# UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, LAW,
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**Master's degree in
Human Rights and Multi-level Governance**

THE MIND OF WAR:

SYMBOLIC INSTRUMENTS OF MILITARY IDEOLOGY WITHIN
THE COLOMBIAN POPULATION IN THE ARMED CONFLICT.

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Abstract

Since the beginning of the Colombian armed conflict, ideology has been the main replicator to promote the fight between the actors in the conflict, the first actor in the conflict that began using ideology as an instrument of war was the guerrillas based on the different branches of the Communism, as a counterattack, the Colombian military forces began to use anti-communist speeches and propaganda to maintain the government structure, establishing it as the main base of the military ideology that would develop throughout the armed conflict.

This thesis aims to study the military ideology from a historical perspective, seeing the changes from the beginning of the armed conflict until 2016, the date on which the peace process was signed with the oldest guerrilla group in Colombia, the FARC; to identify symbolic instruments of military ideology used not only within the institution but also in Colombian society, analyzing interviews with military personnel and reviewing the Colombian press of the 20th and 21st centuries.

Keywords: Military ideology, psychological warfare, Colombian armed conflict.

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Introduction

In the following investigation, one of the most important factors in the Colombian armed conflict will be investigated: ideology, specifically the military, and how it has influenced the Colombian population. Mainly, symbolic instruments originating from military ideState-of-the-artocess of diffusion through the press towards the population will be identified, through the analysis of interviews made with soldiers in the historical memory section of the national army radio station and the analysis of Colombian newspapers of the 20th and 21st centuries.

The analysis of both instruments will help to identify and understand the military culture of the Colombian army, to identify symbols and meanings within the institution, and then identify them in the Colombian press, since the media help to reconstruct and configure collective thoughts, which in this case affects the course of the conflict, the perception of violence, peace, justice, and impunity.

Starting through the social history that led to the creation of communist guerrillas in the middle of the 20th century, as well as the military history of the army about the Colombian armed conflict until 2016, when the peace agreement was signed with the oldest guerrilla in Colombia. Proceeding to the identification of the symbols within the military culture and the Colombian press explaining them as part of psychological warfare and symbolic violence that directly affects the Colombian population even today.

1. CHAPTER 1

1.1. State of the art
1.1.1. First part: Colombian armed conflict from the 50s to the '90s

1.1.1.1. Social context of the beginning of the Colombian armed conflict

The Colombian armed conflict began around 1960 when the period of La Violencia (1928-1958) turned into an internal conflict. La Violencia was a stage where the Conservative (right) and Liberal (left) parties clashed with weapons, in the years 1928-1958, and where political affiliation within the country was the most important thing, the social life of the country revolved around the bipartisanship. The civil wars that took place between the middle of the 19th century and the middle of the 20th century left the country with a deep economic crisis, forced displacements, massacres, persecutions, dispossession, and mistrust of the government.

The hegemony of the Conservative Party in Colombia was around 1886 to 1930, after its victory in the War of the Thousand Days, where Panama was sold to the United States by the current president of this year (1899-1902) and where the influence and bilateral relations with the United States became official. This period is characterized by the government's abuse of the most vulnerable and needy populations after the wars of independence, and the neglect of these populations, due to clientelism, latifundism, and land dispossession.

After the scenario left behind by the time of Violence and all the civil wars before it, what is known as the National Front was given way, which is a bipartisan agreement in the year 1958, which consisted of a president from each political group (conservative and liberal) had the right to govern interchangeably and have a fair distribution of power. During the following years, the country was having an economic increase due to the exports of coffee and oil, however, since 1928 due to the global economic crisis, work levels began to decrease and in 1929 many companies had to close due to the Great Depression, an economic phenomenon that was being experienced worldwide.

In this context, the unions of employees of large companies (mostly foreign) began to be established and the poverty rates in the country were reaching their maximum. Alongside the union, groups were a variant of social movement groups, such as peasant communities, artisans, indigenous peoples, and students. The conservative party under its military ideology in the Armed Forces and Police sought to stop and repress social demonstrations, an important historical event that reflects the extremity of repression and the government's incomprehension of the social needs of the time and the ambiguity in giving everything his support for foreign companies was the massacre of the banana companies.

It was December 5, 1928, in the Magdalena swamp, when the workers led by the Magdalena workers union, tired of labor exploitation by the United Fruit Company and due to poor living conditions and low pay received by the America from company, they decidedFoundationstrike to demand more labor rights, among these were: mandatory group health insurance, hygienic rooms and rest on Sundays, weekly pay, among many others.

On the night between December 5 Foundation military arrived at the company, the railway station was established nearby where 2,000 - 4,000 strikers were sleeping or resting, and the general who commanded three hundred soldiers read a national decree that it prohibited assemblies of more than three people and ordered all people to be dispersed or shot. Three bugle blasts followed at an interval of one minute each and none of the assembled people moved, at which point the exercise opened fire on them. To date, it is not known exactly how many women, children, and men were murdered, since the bodies were taken by railway to the sea where they were dumped.

Due to events of social repression such as the one mentioned above and social protests prohibited by laws promulgated by the Colombian State, the first left parties were born, such as the Partido Socialista Revolucionario, Partido Comunista Colombiano and some lines of the liberal party decided to categorize themselves as center-left. Political persecution by the Armed Forces, the problem of land possession, inequality, social exclusion, weakness, and the absence of the State, among others, caused the Colombian armed conflict.

All this social chaos that the National Government did not manage equitably and fairly gave way to the formation of a plurality of guerrilla groups with communist ideologies of different lines, in the global context of the 60s, the communist ideology was very strong in The region

of the American continent and internationally the world was divided into two ideological blocks, the capitalist and the communist. In the western block, where Colombia is located, the capitalist ideology was within the form of government, for this reason, the worrying threat of the growth of socialist/communist groups within the country needed to be reduced to the minimum, and since the 1930s With more emphasis of effort to reduce the spread of communist ideology in the 1960s, 1970's, the country's military forces focused and took as the basis for their military ideology, the counterattack, and destruction of communist ideology and everything that identified with her.

For the decades of the '80s and '90s, with the end of the cold war and the fading of the communist ideology, the military doctrines and ideology changed and redefined the "enemy", with it came several military restructurings, the way of making war and new political reforms. Likewise, in these decades the concept of human rights began to be more involved, there was more control and international involvement within the armed conflict, they were also strengthened and more agreements were established with the United States mainly and the Colombian armed conflict had international visibility, however, this internationalization was due to the involvement of drug trafficking, since it affected other nations.

1.1.1.2. Military context of the Colombian armed conflict

In 1964, the guerrillas had already taken over a large part of the country, especially the rural areas where the State had no presence. The communist ideology spread easily due to the social needs that the country was experiencing at the moment and the promise of an ideal world where everyone had the same rights, equally and justly, increasingly attracted marginalized and vulnerable communities. The concern of the national government was growing and the Armed Forces, in their eagerness to recover lost territory, began to create strategic counterattack plans.

In this context, the activation of the Gama Sovereignty Plan (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)) began, this Plan consisted of recovering the territories where the FARC-EP guerrilla began, Marquetalia (Tolima), Riochiquito (Cauca), El Pato and Guayabero (Huila) through

armed counter-offensive combat against the guerrillas, where the Armed Forces lost (No matarás, comisión de la verdad; 2022). Due to the defeat of the Armed Forces, Operation Marquetalia began, which was defined as a "civic-military" action that was "framed within the general plan known as Operation Sovereignty, which sought to "achieve the repression of the violence and the peaceful approach and aid provided to the prevailing needs [of the population]" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)).

> "Operation Marquetalia had four stages: concentration of troops; isolation of the assigned target; encirclement and destruction of the latter; and final consolidation. For them, the Military Forces hoped to develop intelligence and counterintelligence actions, psychological actions with the civilian population, territorial control of surrounding areas, intensive retraining of troops, establishment of blockades to escape routes and installation of a fence against the subversives, air support against the troops, assaults against the self-defense groups and search operations…"

(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P. (2017)).

With this military operation, it can be seen how the counterattack against the guerrilla groups was defined and wanted to generate a great impact and control. The great seizure of territory by the FARC guerrillas in this territory was more easily accepted by the population because they were One of the territories most affected by the time of La Violencia, the State had no validity and they did not trust it either due to its past.

From the perspective of the Military Forces, the operation "seeks to "achieve the repression of the violent and the peaceful rapprochement and aid provided to the prevailing needs [of the population]" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). Concerned about the good reception of the communist ideology in these areas, the army decided that the operation was framed within the Lazo Plan, a civil-military strategy that would help the Armed Forces to begin to enter making their military presence be accepted by the population tablets such as health brigades, an educational focus and more presence of the State from a social perspective.

The Lazo Plan was created between the years of 1962-1966 and brought with it the first restructuring of all the Armed Forces, focusing mainly on the validation and acceptance of society towards the Armed Forces, according to "General Alberto Ruiz Novoa (the brain of the plan) «The philosophy of the Plan was 'to take away the water from the fish', that is, to take away peasant support for the guerrillas. There were tactical innovations, such as the

guerrilla locator groups, but civic-military action was more important than combat» (Leal Buitrago, La seguridad nacional adrift, XX)" (No matarás, comisión de la verdad; 2022).

During the Army's counterattacks against the guerrillas, the military stated that the threat from the communist guerrillas was worse than previously thought, since they are not confronting peasants who, armed with weapons, are seeking the right to own vacant lands that had been colonized, but rather that it was an organized and more structured communist threat, that is, they were beginning to face a political war.

Given the political importance that the communist guerrillas were beginning to have, the army decided to first reinforce itself and then withdraw. More money began to be allocated to the Military Forces, sending the most experienced soldiers (including those who had gone to the Korean War (1950-1953)) to counter-guerrilla confrontations, they extended the time of compulsory military service, there was a greater concentration in the region of airplanes, helicopters, artillery pieces, modern rifles, communication radios, transport vehicles; They created the School of Lancers, imitating the model of the Ranger School of the United States Army and, most importantly, the principles of irregular warfare began to be incorporated into military training.

Returning to the irregular Military Forces for irregular warfare meant "resorting to flexible and changing procedures, systems, modalities, while simplifying and lightening their means, equipment, and organizations, conserving only those oral, psychological and material elements that constitute a positive advantage over irregular forces" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). One of these strategies was to involve the civilian population as informants and informers and the payment of rewards to the military or police, which brought more success in military operations against banditry.

The experience lived by the military who fought in the Korean War left great admiration for how the US Army worked due to its logistics and operational organization, which stimulated the desire to create a replica of the United States' doctrinal and organizational model. This established the Lazo Plan, which also brought with it the establishment of bilateral relations with the United States, and the National Security doctrine was created, which would change the way of attacking military operations.

The Armed Forces were modernized in terms of weapons with the acquisition of an arsenal of rifles and warplanes, and strategies were created to gain greater acceptance and support from the civilian population. As a strategy to legitimize the State institution in populations where "before there was" an absence of State, the National Army was used to promote institutional actions such as education, health, transportation, justice, security, and others; as the Army was the only institution that had a presence in remote and rural areas of the country.

Also, as the first moment of the implementation of the Lazo Plan, Military-Civilian Coordination Committees were established in regional and local areas, integrating with priority police officers and retired soldiers, "people of good behavior" who were trustworthy to the military forces to whom that they would be given weapons at critical moments, training of location teams and the creation of joint Operations centers; along with the implementation of civil action programs, such as the construction of roads, bridges, aqueducts, schools, health centers, etc.

As a second moment, the positive intelligence and counterintelligence programs were also prioritized, actions necessary to acquire the greatest possible information on the situation of bandits and guerrillas, their support networks, movements, their capacity and manner of action; this information was mainly acquired by civilians who played the role of informants. The third and fourth moments of the Plan were to create isolation from the sources of supply to the subversive groups through the control of the civilian population and campaigns by Location Teams.

After Operation Gama Sovereignty (1964), legal "civil self-defense" boards were activated, according to the military manuals of the 1960s they referred to them as; "The self-defense junta is a military-type organization made up of selected civilian personnel from the combat zone, who are trained and equipped to carry out actions against guerrilla groups that threaten the area or to operate in coordination with troops in actions of combat" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). The assigned weapons were weapons confiscated from the guerrillas, they had to have direct control of the military units and could not carry out offensive actions.

The military forces could make use of the self-defense groups only for the following tasks:

> "(1) guards or sentinels of critical facilities. (2) Mobile reconnaissance patrols that cover critical areas of towns and villages. (3) Fixed guard posts on those roads where there is

a danger of guerrilla attacks. (4) Control of foreign individuals entering or leaving the region. (5) Information to the military unit about subversive activities, of individuals or groups. (6) In control, search and destruction operations, for which weapons and ammunition for the exclusive use of the Military Forces can be provided, for the duration of the action."

(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

Along with this, enormous power was granted to the Military Forces, and Verbal War Councils were created, a tool of military criminal justice since 1958, through Decree 250 of the military Government and protected by the Constitution of 1886, where military courts were authorized and promoted to try civilians. The Government of 1965 authorized the Verbal Councils of War to carry out investigation and prosecution of "acts that threaten the existence and purposes of the institution or against the existence of the Nation and organization of the State" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), putting the civilian population in the hands of the military, with the danger of falling into injustice and violation of human rights.

During the following years, the Armed Forces identified and categorized what they would call the "civilian insurgent population" and defined them as a minority agitation group that operates clandestinely and distinguished between "two types of revolutionary actions: (1) Actions of the type civil that is carried out within the formal structures of society and, (2) Military-type actions that are conducted by guerrilla groups" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). Civilian actions occurred more than anything in the cities when demonstrations were held, according to the military, it was a strategy of the subordinates to occupy more than 70% of the armed forces in the demonstrations and leave rural areas where the guerrilla groups were. The threat was also extended within the military institutions due to the "mediocre" security studies that were carried out when recruiting personnel for the obligatory civil service since the guerrilla groups chose people with no criminal record to infiltrate them into the ranks of the army.

Therefore, in 1978, the Security Statute has signed was a statute where "the violation of human rights was allowed with methods similar to those of the dictatorships of the Southern Cone" (No matarás, comisión de la verdad; 2022), where armed institutions were allowed to search homes without a warrant, arbitrary arrests, torture, forced disappearance, and the aforementioned Verbal Councils of War were reinforced; the power of the Armed Forces was getting out of control and this period is known as a "dictatorship disguised as democracy".

In the following years, military offensives became more frequent and the way of operating was attacked, although this often brought casualties in the armed forces, since the soldiers faced situations in unknown rural areas or jungles. tropical, they did not have enough ammunition and they lacked experience in military operations. By the year 1985, the Military Forces required more budget to start a new restructuring. This year, the country was divided into six fields of military operations, five naval zones, and five air zones. "The country's brigade commanders would also select the best soldiers who finished their mandatory service to form companies of volunteer soldiers, "seeking to give the brigades a highly trained combat element with priority in the execution of offensive counter-guerrilla operations." (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

The restructuring carried out in 1985 and how it was operated gave worrying results. In 1989, the Minister of Defense warned: "The number of troops available to the Military Forces at this time... which amounts to one hundred and twenty-two thousand eight hundred and eight men [...], it is still insufficient if one takes into account the territorial extension, the population of the country [and] the responsibility assigned to maintain territorial integrity, sovereignty and control of the maritime and air space" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), even with all the strategies to increase personnel and budget in military institutions, they were not enough to combat the guerrillas.

Up to that period, no strategy gave the expected results and neither did it withdraw the expansion and operations of the guerrillas in Colombian territory. The lack of budget for combat was the main element that most affected a propitious and high-magnitude operational restructuring to counterattack the subversive groups, which would put the Colombian Army in a situation of no improvement during the 50s to the '90s, however, in the following years, from the perspective of the Military Forces, the scenario improved a lot.

1.1.1.3. Colombian military doctrine

Within the military institution, the doctrines were the most important thing to keep the institution alive and strong, within the strategic plans, different doctrines were defined that not only expanded within the institution but also within Colombian society. The doctrines were used as instruments of war to justify attacks and counterattacks against those who threatened the State or military institutions, however, within the Colombian armed conflict, criminal practices and political uses of violence were not separated.

In the case of Colombia and within the framework of the cold war (1947-1991), the doctrine was based on the existence of "an enemy, international communism, which acted covertly through an internal enemy. In Colombia, that enemy was represented in the armed opponent, but also in those who without weapons contested the power established" (Thou shalt not kill, truth commission).

From the beginning, the doctrine of the Colombian Army had a European influence "From 1914 to 1942, according to Helg (1986), the Colombian Army had a Swiss, German, and French doctrinal influence, which materialized in the use of uniforms and unit models. European-style military" (Cardona; J. M. (2020)). However, since 1942, with the Second World War, the doctrinal influence began to be American due to the bilateral relations that were being established between Colombia and the United States, manifested more evidently in the Military Assistance and Advisory Pact (PAM) signed in 1949.

By the year 1953, the Military Forces had no experience and did not know how to attack and act as a counter-guerrilla force, so several Colombian officers received training as rangers at the Ranger School, located in Georgia, United States, bringing the model of attack, organization, and base for the creation of the Lanceros school at the end of 1955. In 1962, through the second cooperation mission between the United States and Colombia, called Yarborough, the counterinsurgency doctrine, better known as the Doctrine of National Security, would be applied in the following years as a basis for counterattack plans and strategies.

The doctrine of National Security "is a military theory of the State that seeks the survival of the nation against all adverse forces, and the triumph of national objectives (Comblin 1978: 67) from the militarization and ideologization of security, including in its instrumentalization the occupation of state institutions" Jiménez, C. J. (2017). It mainly consisted of establishing

the definition of the "internal enemy": "as a stigma against opponents, under the argument that after their actions there were the tentacles of international communism. Following this line, systems of propaganda, psychological warfare, restructuring of the Forces, and, the riskiest, the training of civilians to support the military in war" (No matarás, comisión de la verdad; 2022), was thus basically a counterinsurgency doctrine.

