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COORDINATING ORGANIZATIONS INTO  
COHERENT APPROACHES TO HUMAN  
SECURITY:

THE ITALIAN WAY AND THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL PEACE CORPS  
CONCEPT.

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*to the Women to whom I belong*

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## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is conceived to be a contribution to the understanding of the Italian “Civil Peace Corps” Concept, as a tool delivering non-violent conflict transformation actions of positive peace<sup>1</sup>, contributing to Human Security interventions within National, European and International “Early Warning Systems”, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Operations. It is, anyway, not concerned on *how* to run these interventions, taking into brief account the existing framework, into which an institutionalized implementation of the Italian CPC concept would find its place, as an instrument complementary to others.

This thesis is, therefore, aimed to address the following question: could the institutionalised development of the Italian CPC Concept be considered as a potentially useful tool, in the framework of comprehensive approaches to HS in EWS, CP and CMO? The tentative answer is organized in five chapters, giving overviews over: the international CA to CM; the Italian approach to a HS CM; the CPC concept; the path towards a CPC institutionalisation in Italy; the potential usefulness of the CPC in the current system with education, training and employment issues, considering also cultural concerns in the background, aiming to give an answer to the main question.

This work stems from a study path paced attending the “Human Rights and Multi-Level Governance” Master’s Degree Course at the University of Padua and a set of personal and professional experiences, which altogether raised awareness about the usefulness of a shared vision concerning conflict transformation, based on the mainstreaming of International Law and Human Security concept.

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<sup>1</sup> Summarizing Galtung’s thought, “Negative Peace” is the absence of direct violence, while “Positive Peace” refers to the absence of direct and structural violence, aiming to a wider social justice. “Positive Peace” wording is credited to having been used for the first time by Martin Luther King in 1953” but the white moderate, who is more devoted to “order” than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice”.

With the publication of the UNDP<sup>2</sup> “Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security”, the use of “HS” concept and idea begun gaining ground. The General Assembly of the United Nations states as a common understanding<sup>3</sup>: “*Human Security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities*”, as the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, entitled to freedom from want and freedom from fear.

It notices how HS actions do not entail the use of force, not replacing State Security, acknowledging the primary role and ownership of national Governments in implementing HS obligations with respect to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. It also traces a clear distinction between “Human Security” and “Responsibility to Protect”. The HS concept, although not replacing “traditional” State Security concerns (which, in ideal terms, should be ancillary to it<sup>4</sup>), comes by acknowledging how the HR system gave a central role to the human beings, and states’ effectiveness in tackling trans-national realities and asymmetric security (state and HS) threats<sup>5</sup> diminished<sup>6</sup>. An important consideration regarding HS is worth to be quoted verbatim, as in the “Thematic Guidance Note for Regional and National Human Development Report Teams”<sup>7</sup>: “*The concept does not only apply to fragile states. Security, in the broad sense, is important for all societies. The Human Security approach is flexible and can be tailored to different Countries*”. This implies as a HS approach shall be regarded as a broad perspective through which to analyse threats, encompassing different typologies of intervention, therefore including also room for the CPC concept.

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<sup>2</sup>Human Development Report 1994 , New York Oxford University Press, UNDP [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr\\_1994\\_en\\_complete\\_nostats.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> A/RES/66/290 “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security” of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, adopted on the 25<sup>th</sup> of October, 2015, during the sixty-sixth session; <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/GA%20Resolutions%20and%20Debate%20Summaries/GA%20Resolutions.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> A.Papisca, *Il Diritto della dignità umana. Riflessioni sulla globalizzazione dei diritti umani*, Venezia, Marsilio, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> UN General Assembly, «*In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*», Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005

<sup>6</sup> A. Papisca e M. Mascia, *Le relazioni internazionali nell'era dell'interdipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, Cedam, 2012 (4<sup>o</sup> ed.).

<sup>7</sup> [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/human\\_security\\_guidance\\_note\\_r-nhdrs.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/human_security_guidance_note_r-nhdrs.pdf)



# CHAPTER 1

## INTEGRATING ORGANIZATIONS

### 1.1. U.N. Integrated Approach

In the current international system, the United Nations Organization is the pivotal element. The Charter of the UN, signed after the end of the Second World War, is the final product of the political agreements reached among the wartime “United Nations” victorious on the defeated Axis Powers, with the aim of establishing a new international order able “*to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war*”.

In its wording, the charter allows the use of force in two cases, in self-defense, as per Art. 51; or following the provisions of Chapter VII, giving to the UN Security Council powers on “*action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression*”, with non-military (Art.41) and military actions (Art.42), to be exerted by Forces placed under the UNSC authority (Art.43) and the control of the UN Military Committee (Art.47). Art.53 also gives room to the UNSC to use “*regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council*”. Of course, being the U.N. Charter the result of political compromise following a world war, is far from being perfect<sup>1</sup>, giving to the 5 powers entrusted with veto power, the possibility to carry “*action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security*”, as per Art. 106. A “transitional security arrangement” still

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<sup>1</sup>As an example, the UN Military Committee has been described by a British naval historian, Dr. Eric Grove, as "a sterile monument to the faded hopes of the founders of the UN". [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539026?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539026?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

valid.

Following, or despite, the incompletion with the architecture foreseen in UN Charter's Chapter VII, UN anyway established and conducted numerous UN Peace Keeping Operations, being the first one the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948. The UN PKO model developed during the decades, leading to the establishment of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, guided by an Under-Secretary General, supervising the UN PKOs around the world.

What above summarized is the most controversial point of the UN system, with regard to the shortcomings on collective security. But as the result of political compromises, aimed to achieve shared goals, it is worth highlighting. It shall moreover be useful to recall what stated by UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali<sup>2</sup>: *“Power brings special responsibilities, and temptations. The powerful must resist the dual but opposite calls of unilateralism and isolationism if the United Nations is to succeed”*. Anyhow, setting aside the UN system's limitations, numerous intangible results have been achieved through it, paving the way in the last 70 years to the International Law of Human Rights, ultimately leading to the HS paradigm, recognizing how “State Security” agreements without HS measures are hardly sustainable. Through its specialized agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF etc.), the UN catalysed and coordinated international efforts to Humanitarian Aid development issues.

Numerous reports and findings showed contrasting data about the effectiveness of UN PKOs, especially with regard to the lack of sustainability, thus, long-term results, of these interventions. Milestones in this process, have been the *“Brahimi Report”*<sup>3</sup> in the year 2000, which shed light on the lack of coherence, leadership and support of deployed PKOs, followed in 2005 by Kofi

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<sup>2</sup> A/47/277 - S/24111 17 June 1992 “An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping”, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 [http://unrol.org/files/A\\_47\\_277.pdf](http://unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> A/55/305-S/2000/809 “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects”, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” <http://unrol.org/files/brahimi%20report%20peacekeeping.pdf>

Annan’s “*In larger freedom*”<sup>4</sup>, which focussed more on the practical convergence of goals between “State Security-led” PKOs and “Human Security-led” development interventions, thus merging the “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” ideas into a unique model of intervention, adding moreover the notion of the “freedom to live in dignity”.

Of course, the operational implementation of concepts is always bound to a number of constraints; anyway, the development of thoughts among UN system gave birth to the Integrated Mission concept. This consists into a planning process coordinating the elements of the UN “family” into a single Country-level UN system, carrying on complex, multi-dimensional, peacebuilding interventions.

The challenge of integrating the components of UN interventions is still ongoing, as every complex process, nevertheless it is out of question how the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of UN PKO interventions<sup>5</sup>, integrating the agencies specialties, took to a level of coordination unbelievable until just a few years ago. It involves together into a single approach political, security, development, Human Rights and humanitarian actors (fundamental the OCHA’s role into managing humanitarian and emergency relief) at Country level, generally under the coordination of a UNSG Special Representative.




Figure 1: The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> A/59/2005 “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005)


<sup>5</sup> A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines” <https://cc.unlb.org/UNASAS%20Documents/KEY%20DOCUMENTS/United%20Nations%20Peacekeeping%20Operations%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf>

In 2008, a SG decision defined the Integrated Approach as not requiring a structural integration, but providing for it whenever needed, defining a strategic partnership between UN PKO (“State Security paradigm”) and UN Country Team (“Human Security paradigm”), and mutual cooperation and support, in close collaboration with other partners. Also, DPKO’s central Planning capabilities are mined by a lack of intelligence capabilities, then delegated to the Country Level<sup>7</sup>.

The evolution of UN PKOs is summarized into the statement<sup>8</sup>: *“Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote Human Rights, and assist in restoring the rule of Law”*.

The Integrated Approach requires a shared vision of UN’s strategic goals, aligned or integrated planning<sup>9</sup>, agreed responsibilities (division of tasks, aimed to avoid overlapping) and mechanisms for monitoring and impact evaluations.



**Figure 2:** The Challenge of Mission Integration<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> “Alcune riflessioni su struttura e competenze del dipartimento delle operazioni di pace dell’ONU - cooperazione internazionale”, Enzo Fanelli in “Informazioni della Difesa 4/2012

<sup>8</sup> See note 6

<sup>9</sup> Planning Toolkit,

[http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/Planning%20Toolkit\\_Web%20Version.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/Planning%20Toolkit_Web%20Version.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> See note 6

## 1.2 NATO Comprehensive Approach

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an InterGovernmental Political-Military Alliance, established by the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949, as a system of collective, mutual Defence, to respond in case of attacks by external parties. During the Cold war, its *raison d'être* was to deter potential threats of aggression carried by the Soviet Union and its Allies in the European continent. At the time, the Alliance planning was conducted in the “General Defence Plan” framework, developing a number of operational plans aimed to defend NATO nation’s territories from an identifiable, quantifiable and symmetric threat, thus responding to a full State Security paradigm<sup>11</sup>.

Engaged in the early '90 into operations different from the ones foresaw during the cold war, NATO found itself entangled into a twofold reality. The first part was made of high-intensity air campaigns (similar to the first part of the “Gulf War”, conducted by a non-NATO, UN-mandated and US-led coalition), into which the Military Alliance had the possibility to prove its efficiency in designing and successfully concluding traditional military operations, although limited to the air domain, thus into “*winning the war*” actions.

When going to the “*boots on the ground*”, so to the land domain, the Alliance discovered the reality of PKOs (which the Gulf War coalition avoided, bounded to a “traditional” military victory on the Iraqi forces), appreciating how the operation’s success possibilities could be highly enhanced by a positive partnership with other actors present in the area, both Governmental and non-Governmental. The difference in mind-set required by leadership and units was then summarized into the “*winning the peace*” aim, so to keep the situation on the ground safe enough (ensure the “SASE”, *safe and secure environment*” and “FOM”, “*Freedom Of Movement*”), allowing peace agreements’ implementation.

It is important how, going to International Law, NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in 1992 was conducted in compliance with UNSC Resolutions, while this did not happen for the air campaign on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999.

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<sup>11</sup> Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze “Operations Planning Course - Student Handbook ” [http://www.difesa.it/SMD\\_/CASD/IM/ISSMI/Documents/Fusione\\_Coop\\_OPC.pdf](http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/ISSMI/Documents/Fusione_Coop_OPC.pdf)

This breach in International Law was nevertheless justified on Humanitarian grounds, after the shocking events of Srebrenica and Rwanda in the 90s, which gave the rise to the “Responsibility to Protect”<sup>12</sup> doctrine, lately adopted by the UN. The presence in the “*theatre of operations*”, of actors external to the traditional dynamics of armed conflicts, imposed restrictions not previously considered into the application of military force, limiting the effectiveness of many assets and requiring the development of new strategies and tactics<sup>13</sup>. This ultimately leading to a revision in the use of force foreseen by military doctrines, as the operations were taking place into essentially permissive environments, with a military presence aiming to prevent escalations back into open conflict.

Traditionally, military cooperation with civilian actors had been regarded as a merely logistics challenge, or little more. NATO’s involvement beyond domestic borders, anyhow, prompted the need for the military to liaise in a different way to civilian issues and actors, establishing the Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine, defined in NATO<sup>14</sup> as: “*The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-Governmental organisations and agencies.*”.

Different ideas about CIMIC are considered by other organizations (also in EU), as within UN the Civilian-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) concept is established, with an emphasis on the military support role to humanitarian relief<sup>15</sup>: “*UN-CMCoord is a key component of OCHA’s core function: coordinating humanitarian response. In humanitarian operations with a military presence, OCHA leads the establishment and management of interaction with military*

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<sup>12</sup> “The Responsibility to Protect” Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001 <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> Stato Maggiore della Difesa – III Reparto – Centro Innovazione della Difesa “PID/O-5 L’Apprezzamento del Comandante ed il Progetto della Campagna (Campaign Design)” [http://www.difesa.it/SMD\\_/CASD/IM/ISSMI/Documents/Apprezzamento\\_Comandante\\_Progetto\\_Campagna\\_PID\\_O\\_5\\_VolI.pdf](http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/ISSMI/Documents/Apprezzamento_Comandante_Progetto_Campagna_PID_O_5_VolI.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> AJP-9 NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE, Version June 2003 <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> “What is United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination?” [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM\\_CMCoord\\_11November2013\\_eng.pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM_CMCoord_11November2013_eng.pdf)

*actors. This relationship will change depending on the type of emergency and the roles and responsibilities of the military”.*

Interventions on the ground in the Balkans were structured to achieve the goal of maintaining conditions established by the peace agreements, being in that “straight” PKOs. After 9/11 and the intervention in Afghanistan (NATO called for the first time in history for “Article 5”, providing for mutual Defence) which, after an initial engagement on more “militarily traditional” grounds, evolved into the “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF) Mission. NATO forces found themselves stuck into a new and more demanding challenge, named as “Counter Insurgency” (COIN) or “Stabilization and Reconstruction” (S&R), as almost no SASE was achieved. This while US and other forces were at the same time deployed to Iraq, after the “Iraqi Freedom” campaign – which has been defined as not in conformity to international Law, thus “*illegal*”, by UNSG Kofi Annan<sup>16</sup> –. NATO became lately involved in Iraq, in the form of a Military Training Mission.

This led to a radical change into NATO’s concerns about non-military issues, formalizing the “comprehensive approach” to CMOs. NATO’s topic page reports how<sup>17</sup>: *“NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that lessons learned from NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Allied leaders agreed to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction.”*

Such a statement summarizes the shift into theoretical view of military role in CMOs, originated by the analysis of the outcomes produced by the actions the Alliance conducted in its operations (and the United States and other Allies in non-NATO interventions), so, the near impossibility of achieving the “*desired end state*”, to “*win peace*”, with solely military means. It is important to notice as NATO, due to its inherent nature of political-military Alliance, is therefore

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<sup>16</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq>

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_51633.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm)

essentially a provider of “hard power”, in the form of a military force ready to be employed into high-intensity conflicts of “traditional” kind, responding to a “State Security” paradigm. Its role in CMOs, nevertheless, imposed a deep revision in its strategic thought, in order to render it more functional to the new operational needs. Moreover, this shall be seen as an acknowledgment of the supporting role of the military component towards other elements in CMOs,

In its “Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive”<sup>18</sup>, “NATO recognizes that that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. There is a need for more deliberate and inclusive planning and action through established crisis management procedures that allow for both military and non-military resources and efforts to be marshalled with a greater unity of purpose. Adopting such a comprehensive approach to operations begins with inculcating a culture of active collaboration and transparency among those involved in crisis management”




Figure 3: Theoretical International Strategic Operations Design<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> <https://publicintelligence.net/nato-copd/>, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe – Belgium - Allied Command Operations - Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive -Copd Interim V1.0 17 December 2010, <https://Info.Publicintelligence.Net/Nato-Copd.Pdf>

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem



### 1.3 E.U. Comprehensive Approach

The European Union is a political-economic Union operating through a set of supra-national institutions and interGovernmental-negotiated decisions among the member states. Established in its present form with the Lisbon treaty of 2007, the EU explicitly acknowledges the centrality of UN and international Law in the collective security system. European identity<sup>20</sup> in international relations grew in a frame of norms-based multilateralism, promoting Human Rights, International Law and institutions.

EU's external action took to the development of a broad range of initiatives and instruments, considering conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis management and peace-building, contributing to the promotion of the Union as an actor capable of carrying a wide range of actions in supporting local institutions into a development path, within a HS paradigm.

EU is considered to be an actor wielding considerable “*soft power*”<sup>21</sup> into the international arena; this labels the capability to influence other's decisions and the events by mean of non-coercive measures. In tackling the challenges of contemporary reality, the EU acknowledges the impossibility, for a single nation or organization, to exert sufficient power and enact the full range of actions required to positively influence the course of the events<sup>22</sup>: *“Many of the most critical security threats the world faces today [...] are interconnected and increasingly complex, impacting on both developing and industrialised Countries alike. [...]. Impressive technological and scientific advances [...] offer significant opportunities for growth, development and improvement of human wellbeing, yet they may also carry with them security threats that need to be better understood and mitigated. In a multi-polar world, responding to these challenges in an*

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<sup>20</sup> J. Howorth, *Implementing a 'grand strategy'*, in A. de Vasconcelos, *What ambitions for European defence in 2020?*, Paris, Institute for Security Studies/European Union, 2009

<sup>21</sup> J.S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs Press, 2005

<sup>22</sup> Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) - Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020 Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017  
[http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/icsp\\_strategy\\_paper\\_2014-2020\\_and\\_mip\\_2014-2017\\_annex\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/icsp_strategy_paper_2014-2020_and_mip_2014-2017_annex_en.pdf)

*effective manner requires a significant collective effort, based on strong partnerships with other states, civil society actors, multilateral and regional partners. Threats to international peace and security cannot be efficiently tackled by States acting individually. Synergies and cooperation are also increasingly needed at international level, as donors are facing similar problems in terms of scarce resources. In the face of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal objectives [...] will be achieved in isolation from the wider world”.*

In order to efficiently confront these threats and contribute to a wider understanding and, consequently, improvement of crisis or potential crisis situations, the EU elaborated during the last decade its own concept of “Comprehensive Approach” to external conflict and crises. The most up to date formalization of this concept shall be found into a Joint Communication<sup>23</sup>, followed by a document reporting the Council’s conclusions<sup>24</sup>, defining the steps taken and foreseen towards its implementation:

- 1- Development of a shared analysis, noticing how a coherent strategy for conflict prevention and CMOs starts with shared data and analysis;
- 2- Definition of a common strategic vision, through joint policy definition;
- 3- Focus on prevention, before violence erupts;
- 4- Mobilisation of different strengths and capacities of the EU, including Civil Society and NGOs;
- 5- Long term commitment, to peace and state building, also in education;
- 6- Linkage of policies and internal and external action;
- 7- Better use of EU Delegations, as focal points into third Countries ;
- 8- Work in partnership, with, UN, NATO, IMF, WB etc.

The improvements in theoretical concepts and the experiences from the engagements that the EU already undertook or are currently ongoing, took the EU to what shall be regarded as the most HS “inspired” concept of intervention,

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<sup>23</sup> JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL - The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises - Brussels, 11.12.2013 [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211\\_03\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach *FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 12 May 2014* [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf)

encompassing a very broad spectrum of possible actions, including, for instance, educational sides of peace and nation building, often not considered. It has been remarked<sup>25</sup>, for instance, as the lack of a proper intervention into Bosnian educational system allowed the perpetuation of an ethnical bias, which negatively influenced youth respect to peaceful cohabitation.

As previously mentioned, the EU is a main actor in the field of *soft* power but, as widely known, is still developing credible *hard* power capabilities. When, with the interventions in the Balkans, the need to deploy consistent EU-led military assets emerged, the EU sought for a deeper cooperation with NATO, which took to the “Berlin plus”<sup>26</sup> agreements, defining the ways the latter was going to support the former, in terms of information, planning and assets.

Despite that, efforts in developing a better integration also under a military and police perspective have been made, pursuing an improved CFSP and CSDP policy coherence and EEAS empowerment, although the transformation process is constantly ongoing. This due to the rising increase in demand for the EU to provide more security, alongside its *soft power* capabilities, because as HR/VP Mogherini<sup>27</sup> said, “*There can be no development without security, as there can be no security without development*”. It seems then relevant to underline the developments of this line of thought, by taking into account the Council of the EU Conclusions on CSDP<sup>28</sup> and on HR and democracy.

The first document underlines the need to further strengthen the links between external and internal security, encouraging “*the development of further synergies between CSDP, in its civilian and military dimensions, and Freedom,*

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<sup>25</sup> Gen.C.A. CC Vincenzo Coppola reported speech into “Difesa: cooperazione fra diplomazia, forze di pace e università, nuova strategia per missioni peacekeeping e prevenzione conflitti”, “Il nuovo giornale dei militari”, 16 Aug 2015, <http://www.nuovogiornaledemilitari.com/difesa-cooperazione-fra-diplomazia-forze-di-pace-e-universita-nuova-strategia-missioni-peacekeeping>

<sup>26</sup> EU-NATO: THE FRAMEWORK FOR PERMANENT RELATIONS AND BERLIN PLUS <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY COMMITTEE *Chairman's E - Newsletter* Issue n. 19, September 2015 Interview Mrs Federica Mogherini [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eumc/documents/issuespecialedition\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eumc/documents/issuespecialedition_en.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> Council conclusions on CSDP, 18 May 2015 - <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18-council-conclusions-csdp/>

*Security and Justice Actors*”, “including Europol, FRONTEX and CEPOL, Interpol, and the European Gendarmerie Force”. It also recognizes the need to increase the efficiency of CM, planning and conduct of CSDP operations; it draws guidelines on how to increase effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP and to enhance the development of capabilities. It also stresses the need to strengthen the European Defence technological and industrial base. The second Conclusion<sup>29</sup> highlights the EU policy regarding the “Action Plan on HR and Democracy”, aimed to boost the ownership of local actors (including third Countries’ CSO and supporting HRD), to address HR challenges and ensure a comprehensive HR approach to conflicts (including the mainstreaming of HR into all phases of CSDP planning, review and conduct, “with emphasis on the protection of civilians in particular children, and the empowerment and participation of women and girls”); finally, to foster coherence and consistency among EU HR and CSDP instruments.

With reference to the inclusion of Civil Society (CS) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) into peace processes, it seems important to highlight the establishment in 2014 of the “Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace”<sup>30</sup> (IcSP) and the “Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights worldwide” (EIDHR). The first one is intended to contribute to peace and stability by sustaining EU external action, through technical and financial assistance to a range of initiatives aimed to good governance and conflict prevention. The second one is more focused in promoting democratization and Human Rights policies.

In its efforts to “bring together our development support and our security assistance in Countries plagued by conflict”<sup>31</sup>, the EU pushed towards a better coordination, so that Humanitarian Aid became a natural part of this struggle. In 2007 common understandings brought to the “European consensus on

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<sup>29</sup> Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015 – 2019 20 July 2015; <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10897-2015-INIT/en/pdf>

<sup>30</sup> the Regulation establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument\\_contributing\\_to\\_stability\\_and\\_peace\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_en.htm)

<sup>31</sup> See note 27

Humanitarian Aid”<sup>32</sup>, issued by the European Commission; a wide reformation process enhanced the proficiency of the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO), leading to a better planning and coordination of humanitarian interventions<sup>33</sup>; also, a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps has been established and is planned to become operational in 2016<sup>34</sup>.

In the light of the measures taken, it seems the EU policies definition has been following the recommendations of the “Barcelona Report”<sup>35</sup>, calling for primacy of Human Rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, bottom-up approach, regional focus, use of legal instruments and appropriate use of force. It could be also deemed how EU is seeking to a major improvement in its’ actions coherence, as outlined by Pirozzi’s<sup>36</sup> considerations on EU CM. This, in order to achieve long-standing and sustainable peace and stability within a HS frame.



Figure 4: The conflict transformation timeline<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - *The humanitarian challenge* [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> General Guidelines for Operational Priorities on Humanitarian Aid in 2015 [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/strategy/strategy\\_2015\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/strategy/strategy_2015_en.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> EU REG No 375/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 3 April 2014 (‘EU Aid Volunteers initiative’) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0375&from=EN>

<sup>35</sup> *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities*, Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, Barcelona, 15 September 2004 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/humanSecurity/barcelonaReport.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> Pirozzi, *The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management*, EU Crisis Management Paper Series, Brussels, DCAF, 2013; <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/The-EU-s-Comprehensive-Approach-to-Crisis-Management>

<sup>37</sup> Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action <http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/EEAS%20guidance%20note%20on%20conflict%20analysis.pdf>

#### 1.4 European Countries Integrated Approaches

The ambition of achieving a better comprehensiveness into crisis management and external action has been pursued also at National level, with the clear intention of obtaining a maximization of the outputs, while at the same time (due to the crisis situation) sparing resources, both human and economical. Within Europe, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, a major issue in defining a collective action is to gather awareness into issues tackling common interests and, as a consequence, to draft, approve and follow shared courses of action. This due to the fact that, in many cases, national policies are constrained by local issues catalysing in a more direct and immediate way the public opinion interests and feelings. Moreover, among a State and the other, there are several differences in national interests and into the way “whole of Government approaches” are conceived and realized.

