. It emerges from that day's newspaper that the communiqué was analyzed by some experts in order to find similarities with the first, in order to confirm its authenticity. When reporting the other newspapers' coverage of the news, it is said that “*Il Popolo*” - the Christian Democracy's newspaper - stated that the missive was a desperate attempt by the Red Brigades to escape their isolation. Moreover, they “*don't want to trial Moro, but rather the whole Italian people and Italy's postwar history*”⁴¹⁰.

On March 28th, the “*Corriere della Sera*” criticized the lack of concrete actions and condemned the faulty release of suspect pictures which portrayed people already imprisoned: such actions, it was said, made the police work less effective and did not contribute to the creation of a watchful citizenship. Finally, it was reported that a former

⁴⁰⁹ “Avanti!”, 27/03/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780326.82-72_0001_d.pdf

⁴¹⁰ “Corriere della Sera”, 26/03/1978, retrieved from https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/browser_news.shtml#!/N4IgLgpgzmCGcgFwgMIHkBKBlAohggIADQgQAmAlgF4UD2AdhEiAHKw0OwA2TJUArgAdBPALYR6YWsxYNeIMvFhIAjAE4A7AA4ADAGYATADYdpsyUGwA5hXrLEBkhTLMNiAPSWr0dwCcAxlCKYM6wgQbuAAJqACw6BgbE4BRSXNLIAC+QA

Socialist secretary claimed that responsibilities for Moro's kidnapping may be looked for in the United States. Moreover, the hypothesis that none of Moro's kidnappers might be able to interrogate him properly was advanced, hinting at the possibility that someone from the outside might be helping them in carrying out the mock trial⁴¹¹. A day later, a meeting among the representatives of the Christian Democracy was held to analyze the content of Moro's missive, which had been delivered that same day. Andreotti stated that from such a meeting a unanimous opinion emerged that it was necessary to adopt a line of firmness. In addition, he also declared that Moro's situation was tragic to the point that it deprived anything he wrote of "moral validity". This point will be mentioned again in a couple of lines.

Between March 30th and March 31st, the newspapers started to debate about the third communiqué and Moro's letter. The missive, addressed to Cossiga and here summarized, said: *"I write to you [...] so that you can reflect on what to do, in order to prevent worse trouble. [...]. It is our collective work to be under indictment [...]. Other than the humanitarian reason, that cannot be ignored, the Raison d'État ("ragion di stato") comes into play. Such a raison d'état in my case means [...] that I find myself in an uncontrolled domain, subjected to a people's trial [...] with the risk of being induced to talk in an unpleasant and dangerous manner [...]. The sacrifice of the innocents in the name of abstract legality principle, while a state of necessity should lead to save them, is inadmissible. Every other State regulated itself in a positive manner [...]. I remind you of the exchanges between Breznev and Pinochet [...]. I think that a preventive step from the Holy See (or from others? who?) could be useful [...]. A hostile attitude would be an error"*⁴¹². So, the first person to propose some kind of negotiation, to safeguard his life and the State's secrets, was Moro himself⁴¹³. But what did Moro refer to in his missive? Probably what is commonly known as "Lodo Moro". In the early Seventies, Italy had started to think about the possibility of an agreement between the government and the

⁴¹¹ "Corriere della Sera", 28/03/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NjovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyODgzMw%3D%3D>

⁴¹²Di Sivo, M. (2013). Le lettere di Aldo Moro dalla prigionia alla storia, available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/75/Moro_-_Le_lettere_di_Aldo_Moro_dalla_prigionia_alla_storia%2C_Mura%2C_Roma_2013.pdf

⁴¹³ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

Palestine Liberation Organization - as well as Syria, Iraq, and Libya - in order to avoid that Palestinian terrorism could affect the peninsula⁴¹⁴. It is very likely that Italy was not the only country to establish such an agreement: Austria and Germany, for example, seemed to have done so, too. The agreement consisted, from part of the Italian State, in an indifference with respect to terrorists' transition in the peninsula, favorable conditions in case of arrest and, according to some, even weapons⁴¹⁵. Favorable conditions included - as Moro confirmed in his letters - the liberation of terrorist prisoners, especially Palestinians.

Before moving on to see what the newspapers said on that day, it is important to highlight that with this missive Moro had probably hoped to open a channel of communication, since he explicitly asked to keep the letter secret. However, it offered a great deal of publicity, and the brigadistas preferred to exploit it with the excuse that "*nothing must remain hidden from the people*"⁴¹⁶. Some members of the Red Brigades, especially Morucci and Faranda, had opposed the public release of the missive at such a crucial stage and argued that it would inevitably cause the politicians to assume a position of rigidity. However, Moretti was not persuaded⁴¹⁷. Unfortunately, it is almost certain that this decision contributed to the vanishing of every possibility of negotiation, especially in light of the fact that the government could not publicly admit having negotiated with terrorists, granting them a form of recognition. At the same time, undercover negotiations clashed with the Red Brigades' will, since they aimed at a public confrontation with the Christian Democracy⁴¹⁸. A solution had to be found by the party, which must remain united. It is interesting to note, however, that such an attitude generated - in some parts of the society - a sort of paradox, as the following affirmation given by an observer demonstrate "*from these Christian Democratic leaders from whom the Italians have heard half-words, half-truths, and half-promises for so many years, there now seem to come, and on such a tragically difficult topic, accents of unusual firmness*"⁴¹⁹. Moro's first letter had been a

⁴¹⁴ Lomellini, V. (2022). *Il «lodo Moro»: Terrorismo e ragion di Stato 1969-1986*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

⁴¹⁵ Ibidem

⁴¹⁶ Communiqué no. 3, p. 43. in Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴¹⁷ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴¹⁸ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

⁴¹⁹ Augias (1978, p. 38).

game changer, and the “real” versus “false” Moro debate began. The very first step was the result of what is probably the most relevant action of the Crisis Management Committee and the Experts Committee: the so-called “Stockholm syndrome operation”, which was aimed at justifying Moro’s statements in his letters by conveying the idea that he was identifying himself with his captors to the point that he could not be held responsible for his own words. Similarly, Pieczenik believed that it was necessary to attribute Moro’s words to a brainwash⁴²⁰. Both the government members and the press thus started to insist on the fact that Moro surely had to be drugged. This strategy made Moro’s voice harmless and caused him not to be considered just as an influential interlocutor as before and justified the government’s choice of not taking into consideration anything he might have asked to the institutions or have reveal to his kidnappers⁴²¹. The “*Avanti!*”, on its publication of March 31st, firstly remarked on the line of firmness adopted by the government and supported by the Socialist Party and the Communist Party as well. With regard to the possibility of Moro not being in the fullness of his faculties, on page 12, it stated that the missive has clearly been written in a state of physical and moral duress, which can only immensely diminish the words contained in it. Two pages later, an interview to Judge Sossi was divulged, in which he affirms that Moro’s letter had likely been written in a state of necessity, but not under dictation. According to him, the Red Brigades make people drink “*potions with special chemical substances about once or twice a day, but never when messages have to be written*”⁴²². Moreover, another article is dedicated to this matter, with an expert describing how such substances can “*make the subject susceptible to obeying to impositions*”. The other mentioned expert, on the other hand, firmly believed that the letter could have only been written under dictation⁴²³. The newspaper also reported that the “*Osservatore Romano*” - the Holy See’s newspaper - did not mention the possibility of a mediation from part of the Vatican, which replied very cautiously to Moro’s proposal, as well as stigmatizing the

⁴²⁰ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

⁴²¹ Ibidem

⁴²² “Avanti!”, 31/03/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780331.82-76_0001_d.pdf

⁴²³ Ibidem

attention given to the Red Brigades messages by the press⁴²⁴. Similarly, the “*Corriere della Sera*” stated: “*Who wrote this letter? Did Moro, President of the Christian Democracy [...], inspiring strategist of Italian politics, write it? Or was it written by a man with the same name and face, but reduced to powerlessness [...] perhaps stunned with drugs [...]?* The second hypothesis is the most likely”. It is said that Moro “even negates the basis of the rule of law”⁴²⁵. The next day, the newspaper titled: “*It is not possible to accept the Red Brigades’ blackmail*”.



Fig. 3.4, “Corriere della Sera”, 31/03/1978, “The answer of the Christian Democracy: it is not possible to accept the Red Brigades’ blackmail”

On the very first page it can be read: “*With yielding in the face of blackmail, the kidnapped can sometimes (not always) have their lives saved. However, more people will be affected [...]. Unlike what they made Moro write, the Reason of State demands the categorical rejection of their blackmail*”. Such a line was confirmed by a note by the Christian Democracy published in “*Il Popolo*”, in which it is stated that “*we reaffirm with conviction that it is not possible to accept the Red Brigades’ blackmail*”. A disquisition was carried out by a professor, reported in an article, concerning hypothetical hidden messages contained in Moro’s missive. This an expert claimed that, according to him,

⁴²⁴ “Avanti!”, 31/03/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%20001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780331.82-76_0001_d.pdf

⁴²⁵ “Corriere della Sera”, 30/03/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/MzovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyODczMA%3D%3D>

Moro “copied a text written by one of his captors” and that he “did not agree with the content of the letter”. He deduced that “he intends to sacrifice himself and [...] he refuses the exchange”. Moreover, another message he supposedly conveyed was the fact that his friends knew him too well to believe what was written in the missive. Similarly, another article reports that “[Moro’s] captors forced him to prospect the solution that they want, with the result that proposing the other solution might mean his sacrifice. Moro, however, shows that he knows that the choice must be made in the interest of the Republican State, before his personal one”. On page 4, an article listed all the ways in which a person can be annihilated in order to make them act against their will: particularly, the hypotheses of lack of sleep, being forced to stand up, hypnosis, drugs, and constant solicitations were explored. Finally, it is interesting to notice that while discussing the content of Moro’s missive, the author of an article published on page 4 asked to himself: “*The eventuality of freeing inmates [...] would lead [...] to the chance of securing the escape to another country. And which country would be willing to offer hospitality and immunity?*”. Knowing about the Lodo Moro, it is easy to affirm that Italy itself could easily be one of those countries, considering that it offered transit immunity to other countries’ terrorists and favorable releasing conditions in case of arrest. In fact, it is ascertained that Moro was talking exactly about that⁴²⁶

After on April 3rd some voices circulated about the possible existence of a document drafted by the Red Brigades, containing their conditions for Moro’s liberation, on April 4th, the government confirmed to the Chamber of Deputies its intention to stick to the firmness line of action⁴²⁷. According to Castronuovo, nevertheless, the first timid attempt by the Socialists to engage in a negotiation with the Red Brigades dates back to this day: Curcio’s lawyer Guiso was asked by Craxi to speak to his client, who however referred to him to interact directly with Moro⁴²⁸. It is not clear whether Curcio had been able to maintain meaningful contacts with the brigadists on the field or not, nor if he was

⁴²⁶ “Corriere della Sera”, 31/03/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyOTAyOA%3D%3D>

⁴²⁷ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l’assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

⁴²⁸ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l’uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

receiving information through an intermediary. On April 5th, another letter from Moro - this time directed to Zaccagnini - was published by the press and will be summarized here. It can be read: *"I am called to pay [for our actions] with consequences that are not hard to imagine. [...] Morally, you are the one who is in my place, where materially I am [...]. I am a political prisoner that your abrupt decision to close any talk related to other prisoners places in an unsustainable position [...]. Every moment might be too late [...]. Firmness may appear more appropriate, but some degree of concession is not only equitable but also politically useful. As I reminded, many States behave in this civil way [...]. If it is not the case, you will have wanted it and, I say this without animosity, the inevitable consequences will fall on the party and the people [...]. To say the truth, I feel somewhat abandoned by you. After all, I already expressed these ideas to Taviani during the affair Sossi"*⁴²⁹. The *"Avanti!"* announced that the government once again rejected any chance of accepting the terrorists' blackmail or bargaining with them and that the Prime Minister highlighted the unity manifested by the political parties. A new reference was made with regard to a possible international matrix in the events, especially in light of a controversy that arose between the USSR and China. The new amendments to the "Royal Law" were discussed by the newspaper, which however stressed that these restrictions should only have a temporary effect and that, to effectively confront the terrorist emergency, the laws should be of a social nature. Finally, on the very last page, the *"Avanti!"* reported a note that the Christian Democrats had made the newspaper *"Il Popolo"* publish after their meeting which followed the reception of the communiqué and the letter. Such a note stated: *"[...] the text of Moro's letter to Zaccagnini reveals once again the conditions of absolute coercion under which such documents are written and confirms that this letter is not morally ascribable to him"*⁴³⁰. Meanwhile, investigations were still unsuccessful. The *"Corriere della Sera"* titled the appearance of the new letter *"A missive from hell"*. The very first article stated that *"a consideration must be made:*