The security doctrine was based on the doctrine developed in France during the war in Indochina (1945-1954) and the war in Algeria (1954-1962), and in the British Army in the war in Malaysia, where "European armies they faced revolutions with great popular support, against irregular guerillas that they combined weapons and politics, and had territories under their control" (No matarás, comisión de la verdad; 2022). For this reason, the change in perception of the institution within the civilian population was essential for the counteroffensives, since one of the key points of this doctrine was to fight for the support of civil society, "...both the national government and the command of the Military Forces considered that to achieve the containment and eventual drowning of the guerrillas it was necessary to "dispute" the popularity and support that they could potentially receive from the civilian population" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

> "The heart of this doctrine was located at two extremes: first, the need to learn from the enemy and copy his strategies and tactics, methods and techniques; and second, an assessment of psychological warfare. Among the main characteristics of guerrilla warfare, it was considered that the goal was the control of the population, its values , and ways of living; In addition, there was no distinction between the civil front and the military front, or between war and politics, since it was an unconventional war, where the enemy used dirty tactics, techniques, and methods, infiltrating society for its domination (Goodman et al. al., 1990)".

(Cardona; J.M.; 2020).

The first phase of Plan Lazo (1962) was put into practice, where the indoctrination of "civil units of legal self-defense" was stipulated, where "outstanding people of society" were chosen so that at critical moments they went to fight counterattack the communist guerrillas. This involvement of civil society as an armed actor in the internal conflict would have very serious repercussions in the future, which will be explained later. The indoctrination of these people consisted in that through "psychological operations" it was intended to "build an

internal enemy who should be expelled, stripped off of his citizen character and treat as a criminal from public order" (No matarás, comisión de la verdad; 2022).

Thus, it is understood that the doctrine is not a copy of reality, but rather a set of productions, "of strategic practices (manuals and regulations), in this case of the Army, which seeks to legitimize or justify actions and behaviors such as the effectiveness in operations" (Cardona; J. M. (2020)), thus becoming an ideology that not only penetrated the military institution but also the Colombian population.

1.1.1.4. Military ideology in the Colombian armed conflict

To better understand the logic of military actions, Ugarriza and Ayala (2017) in their book "Militaries and guerrillas: the historical memory of the armed conflict in Colombia from the military archives, 1958-2016", identified five factors of the military confrontation and ideological within the Colombian armed conflict: The first factor is the use of the anti-communist discourse derived from the cold war and that was promoted by political parties since the 1920s and installed in the military culture in 1958. The second factor is the inequality of knowledge of war between the Military Forces and their adversaries, the people who fought in the guerrilla groups of the 60s were aware of irregular warfare due to the experiences of past wars, leaving the new military inexperienced in combat at a disadvantage.

The third factor is about the adaptation of the international military doctrine against the communist bloc, which for the war that was taking place in Colombia, was not very consistent with technical training, the creation of organizational structures, and the forms of internal relations. The fourth factor refers to the doctrinal difficulty in understanding bandit warfare, which was mainly within the cities, and guerrilla warfare. This lack of knowledge of the enemy increased the loss of life among rural combatants. Finally, the fifth factor, which increased the variety, understanding, and management of the armed conflict, consisted of the involvement of civilians in the war, established in the legal framework of 1886, which also gave legal and administrative powers to the military.

The social scenario within the country at the beginning of the 20th century was quite varied, the country's social and economic inequality was in decline, and social protests and demonstrations were increasingly frequent. For the State, social demonstrations, protests to demand rights, and guerrilla groups and bandits were the same and the position they took against them was to attack them all equally:

> "The conception of communism as the germ of disorder and anarchy that could spread in the country had become popular among business and political sectors of a national, regional, and local order, and the number of strikes and demonstrations that took place periodically in companies, factories, and state entities were classified as an "epidemic evil", promoted not in the interest of the legitimate rights of workers, but because of the "criminal" purposes of communist ideology, against which the democratic Colombian State had to be cautious".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

The State takes as its cause the defense of large companies to maintain "social order", any form of demand for better working and living conditions was understood as an act of rebellion caused by communist ideology, and any demand to apply the civil rights, was an act that was influenced by leftist ideas:

> "Laureano Gómez Castro (1950), considered that before the advance of said ideology, it was necessary to "cleanse the popular mind of the stinging weeds of historical materialism that degrade the human person and, demolishing it, deliver it defenseless to the punishment of collectivist tyrannies" … In the Colombian case… it should be noted that the salvation of traditional culture is due to the loyalty and heroic decision of the Military Forces and that our Nation does not groan now under communist tyranny. As a reward for such distinguished service, the people must ensure that their army has the appropriate technical means for its full effectiveness".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

In this sense, a guerrilla was a "degraded person," "not a hero," and someone who threatened traditional culture. With this speech by the president, the definition of "enemy" probably began to be defined, not only within the institutions of the military but also within Colombian society. The outlawing of the communist party occurred through anti-communist speeches within the Military Forces, reinforcing the idea that there was a "moral value" and that the military was the defender of the "traditional values of society": "The government will prevent

or above Christian morality, a materialistic concept of man and his task is established... (possession of Rojas in 1953)" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

The world and Western civilization have forgotten the Christian value, President Rojas said a year later, making an allegory to God and reiterating religion in the country's military culture, to generate rejection of the atheist communist groups, who had no respect for God nor life. "There is a subversive plan to overthrow the legitimate authorities, denounced the new civil government in December 1958, "with the use of barbaric procedures... contrary to the principles of Christian civilization" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017), it is understood then, that the Christian civilization is the population that does good and does not belong to subversive groups.

The involvement of military ideology in Colombian society has its beginnings in 1962, as previously shown, with the development of civic-military activities that Plan Lazo put into practice to gain the support of Colombian society through the implementation of actions and social programs, it was not only done with the objective of state presence but also to spread the thought of rejection of the communist ideology, it was a work with a double meaning that was more intended to generate rejection of the communist guerrillas to have greater acceptance and support for what it was very important for military operations, rather than wanting to improve social conditions itself.

From the perspective of the military and from their trial, which in the same way serves as a speech to generate a collective thought, they stated that:

> "The issue had its roots in the idiosyncrasies that since the past times of the Conquest had characterized the inhabitants of the country; in the propensity to commit all kinds of excesses that could only be contained with a deep Christian education; in the low level of life of the inhabitants of many regions of the country where there was a deficit of housing, food, clothing, high fertility rates, high mortality rates, child labor exploitation; and in the notorious differences between social classes".

> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

The same was true of the perception of violence by the military:

"Likewise, the uniformed officers considered that the violence, in a kind of vicious circle, was also fueled by the growing unemployment rate that was derived from the forced migration of people from the countryside to the cities, forcing themselves, out of necessity, to resort to looting or robbery to survive together with their families. Derived from the above, the Plan argued that another of the worrying factors that fueled and sustained violence was the deep moral crisis that Colombian society was going through, which was expressed in social instability, the economic exploitation of violence, the lack of professional ethics in the performance of the charges, the loss of respect for human life, the honor and comes from people, and the supremacy of the material over the spiritual".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

Therefore, the communist guerrillas began to be demonized using religious discourses (support of the church), of "civilization" (quite a questionable concept), turning them into "antisocial". The collective imagination began to be created that being a Christian meant being civilized and being civilized meant not being poor. The construction of this enemy was to be poor, atheist, ic, and uncivilized (antisocial), and for this reason, he became a communist/socialist. A "good" person, a person "outstanding in society" was, then, the opposite.

However, it must be taken into account that due to the great power that the military had in the middle of the 20th century and the control that it exercised within the population in all areas, they did nothing more than forcibly sow the construction of the enemy within of society, making use of the training of the self-defense groups and the Verbal Councils of War. Such power and control over the civilian population and even more so in rural and remote areas would cause injustices and arbitrariness, for the year 1982 the number of detainees by the Oral War Councils reached 56,044 and a Human Rights Committee denounced torture and executions However, all these complaints were denied by the Government of the time, since: "For the Army, the accusations were the product of "left-wing elements" that promoted discredit campaigns against the Military Forces, to "remove their support." of the population" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

The guerrilla groups were perceived not only as "a military threat to the democratic State, but also from an ideological point of view" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), "the infiltration action has been carried out and has resulted effective, mainly in the union, student and clerical fields [...] which has allowed a considerable number of young communists to exist in the student environment and a high percentage of these with revolutionary

tendencies" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), the threat was transferred to the city and to the military institutions "being the preferred targets the lower commands and the cadre training schools" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017), with infiltration in the military forces.

At the beginning of the 80s, the Armed Forces were concerned about the social situation of the country:

> "given the lack of awareness of the real danger that hangs over the country." In particular, they feared that "if the leftist groups, supported by a sector of the Liberal Party, manage to achieve union […] or if the leftists continue to work in total and absolute freedom in indoctrination, organization, and recruitment of their armed forces, We will arrive in a very short time at the time of no return, where the problem would no longer be solely that of the Nation, but rather a survival of uniformed personnel".
>
> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

The concern of the military was that the guerrilla groups had the ability and facility to promote political ideas that could destabilize the actions of the Armed Forces, to the point of weakening them and making them incapable of facing the communist threat. This unleashed the application of the Security Statute, which gave the military the power to decide who was a guerrilla collaborator, who was a guerrilla, who was a bandit, etc.; practically, it gave him the power and freedom to "destroy the enemy" whether or not he was.

One of the consequences of the ideology that the application of the national security doctrine would bring would be the MAS groups. In the 80s, they would become a new social phenomenon and actor within the armed conflict, these groups would be defined by the guerrillas as "the incarnation of the neo-fascist theory of National Security [...] that give carte blanche to organizations of torturers and murderers" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). MAS was the product of the civil self-defense groups legally created in the previous decade and which, at this point in the conflict, already had the reputation of being "a covert form of private justice and then as an instrument of revenge, of disproportionate and gratuitous punishment, even of frivolity in crime" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)) and the great human rights violations they were committing were getting out of control.

The most worrying aspect of this new actor in the conflict was its leak to government institutions, since former members of the Armed Forces, regular soldiers who had already

finished their military service, and soldiers who were still in public office but did not earn enough money. , were easy prey to the recruitment of these groups: "At that time, few officers or noncommissioned officers had cars," says a retired noncommissioned officer. "The parking lots of the units were empty. But suddenly, one saw a captain or a sergeant parking a car, and one knew that there was something strange" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

> "According to a report from the Attorney General's Office, a total of 163 individuals, including 59 active military personnel, belonged to the MAS. "People directly or indirectly linked to the Armed Forces have been swept away by this current of national dissolution," he says. "With this, they have undoubtedly exceeded the limits of the mission entrusted by their institutions"
>
> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

Because of this, the Government and the Courts decided to limit and disassociate themselves from all forms of collaboration between the civilian population and the military, restrict and prohibit the use of weapons and their participation in military operations. It was urgently needed to clear the name of the State and the ACCU (Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá) began to be named, thus assigning them their identification, emphasizing the detachment from the Armed Forces.

The ACCU identified itself under the motto: "legitimate defense is not a mathematical formula, it is a human formula" and proposed to "train and train peasant commanders and leaders to lead peasant self-defense groups" and "carry out military operations that necessary", disseminating "the disadvantages that a communist totalitarian system would have in Colombia" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). The psychological intensity campaigns by the State and the counterattack strategies were giving the desired results but at great costs.

The application of this ideology, referring to the perspective of the military forces towards the Colombian population, was seen in the speeches given by political leaders in public media, which not only promoted rejection but also terror:

> "— There is a strategy and a programming of terror whose objective is synthesized in a pathetic phrase, repeated without rest by the political leader Laureano Gómez before acceding to the Presidency: "there are one million eight hundred thousand false identification cards". The phrase was tantamount to stripping the country's majority party of its citizenship —"

(Gómez, G.S.; 1990).

The visibility that this type of speech tries to give is from the perspective of the Military Forces, since, as has been repeatedly mentioned throughout the thesis, the support of the Colombian population was the most important thing because in this way the attacks, symbolic value is given to the fight against insurgents and the institution is established as a symbol that is not questioned and therefore they have the "right" to do what "is due" (want) because it is what It is good for the whole society.

1.1.1.5. Military Culture

Within the military ideology, clear factors are established that correspond to the definition of military culture in the Colombian Armed Forces, through the establishment of three components that make up this concept, the visible, moral, and vocational:

> "VISIBLE COMPONENT: "Are explicit, visible and easy to teach aspects of military culture that identify men and women as members of the Force, which are evident in uniforms, distinctions, military courtesy, ranks, and the ceremonies" (Barco Giraldo, 2017). MORAL COMPONENT: "It is the component that separates the civilian from the military, it is in this where the implicit understanding occurs and where ethics and values become a creed. This component includes the creeds of service, the fundamental values of the army, and the meaning of the national prayer" (Barco Giraldo, 2017). VOCATIONAL COMPONENT: "This component of the Military Culture identifies active and retired military since from this moment on this is rooted in the human being, in this area it includes hidden aspects that cannot be evidenced with the naked eye or taught directly, aspects such as discipline, teamwork, self-sacrifice, esprit de corps, warriors full of ethics, values , and belief in what they do" (Barco Giraldo, 2017)".

(Ospina Quiroga & Rodríguez Sajonero; 2018).

Military training ranges from physical training to educational training where it is taught what it is to belong to the institution and the importance of the role they develop, it is also accompanied by initiation rituals, symbols of identity with the institution, and the language used. within the institution. It is important to take into account that the military culture is never static, since the values, the (military) objective, and the forms of attack change constantly. In the case of the Colombian military culture, it is stipulated in the military plans

that were designed. mainly for the guerrilla counterattack and are framed in a doctrine that when integrated becomes an ideology.

Regarding the military self, Cardona Angarita (2020), in his research "Colombian military doctrine in the practices of officers during the internal armed conflict (1995-1998)" interviewed retired military officers to delve into the self-perspective of the military within the institution. Of the security needs that the country has been experiencing since the 1960s, the Colombian army expressed the need to adopt a doctrine for national defense and another for war, where two factors were the most important: the need to learn and know the enemy and psychological warfare, likewise established the Colombian military self.

The armed forces stated that one of the worrying factors that fueled and sustained the violence was the deep moral crisis that Colombian society was going through, which was expressed in social instability, the economic exploitation of violence, the lack of professional ethics in carrying out their duties, the loss of respect for human life, honor and the good of people, and the supremacy of the material over the spiritual, that is to say, being a soldier was precisely the opposite of what the military was. "enemy" (the subversives), in this sense the military mostly belonged to the Christian/Catholic church, had a deep moral responsibility (mainly Christian), with values, professional ethics, respect for human life, honor, pride of belonging to the armed forces, of being a warrior and of loving the "mother country".

In the investigation, the former members of the military represented themselves as:

> "…of the middle class, of urban origin, with a mestizo ethnic self-representation, of the Catholic religion; who was in combat on the front line; with command experience in military operations, with a good level of education at the time of being interviewed, with significant knowledge of practices in the military institution; expert in the development of counter-guerrilla military operations, and with values and virtues oriented towards commitment to the institution and the country (Rivera, 2017)".

(Cardona Angarita, J.M.; 2020).

Regarding the senior officers interviewed, they were very proud of having belonged to the military forces, they justified themselves and aligned themselves with the imaginary ideal of being commanders of the armed forces and putting existing doctrine into practice,

> "Their military training, introduced in the eighties, framed in the institutional model of Charles Moskos, was strongly linked to the imaginary of being a corrections officer, due to the values inculcated, such as military honor, sacrifice, and line of duty. This imagination functioned as a "set of mental images that operate as a network and that are resignified as time passes" (Escobar, 2000, p. 76)".

<div align="right">(Cardona Angarita, J.M.; 2020).</div>

This image of the officers was built through the values and principles internalized from the training stage, this training was guided by the military doctrine developed outside and inside the country, but some interviewees stated that it focused a little more on training and training in commissions abroad.

> "From the pluralistic model of Charles Moskos, and when confronted with the interviews of the officers, it can be observed that, in the Army, for the nineties, the institutional aspect is more identified in the elite units, such as the special forces and the Mobile Brigades 1 and 2, which, in normal units, because the latter did not have all the support described in the doctrine".

<div align="right">(Cardona Angarita, J.M.; 2020).</div>

This shows the importance of the doctrine and the definition of what military culture is, as well as the economic support for the institution since the doctrine can be captured, handled, and understood by the retired officers, framed within the guidelines of the Government. National. Taking into account that "the doctrine could be understood not as a copy of reality, but as the production of strategic practices (manuals and regulations), in this case of the Army, which seek to legitimize or justify actions and behaviors such as effectiveness in operations" (Cardona Angarita, J. M. (2020)). However, it is important to mention that many of the military manuals were taken from the United States Army, translated, and tried to adapt to the Colombian context, but it did not work very well because the Colombian war conditions were very different.

The adaptation of the military manuals of the US Army is an important point to take into account, as has been mentioned throughout the thesis, the Colombian Army has a close relationship with the United States Army, which meant that the values and the imaginaries of the military towards themselves come from the American military culture, showing itself in Cardona's research (2020), as:

> "At the same time, the officers at a general level —who represented themselves within the framework of a social conservatism and with imaginaries strongly anchored to the

fulfillment of duty, conviction, and vocation of service— saw themselves faced with adverse conditions both for the context of the public order of the Colombian armed conflict as well as the conditions and capacities of the military units about the doctrine".

<p style="text-align: right">(Cardona Angarita, J.M.; 2020).</p>

In the same way, it is important to take into account that military culture transfers to the daily life of the military since when the soldier went to combat he had to wear "the face" of being a soldier who was aligned with state ideologies, but at the same time in the other aspects of his life (personal/private) the ideologies of his work were also in all personal areas, which made it less hard to fight the "enemy", "fighting against a communist threat that represented the end of society as it was known, the fear of losing the notion of life as it was conceived at that time (government as savior of traditions) … defense of the traditional values of society" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). In other words, for the military, he is defending life itself, social life, family life, and Christian life, as he knows it.

From the high command, it was stated that "it is important to make [the soldier] aware that when he goes to public order he is going to kill, finish off the enemy and never fear that they are going to kill him […] The bandit is a coward when he is losing, he runs and the bosses will always try to take cover from the harsh reality of war" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). At the same time, the instructions warned that, however, "abuse by word or deed and the use of violent means to obtain information is prohibited" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), due to the serious accusations of violation of human rights that the Army was presenting.

Likewise, to "obtain successes against groups up in arms...it is necessary to awaken professional mysticism, excellent morale, and esprit de corps [that allow] always maintaining the initiative" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). As the doctrine specifies, the main objective was to end the threat of communism within the country, so the military had to act by this, thus being all the other factors that "compose" a military, which make him can be "effective" in combat, from his private life to his life as a public official.