It is important to keep in mind how, due to the very simple fact that States are, by definition, the actors of “State Security” system, diplomatic and military apparatus are usually the leading components of “whole of Government” approaches. As a result, national “strategic cultures”, so the willingness – or the lack of it – to get involved into external action, especially with a military dimension, deeply influences the various solutions. Despite that, possibly showing the mainstreaming of the HS paradigm into national strategic cultures, several states have included, or are including, NGO and CSO into their architectures.

A Report<sup>38</sup>, “*Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU member states*”, published in December 2014 by the “*Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law (KPSRL)*” gives an hindsight on the agreements which led to current EU CA: “*It serves the UK that prefers NATO as a construct for more robust and offensive military missions; it serves Denmark, which has an optout of the CSDP; it serves Sweden, which aligns itself with CSDP missions only if they are covered by a UN mandate; and it serves Germany, which has no strong*

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<sup>38</sup> “Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU member states” Volker Hauck and Camilla Rocca, December 2014, European Centre for Development Policy Management <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/Gaps-Between-Comprehensieve-Approach-of-the-EU-and-EU-Member-States.pdf>

*ambition to act militarily at the EU level. Furthermore, it serves France, as it leaves the door open for more CSDP missions (and French control over them) as long as they are discussed among EU member states in the relevant Council bodies, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC)*". The report defines the dimensions of CA to CM external action and goes for a comparison among 6 European Countries, useful in the brief analysis of the Italian situation, chapter 2:

- 1-Political and strategic purpose, so why and for what a CA;
- 2-Scope: a narrow approach limiting to CIMIC/CMCoord, a medium one, including diplomacy, security (military and police) and development, or a system-wide one, adding also ROL, business and trade;
- 3-Degree of interaction and use of instruments: from information sharing, to coordination of activities to joint planning and implementation;
- 4-Level of institutional formalisation: from "ad-hoc cooperation" to "flexible arrangements" to agreed and pre-established institutional networks;
- 5-National or international orientation: the level of proactivity towards cooperation with other non-national and international actors.

UK's CA has been found to be a system-wide one, with a high institutional integration level, where the "National Security Council" orients the actions of MoFA, MoD and DFID (Department for International Development), which are linked to the national security strategy. There is a shared funding mechanism in place, jointly managed. UK supports EU conflict prevention in CSDP military missions, although strongly advocates CMO of military kind under NATO umbrella.

Germany's "*Vernetzte Sicherheit*", "Networked Security", is a system-wide concept of CA, with a low level of institutional integration and a plurality of coordination mechanisms, without shared funding systems. Germany supports EU external actions, usually refraining from military interventions.

French "*Approche Globale*", "Global Approach", has a limited scope, focused on civil-military cooperation, with a high institutional integration, where the MoFA provides for inter-ministerial coordination with MoD and ad-hoc involvement of development agency. There is no shared funding system, though the Ministry of Finance is involved in inter-ministerial meetings. France supports

European integration also on the military side, with scant interest towards conflict prevention.

Sweden's CA is system-wide with high institutional integration among diplomacy, foreign trade and development; MoD and other ministries engaged ad-hoc. Strongly supports EU conflict prevention, in a HS perspective, participating in EU or NATO (although not being a NATO member, Sweden is member of the "Partnership for Peace" program since 1995) CMO under UN mandate.

Danish "whole-of-Government" or integrated approach is system-wide and highly integrated, with MoFA leading the approach in close coordination with the MoD; the Danish Development Agency is part of the MoFA, with NGOs and private sector included in such framework. Funding is shared with decisions taken by an inter-ministerial committee. Denmark has an opt-out option from CSDP (unique case) and participates to NATO and UN operations.

The Netherlands "Integrated Approach" is a system-wide one, with a high integration led by MoFA and MoD extended to Police and Development, coordinating on a case basis with NGOs and private sector and a shared funding. The Country supports European integration, also in the military field, supporting EU CA and participating to CMO.

Of course, also US and Canada have their "whole-of-Government approach". The Russian Federation, in Ukraine, showed a worrying masterful attitude in applying a CA to offensive goals<sup>39</sup>: "*War and peace, Mr Gerasimov wrote, in remarks that now seem prophetic, are becoming more blurred. "Methods of conflict," he wrote, have changed, and now involve "the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures"*. NATO categorised this approach "*hybrid warfare*"<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> August 28, 2014, Ukraine: Russia's new art of war, by Sam Jones for Financial Times

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz3gkf2m87i>

<sup>40</sup> NATO's Hybrid Flanks- NATO Defense College, Jacobs & Lasconjarias [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014\\_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede011015resarchpaper\\_nato\\_/sede011015resarchpaper\\_nato\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede011015resarchpaper_nato_/sede011015resarchpaper_nato_en.pdf) Rome, 2015



## 1.5 Integration Issues

The acknowledgment of the difficulties in performing actions with efficiency and effectiveness in CMO took to the development of the CA, interpreted in different ways, of course. As usual, anyway, the theoretical concept clashes with its practical implementation due to a large number of reasons.

At the international as well as national and local levels, different actors have different policies, which somehow hamper CA operationalisation. The involvement of local actors (important to remember, partnering local organisations is a pivotal element of the sustainability of peace and security interventions) is sometimes difficult, especially where security concerns are important. Military actions by the US and its Allies, during the recent campaigns, failed too often in factoring in the right way the effects of their actions on local population, taking to an important shift into military doctrine, more driven by global constraints and less by tactical considerations. This nevertheless deteriorated in some manner the willingness of humanitarian actors and NGOs in being involved into interventions alongside the military. Of course, the Humanitarian Principles, being Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence (and more recently, the “*do not harm*” principle), cannot be easily operationalized within a strictly politically-driven action and this causes tensions and attritions. As mentioned, another major problem in coordinating International Organisations efforts is given by the difficulties in gathering sufficient consensus among member states around an issue and on the instruments to enact in order to engage it.

An interesting case study regarding inter-organizational issues is “Police knowledge sharing capabilities”<sup>41</sup> and some of its conclusions can be considered. With regard to “*barriers to knowledge sharing*”, difficulties noticed have been the

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<sup>41</sup> Lead Authors: Kamal Birdi, Kerry Allen, Christine Turgoose, Ian Macdonald & Julia Vössing: Institute of Work Psychology, Management School, University of Sheffield, UK, COMPOSITE Knowledge sharing research programme. [http://www.composite-project.eu/tl\\_files/fM\\_k0005/download/COMPOSITE%20WP3%20Brochure.pdf](http://www.composite-project.eu/tl_files/fM_k0005/download/COMPOSITE%20WP3%20Brochure.pdf)

*“bureaucratic processes for sharing”* and *“forces being insular”*, due to incompatible information structures and procedures. Among findings and recommendations, the study concluded how some actions shall be taken: *“awareness of organisational and legislative differences should be improved”*, *“effective leadership and leading by example”*, *“clear and efficient processes for quick knowledge sharing”*, *“strategies should be developed in conjunction with other forces”*, *“better relationship should be developed through regular face-to-face activities”* and *“standardised technological system should be utilised”*.

Although the study examined Police forces only, these findings are relevant for any knowledge sharing and policy developing processes among different organisations, especially when engaging in CA with a common, shared final end.

An ECHO Summary note<sup>42</sup>, dealing with coordination of Humanitarians and Police for the Protection of Civilians, notes how the need for mutual cooperation has been acknowledged by all actors. It has often been hampered, anyway, by the *lack of awareness of the respective mandates, policies and principles*, at local, operational and strategic levels. Moreover, the opportunity for a more stable coordination among components has been noticed. Lessons learned from the most positive experiences in this sense (Georgia and Darfur) should be captured and developed. The need for a better coherence, driven by a top-down approach, has also been noticed<sup>43</sup>, as efforts are often wasted into fragmentary and confusing actions, although the final aim should be the same. Furthermore, another major problem is the short-time vision of many interventions, suitable in some cases for military actions, but for sure negative for nation building purposes (see figure 4).

In conclusion, coherence of efforts should to be pursued by organisations *aware and respectful of each one’s mandate*, on a common shared information base, towards complementary goals aiming to achieve the same agreed end state.

Defining how to best attain such a complex capability is an ongoing process.

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<sup>42</sup> Roundtable on Civil–Military Coordination The Police, Humanitarians and the Protection of Civilians: Coordinating ‘Civilian’ Contributions 1 March 2012 ECHO Headquarters, Rue d’Arlon, 88, 1049 Brussels, Belgium <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/01-03-12%20Roundtable%20Summary%20-%20The%20police%20humanitarians%20and%20protection%20of%20civilians.pdf>

<sup>43</sup> See note 25

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **ITALIAN NATIONAL MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH**

#### **2.1 National Crisis Management Organization and Intelligence role**

The Italian Republic undertook, during the last decade, an extensive reform process in many fields, including its Intelligence, Crisis Management, Humanitarian Aid, Foreign Affairs and Defence structures. The situation is developing, as many relevant implementing provisions have not been issued up to October 2015.

##### *2.1.1. The Intelligence organisation*

Law 124/2007<sup>44</sup> gave a renewed the Republic's information and security system and the policy on secret matters, to enhance national intelligence capabilities, political direction and democratic control. The Head of the National Information and Security System is the Prime Minister, who shall delegate some of his or her functions to a Delegated Authority (DA), overseeing the Department of Information for Security (DIS), which coordinates the Agencies for Internal and External Information and Security (AISE and AISI). The Law also established the "*Comitato Interministeriale per la Sicurezza della Repubblica*" ("Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic", CISR), whose members are the PM, the DA and the heads of MoFA, MoI, MoD, MoJ, MEF, MED (Economic Development), to give guidance on information and security policy.

The Law also transformed the previous "*Comitato Parlamentare di*

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<sup>44</sup> Legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 124 "Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto " pubblicata nella *Gazzetta Ufficiale* n. 187 del 13 agosto 2007 <http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/071241.htm>

*Controllo sui Servizi Segreti*”, “Parliamentary Control Committee on the Secret Services” (“COPACO”) into the new and more incisive<sup>45</sup> “*Comitato Parlamentare per la Sicurezza della Repubblica*”, “Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic” (COPASIR), which has the important role of supervising that the Republic’s Information And Security System operates following Laws and rules<sup>46</sup>. Its president is chosen among parliamentary opposition’s parties. It has been entrusted, by Law 133/2012<sup>47</sup>, with wider attributions about delving into alleged irregularities by personnel of the information and security services.

### 2.1.2. The Crisis Management structure

The Italian CM structure is defined by the “*DPCM 05/05/2010, Organizzazione Nazionale per la gestione di crisi*”<sup>48</sup>, “National Crisis Management Organisation”. Its adoption was needed in order to update national procedures and make it interoperable to a certain extent with EU and NATO’s ones, with particular attention paid to accurate intelligence handling.

The NCMO determines, when deemed necessary, the contrast measures of crisis situations handled by UN, NATO, EU and other IO, taking the burden of all crisis which cannot be handled by other already existing structures.

The Decree institutes the “*Comitato Politico Strategico*” “Political-

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<sup>45</sup> SISTEMA DI INFORMAZIONE PER LA SICUREZZA DELLA REPUBBLICA - LE INFORMAZIONI PER LA SICUREZZA IN UN SISTEMA DEMOCRATICO Idee per avviare un dibattito e affrontare una sfida culturale – Quaderno di Intelligence 1 – Gnosis <http://www.sicurezza nazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Q1-Quaderno-di-intelligence-1.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> COMITATO PARLAMENTARE PER LA SICUREZZA DELLA REPUBBLICA RELAZIONE ANNUALE (Attività svolta dal 6 giugno 2013 al 30 settembre 2014) <http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/845634.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> Legge 7 agosto 2012, n. 133 Modifiche alla legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 124, concernente il Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e la disciplina del segreto [http://www.parlamento.it/application/xmanager/projects/parlamento/file/repository/commissioni/bi\\_camerale/COMITATO%20SICUREZZA/Legge\\_7\\_agosto\\_2012.pdf](http://www.parlamento.it/application/xmanager/projects/parlamento/file/repository/commissioni/bi_camerale/COMITATO%20SICUREZZA/Legge_7_agosto_2012.pdf)

<sup>48</sup> DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 5 maggio 2010 Organizzazione nazionale per la gestione di crisi. [http://www.sarannoprefetti.it/SP/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=789:dpcm-5-maggio-2010-organizzazione-nazionale-per-la-gestione-di-crisi&catid=144:difesa-civile&Itemid=26](http://www.sarannoprefetti.it/SP/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=789:dpcm-5-maggio-2010-organizzazione-nazionale-per-la-gestione-di-crisi&catid=144:difesa-civile&Itemid=26)

Strategic Committee”, (CoPS), to “*give address and national strategic guidance into crisis situations*”. CoPS is led by the Prime Minister and includes the Ministers of MoFA, MoI, MoD and MEF (assisted in the meetings by relevant personnel), complemented by, among the others, the heads of public security, information and security services and the CDS, plus others as needed. The CoPS evaluates the situation, examines and defines the provisions to be submitted to the Council of Ministries for approval and, in case of need, authorizes on a temporary basis the undertaking of contrast measures. In circumstances of exceptional and urgent needs, the PM takes the measures deemed necessary, informing the other CoPS components. All CoPS decisions are forwarded to the President of the Republic (in Italy, he is the “*Supreme Commander*” of the Armed Forces and chairs the “*Supreme Defence Council*”, foreseen by Constitution’s Article 87).

The Decree then establishes the “*Nucleo Interministeriale Situazione e Pianificazione*”, “Interministerial Situation and Planning Group” (NISP), to support CoSP and the PM. NISP President is the Undersecretary of State to PM, who shall delegate these functions to PM’s Military Counsellor. NISP includes two representatives of MoFA, MOI and MoD, one of MEF and others from the information and security services and other state structures. The NISP gathers at least every two months and its components are constantly linked with IT means.

Its functions are, basically, to coordinate every structure’s actions for crisis prevention and response, gathering and handling relevant intelligence, promoting interministerial planning; coordinates national tasks within international CM agreements. During actual crisis situations, it monitors the situation, elaborates the “national stance” towards it and drafts proposals to the CoPS.

As the NCMO is based on a Decree instead than a Law, it has been argued as this may cause coordination difficulties with other structures already in place<sup>49</sup>, when not even an inter-institutional conflict leading to confusion<sup>50</sup>. What has

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<sup>49</sup> Difesa civile La riforma dell’organizzazione nazionale per la “gestione di crisi” DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 5 MAGGIO 2010, Matteo Gnes in *Giornale di diritto amministrativo* 1/2011  
[http://www.irpa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/gda2011\\_01\\_Gnes\\_GestioneCrisi.pdf](http://www.irpa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/gda2011_01_Gnes_GestioneCrisi.pdf)

<sup>50</sup> L’affermazione Del Comitato Interministeriale Per La Sicurezza Della Repubblica (Cisr)Quale

been confirmed, anyway, is the fundamental role of Intelligence Services in supporting the ministerial and Governmental decision making process<sup>51</sup>, as well in reaching positive outcomes in crisis management<sup>52</sup>, a role which is sought to be further developed also in regard to cybernetic security<sup>53</sup> (DPCM 24/01/2013), looking for synergies with civil society, and entrusting the NISP with responsibilities on the monitoring of “cybernetic crises”.

### 2.1.3. *The evolution of the National Multi-Dimensional Approach*

With reference to the external action, the MoFA and MoD partnership is a long-standing one, which released in 2012 the “*Approccio Nazionale Multi-Dimensionale alla gestione delle crisi*”, “*National Multi-Dimensional Approach to crisis management*”<sup>54</sup> (ANMD). The document elaborates the guidelines for the configuration of national CMO, on both a national or multinational scale, as a product of the whole “*Sistema Paese*”, “National System”. It was forwarded to the NISP in 2011. In addressing the Italian Senior Military Leadership<sup>55</sup>, the *pro-tempore* CDS General Biagio Abrate made explicit reference to the HS concept, stressing how the military component of a CMO is just a contribution to S&R efforts and, for other elements, coherence of efforts with the military will be a requisite for ultimate success. MoD established in 1997, for the purpose of

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Nuovo Protagonista Della Politica Di Sicurezza Nazionale Riccardo Bellandi, 2013, in [http://www.federalismi.it/ ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=23697&dpath=document&dfile=03122013161508.pdf&content=L'affermazione+del+Comitato+interministeriale+per+la+sicurezza+della+Repubblica+\(Cisr\)+quale+nuovo+protagonista+della+politica+di+sicurezza+nazionale+-+stato+-+dottrina+-+](http://www.federalismi.it/ ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=23697&dpath=document&dfile=03122013161508.pdf&content=L'affermazione+del+Comitato+interministeriale+per+la+sicurezza+della+Repubblica+(Cisr)+quale+nuovo+protagonista+della+politica+di+sicurezza+nazionale+-+stato+-+dottrina+-+)

<sup>51</sup> See note 45

<sup>52</sup> Informativa urgente del Governo sulla liberazione delle due volontarie italiane rapite in Siria nel luglio 2014 *Intervento del Ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale* <http://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0364&tipo=stenografico#sed0364.stenografico.tit00030.sub00010>

<sup>53</sup> Direttiva recante indirizzi per la protezione cibernetica e la sicurezza informatica nazionale <http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/dpcm-24-01-2013.pdf>

<sup>54</sup> *Approccio Nazionale Multi-Dimensionale alla gestione delle crisi (ANMD)* Ed. 2012 [http://www.difesa.it/SMD/\\_Staff/Reparti/III/CID/Dottrina/Pagine/Approccio\\_Nazionale\\_Multi\\_Dimensionale.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/SMD/_Staff/Reparti/III/CID/Dottrina/Pagine/Approccio_Nazionale_Multi_Dimensionale.aspx)

<sup>55</sup> Intervento del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa, Gen. Biagio Abrate, presso il Centro Simulazione e Validazione dell'Esercito (Ce.Si.Va.) Civitavecchia - 28 giugno 2012 in *Informazioni della Difesa* 4/2012 [http://www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/periodico/periodico\\_2012/Documents/R4\\_2012/R4\\_2012.pdf](http://www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/periodico/periodico_2012/Documents/R4_2012/R4_2012.pdf)

tracking the situations ongoing into operational theatres abroad and providing the needed Command and Control, the “*Sala Operativa del Comando Operativo Interforze*”, “Operations Room of the Joint Operations Headquarters” (JOC-COI). The organization of MoFA for what concerns the “traditional” diplomatic organization did not change consistently with the new Law, dealt with in 2.2, so it is sufficient to underline the role of the “*Unità di Crisi*”, “Crisis Unit” (MAECI-UDC) in handling crisis situations involving Italian nationals abroad.

With regard to that, it is interesting to point-out how the Italian Embassies are tasked to draft “*emergency*” and “*evacuation*” plans, to be enacted in cases of need, in order to safeguard nationals’ safety. About risk analysis, planning is fundamental and access to information is a prerequisite to this activity, conducted mainly in the local Diplomatic Representations, with the cooperation of the UDC. In emergency cases, the Head of Mission shall request to MAECI a “*Non-combatant Evacuation Operation*”, initiating after a Governmental authorisation, ordered by the CDS and placed under the Chief of Diplomatic Mission’s responsibility. The technical aspects are charged to the *Chief of Military Contingent*, supported by the COI-JOC, which shall request to employ a *Special Operations Forces Contingent*. A CASD Workgroup elaborated in 2013<sup>56</sup>, saw in the lack of proper information on nationals abroad and conditions on the ground as the main issues with regard to this kind of operations, criticising the “*all-Italian tendency to a private, independent and subsidiary management of the presence abroad*”. The Study deemed as necessary to “*incentive the information exchange among nationals abroad, NGO and Diplomatic Representations*”.

In the years 2013 and 2014, several Law Proposals<sup>57</sup> have been advanced in the Parliament, aiming to give to the Country a unique, general discipline with regard to international missions, still lacking, as the situations are handled on a six-

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<sup>56</sup> Predisposizioni strategiche per l’evacuazione e/o la protezione dell’incolumità dei connazionali non combattenti in caso di crisi” (Non-combatant Evacuation Operations – NEO [http://www.difesa.it/SMD\\_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/ricerche/Documents/Ricerche\\_2014/Ricerca\\_AH\\_S\\_08.pdf](http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/ricerche/Documents/Ricerche_2014/Ricerca_AH_S_08.pdf)

<sup>57</sup> Disposizioni in materia di missioni internazionali A.C. 45, A.C. 933, A.C. 952 e A.C. 1959 <http://documenti.camera.it/Leg17/Dossier/Pdf/DI0126.Pdf>

month basis, losing so in terms of interventions' coherence. The Draft Law, "*Disposizioni concernenti la partecipazione dell'Italia alle missioni internazionali*", "*Provisions regarding the Italian participation to international missions*", has been lately approved by the Chamber of the Deputies and forwarded to the Senate in May 2015 and, after evaluations by the Defence Commission, is currently before the Senate's Assembly (since September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2015)<sup>58</sup>. Among the proponents, Member of the Chamber Giulio Marcon (see chapter 4.1).

In general terms, the Draft aims to define the possible employment of Italian Military, Police, Civilian and Humanitarian assets, within the contours of General International Law, International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, mainstreaming relevant international provisions (like UNSC Res. 1325). Important to observe how the Draft Law approved by the Chamber of the Deputies explicitly includes the "*Corpi Civili di Pace*", CPC, as an Italian asset. The Draft foresees Italian interventions in CMO as authorised by the Parliament and the Government on a yearly base – or under particular circumstances –, weighing a MAECI proposal coordinated with MoD, reporting to the Parliament on the state of the mission. The report is integrated by the evaluation of relevant IO on the Italian contingent and the Government gives also account on the results of the Development Cooperation's activities. It then deals with financial and personnel provisions and, on Penal Law matter, establishes as standard to apply the Military Peacetime Code, unless different decisions are taken by the Government. It is pointed out the legitimacy of the use of weapons, force and other coercive means, when respectful of the Rules of Engagement and underlined the obligations deriving from the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the Draft foresees a "*Diplomatic and Cooperation Advisor*", attached to the National Military Contingent Commander, if deemed useful for specific cases. This shall be seen as an Italianisation of the "*Civil Affairs*" concept, like in UNIFIL.

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<sup>58</sup> Fascicolo Iter DDL S. 1917 Disposizioni concernenti la partecipazione dell'Italia alle missioni internazionali <http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/FascicoloSchedeDDL/ebook/45653.pdf>



## 2.2 Reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Due to several reasons<sup>59</sup>, not last a persistent political instability and a faulty attitude in gaining international credibility, Italy experienced strong difficulties in developing a strategic vision of the Country's international stance and action.

Law 125/2014<sup>60</sup> gives a new set to the “*Cooperazione internazionale per lo sviluppo*”, renovating the system previously ruled by a Law passed in 1987. The first, important point to underline, is the new name of the Italian MoFA, from “*Ministero degli Affari Esteri*”, MAE, to “*Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale*”, MAECI, as the Law acknowledges the Cooperation role as “*an important and qualifying part of Italian Foreign Politics*”, inspired by UN Charter and European Charter of HR, in compliance with the Art.11 of the Italian Constitution, “*repudiation of war*”. It also recognizes the centrality of the human being, in both its individual and communitarian dimensions, explicitly referring to HS concept, reaffirming the role of internationally agreed Humanitarian Principles and the support to local actors. It also envisions a role of the immigrants communities in promoting local development in the Countries of origin, (such as small businesses)<sup>61</sup> and in the definition of better migration policies. It states how cooperation funding can't be used, either directly or indirectly, to support military operations. The Reform “raises the level” about the role of International Cooperation within Italian Foreign Politics. The political responsibility of Development Cooperation is given to the Minister of MAECI, who delegates functions to a Deputy-Minister with respect to Development Cooperation matters. The Minister proposes, together

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<sup>59</sup> Scegliere per contare. Sintesi e raccomandazioni del Rapporto sulla politica estera italiana Edizione 2014 a cura dell'Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)\* 14/06 <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1406.pdf>

<sup>60</sup> LEGGE 125/2014, Disciplina generale sulla cooperazione internazionale per lo sviluppo. <http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgc/Documentazione/NormativaItaliana/legge%2011%20agosto%202014%20n.%20125%20-.pdf>

<sup>61</sup> Cooperazione italiana allo sviluppo, una nuova agenda per il futuro tutta da scrivere Repubblica <http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/cooperazione/2015/01/20/news/cantini-105337645/>

with the Minister of MEF to The Ministers' Council the "Triennial Cooperation Planning Document", for approval. Parliamentary Commissions for Foreign Affairs shall forward proposals about drafting the Planning Document and receive implementations reports. The Law institutes a "*Comitato Interministeriale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo*", "Interministerial Committee for Development Cooperation", CICS. This Committee has to ensure the coherence of cooperation activities with Governmental choices, the proper information of national policies with cooperation aims and it is composed of 11 Ministers and other subjects. The "*Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo*", "Directorate General for Development Cooperation" is entrusted with the elaboration of cooperation interventions' guidelines, in adherence to the lines of National Foreign Politics<sup>62</sup>. It shall handle the political dialogue with the Governments of partner Countries in defining development priorities<sup>63</sup>. In implementing Cooperation projects, the "*Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo*", "Italian Agency for Development Cooperation" (AICS) has been established and its Statute recently approved<sup>64</sup>, with a focus on sustainable development. More over, Law establishes the "*Consiglio Nazionale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo*", "National Council for Development Cooperation", CNCS. Its members are drawn out of a wide part of national society, including local institutions, ONG, CSO and Universities<sup>65</sup>.