⁴²⁹ Di Sivo, M. (2013). Le lettere di Aldo Moro dalla prigionia alla storia, available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/75/Moro_-_Le_lettere_di_Aldo_Moro_dalla_prigionia_alla_storia%2C_Mura%2C_Roma_2013.pdf

⁴³⁰ "Avanti!", 05/04/1978, available for consultation at http://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?F%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780405.82-81_0001_d.pdf

*[...] every remote assumption of approach has fallen. The Red Brigades announced the passage from a civil war to a general offensive [...]. This means that no negotiation, no humanitarian subsidence could stop a strategy that aims at the death of more men and the end of democratic institutions". It is reported that the Christian Democracy did not consider the missive morally ascribable to Moro, and that "[he] reveals once again the calm courage with which he is ready to face even the most atrocious destiny". A statement that really does not reflect, in my opinion, the content of the letter. Moreover, it was highlighted that Andreotti had claimed that "we cannot negotiate with people whose hands are dripping with blood"*⁴³¹

Interestingly, on April 6th, the name Gradoli came up again among those working in the investigative field: this time, it did not indicate a street, but rather a town. Checks were carried out unsuccessfully. It is said that the name came out from a seance held on April 2nd at professor Clò's house, which was attended by some friends of his - including Prodi - after asking where Moro was being held prisoner. Information about such a name was then provided to the investigators. According to some, the words "Viterbo" and "Bolsena" were also composed⁴³², which is why the investigators proceeded to check on the town rather than a street in Rome. It seems, however, the Prodi did not only communicate the name Gradoli: in fact, there exists a note written by Zanda, Cossiga's collaborator, dated April 5th, with detailed information. "*Along state road 74, in a small stretch in the Viterbo province, locality Gradoli, isolated house with basement*"⁴³³. To this day, all the participants insist on supporting the seance thesis and claim that nobody manipulated the slab⁴³⁴, although it is legitimate to raise questions on the matter. It is far more likely that the seance has been just an excuse made up to cover a source, although no proof was found to confirm such a hypothesis. Moro's wife, after coming to know the successful outcome of Gradoli's perquisitions, suggested to check via Gradoli in Rome as well. However, allegedly, a police officer claimed that such a street did not exist, despite the

⁴³¹ "Corriere della Sera", 05/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/MjovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyOTQzMzQ%3D%3D>

⁴³² <https://www.ilpost.it/2018/04/04/prodi-seduta-spiritica-moro/>

⁴³³ <https://www.ilpost.it/2018/04/04/prodi-seduta-spiritica-moro/>

⁴³⁴ <https://www.gerograssi.it/cms2/file/casomoro/DVD9/3/CX.pdf#page=90>

checks carried out on that same street just two days after Moro's kidnapping. The Minister of Interior denied such allegations⁴³⁵.

According to Castronuovo (2007), around April 8th Moro's family contacted Swiss lawyer Payot, who had intervened in a similar case in Germany. However, in the newspaper "*Corriere della Sera*", his involvement seems to date back to March 18th. Regardless of when he was actually implicated, the lawyer confessed to the head of Moro's secretariat that he could establish contact with the Red Brigades⁴³⁶, and his contacts seemed to be truthful. He was not formally appointed, but the government, which had been informed of the contacts, declared to be open to follow the developments. However, after a short while, it seemed that he could not be a valid channel of communication and that he was not actually in contact with active terrorists. In the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry's report, it is said he quit some days after the initial contacts after having said that the Swiss authorities had hindered him, but there would be no evidence of this⁴³⁷. Castronuovo (2007), is of a different opinion: Cossiga would have contacted his Swiss counterpart and asked to not let Payot work on the affair⁴³⁸.

The fifth communiqué also contains some words from Moro, although not in the same form as the previous missives. That day's "*Avanti!*" started with an article that referred to the psychological war conducted by the Red Brigades against the State and the Christian Democracy. Once again it was said that Moro's faculties were jeopardized by his detention conditions, and a comparison was made with processes conducted in Stalin's USSR, during which people were made to confess all sorts of implausible things. The article goes on to say that "*you don't exchange a citizen without any criminal record, leader of the major Italian party, with inmates waiting for a trial or that have already been sentenced due to extremely serious charges*". As previously mentioned, a message written by Moro was included in the communiqué. In it, he said "*it comes all the way here*

⁴³⁵ <https://www.ilpost.it/2018/04/04/prodi-seduta-spiritica-moro/>

⁴³⁶ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

⁴³⁷ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

⁴³⁸ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

*the news of Taviani's denial of my affirmation regarding the exchange of prisoners which I exposed to him and Gui [...] I hasten to say that Taviani did not agree with me, as many do today. They are convinced that this is the only way to defend the State's authority [...]. In this case, it was about imagining, with appropriate guarantees, to pose the topic of an exchange of political prisoners with the effect of saving innocent lives [...]. There is a set of political reasons to consider and to follow, without instantly making an impermeable block in which not even reasons of humanity can enter, which highly civilized nations felt during painfully similar circumstances and that induced them to a bit of flexibility which Italy refuses"*⁴³⁹. The "Corriere della Sera" stated that the language used in the communiqué takes away credit to those voices claiming that contacts between Moro's family and the Red Brigades had started, and even the existence of a letter directed to his wife - intercepted a couple of days before - was not mentioned, as they most likely judged it as a private message. This message was said to contain the conviction on Moro's part that the Christian democracy was actually obstructing any negotiation process. As usual, his words were considered to be unreliable, and indeed, some days later, the party confirmed that no openness towards the terrorists was to be pursued⁴⁴⁰.

On April 16th, the intervention of Amnesty International was solicited. However, such a body specified that it does not act on the request of the States, but only on the initiative of private individuals: for this reason, the request for an appeal came from Moro's family. It also specified that it could not exercise any form of mediation or bargain with the kidnappers and that it did not want to be involved in any other action where other organizations were implicated. Amnesty issued a press release - based on humanitarian grounds - on April 17th, but no answer came from the Red Brigades⁴⁴¹. What stood out to me when looking at the "Avanti!" of the 16-17th of April is that it did not devote a lot of

⁴³⁹ "Avanti!", 11/04/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780411.82-86_0001_d.pdf

⁴⁴⁰ "Corriere della Sera", 11/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NDovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AyOTkxNw%3D%3D>

⁴⁴¹ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

space to a news that - at least to me - appears striking and worthy of much more attention: indeed, Moro had been condemned to death by the Red Brigades. However, only a short article was dedicated to such devastating news, and it mostly summarized what had been said in the sixth communiqué. The only consideration made by the writer is that, from the leaflet, it cannot be deduced that the Red Brigades were actually going to execute the judgment: in this respect, Sossi's case was posed as an example, since even then the Organization had sentenced him to death but did not proceed with the action⁴⁴².



Fig 3.5, “Avanti!”, 16-17/04/1978, “Moro’s assassination decided yesterday evening by the Red Brigades”

The “*Corriere della Sera*” also did not devote as much space to the news as I expected, although it is interesting to note that it stated “[we have to] find a way to free him”. The newspaper reported that an emergency meeting was held and that a note to be published on “*Il Popolo*” was given to the journalists. It said: “we shall not leave any stone unturned in order to save the life of our President”. The Red Brigades are defined as “assassins dressed up as judges” and the article claimed that, with the sixth communiqué, the Organization meant to remind everybody that Moro is in their hands, or better, in their power. If they wanted to, they could eliminate him in any moment. The article concluded:

⁴⁴² “Avanti!”, 16-17/04/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?F%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780416.82-91_0001_d.pdf

“they should not believe that, with such an action, they would win”⁴⁴³. The next day’s newspaper claimed that: “the last script [of the Red Brigades] shows that they know that they are heading for defeat. The communiqué shows a sense of unsuccessfulness with respect to the purposes of the operation”. Moreover, “the reaction of the political forces up to now has been compact and reassuring. Humanitarian appeals can perfectly go along with the State’s refusal [to negotiate] if they contribute to saving Moro’s life and, concurrently, the unity of the political environment”. In addition, Moro’s missives were considered to be just another instrument to break such unity. It was reported that the President of the Republic asked the brigadists to behave with a “sense of humanity”. Finally, it is said that it cannot be excluded that the new communiqué, shorter than the previous one, was drafted in a hurry because of something sudden that changed the Red Brigades’ plan⁴⁴⁴.

On April 18th, while the parties were manifesting democratic solidarity to the Christian Democracy and expressing support for the line of firmness and the possibility of international organizations’ efforts were being assessed, the police investigations finally led somewhere. To be precise, however, it was a water leakage that actually enabled the investigators to make progress in their search. In a building of via Gradoli, around 8 am, the first-floor tenants heard hasty steps and other no better-specified noises. According to Castronuovo’s reconstruction, after a while, a water stain started to form on their ceiling, and they realized that there was probably a leak from the apartment above. They called the building manager, who, in turn, called a plumber. However, realizing that he could not do anything about the problem, he asked for the intervention of firefighters, who entered the apartment from the balcony and noted that the leakage had been caused by a shower faucet left running. While the firefighters were leaving, one of them noticed “on a table near the entrance [...] some papers with the Red Brigades emblem on them”. After a quick inspection, they called the police⁴⁴⁵. Among the documents, weapons, and other

⁴⁴³ “Corriere della Sera”, 16/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NjovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMD EyMQ%3D%3D>

⁴⁴⁴ “Corriere della Sera”, 17/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/MjovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzM DI4OQ%3D%3D>

⁴⁴⁵ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

material discovered was evidence linking the apartment to Via Fani, such as the original license plate of the Fiat 128 that had initiated the accident and two airman uniforms. It seemed as if this apartment, a relatively short distance by car from Via Fani, may have been the headquarters for the Moro operation⁴⁴⁶. In my opinion, it is interesting to remember that the Red Brigades followed a strict behavioral code, which included rules aimed at not arousing suspicions and unwanted attention. Thus, it seems unlikely that one of their members - probably Moretti himself - made such a naive mistake. Maybe they wanted the police to find the den; perhaps, they meant to mislead the investigations and create chaos. In fact, there is to notice that no information concerning Moro or where he was located was found: thus, a discovery that at first seemed to be a breakthrough in the investigation turned out to be just a smokescreen. Moreover, there was no hint that led the investigators to the tenants, and two people - a man and a woman, most likely Moretti and Balzerani - were seen fleeing after noticing the police. Or maybe someone else - perhaps the secret service? - somehow infiltrated the house and left the faucet running in order to make the den discovered. What is for sure is that police roadblocks and similar operations had not been successful in contrasting the terrorists at all. The Socialist Party also supported the thesis of an intentional act in the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry⁴⁴⁷.

A day later, on April 19th, dramatic news broke in every newspaper: Moro had been killed. Consequently, an urgent meeting was called among the Christian Democracy, Socialist Party, and Communist Party's leadership. The "*Avanti!*" reported the state of anxiety that characterized the country after the - fake - seventh communiqué was received. The article stressed the hope that it was fake and only aimed at increasing confusion among the civil society and the police. The Red Brigades were harshly criticized for their *modus operandi*. Another article reported the words of Bufalini, a member of the Communist Party: "*we have to prepare ourselves for the worst. The Red brigadists [...] are not destined to be exhausted if they are not blocked*", hinting at the fact that firmness is the only possible line of action. After repeatedly insisting on the fact that the message was almost surely

⁴⁴⁶ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁴⁷ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908011.pdf>

authentic, an article on page 3 doubted the truthfulness of this claim: according to it, there were some typographical mistakes not present in the previous communiqués, as well as some grammatical errors. Moreover, it was easy to notice the absence of the usual slogans. In a similar fashion, another article stressed that it was unlikely that anyone had been able to access the area indicated by the communiqué due to severe weather conditions. Consequently, the publication of the next day raised stronger doubts about the authenticity of the communiqué and also reported that the imprisoned members of the Red Brigades in Turin did not think the message was attributable to the Organization.