For this reason, all the political speeches made by the high command, the Colombian presidents, and the presidents of the United States together with the religious and moral speeches, were what gave the military courage when in combat, an example of this was the

prayer they say before attacking and entering the Palace of Justice, the day it was taken over by the M-19 guerrilla: "Exalted in spirit, the soldiers from the Artillery and Presidential Guard battalions entered behind the vehicle, shouting at the top of their voices. voice the Army's homeland prayer: "Colombia, my homeland, I carry you in my heart...!" "(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P. (2017)). The value of the military comes not only from the duty to do their job but from the thought that they are protecting society and that they have God's approval.

The symbology and language within the institution are extremely important, as shown in the previous example, religion plays a very essential role within the Colombian military, identification with the national symbols, created and established since the independence of Colombia, the Creating love for the country where you live is extremely fundamental to create the sensation of protection of the territory, whose function of this is all the symbols of national identity:

> "For the Military Forces, its symbols and slogans are closely related to institutional identity, which also denote the policies of the top commanders of each force and the direction to comply with constitutional mandates. For the National Army, its slogan is "Multimission Heroes", the National Navy "We protect the Blue of the Flag" and the Colombian Air Force "This is how you go to the Heights". Similarly, the uniforms are also charged with that connotation of the identity of each Force, although they have transformed. Previously the uniform was green, the same for each force and they did not change too much, however, the Forces wanted to differentiate themselves from each other for that reason the Force's uniforms are different (Roca, 2001)".
>
> (Ospina Quiroga & Rodríguez Sajonero; 2018).

In this sense, the patriotic stories, the uniforms, the prayers, the initiation rituals, the military training, the institutional symbols, and logos, are related and personified in the military and are fully shown when they are in combat or military operations.

1.1.2. Part two: Colombian armed conflict after the '90s

1.1.2.1. The fall of the Soviet Union, a change of ideology, and the course of the armed conflict

The fall of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc in Eastern Europe also had consequences in Colombia, mainly affecting guerrilla operations and causing them to change their discourse of communism, directing it towards a discourse with nationalist principles, transforming the guerrilla discourse as the fight against the country's elites. Another big change was in the financing part of the cause, they no longer had international support, which caused the guerrillas to start getting involved with drug trafficking, although only in the coca production part and not in the commercialization because they were shielded from being categorized as a drug trafficking group, thus changing the course of the armed conflict and creating the need to redefine the concept of "enemy" within the Armed Forces.

The Marxist insurgencies were forced to incorporate nationalist elements in their discourse to regain validity within the Colombian population, the FARC's strategy was to take and adapt the country's history to their benefit, taking the figure of Simón Bolívar (main Colombian independence movement) as a martyred victim of the political leaders of the 19th century. At the end of the 20th century, the FARC proposed a "Bolivarian military doctrine", in which its Military Forces would only protect the border without interfering in internal affairs and making themselves seen as saviors of the "homeland" since they were strongly opposed to the involvement American within Colombian politics and territory.

During this period the United States was becoming increasingly involved in Colombia, increasingly influencing policy-making, the creation of new doctrines, the redefinition of military ideology, and new forms of guerrilla, drug-trafficking, and terrorist counterattack. In addition to this, the guerrillas in their eagerness for financing to sustain the war against the Colombian State and from this moment against the United States as well, made the conflict even more violent after the 1980s by all the actors. of the conflict. The guerrillas began to resort to methods such as kidnapping, extortion, looting, robbery, selective assassination, etc., and the military forces of the Colombian State had to redefine counterattack methods and military ideology, becoming just as violent as the other actors in the conflict.

1.1.2.2. Military forces

Since the 1990s, due to the serious accusations against the Army for collaborating with armed self-defense groups of civilians, the General Command of the Armed Forces eliminated from its manuals the organization of the armed civilian population as part of the counter-guerrilla strategy:

> "The Minister of Military Defense warned that "some of these groups went from prevention to action, growing with a spirit of retaliation or revenge against the insurgent groups and their political wings, financed by the same community, which is a victim of the subversion, and by groups of drug traffickers, who took advantage of their organizational infrastructure to infiltrate and dominate areas. For this reason, they have equipment, weapons, and training […] They were inappropriately named paramilitaries, with the political desire of subversion to identify them with the Public Force".

(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

In 1991, the Army decided that to clear its image of accusations of crimes against humanity and ties with armed self-defense groups, it made an effort to maintain its presence in areas affected by the conflict and carry out census, propaganda and help the population with issues of reforestation, repairs, painting of schools and children's homes, public cleaning, traditional festivals, etc., all to prevent the FARC-EP from returning. Thus returning to the base of the National Plan (loop) being civic-military, but in this case, much more importance was given to the military component.

The decade of the 90's also brought changes in the military scenario, the trial of civilians and guerrillas through Verbal War Councils was prohibited, and the military powers to declare a state of siege to "internal commotion" were restricted, which would cause the year 1991 the Military Forces activated the new theaters of operations for the Army and the Air Force and Navy, where six critical areas of the country were identified in thirteen departments. Since then, volunteer soldiers have dwindled, affecting military operations.

In 1992, after several attempts to sign peace with different guerrilla groups, the talks for a possible peace with the FARC finally broke down, the scale of guerrilla violence spread to eleven departments, and "the government was forced to decree the State of Internal

Commotion. With its decree, the Government put a price on the heads of the leaders of the Farc, the ELN, and the EPL, and launched a propaganda campaign throughout the country to encourage denunciations" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

The state of internal commotion in Colombia refers to the:

> "General faculties. Under the declaration of the State of Internal Commotion, the Government may suspend laws incompatible with said state and will have the strictly necessary powers to ward off the causes of the disturbance and prevent the extension of its effects. These faculties include the others enshrined in the Constitution and this law".

<div align="right">(Article 36 of Law 137 of 1994).</div>

In other words, the State had the freedom to create laws or military strategies without having to go through congressional approval, intending to quickly apply the new laws necessary to maintain the conjunctural situation of violence that the country was experiencing at that time, since that Colombian society since the 1980s was experiencing a very critical situation, the conflict had spread to the cities and surroundings, the population was very afraid, there was no security anywhere, the State, Forces could not be trusted. Armed and not in subversive groups.

At the end of the 80s, members of guerrilla groups began to be given political space, the most recognized being the Patriotic Union and the Esperanza Paz y Libertad Movement, however, although close to 60% between 1985 and 1992 were militants of the political party of the Patriotic Union, becoming at the same time, politically persecuted "for the Ombudsman's Office" although many massacres in Colombia have different origins, in recent years they seem to have the purpose of intimidating and punishing members, sympathizers or the alleged opposition supporters. These massacres are carried out by extreme right-wing groups, paramilitaries, or hitmen at the service of the aforementioned groups" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). In this regard, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently found the Colombian State guilty of the genocide of the Patriotic Union political party.

As for the political party Movimiento Esperanza Paz y Libertad, it lost its legal status for failing to achieve more than 50,000 votes in 1991, for the following year there were more than one hundred assassinations belonging to this party, "Ombudsman's Office," the murders are attributed in a large majority to an extermination campaign ordered by the top leader of

the EPL dissidence, Francisco Caraballo, who would have signed an agreement with the commanders of the Farc and the ELN to annihilate the former members of insurgent groups who signed the agreements with the Government" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)). In 1995, the critical situation of the Military Forces put the Government and the command in discussion: "the operational results continue to be evaluated by the number of enemy casualties, without taking into account the impact of this indicator on the enemy organization, on the population civil society and in the institution itself" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

At the end of 1994, public order was delicate, the guerrillas were waiting for the demilitarization of the La Uribe zone and since it did not happen, they proceeded to commit a series of operations that left a large scale of victims, including murders and kidnappings of dozens of soldiers, police, mayors and councilors, for this reason, the Government chose to define "special public order zones" in the following years. In 1996, the Public Order Space Zones were created, a military strategy to mitigate the loss of life in guerrilla attacks. A military commander was assigned to a municipality, town, or city who would control the carrying of weapons, the mobilization, and the residence of the people who inhabited the areas.

It was an open secret that there were some politicians and drug traffickers behind the rise of the self-defense groups, in addition to the fact that the Government had authorized, since 1994, the legalization of weapons for civilians "for restricted use" as "private security", which they put more in focus the veracity of the Government from international organizations:

> "the prosecution. "The Convivir usurp the state monopoly of force […] The activities carried out by the 'Convivir' involve civilians in the armed conflict and make them participate directly in the hostilities […] Alongside the Military Forces and the Police National [there are] private civilian organizations that carry weapons of war under the pretext of confronting the insurgency and common crime [...] With the organization of the Convivir, the Colombian State has once again fallen into the error of promoting the appearance of 'armed actors' who aggravate the problems of illegal repression and war without containment. It is still time to correct that very serious mistake".
>
> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

In 1996, an ambush by the guerrillas left a total of 31 soldiers dead. This ambush would inaugurate a series of military setbacks that marked the course of the conflict during the

following years. However, the military forces were again in the situation of not knowing the areas of operation and not knowing the movement of their adversary:

> "The military commanders could not avoid self-criticism in the face of the setbacks suffered. "The enemy was not studied —and is not studied— and its new operating tactics are not known, when the enemy, qualitatively, evolved from guerrilla warfare to a war of movement or positions, where the weapons are used with great propriety. principles of mass and surprise to annihilate the adversary regardless of the cost of guerrilla casualties in open combat".

(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

Additionally, there are also climatic and geographical difficulties, diseases played an important role in demotivating the military, the tropical jungle was very dense and without adequate knowledge of the area, the military was at risk of getting seriously ill, generating a loss of capacity in the operations of the units. In the same way, the Army was easily fooled by the strategies that the guerrillas were using, the new strategies applied and unknown to the military forces altered operations and what was believed to be a counterattack turned out to be a decoy used by the guerrillas to distract the military and attack heavily in other areas.

For this reason, the Military Forces diagnosed: "it is essential to acquire high-tech material such as a FLIR or satellite system that allows the location of guerrilla concentrations, with the purpose of first bombarding enemy positions, and then carrying out airborne landings." " (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), since the attacks take place in different areas of the country and simultaneously, the capacity of the Army and the Air Force were not enough, the urgency and response to be more successful in the military operations was the endowment of the Air Force with sufficient means to allow it to attend to at least two attack situations at the same time, with game support and troop transport.

In 1998, a public speech by the Defense Minister of the time stated: "We need strong, prepared, and well-endowed Armed Forces. If they are weak, unorganized, and demotivated, the future is a failure... A budget is required to improve their staffing, organization for greater efficiency and appropriate legislation so that they can develop their professional activity" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

Due to the frequent failures in combat, the military forces decided to retrain their troops, "during which the maneuvers and techniques that were applied in excellent shape in the

combats of Mitú were tested" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), helicopters, night vision goggles, and laser lights were used to communicate with pilots in the air. Urgent resources were needed and for the process of modernization of the Military and Police Forces, a restructuring would be designed by the Government, which would be given the name Plan Colombia.

Plan Colombia is given under the bilateral relationship with the United States in the year 1999, with the specific objectives of Colombian social and economic rehabilitation, ending the Colombian armed conflict, and creating an anti-narcotics strategy. In the military sphere, 40,000 regular and volunteer soldiers were incorporated into the Armed Forces, mainly the Army. 10,000 soldiers were to be incorporated per year to fill the gaps that the country had in different areas affected or occupied by the guerrillas. The second great action was to generate economic intensive "salaries, remunerations of different orders, payment of social benefits, etc.— so that those who joined remain in the forces" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017).

The third action was the integration of the different forces and the design of joint action plans. The fourth action was the creation of increasingly trained and specialized counterinsurgency units. The last and fifth action of the Plan was the sustained and significant economic investment for the acquisition of ammunition and war materials, communication materials, and means of land, river, and air transportation. Thanks to the implementation of the actions, the Military Forces grew in the number of members and their capacities improved remarkably, going from approximately 82,000 to 132,000 soldiers destined for the counterinsurgency fight. Additionally, new battalion units, mobile counterguerrilla brigades, and special operations units were created and built.

The US contribution also included:

> "74 helicopters; four patrol vessels for the coast guard service; two logistic support planes to favor the work carried out by the naval forces of the South and the Pacific; five aircraft to carry out various missions; the training of the crews of those aircraft; and the adaptation of the Larandia and Tolemaida military bases. Additionally, and by the budget items earmarked for this purpose, the Government acquired twelve Black Hawk helicopters, six Russian-made MI-17 helicopters, and a fleet of planes to transport troops, war material, and military supplies".

> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

By the year 2005, the military forces were more sophisticated and operational, thanks to the invested budget, the reorganization, and redefinition of the military units, for this same year they increased from 22,459 to 79,176 professional soldiers since 1998. Between 1999 and 2005, Plan Colombia brought 3.7 billion dollars in US aid, of which 2.7 billion went to the fight against illicit drugs and organized crime.

In 2002, after the change in characterization of the guerrillas from an idealistic communist group to a terrorist group and after the takeover of the thirteen communes of Medellín with the Orion operation, the Patriot Plan was created:

> "The Patriot Plan identified three key areas: the first, in Cundinamarca, south of Boyacá, and part of Meta and Casanare, from where the siege of various structures was intended to prepare an offensive to take Bogotá, while the guerrillas carried out takeovers. of populations, massive kidnappings and extortions; the second, the southeast of the country, in Meta and Caquetá, a zone where the secretariat and the rearguard of the FARC were located; and the third, the region of Urabá, where there was a marked presence of various structures of the guerrilla group".

(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

The main objective of the Patriot Plan was to encircle the surroundings of Bogotá and go through the nearby territories recovering territories taken by the FARC. The first step was Operation Libertad I, where the Military Forces put into practice almost all the elements of the new way of making war:

> "the use of small groups; the inaugurated logistical capacity of the Rapid Deployment Force to sustain a large-scale military operation for more than a semester; the isolation of the contacts of the guerrillas with the population; cutting off food and ammunition supplies; the incentives for the soldiers involved to desert, capture, or kill the leaders of each front; and the use of information from the demobilized guerrillas".

(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

As for the following Operation Libertad II, use was made of "peasant soldiers, who not only served as informants but also hindered guerrilla mobility and the ability to provide logistics and food to their combatants, now isolated by the military siege." " (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P. (2017)), the following year, the Military Forces bombed and machine-gunned the jungles of Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá, Putumayo, and Amazonas.

In 2002, as a new war strategy, a new version of the Meteor Plan was made, to retake control of security in the country's road network with military registration and control actions on the country's highways, the military launched with anticipation against possible threats and methods of infiltration and ambushes were used. In 2003, along with the Patriot Plan was the Condor Plan, which reorganized the command structure to adapt to the new form of warfare, deepened the professionalization of soldiers with the creation of the Combatants School, modified military service, there was the expansion of territorial coverage, more ammunition, war material, construction of battalions and acquisition of helicopters.

In 2004, through Operation JM, a series of attacks against the main commanders of the FARC would begin for the next 4 years, with the express objective of "breaking the will to fight" and forcing them to negotiate with the Government. The frequency and harshness with which the guerrillas were attacked at the beginning of the 21st century are not random, all the operations were led under the presidential command of the most controversial president that Colombia has ever had, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who not in vain, his The presidential term has been the one in which the most crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed in the entire history of the Colombian armed conflict.

Before 2007, the cooperation between the United States and the Military Forces allowed Colombian intelligence systems to incorporate state-of-the-art tracking technology in the attempt to rescue three Americans kidnapped by the FARC, it was proposed by the United States to create "bombs smart", using GPS, the bombs could be directed with precision, after which the White House and the Department of Justice of the United States authorized the use of technology to bomb guerrilla camps.

Once the Patriot Plan was completed, that is, with the withdrawal of the FARC, mainly in border areas, the Government began to consolidate the presence of the Public Force and basic State services in the territories retaken from the FARC. From the Consolidation Plan, the military forces began to build sewerage works, aqueducts, and roads in 10 areas of the country, with a budget of more than 320 billion between 2009 and 2011. The areas where the Consolidation Plan was most exercised were "Macarena and Río Caguán Zone, the Pacific Zone (Nariño, Cauca, Buenaventura, South of Chocó), the Bajo Cauca Antioqueño and South

of Córdoba Zone, and the South of Tolima and South of Valle del Cauca" (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

However, the war strategies did not end with the completion of the Consolidation Plan. The military offensive between 2007 and 2010 placed a strong emphasis on psychological campaigns for the demobilization of guerrillas, propaganda, and civic actions, since the objectives of the Plan also consisted that "by neutralizing their armed capacity and their will to fight, to force their demobilization and disarmament, and force their submission under the conditions of the Government" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017), there was still talk of submission and not of peace talks.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, there was another important restructuring and definition within the military institution, there was budget growth and the size of the Armed Forces never seen before. Hand in hand with the increase in offensive operations, there was a worrying increase in human rights violations by the Armed Institutions, alarming not only the military Forces but also the Colombian State and international organizations, since the strategies to reduce whatever cost to the guerrillas, brought with it a very serious social phenomenon,

> "Given the pressures and incentives to obtain results in terms of guerrilla captures and casualties, the commanders resorted to an internal training campaign for soldiers in Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law to "make them aware of the importance of respect for the life, honor, and property of non-combatants in the conflict".
>
> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

From the military institution, it was recognized that due to the policy of incentives, the crimes by the Army escalated to a point of no return:

> "Although it is true that many times we are evaluated based on the casualties in combat, it is also true that we should not despair due to operational results that often lead us to commit arbitrariness, which later has repercussions on demands and problems that we must face. , ending up, in most cases, dismissed from the Force and facing legal problems".
>
> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

Concern for the reduction of extrajudicial executions, mainly, caused human rights courses to begin to be given within the armed forces and human rights workshops, not only to denounce the violation of the same by the guerrillas but also for the application of the

institution itself. By 2006, the social phenomenon of "false positives" (the name assigned by the Colombian press to extrajudicial executions) began to decline.