### 2.2.1. MAECI's way ahead

Extremely remarkable efforts have been made by the MAECI in pursuing

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<sup>62</sup> Intervista a Giampaolo Cantini - L'Italia per la cooperazione allo sviluppo "Sindacalismo" - <http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/Documentazione/AltriDocumenti/Intervista%20Ministro%20Cantini%20-%20Definitivo.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> Eduardo Missoni for Action Aid – Cooperazione Italiana: gli ostacoli da superare - [https://www.actionaid.it/app/uploads/2015/06/CoopIta\\_Ostacoli\\_da\\_Superare.pdf](https://www.actionaid.it/app/uploads/2015/06/CoopIta_Ostacoli_da_Superare.pdf)

<sup>64</sup> DECRETO 22 luglio 2015, n. 113 Regolamento recante: «Statuto dell'Agenzia italiana per la cooperazione allo sviluppo». <http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2015/07/30/15G00128/sg>

<sup>65</sup> Consiglio Nazionale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo <http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/Documentazione/NormativaItaliana/DM%201002-714-BIS%20Consiglio%20nazionale%20cooperazione%20allo%20sviluppo.pdf>

transparency<sup>66</sup>, also in Cooperation, enhancing a project managing complying with European standards, previously not thoroughly taken into account<sup>67,68</sup>.

With these new provisions, the subjects of Italian Cooperation increased, involving a much wider portion on national society, aiming to strongly push towards economic development of partner Countries. It involves now the State Administration, universities and public entities, local institutions, CSO, non-profit and, the most remarkable novelty, profit subjects. The last ones should be “*adhering to the commonly agreed standards on social responsibility and environmental clauses, moreover respecting relevant Human Rights norms on international investment*”. The AICS promotes innovative partnership forms, involving small and medium enterprises, in sustaining the growth of private sector in partner Countries. The DGCS prompted a form of cooperation with the MoE (in Italy MIUR, “*Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca*”), aiming to spread knowledge about Development Cooperation within the national education system<sup>69</sup>, with a local focus, although still on a limited scale<sup>70</sup>.

The first cooperation’s triannual plan “*Un mondo in comune*”<sup>71</sup>, “*A World in common*”, approved by the Council of Ministers and endorsed by the CNCS in its first meeting in July 2015, underlines how every actor in the cooperation

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<sup>66</sup> PROGRAMMA TRIENNALE PER LA TRASPARENZA E L’INTEGRITA’ (2014 – 2016)  
[http://www.esteri.it/mae/approfondimenti/2014/programma\\_triennale\\_per\\_la\\_trasparenza\\_e\\_%27integrita\\_2014-2016.pdf](http://www.esteri.it/mae/approfondimenti/2014/programma_triennale_per_la_trasparenza_e_%27integrita_2014-2016.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> Eduardo Missoni for Action Aid - Indirizzo politico, governo, controllo e attuazione nella riorganizzazione della Cooperazione Italiana  
[http://www.eduardomissoni.net/CV/mieiscrittipe/150617%20-%20Riforma-Cooperazione\\_Italiana.pdf](http://www.eduardomissoni.net/CV/mieiscrittipe/150617%20-%20Riforma-Cooperazione_Italiana.pdf)

<sup>68</sup> Action Aid Transparency Index - <http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/index-2014/results/>

<sup>69</sup> Dichiarazione d’intenti tra MIUR e MAE – DGCS, 10/06/2014  
<http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/Documentazione/AltriDocumenti/DICHIARAZIONE%20D’INTENTI%20MIUR%20MAE%20FIRMATA%2010.06.2014.pdf>

<sup>70</sup> Settimana scolastica della cooperazione allo sviluppo, 13 – 19 Aprile 2015  
[http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/Documentazione/AltriDocumenti/Settimana%20coop\\_13-19%20aprile%202015\\_.pdf](http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/Documentazione/AltriDocumenti/Settimana%20coop_13-19%20aprile%202015_.pdf)

<sup>71</sup> “Un Mondo in comune”, La nuova cooperazione italiana, documento di programmazione  
<http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/portaledgcs/Portaledgcs/Documentazione/NormativaItaliana/UN%20MONDO%20IN%20COMUNE%201%20luglio.pdf>

system has to learn how to play a new role or to update his previous one, as the ability in being part of a team is the implicit “*cultural challenge*” of the whole plan. The Country has to “*overcome a guilty carelessness towards its international projection*”, informing its policies to the ones indicated by OSCE-DAC and EU and proceed in organizing the needed information exchange. In project planning, implementation and evaluation, it’s foreseen to follow the relevant international guidelines and to strengthen coordination with EU and its MS about bilateral and multilateral actions, underlining funding options for “*delegated cooperation*”. The plan underlines the need for interventions coherent with national agenda, actors’ coordination, systematic diffusion of information and control. It stresses how economic development of partner Countries has also demonstrated positive effects for private and profit firms. A fundamental aim of Italian Foreign Politics, together with the international community, is the eradication of extreme poverty and, therefore, the work to sustainable growth, as set by the “*2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*”, passed on September the 25<sup>th</sup>, 2015, by the UNGA.

In its Triannual Plan 2015-2017<sup>72</sup>, the MAECI clearly shows a HS inspired action in the Italian Foreign Politics. The “*First Strategic Area*” is “*Security and Rights*”, underlining how State’s security can’t be achieved if not within a HS strategy. The Plan also recalls the “*integration of European instruments within a renewed Atlantic Alliance*”. It emphasizes, about “*global governance*”, how the complexity of international panorama makes some issues “*elusive and hard to decode*” and experience demonstrated the “*inadequacy of solutions based on hard power alone, as well as those implying resorting to soft power only*”. It also stresses the need to operate within the International Legal framework, avoiding *unilaterality*, detrimental to the whole international community.

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<sup>72</sup> Piano Della Performance Del Ministero Degli Affari Esteri E Della Cooperazione Internazionale Programmazione Triennale 2015-2017  
[http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/normative/normativa\\_online/principalidisposizionimae/2014/20140617\\_piano\\_della\\_performance\\_mae\\_2015\\_2016.pdf](http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/normative/normativa_online/principalidisposizionimae/2014/20140617_piano_della_performance_mae_2015_2016.pdf)

### 2.3 The White Paper for International Security and Defence – “Our Defence”

The Italian Defence is constantly changing, as it happens in every Country, in order to execute its tasks but, unlike other Countries, *“Italy has not yet removed traditional weaknesses: insufficient awareness and attention toward the issue of international security, the inadequate elaboration of a thorough strategy in support of national interests, and the scarce attention given to the effectiveness of its means of intervention, starting with its Armed Forces”*<sup>73</sup>. After a debate engaging also Academia<sup>74</sup>, think tanks<sup>75</sup> and Civil Society<sup>76</sup>, in April 2015, the Minister of Defence Roberta Pinotti handed over to the Supreme Defence Council the *“Libro Bianco per la Sicurezza Internazionale e la Difesa – La nostra Difesa”* (WPD)<sup>77</sup>, indicating the Government’s stance on Defence. The wording clearly shows the Italian will to work through International Institutions of collective security, first of all with the UN (stated also in MAECI triannual plan). Some comments praised as a positive novelty the *“political direction”* of National Defence, while in the past *“Governments often limited to ratify and fund decisions taken by the “apparats” bureaucratic, military and industrial”*<sup>78</sup>, although other comments were less positive and criticism arose<sup>79</sup>, mainly about Defence industry<sup>80</sup>.

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<sup>73</sup> The Ministry of Defence White Paper for international security and defence GUIDELINES <http://www.difesa.it/EN/Documents/White%20Paper%20-%20Guidelines.pdf>

<sup>74</sup> La piccola rivoluzione possibile del Libro Bianco della Difesa 9 Aprile, 2014 Fabrizio Coticchia, Niccolò Moro <http://www.ispionline.it/it/publicazione/la-piccola-rivoluzione-possibile-del-libro-bianco-della-difesa-10193>, per Ispionline

<sup>75</sup> Convegno Nazionale sulla Sicurezza Internazionale e la Difesa Relazioni dei partecipanti <http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/Convegn%20CASD%202014%20libro%20bianco%20-%20Relaz%20partecipanti.pdf>

<sup>76</sup> “Roberta Pinotti apre ai cittadini” HP 2014 [http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/06/26/libro-bianco-della-difesa-governo-apre-ai-cittadini\\_n\\_5532331.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/06/26/libro-bianco-della-difesa-governo-apre-ai-cittadini_n_5532331.html)

<sup>77</sup> White Paper [http://www.difesa.it/Primo\\_Piano/Documents/2015/07\\_Luglio/White%20book.pdf](http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Documents/2015/07_Luglio/White%20book.pdf)

<sup>78</sup> LIBRO BIANCO DELLA DIFESA: UNA SVOLTA NECESSARIA di Gianandrea Gaiani 23 aprile 2015, pubblicato in Analisi Italia <http://www.analisdifesa.it/2015/04/libro-bianco-della-difesa-una-svolta-necessaria/>

<sup>79</sup> Centro Studi Difesa Civile, - Politica di Sicurezza e Difesa Comune - Libro Bianco della Difesa: un’occasione mancata <http://www.pacedifesa.org/canale.asp?id=528>

<sup>80</sup> Libro bianco della Difesa, la Pinotti lascia mano libera a generali e industriali, Toni De Marchi

### 2.3.1. *The Armed Force's evolution*

One of the very first utterances shows an evolution of Defence, “State Security” concept, within a HS paradigm, *“The Defence of the State, in fact, cannot and should not be limited exclusively to the indispensable action of the Armed Forces. It must be a unicum in which every segment of society, according to aptitude and ability, contributes to the creation of the broad and coordinated security framework that is a real guarantee of freedom for our nation”*.

It calls for the opportunity of a reasoning on the *“adequacy of the governing bodies and their related support structures, developed over the years to deal with situations of crisis or emergency.”* referring to the lack of needed normative provisions (see chapter 2.1) and it says how *“It is, appropriate to study new solutions in order to ensure the rightful position of the delicate decision making process relating to the exercise of military force”*. The strategic analysis and design of the WPD has so the purposes to: indicate which military component can best address the detected challenges; identify a sustainable Defence governance model; develop cultural and organizational elements to enable the Defence contribution to the Nation’s efforts in the wider, HS, security framework.

The WBD underlines the massive downsizing the Armed Forces underwent in the last years, under strong budget constraints and stresses on the necessity to *“strengthen the vital links”* among Armed Forces and other State’s Organisations and *“citizens in uniform”* as a part of the whole population, so that a diffused *“Defence culture”* shall lead to a better decision-making on Defence matters. It is important to highlight how: *“Addressing the problem of national security and Defence from a modern perspective requires a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary approach”*, so that *“the concept of “Defence” can evolve, become broader, including all the different perspectives and skills involved in it”*, integrating with *“the so-called “third sector”, in particular with regards to the*

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per “Il fatto quotidiano” <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/04/21/libro-bianco-della-difesa-la-pinotti-da-mano-libera-a-general-e-industriali/1611408/>

*role and functions of National Civil Service. In this effort, the underlying connecting element of the evolution is represented by the shared values which permeate the very existence of our nation*". Relations between citizens, institutions and Armed Forces should be based on "*constant communication and assiduous interaction*", "*transparency, public interest and constructive criticism the basis of the trusting relationship*", by sharing the same values framework. The WPD has so the "*intention of contributing to the effort made by the entire national community*". After a threats analysis, the document outlines objectives of international security, designing national Defence, being European integration, transatlantic cohesion and global relations (it "*recognizes the UN as the main and unavoidable reference for legitimacy, in particular with regards to issues of international security*")

### *2.3.2. Italian Defence priorities*

The priority for the Country is "*The achievement of a high degree of stability and democratic development in the Countries that affect the Mediterranean*". So, "*The Defence will contribute to the development of Government policies designed to ensure this objective by ensuring targeted military cooperation with all nations in the area*", "*in order to build a broader context of security and stability over time*", a reference to the advice and assist missions<sup>81</sup> (Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia). "*If specific circumstances make it necessary, the Defence must be prepared to take direct responsibility, in response to crisis situations and be prepared to intervene for peace and stability in accordance with the decisions of the international community*". "*In some cases, Italy may also have to take on the responsibility of leading these operations*". "*In accordance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it will also offers as a reference actor for*

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<sup>81</sup> XVII Legislatura IV Commissione Resoconto stenografico Seduta n. 2 di 5 agosto 2015 [http://www.camera.it/leg17/1058?idLegislatura=17&tipologia=audiz2&sottotipologia=audizione&anno=2015&mese=08&giorno=05&idCommissione=04&numero=0002&file=indice\\_stenografico](http://www.camera.it/leg17/1058?idLegislatura=17&tipologia=audiz2&sottotipologia=audizione&anno=2015&mese=08&giorno=05&idCommissione=04&numero=0002&file=indice_stenografico)

*initiatives to be undertaken and continuing those already in progress in central Europe and the Balkans”.*

The Defence is defined as one of the “*State's tools disposal*”, planned to acquire, develop and sustain the skills suited to “*understand the causes of modern conflict and the needs arising*”, prevent “*the emergence and consolidation of situations of risk or threats*” and “*intervene, to handle crisis situations*”. The Missions of the Defence are (also contributing to EU actions):

- 1-*Defence of the state* to safeguard national territory, so “*the vital interests of the Nations*”, “*the security of areas of national sovereignty and of Italian citizens abroad*” and “*the security of lines of access to the nation*”;
- 2-*Defence of the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Mediterranean area*, contributing to NATO's collective Defence and to maintain stability in these areas;
- 3- Contribute to the development of peace and international security, in the context of international crisis management, to prevent and manage crises outside priority intervention area, in accordance with the UN Charter;
- 4-Specific tasks and joint operations like in the event of natural disasters.

The WPD emphasizes the “*ability of the military component to pool resources and perform joint force and interGovernmental operations*” as well as “*In their contribution to humanitarian and rescue operations in the case of catastrophic events, the Armed Forces have demonstrated a versatile [...] intervention capability even in the critical early stages*”, which is going to be enhanced<sup>82</sup>, factoring also industrial, social, budget and environmental issues. It notices the need to improve the adaptation process of Defence into the integrated “national system”, as the lessons learned process was not as efficient as wanted.

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<sup>82</sup> 12 Nov 2014 Legge navale: audizione del Capo di Stato maggiore della Marina militare Commissione Difesa [http://webtv.senato.it/4191?video\\_evento=1268](http://webtv.senato.it/4191?video_evento=1268)



### 2.3.3. The future evolution

It is indicated the need to ensure “*the identification and understanding of all the actors involved in the area of operations, discriminating between enemies (in the Italian text “avversari”) and passive population, friendly military forces and civilian organizations*” and how “*Adopting a global intergovernmental approach to security and Defence issues, the Armed Forces will act to protect and safeguard populations, to develop and support the authorities and local forces and increase security and stability levels, working closely both with diplomatic personnel and other ministries personnel as well as from IO and NGOs.*” all supported by an adequate information flow, analysis capability and strategic assessment. Significantly, it is stated how “*it is still necessary to improve communication with the general public by sharing the aims, the scope and the actions of the armed forces, thus ensuring transparency and control.*” and “*more effort in order to speed up analytical and procedural changes, as well as changes in attitude and predisposition, at all levels and in all sectors*” are needed.

About personnel, “*The ability to interact in multicultural and complex environments, the ability to understand situations as well as a spirit of invention and adaptability to different environments, will be the main human characteristics in which to invest*”. The need of reducing redundant and inefficient structures within the organization is stressed, as well as the imperative to proceed on a more marked jointness of the forces, also at multinational level, giving more powers to the CDS, especially in managing operations abroad. Interest to notice how “*at the end of active service, general managers will not be able to work for companies in the Defence sector for a certain number of years in order to avoid any conflict of interest*”. Defence schools will give access “*to university students and other administrations’ employees, depending on interests and skills.*” And military personnel with proper qualifications shall be employed outside the Defence sector, when deemed to be useful for the community. More efforts will be taken in incorporating younger and more educated personnel, as well as an increased number of women (implementing UNGA res. 1325) and in strengthening

partnerships and ties between military personnel and communities.

The measures foreseen by the WPD are scheduled to undergo immediate implementation process, when not requiring legislative provisions, to submit to Parliamentary debate (on the issue, criticism arose<sup>83</sup>). Aside the, extremely important, “cultural shift” indicated by the WPD, it is important to remember how the national Armed Forces shall continue to be prepared for “traditional” conflicts, which are a risk “*perceived as less likely today, but cannot be neglected because it can affect vital national interests, including the very survival of the State, more than any other circumstance*”.

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<sup>83</sup> Libro Bianco della Difesa, a pensar male si fa peccato... UIL <http://www.uilpa.it/notizie/ultime-notizie/2739-libro-bianco-della-difesa-a-pensar-male-si-fa-peccato>

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CIVIL PEACE CORPS PROJECT

#### 3.1 CPC Concept Development in Italy

##### 3.1.1. Alexander Langer

The concept of a Civil Peace Corps is kicked off, in Italy and Europe, by an idea of Alexander Langer, born in 1946 in Sterzing/Vipiteno, a small city in the Italian, but with a German-speaking population majority, Province of Alto Adige/Südtirol. A territory with a complex history and a very tense situation when Langer was young, which deeply influenced his thoughts about the equality among human beings, the cohabitation of different groups and the coexistence of diverse cultures and languages. He studied sociology at Trento University and, not allowing Italy, at the time, the *conscientious objection*, served as conscript in a Mountain Artillery Regiment.

After experiences in the leftist parties, Langer became one of the founders of the Green Party and then a member of the European Parliament. At the beginning of the Yugoslavian crisis, he pushed his efforts in negotiation initiatives towards the parties involved in conflict<sup>84</sup>, which anyway abruptly in the dreadful consequences we know. He defined himself<sup>85</sup> as a “*pacifist in the intentions*”, as “*nonviolence was an essential component of the pacification process, not being dogmatic or passive: was the constant exploration of ways alternative to violence, the support to those who were victims of violence*”. He knew as a systematic use of coordinated violence against a civilian population, (by state or non-state actors like the semi-independent paramilitary militias in the Bosnian conflicts) couldn't

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<sup>84</sup> Verona Forum 17-20 september 1992, Verona-Final conclusions <http://www.alexanderlanger.org/en/0/3668>

<sup>85</sup> Alexander Langer e il progetto per la creazione di un Corpo Civile di Pace europeo: Daniele Marchi A.A. 2010/2011 <http://www.alexanderlanger.org/it/65/3740/print>

have an answer other than military means, upholding in this reasoning the role of the collective security system towards humanitarian and protection means.

The experience of a “peace caravan” through Yugoslavia in 1992 was quite positive, while another in 1993 proved to entail too many risks. In 1995 he advanced the first proposal for a European Civilian Peace Corps (ECPC), to be employed in conflict transformation, as the “Bourlanges/Martin-report” states: “*a first step towards a contribution to conflict prevention could be the establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps (including conscientious objectors) with training of monitors, mediators and specialists in conflict resolution*”. Communications of EU Commission<sup>86</sup> and Parliament<sup>87</sup> followed, as well as studies concerning organizations, methods<sup>88</sup> and also lessons identified review<sup>89</sup>.

### 3.1.2. Antonio Papisca

A milestone in the implementation process of the Italian CPC, is the conceptualization work of Professor Antonio Papisca, University of Padua, proposed to the undersecretary of MAE<sup>90</sup> in 2006 and explained in a Paper, meaningfully inspired by the “*primacy of Human Rights, nonviolence and politics for conflicts resolution*”<sup>91</sup>. Professor Papisca deals with the need of political authority retaining the full control of military operations, as per International Law,

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<sup>86</sup> COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION on Conflict Prevention 2011 [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis\\_management/docs/com2001\\_211\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis_management/docs/com2001_211_en.pdf)

<sup>87</sup>A5-0394/2001 European Parliament resolution on the Commission communication on Conflict Prevention, 2001 <http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/EU131201.pdf>

<sup>88</sup>Towards a European Civil Peace Service (ECPS) Schmidt, Rossi, 2009 <http://www.interventioncivile.org/IMG/pdf/14Oct-ECPS-DiscPaper.pdf>

<sup>89</sup>European civil peace corps and nonviolent conflict solution: potential, challenges, weaknesses, strengths, Barbiero 2010 <http://www.alon.it/public/European%20Civil%20Peace%20Corps.pdf>

<sup>90</sup> Corpi Civili di Pace: sì della Sentinelli, domani convegno a Pisa, da unimondo.org <http://www.unimondo.org/Notizie/Corpi-Civili-di-Pace-si-della-Sentinelli-domani-convegno-a-Pisa-48545> Corpi Civili di Pace: sì della Sentinelli, domani convegno a Pisa 2006

<sup>91</sup>Riflessione preliminare a un progetto di fattibilità per l’istituzione del Corpo Civile di Pace (Servizio civile di pace) in Italia. Il primato dei diritti umani, della nonviolenza e della politica per la prevenzione e la risoluzione dei conflitti - Antonio Papisca 2007 [http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU2\\_2007\\_A083.pdf](http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU2_2007_A083.pdf)

while empowering the civilian component within peace missions and, furthermore, recognizing interventions of NGO, volunteers and local actors. He also considers how there are two options in the employment of civilian personnel in peace missions, in military missions (of course, legitimate under International Law) and outside. In the second case, he suggests how these interventions should be placed under the supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs' authority, seeing the military not as a State's "power", but as a tool, to be used with the aim of achieving legitimate objectives. The Legal framework for CPC establishment is given by Articles 10 and 11 of the Italian Constitution<sup>92</sup>, being "*recognition of International Law*" and "*rejection of war*" giving a concrete contribution to the formal status of "*peace loving State*", as per Art.4 of the UN Charter.

He then draws on Art. 52 Cost. "*Defence of the Fatherland is a Sacred Duty*" and Art. 1 Law 64/2001<sup>93</sup> on the National Civil Service as "*Defence of the Fatherland with non-military means and activities*", with the active participation in the promotion of HR of SCO, as per art. 2 Cost, "*inviolable rights of the person, as an individual and in the social groups within which human personality is developed*". This goes in shifting the "State Security" paradigm of "*si vis pacem para bellum*" to a HS paradigm of "*si vis pacem para pacem*", to which State Security has to be a functional instrument, to "*fully realize*" the rights of every person, as per Art. 28 UDHR. After recalling other principles of International Law (already mentioned in chapter 1.1), Professor Papisca warns on the dangerous interpretations given to Art.51 of the UN Charter. These concerns are a matter of fact also today, given the recent bombings and "targeted" or "extra-judicial killings" carried in Syria by the United Kingdom<sup>94</sup> and France<sup>95</sup>, under Art.51.

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<sup>92</sup> THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC  
[http://www.quirinale.it/qnrw/statico/costituzione/pdf/costituzione\\_inglese.pdf](http://www.quirinale.it/qnrw/statico/costituzione/pdf/costituzione_inglese.pdf)

<sup>93</sup> "Istituzione del servizio civile nazionale" <http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/01064l.htm>

<sup>94</sup> La Grande-Bretagne a tué deux djihadistes britanniques en Syrie Le Monde.fr avec AFP et Reuters 08/09/2015 [http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/07/la-grande-bretagne-a-mene-une-attaque-aerienne-en-syrie-au-mois-d-aout\\_4748434\\_3214.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/07/la-grande-bretagne-a-mene-une-attaque-aerienne-en-syrie-au-mois-d-aout_4748434_3214.html)

<sup>95</sup> Hollande annonce des frappes en Syrie à la veille de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU Le Figaro

The document recalls the cost-benefit supremacy of prevention over intervention, advocating for the HS functions of civilian and military components, also face to International Justice and summarizes international and Italian experiences of peace building, tracing then the areas of intervention of CPC:

- “Crisis” areas, where conflicts of different kinds, instability, lack of democracy and violation of Human Rights, noticing potential linkages and overlaps between CPC and Development Cooperation;
- Conflict transformation, being the specific task of CPC, to prevent escalations through interposition, mediation, dialogue facilitation, information, communication and co-education;
- Post-conflict peacebuilding.