Fig. 3.6, “Corriere della Sera”, 19/04/1978, “A message announces: Aldo Moro was killed. Corpse’s research is in vain. A hideout discovered in Rome”

The “*Corriere della Sera*” defined the day as the “*most dramatic day of this affair*” and claimed that the news “*took away from Moro’s destiny any political color*”. It was reported that at first the communiqué was not taken seriously and that, although it was initially considered to be real, by the end of the day its authenticity was listed at fifty percent. The idea of a misdirection was proposed. It is affirmed that the location indicated by the communiqué was searched, but no evidence of a body being left there was found. As the “*Avanti!*” did, the “*Corriere*” also highlighted the fact that the imprisoned members of the Red Brigades did not recognize in the seventh communiqué the classic style of the Organization. The newspaper also reported the news of the hideout of via Gradoli, claiming that the Red Brigades surely did not feel hunted by the police, since

they had used the apartment until the night before⁴⁴⁸. I feel that it is natural to wonder why the people in charge doubted the communiqué's authenticity, especially in light of the fact that - as can be seen by the newspaper articles - everybody thought it was, in fact, authentic. Why did the debate arise in the first place? It was the first time that the newspapers questioned with such intensity the authenticity of the communiqués. Keeping in mind that the newspapers were published the day after the communiqué was received, we can ask ourselves: was it because there was no trace of the President - nor of any other human being - in the frozen lake where his body was supposed to be found? Was it because someone in the media knew that it was not real and was trying to hint at it? Why did the so-called “experts” initially affirm the communiqué was almost certainly authentic due to the “demonstrated” analysis of the typewriter typeface, only to discover it was actually counterfeited? Did they not notice immediately? As it often happens when dealing with this story, we will probably never know.

According to what Castronuovo wrote, Pieczenik was carefully evaluating when to stop the simulation of a negotiation, and the moment came *“right after the fourth week of the seizure, when Moro’s letters started to feel desperate, when it seemed that he was about to reveal state secrets and give names of those who were privy”*. It seemed that at that point the public opinion needed to be prepared for the eventuality of Moro’s death: to do so, a psychological war was carried out by publishing the fake seventh communiqué. Moreover, said war aimed at manipulating the Red Brigades and inducing them to kill Moro, so that the public opinion would unanimously and strongly reject them⁴⁴⁹. However, as already mentioned, Pieczenik’s role is quite smoky, and it is not even clear if he stayed in Italy during the whole affair or if he flew back to the U.S. before it ended, possibly around mid-April. For example, Castronuovo (2007) reported that he mentioned that *“I had the feeling that there was no political will to save Moro [...] so I left sooner than expected”*. A different version regarding the fake communiqué was given by Andreotti and also reported by Castronuovo: he stated that a man, who qualified himself

⁴⁴⁸ “Corriere della Sera”, 19/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/MTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMDA1NA%3D%3D>

⁴⁴⁹ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

as a member of the Red Brigades, anticipated the falsified missive as an evidence of his trustworthiness⁴⁵⁰. This dramatic turn of events most likely gave impetus to the following attempts at negotiating Moro's freedom.

3.3.2 APRIL 21ST - MAY 8TH: THE SOCIALIST BREAK. A POSSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATION?



Fig. 3.7, “Avanti!”, 21/04/1978, “Moro is alive: there’s a picture”

From this day on, a great direction shift can be detected in the “Avanti!”: there is a need to negotiate for Moro's life. It can be read: *“there is the imperative that is imposed to every civilized society, and thus to the Italian State as well, [...] the defense of human life”*. This, of course, while ensuring that criminal laws are correctly applied. *“A prisoner exchange would clash with reasons of principles but also legal hurdles. A formal negotiation between the State and Moro's kidnappers can't be proposed either. However, there can be margins that allow [...] to obtain Moro's liberation [...]. Let's not forget that [...] in a democratic society [...] the principles must be at the service of men, not the men at the service of principles”*. The newspaper mentioned that in the previous days there had been talks about the possibility of interventions by international or non-political organizations. Yet, the government remained firm on its idea that the state itself did not have to negotiate. Contextually, some of the articles reported the forty-eight-hour

⁴⁵⁰ Ibidem

The “*Corriere della Sera*” wondered: “*To negotiate or not to negotiate: after the blackmail, the dilemma threatens to break the political landscape*”. According to the newspaper, there were four points to be reconciled: saving Moro’s life, respecting the laws of the Republic, keeping in mind the public opinion’s sentiments, and finding a way to open the doors of the “people’s prison” without elevating the terrorists to the status of a “State”. The article, talking about those favorable to negotiations, commented: “*there are those who think that it is not right, when for the first time the phone rings, to suddenly hang up. Even if on the other side there is a criminal*”. Moreover, the journalist believed that by not specifying the number and names of the political prisoners to be freed the Red Brigades meant to test the opponent’s reactions. However, it was also reminded that the Christian Democracy is a political party, and as such it does not have the power to release inmates. While commenting on the reactions of the political forces, it is reported that: “*the first “no” was the Communists’ [...]. The first “yes” came from the Socialists [...]. Both the government and the rest of the parties remained firm on the original line*”. I found it interesting to read a dialogue between two members of the Parliament: “*I want Moro to live*”, followed by “*Jackal, I don’t want the Republic to die!*”. It is clear that the members of the political class were facing an enormous dilemma. Later on, it was reported that even the police members had asked to not negotiate. Guiso’s opinion on the ultimatum, as well as the news that Moro was alive, was also reported. He claimed that such an ultimatum needed to be seriously considered and said: “*we don’t have to joke if we don’t want to become accomplices of a clear-headed homicide*”. He also stated that the deadline was negotiable, as long as some of those affected by it declared to be willing to negotiate on a political basis⁴⁵².

Thus, it can be said that particularly from this day onwards, there were two fronts clashing within the political environment: the firmness front versus the negotiation front. That same day, the Christian Democracy embraced the appeal of Moro's family and identified Caritas Internationalis as a viable actor to induce Moro’s kidnappers to free him. Despite what seemed to be positive initial contacts, with the Red Brigades asking for a Christian

⁴⁵² “Corriere della Sera”, 21/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NDovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMDU1NQ%3D%3D>

Democracy representative, the attempt proved to be unsuccessful⁴⁵³. Similarly, the Holy See declared to be available to any collaboration seen as useful to free Moro, and the Pope himself made an appeal to the Organization, asking them to free their prisoner without conditions: a plea that, in my opinion, was not particularly on point, considering he was addressing terrorists that clearly had no intention of coming out from the situation without even just a small gain of some sort.

Between April 22nd and April 25th, the General Secretary of the United Nations launched three different appeals to the Red Brigades for Moro's immediate liberation. However, some sentences in his second message, in which he affirmed that the execution of the sentence could only harm the cause of the Red Brigades and that, in the case of Moro's release, those who support similar causes would have applauded this move, generated concerns among the political environment: in fact, there was the fear that similar statements could end up giving to the Red Brigades the status of political interlocutor. It was then thus specified that the words were inspired by humanitarian reasons⁴⁵⁴. Even the President of Uganda, some days later, announced that he intended to get in contact with the Red Brigades to convince them to release Moro⁴⁵⁵. Finally, it should be mentioned that a member of the Parliament, Cazora, established private contacts with the mafia in order to try and save Moro. On April 23rd, the "*Avanti!*" published another missive coming from Moro and addressed to Zaccagnini, delivered three days prior. Moro wrote: "*With deep bitterness and astonishment I saw [you], without any serious human and political consideration, take a rigidly closed attitude. [...]. Is it possible that you all want my death for an alleged reason of state that someone suggests to you, as a solution to all of the country's problems? You'd be swept away [...]. A rupture would open inside the party, that you cannot dominate [...]. I make it clear that, on my part, I will not absolve or justify anybody [...]. Let not occur, I beg you, the terrible fact of a death decision made on the directive of some executive obsessed with security issues, as if there were no exile to*

⁴⁵³ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

⁴⁵⁴ Ibidem

⁴⁵⁵ "Corriere della Sera", 04/05/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMTQwNw%3D%3D>

*satisfy them [...]. Any openness [...], with the hours rushing by, would be extremely important [...]. Remember [...] that the Republican Constitution [...] canceled the death penalty. In this way, dear friends, you would be reintroducing it [...]. Whether the sentence is carried out, is up to you [...]. If you don't intervene, a heinous page of Italy's history would be written. My blood would fall upon you. Think this through"*⁴⁵⁶. The following missive, delivered on April 24th, was very similar in content. The "*Corriere della Sera*", reported a comment on the missive which said: "*I believe you understand how difficult it is to find an appropriate answer to the situation*" and that "*Moro seems to understand the difficulties that such a choice entails for the Christian Democracy*"⁴⁵⁷.

On April 25th, the "*Avanti!*", commenting on the Red Brigades' high-caliber prisoner exchange proposal, said: "*one cannot accept an impossible request*" and "*to this request, it must be responded without hesitation that it is impossible and unacceptable*". Moreover, "*no barter could have a positive outcome if it was based on impossible solutions*". The Red Brigades reject the need for a mediator at the "*current state of things*", but they would be willing to accept the role of the Caritas Internationalis if the Christian Democracy and the government were to authorize the Organization to act in a "*public and explicit way*". The newspaper stressed that the Socialist Party had already firmly rejected the possibility of a prisoner exchange. In addition, it was reported that the Christian Democracy had decided to not hold any meetings, even informal ones, making it clear that the party did not intend to address the problem as such and thus leaving very little room for hope. Then it was highlighted that this time the communiqué did not contain any ultimatum, possibly leaving more time to find a solution. Moreover, the plea launched a couple of hours before the eighth communiqué was released - coming from the President of the Security Council of the United Nations - was reported. In it, the President stressed that if Moro was allowed to live, then the confrontation between different ideologies within society could have continued to be realized. If he were to die, such a dialogue would have been interrupted. Finally, on page 5, Guiso's statement was

⁴⁵⁶ Di Sivo, M. (2013). Le lettere di Aldo Moro dalla prigionia alla storia, available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/75/Moro_-_Le_lettere_di_Aldo_Moro_dalla_prigionia_alla_storia%2C_Mura%2C_Roma_2013.pdf

⁴⁵⁷ "Corriere della Sera", 22/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NzoveGFnZXMvcmNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0A5NDc0Ng%3D%3D>

reported: *“there are possibilities to save Moro if one wants it, and I can see that there has been a quite clear opening”*⁴⁵⁸. The *“Corriere della Sera”*, in a long article centered on the anniversary of April 25th, commented on the new requests coming from the Red Brigades, which are considered to be morally unacceptable. *“It is not possible to admit even hypothetically the capitulation of the Republic [...] before a gang of evildoers”*. When commenting on the letter, it was said that *“it is the letter of a [person] sentenced to death who clings to a strand of hope with logical reflections. Or are they written under the dictation of his cruel captors? [...] In the situation that Moro is in, it is not possible to think about free choices. Every act of his [...] can only be the sign of a bent consciousness [...]”*. Moreover, it is said that if in the previous days the brigadists had been able to open a break in the political unity, fostering a negotiation front, *“with their request they reassembled the unity of the grid”*. Indeed, in light of those new developments, the Christian Democracy had nothing else to say and considered its attitude as *“painful realism”*. *“Lotta Continua”* was the only one still considering the eventuality of releasing the named prisoners⁴⁵⁹.

In addition, on April 25th, people close to Moro's family requested the intervention of the International Red Cross. The government expressed concern about the fact that such an intervention might assume the hypothesis of an armed conflict and thus lead to the recognition of the brigadists as a part of a conflict. However, art. 3 of the ‘49 Geneva Convention⁴⁶⁰ could be interpreted in such a way as to avoid that possibility. The Socialist Party was asked to have a solicitation for an analog application of art. 3 of the Convention delivered to the Red Cross, but it does not seem that the hypothesis has been followed up. The next day, the President of the Red Cross made it clear that, in case of hostage-taking, the Red Cross strictly adhered to the rule of refraining from any intervention, except in exceptional cases in which it was requested by an interested party with the agreement of

⁴⁵⁸ “Avanti!”, 25/04/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780425.82-99_0001_d.pdf

⁴⁵⁹ “Corriere della Sera”, 25/04/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/MzovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMDU4Mw%3D%3D>

⁴⁶⁰ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949/article-3>

the others. Considering that Moro's case did not fit into the category of intervention possible under the "non-international armed conflict" classification. According to the President, for Moro's case, only a humanitarian plea was possible - especially considering previous pleas coming from other authoritative sources - if it was to be requested by the government. Some days later, on May 2nd, the hypothesis of such an appeal was abandoned⁴⁶¹.