In 2016, a total of 364 active and retired soldiers remained deprived of their liberty after being convicted of crimes related to the conflict and for the same year, the internal manuals and regulations of the Army, Armed Forces, and Air Force were updated, which made a " change in the definition of the security threat and the tactics to face it, configuring a de facto systematic reform of the military doctrine" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017), 17 basic manuals were published that defined the new way of doing intelligence, defense, and offense, and redefinition of military doctrine:

> "The new military doctrine, understood as the set of tactical, operational, and strategic forms of the Military Forces contained in their manuals and documents, crucially suggests a redefinition of the adversary starting in 2016. The new threat, characterized as 'hybrid', combines the forms of action of the guerrillas and the private armies of drug trafficking, which would seek to prosper in a scenario of institutional weakness".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

The military forces were concerned with directing actions to generate institutional stability outside and inside Colombia. By 2011, the confrontation scenarios changed drastically:

> "The unilateral ceasefires offered by the FARC between 2012 and 2016, and the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and hostilities with the State in 2016, as well as before its definitive resignation to the kidnapping and release of civilians, soldiers, and policemen in their power in 2012, are points that mark the decline of armed confrontation as a strategic scenario".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

However, despite the great achievement of signing a peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government, even today there are dissidents from the FARC, dissidents from the self-defense groups, and a strong guerrilla, which means that the internal conflict persists on a different scale but still, violence is in Colombian society and the restructuring operations manuals have been constantly modified in recent years.

1.1.2.3. Redefining the notion of "enemy"

Added to the list of new "enemies" and at the same time new actors in the armed conflict are the drug trafficking groups that in the 1980s decided to declare war on the Colombian State, after the Extradition Agreement that the Government signed with the United States. This war caused multiple terrorist acts against the State and civil society, the selective assassinations of various presidential candidates, congressmen, and ministers, which were carried out to put pressure on the Government to not allow the extradition of drug lords, which finally caused an agreement with "Los Extraditables" (drug traffickers) and prohibiting extradition.

Since the 1980s, the Medellín drug cartels led by Pablo Escobar, and the Cali cartels led by the Ochoa brothers, had direct relations with guerrilla groups for their financing and with the Colombian government, with the same objective. The agreement with the guerrilla groups was that they were only involved in the cultivation and processing stage of coca and not in the commercialization, since they did not want to appear before the Colombian and United States governments as drug traffickers and that extradition would be applied to them. As for the Colombian State, the relationship was based on the financing of political campaigns of some politicians who supported non-extradition.

On the other hand, the guerrilla groups, with their growing relationship with drug trafficking, kidnapping as a method of financing, blackmail, looting, and extortion, were classified as criminal groups and caused the armed conflict to reach a scale of violence not seen before by them and the Colombian Army. Due to their involvement with illicit drugs, the guerrilla groups became international and became not only an internal problem but also an external one, specifically with the United States.

In 2002, the Government characterized the guerrillas as a "terrorist enemy" and the security policy focused on the recovery, presence, and consolidation of the territory, through the strengthening of the Public Force and intelligence. After the attacks on the twin towers in New York on September 11, 2001, US policies towards newly named terrorist groups became more extreme, categorizing any illegal armed group as a potent international threat.

Secretary of State Colin Powell in a public interview mentioned that security policies would be more stringent because any terrorist group might have the ability to act on a large scale:

> "And many of them will try to attack our interests in the region where they operate and here at home. We have to treat all of them as having the potential to affect our interests

globally or to affect our friends and interests in other parts of the world. For example, in Colombia alone, there are three groups that we consider to be terrorists (FARC, ELN, AUC), and we are working with the government to protect their democracy against the threats that these terrorists pose".

<div align="right">(León Gómez, E.P.; 2002).</div>

Thus, the perspective of the guerrillas and the manner of attack and focus on operations were changed, they were no longer conceived as a group that supported the ideals of communism, but rather as a terrorist group that threatened national security. and international, so they had to be attacked harder, trying to be destroyed. After the change in security policies, due to the need and pressure to reduce the guerrilla groups on a large scale, leaders and social movements denounced the abuse of force and the complicity of the institution with paramilitary groups and forced disappearance in the thirteen commune of Medellín, after the military takeover in Operation Orion.

Adding to the list of enemies of the State, international and national institutions or organizations that denounced human rights violations and those that promoted them were also found among them, also becoming the target of the Armed Forces. They were enemies in the sense that they denounced crimes against humanity and war crimes and this, from the Military Forces, destroyed their public image and they never accepted these crimes:

> "The guerrilla" has correlations with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), especially national left-wing organizations that, supported by foreigners and in clear agreement with leftist groups, have launched an offensive against the State and the Armed Forces, accusing them of violations. recurring Human Rights, a campaign through which they seek to obtain tangible results represented in economic and tariff sanctions, as well as international pressure on the Colombian State".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

Even though there is plenty of evidence of the crimes denounced, the State did not acknowledge any of the crimes for which it was accused and that it committed with guerrillas or with the civilian population, which harmed the victims of the conflict and caused much more damage for not paying attention to it. to the violation of human rights, thus causing many more violations. In this sense, these organizations were not an armed "enemy" but an ideological and bad publicity one.

On the other hand, the state Armed Forces argued that the guerrillas were having success in terms of ideology with the new change in their discourse: "it boasts easy management of its national and international public relations, coordinating its interests with the left-wing NGOs. They take advantage of political and social situations to manipulate propaganda and expand their spaces for action" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017), this is how being a human rights defender became, in a certain way, part of what is the state "enemy" but in the sense of "support" for the guerrillas.

> "The Military Forces "are losing the war in the political and judicial spheres, in the face of the sagacity of the subversion and their allies […] They are relatively incommunicado in the face of public opinion […] There is no close communication with the citizenry […] It is clear that the subversives are losing in the military field, but they are advancing by leaps and bounds in the political field through the management of psychological warfare".

> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

Once again, the image and perception of the Military Forces, the most important thing, now creating the anti-guerrilla discourse based on the fact that the human rights violations for which he was being accused had been a strategic invention to discredit the public image of the state created by the communist guerrillas.

By the year 1996, one of the groups that caused the most damage in terms of war crimes and crimes against humanity, was the self-defense groups:

> "The Command of the Military Forces insisted, through a permanent order to the Army, Air Force, and Navy, that the self-defense groups "should be prosecuted because they are criminals who threaten the security and tranquility of the citizenry in general, with the which should not have any kind of consideration or should be indifferent to their criminal actions ".

> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

During the following years, the Army command gave the order to cut off all contact and ties with any self-defense group. This is how these groups, which were once used by the State for counter-guerrilla military operations, became the focus of persecution and they were now considered criminals. Between the years 1997 and 2000, the Army reported more than 300 captures and more than 120 casualties of members of the self-defense groups.

By October 1998, the self-defense groups were complaining about the lack of "collaboration" of the State towards them:

> "It has hurt us because it seems that it obeys more to a policy of commitment to the guerrillas or the desire for promotion or merit medal of a non-commissioned officer […] It is not our policy to confront them, nor any State agency […] [but] our presence will continue to be constant in this strategic corridor of the guerrilla and the delinquency that supports it".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

And for the same year, the Armed Forces viewed with concern the integration of retired military members into the self-defense groups,

> "In recent captures and casualties caused to organized crime groups, the presence of retired Forces personnel has been evidenced [...] It is essential to instruct all Force personnel so that when they have information or suspicions about retired military personnel linked to these organizations, and that may represent a risk to the integrity, morality, prestige, and good name of the institution, their entry into military installations be reported and restricted".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

The connections between former members of the military and self-defense groups, as well as active members of the institution, were increasing. The danger of these relationships was the constant crimes against humanity that were increasing, as well as the financing of drug trafficking and its involvement within the Armed Forces, the institution that was supposed to protect the civilian population, which was at the service of drug traffickers and criminal organizations.

By the year 2001, the Police accused the self-defense groups of more than 70 massacres and more than 200 cases of selective murder, it is then that "the Army ordered its units not to use the term 'paramilitary' but to speak of 'private justice groups'. ', 'autodefensas' or 'common organized crime' (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017), a reason supported in the following sessions. In the same way, there was an urgent search for the discourse of the paramilitaries to be separated from the Military Forces, to protect the image and validity of the institution, but evidence showed that there were still relations between these criminal groups and the State.

1.1.2.4. Ideology and Military Doctrine

After the unsuccessful attempts at peace negotiations with the FARC, in 1997, the guerrillas released a statement that contained a series of demands to give rise to the following attempts at peace talks, among them: "[dismantle] "the theory of national security and paramilitarism, together with the Convivir cooperatives, decriminalize popular protest, suspend repressive decrees and special zones of public order, introduce democratic changes in the structures of the State and the political regime and clear some municipalities" (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017). But the State was not going to accede to their requests.

In the following years, there was a critical political and violent situation in the country at the end of the 20th century, along with a crisis in the Armed Forces where concern for the internal situation of the institution was expressed:

> "The morale and discipline of the troops left much to be desired. During those months, "six marijuana-affected soldiers escaped from the base, returning eight days later" to later "form a kind of union that did not follow orders," and two soldiers were given leaves of absence without the battalion commander I knew it".

> (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

Strong reasons were needed to maintain the motivation in the ranks, but the constant losses in counterattack operations with the guerrillas lowered spirits since combat casualties by the military were quite high and no estimate of casualties was known. by the guerrillas because they collected their dead in a quick and organized manner, which caused demotivation within the institution as they did not know the results. The military claimed that the guerrillas had no moral responsibility for this, since "No one has to answer for their dead.".

The national security doctrine at the beginning of the 2000s had a change of perception since how the war was being waged in the internal conflict had changed significantly. After the redefinition of the enemy, now seen as criminals and terrorists, it implied having much more specialized attack methods and focused on this new definition, now they were treated as a threat to national and even international security and were not treated as a threat ideological, which change respective of the national security doctrine.

Between 2002 and 2010, the Democratic Defense and Security Policy of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez consisted of a proposal to make Colombian society play a more active role in the State's struggle against the threat of insurgent groups and other groups. criminals, creating a legitimization of fear. Through public media, the concept of Democratic Security was introduced into the daily life of the Colombian population to legitimize the State's action against the FARC guerrillas and drug trafficking, immersing the civilian population in the categorization of these groups as real "threats". and tangible in the daily life of Colombians.

In the research carried out by Diana María Gacharná Castro (2014) "The policy of defense and democratic security in Colombia (2002-2004): Promotion of fear or deepening democracy?" It is mentioned that fear was a legitimization mechanism of the Democratic Defense and Security Policy in which two strategies were used: 1. Generating anxiety and uncertainty among the civilian population using the politics of fear and 2. The use of strategies of fear marketing, makes people believe that the threat is real, and close and makes people believe that the only possible solution is the one proposed by the State.

> "The Democratic Security platform was built on a complex foundation centered on the growth of State authority, institutional strengthening, and greater citizen engagement. A State endowed with functions and rights that, at times, ignored respect for Human Rights and that concentrated on the use of military means to confront the main enemy of the well-being of Colombians: terrorism".

(Gacharna; 2014).

The implementation of this doctrine brought with it a large budget from the United States in its campaign to fight terrorism and the majority of the Colombian public budget was allocated to the war. However, the financing by illegal organizations such as drug trafficking and paramilitaries within government institutions was also being used for the war against the guerrillas.

> "This strong economic investment in the field of Security and Defense confirmed Uribe Vélez's desire to insist on terrorism as the main enemy of Colombians, which, added to the use of emotional language, managed to bring Defense Policy and Democratic security to citizens. But this expense could not have been sustained if the perception of insecurity was reduced; hence the need to appeal to fear individually and collectively".

(Gacharna; 2014).

It is for this reason that a large publicity campaign was carried out where citizens were shown that the State was the only one that could protect them, an example of this occurred in 2002, with an intensive campaign by the publicity media, on "Live Colombia, travel through it", after the Plan for the recovery of the country's roads, to publicly show the Colombian population the effective recovery of security. The evaluations made by the Armed Forces at this time were positive:

> "In 1988 we did not have the percentage of credibility and confidence that we have today [of the population]", the Military Forces evaluated in 2004. "The perception of the Colombian people was that we could not win the war, that we were not capable of winning it to the violent Perception that has changed. Today the country believes us".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

In June 2003, the Democratic Defense and Security Policy became the center and basis for the creation of public policies, government institutions, and all their actions and political and economic decisions,

> "This policy was based on pluralistic democracy and security of co-responsibility (responsibility of the Government, responsibility of the citizens). A policy that sought to recover the credibility and authority lost in previous presidents, by generating trust, transparency, and cooperation from civil society: "A political model of pluralistic democracy where there are no exclusions but which is not marked by hate either. In this, we fundamentally agree with our Bishop emeritus: neither exclusion and of course love, which avoids hatred ".

<div align="right">(Gacharna; 2014).</div>

The main objective of this doctrine and policy was to "finish off" the guerrilla and it was being achieved for the first time in the history of Colombia, however, the situation within the military institutions was delicate, from the Government, there was debate and concern by:

> "The outbreaks of moral corruption that occur within the Armed Forces and the National Police, due to infiltration and/or penetration by drug trafficking, and other crimes, such as smuggling, common crime, and subversion, have caused distrust and animosity. part of the citizenry. The loss of moral values, even if isolated, blurs the image of the Public Force, all this is occasionally complemented, with excesses in the treatment of the civilian population, even incurring violations of Human Rights".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P; .2017).</div>

There was concern about the involvement of paramilitary groups within the military and government institutions in the following years. The "acceptance" would be called into

question once again when the concern about the relationship between paramilitaries and the military arose, from semantics:

> "In the discursive field, the military felt they were losing the semantic battle, and in the legal field, they felt vulnerable. The military command was concerned that among the soldiers there was talk of paramilitaries referring to the "illegal self-defense groups"; commanders referring to the 'leaders' of the armed groups; of guerrillas instead of 'terrorists'; and operations describing acts of armed 'delinquency'".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

Since the beginning of the armed conflict, the Military Forces were concerned about the perception that the population had towards them. Since the 1960s, they began to be denounced for a series of crimes against humanity and war crimes by non-governmental organizations in response to this. Since 1996, the army began to implement books that helped identify and denounce violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the guerrillas:

> "We cannot expect a terrorist organization like the FARC to show humanitarian gestures, respect the life of others, or show some degree of consideration for Human Rights or International Humanitarian Law," reads the prologue to one of its volumes. "They have crime as a profession and within this conduct, they practice the cruelest and most extreme, such as massacres, kidnapping, forced recruitment, and other no less atrocious".

<div align="right">(Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).</div>

Even in the instruction books and knowledge of human rights delivered by the Army, the ideology and construction of the enemy were made very clear, making an instrumentalization of human rights and international humanitarian law. In response to the accusations made for the violation of human rights, the possibility of creating an NGO for each tactical unit was raised, where citizen participation, respect, promotion, and dissemination of human, economic, cultural, and environmental rights are promoted. environment, where people who have been victims of the guerrillas or criminal groups could denounce them since they would also have violated several human rights, but even more so with the aim of "counteracting" the action of false accusations by front organizations. (Ugarriza, J.E., & Ayala, N.P.; 2017).

For the Armed Forces, the accusations of human rights violations were not only to "discredit" the institution, but at a certain point, it became a "legal war" where they justified that the actions committed by them were not contested in court. the political constitution of 1886 and

that the interference of international organizations and NGOs was focusing more on the Military Forces, in the same way, they also justified that the complaints made against them were not in great quantity if one took into account the size and personnel within the institution.

After the demobilization of the self-defense groups in the 1990s, the military concern was that "during the new century it focused on avoiding at all costs accusing the institution of promoting extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances within the framework of the military offensive" (Ugarriza, J. E., & Ayala, N. P.; 2017). Now there was a legal struggle that was intended to demonstrate above all that the acts committed by the Military Forces should not be questioned, they wanted a supremacy of truth to maintain order and organization without having anyone question their way of acting in combat and outside of it.

1.1.3. Consequences of military ideology: Extrajudicial executions

Extrajudicial executions will be taken as a material example of the consequences of military ideology since this phenomenon continues to be investigated socially and legally due to the practices carried out by the Army and the involvement of senior public officials. In the years 2002-2010, the phenomenon of "false positives" peaked, under the scheme of the government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, in its "democratic security policy", where there were 3 fundamental changes of special importance that led to the growth of this phenomenon: "(1) the strengthening of the logic of war instead of seeking to promote a negotiated solution; (2) the systematic nature of the cases of extrajudicial executions; and (3) the rapid growth of the foot strength of the Military Forces. As will be observed, this last point, in particular, influenced the incentives to produce casualties in the period of "democratic security" (Rodríguez; 2020).

It is important to recognize that the concept of "false positives" was used mainly by the Colombian press to name extrajudicial executions committed by public officials. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its 2016 report, "defines" false positives "in Colombia as "extrajudicial executions in the framework of the armed conflict, with a modus operandi characterized by the death of civilians during operations, subsequently presented to the public

as members of illegal armed groups killed in combat, through various mechanisms of distortion of the crime scene and the circumstances of the manner, time and place in which the events occurred" (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2017, p. 45)" (Rodriguez; 2020).

The incentives offered within the institutions of the armed forces were an important trigger in this phenomenon, since the increase in prizes, bonuses and promotions coincide with the growth in the statistics of extrajudicial executions, having a greater occurrence during this period (2002 -2010). "United Nations reports estimate that although it is true that the "false positives" did not correspond to a State policy, they cannot be taken as isolated cases, taking into account that an "informal system of incentives offered to soldiers for that produced casualties and an official system of incentives offered to civilians to provide information that led to the capture or death of guerrillas" (Alston, 2010, p. 2)" (Rodríguez; 2020).

Leaving many urban and rural populations affected by extrajudicial executions in their most complex period, where people were found, who due to economic needs (mainly), accepted businesses promised by strangers without putting up much of an obstacle:

> "…the peasant and indigenous population went from representing 41.7% of the victims of extrajudicial executions in 2002 to 72.6% of the victims in 2005, basically due to The second characteristic is observed between 2006 and 2008, when a "victims' urbanization process" took place, with young people from marginalized neighborhoods or those associated with left-wing political causes being a special target, although on occasions without the slightest political ties. The third characteristic is observed between 2009 and 2010, when there was a reduction in cases and measures were taken to prevent and punish these criminal behaviors, as a consequence of the pressure generated at the national and international levels by the media scandal and the discussions about the role of the incentive policy that could aggravate the problem (Observatory of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 2012, pp. 111-118)".

<div align="right">(Rodriguez; 2020).</div>

Although this war crime is one of the most degrading in terms of Human Rights violations, it is also one of the fewest with international legal support to prosecute them. Even though today there are many legal instruments for the protection of human rights, there is still "a conceptual and legal vacuum related to extrajudicial executions, because the deaths caused by such irregular and degrading ways are not specifically typified in international conventions of universal or regional scope (Henderson, 2006, p. 284)" (Rodríguez; 2020).