Significantly, is underlined the principle of the consent of local communities to the CPC interventions and how, unlike civilian members of international missions, the “peace worker” operates and lives *in* the territory, together with the local population and in particular with the vulnerable groups. In order to be welcomed by the local population, it is important for peace operators intervene autonomously from Governmental actions and “*multinazionali rapinatorie*”, “*predatory multinationals*”, in support to local partners. Links with Governments are not excluded, but have to be carefully evaluated.

In a deeper examination of the roles of civilian members of institutional missions and members of CPC, is advocated a shared vision of “civil society” among all, so to have a “peace mission’s civic defender”, to overview the conduct of mission’s personnel, both military and civilian. The conclusion considers the opportunity of a “special passport” for peace operators, the need for a gender balance, the opportunity for the CPC to be the Italian contribution to the European Civil Peace Corps, and the need of creating a permanent system, able to manage and handle the CPC training, employment and doctrine.

### 3.2 International experiences

Here a brief description of the main experiences and programs, at the international level, about peace and Human Rights.

*“The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme is the UN entity that contributes to peace and development through volunteerism worldwide. UNV mobilizes action-oriented volunteers to make an impact in the peace and development programmes of the United Nations, and is a global advocate for the recognition of volunteerism”*<sup>96</sup>. They are employed in UNDP development projects. The program is organized on *International, National and Youth Volunteers*, the first and second components with high or medium technical qualifications and experiences in the fields needed by development projects and deployed up to 24 months. The third component, aged 18-29, is made up of volunteers recruited among Universities and deployed on a 6-months basis.

The *“Cascos Blancos”, White Helmets*, are based on an Argentinian initiative of 1993, when President Menem decided to give an Argentinian contribution to Humanitarian Aid and development, as a “pre-identified, standby and trained national volunteer corps”, nowadays including tasks involving rehabilitation and reconstruction and risk management and resilience, also in Argentina. They are recognized by UN<sup>97</sup>, for “humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and technical cooperation for development (document A/67/L.32)”. The “White Helmets Commission”<sup>98</sup> is part of the Argentinian MoFA, answering to UN and OAS calls for contribution with a focus on developing local partners. Volunteer’s training is provided by the Ministry of Defence in a specific structure<sup>99</sup>.

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<sup>96</sup> Who is UNV? UN Volunteers, inspiration in action, official site [http://www.unv.org/fileadmin/docdb/pdf/2015/Corporate/Position\\_vol\\_post2015.pdf](http://www.unv.org/fileadmin/docdb/pdf/2015/Corporate/Position_vol_post2015.pdf)

<sup>97</sup> 2012 GA/11327 Recognizing Evolving Nature of Humanitarian Crises, General Assembly Encourages Dialogue among Member States, UN Agencies to Bolster Emergency Response System - General Assembly - <http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11327.doc.htm>

<sup>98</sup> The White Helmets Commission, the body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.cascosblancos.gov.ar/en>

<sup>99</sup> Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz

### 3.2.1. European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps

Article 214 TEU foresees a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps, mentioned in chapter 1.3 and established by EU Reg 375/2014<sup>100</sup>. Volunteering is defined as “*a concrete and visible expression of solidarity allowing individuals to dedicate their knowledge, skills and time to the service of fellow human beings, without pecuniary motivation*”. Interventions should be aimed to “*immediate, effective, efficient and coherent response and to support third Country local communities*”, focussing so on DRR, resilience development and Development Cooperation, with reference to Humanitarian Principles. Significant care is given to personnel training “*providing European standards and procedures [...] commonly agreed benchmarks for training and preparation [...], a database of potential volunteers*”, which is going to be evaluated prior of intervention. Also personnel security is deemed “*of paramount importance and be subject to regular exchange of information, including with Member States. EU Aid Volunteers should not be deployed to operations conducted in the theatre of international and non-international armed conflicts*”. Great consideration is given to implementing organisations: “*ensure ownership by the actors in the field and to maximise the potential uptake of the actions under that initiative*”. It recalled the Commission’s Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility, as “*private companies can play an important role and contribute to the Union's humanitarian operations, in particular through employee volunteering*”. The Regulation calls (Art.6) for “*Coherence and complementarities of Union Action*”, in external action, in particular with Humanitarian Aid, Development Cooperation and civil protection “*avoiding duplication and overlap*” and field coordination with UN OCHA. The organisation of EU Aid Volunteers is ongoing<sup>101</sup> and, stemming from Art.217 TEU, seems to defer to unforeseen developments the establishment of an ECPC.

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<http://www.caecopaz.mil.ar/web2014/>

<sup>100</sup> See note 34

<sup>101</sup> Calls for proposal: EU Aid Volunteers [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/node/3761\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/node/3761_en)



### 3.2.2. United States of America's Peace Corps

US Peace Corps have been created in 1961 and their scopes are “technical” aid to Countries requesting it, contributing to promote understanding of Americans by other peoples and vice-versa. The deployment is scheduled to be 24-months long. Being a 50-years old program, there have been calls for reformation, as the political aims which prompted its institution are completely gone, so that an adaptation to the 21<sup>st</sup> century is being advocated<sup>102</sup>, in 2003 and 2008. Moreover, some scandals and problems through the years casted shadows on how programs are handled<sup>103</sup>. The reform shall lie on nine principles being: don not harm, demand-driven, “All-American engagement” (to reduce deployment, enabling older people to participate), flexible, technologically savvy, partnership with other organisations, engagement with “rising powers” and urban communities (instead of rural) and massive budget increase, that would be anyway way long cheaper than military expenses. Among the possible options, it was considered: *“Moving the Peace Corps into the private sector where it would be less vulnerable to political pressures and have the greatest possible flexibility.”* The one which gained more support was anyway *“Putting the Peace Corps at the center of a new Corporation for International Study and Service”*. Also, a considered option was *“Promoting volunteer service by foreigners in American communities would be a critical part of the Corporation’s mandate to build bridges with the rest of the world and move beyond the paternalistic one-way pattern of the past”*.

### 3.2.3. German Civil Peace Service

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<sup>102</sup>September 2008 Ten Times the Peace Corps: A Smart Investment in Soft Power By: Kevin Quigley and Lex Rieffel for The Brookings Institution <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/09/peace-corps-rieffel>

<sup>103</sup> World Share Peace Corps Volunteers in Their Own Words - New York Times [http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/25/world/peace-corps-stories.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/25/world/peace-corps-stories.html?_r=0)

The “Ziviler Friedensdienst”<sup>104</sup>, German Civil Peace Service (CPS) is, with regard to *Conflict transformation* (so to influence conflict dynamics by working “on conflict”), probably the closest to the Italian Concept, in a vision of *Positive Peace* and adopting an *Action Research* approach<sup>105</sup>. The CPS is a Consortium of GO and NGO, financed by German Ministry for Cooperation<sup>106</sup>. It dialogues with local organisations in creating, “*strengthen information and communication structures that trace the causes and consequences of violent conflict (including monitoring the development of conflicts)*”, provides assistance to marginalized groups, and promotes HR and peace education. The strategic rationale of CPS, is<sup>107</sup>: “*CPS projects alone cannot prevent or end armed conflict. It is only in combination with coherent contributions made by other policy fields, [...] at the national and international levels and in close cooperation with other players in the conflict regions in question that the prevention of violence can become a reality. The advantage of CPS as an instrument is that civil society players are able to complement Governmental initiatives but can work independently of the Government at a variety of social level.*” In CPS interventions, “*there is a close link between Development Cooperation and civil conflict management. Development inevitably means changing the status quo and thus, changing the constellation of political and economic interests*” so that conflict management and transformation has to take into account economic development activities. A great importance is dedicated to Networking, among CPS organizations, local partners, other development organizations and with the German mission, in meetings

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<sup>104</sup> Civil Peace Service <http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/en>

<sup>105</sup> Action research: a necessity in Peace Work Edited by Christiane Kayser and Flaubert Djateng Civil Peace Service (CPS) / BfdW <http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/sites/ziviler-friedensdienst.org/files/anhang/publikation/zfd-action-research-necessity-peace-work-2552.pdf>

<sup>106</sup> Daring to Build Peace – Zfd - <http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/sites/ziviler-friedensdienst.org/files/anhang/publikation/zfd-mehr-frieden-wagen.1009.pdf>

<sup>107</sup> Standards for the Civil Peace Service Common Basis for the Development of Projects as Defined by the Civil Peace Service Group, 2005 <http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/sites/ziviler-friedensdienst.org/files/anhang/publikation/zfd-standards-fuer-den-zivilen-friedensdienst-1003.pdf>

dealing not only with security situation, but also jointly monitoring the conflict situation (developments with regard to the potential for peace and conflict), as an important step towards more coherent responses from local and international players.” About personnel “*CPS experts must not only possess commitment, but also professional and life experience*”, highly skilled in respective fields, varying due to the assignment. They are recruited through a wide network of CSO and NGO, in all of Germany. In training professional into conflict transformation techniques, The Academy for Conflict Transformation <sup>108</sup> has been created. An important structure in Germany for training personnel to be employed also under UN, EU and OSCE umbrella, is the, Center for International Peace Operations, ZIF<sup>109</sup>. This centre is the lead of “Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management”<sup>110</sup> (ENTRi), aiming to prepare personnel to CMO and thus to improve HS. It has been created in 2008 “to support the comprehensive approach of international peace support operations at the national level”, so that its platform is supported by the Armed Forces, Police, Development Cooperation, MOI, MEF and MOJ. “*The close cooperation among the training institutions and the joint preparation of experts for deployment strengthens the mutual understanding of the roles of civilian, police and military personnel in a mission*”. Important to highlight the role of European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)<sup>111</sup>, independent civil society platform of European NGOs and think tanks committed to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It aims to influence EU and MS<sup>112</sup> on HS, foreign policy and peace building issues.

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<sup>108</sup>The Academy for Conflict Transformation <http://www.forumzfd-akademie.de/en?SESS6ee7fee5dfccf06cf0837b9d3ec759fd=d3c009ad5d77e4335b4ae4aac532d4c>

<sup>109</sup>Center for International Peace Operations, <http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/en>

<sup>110</sup>Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) <http://www.entriforccm.eu/>

<sup>111</sup>EPLO Web site <http://www.eplo.org/about-us.html>

<sup>112</sup> Roundtable The role of Italy in EU peacebuilding and conflict, EPLO – CSDP Rome 2014 prevention [http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Member%20State%20Work/Italy/MS Meeting\\_Italy\\_Report.pdf](http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Member%20State%20Work/Italy/MS Meeting_Italy_Report.pdf)

### 3.3 Evolution of CPC concept within the Italian National Civilian Service

#### 3.3.1. Evolution of the National Civilian Service

After the CSO experiences during the Bosnian conflict, which saw an extensive involvement on GO, IGO and NGO in development projects, as well as UN and NATO peacekeeping deployments, Italian CSO engaged in nonviolent initiatives in Palestine and Congo, many served into the “Peace Brigades International”<sup>113</sup> and “Nonviolent Peaceforce”<sup>114</sup>, in “*attempts to realize the Ganhian Shanti Sena/Peace Army concept*”.

Under the institutional profile, the Italian situation saw a long development process, driving the recognition of Civilian Service as, among other features, “*concurring to the Defence of the Fatherland with non-military means and activities*”, promoting the realization of the constitutional principles of social solidarity and cooperation at national and international level, including social, people and peace services:

- Articles 11 and 52 of the Constitution, Art. 117 (“*The State has exclusive legislative powers in [...] foreign policy [...] Defence and armed forces; State Security*”)<sup>115</sup>;
- Law 772/1972<sup>116</sup>, allowing in Italy the *conscientious objection*, important also the Constitutional Court Rulings 53/1967 and 164/1985;
- Laws 230/1998<sup>117</sup> on the *Civilian Service* instead of Conscription;
- Law 331/2000<sup>118</sup> on the institution of the Professional Military Service;
- Law 64/2001<sup>119</sup> instituting the *Voluntary Civilian Service*;

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<sup>113</sup> Peace Brigades International site <http://peacebrigades.org/>

<sup>114</sup> Nonviolent Peaceforce site <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/>

<sup>115</sup> See note 88

<sup>116</sup> Legge n.772 del 15 dicembre 1972 Norme per il riconoscimento dell'obiezione di coscienza <http://www.caritasitaliana.it/caritasitaliana/allegati/524/Legge%20772-72.pdf>

<sup>117</sup> LEGGE 8 luglio 1998 n. 230 - Nuove norme in materia di obiezione di coscienza. [http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/norme/legge\\_230\\_1998.pdf](http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/norme/legge_230_1998.pdf)

<sup>118</sup> LEGGE 14 novembre 2000, n. 331 Norme per l'istituzione del servizio militare professionale <http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2000;331>

<sup>119</sup> See note 89

- D.Lgs. 77/2002<sup>120</sup>, *Civilian Service Abroad*.
- Law 226/2004<sup>121</sup> *stay condition of the Conscription system*;
- Constitutional Court Rulings 228/04, 229/04 and 431/05, about the organization of Civilian Service by regional administrations<sup>122</sup>.

Law 230/1998, Art. 8 c.2 l. “e” entrusted to the National Civilian Service Office (“*Ufficio Nazionale per il Servizio Civile*”, SCN Office, established within the Presidency of the Council of the Ministers, then developed into the “*Dipartimento della Gioventù e del Servizio Civile Nazionale*”<sup>123</sup>, a Department subordinated to the same Presidency) to “*research, together with the Civil Protection Department, forms of research and experimentation of forms of civil Defence, non armed and nonviolent*”<sup>124</sup>. In 1999, the Cemiss “*Centro Militare Studi Strategici*”, “*Military Strategic Studies Centre*”, commissioned a study on “*Civilian Defence and the White Helmets Project – Civilian not-armed peacekeepers*”<sup>125</sup>.

### 3.3.2. The DCNAN Committee

After several steps, in 2004 was instituted<sup>126</sup> the “*Consultative Committee for Civilian Defence Not Armed and Nonviolent*”, (“*Comitato di Consulenza per*

<sup>120</sup> Decreto Legislativo 5 aprile 2002, n. 77 "Disciplina del Servizio civile nazionale a norma dell'articolo 2 della legge 6 marzo 2001, n. 64" <http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/02077dl.htm>

<sup>121</sup> Legge 23 agosto 2004, n. 226 "Sospensione anticipata del servizio obbligatorio di leva e disciplina dei volontari di truppa in ferma prefissata, nonche' delega al Governo per il conseguente coordinamento con la normativa di settore" <http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/04226l.htm>

<sup>122</sup> Servizio civile Facoltà delle Regioni e Province autonome di istituire un proprio servizio civile [http://lexbrowser.provinz.bz.it/doc/de/3380/corte\\_costituzionale\\_sentenza\\_n\\_228\\_del\\_16\\_07\\_2004.aspx](http://lexbrowser.provinz.bz.it/doc/de/3380/corte_costituzionale_sentenza_n_228_del_16_07_2004.aspx) <http://www.issirfa.cnr.it/1915,1457.html>

<sup>123</sup> Dipartimento della Gioventù e del Servizio Civile Nazionale <http://www.gioventuserviziocivilenazionale.gov.it/>

<sup>124</sup> “Predispone, d'intesa con il Dipartimento della protezione civile, forme di ricerca e di sperimentazione di difesa civile non armata e nonviolenta” <http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/98230l.htm>

<sup>125</sup> La Difesa Civile ed il Progetto Caschi Bianchi. Peacekeepers civili disarmati. [http://www.pacedifesa.org/documenti/Indice\\_e\\_conclusioni-RicCeMiSS.pdf](http://www.pacedifesa.org/documenti/Indice_e_conclusioni-RicCeMiSS.pdf)

<sup>126</sup> DPCM <http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/223587/dpcm18-02-04-su-comitato-dpn.pdf>

*la Difesa Civile Non Armata e Nonviolenta*”, DCNAN Committee)<sup>127</sup>, with members from several State Institutions, Ministries and Academic experts. The Committee (President since February 2005, Professor Pierluigi Consorti<sup>128</sup>, Pisa University, who took the place of Professor Antonino Drago, teaching in the same University) was tasked to elaborate analysis, draft reports, promote initiatives aimed to enable the SCN Office to experiment forms of DCNAN. It seems important to underline the Committee’s contributions to the SCN with the following works:

- Study on peacekeeping and peace research civilian education activities<sup>129</sup>, last update in July 2008;
- Criteria of projects’ evaluation of Civilian Service abroad<sup>130</sup>, 2005;
- Guidelines for the training of Civilian Service Volunteers<sup>131</sup>, 2006, updated in 2008 and confirmed in 2013<sup>132</sup>;
- Seminary on the evolution of the concept of Fatherland’s Defence<sup>133</sup>, in May 2005, leading to the release, during a press conference in 2006, of a document, “The DCNAN”<sup>134</sup>; Important to notice how, despite the speech of General Biagio Abrate “*I can say today, despite my training,*

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<sup>127</sup> Comitato DCNAN, dal sito del Dipartimento della Gioventù e e del SCN <http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/menusx/servizio-civile-nazionale/uscn/comitato-dcnan/>

<sup>128</sup> Comunicazione, [http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/161895/ed2fcbda-5a48-454d-b882-7a324545985d\\_comunicato-25-febbraio-2005.pdf](http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/161895/ed2fcbda-5a48-454d-b882-7a324545985d_comunicato-25-febbraio-2005.pdf)

<sup>129</sup> Le attività formative civili relative a peacekeeping e peace research, Valdambri per UNSC – C DCNAN <http://www.reteccp.org/biblioteca/dossier/leggiread/formative.pdf>

<sup>130</sup> Criteri e requisiti per la valutazione di progetti sperimentali di servizio civile all’estero nell’ambito della DCNAN, 2005 [http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/561212/CRITERI-E-REQUISITI-VAL\\_PROG.pdf](http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/561212/CRITERI-E-REQUISITI-VAL_PROG.pdf)

<sup>131</sup> Linee guida per la formazione generale dei giovani in servizio civile nazionale <http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/223737/determina-direttoriale-4-aprile-2006-unsclinee-guida-per-la-formazione-generale-dei-giovani-in-servizio-civile-nazionale-1-.pdf>

<sup>132</sup> Decreto 160/2013, Dipartimento della Gioventù e del Servizio Civile Nazionale, PCM - [http://www.regione.basilicata.it/giunta/files/docs/DOCUMENT\\_FILE\\_2968652.pdf](http://www.regione.basilicata.it/giunta/files/docs/DOCUMENT_FILE_2968652.pdf)

<sup>133</sup> Quale difesa? (Consorti, 2006) [http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/modulistica-unscl/modulistica-dcnan/documenti-per-lapprofondimento-comitato-dcnan/quale-difesa-\(consorti,-2006\)/](http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/modulistica-unscl/modulistica-dcnan/documenti-per-lapprofondimento-comitato-dcnan/quale-difesa-(consorti,-2006)/)

<sup>134</sup> La Difesa civile non armata e nonviolenta (DCNAN), 2006 <http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/218009/dcnan-30-gen-06.pdf>

*how weapons are not always essential in some crisis scenarios, on the contrary, sometimes could be detrimental*”, Defence representatives formally expressed a “*dissenting opinion*” on some contents. General Abrate<sup>135</sup> was at the time head of the MoD Minister’s Cabinet and became CDS from January 2011 to January 2013, delivering the address to Military senior leadership about “Comprehensive Approach”, which is referred in Chapter 2.1<sup>136</sup>.

- In 2011, the Committee proposed, on a strict budget base<sup>137</sup>, a DCNAN pilot project, taken up by “*Associazione Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII*”<sup>138</sup>, and SCN Office launched a special selection call for 6 volunteers to be employed in Albania in the project “*White helmets beyond vengeance*”.

The Committee ceased its activities at the end of 2011, after the “spending review” cuts<sup>139</sup> and diverging considerations arose<sup>140</sup> on the issue, as well as replies<sup>141</sup> and comments<sup>142</sup>.

In 2011, a conference took place in Vicenza, dealing with “*prevention of armed conflicts and training of CPC*”<sup>143</sup>. The initiative prompted out from the movements opposing to US military presence in Naples and Vicenza<sup>144</sup>, abrupted

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<sup>135</sup> SMD [http://www.difesa.it/SMD\\_/CaSMD/CapiSMD/Pagine/GeneraleBiagioAbrate.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CaSMD/CapiSMD/Pagine/GeneraleBiagioAbrate.aspx)

<sup>136</sup> See note 54

<sup>137</sup> <http://www.esseciblog.it/esseciblog/2010/11/nuova-riunione-del-comitato-difesa-civile-nonviolenta.html>

<sup>138</sup> Progetto di servizio civile sperimentale sui temi della difesa civile non armata e nonviolenta – Caschi Bianchi oltre le vendette [http://www.odcpace.org/files/bandoDCNAN/sintesi\\_progetto.pdf](http://www.odcpace.org/files/bandoDCNAN/sintesi_progetto.pdf)

<sup>139</sup> Comunicato Comitato DCNAN [http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/161845/78f2c05e-62be-49c9-8c59-c659c6f1b0b0\\_comunicato\\_dcnan-7-novembre-2011.pdf](http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/161845/78f2c05e-62be-49c9-8c59-c659c6f1b0b0_comunicato_dcnan-7-novembre-2011.pdf)

<sup>140</sup> Leva Civile, Autunno senza consulte- Di Blasi 2012 <http://blog.vita.it/levacivile?s=dcnan>

<sup>141</sup> Comitato addio, Consorti replica a Di Blasi - Consorti 2012 <http://www.vita.it/it/article/2012/09/07/comitato-addio-consorti-replica-a-di-biasi/120897/>

<sup>142</sup> Antonino Drago: nessun rimpianto per questo Comitato – Drago 2012 <http://www.vita.it/it/article/2012/09/13/antonino-drago-nessun-rimpianto-per-questo-comitato/120953/>

<sup>143</sup> LA PREVENZIONE dei CONFLITTI ARMATI e la FORMAZIONE dei CORPI CIVILI DI PACE A cura di Matteo Soccio, Casa per la Pace <http://www.peacelink.it/pace/a/39541.html>

<sup>144</sup> NAPOLI CHIAMA VICENZA - Disarmare i territori, costruire la pace.

after the beginning of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The proposed initiative was the establishment of a “Center for the forecast and prevention of armed conflicts and CPC training”<sup>145</sup>.

In May 2013, a Law Proposal<sup>146</sup> was presented before the Chamber of the Deputies, proposing the establishment of a “*Istituto superiore di studi per la formazione, la ricerca e l'intervento per la costruzione di processi di pace, la trasformazione nonviolenta dei conflitti e la promozione dell'eguaglianza sociale*”, “*Superior School of Studies for training, research and intervention into peacebuilding processes, nonviolent conflict transformation and social equality promotion*”. The Institute should train *social facilitators* and *peace workers*, liaising with a number of associations and Institutions, including Defence.

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<http://www.casaperlapace.it/> Ganhiedizioni – Alex Zanotelli

<sup>145</sup> Un centro per la previsione e la prevenzione dei conflitti armati e per la formazione di CCP: L'Abate <http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/Abate%20%20-20Relazione%20Vicenza.pdf>

<sup>146</sup> Istituzione dell'Istituto superiore di studi per la formazione, la ricerca e l'intervento per la costruzione di processi di pace, la trasformazione nonviolenta dei conflitti e la promozione dell'eguaglianza sociale [http://www.camera.it/\\_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0009270.pdf](http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0009270.pdf)



## CHAPTER 4

### THE ITALIAN CPC INSTITUTIONALISATION PATH

#### 4.1 The Italian CPC Experiences

##### 4.1.1. “White Helmets against Vengeances”, CPC Experimental Project

The CPC pilot project in Albania, based on the principles of research-action, took place between October 2011 and October 2012, being particularly important due to the subsequent elaboration process<sup>147</sup>, conducted with the support of the “Human Rights Center” of Padua University<sup>148</sup>, headed by Professor Marco Mascia. Some of the outcomes emerged from the field work have been: the importance of *violence escalation prevention*; the needed nonviolence, the performance of a *participative conflict transformation* taking to *confidence building*, especially in women, youth and marginalized people; focus on the *operators formation*, also during the project. It has been noticed how, in conflict transformation actions, conducted in places where young people needs to be engaged, the relatively young age of the operators, or at least a number of them, is an asset of great importance in order to successfully deliver the interventions.