A day later, on April 26th, the Socialists pressed ahead with their bargaining initiative. A small group of legal experts was established to try to identify some "political detainees", *brigatisti*, members of the Armed Proletarian Cells (NAP), or other revolutionaries, who had not killed or wounded anyone, whose legal position permitted some kind of intervention and who, because females with children or persons afflicted by health problems, were deserving of sympathy⁴⁶². They hoped that an act of indulgence, such as a presidential pardon, would somehow convince the brigadists to release Moro alive. Although the greatest part of the prisoners proposed by the Organization had been discarded, one seemed to be suitable for the solution: Besuschio, who was a decently important brigadists who did not commit any homicides and had health problems. In addition, another person was identified. Craxi then publicly sketched out his idea, and Zaccagnini expressed the Christian Democracy's interest in exploring the possibilities for a humanitarian initiative that would respect the laws of the state. However, the Republicans and the Communists were extremely uneasy about the Socialist project, which they believed risked becoming a concession to the terrorists disguised as something else. For this reason, the Communist Party openly criticized the suggested extension of executive clemency or provisional liberty⁴⁶³. In response to their and others' critics, I find it interesting to report the answer given by Craxi in the "*Avanti!*" of April 28th to an article published in the newspaper "*La Stampa*" a day before. "[...] *We believe that the State has the obligation to protect all its citizens and save them when their lives are in danger. The State has the duty to enforce its laws [...] and punish the perpetrators [of criminal*

⁴⁶¹ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

⁴⁶² Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁶³ Ibidem

actions]. It is the circumstances that establish the priority [...]. We don't want a helpless and submissive State [...]. On the contrary, we pretend that the State defeats terrorism [...]. Who can say, with honesty, that the price of Moro's life means saving the Republic? What are the true sentiments that inspire attitudes of fanatical intransigence? [...]"⁴⁶⁴. The text goes on to stress that many other States have pursued different ways than those being explored in this case and that the socialists simply refuse to give up and wait helplessly.

In a letter dated April 28th, Moro said: "*[...] I didn't suffer any coercion, I am not drugged, I write with my style and my usual handwriting [...]. Yet, they say, I am another one⁴⁶⁵ and I don't deserve to be taken seriously. Then, my arguments don't even get answered [...]. I have to say that I was deeply saddened that some friends [...] doubted the truthfulness of what I was advocating [...]. I deemed acceptable, as it happens in war, a political prisoner exchange [...]. The exchange is beneficial not only to who is on the other side but also to who is in danger of being killed, basically to a common man like me [...]. In a similar situation, the socialists may be decisive. But when? Woes, dear Craxi, if your initiative was to fail [...]. It is time to add that [...] even the liberation (with the expatriation) of a fair number of cases was conceded to Palestinians, to avoid the threat of retaliations capable of damaging the community. And it was threats [...] that did not have the same degree of urgency as this one [...]. It is within the Christian Democracy that problems are not faced bravely [...]. I will die if my party decides so [...]. But no responsible person should hide behind the adherence to an alleged duty*"⁴⁶⁶. In another letter delivered on the same day, Moro asked Pennacchini - President of the Parliamentary Committee for the control of information and security services and on the state secret - to reveal the truth about the Palestinians case. In other words, it seems that he asked him to reveal the existence of the so-called "Lodo Moro". Following this letter, the "*Corriere*

⁴⁶⁴ "Avanti!", 28/04/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?F%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780428.82-103_0001_d.pdf

⁴⁶⁵ Underlined in the original letter

⁴⁶⁶ Di Sivo, M. (2013). Le lettere di Aldo Moro dalla prigionia alla storia, available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/75/Moro_-_Le_lettere_di_Aldo_Moro_dalla_prigionia_alla_storia%2C_Mura%2C_Roma_2013.pdf

della Sera”, after remarking the fact that Moro was writing under the influence of his captors, wrote about Craxi’s attempts to find a solution: “[Craxi’s] objective is the Christian Democracy: he wants to divide it, bend it, convince it to give up on its intransigence”. Moreover, the party direction decided to not summon the National Council, as asked by Moro⁴⁶⁷.

April 30th was characterized by an important event: Moretti called Moro’s home. As the phone was tapped, the call was recorded by the authorities⁴⁶⁸. In short, Moretti said: “*up to now, all the things you have done [...] are of absolutely no use [...]. In the coming hours we cannot do anything other than carry out what we have said in Communiqué no. 8. So, we believe only this: that an intervention, immediate and clarifying in this sense, by Zaccagnini is needed [...]. We have done this simply out of scrupulousness, in the sense that a sentence of death is not something that can be taken lightly, not even on our part. We are willing to bear the responsibilities that [...] fall on us, and we would like exactly, since your father insists, believes, that in fact you have not intervened directly because you are badly advised [...]. The problem is political, so, at this point, the Christian Democracy must intervene. We have insisted on this very much because it is the only way by which a negotiation can eventually be reached*”⁴⁶⁹. That phone call had an immediate effect, since Moro’s family made an appeal to the Christian Democracy saying that “*the party’s action is completely insufficient. This way, the death sentence of the kidnapped is ratified*”⁴⁷⁰ and thus breaking their relationship with the party.

On May 1st, a letter addressed to Craxi was published by the “Avanti!”. In it, Moro said “*since I learned about [...] a strong humanitarian sensibility from part of your party [...] I am here to beg you to keep going and accentuate your important initiative. It has to be made clear that it is not about inviting others to humanitarian actions, which are completely useless, but to give rise with due urgency to a serious and a balanced prisoner*

⁴⁶⁷ “Corriere della Sera”, 30/04/1937, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/MjovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMT E4Mw%3D%3D>

⁴⁶⁸ Atti of the Moro Commission, quoted in Mimmo Scarano and Maurizio DeLuca (1985, pp. 211-12).

⁴⁶⁹ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁷⁰ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

exchange". I also find it interesting to mention that in that day's publication of the "Avanti!", a disquisition on the prevalent interpretation of Moro's letters was carried out. In particular, the article said: *"the incredulity [about Moro's missives] has grown as his anguish and critics towards the biggest political forces grew [...]. To not take Moro's letters was the Communist Party's instruction [...]. They seem more worried about Moro's "memory" and not his life. They're already thinking about his funerals and monuments and dispute about the interpretation of a style and on a life they're not contributing to save [...]. Why don't you read Moro's letters as the ones of a clear-headed prisoner, even if desperate, because he has felt abandoned for 45 days? It is clear that it's easier to think as hitherto; even easier is to not think at all [...]. It's easier, but it's not right. Moreover, even if Moro was impaired, would this justify the attitude of abandoning him to his destiny?"*⁴⁷¹. The same article - titled *"Why not believe his letters?"* can be found in the "Corriere della Sera" of the same day. It also reported that another newspaper announced that Moro's next move would be a law proposal, to be made directly to the Parliament: such an eventuality - which would entail the right to exile for political prisoners - was analyzed in a subsequent article and was deemed impossible, especially due to legal and substantial constraints. An article said: *"we want to humbly sense Moro's will if he wasn't in such an atrocious state of necessity"*. In other words, in my opinion, the newspaper is saying "his will is to be killed", although his missives say something very different. Furthermore, his "state of necessity" is not a decorative element, but rather his reality, so reasoning as if it was not is not useful in any way. This day also marked the rupture between Moro's family and the Christian Democracy, with the former asking the party to *"courageously take their responsibilities"* and stating that *"the refusal of any initiative ratifies Moro's death sentence"*. Finally, an article wondered what the government should do in this situation: the answer is quickly given. *"Refuse any*

⁴⁷¹"Avanti!", 01/05/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?P%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780501.82-105_0001_d.pdf

*terrorists' release. Do not grant amnesty, pardon, or exile. Tighten prison surveillance. Adopt legal measures to strengthen the police and the judiciary”*⁴⁷².

On May 2nd, Craxi met with Andreotti to illustrate his idea of a one-for-one exchange, mentioning Paola Besuschio as a possible beneficiary. Though not rejecting the autonomous solution in principle, the Prime Minister opposed the freeing of Besuschio and was worried that a concession would not necessarily lead to Moro's release⁴⁷³. A meeting was held with the Christian Democracy committee that was managing the crisis and the idea of an autonomous humanitarian gesture was presented: following further meetings with the other parties, Craxi felt that the sides were converging⁴⁷⁴, to the point that the Christian Democracy issued a communiqué formally referring the proposal to the government, and it was announced that the Central Directorate of the party would meet on May 9th and a decision would be taken regarding Moro's request, expressed in a missive, for the urgent convocation of the Christian Democracy National Council⁴⁷⁵. The government remained vague in its answer: the postponement to an uncertain date surely did not make the Red Brigades happy. In the meantime, the proposal of freeing Besuschio was set aside and little actions were taken for the release of the other identified prisoner. According to Castronuovo (2007), many years later it emerged that the imprisoned brigadists had started to move as well, since they now hoped for a peaceful resolution of the affair in order to avoid tightening prison conditions. It seems that they even drafted a communiqué asking to shift the negotiation stage from the liberation of political prisoners to the improvement of jail conditions. If the Socialists were to accept such a proposal, the inmates would have publicly declared that Moro's life had to be spared, in the hope of avoiding the carrying out of the sentence. According to Franceschini, however, Craxi decided to not take the proposal into consideration⁴⁷⁶. In contrast, Craxi affirmed that contacts had indeed been established, but did not lead to any decisive facts. Meanwhile,

⁴⁷² “Corriere della Sera”, 01/05/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/MTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMDg4Mg%3D%3D>

⁴⁷³ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁷⁴ Craxi Testimony, pp. 488-9.

⁴⁷⁵ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁷⁶ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

Morucci and Faranda tried to convince Moretti that the Red Brigades had effectively been recognized as a political force by the interventions of the Pope and Waldheim and by the statement of the Christian Democracy after the meeting with the Socialists on May 2nd. They told Moretti that killing Moro would represent a political watershed highly damaging to the revolutionary movement, and that it would create an escalating military struggle with which the Red Brigades could not cope⁴⁷⁷. However, he was not convinced, although he agreed to postpone the execution for a couple of more days. At some point, contacts were established between prominent *autonomi* Piperno and Pace and the Socialists - especially Craxi - with the formers suggesting a political recognition of the Red Brigades and proposing themselves as mediators⁴⁷⁸.

On May 4th, the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Arafat launched a public appeal to the Red Brigades inviting them to free Moro. It seems from the official reports that no contacts followed such an appeal. In 2017, Bassam Abu Sharif - former senior advisor of Arafat - was queried by the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry in relation to those events. He claimed that Arafat's appeal was public and most of all political. However, there were no contacts between the Organization and Moro's kidnappers: the existing links were with the already imprisoned members of the Red Brigades. Moreover, Sharif claimed that the Popular Front, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Fatah were against any action or operation in Italy, especially for what concerned Moro, since Palestinians liked him, and he represented something very important to them. Sharif also stated that, if they had any chance or if they were asked to contribute to Moro's liberation, they would have not hesitated. The President of the Commission, however, reported that Arafat had claimed that contacts had actually been put in place, but the Red Brigades had asked for impossible *quid pro quos* and then had, all of a sudden, closed all dialogues. Sharif also stressed that they thought that the Americans - Gladio agents in particular - had infiltrated the Red Brigades after the arrest of the founding members⁴⁷⁹. According to him, Moro was not kidnapped by the Red

⁴⁷⁷ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁷⁸ Fumian, C., Calogero, P., & Sartori, M. (2011). *Terrore rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa.

⁴⁷⁹ https://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/html/68/audiz2/audizione/2017/06/26/indice_stenografico.0140.html

Brigades, especially in light of the high professionalism which had characterized the action⁴⁸⁰. The same day, a summoning of the central direction of the Christian Democracy was announced for May 9th, in order to discuss possible solutions to the affair.