The statistics, "According to the 2015 Human Rights Watch report, as of July 2014, the Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor's Office has investigated more than 3,500 cases of illegal executions allegedly perpetrated by 785 members of the Army (low-ranking soldiers and non-commissioned officers) between 2002 and 2008" (Leal Buitrago, 2003). In the same way,

> "The report ¡Basta Ya! of the Historical Memory Center, published in 2013, indicates that between 1958 and 2012 the conflict caused the deaths of 40,787 combatants and 177,307 civilians. The number of disappeared between 1981 and 2010 was 25,000, the number of kidnapped was 27,023, and the number of murders was 150,000. Of this last figure, 38.4 percent were in charge of the paramilitaries, 16.8 percent of the guerrillas, and 10.1 percent of the Public Force (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2013)".

(Leal Buitrago, 2003).

The JEP (Special Jurisdiction for La Paz) also establishes in investigation case 03: "Deaths illegitimately presented as combat casualties by State agents", that at least 6,402 people were illegitimately murdered as combat casualties between the years 2002 - 2008 mainly in the regions of Antioquia, Caribbean Coast, Norte de Santander, Huila, Casanare and Meta. In the report, it is mentioned that:

> "The unlawful deaths presented as combat casualties in Colombia (i) involved the serious violation of the human rights of at least 2,248 victims that occurred between 1988 and 2014, concentrating 59.3% between the years 2006 and 2008, (ii) that these events occurred in 29 of the 32 departments of the country and (iii) that more than 90% of the members of the Public Force who have voluntarily joined the JEP, allegedly participated in this type of event".

(JEP, case 003; 2018).

It is not by chance that at least 90% of the military officers who voluntarily accepted the JEP statements were involved in false positive practices and that their highest point was between 2002 and 2006. In the final report of the Truth Commission, there is some talk about how beyond the systematization of murders by the State, an ideology is involved, a "culture of war" that has been not only in the government institutions of the country but also within Colombian society; and that both personal experiences of victims and actors of the conflict, as well as propaganda made in the media, have spread a collective thought, which turned a blind eye for a long time to what was happening in many regions of the country.

Problem Statement

According to the previous bibliographical review, it was found that there is a direct relationship between the Colombian national security doctrines and the perception of violence that Colombian society has, however, there is a gap in the reviewed investigations in the sense that they do not It investigates in depth the relationship between military ideology and the Colombian press as a factor that helped to reproduce a collective imagination within the Colombian population, through the construction of ideological instruments.

In this sense, the lack of research on the effectiveness of ideological instrumentalization within the Colombian population is important to understand the influence of military ideology within the population, this being the key to understanding how the armed conflict is understood today. today and, as has been shown in the bibliographical review, to have a change of perspective within society when trying to achieve a stable and lasting peace.

This is how this thesis raises the need to identify which have been the symbolic instruments of military ideology used within Colombian society, to create a perception of violence for the benefit of the State that has been integrated into the collective imagination of society, thus creating a "culture of war" that has in part made it difficult to create a society that lives in a post-conflict environment.

In the same way, it is important to know about the development and use of military ideological instruments so that in the future the same methods are not incurred and the management and control for the formulation of doctrines may have a limitation concerning military ideology. about the involvement of society, to avoid multiple violations of human rights, especially where innocent lives are more protected.

1.2.1. Research question

How has the influence of the symbolic instruments of military ideology been in Colombian society in the context of the armed conflict?

1.2. Investigation objectives

1.2.1. General objective: Identify the symbolic instruments of military ideology in the armed conflict and its influence on Colombian society.

1.3.2. Specific objectives

1. Identify the ideological symbols used in the armed conflict from the perspective of soldiers belonging to the Colombian Armed Forces.

2. Identify military ideological symbols within Colombian society through the press in the context of the armed conflict.

1.4. Theoretical framework
1.4.1. An approach to social psychology

The theoretical approach that is best suited for the development of this thesis is based on social psychology but focused on politics, understanding it as stated by Braunstein (1978): "Psychology operates as an ideological apparatus of all State apparatuses (ideological, repressive and technical) and the social order that must be fulfilled consists of avoiding that, in them, it is necessary to resort to the physical violence of the repressive apparatuses (p.361)" (Porras Velásquez; 2011) and to better understand the phenomenon ideological within Colombian society, the relationship of social psychology with ideology will be taken to give a pertinent relational response to respond to the objective of this thesis.

Following the above, it is pertinent to define the concept of social psychology that best suits this research, which is based on the assumption that "social psychology is the discipline that studies how psychological phenomena are determined and configured by processes social and cultural" (Porras Velásquez; 2011), described by the constructionist partner Ibáñez (2004) where he specifically explains that it is "a discipline that emphasizes the determination and social constitution of psychological phenomena" (Porras Velásquez; 2011). , and emphasizes that social phenomena are a historical reality and therefore change over time.

To understand social psychology about ideology, two definition proposals will be taken into account, the first is the one made by Moscovici (1994) who points out that "the central and exclusive object of social psychology are all phenomena related to ideology." ideology and communication, ordered according to their genesis, their structure and their function" (Porras Velásquez; 2011), the same author mentions that ideological phenomena are systems of representations and attitudes, referents as phenomena of prejudices, stereotypes, beliefs, etc. ., "Whose common feature is that they express a social representation that individuals and groups build collectively through daily interaction to act and communicate. These representations shape social reality" (Porras Velásquez; 2011).

On the other hand, Martín-Baró (1987) proposes to define social psychology as "the scientific study of action as an ideological" (Porras Velásquez; 2011), this author understands "that social interaction as the exchange of signs, symbols, emotions, feelings, cognitions, which are assumed from a dialectical perspective to overcome the sociologist or psychologist perspective" (Porras Velásquez; 2011). In the same way, the author assures that from an ideological perspective, they are expressing the same ideas of influence or interpersonal and social relationship, that is, the action is marked by valued contents and historically referred to as a social structure.

1.4.2. An approach to ideology

The ideological component occurs mostly in contexts of power relations, According to Ibáñez (1996) "Ideology refers on the one hand to beliefs, convictions, the way of seeing things, and on the other hand it also refers to something that has a little foundation and little connection

with reality or with practice (Ibáñez, 1996, p.309)" (Porras Velásquez; 2011). From a more sociolinguistic perspective, Van Dijk (2003) states that ideologies are "the basic systems of social cognition, made up of shared and group-specific mental representations, which are part of general beliefs (knowledge, opinions, values, truth criteria, etc.) of entire societies or cultures (p.92)" (Porras Velásquez; 2011), the main function of ideology is to organize mental representations.

On the other hand, for the author Franzoi (2007), social constructions, values , and beliefs are based on a social construction that he decides to define as ideology, "an ideology is a set of beliefs and values held by the members of a social group, which explains their culture both for themselves and for other groups" (Porras Velásquez; 2011), such beliefs and values build a collective psychological reality that promotes a particular way of life within a culture, "Therefore, in the same way in that we have a theory about ourselves, which we call self-concept and which guides our behavior; so also a society has its self-concept that we call ideology" (Porras Velásquez; 2011).

For Martín Baró (1987), there are two fundamental conceptions of ideology: one of a functionalist type and the other of a Marxist type. The functionalist conception understands ideology as "a coherent set of ideas and values that guides and directs the activities of a certain society and, therefore, that fulfills a normative function regarding the action of the members of that society" (Porras Velásquez 2011). The second conception, the Marxist one, understands ideology as "a false consciousness in which an image is presented that does not correspond to reality, which it covers up and justifies from the interests of the dominant social class" (Porras Velásquez; 2011), the second being the most adapted for the study of this thesis.

In Althusser's (1973) definition, ideology from a Marxist structuralism perspective defines it as a "system or structure that is imposed and acts through individuals but without individuals configuring that ideology in turn. It is about an acting totality but without a subject itself since, in the ideology thus understood, the subject acts to the extent that it is acted on" (Porras Velásquez; 2011), that is, that ideology is not considered as something external. or added to individual or group action, on the contrary, it is an essential human activity that is constituted by reference to a significant reality given by certain social interests.

Finally, taking into account the definition of the ideological level of Castro-Gómez (2000), where he states that:

> "Individuals enter into a symbolic relationship to the extent that they participate, voluntarily or involuntarily, in a set of representations about the world, nature, and the social order. The ideological level thus establishes a hermeneutic relationship between individuals, while the representations to which they adhere serve to give meaning to all their economic, political, and social practices".

<div align="right">(Porras Velasquez; 2011).</div>

That is to say, the participation of individuals in the expansion of an ideology is not always voluntary and conscious since some institutions promote strategies to make these ideological representations look like something natural, in this sense their practical function is not to generate truths, but " truth effects", so it is not wrong to say that individuals do not "know" their ideology, but rather "live" it. In the case of this thesis, this institution is the Colombian State, and how the naturalization of the military ideology within Colombian society occurred through the media, mainly television propaganda and national newspapers.

1.4.3. Politic ideology

Within political ideology, psychological warfare is the main element, as proposed by Martín-Baró (1987) "psychological warfare is the heir to dirty war" (Porras Velásquez; 2011) since this model of war makes it possible to achieve the same objectives of safeguarding the image of formal democracy, to preserve the support of public opinion for those who exercise it. That is, "psychological warfare claims to be the democratized way to achieve the same goals as the dirty war" (Porras Velásquez; 2011).

It is necessary to inquire about how this type of (psychological) war is used, the symbolic violence in this type of war is the main element of attack, where it seeks to conquer the minds and emotions of the population, whose objective is not it is more than corrupting the social conscience of the adversary (Martín-Baró, 1987). This type of war is not reduced only to the field of public opinion, through public campaigns or propaganda, but rather tries to influence the whole person, therefore:

"To create the environment of insecurity, terrifying repression is used: visible executions of brutal acts that trigger fear and panic in the citizenry. The population is paralyzed when it finds out about the facts. Similarly, manipulative repression is used to prevent effective support for the enemy. The population must maintain a dose of fear, through a systematic dosage of threats and stimuli, rewards and punishments, acts of intimidation, and displays of unconditional support".

(Porras Velasquez; 2011).

Psychological fear is the result of a combination of civic action strategies, a means by which the executors try to show themselves as "servants" of the population, with an understanding treatment of the population and offering their collaboration to various social sectors, even though this is your responsibility,

"However, the executors of psychological warfare try to make it clear who is in charge and who is obeying; the militarization of daily life and the main social spaces contribute to the omnipresence of control and the repressive threat. In short, both dirty war and psychological warfare are ways of denying reality. In the latter case, everyday reality itself is denied as such and redefined by official propaganda. The continuous official reports become the "reality", however obvious the distortion of the facts may be."

(Porras Velasquez; 2011).

The author Castro-Gómez (2000) is interested in analyzing what Althusser calls the "information apparatus" since, from the last century until today, the media have become a place of ideological battles for control. of social imaginaries. The media have great power to outline new forms of subjectivity, style, and vision of the world, and behavior, but media culture has an advantage, which the author expresses as "the advantage of media culture over other ideological apparatuses lies, precisely, in that their restraint devices are much less coercive. Therefore, it can be said that a power that monitors and punishes does not circulate through them, but a power that seduces" (Porras Velásquez; 2011). However, in my opinion, this last statement is hardly questionable, since, through empirical data, it has been possible to see that it is society itself that punishes when there are different opinions in society.

Being the media, in contemporary times, the main source of ideologies, their control constitutes a fundamental key to the consolidation of political dominance. For this reason, several things must be taken into account, firstly, that the media produce and strengthen "belief systems" "based on which some things are visible and others are not, some behaviors are induced and others are avoided, and some things are considered natural and true, while others are refuted as artificial and false" (Porras Velásquez; 2011).

Secondly, the media are the scenario where their ability to put into motion all the seductive mechanisms of the image to achieve the coercive consent of consumers is put into play. And finally, thirdly, it must be taken into account that information is precise, that is, giving an ideological form to a pre-existing matter.

1.5. methodological approach
1.5.1. Epistemological foundation

The epistemological foundation that is best suited for the development of this research is historical materialism, I understand this as the historical study through an idealistic analysis, that is, observing the ideologies of society and understanding that they change over time. History is studied from the material circumstances within a society, where the same society gives it value, according to Marx "it is not consciousness that determines life, but the life that determines consciousness" addressing the study of human society from reality and analyzing the image from there.

The reason for this epistemology is justified by wanting to identify military ideological instruments submerged in the collective imagination of Colombian society, built from replicating methods of specific social constructions, such as the media. It must be based on the understanding that this ideology in society was induced by military instruments (reality), such as counter-guerrilla operations strategies, and promoted by methods such as propaganda, speeches, publicity campaigns, etc., analyzing from there its adaptation as an ideology in Colombian society (imaginary).

1.5.2. Research techniques

To respond to the objective of the investigation, investigation techniques such as emerging categories found in interviews made with soldiers in the historical memory station of the National Army that is precise and relevant to this investigation were used, in the same way, it is intended to analyze the review of the Colombian press from the years 1960, 1980, 1990,

2000, 2003, 2009, and 2011, to later carry out a relational analysis and find emerging categories of analysis between the two samples to identify symbols with military meanings within of the Colombian population.

1.5. Ethical aspects

Regarding the ethical aspects of this research, it is ensured that the sources used as well as the documents reviewed were taken from official sources and the creation of false data or plagiarism was never resorted to. In the same way, it is important to mention that this thesis is objective and does not fall into political and ideological biases justifying atrocious acts committed by all the actors in the conflict in Colombian society.

2. Chapter 2.

This chapter will present the emerging results of the analysis of interviews collected from the historical memory station of the National Army of Colombia, where it is analyzed from the perspective of the military how they perceive themselves, the institution, and how its history. within the Armed Forces, with the purpose of knowing in depth the Colombian military culture and thus understanding the military ideology. The interviews and life stories were made of officers, non-commissioned officers, and professional soldiers.

The analysis is based on the identification of emerging categories found in all the interviews and reports, where the following can be identified in general terms: the military culture of the Colombian army, these categories will be related to the media analysis made of the Colombian media of the years the '60s, '80s, '90s, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2022, these years were chosen because you can see the change in the perception of the population about the conflict, it was done to identify the military ideological instruments within Colombian society. Newspapers are taken because they have been the constant means of

communication throughout history and because they contain solid evidence for better analysis.

2.1. Results
2.1.1 Emerging categories of interviews

The following emerging categories were found in interviews with officers, non-commissioned officers, lieutenants, colonels, and professional soldiers of the Colombian army. These categories were found in most of the interviews carried out by the military historical memory program that the National Army radio does, where military culture, military self, their perception of the enemy, and the conflict were taken into account. through their memoirs.

2.1.1.1. Pride

From the beginning of the interviews, pride in belonging to the institution was found as a common denominator, expressed in its terms:

- "I belong to the glorious Colombian army".

- "my glorious army gave me the opportunity".

- "I feel very honored to have been a soldier of the country"

-"... and yes and having the pride of saying and wearing the uniform is wonderful and I think that we can help build the country there".

- "... first of all there is a lot of pride because it is a disciplined race that demands them and pushes them to the limit and there is a lot of pride for being there, for maintaining, and above all that".

The pride of belonging is manifested by the knowledge acquired, the experiences acquired, the constancy of belonging to the institution, the responsibility of the work because it is a job or a profession that is not for everyone, and the fact of not giving up. defeated is synonymous with strength. In the same way, how the military expresses themselves towards the institution is with respect and honor, as they say, for example, when referring to the institution with the word "glorious army" or when they refer to people who occupy ranks older as: "my colonel" or "my lieutenant colonel" and then the full name of the person is added, as a synonym of respect, of hierarchy.

2.1.1.2. Heroes/military

In this category, the word "heroes" was found quite a lot in the interviews to refer to the military, where he also shows in his own words what it is to be a military man:

- "Heroes of Colombia"

- "Our heroes"

- "honor and glory for them, who allowed this rescue, allowed these people to return to the bosom of their families"

- "To others are the inner strength, the strength of the heart, the strength of the soul, of that spirit that our members of the national army have"

- "This experience, this knowledge, and all this altruism of these people who make up the body of professionals of the reserve, have allowed the development of multiple initiatives and important projects that are still running today"

- "We pay tribute to these reserve officers who are still there attentive to what they can help, how they can build, and how they continue to be part of this joint work with our military forces and with the community to continue growing as a country"

- "they become role models, but particularly for children"

- "... of our heroes of the reserve, the hope of a people that permanently deposits all its energy and faith in its military forces."

- "The first thing you feel when you have this uniform, when you assume the responsibility of leading men, of commanding men, of answering for your life, for your integrity, is something amazing."

- "our soldiers, our heroes of the homeland".

- "How does one get courage as a soldier? To face every one of the bombs, every bombardment, and also dangerous situations, for one as a human being and for the population that surrounds him."

- "great combatant, he is a fighter, he falls and comes back and gets up and that's how it happens to the military every day, sometimes without knowing about the children, the family or having the news that our son is sick ".

- "There are some phrases that one has always heard: the military does not see his children born, he does not see his parents die."

- "soldier of the homeland, a hero of the homeland, a policeman, a marine, any of our heroes, he finds words like mysticism, willpower, discipline, love of the institution, love of the homeland, and from there forward all the motivating forces that a human being can have".

- "A soldier who is wounded in combat is a hero."

- "It is not an issue for everyone, it is a matter of vocation, that is felt... let's say that in my case, there was a great contribution from my family, I also carry it in my blood... but as I see it and it is something it is very common to say in the army: there was an army first than a homeland... so if we go back to the commanders there is a line that leads us to the origin of the army, let's say there is a succession of commanders that take us to the first patriot army, then Under this awareness that we are part of a genealogy that has more than 200 years of history and that gave rise to this country, let's say that once inside, you feel a commitment to history and Colombian society".

- "... I have tried to be a soldier in good standing."

- "Meanwhile I will be doing my best to continue contributing to this country for which it needs a lot of our commitment."

- "Everything you say seems fundamental to me, I think that all of us who wear this uniform have experienced very similar situations and I think that the risk has to do with that unlimited responsibility that those of us who wear the camouflage has, so I would like to take advantage of this and to remind everyone of the oath that we make in which one is asked perhaps the most important question in life: do you swear to God and promise to the country to defend this flag until you lose your lives for it and not abandon your leaders, comrades, and subordinates in war action and on any other occasion?