The CPC pilot project had, by a matter of fact, joined an already existing intervention, initiated within NGO/CSO initiatives named “*Interventi Civili di Pace*”, “*Civilian Peace Interventions*”, CPI. In that case, the initiative was “*Operazione Colomba*”, “*Operation Dove*”<sup>149</sup> which is currently ongoing and is

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<sup>147</sup> Il progetto sperimentale di Servizio Civile all'Estero “Caschi Bianchi: Oltre le Vendette” in Albania. Sperimentare e applicare la difesa civile non armata e nonviolenta <http://www.serviziocivileparma.it/web/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/CASCHI-BIANCHI-OLTRE-LE-VENDETTE.pdf>

<sup>148</sup> Caschi Bianchi oltre le vendette - Sperimentare il Servizio Civile e la difesa civile non armata e nonviolenta per conoscere e trasformare i conflitti – Cleup Padova AA.VV. (2013) <http://unipd-centrodirittumani.it/it/pubblicazioni/Caschi-Bianchi-oltre-le-vendette/1084>

<sup>149</sup> Operazione Colomba – Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII – Albania

continuously improving, under doctrinal, practical and methodological points of view, improving action's policies and organisation's efficiency, increasing so the intervention's impact<sup>150</sup>, hence showing a good organisational learning process.

In the meantime, as said, Italian CSO and NGO lived many experiences of non-institutional Civilian Peace Interventions, among them, the “*Comunità di Sant'Egidio*”, “*Rete Caschi Bianchi*”, “*Rete Corpi Civili di Pace*” and others<sup>151</sup>. In 2007, with the aim of coordinating efforts among MAE, SNC and SCO, the “*CPI Table*” was established, with an informal format and a wide agreed consent base, which provided for an advocacy action on related issues during 2013 elections<sup>152</sup> campaign. The same Operation Dove is staged also in Lebanon, Palestine, Colombia and other Countries.

#### 4.1.2. Identity and criteria of Civil Peace Interventions

In 2012 the “Table” produced a Document<sup>153</sup>, on the identity and criteria of Italian CPI (non-institutionalised CPC, but there is no commonly agreed distinction, by a matter of fact). Basic principles are: nonviolence, independence (from political influence), impartiality (towards parties in conflict), non-interference (towards local NGO), gender equity, respect for local culture, simple lifestyle (as closer as possible to local population's one) with an example-led promotion of resources and structures sharing. Among action fields, HR and

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<http://www.operazionecolomba.it/albania/albania-progetto.html>

<sup>150</sup> Caschi Bianchi in Europa 2015 - Caritas Italiana – Scheda progetto  
[http://www.caritasitaliana.it/materiali/temi/serviziocivile/progetti\\_bando\\_2015/PROG\\_Caschi%20Bianchi%20in%20Europa%202015\\_Caritas%20Italiana.pdf](http://www.caritasitaliana.it/materiali/temi/serviziocivile/progetti_bando_2015/PROG_Caschi%20Bianchi%20in%20Europa%202015_Caritas%20Italiana.pdf)

<sup>151</sup> Ricognizione delle esperienze più significative in materia di difesa civile non armata e Nonviolenta- Croce per SCN <http://www.reteccp.org/biblioteca/dossier/leggiread/ricognizione.pdf>

<sup>152</sup> Agenda della Pace e del Disarmo per la prossima legislatura – Tavolo ICP  
<http://www.interventicivilidipace.org/wp/agenda-del-disarmo-e-della-pace-per-la-prossima-legislatura/> Briefing paper per i candidati alle elezioni politiche 2013  
<http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/Briefing%20paper%20per%20i%20candidati%20alle%20elezioni%202013.pdf>

<sup>153</sup> Identità e Criteri degli Interventi Civili di Pace Italiani Tavolo Interventi Civili di Pace  
Roma: 10 giugno 2012 <http://www.interventicivilidipace.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Documento-Criteri-ICP-giugno2012.pdf>

electoral monitoring, mediation, confidence and reconciliation building, advocacy, nonviolent escort, peace education, empowerment, capacity and community building, DDR assistance and “*Do not harm approach*” consulting.

Planning process and code of conduct are entrusted to the organisations; security issues are coordinated with military or civilian agencies, keeping Italian authorities informed of their movements. Operators are volunteers, able to operate *in* conflict situations, conflict-prevention and post conflict reconciliation; *on* conflict situations, facilitating conflict transformation. Generally speaking, long-term remunerated operators are coupled by shorter-term volunteer operators. Adequate formation and training is given by the associations.

About institutional relations, CPI could be *under institutional mandate*, defining objectives and political direction, while delegating planning, organization and conduct to the associations; *under institutional aegis*, approving mission’s objectives and leaving then freedom of action to the associations; *publicly-funded only*. Connections shall be maintained with SCN Office, MAE DGCS, MOI or local authorities, depending on the interventions.

#### 4.1.3. Locally organised CPI

Also interesting the involvement of local administrations, most notably the Municipality of Naples, in the project “*Corpi Civili di Pace in Kosovo*”, in 2012<sup>154</sup>, with the objective of “*transferring the acquired experiences back home*”, due to the direct interest of promoting local administration into “*handling of discords among communities and contrast to widespread conflicts*”<sup>155156</sup>. The project had a follow-up, in the same area, the “*P.U.L.S.A.R. Project*”, purporting

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<sup>154</sup> Corpi civili di pace Ebook di Gianmarco Pisa edizione Multimage  
<https://www.bookrepublic.it/book/9788899050207-corpi-civili-di-pace/>

<sup>155</sup> Il Kosovo come paradigma di conflitto e di un lavoro sul campo di Gianmarco Pisa  
[http://scienzaepace.unipi.it/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=162%3Averso-i-corpi-civili-di-pace&catid=25%3Aforum&Itemid=19](http://scienzaepace.unipi.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=162%3Averso-i-corpi-civili-di-pace&catid=25%3Aforum&Itemid=19)

<sup>156</sup> Corpi Civili di Pace in Kosovo La Giunta Comunale, con delibera n° 1029 del 20/11/2011, ha aderito al progetto “Corpi Civili di Pace in Kosovo”  
<http://www.comune.napoli.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/16621>

the concept of “*cultural peace building*”<sup>157</sup>, entailing the development of narratives, able to raise awareness on the possibility of different and positive relationships among communities<sup>158</sup>.

The organisation of ICP and CPC actions, is, generally speaking, aimed to support local CSO or community-based organisations, in a sustainable HS paradigm. In the conflict transformation processes it is recognisable, at individual level, an epistemological approach proper of qualitative social research methods, like participant observation, translated into participatory action. At the organisational level, qualitative/quantitative mixed approaches show up.

The associations, depending on the actions that ICP are conducting, manage advocacy policies and engage public opinion and decision makers, aiming to gather a more widespread awareness on the issues dealt with and, therefore, generate a positive posture towards it. This, having the final goal of tensions de-escalation, thus positively transforming the conflict.

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<sup>157</sup>Il peace building culturale, Napoli 2015 <http://www.premiodellanonviolenza.it/2015/Pulsar.pdf>

<sup>158</sup> Peace-Building e Lavoro Culturale L’attivazione dei vettori culturali nei percorsi di trasformazione costruttiva dei conflitti Gianmarco Pisa, 2007 - <http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/CCP%20PeaceBuilding%20e%20Lavoro%20Culturale%20def.pdf>

## 4.2 The first Legislative step

### 4.2.1. The “Marcon Amendment”

Law 147/2013<sup>159</sup>, comma 253, making reference to Law 64/2001, provides funding to the experimental institution of a CCP contingent, aiming to form 500 youths for three years, 2014, 2015 and 2015, with a financial base of 3 millions Euros, to be deployed to perform non-Governmental peace actions in conflict areas, or areas suffering for environmental emergencies. Contingent’s organisation is settled as per Art.12 D.Lgs. 77/2002. Some positive comments appeared on press news<sup>160</sup>, although the promoter of the Amendment, Member of the Chamber of Deputies Giulio Marcon, received feedbacks on how CCP implementation should not be related to the SCN<sup>161</sup>, probably due to the consequent shortnesses in terms of “permanent” or, anyway, long-term operators. The Law Proposal (C.1981) was then submitted on January the 21<sup>st</sup>, 2014<sup>162</sup>. Until October 2015, the proposal has not been discussed.

In February 2014, a Law Proposal<sup>163</sup> was posted before the Chamber of the Deputies, about the institution of a Compulsory Civilian Service. In the same month, the President of the Italian Republic Giorgio Napolitano appointed the Mayor of Florence City, Matteo Renzi, as new PM, replacing PM Enrico Letta, despite some disagreements<sup>164</sup>. PM Renzi confirmed the delegation of powers on the Information and Security Services to the Undersecretary Marco Minniti<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> LEGGE 27 dicembre 2013, n. 147 Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio annuale e pluriennale dello Stato <http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/12/27/13G00191/sg>

<sup>160</sup> Renzi apre la crisi: “Nuovo governo Legislatura costituente fino al 2018” Repubblica.it <http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/diritti-umani/2013/12/23/news/disarmo-74336738/>

<sup>161</sup> Corpi civili di pace 18 dicembre 2013 <http://giuliomarcon.it/2013/12/corpi-civili-di-pace/>

<sup>162</sup> Istituzione dei Corpi civili di pace Presentata il 21 gennaio 2014 [http://www.camera.it/\\_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0019080.pdf](http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0019080.pdf)

<sup>163</sup> Istituzione del servizio civile obbligatorio per le giovani e i giovani e delega al Governo per la sua disciplina Presentata il 4 febbraio 2014 [http://www.camera.it/leg17/995?sezione=documenti&tipoDoc=lavori\\_testo\\_pdl&idLegislatura=17&codice=17PDL0018810](http://www.camera.it/leg17/995?sezione=documenti&tipoDoc=lavori_testo_pdl&idLegislatura=17&codice=17PDL0018810)

<sup>164</sup> <http://www.lastampa.it/2014/02/13/italia/politica/renziletta-duello-finale-in-direzione-oggi-il-pd-decide-la-sorta-del-governo-iLMk1xyBCmQCpsb6eu6mMN/pagina.html>

<sup>165</sup> Biografia di Domenico Minniti detto Marco

(Degree in Philosophy), who had had previous assignments within Defence, internal affairs, and interministerial coordination during the Kosovo crisis.

Always in February 2014, a National Convention, “*La miglior Difesa è la Pace*”<sup>166</sup>, “*The best Defence is Peace*”, took place in Rimini, outlining interesting developments on CPC, some of them are going to be dealt with in next chapters. In March 2014, the ICP Table submitted a contribution on the implementation of the “*Marcon Amendment*”, underlining the need of a proper monitoring and evaluation structure<sup>167</sup>.

#### 4.2.2. CPC National Convention, July 2014

A national convention on CPC took place at Padua University, the 8<sup>th</sup> of July, 2014, where several issues were discussed. Among them, the need to integrate the different actions through networking, to innovate the projects by working on the lessons identified and to motivate and give recognition to the operators, who are the projects’ strength. The Undersecretary of the MoL Luigi Bobba, with regard to the time needed to start the experimentation, stressed about the lack of communication among actors, even among *institutional* actors and the need of providing an adequate security frame to the operators, as well as giving a proper training when employed in conflict areas. He called for an increase in the numbers of SCN, both in personnel and funding.

The undersecretary highlighted the credibility that Italy gained in the international arena, thanks to the military personnel deployed abroad, and emphasized how CPC shall and should become an extremely valuable *soft power* asset. Therefore, the need to coordinate interventions with MAECI. During the meeting, the need of a *participative* approach instead of *imposing* was stressed.

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<http://www.governo.it/Governo/Biografie/sottosegretari/minniti.htm>

<sup>166</sup> Convegno “La miglior Difesa è la Pace”, Rimini, 13-14-15- Febbraio 2014  
<http://www.odcpace.org/new/index.php/atti-del-convegno>

<sup>167</sup> Contributo per l’UNSC sull’implementazione dell’emendamento sui Corpi Civili di Pace  
<http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/Documento%20sui%20CCP%20per%20UNSC%20%2817%20marzo%202014%29.pdf>

Also, light was shed on the possibility to detach CPC from SCN, as the latter deals with different issues, although areas of intervention could overlap. The opportunity of seeing the final publication of the WPD and the reform of the Development Cooperation, to clearly define CPC's frame, was also pointed out.

#### 4.2.3. Political and security developments

In early August, 2014 two Italian girls, Vanessa Marzullo and Greta Ramelli, were reported missing in Syria<sup>168</sup>, abducted by an unidentified armed group. The issue raised widespread concern among the public opinion, worried about them (as well as for other kidnapped nationals) and stunned by the presence of two Italian girls in a war-torn Country, on their personal initiative, while volunteering outside the recognized IO/NGO/CSO network<sup>169</sup>. After a heated debate around volunteers on press<sup>170</sup> and social networks<sup>171</sup>, clearly not always based on objective facts<sup>172</sup> they were brought back to Italy on the 16<sup>th</sup> of January 2015. Rumors spread about Italy paying a ransom to the Islamist group *Al-Nusra*, amounting to the sum of 12 millions Euros. The Minister of MAECI Paolo Gentiloni, reporting to the Parliament about the events, on the same day, wanted to “*thank especially the intelligence services, which worked with courage and professionalism, the UDC and all the authorities involved in a teamwork that produced an outstanding result*”<sup>173</sup> (see chapter 2.1). Among other considerations,

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<sup>168</sup> Siria, due italiane irreperibili e forse rapite: si tratta di due volontarie scomparse da Aleppo  
L'Huffington Post [http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/08/06/siria-italiane-rapite\\_n\\_5654853.html?utm\\_hp\\_ref=italy](http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/08/06/siria-italiane-rapite_n_5654853.html?utm_hp_ref=italy)

<sup>169</sup> Perché Greta Ramelli e Vanessa Marzullo erano in Siria Ragazze rapite in Siria, Giuseppe Esposito (vicepresidente Copasir): "Vanessa e Greta partite come i vecchi pellegrini senza copertura" [http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/08/12/ragazze-rapite-siria-copasir\\_n\\_5672363.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/08/12/ragazze-rapite-siria-copasir_n_5672363.html)

<sup>170</sup> Crolla l'alibi pacifista. Ecco tutte le prove delle amicizie jihadiste - Il Giornale <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/crolla-lalibi-pacifista-ecco-tutte-prove-delle-amicizie-1083856.html>

<sup>171</sup> Greta e Vanessa, disinformazione pura - Il fatto quotidiano <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/01/18/greta-e-vanessa-disinformazione-pura/1348782/>

<sup>172</sup> <http://www.internazionale.it/notizie/2015/01/16/perche-greta-ramelli-e-vanessa-marzullo-erano-in-siria>

<sup>173</sup> <http://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0364&tipo=stenografico#sed0364.stenografico.tit00>

the members of the Chamber expressed unease about the safety of national abroad in conflict areas and Member of the Chamber Paolo Alli stated how *“it’s not possible to prevent everything and it’s unfair to prevent generosity, but it should be sought to prevent imprudence”*. Minister Gentiloni rejected the rumors of ransom paying as *“allegiations”*.

In October 2014, the *“Centro Studi Difesa Civile”*, *“Centre of Civilian Defence Studies”*, held a seminary<sup>174</sup> on identity, synergies and advocacy strategies about CPC, considering the need to review some concepts, including to evaluate the impact of *“integrated/comprehensive approaches”* on CPC.

The 31<sup>st</sup> of January, 2015, Presidential elections chose Constitutional Court Judge Sergio Mattarella<sup>175</sup>, former University Professor, Member of Parliament and Minister of the Education, as the Twelfth President of the Italian Republic. Among his career’s assignments, the roles of Delegated Authority to the Secret Services and Minister of Defence, while the Kosovo situation escalated to war.

In a press Conference chaired by the Minister of Labour Giuliano Poletti, the 2<sup>nd</sup> of February, 2015, the Government officially presented the CPC<sup>176</sup> to the public. The Undersecretary of MAECI<sup>177</sup> Mario Giro, considered how youth always strives towards a *meaning*, and *“the Italian State never abandons his citizens abroad, even less when they are in danger, no matter what pushed them to go”*. Moreover, he pointed out how CPC *“are not meant to operate into combat areas, as the interventions’ primary goal is to do it away with violence from the conflictual context”*. He concluded by saying how CPC proposal *“gives to the*

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030 Resoconto stenografico dell'Assemblea Seduta n. 364 di venerdì 16 gennaio 2015 - Camera

<sup>174</sup> Seminario Corpi civili di pace: identità, sinergie e strategie di advocacy <http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/Report%20Seminario%20CCP%20Roma%2024%20ottobre%202014.pdf> Centro Studi Difesa Civile 2014

<sup>175</sup> Mattarella eletto al Quirinale con 665 voti. "Pensiero a difficoltà e speranze dei cittadini" [http://www.repubblica.it/speciali/politica/elezioni-presidente-repubblica-edizione2015/2015/01/31/news/quirinale\\_quarta\\_votazione-106185169/](http://www.repubblica.it/speciali/politica/elezioni-presidente-repubblica-edizione2015/2015/01/31/news/quirinale_quarta_votazione-106185169/)

<sup>176</sup> Conferenza stampa di presentazione dei Corpi civili di pace <http://governo.it/GovernoInforma/Multimedia/dettaglio.asp?d=77803>

<sup>177</sup> [http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala\\_stampa/archivionotizie/interventi/2015/02/intervento-sottosegretario-giro.html](http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interventi/2015/02/intervento-sottosegretario-giro.html)



*youth the possibility to participate, support and get passionate with chunks of the world*". Minister Poletti declared how the idea is to build an infrastructure and a procedure, intended to enable the great potential of Italian social engagement to express itself to its best. This, in order to have private commitment coupled with the public one, being individual efforts more effective when included into a system.

April the 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2015, US President Barack Obama gave a speech announcing how, during a targeted killing operation carried by a US UAV against Al-Qaeda's personnel, died Giovanni Lo Porto<sup>178</sup>, Italian Humanitarian Operator, as like as another US prisoner. He pointed out how US officials didn't know about the presence of the two men held captive in the strike area before the attack, aimed to eliminate two US citizens holding leadership positions within Al-Qaeda.

US President Obama expressed his and America's sorrow, while claiming full responsibility for the event, as President and Commander-in-Chief.

Italian President Mattarella praised Lo Porto's engagement as a builder of peace and solidarity. He also expressed fondness towards the Development Cooperation's operators, more exposed to risks due to the worsening of crisis situations. PM Matteo Renzi stated how loss of the hostage's lives were a terrorist's responsibility.

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<sup>178</sup> Giovanni Lo Porto ucciso in un raid Usa. Rapito da Al Qaeda nel 2012, Obama: "Colpa nostra" [http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2015/04/23/news/afghanistan\\_ostaggio\\_italiano\\_ucciso-112656036/](http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2015/04/23/news/afghanistan_ostaggio_italiano_ucciso-112656036/)

### 4.3 The current context

#### 4.3.1. The Ministerial Decree, May 2015

Ministerial Decree 07/05/2015<sup>179</sup> of the “*Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali*”, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, in coordination with the MAECI, taking into account relevant National and International Laws and Regulations, disciplines the organisation of CPC’s experimental contingent, authorized by Law 147/2013.

The Decree defines CPC experimentation as realized by mean of projects submitted by associations, already implementing SCN actions since three years at least and, departing from the second year, could include the secondment of operators to International Organisations.

CPC activities are performed in conflict areas, or areas vulnerable to conflicts. CPC intervention fields are:

- a) Processes of democratization, mediation and reconciliation;
- b) Support to local civil society’s technical capabilities, also by activating linkages among people, organisations and institutions, aiming to conflict solving;
- c) HR and IHL monitoring;
- d) Humanitarian activities, including refugees and migrants support, social reintegration of ex-combatants, facilitation of dialogue among refugees, migrants and host communities;
- e) Peace education;
- f) Support to civilian populations facing environmental emergencies, including prevention and management of conflicts that these emergencies could trigger;

CPC activities shall be performed in Italy and abroad, after issuing the

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<sup>179</sup> DECRETO 7 maggio 2015 Organizzazione del contingente dei Corpi civili di pace, ai sensi dell'articolo 1, comma 253, della legge 27 dicembre 2013, n.147. <http://www.serviziocivile.gov.it/media/586332/decreto07052015corpivicilepace.pdf>

guidelines of a special call for projects, detailing the areas of intervention and the required personnel. The volunteers will be aged 18-28 and can't be members of military or police forces.

The volunteers will undergo a training of at least 100 hours, followed by a coaching of at least 70 hours in the intervention area. The organising associations shall partner with relevant Universities, research centres or other Italian or International Organisations, on the basis of relevant expertise the projects may require. A "train the trainers" course shall be organised on the second experimentation year.

Employment abroad is subordinated to MAECI evaluations and the volunteers must undergo security awareness activities, as well as to take part to security briefings in the intervention areas. The association's organisers will have to provide liaison between them, the MAECI and the volunteers, while retaining responsibility on them. Moreover, in case of violations of security obligations by a volunteer, actions shall be taken, including her or his repatriation. Misconducts or negligence on security matters could entail charging the related costs, incurred by the administration, for rescue and relief actions on the volunteer or the association. The Decree establishes a "Monitoring and evaluation Committee", chaired by the Head of Department, and composed also by one representative of MAECI, two SCN National Consult's members and four associations' representatives. The Committee is tasked with defining the project's monitoring and evaluation criteria and the adoption of a code of CPC's interventions ethics.

May the 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2015, a Law Proposal by popular initiative was presented before the Chamber of the Deputies (Proposal C. 3142)<sup>180</sup>, about the "*Istituzione e modalità di finanziamento del Dipartimento della Difesa Civile non armata e nonviolenta*", "Institution and funding of the non-armed and nonviolent Civil

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<sup>180</sup> PROPOSTA DI LEGGE D'INIZIATIVA POPOLARE: "Istituzione e modalità di finanziamento del Dipartimento della Difesa Civile non armata e nonviolenta" (3142) <http://www.camera.it/leg17/126?tab=1&leg=17&idDocumento=3142&sede=&tipo=>

Defence”. The proposal foresees the institution of the above mentioned Department, within the PCM, having responsibility over the CPC and a “*Peace and Disarmament Research Institute*”, to be defined by a following Law. The Department would have to liaise and cooperate with the Departments of SCN, “Fire Fighters, Public Relief and Civil Defence” and Civil Protection. Moreover, a “DCNAN National Council” shall be established. The Law Proposal has not been dealt with, up to the 9<sup>th</sup> of October, 2015.

#### 4.3.2. Further Political and security developments

July the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015, the Official Gazette published Constitutional Court ruling 119/2015<sup>181</sup>, declaring illegitimate to exclude non Italian citizens, regularly resident in Italy, from the Voluntary Civilian Service.

July the 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015<sup>182</sup>, a bomb blew the building hosting the Italian Embassy in Cairo, Egypt, while the building was empty, so it caused no Italian casualties.

July the 14<sup>th</sup>, 2015, an Amendment to Law Draft “N 1917”<sup>183</sup> was proposed by Senator Nicola Latorre. The Amendment was about entrusting to the PM the possibility to give to Defence assets – hence, military personnel and units – the functional guarantees proper of Information and Security Services members. This, in cases of “*crisis or emergencies concerning national security, or for the protection to citizens abroad*”, in close coordination with the COPASIR<sup>184</sup>. A heated debate took place among the Parliament and on the press,<sup>185</sup> as doubts<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>181</sup>Sentenza della Corte Costituzionale numero 119 del 2015  
<http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2015&numero=119>

<sup>182</sup>Egitto: Gentiloni, bomba consolato non diretta solo a Italia  
[https://www.agi.it/estero/notizie/egitto\\_gentiloni\\_bomba\\_consolato\\_non\\_diretta\\_solo\\_a\\_italia-201507131432-est-rt10084](https://www.agi.it/estero/notizie/egitto_gentiloni_bomba_consolato_non_diretta_solo_a_italia-201507131432-est-rt10084)

<sup>183</sup>MISURE DI INTELLIGENCE E PER LA GESTIONE DELLE CRISI Art. 18-bis.  
(Disposizione in materia di intelligence), Emendamento Latorre, page 63  
<http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/FascicoloSchedeDDL/ebook/45653.pdf>

<sup>184</sup> MISURE DI INTELLIGENCE E PER LA GESTIONE DELLE CRISI  
Art. 18-bis. <http://parlamento17.openpolis.it/emendamento/154005>

<sup>185</sup> “Militari come gli 007”, ma è scontro sulla legge per i poteri speciali  
[http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/07/23/news/\\_militari\\_come\\_gli\\_007\\_ma\\_e\\_scontro\\_sulla\\_1egge\\_per\\_i\\_poteri\\_speciali-119636806/?refresh\\_ce](http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/07/23/news/_militari_come_gli_007_ma_e_scontro_sulla_1egge_per_i_poteri_speciali-119636806/?refresh_ce) Repubblica.it

about amendment's constitutionality were raised<sup>187</sup>. After talkings, was ascertained how such measures shall be taken only in cases of exceptional urgency, by mean of a PM's Decree, to be reviewed by the COPASIR, which should anyway be preventively asked for advice. This, in order to ensure the proper constitutionality of the measures taken and the parliamentary, thus democratic, control over them. The amendment was lately approved<sup>188</sup>, although implementation process and clear command control and communication procedures will need to be established, in case the Law will be passed. The issue was widely debated by the Senate on September 15<sup>th</sup>.