On May 6th, as reported by Meade (1989), a leading Socialist met with Senate President Fanfani and tried to persuade him to endorse the Socialists proposal. Fanfani, who was also being pressed by Mrs Moro, did not personally make a public statement as a signal for the Red Brigades to not precipitate the situation, but rather delegated this job. Unfortunately, the speech held on May 7th fell absurdly flat, becoming just a vague restatement of the Christian Democracy's past positions. The uncertainty was magnified by the government. Shortly before the arrival of Communique no. 9, the Interministerial Committee on Security met, as promised, to consider the idea of an autonomous gesture. A statement issued by the Committee seemed to imply a rejection of the idea⁴⁸¹. The statement said: *"The concession of pardons is connected to humanitarian norms of clemency, independently of external motivations; in other words, independent of any correlation with Moro's affair. Different connections would offend the legal system and the public conscience"*⁴⁸². That day's *"Avanti!"* reported the ninth communiqué and claimed that the Socialist Party was going to continue in its attempt to find a "third way" between the unacceptable subsidence and prejudicial immobility, although very little hope was left. In an article it can be read that *"the Red Brigades want to execute the sentence on a defenseless prisoner. But those who kill a war prisoner are war criminals"*. Yet, hope could still be retained due to the lexical choice of the Red Brigades, who did not state that the sentence had been already carried out. Moreover, an article published in the newspaper *"Repubblica"*, which - as it can be deduced by the answer given in the *"Avanti!"* article - accused the Socialist Party of trying to break the democratic forces' unity by means of its bargaining proposal. The *"Corriere della Sera"* said: *"if you're*

⁴⁸⁰https://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/023/029/00000006.pdf

⁴⁸¹ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁸² *"Avanti!"*, 06/05/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?F%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780506.82-109_0001_d.pdf

human, don't do it" and *"the future cannot be built with machine guns and a society cannot bend to blackmail [...] we are all enemies of the Red Brigades"*. It claimed that, even though Moro might be already dead, the terrorists came out of the affair defeated, because the political solidarity was still intact thanks to a common sense of *"firmness of the law and force of the humanitarian imaginary"*. A thesis is reported, according to which the communiqué did not appear to be final: in fact, if there were no doubts on the authenticity of the letter, the intentions of the Red Brigades were not entirely clear due to the use of the verb *"eseguendo"* (which could be translated as *'by performing'* [the death sentence]).). For what concerns the Socialists' position, Craxi's words are reported, in which he claims that such a development demonstrates that the party's intentions were always transparent in their good faith⁴⁸³.

3.4. MAY 9TH: OUTCOME OF THE AFFAIR AND AFTERMATH

On the morning of May 9th, the major personalities of the Christian Democracy reunited to discuss Moro's fate and Fanfani's critics against the government, as well as his request for action. However, as the idea of conceding a pardon had been set aside, what could be actually discussed was how to fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, Morucci, who at first identified himself as *"Dottor Nicolai"* and then - as the interlocutor insisted on knowing who he was talking to - as *"Red Brigades"*, was making made a phone call to announce Moro's death and to allow for the retrieval of his body. *"We present the last wills of the President by telling the family where they will find his body. The body will be found in via Caetani, in a red Renault 4. The first numbers of the license plate are N5"*

The next day, all newspapers were talking about it. The *"Avanti!"* defined the assassinations as *"a crime against the Republic and the Italian people"*. The first information on Moro's death was given, such as the corpse's finding site, near both the Christian Democracy and the Communist Party headquarters, and the cause of death. It

⁴⁸³ "Corriere della Sera", 06/05/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NDovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMTU0Nw%3D%3D>

claimed that it was now necessary for the state to assert the strength of its institutions and democratic law, carrying out a strategy against terrorism that will have to bring tangible and positive results. Moreover, an article hypothesized that Moro was killed because of the services that he could still provide to the Italian society and State, namely more cohesion. On the first page, the will of the family to respect their kinsman's last words was displayed. Alongside this, the family stated that *"on his life and death, history will judge"*. The newspaper reported the reactions of the major parties and politicians, and different opinions were expressed. Zaccagnini defined Moro's death as *"extreme sacrifice"*; Berlinguer remarked on his attempt to collaborate with the Communists and highlighted his efforts to form a parliamentary majority inclusive of such party; La Malfa stated that Moro was *"the first heroic victim of a war declared against the State"*; Saragat, differently, claimed that near Moro's corpse there was also the corpse of the First Republic, which has not been able to defend the life of a great political figure. For the first time, the brigadists were not terrorists anymore, but beasts. Many pages were devoted to an analysis of Moro's work and personality and to the outrage and solidarity statements coming from abroad; however, articles were also directed at criticizing the inefficiency of the police and called for a renovation of such an organ, as well as the secret services and the judiciary⁴⁸⁴.



Fig. 3.9, "Corriere della Sera", 19/05/1978, "Moro's murder"

⁴⁸⁴ "Avanti!", 10/05/1978, available for consultation at https://avanti.senato.it/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/files/reader.php?P%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%20001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780510.82-112_0001_d.pdf

The “*Corriere della Sera*” immediately titled “*He died so that this Republic can live*” and defined the days as a watershed in Italy’s history. “*Not even fascism ever descended this low*”. The newspaper attributed his death to the insanity of a small group of assassins - offering, in my opinion, a simplistic view of the phenomenon - and was considered to be the symbol of a value crisis that was affecting the country. The location where the body was found could only be interpreted as a provocation, and the State was ready to take it. It was said that all parties - today reunited and perhaps tomorrow yet again opponents - will always agree on defending the Republic against subversion. If the State wants it, it can defeat terrorism. Moro was said to have been shot at least eleven times and was forced to wear the same suit he had when he was kidnapped, in a sort of “*gloomy ritual*”; next to him, surrounded by his blood, were his belongings. At that point, Italian society could only see the Red Brigades as ferocious assassins, and a lesson could be drawn from the affair: the State has to defend itself, its servers, and its citizens, without indulgences. The details of his finding were displayed in a subsequent article, which described the scene without omitting rough details such as a large blood stain covered by tissues and how many bullets were stuck in his body. It was said that it looked like Moro was shot and then dragged, without shoes, to the stolen car in which he was found. Many hypotheses were advanced as to why sand was found in his clothes, ranging from a hideout near the beach to a misleading clue purposely placed by the Red Brigades. Finally, it was stressed that a special plan to capture the assassins was put in place⁴⁸⁵. For what concerns the international reactions, the Intelligence agencies of the United States believed that the Italian government, with its behavior, had achieved a “*negative victory*”⁴⁸⁶. At the same time, they wondered how the void left by Moro’s death was going to be filled in the political field: in this regard, they thought that the Communist presence in the government was very likely, especially in light of the fact that they had not endorsed terrorism and had maintained a firm attitude against any negotiation proposal⁴⁸⁷. Moreover, according to Ceci (2019), some hours before Moro was killed, the American Intelligence agencies had recognized the Red Brigades as a case of international terrorism,

⁴⁸⁵ “Corriere della Sera”, 10/05/1978, retrieved from <https://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/pro/view.shtml#!/NDovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzMTg1MQ%3D%3D>

⁴⁸⁶ Ceci, G.M. (2019), *La CIA e il terrorismo italiano: dalla Strage di Piazza Fontana agli anni Ottanta (1969-1986)*, Roma, Carocci editore

⁴⁸⁷ Ibidem

thus marking a change in their stances and making it possible for the U.S. to intervene in Moro's affair and to offer Italy some help: however, such a change arrived when it was already too late to save the politician⁴⁸⁸.

Moro's murder was the beginning of the end for the Red Brigades. Soon after the finding, Cossiga resigned from his role, whereas requests for an efficient fight against terrorism continued to grow day after day. Meanwhile, as Zampieri (2017) noted, the parliamentary debate concerning an antiterrorism decree was also growing: a hurdle in its approval was the obstruction carried out by the minority parties; on the other hand, the public opinion was pushing for a strong line of action against terrorism. After about a week of discussions, the decree was approved by a large majority, despite the many disagreements that had emerged. It is possible that the pressure exerted by the public opinion pushed the political class to formulate quick answers, which however did not leave much time to examine in depth some issues posed by the measure⁴⁸⁹. At the same time, it was necessary to understand why the police forces had not been able to identify the hideout and arrest the brigadists, who had gone unnoticed during the whole affair. The tones concerning the inefficiency of the security apparatus sharpened, and the majority started to crack, especially after the administrative elections, which showed a decline in votes to the Communists. One of the few concrete moves against terrorism was the assignment of a special task for such a fight to Dalla Chiesa. Andreotti was called to display to the Parliament how the security forces had acted during the kidnapping, but his explanations remained vague, thus creating dissatisfaction among the political forces and public opinion. Following more discussions, the majority concluded that the economic and social crisis must have had a role in the recent growth of armed violence, although the police inefficiency surely could not be overlooked: in this sense, a broader strategy was necessary to fight terrorism. However, the idea of adopting exceptional measures was rejected. Shortly after the end of the affair, two hideouts of the Red Brigades had been discovered and the operation was somehow misleadingly presented as the "*first concreted development*" of the inquiry. After the affair, however, the Red Brigades carried out more attacks and some had become fugitives, leading to even more polemics about the

⁴⁸⁸ Ibidem

⁴⁸⁹ Zampieri, C. (2017). Alla prova del terrorismo: la legislazione dell'emergenza e il dibattito politico italiano (1978-1982), pg. 300

management of the emergency and to the request from part of the judiciary to be provided with more means to perform their duties. Cracks started to form within the Christian Democracy, with a section of the party - hostile to the historic compromise - assuming a critical position towards the Communist Party⁴⁹⁰.

For what concerns Dalla Chiesa's task force, similar to the one instituted in 1974 and then dismantled, it could act without restrictions on the national territory and contacts had to be maintained with the Minister of Interior: such elements did not go without harsh debates, and its mandate was limited to a year - then renewed in December 1979. Dalla Chiesa set his men to work studying Red Brigades documents, checking housing and public identification records, conducting stakeouts, and tailing and hunting for suspected terrorists⁴⁹¹. Often, after terrorists were identified, they were not arrested but rather followed in order to identify even more accomplices, and infiltrates were also used for the same purpose⁴⁹². As mentioned previously, after Moro's death, the Red Brigades continued to carry out subversive actions, as they had been able to retain a base of support, although smaller than before. Morucci and Faranda, who had disagreed with Moretti on Moro's death, realized that they would not be able to change the Organization's "*blind and bloody strategy*"⁴⁹³ and fled: they were arrested in May 1979, and Gallinari was caught shortly after. In 1980, the arrest of Peci changed the course of the hunt of the Red Brigades. Peci had become a column commander in 1979, but over time began to doubt the aims of the Organization and thought that it had misjudged the presence of substantial popular support for the revolution⁴⁹⁴. After being arrested, Peci realized that the Red Brigades had been long doomed and decided to cooperate with the police and thus helped to identify bases and members, as well as explaining the structure and contacts of the Organization. Peci also declared that Moro's death had been decided with the draft of the ninth communiqué, but that the Red Brigades had let pass a few more days in the hope of

⁴⁹⁰ Ibidem, pg. 413

⁴⁹¹ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁹² Pintore, G. (2016). Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007: la lotta armata e le verità nascoste. *Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007*, 1-407

⁴⁹³ Morucci (1984, p. 26).

⁴⁹⁴ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

any openness in the political environment⁴⁹⁵. The information provided by him led to the arrest of eighty-five brigadists and the finding of many hideouts⁴⁹⁶. In spite of these developments, the Red Brigades were still killing many members of the state apparatus and businessmen and, in 1980, they even released a new Strategic Resolution. In the same year, Judge D'Urso was kidnapped and the brigadists demanded the closure of the prison of Asinara: this time, they reached their aim, although the government insisted that the measure had been already decided before the kidnapping. However, the group was not as compact as before, and sub-columns were beginning to split from the original ones. Then, finally, in April 1981, Moretti was arrested in Milan. This did not mean the end of the Red Brigades, since other personalities started to ascend: one of the most important is undoubtedly Senzani, who kidnapped Cirillo, a Christian Democrat, and killed his escort. At the same time, Taliercio - the director of a petrochemical plant - was kidnapped in Venice and, a couple of days later, Peci's brother was abducted as well, ending up killed. Senzani's disobedience to the directions of the Executive Committee in relation to the kidnappings accelerated the fragmentation of the Organization. The militarist wing presided by Senzani undertook the first campaign at the expense of a foreign target: led by Savasta, they kidnapped General James Dozier, one of the highest-ranking American officers in Italy⁴⁹⁷, who was fortunately rescued alive. In 1981, trials against terrorists started with great use of the so-called "*pentiti*" (repented), such as Peci and, later, Savasta: in exchange for their cooperation, they were granted a one-third reduction in their sentence. Between the end of 1982 and 1983, the vast majority of the Red Brigades' members were arrested, and they had to resort to what is defined as "strategic retreat"⁴⁹⁸. Once again, this did not mean the end of the Organization: they still carried out several actions up until 1987, when even its most famous members declared that it did not make sense for it to exist anymore.