- "Of course, because as it is popularly said, as a soldier I had to rescind my oath, first it was my turn as a soldier and then as a student here wielding the dagger, to return to take that oath in which I promise to faithfully comply with the guidelines of the institution and that of course logically we cannot leave out our men".

- "A unit with professional soldiers, some boars as they say in my land, thrown forward, with an impressive capacity for maneuver".

- "That inner strength that our heroes must have."

- "where that inner strength has to get ahead to be able to face them and continue in the army, in addition."

- "The fear is so great that it is enough for everyone, I felt a lot of fear because at that moment one is like suddenly one as a second lieutenant is like too bold, like thrown forward and does not measure the consequences backward, reckless but when one sees there a person who lost their life due to combat and all that stuff, one says "it could have been me" and I committed that imprudence but I repeat the soldiers I had at that time were true heroes, they helped me a lot to overcome that fear, but without being reckless".

- "We as soldiers of the homeland also suffer the same social conditions that the civilian population suffers, some of us must also be within the category of victims, we also have to honor our veterans."

- "The professional soldiers that they have given me are excellent people and I have always used in my units to spend between four and five days to speak with them, one by one. I like to know where they come from, what their life is like, and what they expect for their future. When you do that, I know, the unit gives better results.

- "I can say that I was born in the Army. At that time, my father was a second sergeant and he drove a truck that was where my mother gave birth because the pain took her by surprise. We didn't make it to the hospital. Due to the hygiene conditions and others, I had to stay my first month of life in the military hospital".

- "I entered the army because when I was little I did nothing but wait every Saturday to see Men of Honor. I wanted to be like them and here I am. I was able to fulfill that dream."

- "I have been in the area for 16 years because I like it. Many colleagues who know that I am not far from retiring ask me why I don't ask for something from the office, but I tell them that I don't see myself anywhere other than the jungle. I want to continue serving the Army from there and if I have to die in the area, I will die happy".

- "Behind each fighter seems to hide a man with questions about happiness and identity."

- "Now that he is a few months away from retiring as a professional soldier, he remembers everything like a movie that he would like to repeat."

- "The day before yesterday I had to drop the weapon to come to this interview," he said, "but I can't wait to go back to the jungle."

- "the thickness of exotic places but the loyalty for a uniform and the honor of duty done".

- "I'm not going to give it to myself as a macho, but I can assure you that I have never felt afraid, neither in the DMZ nor anywhere else."

- "I have always been the machine gunner and since they saw me standing there without giving up, they continued and did not move."

- "I feel that the weapon protects me, my machine gun has never left me lying down and the power of fire is also decisive in combat".

- "I am focused on my work and I do it the best I can. That doesn't mean I'm selfish and mean. During all these years I have always taught what I know to my classmates".

- "A friend killed me, but I must admit that I am not the most compassionate man. It made me sad, especially for his family, but I have learned to be strong, as life goes on. I am aware that death is around us every day and that tomorrow I may die, but do you want me to tell you something? I would die happy because I have done my job correctly".

- "I learned to love plants and animals. They are 80 percent of military life, they are your food, your water, your bed, and your protection. Nature is everything to a soldier."

- "All my youth I spent there and I do not regret it. It changed my life financially because I was able to build my house and I have never lacked anything. He left me with discipline, honor for defending my country, and respect. I feel good about my country because I know that I did my bit to end the armed conflict. I feel like I gave it my all. I am leaving happy because I was correct as a soldier".

- "That's what I've been thinking these last few months there in the jungle, what am I going to do? What I'm going to do with my life? Something will occur to me, but at this moment I tell you, I don't know what I'm going to do without the jungle and the Army. This is my life".

On the other hand:

- "It is a task that many of the soldiers have had to hand over to that loved one, hand them over to their mothers, to their family and the truth is that there are no words to describe what it feels like, how moving a situation like this is."

- "once a taxi driver asked me what the most difficult thing for a military man is I said… I always think that it is being there because of the adversities of the weather, the rain, the heat… but I always said it, for me the most difficult thing has been being away from my family".

According to the fragments collected from the interviews that were shown previously, it can be said that a soldier is synonymous with a hero and this is the one who never gives up, who falls and gets up and tries to stand as many times as necessary. necessary. He sacrifices

himself with nothing in return, for the common good, and is an altruistic person, they say that by belonging to the institution, by wearing the uniform there is an innate and unlimited responsibility, there is a duty to protect the population's civil, is a person who must have discipline, love for the institution and Colombian society, is one who is afraid but who despite him continues with his work.

As a lieutenant commented, it is a responsibility that is transmitted from generation to generation, it is like a bloodline, a genealogy with more than 200 years of history, which gave rise to the country, a legacy that must be perpetuated, which in that order of ideas feels a commitment to history and society. This perception of belonging is built through rituals, one of them is what a lieutenant mentioned, the oath they have to take where they ask the military: do you swear to God and promise to the country to defend this flag until you lose your rights for it? lives and not abandon your bosses, colleagues, and subordinates in war action and on any other occasion? wielding a dagger and faithfully committing to follow orders from the institution.

They must have an inner strength that leads them to fight and despite the traumas in combat, this strength allows them to continue in the institution. In some reports it seems that the uniform is also a type of vulnerability shield, many of them after coming out of combat or when they are retired mentioned that they were aware that they did not cry, they were not compassionate when a soldier died, which is always the case. they were sorry it was the family of the deceased military.

At the same time, they have a great sense of satisfaction because, as they say, "I contributed to the country with my work", also because it is a career that becomes a lifestyle, where the greatest amount of time is spent within the institution. When the time comes to retire, the soldiers don't know what else to do because they don't know how to do anything other than this job. On the other hand, a soldier has feelings of "weakness", when they find themselves in moments when they miss their family, some of them say that this is stronger than going into combat.

2.1.1.3. Mysticism

This category is closely related to that of hero and it is that in some interviews it was mentioned that the military has something special that in his own words he expressed like this:

- "... we feel that strength of the homeland and that mystique of the military forces."

- "We have to remember these phrases with pride, with mysticism, and that strength that our heroes from Colombia have."

- "mystique of our heroes".

- "A hero of the country, a policeman, a marine, any of our heroes, finds words such as mysticism, willpower, discipline, love for the institution, love for the country, and from there onwards. all the motivating forces that a human being can have".

- "I am in the Army because of mysticism."

- "passionate about military mysticism".

- "but you do it with mysticism".

- "They have a special magic, they have a different sense of life".

- "You do it with mystique."

The word "mystic" is an attribute or a unique characteristic of the heroes, it is not very clear in the interviews what exactly this means but they mention it a lot and see it as something unique to them, that makes them mysterious, that makes them have a unique perception within Colombian society.

2.1.1.4. The family

This is a very important category within the life of the military:

- "reunion with the family".

- "in the bosom of their relatives"

- "The issue of the family circle where one grows up with parents."

- "With the family, it is not easy because the damage has already been done, but since you have a family that is willing to support you, to understand you, then you get ahead."

- "Family helps me erase all the sad things I had to live through."

- "Definitely our value in our military life and I believe that in any condition and any profession, it is our family."

- "The only thing I ever did was think about my family."

- "For me, the most difficult thing has been being away from my family."

- "When they separate us from our family, they separate us from our essence, the reason for being, for existing."

- "Another fundamental aspect is the family".

- "The smell that my family perceives when I leave the area of operations."

- "my dad and my brother. My dead relatives help me because they warn me before giving me the lead".

Family is the motivation and at the same time the weakness of the hero, it is part of the reason why they decide to "protect" society because they are also protecting their family. At the same time, the family institution is extremely important as support for the military, it is his guide, and it is partly what helps the military to return to society, adapt to life, help him to heal, and to motivate in the fight.

2.1.1.5. Homeland: Patria

This category is shown as the raison d'être of the military as such, expressed as:

- "of a soldier of the homeland".

- "our heroes of the homeland".

- "love of country".

- "to give one's life for the country".

- "What are the bodies that give their lives for the homeland?".

- "patriot army".

- "Well, everything for the country, that is our motto."

- "The homeland prayer: to give your life on the day that comes."

- "With all our patriotism".

- "Dear country".

The homeland is the ultimate reason for the soldier, it is the reason why he fights, it is what he must protect, it is the manifestation of love, it is where they belong, it is a concept of motivation to have something symbolic to protect, since "homeland "It is not just a territory, it is a "place that needs help" and must be protected, it is the "mother country" it is the one that gives everything and where they have everything, the protection towards her is in some way, a way of thanking for everything he has given.

2.1.1.6. Military instruments

In this category, we spoke specifically about the professions of the Reserve Officers, the relationship between the civilian population and the military forces, as well as the image of the military forces perceived by the community:

- "To put our audience in context, the Professional Reserve Officers corps was created in 1966 at the initiative of the general... who, seeing the need to strengthen the relationship between the community and State institutions, especially armed institutions, created this

body of civilian personnel with great academic, intellectual and professional capacities who have put all their knowledge at the service of the nation for many years".

- "The initiative was to achieve that bridge between the civil and the military, surely later within the anthem that represents us of the reserve, the purpose is clearly explained."

- "yes of course. That was the purpose, so it was very difficult to bring a doctor because he was a civilian, the community still saw them separately, so at that moment, General Navaz said: we need doctors but in uniform, we need psychologists but in uniform, we need people from society who live in those territories but that they have the army clothes on so that people understand that they are also part of that great group. That it doesn't matter that I'm in a hospital or an audio booth, but that my heart is pixelated and that's the most important thing."

- "Definitely the professionals have achieved a very important job, our professionals, officers, non-commissioned officers, in this permanent relationship with the community, has allowed this impact, we asked... regarding this transformation of the image of our military forces in front of to the community."

- "Including the modernization of the military forces, it has had a positive impact in terms of the link that department 9 has, which is comprehensive action, how we reach those populations and how we begin to build the country from all the material and the human talent that we have".

- "Much of this work is focused on that, on how we contribute to the communities not only to bring well-being but to lead other ways of life, other ways of subsistence in the regions."

- "to be that articulating subject, between two worlds that have unfortunately also been treated as a form of war."

- "It is very important as always to teach by example and take them as examples, in children it is to reach that goal."

The importance of acceptance by the population towards the military forces has always been a constant in the conflict, the manifestation of this importance has been reflected in the creation of the corps of professional reserve officers, whose objective is to build a bridge

between civilians and the military, they are civilians who want to participate in the armed forces by putting their professions at the service of the institution. This has been perhaps the most effective instrument that the army has had when entering the Colombian population, putting their participation within the institution as an option.

2.1.1.7. The country/the Colombians

During the interviews, the word "country" and "Colombians" were also mentioned a lot, as shown below:

- "Particularly when all Colombians hear it."

- "for the country".

- "The whole country".

- "He leaves us a rather sad story in the country."

- "that marks the history of the country".

- "the country would never have imagined".

- "Compatriots".

- "growing as a country".

- "All Colombians are very grateful to him."

- "our country".

It was important to see that they were referring to the country and Colombians in general when they were referring to a specific population, for example, when they said that "all Colombians appreciate your work." On the other hand, it was interesting to see how they speak of the "country" as a person, as a subject that feels, not of the population or of the people who are within the territory, but of an individual as real as a person himself.

2.1.1.8. The army/institution

The institution was also an emerging category for all the times it was mentioned:

- "... The army provided us with everything, new clothes, even toiletries."

- "where the national army, through its intelligence, managed to develop a plan that produced one of the most significant and important operational results of our military forces."

- "My God and the institution, my glorious army allowed me to study abroad."

- "our national army".

- "The public force has the constitutional mission of guaranteeing the life, honor, and good of the citizens, the freedom that is the greatest treasure that we Colombians have, which we enjoyed 200 years ago and in that order of ideas the actions of the members of the public force corresponds to guarantee the institutionality, the actions of the members of the guerrilla, with their political interest in the seizure of power".

- "When you are there you belong to the military forces".

- "There is nothing more diverse than the national army, I have seen people come from all over, I have never seen such diverse people, with so many accents, colors, flavors, everything... it is a small sample of what society is." Colombian... of what our culture is, of what we Colombians are...".

- "And also the opportunities that the army offers him, well, to improve himself, to support his family, to get ahead, also like everyone else."

- "First there was an army than a country...".

- "It is time to highlight how the national army has established itself as the most beloved institution by Colombians. Throughout history, has there been a direct relationship of affection, of support for our national army, for our military forces?".

- "Of course, if, as we have already said, the Colombian nation and the construction of the state start from the military forces, first there was an army, which country, which nation, then

the military forces have been very close to the Colombian people and have accompanied the civilian population in the most difficult moments, not only in war situations but in situations of environmental disasters... we have always been next to the civilian population, as my colonel said, our reason for being is the Colombian people".

- "I am in the Army because of mysticism. It's hard to explain because it doesn't just have to do with carrying a rifle or a uniform. It has to do with belonging to an institution like this and what is woven inside, between us".

- "The majority agree that they gave their youth to the Army and the majority also agree that they genuinely love the institution."

- -"In terms of resilience, I have seen that the army is like a family and that is the most important thing because they support each other and I think that without that, it would not exist because they are very extreme situations, very extreme situations and they are the that they give each other support and help each other and I think that this is vital, as you would say as a member of civil life I have not seen that level of community and familiarity let's say on the outside".

- "solidarity and real friendship between the courses".

Within this category, you can see the gratitude that the military has for the institution, either because it allowed them to find a path or a reason in their lives, a job opportunity, a compensation opportunity, it is a property for them. On the other hand, it is also the representation of the ties that are created within the institution, in some interviews, it was mentioned that the relationship of solidarity and familiarity that was woven within the institution between the soldiers was not seen anywhere else, also They take institutionality to other levels of social life, replicate their knowledge in family life, among friends, etc. In the same way, the institution also reaches social levels different from those of the war, they have a civil civic plan, where in many regions of the country, as they expressed it, they are the face of the State, where many times they have had to play the role of assistants.

2.1.1.9. Doctrine/ideology

In this category, everything related to the perspective of the military towards themselves, the institution, and the conflict was taken into account, since the word "doctrine" was not found in the interviews, some phrases and thoughts expressed orally give clues about How is this military doctrine that is often very difficult to perceive due to how naturalized it is:

- "I consider that those words came from the heart and are the living reflection of what a Colombian soldier is. Despite 10 long years and so many subhuman conditions, they failed to break our thinking, our institutional convictions."

- "It is the institution, the training that our army gave us that has made it possible for us soldiers to bear such infamy. 3. It is realizing as a social being, which is ultimately what one comes to do on this planet, to form a family, to see their children grow up, these things to form as a social being".

- "How good it is to return to the land, how good it is to return to the family, how good it is to be able to return to a country like Colombia."

- "To cement the idea that the first thing Colombia needs is the spirit of coexistence, in the sense of jointly respecting and protecting the life, honor, and property of all."

- "heart is pixelated".

- "The homeland prayer: to give your life on the day that comes. The most important thing is that each person added to his routine to his life, must have a cause, and his cause, or at least the one that brings us together as a body of professional reserve officers is precisely the defense of democracy and good name. of the country, that is, that cannot be carried only by those who are... those who decided to take a career in military sciences and weapons, a normal Colombian cannot say: oh well, the army is there they were the ones who decided to put that responsibility on their backs, no. That has to be all Colombians and we are multiplying subjects in each of our families, in each of our environments".

- "In addition to generating hope, as they say out there, among children it is very important."

- "Precisely the message is that we have a wonderful country and that we must defend it anyway because there is nothing sadder, than when one travels through the roads of Colombia to see Venezuelan migrants traveling in the cold, at night because they took away from their country, its land and we cannot allow that to happen and the guarantee for us is precisely to have strong military forces, convinced like the ones we have, that is the guarantee, when a country loses respect for security, for defense, to its forces, to its men, it becomes a perfect breeding ground for organized crime to settle and that is precisely the message, it does not matter, we are a young country, we have a quantity of wealth that many are behind that wealth, water, our natural resources, it is a precious country and we need the military forces and of course civilian men and women who can defend it until the moment it is n necessary".

- "My vote because I think we have to do it, I think that this is a democratic country and we cannot lose it."

- "Being there with my platoon and company commanders, they begin to immerse themselves in what I should do, what is the fundamental mission that an officer in the army must fulfill, the relevance and importance of not only officers but also non-commissioned officers and soldiers within the country, all the relevance and importance of the work that we develop and that is where that spirit of wanting to continue the arms race was born in me".

Institutional convictions, as mentioned by an interviewee, are often what keeps them alive in extreme situations that are experienced in combat. The training they receive includes everything, but it is in practice that they realize that their military mentality is there. In another interview, they mentioned "cementing the idea that Colombia needs a spirit of coexistence, in the sense of jointly respecting and protecting the life, honor, and property of all", this "cementing the idea" is a reflection that in The military has already implemented this idea and they want to spread it. Now the important thing is to understand what they mean by "jointly protecting the life, honor, and property of all".

For the military, the work they do is the right thing and when they feel that it is the right thing not only for them but also for Colombian society, it generates more passion for them, more reason to continue doing it, symbolic instruments like the one mentioned in an interview and

they use a lot is prayer, a prayer towards the homeland that says that you have to give your life the day you touch the country because there is nothing more important than protecting the nation from those who want to take it away, it is a constant threat. There was also a lot of "defending democracy and freedom", basic principles of military doctrines.

2.1.1.10. Reason to be a soldier

Many of the soldiers interviewed did not mention the reason why they chose the military career, however, the few who did express it this way:

- "But try to explain it: Wilson was abandoned by his mother in San José del Guaviare when he was five years old (she threw him into a river); At seven –because his stepmother humiliated him and hit him with objects– he ran away from home and began a journey that ended a decade later when a friend from raids proposed that he do military service. "I felt that my life was going halfway in everything and I thought that being a soldier something could change."

- "But his sadness is not exceptional. Stories of a difficult childhood were present in conversations with soldiers, NCOs, and Army officers. In the case of Wilson, it is the abandonment of the mother, but the childhood of some soldiers who participated in the memory workshops went through hunger, the murder of their parents, forced displacement, domestic violence, recruitment... that childhood fruitless almost becomes an implicit metaphor for what, in the end, has also been the war.

- "His dream was to be a policeman because he liked the discipline, the militia, and weapons."

- "I want to save the lives of the heroes."

There is a lot of variety in the reasons for choosing a military career, among the most common are: the opportunity to have and/or build a future, the "easiest" way to have a job opportunity, abandoning the family or having relatives close within the institution; On the other hand, there is also the desire to want to be part of the heroes of Colombia, either because they heard

experiences about the military or in some cases because there was a large military presence and military life was very normalized.