In July and August 2015, the feeling about the need of increasing intelligence management efficiency<sup>189</sup>, boosted among Parliament and public opinion, also with regard to internal security. This, due to the arrest of two alleged "*lone wolves terrorists*"<sup>190</sup> and the unauthorized helicopter flight over the city of Rome, during the funeral Mr. Vittorio Casamonica<sup>191</sup>. Measures ensuring a better coordination of Law Enforcement Forces and Public Order and Security Agencies were announced. Furthermore, due to the "*Hacking Team*"<sup>192</sup> case, the issue of cyber security became known to the general public.

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<sup>186</sup> Il governo italiano vuole trasformare le forze speciali in 007 (che significa?)  
<http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/24/il-governo-italiano-vuole-trasformare-le-forze-speciali-007-che-significa/>

<sup>187</sup> Militari e intelligence, a chi piace (e a chi no) l'emendamento Latorre - Pierrì – formiche.net  
<http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/23/latorre-militari-servizi-segreti-emendamento/>

<sup>188</sup> Militari come 007, vi spiego perché è cosa buona e giusta. Parla Latorre (Pd)  
<http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/24/militari-intelligence-latorre-presidente-consiglio-renzi/>

<sup>189</sup> Salto di qualità dell'Intelligence contro il terrorismo liquido  
<http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/archivio-notizie/salto-di-qualita-dell-intelligence-contro-il-terrorismo-liquido.html>

<sup>190</sup> Vi spiego come i nostri 007 stanno fermando Isis. Parla Andrea Margelletti  
<http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/22/isis-brescia-arresti-terroristi-islam-intelligence/>

<sup>191</sup> Calende greche per rafforzare i radar anti terrorismo?  
<http://www.formiche.net/2015/08/27/radar-enac-riggio-prefetto-gabrielli-comitato-ordine-sicurezza-2/>

<sup>192</sup> Hacking Team: tra i clienti dei tecno-spioni di Milano anche servizi segreti, PolPost e Carabinieri  
[http://www.corriere.it/tecnologia/15\\_luglio\\_09/hacking-team-polizia-postale-carabinieri-finanza-libano-clienti-08ab5e08-264c-11e5-9a08-f80f881ecc8e.shtml](http://www.corriere.it/tecnologia/15_luglio_09/hacking-team-polizia-postale-carabinieri-finanza-libano-clienti-08ab5e08-264c-11e5-9a08-f80f881ecc8e.shtml)

The 9<sup>th</sup> of September, 2015, the MAECI hosted a Conference<sup>193</sup>, chaired by the Minister Gentiloni, on the topic “*Security is a serious thing*”. The aim was to disseminate<sup>194</sup> a document, prepared in cooperation and agreement with ONG networks, dealing with risk management abroad. The principle of association’s responsible person, maintaining reliable contact with the personnel, while liaising with the diplomatic presence in the Country, was reaffirmed. The conference underlined how, many times, in some Countries the ONG/CSO presence is the only Italian one, so that their operators can be extremely important in getting a better awareness and understanding of the situation. This would enable an informed decision making, especially in cases of particular need.

September the 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2015, a “discussion table”<sup>195</sup> took place, to make the point of the situation with regard to CPC experimentation. Member of the Chamber Giulio Marcon expressed concern about the possibility to keep up with scheduled, and participants asked the Government to make possible the deployment of the first volunteers’ contingent before the end of 2006.

He said how the Law Proposal, which has been agreed by 70 Parliament Members of different political parties, “*will be considered as soon as possible*” and remarked how the proposal foresees training for at least 400 hours. Moreover, it envisions the possibility to include into the projects Volunteers aged from 18 to 65. He stressed how this would be a considerable asset in engaging with almost all the age cohorts, a quite important feature when dealing with vulnerable groups.

Undersecretary of the MoL Luigi Bobba was confident with keeping the project on schedule, although he noticed many difficulties to overcome. The main

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<sup>193</sup> La sicurezza è una cosa seria CONVEGNO 09/09/2015  
<https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/452417/la-sicurezza-e-una-cosa-seria>

<sup>194</sup> Suggestimenti per la gestione dei rischi e la sicurezza degli operatori delle organizzazioni di Cooperazione e solidarietà internazionale  
<http://www.link2007.org/assets/files/documenti/Doc.SicurezzaCosaSeria-ONGUDC.DOSSIER9.9.15.pdf>

<sup>195</sup> Corpi civili di pace, “avviare al più presto la sperimentazione  
<http://www.difescivilenonviolenta.org/corpi-civili-di-pace-avviare-al-piu-presto-la-sperimentazione/>

one, being to define precisely the tasks to be given to the Volunteers, considering the difficult conditions of the places where they will operate. Particular concern was expressed about the security issues and the need to manouvre within the rules set by the SCN abroad. Another point dealt with, was the decision of not to extend the possibility to take part to CPCs to the foreign citizens living in Italy, due to possible issues arising around diplomatic guarantees, when in third Countries. The associations asked for a stronger cooperation with MAECI which, as reported, was interested about the experimentation's developments. Undersecretary Bobba then stressed the will to establish soon the Monitoring Committee and another time remarked the Volunteer's security issue.

The 28<sup>th</sup> of September, 2015, Cesare Tavella<sup>196</sup>, an Italian Cooperation expert working in Bangladesh, was murdered while jogging on the streets of Dhaka. DAESH claimed the actions, although no evidence was provided. Moreover, Bangladesh Government denied the existence of DAESH in the Country. On October the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5 days later, a Japanese citizen was killed<sup>197</sup> in a similar way and Bangladesh Authorities did not exclude connections with Tavella's case.

On October the 6<sup>th</sup>, 2015, the press agency ANSA declared to have received reliable information about the Italian Government's ransom payment to *Al-Nusra* group, on the issue of Ramelli and Marzullo's abduction. This, for an amount of about 11 millions Euros. The same day, the Government declared being evaluating the possibility of an Italian participation to the air bombing campaign against DAESH in Iraq. It was stressed how such an intervention would be an answer to the request advanced by the Iraqi Government and, nevertheless, it would not be approved after a Parliamentary debate.

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<sup>196</sup> Italiano Cesare Tavella ucciso in Bangladesh, Isis rivendica l'agguato Ministro Dacca: 'Non c'è prova su Isis' [http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2015/09/28/bangaldesh-site-isis-rivendica-uccisione-italiano\\_263ab3d7-d2f0-4ce8-8964-1077c7e5b71f.html](http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2015/09/28/bangaldesh-site-isis-rivendica-uccisione-italiano_263ab3d7-d2f0-4ce8-8964-1077c7e5b71f.html)

<sup>197</sup> Bangladesh, ucciso cittadino giapponese: Isis rivendica [http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15\\_ottobre\\_03/bangladesh-ucciso-cittadino-giapponese-isis-rivendica-acf5833e-69eb-11e5-b67f-8dc132718e33.shtml](http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_ottobre_03/bangladesh-ucciso-cittadino-giapponese-isis-rivendica-acf5833e-69eb-11e5-b67f-8dc132718e33.shtml)

Always on October the 6<sup>th</sup>, 2015, the President of the Italian Republic Sergio Mattarella during an interview by the Russian press agency TASS<sup>198</sup>, declared how<sup>199</sup>, in order to “*defeat the fundamentalist terrorism*” is “*needed a collaborative answer of all Countries within the International Community*”, because “*unilateral initiatives are unable to solve and adequately tackle the problem*”. Moreover, he also added how “*the fundamentalist terrorism is maybe the main frontier we will face in the next years. We need an answer entailing the use of force and a cultural answer too, to defeat the hate propaganda that, through the internet, is disseminated by the fundamentalist terrorism. I repeat, cooperation from everybody is needed. We need International collaboration with common strategies and actions. This is possible and essential because the danger is tremendous*”.

On the same day, the President reaffirmed the need of an effective international cooperation, able to stop the migration’s tragedies, while receiving the delegates to an interparliamentary forum dealing with “*The role of Parliaments in the globalisation era: fundamental rights, democratic participation and development*”<sup>200</sup>.

The day after, October the 7<sup>th</sup>, he received the US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter, together with the Minister of Defence, Roberta Pinotti<sup>201</sup>, who on the 6<sup>th</sup> referred to the Defence Parliamentary Commissions on the situation of Italian Defence<sup>202</sup>.

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<sup>198</sup> Estratto dell'intervista del Presidente Mattarella con l'agenzia di stampa russa ITAR-TASS <http://www.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.aspx?tipo=Notizia&key=13326>

<sup>199</sup> Pinotti: «Bombe italiane sull'Isis? Valuterà il Parlamento» L'intervista Mattarella: «Collaborazione di tutti» [http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15\\_ottobre\\_06/difesa-bombe-sull-isis-iraq-valutiamo-l-ipotesi-gli-alleati-5b42452c-6bfd-11e5-bbf5-2aef67553e86.shtml?cmpid=SF0201R03COR&refresh\\_ce=cp](http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_ottobre_06/difesa-bombe-sull-isis-iraq-valutiamo-l-ipotesi-gli-alleati-5b42452c-6bfd-11e5-bbf5-2aef67553e86.shtml?cmpid=SF0201R03COR&refresh_ce=cp)

<sup>200</sup> Mattarella: «Rilanciare l'esigenza di un'efficace cooperazione internazionale capace di porre fine al dramma delle migrazioni» <http://www.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.aspx?tipo=Notizia&key=13325>

<sup>201</sup> Il Presidente Mattarella ha ricevuto il Segretario alla Difesa degli Stati Uniti d'America, Ashton Carter <http://www.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.aspx?tipo=Notizia&key=13323>

<sup>202</sup> Missioni internazionali. Pinotti riferisce alle commissioni riunite [http://www.difesa.it/Il\\_Ministro/Audizioni/Pagine/Audizione-06\\_10\\_2015.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/Il_Ministro/Audizioni/Pagine/Audizione-06_10_2015.aspx)



## CHAPTER 5

### THE IMPLEMENTATION

#### 5.1 The use of force

In this section, the shift from *State Security* to *Human Security* is seen in the evolution of State's use of force and read through the lens of the Preamble to the UN Charter. It is deemed important to shed light on this evolution process, as a precondition for an *aware cooperation* of CPC as a tool for the *promotion of positive peace*, among the other State's and International instruments for stability.

##### 5.1.1 A conceptual path

The use of force is, maybe, the most debated issue within the HS discourse. The very first words of UN Charter's preamble are: "*We, the peoples of the United Nations, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind*", recognizing from the very beginning the tremendous grief given by *war*, mainly intended as interstate conflict, the kind of conflict which gave birth to the *Humanitarian Law*. This is quite self-evident given the circumstances, being the Charter written at the end of the most dreadful interstate war in the history of human kind. Thus the, climax, in its negative form, of the "Westphalian, State Security" paradigm. Other relevant provisions on the use of force, with reference to State Security, have been briefly discussed in the previous chapters. From this situation came the dichotomy of *war* or *peace* and State's right of *sovereignty*, which is today widely challenged.

Then the UN Charter goes on "*to reaffirm faith in fundamental Human Rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small*", dealing in this way with *individual rights*, planting the seeds from which *Human Rights Law* flourished, aiming to freedom from *fear* and from *want*. But words are empty shells, without actions.

So, the continuity in the conceptual path is given by the need to "*establish*

*conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international Law can be maintained*”, entrusting to the States the responsibility to take care of the people within their borders, ensuring their *Human Security*, by establishing a sustainable peace. The Preamble’s first part, concludes by bestowing Member States with the duty “*to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom*”, so to enact the *promotion of a positive peace*, a concept widely researched by Professor Antonio Papisca.

Is all of that easy to achieve? Of course not. As it is often the case, things run slowly and changes are not fast to come. As known, after UDHR, the first *binding* HR Conventions on Civil, Political, Economic and Social Rights, were signed in 1966, 21 years after the UN Charter. So, what relevant *sources of international Law*, could have been *maintained*? What about States complying with IHRL Conventions and others not doing it? What about the *gaps in rights implementation*? The development of IHRL anyway went on, and the force had to be used in PKO, CMO, or “*Military Operations Other Than War*”, taking Allied States, cooperating in the same theatres of operations, to experience troubles while coordinating and conducting joint operations. All democracies face similar pressure but, due to the differences in their histories and institutions, they use force differently. One of the main points to be defined is “*how the term ‘force’*” when referred to organisations, is generally “*reserved to statutory security forces and the term ‘violence’ to non-state actors. This is not to deny that security forces can misuse force, and that violence used by ‘deviants’ may be regarded as legitimate. A riot, for instance, may be seen as the only option for marginalised groups to voice their dissent against the established order*”. These considerations are drawn by an interesting analysis paper on the use of force, written by Cornelius Friesendorf<sup>203</sup> for DCAF in Geneva.

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<sup>203</sup> International Intervention and the Use of Force: Military and Police Roles Cornelius Friesendorf - 2012 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/International-Intervention-and-the-Use-of-Force-Military-and-Police-Roles>

### 5.1.2. *The use of force in CMOs, balancing IHL and IHRL provisions*

How can a Country enforce binding International Law, when partnering with another, not constrained by the same rules? Where lays the *threshold of violence*, between IHRL and IHL and vice-versa and what interpretations are to be applied? Here is an example, borrowed by Friesendorf. *“The German approach was different from the US approach. During one surveillance operation a shepherd accidentally spotted KSK soldiers, who consequently had to abort the operation; when the Germans returned to camp, the US commanding officer scolded them for not killing the shepherd. Also, during joint German-US operations the Germans would leave the arrest of suspects to their US comrades. Such reservations reflected different rules of engagement and definitions of military necessity”*. The paper’s findings are how *“US and Germany have had greater difficulties in calibrating levels of force to the problem at hand than the UK and Italy”*. This also because US Forces were almost permanently postured towards the use of maximum force, employing Army and Marines assets. Although *“The adoption of the COIN doctrine in 2009 put a premium on the discriminate and proportionate use of force. Yet, as US casualties soared, the US again showed a propensity for maximum force”*. This, with the consequent *“collateral damages”*. Due to its experiences in Northern Ireland, *“The UK stood ready to employ maximum force”*. *“But in comparison to the US, the UK was better prepared for efforts against suspect criminals.”* The paper recalls how UK intelligence and Special Forces assets were already highly cooperative and, when tasked on UK soil, the military assets are tried for *ex-post* evaluation.

According to Friesendorf, Germany relied on *“show of force”*, facing heavy problems when dealing with riots in the Balkans, not trained for CRC, nor authorized to use deadly force. Also, in Afghanistan Germany wanted its military to operate within an IHRL frame, inadequate to the conflict situation on the ground. Even switching to IHL, *“Germany remained a reluctant ally within NATO, imposing numerous caveats on its security personnel”*. But, it is important to remark how: *“Democracies must defend Human Rights. This means that the objectives of interventions, ranging from the stabilisation of war-torn Countries to counterterrorism, do not justify all means. But important differences remain“*.

### 5.1.3. The Italian way to use of force in CMOs

In the Balkans, Italy “*deployed combat forces, but the most outstanding Italian contribution was the deployment of the Carabinieri. Initially, they were hamstrung by the failure of commanders of regular military forces to understand Gendarmeries*”. “*The Carabinieri have keenly exported the gendarmerie model, both in an executive capacity and by supporting host-state police forces.*”

With regard to this, it is underlined: “*NATO developed the Blue Box/Green Box concept, [...] regular police forces or gendarmeries would hold command over the inner Blue Box and the military over the outer Green Box. The concept rendered the Carabinieri more effective by increasing their operational freedom. [...] by the year 2000, the MSU had resolved 261 out of 263 interventions without using force, relying on deterrence and negotiation instead.*”. Also, “*Carabinieri officers stressed their non-martial posture and their method of striking up conversations with citizens as major assets in collecting information, practising what they called a ‘walk and talk’ policy*”. Friesendorf also states how “*There is little systematic evidence that the Italian military has a competitive edge in using versatile force abroad, despite its significant domestic role in crime-fighting .*”

Here a “*fallacy*” in his reasoning could be considered. To identify the role played by the military in the home territory as “*crime-fighting*”, thus *investigative* (“*Polizia Giudiziaria*”) or “*Crowd and Riot Control*” role, does not fit well. The Italian Military, the Army for the most part, is instead employed within national borders in a *Public Security*<sup>204</sup> role (“*vespri siciliani*”, “*operazione primavera*”, “*strade sicure*”, “*domino*” and others). This role could overlap with *CRC* in some cases, but it is a different concept. This is why the Italian military did not show a “*competitive edge*” in crime-fighting as, generally speaking, in the Balkans they were tasked to ensure *SASE* and *FOM*, as prerequisites to enable the “*Rule of Law*” hence, crime-fighting, operations, usually conducted by the Carabinieri, as well as other Police and Gendarmerie Forces, *with the support* of the other

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<sup>204</sup> Legge 24 luglio 2008, n. 125 "Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 23 maggio 2008, n. 92, recante misure urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica" Art. 7-bis. Concorso delle Forze armate nel controllo del territorio <http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/081251.htm>

Military Forces. A statement from Senators Casini and Latorre<sup>205</sup> shall be recalled: on another valuable feature of Italian Forces: *“not only the military capabilities, but also the way to conduct missions, distinguished by strong impartiality among parties and a particular attention and sensitiveness towards civilian population needs and the humanitarian roles. With our example, we enabled the cooperation element to grow stronger”*.

Friesendorf then finds how: *“In comparison to the US and Germany, Italy has a competitive edge in the application of versatile force. One reason for this is the experiences of the Italian Armed Forces in Law enforcement. The Armed Forces’ mission of protecting the national territory is generally understood as including Defence against internal threats.”*

But why does Italy have such a *“competitive edge”*, from where does it stem out? A possible explanation could be read in Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte’s contribution to the WPD development process<sup>206</sup>. In his paper, he considers how *“as a consequence of the migrations spanning through the centuries and due to its past division into multiple State entities, lasted almost two millennia, the population is influenced by different heritages and it’s considered vulnerable to an endemic instability”*. Moreover, *“the Italian State is constrained by internal security expenses, proportionally much higher than other European Countries, to the detriment of its external security funding”*. Paradoxically, it could be considered how, due to its *“endemic instability”*, Italy had the possibility to develop a wide range of *stabilisation* forces and instruments, capable to apply the use (and most notably non-use) of minimum force in versatile ways and in different contexts, where the border between IHRL and IHL becomes blurred. And deadly dangerous, for those who are to apply minimum force.

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<sup>205</sup> Senato della Repubblica XVII LEGISLATURA N. 1917-A RELAZIONE DELLE COMMISSIONI PERMANENTI 3ª E 4ª RIUNITE (Relatori Casini e Latorre) Comunicata alla Presidenza il 4 agosto 2015 SUL DISEGNO DI LEGGE Disposizioni concernenti la partecipazione dell’Italia alle missioni internazionali (n. 1917) <http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/FascicoloSchedeDDL/ebook/45653.pdf>

<sup>206</sup> Convegno Nazionale sulla Sicurezza Internazionale e la Difesa Relazioni dei partecipanti <http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/Convegn%20CASD%202014%20libro%20bianco%20-%20Relaz%20partecipanti.pdf>

#### 5.1.4. *The – incomplete? – evolution of the Italian Legal frame*

In the relationship between the State and its citizens, it has to be considered how, in the evolution from State Security paradigm into HS, the use of force by the State in front to its Citizens has radically changed. As well as the relationship between *the State* and its Forces' *personnel* also changed.

Attempting to draw an evolution of the Italian Military and Police Forces' postures in Law Enforcement could be a slippery ground; nevertheless it is strictly intertwined with what above mentioned, in the "*conceptual path*": resilience of Institutions to changes and "*implementation gap*". Even face to the State's Constitutional Law. Article 52<sup>207</sup> of the Italian Constitution, already mentioned in previous chapters, sets out how "*The organisation of the Armed Forces shall be based on the democratic spirit of the Republic*"

*Art. 54: "All citizens have the duty to be loyal to the Republic and to uphold its Constitution and Laws. Those citizens to whom public functions are entrusted have the duty to fulfil such functions with discipline and honour, taking an oath".* Art.98 regulates: "*The Law may set limitations on the right to become members of political parties in the case of magistrates, career military staff in active service, Law enforcement officers, [...]*"

The Italian Criminal Law, "*Codice Penale*", RD 1398/1930<sup>208</sup>, is known as "*Codice Rocco*", by the name of Mussolini's Minister of Justice, Alfredo Rocco. Articles 50 -55 of Criminal Code deal with legitimate defence, use of weapons, fulfilment of a duty, excess in defence and state of necessity. The "*Single Act of Public Security Laws*", "*TULPS*", RD 773/1931<sup>209</sup> and the Peacetime and Wartime Military Criminal Codes, RD 303/1941<sup>210</sup>, are relevant Laws still in force in Italy, although heavily amended, mainly by Constitutional Court rulings.

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<sup>207</sup> See note 90

<sup>208</sup> Codice Penale, <http://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/10/30/codice-penale>

<sup>209</sup> Regio Decreto 18 giugno 1931, n. 773 " Testo unico delle Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza " <http://www.sanzioniamministrative.it/collegamenti/I%20Codici/TULPS/TULPS.htm>

<sup>210</sup> Peacetime Military criminal codes, by Giuseppe Scandurra, Difesa.it [http://www.difesa.it/Giustizia\\_Militare/Legislazione/PeacetimeMilitarycriminalcodes/Pagine/default.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/Giustizia_Militare/Legislazione/PeacetimeMilitarycriminalcodes/Pagine/default.aspx)

The first “Military Discipline Regulations” of the Republican Italy, were nevertheless published in 1964, then amended in 1978 and 1986. The current Military disciplinary set is finally given by the Legislative Decree 66/2010<sup>211</sup>, the “*Code of Military Regulations*”. Military Unions or Labour Organisations are not allowed, like in the majority of Countries; Law 382/1978<sup>212</sup> “*Tenets on Military Discipline*”, anyhow, instituted the “*Representation Councils*”, dealing with welfare issues within Armed Forces. Law 121/81<sup>213</sup> provided for the demilitarization of the State’s Police, “*Polizia di Stato*”, among other things, allowing enlistment of female personnel and unionization of the Force.

The Italian Criminal Procedure Code, “*Codice di Procedura Penale*”, DPR 447/1988<sup>214</sup>, switched the national judicial system from the *inquisitorial* to the *adversarial* one, implementing into domestic Law the relevant European and international provisions, including the ICCPR of 1966, 22 years later.

Italy ratified the 2<sup>nd</sup> OP-ICCPR, on the abolition of the death penalty, in 1995. Twelve years later, Constitutional Law 1/2007<sup>215</sup> amended the Fundamental Law, thus totally erasing death penalty from the Republican Italy, as it was still foreseen by the Wartime Criminal Code. Italy signed the UN Convention against torture in 1985 and ratified it in 1989. In 2015, Italy still doesn’t have a Law foreseeing the crime of torture, although a Draft Law<sup>216</sup> is currently being discussed between the two Chambers of the Parliament. The “Amnesty

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<sup>211</sup> DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 15 marzo 2010, n. 66 Codice dell'ordinamento militare. <http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2010-03-15;66>

<sup>212</sup> LEGGE 11 luglio 1978, n. 382 Norme di principio sulla disciplina militare <http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1978;382>

<sup>213</sup> LEGGE 1 aprile 1981, n. 121 Nuovo ordinamento dell'Amministrazione della pubblica sicurezza <http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1981;121!vig=>

<sup>214</sup> DPR 22 settembre 1988, n. 447 Approvazione del codice di procedura penale. <http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.del.presidente.della.repubblica:1988-09-22;447>

<sup>215</sup> Legge costituzionale 2007, n. 1 "Modifica all'articolo 27 della Costituzione, concernente L'abolizione della pena di morte" <http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/07001lc.htm>

<sup>216</sup> Fascicolo Iter DDL S. 10-362-388-395-849-874-B Introduzione del delitto di tortura taliano nell'ordinamento <http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/FascicoloSchedeDDL/ebook/45512.pdf>

International”<sup>217</sup> web site, dealing with torture cases in Italy, puts in first place the events which took place during Genoa’s “G8” in July 2001 and, in second place, the death of Federico Aldovrandi, in 2005, which are later going to be referred to.