⁴⁹⁵ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

⁴⁹⁶ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁹⁷ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁴⁹⁸ Pintore, G. (2016). Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007: la lotta armata e le verità nascoste. *Dossier Brigade Rosse 1969-2007*, 1-407

UNDERSTANDING THE PAST TO IMPROVE THE FUTURE: A STARTING POINT FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

4.1 BRIEF EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERTERRORISM AND NEGOTIATION

Before covering the evolution of the Italian approach to counterterrorism and negotiation, an overview of Italy's international position should be provided. Italian foreign policy unfolded during the post-war period in three areas: Atlantic, European, and Mediterranean. The Atlantic circle is characterized by the adhesion to NATO and a passive position with regard to the will of the American ally. The European circle, marked by an immediate adhesion to the European Community and by a strong integrationist attitude, took the form of rhetoric more often than concrete actions. Finally, in the Mediterranean circle, considered an area of great strategic importance derived from Italy's dependence on energy imports from North Africa and the Middle East, Italy has exercised a high degree of international autonomy, promoting a pro-Arab policy, often in opposition to the United States and other European partners. Italian foreign and security policy has also been shaped by a domestic political system marked by deep cleavages between pro-Atlantic parties and pro-Soviet parties⁴⁹⁹. Areas of interest include the Balkans and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, due to the alleged linkage between terrorism and Islam and, as already mentioned, because of the dependence on that area's resources. Domestically, after the events of the '70s, in the '80s the terrorist phenomenon in Italy was slowly weakening. It can be affirmed that in the following decade, a big part of the counterterrorism strategy consisted of promoting the former-terrorists collaboration with the justice apparatus as much as possible⁵⁰⁰. Laws regulating the figure of the so-called "pentiti" were adopted and granted a reduced sentence to those who were willing to cooperate with the judiciary: law no. 304/1982⁵⁰¹ is the most prominent example. In the

⁴⁹⁹ Foradori, P., & Rosa, P. (2007). Italy: New ambitions and old deficiencies. In *Global security governance* (pp. 87-110). Routledge, pg 69

⁵⁰⁰ Della Porta, D. A. (1996). Movimenti collettivi e sistema politico in Italia.

⁵⁰¹ <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1982/06/02/082U0304/sg>

'90s, terrorist entities all around the world were deeply affected by the phenomenon of globalization, which represented a sort of paradox for such movements: on the one hand, it represented their main enemy; on the other hand, it was the instrument thanks to which the movements were able to spread in the first place⁵⁰². Counterterrorism measures changed as well: they aimed both at repressing and preventing the phenomenon. Cooperation with international establishments can also be considered as a distinctive element of the 1990s Italian counterterrorist strategy⁵⁰³. Security measures were strengthened in the national territory, especially in those areas considered to be strategic objectives; moreover, the law decree no. 369/2001, then converted by law no. 431/2001, established a Financial Security Committee in order to protect the Italian financial system, collect information useful to freeze terrorists' assets, and enhance the fight against the financing of terrorism⁵⁰⁴. Criminal and terrorist associations were criminalized, as well as the act of sheltering or facilitating criminals in their actions. Moreover, in the early 2000s, the Italian government viewed the European Union as having a special role, given its capacity to mobilize a wide range of instruments "*to assure the relaunch, the re-establishment, and consolidation of difficult economic, social and political situations*"⁵⁰⁵. Even so, the construction of a European Security and Defense Policy was not seen as representing a first step towards the construction of a European army, but rather a project for a European rapid reaction force executing missions consistent with the so-called 'Petersberg tasks'⁵⁰⁶. In any case, Italy believed that the EU should not be a substitute for NATO, which remains at the heart of the European security architecture⁵⁰⁷. In 2004 and 2005, specific measures were taken to monitor Islamic fundamentalism, probably as a response to 9/11 and other events such as the second Gulf War, which had started in 2003. Finally, rules regarding telematic traffic data, personal identification, and expulsion were adopted, and new terrorism-related offenses were introduced. In the same years, Italy started to increase its cooperation with the United Nations - particularly by ratifying all

⁵⁰² Trento, D. (2007) Terrorism and counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970's to date: a review.

⁵⁰³ Ibidem

⁵⁰⁴ https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2001-10-15&atto.codiceRedazionale=001G0434&elenco30giorni=false

⁵⁰⁵ Foradori, P., & Rosa, P. (2007). Italy: New ambitions and old deficiencies. In *Global security governance* (pp. 87-110). Routledge, pg 74

⁵⁰⁶ Rosa, P. (2003) 'L'europeizzazione della politica estera', in S. Fabbrini (ed.) *L'europeizzazione dell'Italia*, Bari-Roma: Laterza.

⁵⁰⁷ Foradori, P., & Rosa, P. (2007). Italy: New ambitions and old deficiencies. In *Global security governance* (pp. 87-110). Routledge, pg 75

the International Conventions against Terrorism - and with the European Union: as a Member State, it was required to adapt its national legislation to the measures collectively adopted at the European level, such as the 2002 framework, the European Arrest Warrant, and several more measures which will be talked about more in depth in the following paragraph of this chapter. Italy's cooperation with the G8 should also be mentioned. In particular, in 2003 the CTAG (Counter Terrorism Action Group) was established⁵⁰⁸, and Italy took charge of the coordination of the technical assistance to Third Countries, thus also facing terrorist menace in the Western Balkans⁵⁰⁹. However, there are still many gray areas. For example, Trento (2007), after having carefully analyzed the counter-terrorism measures adopted by Italy, highlighted that only two measures addressed the policy area of prevention of radicalization and recruitment, thus showing a lack of initiatives in this sense. Moreover, the issue of informing the general public was not dealt with at all, and, to complicate matters, information provided by the media is often alarmist⁵¹⁰. Immigration and asylum policies did not aim to promote integration, but only simplified the process of extradition. On the other hand, the policy area concerning special competence for the police and prosecutors appeared to be the most developed one, right along the international cooperation area⁵¹¹. Using the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs' website, it can be said that the Italian legal system has gradually abandoned the regulatory framework set up to tackle the threat of terrorism in the 1970s with a view to adjusting to the different international challenges posed by the terrorist threats of the subsequent decades, combining repressive measures with the attempt to prevent the phenomenon⁵¹². The competence for tackling terrorism - both in a preventive and in a repressive sense - is shared between Member States and the European Union⁵¹³, with national security matters remaining in the hands of each Member State⁵¹⁴: even so, each State should still comply with a broader European framework. In this respect, in 2024

⁵⁰⁸ http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/building_international_political

⁵⁰⁹ Trento, D. (2007) Terrorism and counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970's to date: a review.

⁵¹⁰ Di Meo, L. (2004). *Media e terrorismo: vittime, condottieri, carnefici*. Edizioni Kappa.

⁵¹¹ Trento, D. (2007) Terrorism and counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970's to date: a review.

⁵¹² https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/temi_globali/lotta_terrorismo/

⁵¹³ Bonomi, M. S. (2019). Counter-terrorism legislation in Italy: the key role of administrative measures. *Roma Tre Law Review*, (1).

⁵¹⁴ Art 4 TEU, retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M004>

Italy renewed its commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges, as well as confirming its determination to protect freedom and security, as well as upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and freedom of expression⁵¹⁵. To sum up, according to Foradori and Rosa (2007), Italy's strategic tradition and its instrumental preferences to meet security threats remain connected to an integrated approach that combines limited and proportional coercive methods with a multidimensional and comprehensive strategy. Central to this approach is the concept of soft power: the power of culture, economy, and commerce "*in pursuing its interests that are most of all interests of stability*" (Toscano 2003; Frattini 2004). In short, there is the awareness that soft and hard power together can produce more efficient outcomes⁵¹⁶. Moreover, according to Bonomi (2019), the use of administrative measures - such as travel bans, expulsion orders, and citizenship revocation - has become a significant counterterrorism tool in some Member States, including Italy, in their efforts to maintain national security. Their increasing prevalence is probably due to the perception that imposition of such administrative measures is proactive and preventive, thus protecting the population from the threat of terrorism⁵¹⁷. Finally, compliance with European instruments and frameworks tended to reinforce Italy's non-negotiation stance, although exceptions can be made, as we will see in the following pages.

For what concerns the issue of negotiating with terrorists, after Moro's kidnapping and subsequent death, the prevalent Italian school of thought has settled on a no-negotiation stance, especially in light of the fact that the country is asked to comply with European legislation. However, some cases in which this stance was bypassed can be mentioned. One of them concerns the kidnapping of Judge D'Urso in 1980. As explained in the previous chapter, the brigadists asked for the closure of Asinara in exchange for his release and were able to achieve their goal. However, I believe that in this case negotiation was pursued with a relatively light spirit since the terrorists' request involved neither the

⁵¹⁵<https://www.state.gov/g7-italy-2024-foreign-ministers-statement-on-addressing-global-challenges-fostering-partnerships/>

⁵¹⁶ Foradori, P., & Rosa, P. (2007). Italy: New ambitions and old deficiencies. In *Global security governance* (pp. 87-110). Routledge, pg 81

⁵¹⁷ Bonomi, M. S. (2019). Counter-terrorism legislation in Italy: the key role of administrative measures. *Roma Tre Law Review*, (1)

payment of ransoms nor political recognition. Another case, more recent, is the one of Silvia Romano. It should be stressed that the following analysis will be carried out exclusively using press sources, since official declaration on the topic was very rare: one of these is a communiqué of 2019 available on the website of the Minister of Foreign Affairs stating that a collaboration was being carried out between Italy and Kenya in order to achieve a positive solution to the kidnapping. The woman was released in Somali territory in 2020 after having been kidnapped in Kenya by terrorist organization al-Shabaab in 2018. Clearly, not much is known about her release by the general public. It is likely, however, that a ransom was paid by the Italian State, although the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Di Maio firmly denied this option in an interview for a local newspaper⁵¹⁸. What is also interesting is that three secret services were involved in the process that led to such an outcome: Turkish, Italian, and Somali. According to some experts, the Italian secret services have weak relationships with the Somali services, while strong relationships can be assumed to exist with the Turkish ones, especially considering the interests this last country holds in Somalia. It is thus possible that they established contacts with the terrorist organization in order to negotiate a ransom. Romano's liberation can be considered a win-win situation: al-Shabaab received financing and international notoriety; Turkey was recognized as an important international actor; the Somali intelligence agency received similar recognition for its role in freeing a hostage in the hands of the terrorists; and finally, the Italian government was able to publicize its efforts in saving a citizen⁵¹⁹. According to the UN - as it can be read in a report of the magazine "*Limes*" - kidnappings of Western people are one of the three main sources of money for terrorist organizations, especially in North Africa: in fact, UN operators are often known as "walking money". This forces Western countries to either accept the terrorists' conditions for hostage liberation or risk difficult actions involving the use of force, whose outcomes are uncertain. Although the institutions never spoke about this matter, it is possible to imagine that Italy always preferred to negotiate and pay a ransom. However, this choice has consequences, namely giving money to such organizations, which are frequently used to buy weapons and expand their activities⁵²⁰. Indeed, the

⁵¹⁸ <https://www.milanotoday.it/attualita/riscatto-silvia-romano.html>

⁵¹⁹ <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/il-ruolo-della-turchia-nel-rilascio-di-silvia-romano-26339>

⁵²⁰ <https://www.limesonline.com/da-non-perdere/la-liberazione-degli-ostaggi-e-il-rischio-di-pagare-i-riscatti-14707188/>

spokesman of Al Shabaab claimed that part of the money acquired thanks to Romano's liberation will be used to buy armaments to carry on with the jihad. The rest, he said, "*will be used to manage the country: schools, food, medicines, training of police forces*"⁵²¹. After these declarations, the High Representative of the European Union Borrell stated that this ransom "*might be a problem for the EU*"⁵²². Thus, to conclude, I believe that it can be said that although the general stance on the matter is "no-negotiation", there are actually several actors that are willing to bargain with terrorists.

4.2 EU ROLE: COUNTERTERRORISM AND INFLUENCE ON THE MEMBER STATES

The European Union is deeply invested in making its territory a safe space for its citizens and unappealing for terrorists, and it has quickly become an important international actor in the field of security: for these reasons, the Union constantly tries to keep up with recent developments on the matter and to adapt its legislation and actions accordingly. By being able to dispose of economic, political, and military tools, the EU can engage in different security functions such as conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The extent to which the EU's security role can be expanded is subject to both internal and external factors, which are interconnected⁵²³. One of the most important documents promoted by the Union is the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in 2003, which allows it to act as a collective actor. There are three main factors that can contribute to explain why the Strategy was embraced: external circumstances, such as the end of the Cold War, the Iraqi conflict, globalization, and the emergence of new security threats; the working of the internal market, especially considering the "four freedoms" of movement connected to its functioning; and the natural institutional developments of the European Union⁵²⁴. As reported by Kirchner (2007), the EES had identified five main threats: one of these, namely the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, falls in the

⁵²¹<https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2020-05-12/silvia-romano-al-shabaab-riscatto-finanziaria-jihad-conversione-8585390/>

⁵²² https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-002980_IT.html

⁵²³ Kirchner, E. J. (2007). Regional and global security: Changing threats and institutional responses. In *Global Security Governance* (pp. 21-40). Routledge, pg 9

⁵²⁴ Ibidem, pg 114

category of the so-called hard security, which focuses on protecting the territorial, economic, and political interests of the nation-state by using key resources such as military and internal security forces⁵²⁵. Three more - terrorism, state failure, and regional conflicts - can be defined as having “hard security edges”, but they also have significant “soft” security implications as their roots, such as poverty and migratory movements, which cannot be tackled easily by military means⁵²⁶.