2.1.1.11. Combat experience/change-see in the process

This category encloses many of the previous categories, manifesting itself as follows:

- "and I had to face approximately 200 subversives until we ran out of ammunition, I had several moments that... well, I was carrying the blood of my soldiers trying to help them, the way one had to face that combat, I felt the bullets whistle, when They take some dirt out of someone with their head stuck there, I felt like the bullets were lifting me, but anyway".

- "What is happening to us, the military, there are so many early warnings, there is so much information about armed actions that the armed groups are going to carry out, that you have to evaluate and assess which one has greater credibility than the one that does not have greater credibility, and at that time to think that the M-19 was going to take over the palace of justice, there were some elements but it was not in such a dimension that at that moment the military forces could affirm that they were indeed going to take over the palace of justice. justice".

- "I interviewed the soldier... when the takeover occurred, they were in the weapons review in the presidential guard battalion, the only ones who had weapons at that moment were the war band, so when they heard the shots, 19 soldiers came out with a lieutenant running because the presidential guard was downstairs… and they ran and they got there so they thought they were in the Nariño palace so they say no, it's in the courthouse and they manage to enter the courthouse with a lieutenant and 19 soldiers and the last two days in the fighting.

- "When the president gives the order to retake the palace, all the military planning is done and this operation is launched, he entered the palace with the armored vehicles and a fire began between the guerrillas and the military, something very important It is that they did not expect this and it takes them by surprise, by taking them by surprise and seeing themselves diminished in firepower, they begin to look at how they can try to reduce this force by the military and at that moment the person who was leading that guerrilla group, it

occurs to him to find a way to communicate to the magistrate, with the media to generate pressure on the president and to be able to continue with that purpose, which was to take him to trial".

- "In the development of an operation, well, already in advance on some objectives, on information that we had, I was hit by a fairly large structure, I was securing a point with a squad, and well, unfortunately in the development of this confrontation, in that combat, which is something that leaves one perplexed, which almost leaves one to go to the psychiatrist… ".

- "… in the area of operations things were more complex, military communications, radio messages were all encrypted and extremely long, in short, the limitations were limited, it was very difficult to get a sick soldier out because the enemy's headquarters were older, at that time we had a permanent presence of the ELN and the FARC, there were many difficulties…".

- "It was a situation in the department of Caquetá but I was there and there was combat against a structure of the 3rd front of the FARC in a veranda and it was an experience between fear and how to feel one there in an adventure, a mixture of many feelings ... my subordinates helped me to leave fear and restriction aside and to assume the role as commander to make decisions and that depending on those decisions could lead the unit to failure or success... ".

- "My baptism, that is, my first fight was on August 18. They killed a soldier, Adrián Acevedo Colorado, and I say that no school or university prepares you for that. It is one thing to receive military training, and combat courses and another is to see the person with whom you have lived for eight months destroyed, who is already like your family. That soldier was the founder of the Bajes Battalion and he had been a professional for 10 years, he died from an explosive device, and he is still in my memory".

- "I never forget the first soldier who killed me. He was my friend and had been at the institution for nine years. They shot him in the head and when I went to pick him up and took him by the head my fingers went into my skull. He managed to speak: "Lieutenant, don't let me die."

- "War is a penetrating smell of charred meat, it is a smell like when you burn a chicken in the oven, it is something charred like the smell of gunpowder in those moments when you are in combat, they are There are many smells that come out because you are firing your rifle, there are parts where the rifle gets hot, they are a trumpet, the rifle gets hot. When there is someone injured by a mine, the smell of burning meat".

- "In Cauca, the war is difficult because of the snipers and because they never face you. They shoot here and you have to run because you know it's going to rain tattoos (...) It's complicated. You live in constant tension (...) In Cauca, they wait for you to do certain kinds of things, for them to react. It's like chess. They have people everywhere (…) Cauca forces you to be more creative".

- "Imagine, all that area of Meta and Caquetá belonged to the guerrillas, it was their house and in 2002 the superiors told us: "Go and recover the area." That was like breaking into his house to hit or kill him. They knew every road, every mountain, and every pasture like the back of their hand."

- "I lasted five months. See, it was so hard that, without lying to you, every three days there was a fight for everyone. I have never seen so much death in my life."

-". We were 30 soldiers against 292 guerrillas and only fifteen meters away, but full of very thick bushes... I know it's hard to believe but that fight is famous because none of our men were killed and only 18 of us were wounded. They lost 40".

The experiences in combat are important since everything they have learned is put into practice here, from the psychological to the physical, and pride is also reflected, the love for the institution that is equal to the love for fellow soldiers is where the hero is embodied, a hero who does not fight could not be called as such, in that sense it is where the "true hero" comes to light, with all the qualifying attributes that are given to him.

2.1.1.12. Service/Sacrifice

The service was mentioned quite a bit in the interviews:

- "to be able to serve society as in fact we have been doing".

- "provide security to Colombians without demanding anything in return."

- "... the military forces that come to provide support, that come to provide a service from a service as basic as a hairdresser to a service as complex as a surgical operation."

- "that the service capacity of the members of the military forces, who work all their lives to renew, to transform, to build a country, because they are different people, they have a special magic, they have a different meaning of life".

- "gift of service".

- "to know that they are people who are willing, not only to serve but also in the military operations in which they are also immersed, well, even giving their lives, and in that order of ideas, they are exemplary people or citizens because they They do not receive any type of remuneration, simply the smiles, the satisfaction of having served to accompany their military forces and knowing that they are helping to build the country and the construction of the social fabric."

- "One understands that the military forces and one as a soldier are at service, is here to serve and that is a great satisfaction."

- "service in the institution".

- "With affection, with love for a country like the one we have."

- "compulsory military service".

- "Giving everything in your life for the community... what comes out of your soul, that you give everything so that the country feels safe and that they can say what we were saying a moment ago: better than what happened to me and not to the community Whom did you take care of?"

- "Serving my country until the day I have to "hang up my uniform".

- "I want to continue serving the Army."

- "Despite the sacrifices of a military life, he says that he would accept the invitation of his raiding friend twenty years ago, and he would be a soldier again."

- "the conflict from another perspective".

One of the qualifiers that are attributed to the military is the capacity for service and sacrifice, it is a disinterested service, for the common good, and it is even giving one's life if necessary to protect the country and the people who are within it. In addition to this, they also look after the well-being of citizens in the sense that they also help in everyday life scenarios. It is precisely this ability to serve and sacrifice that in part gives the military this "mystique" that "magic" because it is not common to see people who give everything without receiving anything in return and this ability to serve is based on the immense love that they have for the country and the population. Even though in Colombia going to the army is at first "compulsory service" it is curious that they called it that since serving in these times was not voluntary, and many times the men who went fell in love with the institution and others did not he wanted to know nothing about her.

2.1.1.13. The conflict

The perspective of the conflict from the military:

- "political situation".

- "That situation because the FARC wanted to be noticed, come to the table strengthened and used it."

- "it changes the nature of the conflict a bit".

- "who have not lived through the conflict and who know very little about that deep Colombia."

- "Did the dynamics of the conflict change in the '80s, '90s, and 2000s? Do these dynamics of violence change, do these armed groups change? Or do they stay the same? It does not change, in essence, it does not change, the destabilizing factors remain the same…".

- "does not change, they have simply evolved".

- "Obviously we have made progress, I cannot say that we are as we were many years ago, but one does not see that progress is maintained and many places deteriorate, in many regions".

The perception that the military has regarding the conflict is interesting since they know and state that it is a political war, but for them, despite the changes that have occurred throughout the history of the armed conflict, it continues to have the same bases, that is, for them, they have always been criminal groups, bandits, terrorists, who use methods of irregular warfare and that their ideology is not their greatest strength, but that they still recognize that due to the intervention of the army and the achievement of a counterattack, the conflict nowadays it is not as terrible as before.

2.1.1.14. Smearing/unarmed attack on the institution

This category refers to how the military identifies this instrument of war:

- "In recent months, we have seen a media attack on the public forces, the army especially, but these people who do this, I want to tell them to put themselves in the boots of a soldier for a minute because, without a doubt doubts, I dare to say it, that all those who do it do not know what a barracks is, they do not know what we have to do and they do it with petty interests, many allow themselves to be carried away by the current of the moment and by an ideological influence and I can say this to the most important media outlet in the country, who have published things written against our institution, those people who publish this, it would be good if they evaluated it because it is not so easy to put a journalist on a desk to

write paragraphs and things due to the media trend and certain influences, it would be good to tell them to put themselves in the shoes and heart of a soldier and of the conflict".

- "It sadly seems to me that the public forces have been judged and condemned by many Colombians."

- "They must be very clear about this, someone says that in war and in love anything goes, so one of the war strategies is precisely to distort that work, to misinform about that work that is being done, to erase the prestige that it has been creating Not in vain has the institution always had that level of recognition in national surveys, but there are subjects specialized in strategic communication who say: well, we are going to start discrediting it because we cannot be in an environment where the population wants and protects to my adversary, then they start with a rumor, with a phrase that is not true, to position in the collective imagination concepts that do not even exist in the penal code and suddenly people begin to associate the uniform with that phrase, then it is a ballast that someone should end up saying: hey, wait a minute, you probably don't have information, you don't have time to read a newspaper, you don't have time to talk to someone Come then, I'll tell you what the truth is on this specific topic. It has happened to us many times when they tell us: no, it's that the soldiers in the high mountain battalions finish the frailejón but they don't know that a couple of weeks ago the soldiers planted frailejón, they protect... the fact that there are soldiers in the high mountain battalions it is a guarantee for the Colombian people because there are organized crime routes out there that they need to get these soldiers out of that place, so the only way is: since they cannot do it fighting, then they misinform and someone has to be that instrument, to tell the truth of each of the facts."

- "They have been zones where the action of the state at the hands of us, the military forces, vs the action of the organized armed groups, converges, so as they say "we were left in the middle of the crossfire" that is a theory that has been sold because we We have never been against the civilian population, we will never attack them before. Our mission is to help and try to reestablish the constitutional order where we have arrived... but their position is respectable and our idea is to try to change the mentality that The phrase "crossfire" does not exist, it is the "enemy's fire against the civilian population and the enemy's fire against the institutions, against us and we are going to restore constitutional order and defend the life

and honor of citizens" the citizen who is acting outside the law because the weight of the law will fall on him but the others do not have to suffer the consequences of that".

Through the interviews it is seen how there is an invalidation regarding what the media or judicial investigations say today, about the crimes committed by the State and the army, in my opinion, this is closely related to another category found and is how they name the crimes that the army commits such as murder, which for them is "combat casualty" and with this language the,y put criminal groups as the only ones that are committing atrocious crimes, one of them mentioned that while He was inside the institution, he never received an order from someone who told him directly that he had to pass off civilians as guerrillas and pass them off as deaths in combat, however within the institution there is not much knowledge about the crimes committed and although there is compelling evidence, for them it is nothing more than an attack, a type of media and judicial war.

2.1.1.15. Stigma: Perception of civilians described by the armed forces

Hand in hand with the previous category, there is what the military themselves call "the stigma", explained from their perspective as follows:

- "It is difficult for a person to defend their activity, their work, if they do not have people around them who can see and show others why they are doing that job, the uniform always clashes a little in the community because it has the paradigm that if there is a uniform it is because there is a situation of violence or emergency, it is not common and even less to see a uniform of a soldier of the homeland, that is, people normally in the countries see the uniformed of the police who have their mission within the cities, but seeing a pixelated uniform begins to generate a lot of uncertainty, unfortunately ".

- "Somehow the fact of the work that our military forces have been carrying out in this reconstruction of the social fabric, building schools, taking part in recreational activities, being much closer to children, has not allowed this stigma, as you have said, is it changing or at least transforming?... yes, of course. That was the purpose…".

This stigma is explained by the relationship of association that many regions of the country have with the military uniform, mainly, it becomes an alert sign because they think that a fight is going to start due to past experiences, in that sense it is not that the population has a stigma or a repel in front of the military forces, is due to past experiences and not by rumors, however, this explanation is not within the reasons of the armed forces.

2.1.1.16. Build country

This category is interesting because in many of the interviews the "building country" was mentioned:

- "How do we begin to build the country from all the material and human talent that we have".

- "And yes, and having the pride of saying and wearing the uniform is wonderful and I think that there we can help build the country."

- "the satisfaction of having complied with accompanying their military forces and knowing that they are helping to build the country and the construction of the social fabric."

- "Giving smiles with all the activities they do is a good sign that we can build the country with all our services."

However, it is not very clear what exactly "build the country" means, but it is clear that the only ones who can do this or are already doing it are the military. Building a country means that it is destroyed or disorganized, as seen in the previous categories, the roots of the problems are not mentioned, they only mention the problem superficially, for them the country is unbuilt and they will be the heroes who build it.

2.1.1.17. God/religion

This category is very interesting and perhaps the only one found in all the interviews. Religion within the military institution is extremely important, as shown below:

- "So it kind of gave me the energy to continue studying, my God and the institution, my glorious army allowed me to go study abroad."

- "You have a family that is willing to support you, to understand you, because you get ahead, glory to God, I found an excellent lady."

- "very general to say: God forbid that this happens again."

- "...god, a supreme being that always the military, I believe that since we put on our boots and took a rifle in our hands we know that what is at stake is our life, what is at stake is the life of our men".

- "for my God was always there, God always enlightened me, gave me wisdom, gave me the understanding to guide, guide my men and make the right decisions."

- "but then my god gives one the strength and endures it."

- "The only thing I always did was think about my family, think about God, I prayed a lot and I think I got over it."

- "I think that perhaps prayer, perhaps knowing that life is unique and that we must continue."

- "Thank God and coping with logical difficulties just from our career."

- "Thanking God for all the blessings he has given me."

- "I lay face down and began to pray. I told God to welcome me to his side."

- "… I prayed: my God, forgive me. There was a time when I did not sleep; I screamed a lot in my sleep. My God, be that as it may, he is a Colombian brother".

- "I walk a lot with my God".

- "I do feel that there is someone supreme that exists or how do you explain that nothing happened to me that day in Puerto Rico."

In the first place, God is often the one who rewards the work done, he is the one who protects, who is thanked, and who is asked for, in that sense he is an inexplicable motivating force that helps them resist combat and helps to recover from the traumas left by combat. Having God's support gives them peace of mind, gives them the feeling that they are not doing things wrong, and gives them "the strength of spirit" to maintain themselves. The role that religion plays in the development of conflict is extremely important. since one of the attributes given to the "enemy" is precisely that of being a "being without God", who has no one to answer for his actions, in this sense, the work of the military is not only towards the population of Colombian but also that it is a job that must be answered before God, it is a job justified on a superhuman level.

2.1.1.18. Combat casualties

This category was not found much in all the interviews, however, it is important to take it into account to understand the construction of the "enemy" later:

- "did not generate any casualties".

- "were subjected".

- "Sadly, because one cannot be happy that other Colombians also died on the other side, there were some members of the ELN who also lost their lives and only that bad memory remains."

- "I was always obsessed with asking about a murder, which is not called that in the army, it is called "discharge".

To understand the antagonistic relationship that the army has against its enemy, it is important to look at how some crimes are named by the institution when they are committed by them, and in the next category, it will be seen how these crimes are named and perceived differently when they are committed by "the enemy".

2.1.1.19. Enemy/guerrillas

Even though the job of the military is to counterattack the enemy, they were rarely mentioned by the military interviewed:

- "We were released and the two subversive kidnappers were neutralized."

- "that the subversives had prepared us for some tests of life."

- "had those FARC people."

- "those people still".

- "against some organized structures of the ELN, who committed crimes there and well that is not from now, they simply carried out actions and went to the other side to Venezuela and well, that has been the game of cat and mouse that we have always had in this country".

- "How to see how war is for them, how they take it personally because when you are in a war and they kill you with your spear, the war is no longer between armed groups but between "my enemy".

- "... logically, because of the times and circumstances of the war, the scenarios in which the enemy presents us, well, it also makes us modify, restructure, organize ourselves in a different way to face this threat, but not only the big changes that have occurred in the institution is due to this dynamic of the war…".

- "The enemy has mutated, society looks at us differently."

- "... the enemy was greater, at that time we had a permanent presence of the ELN and the FARC, there were many difficulties...".

- "In that first encounter with those groups outside the law...".

- "But after that year there was a lot of pressure on them and they had to go into the mountains."

- "My father was killed by the guerrillas in the jungle when I was 13 years old; my brother too…".

The construction of the enemy in Colombia and the internal armed conflict has a long history, in these interviews, it was possible to see how it is for a soldier, from their perspective, and how it is conceived by them, it is very interesting to see how after naming them as subversives, delinquents or criminals, immediately after comes an associated crime such as kidnapping, armed takeover, extortion, etc. It is this creation of an association that the "enemy" is the one who directly commits these serious crimes, even though the army also commits them, what changes are the intentions? It is also important to see that many times the use of language and how they referred to these groups was derogatory as if invalidating their raison d'être. In the same way, it is mentioned that as the enemy mutates, the military forces also transform, implying that the only objective for them is to bring down the illegal groups, leaving it to be seen that the civic-social services, As mentioned in the bibliographic review of the first chapter, they are nothing more than war strategies.

2.1.1.20. The jungle

This category is perhaps the most unexpected, extremely interesting, and important because it is mentioned very often in interviews as seen below:

- "We had to go into the jungle again with the equipment and with the damn chains of infamy."

- "10 long years of kidnapping, crossing the entire Colombian jungle through the eastern part of the country."

- "trying to get rid of the smell of the jungle".

- "After being in the jungle, strange smells like perfume, soap...".

- "Jungle".

- "a person who had been taken to the jungle".

- "It is knowing the subversion completely inside."

- "over there in the jungle".

- "I already know what it is," Wilson says. I have seen dead and mutilated; I've had cerebral malaria and I've been in minefields. I have endured hunger and cold. I spent ten months in the jungle, in the area of operations without knowing anything more than that."

- "She says it's a mountain smell. It's a smell of the mountains, it's not that one smells ugly, you bathe there, you don't bleat as often as you can bathe here but you maintain your normal toilet, but the smell that you bring from the operations area to here, it is a mountain smell".