A news article appeared on the “*Corriere della Sera* in June 2001, one month before the G8,”<sup>218</sup> it dealt with the “*Codice Rocco*” depicting it as a “*block to the freedom of expression, survived to the fascist culture. An instrument of social control useful to the Christian Democratic Party during cold war*”. Then it goes on, quoting politicians and magistrates. Pinto: “*in many cases incompatible with democracy*”; Violante: “*Reform must be discussed, as that Code is the remnant of a totalitarian era*”; Rodotà “*it’s paradoxical how this product of a totalitarian culture managed to survive*”; Salvi: “*Rocco Code is not the only problem*”; in 2015, 14 years after these declarations, Royal Decree 1398/1930 is still in force.

#### 5.1.5. *The evolution in Italian Law Enforcement*

Nevertheless, it is quite undeniable how a consistent evolution of Police Force’s stance, in a HS perspective, took place, deeply influencing Police Force’s organisation, education and training.

A research paper by Maria Luisa Maniscalco, University “*Roma Tre*”, about “*Making security between global and local, the Italian State Police officers’ opinions from a sociological field research*” for the RIEAS, takes a picture of the change that, also in Italy, took Police approach from the State Security to the HS one. The research, published in 2011, ten years after Genoa’s G8, tells how “*the role of the State Police is changed, and its members are seen as the “tutors” not only of the public order, but also of the community safety. Consequently, even the conception of “making security” itself is changed: no longer an order enforced from above, but an order built from the bottom, in the full collaboration with the*

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<sup>217</sup> Amnesty - Tortura in Italia - Alcuni casi <http://www.amnesty.it/stoptortura/italia-casi>

<sup>218</sup> Critiche al codice Rocco, anche la sinistra vuole cambiarlo [http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2001/giugno/19/Critiche\\_codice\\_Rocco\\_anche\\_sinistra\\_co\\_0\\_01061911701.shtml](http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2001/giugno/19/Critiche_codice_Rocco_anche_sinistra_co_0_01061911701.shtml) Galluzzo Marco



*community and with the other police forces on the territory.”. Referring to HS concept, Maniscalco notices “a turnover of priorities as regards to the hierarchies of the referents of protection”, assuring “the supremacy of the protection of population against the defence of the State;” She also goes on by seeing a “a metamorphosis of the State and its action, that deeply affected the traditional role of military, police, judges and social operator”. In this context, “the main indicator of success of the Police doings is the capacity to conciliate the respect of liberties and individual rights and the “service” to the community, through the protection of institutions, Laws, security and public system”. In the research, she sees “presence of two “ghosts”: the one of an extreme use of force and the inefficiency one.” The first “ghost” is imputed to a lack of understanding among parts of Police and parts of the Society, while the second comes from the decreasing funding. Anyway, the research’s conclusion states how Police, “Bent over the supremacy of the Community, it is engaged in the reaffirmation not only of the Law, but also of a “morality” of the threatened social bond.”*

Another article on the “*Corriere della Sera*” of the 25<sup>th</sup> of September, 2015<sup>219</sup>, reported how Aldovrandi’s death “*marked a point of no-return in the will of pretending respect for everybody from the Law Enforcement Forces.*” and “*despite the risk is still there, now it is harder to cover, or even only to delay, or to conceal, responsibilities for crimes committed by representatives of the Institutions, it doesn’t pay anymore*”.

In a meeting on the same day<sup>220</sup>, chaired by Senator Luigi Manconi, President of Senate’s “*Commission for Human Rights promotion and protection*” and Member of the Senate’s “*Permanent Defence Commission*”, with Aldovrandi’s mother and State Police’s representatives, the Mayor of Ferrara said how “*the challenge of security is a tremendous one, therefore it needs great*

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<sup>219</sup> Perché il caso di Federico Aldrovandi continua a riguardarci 10 anni dopo [http://www.corriere.it/cronache/15\\_settembre\\_25/federico-aldrovandi-10-anni-morte-b338a024-6350-11e5-9954-7c169e7f3b05.shtml](http://www.corriere.it/cronache/15_settembre_25/federico-aldrovandi-10-anni-morte-b338a024-6350-11e5-9954-7c169e7f3b05.shtml) Corriere della Sera

<sup>220</sup> Musica, parole e immagini per Federico - Tra cittadino e Stato: la violenza è inevitabile? <https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/453974/musica-parole-e-immagini-per-federico-tra-cittadino-e-stato-la-violenza-e-inevitabile>

*investments in order to be efficient, in training, means and ethics*". In the same meeting, it was underlined how, due to Italian society's stances, too often *social* problems are transformed into *Police* problems, but social solidarity is an unavoidable component of society's security. A strong call to Police ethics emerged, coupled with the need of guaranteeing proper resources. With regard to both issues, the responsibilities of Politics was strongly remarked. Calls to the primacy of Politics had already been issued by the Military Representatives<sup>221</sup>.

The already mentioned employment of the Armed Forces on the National territory prompted a new development in tactics and procedures, trying to combine the needs of *combat* to the needs of *public security*. The Italian Army, for instance, developed the "*Metodo di Combattimento Militare*", "*Military Combat Method*", MCM. In an interview to "*Rivista Militare*"<sup>222</sup>, the Italian Army's Magazine, a 34 years old MCM instructor cadet declared: "*The military personnel today is no more supposed only to stay into a trench, but also among the people. So, although dangers can come from everywhere, it is important to use force in a proportionate way*". The principle of "*force escalation*" is continuously stressed during theoretical studies and training.

It seems also important to point out how this process complies with the "*Guidelines on Human Rights Education for Law Enforcement Officials*", released by the OSCE: "*The training for Armed Forces personnel – in addition to what is presented in the current guidelines – needs to address the important differences between conduct during hostilities and while carrying out Law enforcement tasks, as well as the applicable legal framework (i.e., international humanitarian Law versus Human Rights Law). In particular, training must ensure an appropriate change of the learner's mind-set: from combat logic ("fight the enemy") to Law enforcement logic ("serve and protect the population")*". The same Guidelines stress how "*there needs to be coherence between international Human Rights standards, national Laws and operational procedures. These*

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<sup>221</sup> "Si ai codici identificativi sui caschi degli agenti, ma solo dopo aver cambiato la legislazione sull'ordine pubblico" COCER GdF <http://www.pianetacobar.eu/news/NewsDetail.aspx?Id=588>

<sup>222</sup> "Rivista militare", 3/2015 <http://www.esercito.difesa.it/comunicazione/editoria/Rivista-Militare/Tutti-i-numeri/2015/Documents/RM-on-line-3-2015.pdf>

*guidelines presuppose that Law enforcement services have developed operating rules and procedures that reflect International Human Rights standards.”*

Despite the above mentioned absence of the crime of torture in the Italian Juridical System, Police Forces’ are anyway informing their operational procedures to the highest IHRL standards. In this way, International guidelines<sup>223</sup>, become translated into National guidelines, for instance with regard to the protection of children<sup>224</sup>. But, as said before, the proper implementation of procedures needs resources. The guidelines (drafted also with a Carabinieri contribution) say: “*Particular attention should be paid to the transformation of theoretical knowledge into operational, duty-related skills through relevant, Human Rights-related practical exercises*”. It goes without saying how this entails, besides training procedures applied since basic education when joining Police Forces (as well as other organisations like, for instance, first aid personnel), an *extensive, intensive and recurring* retraining of the personnel already on duty, enlisted when HS concerns were not thoroughly considered (although, it is important to stress on this point, not disregarded). Without such an effort, as too many news stories unfortunately confirm<sup>225</sup>, every attempt to mainstream the respect to Human Dignity is going to be somehow diminished in its goals, the implementation of full HS, due to the lack of technical means and competence.

It is also important to notice how Italy hosts many Excellence Institutions, widely recognised at the international level, both military and civilian. Among them, the International Institute for Humanitarian Law<sup>226</sup>, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units<sup>227</sup> and the NATO Defence College.

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<sup>223</sup> Linee guida del Comitato dei ministri del Consiglio d’Europa per una giustizia a misura di minore  
[http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/childjustice/Source/GuidelinesChildFriendlyJustice\\_IT.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/childjustice/Source/GuidelinesChildFriendlyJustice_IT.pdf)

<sup>224</sup> GARANTIRE I DIRITTI DEI MINORENNI Vademecum per le forze di polizia  
[http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/vademecum\\_insieme\\_per\\_la\\_tutela\\_dei\\_minori.pdf](http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/vademecum_insieme_per_la_tutela_dei_minori.pdf)

<sup>225</sup> Tso letale, l’assessore Saitta: “Storia che fa rabbia” Repubblica.it  
[http://torino.repubblica.it/hermes/inbox/2015/08/17/news/saitta\\_tso\\_letale\\_storia\\_che\\_fa\\_rabbia-121104646/](http://torino.repubblica.it/hermes/inbox/2015/08/17/news/saitta_tso_letale_storia_che_fa_rabbia-121104646/)

<sup>226</sup> <http://www.iihl.org/>

<sup>227</sup> <http://www.carabinieri.it/arma/coespu/english-version>

## 5.2 A new, shared cooperation in Human Security

### 5.2.1. Human Security Mainstreamed into Defence

As like as the Military Forces of other Countries, also the Italian ones are undergoing a deep transformation process towards a full “*dual-use*” capacity<sup>228</sup>, being this the possibility to be employed in non-military activities. The main operationalisation of this concept is the use of military assets in civil protection on the national territory, as well as in humanitarian and disaster relief outside the national borders and on the seas, as the Italian Navy has been doing. Furthermore, the acquisition of cross-cultural competences is more and more stressed, likewise a gender approach in the engagement of local populations during S&R CMO. Also, the CIMIC concept is evolving, as the “*support to the mission*” is conceived as not only civilian actors’ support to the *military* mission, but also as military support to civilian-led missions like, as said, natural disasters, Security Sector Reform, Training and Advising and others, including the protection of cultural sites<sup>229</sup>. This, coupled with the modernization of Italian Security Forces towards the full mainstreaming of HS within its policies, tactics and procedures.

Even the US strategic thinking, within the “whole of Government approach”, seems to have acknowledged the need of military interventions *supporting* other instruments, instead of the opposite, as it happened. In a 2012 paper, Christopher Holshek argued how<sup>230</sup>: “*this calls for wider and deeper consultation and more collaborative, regional approaches than previously—and with hard power clearly ancillary to soft power, not vice-versa, as has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could therefore mean, as AFRICOM is instituting, a role for the military that is more supporting than supported (meaning civilian*

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<sup>228</sup> “Rivista Militare”, 5/2014 <http://www.esercito.difesa.it/comunicazione/editoria/Rivista-Militare/Tutti-i-numeri/2014/Documents/Rivista-militare-5-2014.pdf>

<sup>229</sup> La Difesa e la protezione dei beni culturali in caso di conflitto armato [http://www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/periodico/periodico\\_2014/Documents/R5\\_2014/06\\_17\\_R5\\_2014.pdf](http://www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/periodico/periodico_2014/Documents/R5_2014/06_17_R5_2014.pdf) “Informazioni della Difesa”.

<sup>230</sup> Strategic Studies Institute Book - Conflict management and “whole of government”: useful tools for u.s. national security strategy? 2012 Volker C. Franke Robert H. Dorff Editors <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1102.pdf>

*leaders are in greater charge), and adopting non-military methods. Military planners can avoid negative outcomes by relying on the humanitarian ‘do no harm’ principle. First, military projects should complement the work of civilian organizations, rather than duplicating or ignoring it. Second, focusing on the long-term sustainability of projects will ensure that any goodwill generated does not quickly evaporate. Third, military forces should also target their efforts to areas in which they hold a comparative advantage, such as disaster relief, logistics, insecure environments.”*

Moreover, he goes on in what seems a call to redefine the concept of “military necessity” as conceived in IHL and applied by the US military thinking: “While one cannot expect a military operation to adhere to the NGOs’ values of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, the ‘do no harm’ philosophy can provide a helpful metric for evaluating outcomes from both a humanitarian and political standpoint”. It might be argued how this metric has been considered in cases like the bombing of MSF hospital in Kunduz, in October 2015. It is also correctly seen how: “Because of security, political and economic pressures, U.S. Government and military officials often attempt shorter-term, quick-impact development. The challenge is to design short-term programming that contributes toward long-term development”. And this, for sure, has not been an American-only problem. In the same Study, W. J. Flavin appreciates how: “As a result of the events that unfolded since World War II, the U.S. has ended up with a large and well-resourced military instrument of power that is out of proportion to the other instruments of power of the U.S. It is an instrument that can generate a great deal of capability and capacity and therefore has assumed many civil tasks over time”.

Under a *cultural awareness* point of view, it is interesting to see how criticism was raised on how US forces planned their operations in Afghanistan and Iraq considering merely “State Security” concerns, based on the memory of 1991’s Gulf War. This took to the witnessed consequences, making US and, therefore, NATO military leaders more and more aware of the *cultural* aspects of COIN and S&R operations, at all levels, tactical, operational, strategic and political. Montgomery McFate wrote how “*the value of military intelligence is exceeded by that of social and*

*cultural intelligence*<sup>231</sup>, expressing what should have been clear from the outset, that for carrying effective actions aimed to change a society, it is imperative to know and understand that society's history, language, structures and values. These concerns have been inferred into military planning processes too, marking a shift; it could be said, towards a more qualitative approach<sup>232</sup>. NATO began to include civilian experts into its planning processes, at all levels and different Nations, instituting the "*knowledge development teams*"<sup>233</sup>. Italy also began to integrate the "*selected reserve*"<sup>234</sup> Officers, enlisted due to their particular social, cultural and technical skills, in order to improve the awareness, understanding and planning possibilities.

This shift in Strategic thinking, American, European and Italian, had also been observed by Professor Marco Mascia<sup>235</sup> and shared to a wider public during the National Convention "*La miglior Difesa è la Pace*"<sup>236</sup>, "*The best Defence is Peace*", which took place in Rimini from 13 to 15 February 2014.

Other paragraphs by William Flavin shall be recalled, as resuming also the Italian situation, widely seen in the previous chapters: "*Yet in all this, the military itself recognizes that the civil sector needs to be the final arbiter. The challenge is to operationalize the concept and engage with other agencies to achieve the best outcome*". "*There are obstacles embedded in the [...] Governmental system that work against the very coordination that is needed, however, to attempt to overcome these obstacles may require a significant political price; one that most are unwilling to pay. This presents a challenge because institutions are organized as stovepipes and are provided requisite authorities and funding that reinforce separation.*" This shall be

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<sup>231</sup> M. MCFATE, The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture, Office of Naval Research, 2005 <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/1038.pdf>

<sup>232</sup> Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment, Major Brian M. Ducote, 2010, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. [www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA523040](http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA523040)

<sup>233</sup> Solbiate Olona, Firmato un accordo tra il Liuc e il Comando Nato <http://www.varesereport.it/2015/03/11/solbiate-olona-firmato-un-accordo-tra-il-liuc-e-il-comando-na/>

<sup>234</sup> Ufficiali delle forze di completamento dell'Arma dei Carabinieri [http://www.carabinieri.it/docs/default-source/riserva-selezionata/dm\\_20\\_05\\_2015.pdf?sfvrsn=2](http://www.carabinieri.it/docs/default-source/riserva-selezionata/dm_20_05_2015.pdf?sfvrsn=2)

<sup>235</sup> Intervento Professor Marco Mascia al Convegno "*La miglior Difesa è la Pace*", 2015 [http://www.odcpace.org/new/files/convegno2014/atti\\_del\\_convegno/15\\_Marco\\_Mascia\\_140214.pdf](http://www.odcpace.org/new/files/convegno2014/atti_del_convegno/15_Marco_Mascia_140214.pdf)

<sup>236</sup> Promuovere la Pace è difendere la Patria? Un modello di difesa nonviolento, il ruolo dei civili, l'educazione come strategia per costruire il Diritto alla Pace <http://www.odcpace.org/new/index.php/convegno-la-miglior-difesa-e-la-pace>

seen as not too far from Undersecretary Bobba's opinion about the lack of cooperation *among* Institutions (chapter 4.2).

### 5.2.2. *The DCNAN concepts*

Chapter 3.3 briefly dealt with the DCNAN Committee and its studies. It seems important, after having considered the evolution in Defence, to go back to what the Committee concluded on the 30<sup>th</sup> of January, 2006<sup>237</sup> in the paper "*La Difesa civile non armata e nonviolenta*". It recalled Law 230/1998 on the Civilian Service as a form of Fatherland's Defence *autonomous* and *alternative* from the Military one. Noting how the concept of *National Defence* was not clearly defined, it tried, anyway, to set it as "*the complex of arrangements, measures and actions, military and civilian, allowing the Nation to prevent and face situations of crisis and emergency, internal and international, as well as armed conflict*". It went on by saying how "*besides military defence the system foresees other forms of civilian defence in wide sense, including a non armed and nonviolent civilian defence*", leaving to others do define in practical terms this Defence, limiting to consider the conceptual contours. The Paper noted how similar wordings usually took different meanings in the civilian and in the military diction, making harder to achieve objectives which were nevertheless the same in principles. It gave a resume about the different approaches on Defence by military and civilians. For military, peace was defined as "absence of violence", with the military instrument to ensure deterrence and keep readiness, also for CMO/CRO. Crisis were seen as a tense situation, which may be composed or degenerate into war. The last one with different possibilities ranging from *general war* to PKO.

Civilian doctrine instead, although lacking in uniformity and etherogeneous in its components, was generally splitting interventions among *ordinary* and *extraordinary*, the last ones involving military means as a last resort. Moreover,

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<sup>237</sup> See note 132

the paper noticed how in *extraordinary* interventions the civilian component was usually functional to the military one. Among other things, the Paper considered how it was not the best possibility to entrust civilian peacekeeping to SCN Volunteers only, due to the wide range of skills needed to efficiently perform such missions. The Paper then went on in tracing the origins of the DCNAN concept, going back to the Italian “*Nonviolent Movement*” and its “*Ideological-programmatic Charter*”<sup>238</sup>, which included, among other “*essential tools of nonviolent struggle*”, the “*formation of parallel Government bodies*”. In 2014, a proposal for the political program of the Nonviolent Movement called for “*unilateral disarmament and civil Defence*”<sup>239</sup>. Moreover, it was observed as “*DCNAN is not only alternative to armed Defence, more exactly it suggests to pursue more goals than the latter, which somehow stays in the background as a frame of reference which is considered outmoded and harmful*”. On these contents among others, the Defence representative did not agree, as some of the principles were considered to be in contrast with the Constitution and other Laws. The Paper took in exam the concept of “*Popular Nonviolent Defence*”, “*Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta*”, DPN, admitting how it was “*unknown outside a narrow community of experts*”, not having anyway a common and shared definition even among them. Furthermore, it observed “*skepticism on the possibility to influence decisions by pacifist and nonviolent movements*”, also due to the “*deep economical and political interests revolving around the military-industrial complex*”. Anyhow, as fifth “*field of intervention*” for a DPN, the CPC were cited.

On the following steps, the Paper deemed the SCN as independent from the DPN and saw in its design a predominance of Article 52 of the Constitution on Article 11, “*especially considering the dominant tendency to consider Defence only within security policies*”. It considered so the SCN as a “*sure institutional*

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<sup>238</sup> Movimento Nonviolento “CARTA IDEOLOGICO PROGRAMMATICA”  
<http://nonviolenti.org/cms/Movimento-nonviolento/>

<sup>239</sup> Il nostro programma politico: disarmo unilaterale e difesa civile - Mao Valpiana  
[http://nonviolenti.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Chiusura\\_dibattito\\_precongressuale.pdf](http://nonviolenti.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Chiusura_dibattito_precongressuale.pdf)



*way of civilian Defence and a priority application field of DCNAN*”, noting a “*scarce capacity to form and inform about this feature of SCN*” and seeing it as “*losing its appearance of contrast against the military apparatus and the use of armed force*”. The Paper then concluded by recommending the experimentation of nonviolent ways of conflict transformation, from which the first institutionalised CPC experience in 2011 begun.

### 5.2.3. Possibility for a shared and cooperative cultural evolution

In October 2005, three months before the release of the DCAN document, Professor Francesco Tullio drafted a Paper<sup>240</sup> for the meeting of a State’s Police Union, on “*Terrorism and Civil Defence*”. In his paper he advocated a pragmatic approach to DCNAN, instead of a too biased one, insisting on words and ethical concepts, defined in a negative form (“*Non Armed and Nonviolent*”), leading ultimately to the loss of the “*engagement into dialogue*”. He proposed to remark less the ideological premises, pushing efforts into dialogue on operational issues. The Paper dealt, among other things, with the policies a State can adopt in facing social difficulties within its borders, which usually lead to repression or democraticization, the former related in the text with Genoa’s G8, the latter with transparency of the Institutions and public debate. Among the conclusions, he stated how “*the basic emotions of war, being aggression and fear, can be developed till reckless exaltation or into protestant pacifism, coward and passive (not referring of course to Gandhi’s and King’s pacifism), or again shall be integrated into a realistic and functional Defence project*”. He than asked to put aside political colour’s differences, which only lead to polarization and thus detrimental to DCNAN objectives, setting up a dialogue also with the Armed Forces, on a Civilian Defence leading a transformation of violence into a positive

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<sup>240</sup> Il terrorismo e la difesa civile Francesco Tullio, Centro Interuniversitario sulla Pace, l’Analisi e la Mediazione dei Conflitti, e Centro Studi Difesa Civile (per il convegno del sindacato di polizia SILP, Livorno ottobre 2005 <http://www.ildialogo.org/pace/Terrorismodifesaacivilesilpli.pdf> Professor Tullio died in 2013, by reported in the web site of the “Centro Studi Difesa Civile”.

assertivity.

As previously seen, the DCNAN Paper was partly disagreed by the Defence representatives, showing dialogue misunderstanding at least. A Paper presented at the “*Conference on Missing Narratives for Ending Wars*”, by Tom Matyók<sup>241</sup>, dealt with addressing “*the limitations of cost-benefit analysis in communicating the full human drama of war*” as a tool for nonviolent advocacy, arguing how “*Peace activists contributed to their marginalization by refusing to address the call to war with clearly thought out arguments based on rational analysis; rather than, solely anti-war emotion. The peace movement was against the war, but they could not communicate the peace they favored. The peace movement handed narrative hegemony to those shouting the loudest, War!*”. What if such considerations lately became part of US and other Countries’ estimates or not, seeing the reluctance to engage into new military-only “adventures”.

In another Paper commissioned by the DCNAN Committee, “Study on peacekeeping and peace research civilian education activities” , 2008<sup>242</sup>, Doctor Andrea Valdambriini summarized, among the other findings of his work, some more differences between military and civilian education and training. Some of them are of course still valid, others might need to be revised.

In particular, he considered how “military systems” saw a dichotomy between “peace” and “war”, as security imposed by weapons guaranteed peace. In a “State Security” paradigm, as it was until the Gulf War, it was maybe like that, but recent operations demonstrated how political peace agreements, in order to be sustainable, need a broad range of instruments and the military can be only one of them. To *win war* proved to be quite easy, to *win peace* proved to be impossible for “military tools” only and even for military supported by “civilian tools”, due to the complexity of conflicts and the need to operate for very long time lapses to

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<sup>241</sup>Missing Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Lessons from the United States Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq World Peace Academy Swiss Centre for Peace Studies [https://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/Missing\\_Factors\\_in\\_Cost-Benefit\\_Analysis.pdf](https://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/Missing_Factors_in_Cost-Benefit_Analysis.pdf) 2010

<sup>242</sup> See note 127

transform them. The possibility to use weapons for military actors was for sure obvious, but after 2010, many missions conducted by Italian Forces deployed non-armed personnel, into training and assistance strengthening efforts like MIADIT<sup>243</sup>, “*Missione Addestramento Italiana*”, “Italian Training Mission”. A kind of employment expressly recalled in the WPD, taking place in Gibuti, Somalia, Libia and Palestine among others. In the way to conceive “*conflict*” and “*security*”, Valdambri recalled the “*Police State*” expression. In Police Forces’ Doctrine, the idea of “*public order*” gave more and more field to “*public security*”, marking the shift from State to Human Security. This, despite proper and recurring training of personnel, as well as supply of proper equipments, remain an issue, due to funding constraints. Valdambri also argued how military had, generally speaking, a monodisciplinary education, while giving room to the possibility that nonviolent contents like negotiation and cross-cultural competence, inferred into the military apparatus by new experiences, could prompt a “*reverse contamination*”, generating structural changes.