Overall, it can be said that the European Union adopts many different measures to hinder the phenomenon of terrorism, well explained in a policy paper titled “*The European Union and the fight to counter terrorism*” of 2016. To begin with, the European Arrest Warrant was introduced in 2002⁵²⁷ and has been operational since 2007, and steps forward were made to facilitate extradition procedures for crimes associated with terrorism. The introduction of the Schengen Area allowed EU nationals to travel within the Union without being subjected to border controls: it is easy to understand that this great accomplishment can also present some gray areas, since terrorists are also able to move freely. For this reason, some compensatory measures have been introduced, such as common rules regarding border crossing and external border controls⁵²⁸. Moreover, in case of serious threat to public security, temporary controls between internal borders can be re-established. For what concerns inter-state police cooperation, the existence of the Europol - European Police Office - should be highlighted. Its mission, as stated by the website, “*is to support its Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international and organized crime, cybercrime, and terrorism*”. Europol also works with many non-EU partner states and international organizations⁵²⁹. In addition to systems which enable all European police forces to access databases containing information concerning potential terrorists and to the creation of a list of people and entities involved

⁵²⁵ <https://www.kpsrl.org/publication/from-hard-security-to-human-security-time-for-a-global-campaign#:~:text=Hard%20security%20focuses%20on%20protecting,military%20and%20internal%20security%20forces>.

⁵²⁶ Kirchner, E. J. (2007). Regional and global security: Changing threats and institutional responses. In *Global Security Governance* (pp. 21-40). Routledge, pg 117

⁵²⁷ Framework Decision 2002/584/ JAI of the Council of 13th June 2002 regarding the European Arrest Warrant and surrender procedures between Member States retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32002F0584>

⁵²⁸ <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/386-the-european-union-and-the-fight-to-counter-terrorism>

⁵²⁹ <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol>

in such a crime, the European Union also took steps designed to strengthen the protection of vital infrastructures (roads, railways, electricity grids, and power stations). Moreover, an action plan in terms of NRBC (nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical) was adopted in 2009⁵³⁰. To provide a more comprehensive framework, judicial cooperation was also implemented. Finally, in recent years, it emerged that another element in the fight against terrorism is the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism, to be pursued through integration and inclusion of those sectors of society who are most exposed to such a risk. Obviously, to ensure effective protection, the European Union should not look only at its own territory, but also at neighboring countries: in this respect, it has concluded several agreements with Eastern European, African, and Asian countries and has promoted aid and cooperation projects. Moreover, partnership with the United States is also extremely important, both because of the Atlantic Alliance and because of the U.S.'s role in the international scene.

However, it should be noted that the European Union's action is neither perfect nor completely efficient. For example, in the case of terrorism, investigative services have often tended to privilege direct contact with their counterparts in other Member States. Moreover, Eurojust and Europol are not systematically receivers of information regarding ongoing procedures and convictions delivered in the Member States in terrorist cases⁵³¹. In addition, the fight against terrorism had to confront the difficulty of balancing repression and rule of law. Moreover, many countries - especially considering the recent wave of populism that is sweeping over Europe - may reject the European Union's measures and deem them as interference in national affairs. The obstacles continue. For example, the Member States have deemed it necessary to agree on a definition of the common threat as a justification and basis for a common reaction to the post-9/11 threat; yet, this does not mean that they share the same threat perception. There are in fact still wide variations between public perceptions of the threat within the EU⁵³² and - especially

⁵³⁰ <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/386-the-european-union-and-the-fight-to-counter-terrorism>

⁵³¹ Ibidem

⁵³² Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), 292–313. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00225.x

at a state level - on the relationship with the United States⁵³³, as it can be seen in Eurobarometer surveys. A striking difference, although not the only one, can be seen between the threat perception in the fifteen “old” Member States - where an average of 10% of people considered terrorism as a threat - and the 10 “new” Member States, with an average of 2%⁵³⁴. Clearly, previous exposure to terrorist attacks played a big part in threat perception. Governments will find it more difficult to justify diverting resources to the fight against terrorism and to justify invasive measures if the public perceptions of the threat are rather low, and this can obviously have an impact on their willingness to put in a major effort at the European level⁵³⁵. I think it should be highlighted, however, that in a fairly recent Eurobarometer survey of 2016, when asked about the perceived probability of being victims of a terrorist attack, an average of 40% of people responded “high risk”, and another 47% claimed that there was “some risk”⁵³⁶, thus demonstrating a much-increased fear from part of the public opinion. Moreover, when asked at what level terrorist threat can be fought most efficiently, an average of 23% of people responded “at a European level”⁵³⁷: this data, on the other hand, could demonstrate that the Union is doing a sufficiently good job in handling the issue. In any case, it should be stressed that States which share the same threat perceptions do not necessarily have the same preferences in their threat responses⁵³⁸. The secret of the ESS is therefore to maintain unity among the diverse national strategic needs, to bring closer together national security strategies, and to promote the establishment of a distinct European security culture⁵³⁹.

In 2005, a strategic line of action framed around the EU counter-terrorism strategy was approved, based on four pillars denominated “Protect” (citizens and critical infrastructure), “Prevent” (people from turning to terrorism), “Pursue” (and investigate

⁵³³ Kirchner, E. J. (2007). Regional and global security: Changing threats and institutional responses. In *Global Security Governance* (pp. 21-40). Routledge, pg 116

⁵³⁴ Standard Eurobarometer 65, First Results (field work: March–April 2006), July 2006, p. 5960.

⁵³⁵ Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), 292–313. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00225.x

⁵³⁶ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2016/attentes/eb85_1_synthesis_perceptions_wishes_terrorism_en.pdf

⁵³⁷ Ibidem

⁵³⁸ Kirchner, E. J. (2007). Regional and global security: Changing threats and institutional responses. In *Global Security Governance* (pp. 21-40). Routledge.

⁵³⁹ Ibidem, pg 116

terrorist, impede planning and travel, cut off access to funding), and “Respond” (in a coordinated way)⁵⁴⁰. Nevertheless, the key document remains the EU Action Plan against terrorism, which has been frequently revised⁵⁴¹. Monar (2007) analyzed the four key elements on which the European Strategy rests: firstly, there is a combination of internal and external measures; second, a combination of legislative and operational measures is put in place, with a considerable number of legislative instruments adopted to enhance cross-border law enforcement capabilities within the Union, such as the 2002 Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism⁵⁴². Such an instrument provides a basic common definition of what constitutes a terrorist act and a common minimum-maximum penalty, which however is subjected to Member States’ discretion. The third element is the mixture of repressive and preventive measures; lastly, there is a particular emphasis on strengthening institutional capacity. However, due to the fact that the European Union is based on cooperation rather than integration, the Member States - as mentioned above - tend to retain their powers in such a field, hindering the ability of the Union to promote and carry out efficient and effective measures. Moreover, as often happens, there is a problem of implementation. Finally, there is a problem of legitimacy of the European action, as counter-terrorist measures can have remarkable negative impacts on human rights and civil liberties.

In more recent times, specifically in 2015, a declaration of the members of the European Council defined three priorities: to guarantee citizens’ safety via the improved use of existing tools, to prevent radicalization and to protect the Union’s values, and to cooperate with the Union’s partners at international level⁵⁴³. The Lisbon Treaty established a more favorable legal framework for police and judicial cooperation: rationalization can be seen in the shift from legal instruments specific to the former third pillar towards traditional community acts (regulations and directives) and by an enhancing of the supervisory role of the Court of Justice. The ordinary legislative procedure – and therefore the qualified

⁵⁴⁰ <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/european-region.html>

⁵⁴¹ Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), 292–313. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00225.x

⁵⁴² Ibidem

⁵⁴³ <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/386-the-european-union-and-the-fight-to-counter-terrorism>

majority rule in the Council – now applies to criminal judicial cooperation⁵⁴⁴. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon contributed to operational police cooperation⁵⁴⁵ and enabled police authorities of a Member State to intervene in another Member State, in agreement with the authorities of that State⁵⁴⁶. The solidarity clause was also introduced, which provides for Member States to assist each other in the event of natural or man-made disasters⁵⁴⁷, such as a terrorist attack. The phenomenon of foreign fighters is also being taken into great consideration. In addition to nonbinding instruments, such as the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Member States also have binding obligations in relation to the agreed legal framework instrument of the EU. In 2017, the Council adopted a directive on combating terrorism: the new rules, which replaced the 2002 Framework, strengthen the legal framework of the EU to prevent terrorist attacks and address the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, widening the scope of the existing legislation. Another area of interest was money laundering and terrorist financing, with directive 2015/849 establishing common rules on the prevention of the use of the financial system of the EU for such purposes⁵⁴⁸. A similar point was stressed by a G8 communiqué, which rejected the payment of ransoms to terrorists, in order to avoid indirectly financing their activities⁵⁴⁹. As it can be read in the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report of 2023⁵⁵⁰, terrorism - in the previous year - continued to pose a serious threat to the Member States: the total number of attacks (16) increased compared to 2021 (18) but remained significantly lower than in 2020 (56); 380 individuals were arrested and 427 were convicted for terrorism-related offenses. The Internet was a major enabler of propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. The Russian aggression towards Ukraine fomented right-wing extremism and, although there is not yet any data at the moment this dissertation is being written, it can surely be said that the war between Israel and Palestine has quickly become another

⁵⁴⁴<https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/386-the-european-union-and-the-fight-to-counter-terrorism>

⁵⁴⁵ Art 87 TFEU, retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E087>

⁵⁴⁶ Art 89 TFEU, retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E089>

⁵⁴⁷ Art 222 TFEU, retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/solidarity-clause.html>

⁵⁴⁸ <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/european-region.html>

⁵⁴⁹ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/18/g-8-leaders-communique>

⁵⁵⁰ <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/European%20Union%20Terrorism%20Situation%20and%20Trend%20report%202023.pdf>

ground for radicalization. Finally, the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should be mentioned. It counts seventy-five members, including countries from North America, Europe, and Asia, which makes it the biggest regional security organization⁵⁵¹. It seeks to bridge differences and build trust between States by cooperating on conflict prevention at all levels, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation issues, including counterterrorism. A central focus of the activities of the OSCE has been on exhorting its participating States to ratify international anti-terrorism conventions, and to implement and enforce them in practice in a rule-of-law-compliant manner⁵⁵². For what concerns the specific issue of negotiating with terrorists, the general European stance is a no-negotiation one, although a certain degree of discretionality is often left to the Member States. Human rights instruments, as well as the work of the European Court of Human Rights, are also particularly valuable in the matter of counter-terrorism policies.

⁵⁵¹ <https://www.osce.org/it/whatistheosce/factsheet>

⁵⁵² <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/european-region.html>

CONCLUSION - KILL ONE TO SAVE MANY?

A key insight that emerged clearly during the course of the dissertation is that the topics of terrorism and negotiation cannot be analyzed lightly, partly because of the lack of cohesive perspective on either issue. Yet, it is crucial to carefully study them in order to effectively tackle the issue of terrorism in the present and in the future, taking into consideration both repressive and preventive measures: the latter, in particular, might benefit from rationalized negotiation processes with terrorist entities, although pros and cons should be evaluated scrupulously. The first two chapters of this dissertation had the role of creating a context in which the third chapter, and more specifically Moro's affair, could comfortably lay. For what concerns the topic of terrorism, it was stressed that there is no agreement on a definition of terrorism, which makes it harder to contrast it and gives more discretion to the single parties on what constitutes terrorism and what does not. However, some basic elements – such as the use of force, the political character of the action, and the generation of fear – are considered minimum common denominators for all definitions. The main terrorist group taken into consideration in the dissertation, the Red Brigades, was thoroughly analyzed in its political aims, formation, and organization. In particular, it emerged that the choice of the Red Brigades about the use of violence was the result of a political maturation process, which led the organization to change from the so-called “armed propaganda” to the “armed struggle”. Such a shift was clearly reflected by their actions: in the first phase of their activities, they acted mainly in factories and in a harmless way; from the early '70s, on the other hand, their actions became bloody and directed towards personalities belonging to the state apparatus: Moro's kidnapping and subsequent killing clearly demonstrate this change. Although the Red Brigades were mostly a domestic phenomenon, the Organization maintained contacts with foreign terrorist Organization, and even underwent training in foreign countries: the topic of foreign links was highly debated during the events of 1978, although most of the time it was neither relevant nor useful for the resolution of the Affair. For what concerns negotiation, we highlighted that even in this case there is no proper agreement on a definition among scholars, and several different models of negotiation have been analyzed, such as the game theory or Zartman's three-stages model, which entails the meeting of some preconditions in order to negotiate, the planning an agreement formula,

and agreeing on details. However, negotiations can fail for a number of reasons, such as the inability to engage in credible commitments or lack of trust. A distinction has been made between negotiation between States and negotiation between a State and a terrorist entity: in this second case, the general stance is “no-negotiation”, aimed at avoiding political recognition of the terrorists and handing them money or goods useful for the continuation of their action. The above-mentioned inability of engaging in credible commitments surely is an element which hampers negotiations with such actors. Nevertheless, sometimes governments may be willing to pursue covered negotiations, directly or through backchannels. A particular kind of bargaining with terrorists concerns the hostage crisis, which presents unique challenges since, although the hostages themselves may have no intrinsic value, their extrinsic value to the terrorists can make them bargaining chips. The parties, often covertly, try to reach a zone of mutual agreement to solve the situation: nevertheless, even if an agreement is reached, it is not guaranteed that it will be actually implemented. The Italian approach to the topic of negotiation has historically followed the “no-negotiation” stance, although exceptions were made in the case of the Achille Lauro’s hijacking and, potentially, to rescue Silvia Romano, an Italian volunteer kidnapped in Kenya in 2018. However, it should be stressed that no official statement was released by the government on such a matter, and the analysis was based on the articles published by press and other authoritative sources such as *ISPI* or “*Limes*”. The same can be said for what concerns the international community: while the “no-negotiation” line of action is prevalent, there are some cases in which negotiations were pursued or at least attempted. To quickly sum up the third chapter and draw some conclusive remarks, first of all, it can be said that in Moro’s affair the Reason of State prevailed, and a man’s life was sacrificed in what can be perceived to be a “*game of loss and profits*”⁵⁵³. Meade’s analysis of 1989, which I find convincing, offered an interesting take on the different points of view that characterized the parties’ lines of action, and can be useful to draw some conclusions. Those supporting the policy of firmness strongly believed that releasing convicted brigadists would have violated the rule of law and that the power to do so did not belong to the parties, but rather to the judiciary. Moreover, they believed that a similar concession would have marked a defeat

⁵⁵³ Castronuovo, M. (2007). *Vuoto a perdere: le Brigate rosse, il rapimento, il processo e l'uccisione di Aldo Moro* (Vol. 17). Salento Books.

for the State: the Red Brigades would have considered such an achievement as proof of their strength and right to lead the country to the revolution, further increasing the risk of kidnappings and assassinations and accelerating the process which, in their view, was supposed to lead to the armed struggle. Moreover, accommodating the Red Brigades' requests would also have aggravated the feelings of dissatisfaction and disappointment that characterized the public's relation with the State, and it would have weakened the law-and-order authorities⁵⁵⁴. Conceding the exile was also not a possibility, due to the risk of reiteration of the crime and the widespread contacts between terrorist groups based in different countries. On the other hand, the Socialists believed a solution could be found – especially after Moro was proven to be still alive after the false seventh communiqué which had declared his death - and that the first task of a State was to protect its citizens and their lives. A humanitarian action - they thought - would not violate the fundamental principles of the rule of law and thus had to be at least attempted. The Socialists took into consideration the possibility of subsequent kidnappings but judged that risk more remote than that of the death of Moro. Like him, the Socialists were influenced by cases of prisoner exchanges in other countries⁵⁵⁵ which, however, had not necessarily been successful. In any case, the request from part of the Red Brigades to free thirteen high-caliber prisoners put an end to every chance of negotiation, since even the Socialists considered such a request as a provocation and as a pretext to kill Moro. For the scopes of this dissertation, I retrieved some documents of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry set up in 1983 and headed by Valiante, a member of the Christian Democracy. In this respect, it should be kept in mind that even though the Committees of Inquiry are extremely useful to highlight some information that would otherwise be inaccessible to the public, they are not formed by Judges and law experts, but by politicians: their point of view on the events can thus be affected by their political affiliations. In a document produced by the Committee⁵⁵⁶, it can be read that the agreement between the major parties about the line of firmness against any concession to the terrorists led the civil society towards the isolation of the terrorists, both from a social and political point of view.

⁵⁵⁴ Meade, R. C. (1989). *Red Brigades: the story of Italian terrorism*. Springer

⁵⁵⁵ Ibidem

⁵⁵⁶ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

Moreover, it created the premises for the defeat of the brigadists' subversive project. Two elements contributed to keep the Socialists' hopes alive: firstly, Moro's missives, in which the one-for-one exchange seemed acceptable; secondly, the fact that, after the forty-eight hours *ultimatum* had expired, the Red Brigades had not carried out the sentence. In any case, it should not be thought that the Socialists considered a fully-fledged negotiation with the Red Brigades as a lawful possibility: while they were more prone to a discussion than other parties, they were against formal negotiations and did not mean to make substantial concessions. The above-mentioned document stated that the political forces considered that the Red Brigades were only interested in destroying the state and freeing their fellow incarcerated members, and thus never really took into consideration any Socialist proposals. Moreover, it put forward the thesis that the Organization's prevalent line of action – which had always meant to kill Moro - was not changed at all by the hypothesis of a negotiation, although it seems to have shortened the duration of the abduction⁵⁵⁷. It should be stressed that, as mentioned earlier, the Committee was headed by a member of the Christian Democracy and, in addition, the number of politicians belonging to the various parties was not balanced: forty-four belonged to the Christian Democracy, twenty-four to the Communist Party, and only fifteen to the Socialist Party. Other minoritarian groups had some representatives as well. Thus, it is quite logical that the Committee supported the thesis according to which the Red Brigades had always meant to kill Moro. However, a more well-rounded analysis indicates that these points may not be entirely truthful. Indeed, in the book “*Gli Irriducibili*” (Casamassima, 2012), a declaration from part of a brigadist was reported: *“when the fake communiqué was made about the Lake of the Duchess, we understood clearly that an important part of the State wanted the President of the Christian Democracy dead. We perceived as negative the plea from the Pope as well, that absurd request of releasing the prisoner without conditions. There was a sort of negative push against any negotiation, so that we would act accordingly. If the State had acted in a humanitarian way, we would have been forced to free the hostage and it was what they all wanted in the Organization. On the contrary, by following the line of firmness, we had our shoulders against the wall, we had no way out, considering that every passing day*

⁵⁵⁷ Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani sul sequestro e l'assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia (1983). Available at <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/908010.pdf>

heightened the risk of the prison being discovered. Moretti's call to the family was the last desperate attempt to negotiate"⁵⁵⁸. Faranda said: "I had a lot of hope that something could happen. I didn't expect anything striking, but I hoped that there could be a signal, even minimal"⁵⁵⁹. Moreover, she claimed that "it was not firmness that saved the Republic, but rather the [...] execution of Moro"⁵⁶⁰. In light of these statements, it appears that Moro's life could potentially have been saved without undermining the integrity of the State, suggesting that his death may not have been entirely inevitable. People can ask themselves who is right and who is wrong, who is telling the truth and who is not: the brigadists, or the State? In my opinion, there is no right answer, and even after having carefully analyzed the whole affair in the corpus of this dissertation it is still not possible to know exactly what would have happened if things had gone differently. What is for sure is that an effective negotiation was hampered by the different and incompatible mental models to which the two parties referred. With regards to the media coverage of the affair, which accounts for a relevant part of the third chapter, it was interesting to me to note that in the "*Avanti!*" Moro was almost always addressed by his name, and I was under the impression that he was treated as a real person. In most articles, I perceived a sort of empathy toward his situation coming from the writers, even if it should be stressed that the newspaper was no stranger to those operations directed at discrediting his sanity in order to avoid taking his letters into real consideration. On the other hand, the "*Corriere della Sera*" mostly addressed his figure as "the prisoner" rather than "Moro", creating a sort of emotional detachment in the readers. Although, as mentioned in the introduction, the newspaper was under the influence of P2 - which aimed at steering the public opinion toward a specific current of thought - I did not detect any particular strategy directed at doing so, apart from the just-mentioned detachment. Finally, in the last section of the dissertation, the evolution of Italy's counterterrorism strategies and the role of the European Union in the fight against terrorism were explored. It should be stressed that since the Union works on a cooperative basis rather than an integrative one, it has not quite enough power to make its actions completely effective. In spite of this, I think that

⁵⁵⁸ Casamassima, P. (2012). *Gli irriducibili: storie di brigatisti mai pentiti*. Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, pg 149

⁵⁵⁹ Casamassima, P. (2016). Attacco al cuore dello Stato: le Brigate Rosse da Sossi a Moro. *Attacco al cuore dello Stato*, 1-206

⁵⁶⁰ Declaration given to Casamassima, P.

we should always agree on the fact that a half-effective action is better than no action, and many steps forward have been made in order to build a safer world, such as the adoption of the European Security Strategy. One of the key challenges faced by the European Union is that its ability to take unified action has been hindered by the diverse threat perceptions and preferred approaches to addressing security risks among its Member States. As the EU has expanded, reaching consensus on specific measures to implement across the entire Union has become increasingly difficult. Moreover, considering that national security is still solely retained by each Member State, a State might purposely identify an issue as a national security matter in order to apply its own laws instead of communitarian ones. Italy is putting a lot of effort on affirming itself as an authoritative interlocutor in the international security environment, especially in light of its important role in three main areas: Atlantic, European, and Mediterranean. Moreover, it is adapting its framework to the one proposed by the European Union, as well as to the ones of other international organizations such as the United Nations. In this respect, four main pillars dictate how such frameworks are structured: “Protect”, “Prevent”, “Pursue”, and “Respond”. Finally, the role of the European Union is particularly important when it comes to reinforcing the non-negotiation stance already pursued by the States. However, it should be noted that such a policy is sometimes covertly disregarded: for example, although no official statements were released by the government, according to many intellectuals Silvia Romano’s case was solved by paying a ransom to her kidnappers, which – as it was affirmed by one of the terrorists – will be potentially used to finance further terrorist actions.

For what concerns my own perspective on the affair, I believe that the Italian State should have negotiated or at the very least it should have truly attempted to do so. While it is agreeable that bargaining was probably going to boost the chances of being victims of more attacks in the foreseeable future, it is also true that a man’s life was at stake. In Sossi’s case, concessions were made to save him and were later called back: indeed, no prisoner was released at all, and the Judge was freed. Even in Moro’s case, priority should have been given to rescuing him alive. Since the police and investigative forces were not effective in conducting this task – in ways that sometimes can only leave the person who is investigating them extremely perplexed – the government should have intervened

firsthand, and I believe that at least the one-for-one exchange should have been attempted more vigorously. If the brigadists were to refuse such an option, then the government could have claimed to have tried everything in its power and put the entire blame for Moro's death on the brigadists without anybody questioning it. If accepting the Red Brigades' conditions to release him alive were to actually lead to more kidnappings, then I do believe that in subsequent cases the political class would have had a right to refuse further negotiations. It is true that saving Moro would have created a precedent, but it is likewise true that more kidnappings would have led to more terror, and thus - I believe - the civil society, after years of fear, would have been more prone to finally sacrifice one person for the greater good. In my opinion - although the cases to be considered are not entirely comparable, since in Judge D'Urso case the brigadists only asked for the closure of a special prison and not the liberation of fellow terrorists - the fact that in the just-mentioned case it was decided to surrender to the Organization's request is a sign that, in retrospect, many people wondered if the line of firmness adopted during Moro's affair had actually been the right choice. Similarly, the fact that still nowadays Italy negotiates for the lives of its citizens taken hostage in other countries by terrorist groups - like in Romano's case - is a sign that at least undercover negotiations are often preferred to bloodshed, even if we willingly subject ourselves to the chance that the money paid to such groups will be used to finance further criminal activities. Finally, it is hard to believe that making any concession would have led the Red Brigades to seize power in the country: to me, a similar outcome was quite unlikely, firstly because the civil society's support of their cause was becoming weaker and weaker - and bringing back historical members of the Organization was not going to help in this sense -; and, secondly, because presumably the United States would have promptly stopped this turn to the far left, since they were likely not willing to see an important ally becoming politically closer to the Soviet Union. To conclude, a last reflection can be advanced: a man died, and his sacrifice allowed the integrity of the State to be saved. But was there really no other way?

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