Due to what discussed in the previous chapters, it shall be considered how a structural change took and has being taking place, non only in Defence, but also and more importantly within the whole of the State’s organisation. By bearing in mind all of that, the discourse aimed to demonstrate how the conditions required by an *agreed* or *willing cooperation* among State’s Institutions and CSO/NGO are, in general terms, largely achievable. It is useful to recall the principles of the “Barcelona Report”<sup>244</sup> for a “HS Doctrine for Europe”: “*the primacy of Human Rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force.*”, which seem to be almost in place, of course needing appropriate tuning. And the reasons for this Doctrine: “*morality*”, “*legality*” and “*enlightened self-interest*”.

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<sup>243</sup> Palestina MIADIT 3: al via la terza missione di addestramento dei carabinieri a Jericho [http://www.difesa.it/SMD\\_/Comunicati/Pagine/MIADIT3\\_Palestina.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/Comunicati/Pagine/MIADIT3_Palestina.aspx)

<sup>244</sup> See note 35

### 5.3 Coordinating organisations into Human Security

The Barcelona Report envisioned the creation of a European “HS Response Force”, including military, police, HR monitors, development, humanitarian and administration experts, as well as Volunteers, aimed to “*improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilisation of local support, implementation and sustainability*” to achieve sustainable peace.

The tools existing to handle CMO are nowadays wider and more specialised than in 2004, when the “Report” has been written, as much better are the coordination mechanisms. At the European level, the main shortfall is, in an indirect way, the “*clear political authority*”, given by the mentioned lack of generalised consensus on the actions to conduct. Generally speaking, this has a consequence, at least in 2015’s reality, being how every Nation has to develop its own instruments and capacities, although seeking to integrate them in a wider European framework.

The “*bottom-up approach*” is, by itself, the most widely recognised deficit of military organisations. In the National Convention on the WPD<sup>245</sup>, Professor Luciano Bozzo argued how “*military hierarchical-pyramidal structure is heritage of the subordinated organisational model of industrial society [...], antithetic to the logic governing contemporary advanced societies, evident in the cyber dimension: networked, coordinated, decentred and, so, polycentric*”. Although such a vision shall be regarded as already partly outdated, it is possible to see a connection between this and what stated in the WPD, point 92: “*The identification of lessons learned and the preparation of suitable doctrinal and operational responses, as well as the subsequent adaptation of means and systems, has not been as rapid, effective and precise as expected. Improvement of these activities is essential to make operations even more successful*”.

NGO/CSO, on the contrary are, at least in general, extremely fast in organisational learning, also due to the thin size of the organisations. Their problem, on the contrary, is “*fare rete*”, to “*network*”, to coordinate among

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<sup>245</sup> See note 200

organisations, so to share lessons identified/learned and best practices. The Barcelona Report envisions the figure of the “HS Officer”, putting Human Dignity before State’s concerns, knowing and respecting IHRL, IHL and ICL, aware of conflict’s gender dimensions and “*maintaining the military spirit of sacrifice, heroism, discipline and excellence but combining it with the civilian spirit of listening, individual responsibility, empathy and enabling others*”. This, weighing the “*considerable cultural shift both for the military and civilians*”, widely debated in the previous chapters, pondering how “*this shift is best achieved through training and joint exercises*”.

The image below (Figure N.5) shows the levels of interaction among organisations, following NATO’s CA. There are, anyway, other levels of interaction, but on a negative scale, being “unawareness”, “indifference”, “non-dialogue” and “hostility”. Chief of UN OCHA CMCoord Section, Josef Reiterer<sup>246</sup>, during a webinar with NATO CCOE<sup>247</sup> on the 14<sup>th</sup> of August, 2015, said: “*learned the hard way how hard is to liaise with other actors in the field, in Sierra Leone, when we called for a meeting and just nobody showed up, because nobody cared about coordination... Of course, we were all there to help the same people*”.




Figure 5: NATO CIMIC Handbook “There is a need for a CA using Civil-Military Interaction”<sup>248</sup>

<sup>246</sup> Civil-Military Coordination Section UN OCHA

<https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/CMCS%20organigramme%20March%202014.pdf>

<sup>247</sup> NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence <http://www.cimic-coe.org>

<sup>248</sup> Civil - Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence CIMIC Field Handbook 3rd edition <http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CIMIC-Handbook.pdf>

### 5.3.1. Basic Education and training of SCN and CPC within an Italian ANMD

Of course, when dealing with Italian CPC, “integration” it is not the best solution, as considered in previous chapters. Anyhow, when operating in areas where different National components are engaged, at least “awareness” should have to be ensured. The point of departure of Italian CPC is, as seen, the SCN. The SCN’s training guidelines, briefly mentioned in chapter 3.2, have been issued on proposal of the DCNAN Committee and are still today a document of high moral and practical Value, recalling the “*ties among the consociates, finalised to the achievement of a better social cohesion in the frame of Constitutional freedoms, the struggle against inequalities and social injustices, the hold/reconstruction of binds among citizens and between them, the Republican Institutions and the State*”.

In the light of the developments occurred in military and Law enforcement doctrines and employment, it does not appear unreasonable to find out whether there shall be room to give to SCN Volunteers an *awareness* of what are the objectives, policies and means of military and Law enforcement services. Referring to the documents analysed in the previous chapters, in SCN’s training programs there are references to the origins of SCN from the conscientious objection to Military Service, but the role of military and police services nowadays is not mentioned. This, with particular reference to the *dual-use* capabilities for the military and *protection of human dignity* for police. Vice-versa, it shall be considered to give to these services’ personnel *awareness* of SCN capabilities and employment. During the 25<sup>th</sup> of September meeting dealt with in Chapter 5.1.4.<sup>249</sup>, the introduction of e-learning capabilities within Police Forces was mentioned. It shall be a fast, cheap and immediate way to spread this kind of awareness, which should anyhow be included also in the basic training courses.

Of course, more specific instruction and/or training activities shall be considered and conducted, taking into account the employment of SCN or CPC

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<sup>249</sup> See note 215

personnel, in Italy and abroad, as it is anyhow already done. Maybe, pending a further evolution in Doctrine, Law, training and specialisation, of which the seeds perhaps have already been planted, the Civilian Service will not be seen any more as a form of Defence *alternative* to the military one, on the contrary, the Military Defence will be considered as a *Specialised* form of an “*Active Civil Defence*”, equipped and structured to stop the worst forms of violence. This, as already considered also by the WPD (see chapter 2.3). A good point of discussion could be seen into what the CDS, General Claudio Graziano, said to the Defence Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, on the 5<sup>th</sup> of August, 2015<sup>250</sup>, with regard to the Military training system: “*It’s about finding integrations on all Armed Forces’ common activities [...] and also an important re-evaluation of the CASD (“Centro Alti Studi Difesa”), the Defence High Studies Centre, not only as a military thinking and doctrinal hub, but also for security in a broad sense and more focused on international exchange*”. Dealing with CPC, it shall be of some interest for CPC development to consider taking part to such a “*hub*”, in order to be better prepared to handle the complex linkages and interactions that CPC will have on the ground, via preventive planning.

### 5.3.2. *The multifaceted interactions of CPC in CP and CMO*

The Ministerial Decree 07/05/2015<sup>251</sup>, makes reference to EU Reg. 230/2014<sup>252</sup>, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). It is deemed important to deal with its provisions, as the Decree states how, beginning from the second year, the experimentation shall be extended to IO Italy is being part. IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020<sup>253</sup> explicitly states how:

- “*The primary aim of EU assistance [...] is, on the one hand, to prevent conflicts, build peace and to build crisis preparedness capacities*”;

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<sup>250</sup> See note 81

<sup>251</sup> See note 179

<sup>252</sup> See note 30

<sup>253</sup> Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020 [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/icsp-strategy-paper-mip-20140812\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/icsp-strategy-paper-mip-20140812_en.pdf)

- “*The IcSP is primarily a development and cooperation instrument. This means that it can only address conflict prevention, peace-building and security issues in so far as they hamper development and other cooperation objectives of the EU with non-developing Countries .*”;
- “*IcSP support should be based on a shared assessment and a common objective, which combines in the most efficient manner all relevant EU external policy instruments and tools*”;

In an Italian ANMD/EU CA perspective, it seems useful to try to forecast the most relevant actors the CPC will have to interact with, taking for granted local NGO/CSO/CBO, as paramount to the objective of building local capacities through local ownership: administrative authorities; judiciary authorities; economic actors; police and military, maybe militias and non-state actors; refugees, migrants, host communities, ex-combatants; educational system personnel; health system personnel; civilian protection and civilian Defence assets; religious actors.

In the same way, depending the area of intervention, the CPC could have to operate with: SSR mission’s personnel, civilian, judiciary and police; DDR mission’s personnel, military, police and judiciary; other strengthening/capacity building military or police personnel; humanitarian actors, ICRC, UN, EU; Development Cooperation actors, including profit firms; diplomatic personnel, religious missions.

It goes without saying how, as recalled many times, the fundamental CPC feature in order to be effective, is the *participative approach*, so living *among* the local people. Anyhow, depending the cases, forms of coordination should or, better said, will have to be established. Setting aside the situations already considered in the previous chapters, like “do not harm approach consultant to development NGO” let’s consider a hypothetical case.

A CPC intervention has, among its tasks, the social reintegration of ex-combatants. Shall be useful for the CPC operators to know, in quite good details, facts and figures about the organisation/militia/non-state actor to which the ex-combatants belonged, in order to establish proper narratives for both ex-combatants and host communities, facilitating this reintegration process? Many



actors could lend CPC proper information about that, setting aside OSINT including judiciary investigations made public): local institution, police/armed forces, international police mentoring the local forces are among them and a structured contacts network shall for sure be useful.

A more practical example: in case ex-combatants are undergoing disarmament and demobilisation process, assisted by an International DDR mission, shall it be useful to set pre-established communication channels, through which to inform CPC about the arrival of ex-combatants in the area, with a reasonable anticipation?

Another example. CPC operators acquire information about two girls who went away from a village or an IDP camp, “*as word of mouth said*”, to be forced into prostitution in another Country. To inform local police? What if it’s unreliable, unable or unwilling? To inform the other Country’s police? Directly, through international police presence, through diplomatic channels? Is there a EUROPOL presence in the Country?

Just some simple cases, which may not be of primary concern of CPC operators, nevertheless, shall be a strong contribution from CPC in better accomplishing other’s tasks and, vice versa, enhance CPC awareness and efficiency. It could be regarded as opportune how the “external relations” of CPC should be handled by some of the association’s “staff”, instead of the operators “on the ground”, in order to preserve their legitimacy, neutrality, impartiality and, most important, giving them the time to stay among the people in conflicts to be positively transformed. Another consideration. MAECI considered how Development Cooperation operators are often “*the only National presence on the ground*”, praising the value of this presence, in having a proper situational awareness. With a CPC institutionalisation, CPC operators will also be on the ground, possibly in an even more *embedded* way. It shall be deemed useful to have at least association’s staff members addressed on the best ways to send and receive relevant information, from and to MAECI’s structures, with the aim of improving the overall *awareness* and, thus, security.

### 5.3.3. Training CPC in a European perspective

The Ministerial Decree above mentioned, foresees at least 100 basic training hours, in Italy, and 70 hours in the intervention area. The Draft Law foresees at least 400 training hours. Pending the experimentation which is, by definition, a temporary way to do things, it shall be considered to prepare CPC operators, at least for a part of their training, according to European standards. And here comes the issue of not having, up to now, a European CPC so, on paper, there should be no training standards. This is in a certain way true, but some more considerations can be done.

Setting aside the specific training programs elaborated up to now, which are of course good and validated by the positive experiences of ICP, it could be evaluated whether to gain access, at least for some of the “association’s staff”, to the “Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management” (ENTRi) network.<sup>254</sup> These courses are mainly designed for civilian personnel to be deployed in EU CMO, so for employments different from the CPC ones. Nevertheless, to have staff personnel more *aware* of the “*big picture*” could enhance CPC efficiency within the ANMD/CA overall frame, not last by establishing personal contacts. The acronyms here are used together, as it is quite easy to imagine how the most part of CPC interventions will be in places where other nations and the same EU are already present. The EU training provider in Italy<sup>255</sup> is, in 2015, the “*Scuola Sant’Anna*”, in Pisa, providing “pre-deployment”, “Human Rights” and “Hostile Environment Awareness Training – HEAT”<sup>256</sup> courses. The last one, in particular, is interesting as providing survival, medical, orientation and counter-IED skills, among the others. These are skills usually taken for granted for the military, but not for civilian personnel and are

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<sup>254</sup> See note 110

<sup>255</sup> ENTRi Certification Database – Award of the C<sup>3</sup>MC Label  
<http://www.entriforccm.eu/certification/certified-courses.html>

<sup>256</sup> Course concept for the SPECIALISATION COURSE ON: HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AWARENESS TRAINING (HEAT)  
[http://www.entriforccm.eu/certification/assets/pdf/Course\\_Concept\\_Hostile\\_Environment\\_Awareness\\_Training.pdf](http://www.entriforccm.eu/certification/assets/pdf/Course_Concept_Hostile_Environment_Awareness_Training.pdf)

nevertheless useful in degraded environments and tricky situations.

Taking into account the, not unjustified, concerns about security widely mentioned in the previous chapters, acquiring these skills won't be wasted time for CPC operators, as well as for Development Cooperation personnel<sup>257</sup>. HEAT course, in its practical phases, is managed by personnel of the 1<sup>st</sup> Carabinieri Regiment "Tuscania", based in Livorno (very close to Pisa, where is the "Sant'Anna School"). With the intention of providing CPC personnel with similar skills, it could be pondered the idea of involving more national realities in a wider system, inspired by the Pisa (Sant'Anna) – Livorno (Tuscania) one, also outside the European frame, if for "certification" issues it could prove impracticable. For instance, CPC from Emilia shall take advantage of a partnership between the Bologna University and the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade of the Army; CPC from Veneto, of a partnership between the Padua University and the "Lagunari" Regiment in Venezia; CPC from Trentino Alto Adige/South Tyrol, of an association Trento University – 7<sup>th</sup> Carabinieri Regiment "Trentino Alto Adige". And so on, taking advantage of the capillary distribution of Universities and Military Units on the National territory.

In stressing how such experiences will not be (as they are not in any of the ENTRi initiatives) neither "armed", nor "violent", but just skills-infering, these may have a number of "side effects", caused by a positive interaction among military, police and civilian actors in Italy, instead than directly on the field. Such a discourse would be beneficial for raising *awareness* and prompt a faster and more efficient *functional coordination*, when needed, in the field. Within the ANMD/CA anyway, the practical autonomy of CPC interventions shall never be questioned, otherwise their very sense and usefulness would be wiped out.

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257                      Aggiornamento                      professionale                      alla                      DGCS  
<http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/portaledgcs/portaledgcs/Documentazione/AltriDocumenti/Quaderni%20Cooperazione%202015-1-13.pdf>



## CONCLUSIONS

What considered in this dissertation have the scope of giving an account of the evolution of the Civil Peace Corps concept in Italy and its situation, up to the 8<sup>th</sup> of October, 2015. The reform efforts Italy has been advancing, with great sacrifices especially for some parts of its population, in the last 8 years of economic crisis and growing tensions are, as it seems, beginning to give positive results, although of course so much still has to be done. Among these results, a renewed assertiveness of the Country in the International arena is a very positive novelty, as in the post-second world war era, it has been much more pushed by the events, instead of pushing them. An assertiveness, anyway, not guided by an old-fashioned way of dominance-inspired logics, led instead by a firm adherence to the principles and practices of International Law. Such an evolution will, hopefully, prompt a new sentiment of National Unity based on shared values among its population, allowing in this way the *unity of efforts*, required by a society, in order to work properly and to effectively implement a Human Security environment for all. Moreover, it will enable to project Power outside the Italian borders, in its most important shape, a *moral* power, able to positively influence the course of the events, knowing how an increased well-being of sisters and brothers, near and far, is directly linked and intertwined to everybody's existence. As tremendously tragic experiences showed and are showing, other courses of action are unavoidably condemned to crushing failures, with all their charge of blood, sorrow, tears and, worst of all, *hate*. In this situation, hoping and working for the greater good for our world, as also set by the General Assembly of the United Nations, among the contributions Italy can give, there will be the Civil Peace Corps.

## ACHRONYMS

<b>AICS</b>	<i>IT Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo</i> , Italian Agency for Development Cooperation
<b>AISE</b>	<i>IT Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna</i> , External Security Agency
<b>AISI</b>	<i>IT Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna</i> , Internal Security Agency
<b>ANMD</b>	<i>IT Approccio Nazionale Multi-Dimensionale alla gestione delle crisi</i> , National Multi-Dimensional Approach to crisis management
<b>Art.</b>	Article (of Law)
<b>CA</b>	Comprehensive Approach
<b>CASD</b>	<i>IT Centro Alti Studi Della Difesa</i> , High Defence Studies Centre
<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organisations
<b>CDS</b>	Chief of Defence Staff, <i>IT Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa</i>
<b>CMO</b>	Crisis Management Operation
<b>CCOE</b>	CIMIC Centre of Excellence
<b>CCP</b>	<i>Corpi Civili di Pace</i> , Italian for CPC
<b>CEPOL</b>	European Police College
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civilian-Military Cooperation
<b>CICS</b>	<i>IT Comitato Interministeriale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo</i> , Interministerial Committee for Development Cooperation
<b>CISR</b>	<i>IT Comitato Interministeriale per la Sicurezza della Repubblica</i> , Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic
<b>CMO</b>	Crisis Management Operation/s
<b>CM</b>	Crisis Management
<b>CMO</b>	Crisis Management Operation
<b>CMCoord</b>	Civilian-Military Coordination
<b>CNCS</b>	<i>IT Consiglio Nazionale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo</i> , National Council for Development Cooperation

<b>COCER</b>	<i>IT Consiglio Centrale di Rappresentanza</i> , Military Representation Council
<b>COI</b>	<i>IT Comando Operativo Interforze</i> , Joint Operations Headquarters
<b>COIN</b>	Counter Insurgency
<b>COPACO</b>	<i>IT Comitato Parlamentare di Controllo sui Servizi Segreti</i> , Parliamentary Control Committee on the Secret Services
<b>COPASIR</b>	<i>IT Comitato Parlamentare per la Sicurezza della Repubblica</i> , Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic
<b>CoPS</b>	<i>IT Comitato Politico Strategico</i> , Political-Strategic Committee
<b>CP</b>	Conflict Prevention
<b>CPC</b>	Civilian Peace Corps, <i>IT Corpi Civili di Pace</i> , CCP
<b>CPI</b>	Civilian Peace Interventions, <i>IT Interventi Civili di Pace</i>
<b>CPS</b>	German Civil Peace Service
<b>CRC</b>	Crowd and Riot Control
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisation/s
<b>DA</b>	Delegated Authority, <i>IT Autorità Delegata</i>
<b>DAESH</b>	English transliteration of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, <i>AR ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-‘Irāq wa l-Shām</i> , <b>الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام</b>
<b>DCAF</b>	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
<b>DCNAN</b>	<i>IT Difesa Civile Non Armata e Nonviolenta</i> , Civilian Defence Not Armed and Nonviolent
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development – UK
<b>DGCS</b>	<i>IT Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo</i> , Directorate General for Development Cooperation
<b>DIS</b>	<i>IT Dipartimento Informazioni per la Sicurezza</i> , Department of Information for Security
<b>D.Lgs.</b>	<i>IT Decreto Legislativo</i> , Legislative Decree
<b>DPCM</b>	<i>IT Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri</i> , PM’s Decree

<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
<b>DPN</b>	<i>IT Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta</i> , Popular Nonviolent Defence
<b>DPR</b>	<i>IT Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica</i> , Presidential Decree
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>ECHO</b>	EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
<b>ECPC</b>	European Civilian Peace Corps
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Action Service
<b>EIDHR</b>	Instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide
<b>ENTRi</b>	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
<b>EPLO</b>	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
<b>EWS</b>	Early Warning System
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUROPOL</b>	European Police Office
<b>FOM</b>	Freedom of Movement
<b>FRONTEX</b>	<i>Frontières extérieures</i> , French for "external borders"
<b>GO</b>	Governmental Organisation
<b>HEAT</b>	Hostile Environment Awareness Training
<b>HR</b>	Human Rights
<b>HRD</b>	Human Rights and Democracy
<b>HR/VP</b>	High Representative / Vice President
<b>HS</b>	Human Security
<b>IcSP</b>	Instrument contributing to stability and peace
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People
<b>IGO</b>	Inter Governmental Organisation
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>IHRL</b>	International Human Rights Law
<b>ICL</b>	International Criminal Law
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court



<b>ICCPR</b>	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>IO</b>	International Organisation
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>JOC</b>	Joint Operations Room, <i>IT Sala Operativa Interforze</i>
<b>KSK</b>	<i>DE Kommando Spezialkräfte</i> , German Special Operations Forces
<b>MAE</b>	<i>IT Ministero degli Affari Esteri</i> , MoFA
<b>MAECI</b>	<i>Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale</i> , MoFA & Development Cooperation
<b>MCM</b>	<i>IT Metodo Combattimento Militare</i> , Military Combat Method
<b>MIADIT</b>	<i>IT Missione Addestramento Italiana</i> , Italian Training Mission
<b>MED</b>	Ministry of Economic Development, <i>IT Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico</i>
<b>MEF</b>	Ministry of Economy and Finance, <i>IT Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze</i>
<b>MIUR</b>	<i>IT Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca</i> , Ministry of Education, University and Research
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defence, <i>IT Ministero della Difesa</i>
<b>MoFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <i>IT Ministero degli Affari Esteri</i>
<b>MoI</b>	Ministry of Interior/Internal Affairs, <i>IT Ministero degli Interni</i>
<b>MoJ</b>	Ministry of Justice, <i>IT Ministero della Giustizia</i>
<b>MoL</b>	Ministry of Labor, <i>IT Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali</i>
<b>MS</b>	Member State/s
<b>MSU</b>	Multinational Specialized Unit, Military Force on Police Duty of NATO
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NISP</b>	<i>IT Nucleo Interministeriale Situazione e Pianificazione</i> , Interministerial Situation and Planning Group

<b>NCMO</b>	National Crisis Management Organisation
<b>NGO</b>	Non Governmental Organisation/s, <i>IT ONG Organizzazioni non Governative</i>
<b>OAS</b>	Organisation American States
<b>OCHA</b>	Office Coordination Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OCSE-DAC</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Development Assistance Committee
<b>OP</b>	Optional Protocol
<b>OSINT</b>	Open-Source Intelligence
<b>PCM</b>	<i>IT Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri</i> , Presidency of the Council of the Ministers
<b>PKO</b>	Peace Keeping Operations
<b>PM</b>	Prime Minister, <i>IT Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri</i>
<b>PSC</b>	Political Security Committee
<b>RD</b>	<i>IT Regio Decreto</i> , Royal Decree
<b>RIEAS</b>	Research Institute for European and American Studies
<b>ROL</b>	Rule of Law
<b>SASE</b>	Safe And Secure Environment
<b>SCN</b>	<i>IT Servizio Civile Nazionale</i> , National Civilian Service, sometimes also referred as “Civil Service” in the text.
<b>S&amp;R</b>	Stability and Reconstruction
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>TEU</b>	Treaty of the European Union
<b>TULPS</b>	<i>IT Testo Unico delle Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza</i> , Single Act of Public Security Laws
<b>UDC</b>	<i>IT Unità di Crisi</i> , MoFA Operations Room
<b>UDHR</b>	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>US</b>	United States of America
<b>UNSG</b>	United Nations Secretary General
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNTSO</b>	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNV</b>	United Nations Volunteers
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>WPD</b>	White Paper of Defence, <i>IT Libro Bianco della Difesa</i>
<b>ZDF</b>	<i>DE Zivilier Friedensdienst</i> , German Civil Peace Service
<b>ZIF</b>	<i>DE Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze</i> , German Center for International Peace Operations

## **FIGURES**

**Figure 1:** The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

**Figure 2:** The Challenge of Mission Integration

**Figure 3:** Theoretical International Strategic Operations Design

**Figure 4:** The conflict transformation timeline

**Figure 5:** NATO CIMIC Handbook “There is a need for a CA using Civil-Military Interaction



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*Padova, 09/10/2015*

*SEMPRE E OVUNQUE*