- "From being interned in the jungle for 3-4 months and you go out, it is chaos for you, anyway your brain begins to adapt to things that you have not seen for 4 months and it is very strange, you arrive and the sounds for you They are strange because it has been months without you hearing a taxi, it happened to me by chance".

- "life defending the country in the jungle".

- "The jungle is his life".

- "Few soldiers decide to complete their entire military career in the mountains. For many, the jungle is synonymous with disease, sacrifice, isolation, and death".

- "And of those almost 19 years, 16 have been in the jungle, jungle."

- "Going into the jungle is to open a path and mount at the point of a comb and ax thinking where the enemy is."

- "Hard war due to the very conditions of the jungle, because the helicopter cannot always arrive with supplies, because it is easier to get sick, because there is no cell phone signal, because most of the time you are humid."

- "in the middle of the jungle".

- "I grew up alone and in the jungle of Guaviare. It's just my way of being."

The concept of "the jungle" is the one that caused me the most curiosity on a personal level since it is not mentioned in any investigation related to military doctrine and ideology. The jungle is the place of the unknown, it is the place where the enemy lives, where the military does not know what can happen there, where they do not know how to move, and where personal life at the family level and social circle is limited. and strangers and where their main task, apart from knowing and attacking the adversary, is to adapt to the conditions that the jungle dictates.

In the same way, it is very interesting to see that although these concepts are symbolic, they are physically manifested in the life of the military. This category obeys somewhat to the imaginaries built since the conquest and the colony where the "bad", "cannibals", "pagans", "uncivilized", etc., Indians were positioned, who urgently had to be Christians (as shown by of civilization).

It is extremely interesting to see how this concept of the "place where the enemy lives" continues to obey collective imaginaries imposed by Spaniards since the time of the conquest, which are very important to solidify the image of the savior hero because that is how the brave heroes, Those who risk their lives to enter the enemy territory (the jungle) are challenged to live in the same conditions as them and thus be able to enter their mind, know their movements and tactics, perhaps this is what they mention many times about the " mystique" that the military has, this "magic".

2.1.1.21. Crimes

This category looks like this:

- "As a weapon of struggle and a political instrument: kidnapping."

- "cylinder bombs, non-conventional weapons and prohibited by international treaties, are weapons that lacked aim and as a result of their desire to kidnap soldiers and police, because they did not care that the cylinders fell against defenseless houses, killing children, women and old people

- "political weapon used by the FARC in the country, as it reflects all the cruelty of the conflict."

- "cases in which many hostages held by the FARC were infamously murdered".

- "moment when the FARC began to kidnap an impressive number of soldiers... some were kidnapped and murdered, not only soldiers at that time, around the 2000s, the kidnapping of important political figures began, murders of journalists, presidential candidates... kidnapping is used as a political tool, for pressure by the FARCs…".

- "Let's look to see what violations of rights or what false positives those FARC people had."

- "They murdered entire squads. I remember when I was kidnapped, I had to feel that it was the taking of Gutierrez de Cundinamarca, where they poured monistic acid (?) on our soldiers, over there in the South of Bolívar a whole platoon, the defense minister at that time had to go, to collect because they finished them off with graces or hanged them in the trees, will that be false positives or what will that be? Or that is the pistol plan that those people still have".

- "this guerrilla assault".

- "an attack against the defense minister".

- "a later attack on General Guerrero Paz."

- "of several drug trafficking problems, criminal gangs, car bombs, all this number of acts."

- "They assassinated the governor of Antioquia by mistake."

- "of all these barbaric acts."

- "The firewood that burns this conflict is drug trafficking."

It is interesting to see from the perspective of the military that the victims, the target of criminal groups, are the elderly, women, and children, and they do not refer to themselves (the military) as victims of the actions of criminal groups. u to the men of society. Although these groups do commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, the army but in a "legal"

way, from their perspective, these counterattack actions are always justified solely in the sense of fighting the enemy, there is much ignorance about the crimes committed by the Colombian State within the institution, which on some occasions some soldiers mention that it is part of a media war to discredit, invalidate and discredit the Colombian military forces.

2.1.2. Analysis of newspapers.
2.1.2.1. the Year 1963:

Source: National Library of Colombia. Digital newspaper library. Press of the 20th century.

Source: National Library of Colombia. Digital newspaper library. Press of the 20th century.

Source: National Library of Colombia. Digital newspaper library. Press of the 20th century.

(By a nationalist movement) a lot of news about the USA, its work against Cuba, a lot of nonconformity was reflected, the desire for a revolution, incitement to protest, and many of them, and above all, there was a lot of repressions.

Source: National Library of Colombia. Digital newspaper library. Press of the 20th century.

Source: National Library of Colombia. Digital newspaper library. Press of the 20th century.

Source: National Library of Colombia. Digital newspaper library. Press of the 20th century.

The 60s had a lot of movement from the unions of large companies that international companies specifically from the USA, a decade of great communist influence in the media, and not much propagation by the State or the army, however when it is mentioned, it is He makes a lot of reference to words like bandits, the melancholy of the army, "the manual of the perfect infiltrator" (how to identify a communist within the country), nostalgia for the homeland, conservatism, civic-military action, patriotic march.

There is a lot of social unrest, many demonstrations, a lot of social unrest, a lot of news about the work of the United States in Latin American countries, especially in Cuba, a lot of news about Russia and China, about the coups in Ecuador, and the political situation in Argentina. (Peronism), unlike the newspapers of previous decades, which focused much more on European political situations, this decade is more focused on the social problems of Colombia primarily and then on Latin America. The space of social opinion showed the non-conformity and dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the country insofar as the lack of fair and non-exhausting job opportunities, showed and manifested the claim of society towards the Colombian State. The oil movement, the cotton and banana movement, insurance companies, etc.

2.1.2.2. the Year 1980:

Source: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=N2osnxbUuuUC&dat=19800202&printsec=frontpage&hl=fr

El terrorismo o la transnacionalización de la violencia

Por FERNANDO CEPEDA ULLOA

Vuelven las inquietantes maniobras de URSS en Cuba

WASHINGTON, 1o. (AP) — La Unión Soviética ha reanudado en Cuba el mismo tipo de maniobras militares que produjo el furor y amenazó las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética el año pasado, dijeron hoy funcionarios del Departamento de Estado.

Habla la embajadora

'La guerrillera me cayó encima...'

DOMINGO 2 DE MARZO DE 1980 — EL TIEMPO — 15 A

Unlike the decade of the '60s, for the decade of the 80's there is a lot of violence and references to crimes only made by "communists", "criminals", and attacks by "irregular groups", in the same way, it is seen much rejection of "leftist", "terrorist", "communist" and "socialist" movements, there is also a lot of "dehumanization of the enemy" by using terms such as "the dead impostor was a guerrilla" or "the guerrillas attacked me", building them as an "enemy" not only for the State but for the entire Colombian society.

In this decade the common denominator was national news and US news, international news was based on terms of the cold war, and the word communist and the word democracy is mentioned a lot, as antonyms. There was a lot of news about murders, all made by criminals, bandits, indigenous people, and guerrilla groups, and by this time the term "terrorist groups" were beginning to be used, it was mentioned that "leftist interference in education will not be tolerated," making a stronger reference and seeing it as a threat. Kidnapping, robbery, embassy seizures, and political assassinations, among others, are mentioned a lot and are only connected with criminal groups.

There is also talk of the activities/crimes committed by the guerrillas but not of the counterattacks of the army, the world is also perceived only between the US and the USSR and their influences in certain Latin American countries, international actions were based on movements, agreements and disagreements economic and political on the part of these two countries. It is very important to mention that there is talk of the "recovery of democracy"

with dictatorships that occurred in Latin America when a capitalist model was reestablished in countries that were becoming communist.

2.1.2.3. the Year 1990:

Source: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=N2osnxbUuuUC&dat=19900102&printsec=frontpage&hl=fr

Source: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=N2osnxbUuuUC&dat=19900102&printsec=frontpage&hl=fr

In this decade, many references are made to the attacks or operations carried out by the guerrillas and the counter-attacks carried out by the Army and the police, the Army is never seen as an attacker but rather as a defender in the sense that they are not the first to attack but in responding to the fire. Since the 80s, the violence by the actors in the conflict was on a large scale, in the press of this decade reports of victims of crimes committed by the guerrillas and different criminal groups were published, but there is nothing about acts or operations

carried out by the army or police. Many news items are mentioned about the control of coca, and the "enemy" begins to transfer to drug trafficking but there is no clear difference between guerrilla groups and other illegal groups, in this sense, the "enemy" is the same for all, not there is a difference between them and this leads to there not being different attack models for each one.

2.1.2.4. the Year 2000:

Source: https://caracol.com.co/radio/2000/12/30/nacional/0978159600_097561.html

The 1990s and 2000s were very violent and coincided with the presidential term of one of the presidents who tried to reach a peace agreement with the FARC, but not so effectively. Within society it was said that this president "handed over the country to the guerrillas" in

the sense that he gave them a lot of freedom and these groups became much stronger, in the same way, that in the newspapers of this time, there is a lot of violence, there is news all the time of murders, massacres, antipersonnel mines, kidnappings, etc., with this one begins to see a bit of the normalization of violence but specifically committed by non-state groups.

2.1.2.5. the Year 2003:

SUCEDIÓ EN EL 2003

Con base en los datos contenidos en el documento Balance Anual de Seguridad en Colombia Año 2003, divulgado por la Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, es posible sacar algunas conclusiones sobre la dinámica reciente del conflicto armado en nuestro país.

Por: **ALFREDO RANGEL SUAREZ** *
19 de diciembre 2003 , 12:00 a. m.

Aun cuando la tasa de homicidios ha sido la más baja de los últimos 16 años, el número de bajas y de combates entre las Fuerzas Militares y los grupos irregulares ha sido tal vez la más alta de la historia reciente. Esto significa que, al menos durante este año, el número de víctimas civiles disminuyó en proporción a la cantidad de combatientes caídos en los enfrentamientos, que aumentó. En dos palabras, la población civil fue, proporcionalmente

Ponte al día   Lo más visto

12:00 A. M. **MARÍA ISABEL RUEDA**
SUSCRIPTORES **'Facultades extra y finanzas, dudas de reformas de Petro': Mauricio Santamaría**

12:00 A. M. **DIPOL**
SUSCRIPTORES **El video y las fotos de la captura del señalado proveedor de**

cantidad de combatientes caídos en los enfrentamientos, que aumentó. En dos palabras, la población civil fue, proporcionalmente hablando, menos víctima del conflicto que en los años anteriores. Conclusión ratificada, entre otras cosas, por el hecho de que durante el año que termina el número de masacres disminuyó en cerca de un 50 por ciento con relación al año anterior.

Esto no significa, claro, que los grupos irregulares hayan resuelto humanizar el conflicto y darles cumplimiento a las normas del DIH. Significa, en primer lugar, que la población ha estado más protegida por la Fuerza Pública y, en segundo lugar, que los grupos irregulares se han mantenido parcialmente replegados a lo largo del año. En efecto, los paramilitares han permanecido en un estado de tregua, si no absoluta, por lo menos relativa, pues muchos de ellos están a la expectativa de negociar con el Gobierno su desmovilización. En muchas zonas disminuyeron su hostigamiento contra la población civil y en otras aumentaron los enfrentamientos entre grupos paramilitares rivales, lo que dio como resultado más de 300 muertos en los últimos meses.

Por otra parte, las guerrillas se encuentran relativamente replegadas, jugando con el tiempo, a la espera de que el Gobierno se desgaste,

jugando con el tiempo, a la espera de que el Gobierno se desgaste, decididas a aguantar el chaparrón de la ofensiva gubernamental, con la expectativa de que la eventual desmovilización de los paramilitares les despeje el camino para retornar a muchas áreas, pero mientras tanto se siguen armando, reorganizando sus fuerzas, tratan de consolidar sus bases de apoyo y preparan una futura contraofensiva.

Pero, en medio de esta baja histórica del homicidio y de este repliegue relativo de los grupos irregulares, muy notorio ha sido el cambio de ritmo de la confrontación armada. De manera paradójica y casi imperceptible para el conjunto de la opinión, el conflicto armado, medido en términos de número de combates y de muertos diarios en enfrentamientos, se ha intensificado, tanto en relación con el año anterior, muy intenso luego de la ruptura de los diálogos de paz, como con referentes más lejanos, como los primeros años de la década de los 90, también intensos luego de la toma de Casa Verde por las Fuerzas Militares, y posteriormente con el fin de los diálogos de paz con el gobierno de César Gaviria.

En efecto, aun cuando las guerrillas también aumentaron sus acciones este año, el mayor esfuerzo en la intensificación del conflicto lo han aportado las Fuerzas Militares. Así, considerando el número de

lo han aportado las Fuerzas Militares. Así, considerando el número de hombres que cada parte tenía hace diez años y su pie de fuerza actual, las Fuerzas Militares han multiplicado por tres su actividad por hombre en armas, mientras que las guerrillas han mantenido prácticamente igual su accionar.

También es importante resaltar que, en términos estrictamente porcentuales, el mayor incremento de las acciones ofensivas de las Fuerzas Militares se ha dado contra los grupos de autodefensa y no contra las guerrillas, lo que desvirtúa una vez más las acusaciones de supuesta confabulación institucional de la Fuerza Pública con los paramilitares. Por este notorio incremento de su actividad contra los grupos irregulares, las Fuerzas Militares aumentaron también su cuota de sangre: 523 muertos este año frente a 311 el año anterior. No obstante, el aumento de la cuota de los irregulares fue mayor: de casi 1.400 el año anterior pasaron a cerca de 3.000 este año.

Por otra parte, el año que termina ha mostrado al mismo tiempo los avances y algunas debilidades del Estado en la provisión de seguridad a la población. En efecto, mientras disminuyeron los homicidios, el secuestro, los asaltos, el hurto de vehículos, etc., aumentaron los atentados contra la infraestructura petrolera en un 53 por ciento, los atentados contra la infraestructura petrolera en un 53 por ciento, los retenes ilegales en 70 por ciento y hubo 3 paros armados en promedio por mes.

Es evidente que, a pesar de los esfuerzos recientes por aumentarlo, el pie de fuerza de la Fuerza Pública sigue siendo dramáticamente insuficiente. Por ello, mientras se logran nuevos incrementos, la única opción sigue siendo aumentar el nivel de actividad de quienes ya están en filas. Por esto resulta tan oportuna la conminación del Comandante del Ejército, el general Carreño, a sus hombres, para duplicar inmediatamente el ritmo de las operaciones militares, con la advertencia de que de los resultados obtenidos dependerán la permanencia, los ascensos y los retiros de la oficialidad. Dada la estrechez de recursos, será la única manera de consolidar lo ya logrado y de seguir avanzando en el mejoramiento de la seguridad colectiva en el 2004.

Since 2003, the concept of "security" and "democracy" began to be seen and taken on more importance in the press, which was based on a simple equation: there is more security (lower rates of violence and insecurity) but the numbers of casualties in combat between the Military Forces and the irregular groups increased, that is, the number of civilian victims decreased in proportion to the number of combatants killed in the confrontations. The newspapers continue to show strongly that the irregular groups do not follow the rules of International Humanitarian Law, but it is mentioned that the protection by the state Armed Forces has been stronger than ever, which makes them withdraw and not expand, which In the same way, it must give a sensation of diminishing the armed conflict. Much more military activity is shown by the Armed Forces, while the activity by irregular groups remains unexpanded, they also mention that these military actions have also been carried out against the paramilitaries "reaffirming" the disconnect between these groups and the State. A more secure enemy elimination association is created.

2.1.2.6. Year 2007:

Resumen semanal de noticias sobre el conflicto armado y la construcción de paz
Escuela de Cultura de paz de la UAB (1)

El Comando Conjunto de Occidente de la guerrilla de las FARC afirma que 11 de los 12 diputados del Valle del Cauca que estaban en su poder murieron en el fuego cruzado entre sus hombres y efectivos de un grupo armado sin identificar. Raúl Reyes, dirigente de las FARC, se compromete a cooperar para entregar los cadáveres a sus familiares, siempre y cuando se suspendan las operaciones militares en la región donde ocurrió el ataque. El hecho ha sido condenado por el Gobierno, por voceros de los partidos políticos y sociales, que establecen la responsabilidad de las muertes de los diputados en las FARC, al tiempo que el Gobierno niega ser el autor del ataque. Amnistía Internacional se suma a la condena y exige a las FARC y el ELN liberar a todos los secuestrados en su poder. En similar sentido se pronuncia el Episcopado colombiano y conmina al Gobierno y a las FARC a pactar sin dilación el acuerdo humanitario. Además, distintas organizaciones humanitarias, de familiares y de víctimas, así como de oposición, exigen al Gobierno esclarecer la verdad sobre sus operaciones militares con fines de rescate. Entretanto la OEA y el CICR ofrecen sus buenos oficios para recuperar los cadáveres. España, Suiza y Francia, que fungen como facilitadores para el acuerdo humanitario, proponen al Gobierno colombiano

que fungen como facilitadores para el acuerdo humanitario, proponen al Gobierno colombiano convocar la Comisión Internacional de Encuesta para que investigue la muerte de los diputados y las circunstancias en que se produjeron sus muertes. Esta propuesta el Gobierno la rechaza, por considerar que la invocación de este instrumento le da estatuto de beligerancia a las FARC, punto de vista que ha sido rebatido por expertos en DIH. Anncol, El Tiempo, El País, El Espectador, Semana, 28/06/07 - 04/07/07

El presidente A. Uribe insiste en que no habrá despeje para un acuerdo humanitario y pide a los colombianos manifestarse a favor de su postura, a condenar a las FARC por las muertes de los diputados y a que le exijan la liberación inmediata de todos los secuestrados. Estas declaraciones las hace en los días previos a las manifestaciones que están convocadas en las principales ciudades del país en repudio a la muerte de los secuestrados y por el acuerdo humanitario. De otra parte Gustavo Moncayo, padre del cabo Pablo Emilio en poder de las FARC desde la toma de la base de Patascoy en 1997, realiza una marcha desde Sandoná, Nariño, hasta Bogotá para clamar por el Intercambio Humanitario. Durante el trayecto, se han sumado centenares de marchantes y en cada población por la que pasan son recibidos por manifestaciones masivas de gentes que comparten su clamor. El País - Cali, El Tiempo, El Espectador, Caracol - Radio, El Colombiano, 26/06/07- 04/07/07

La comisión de negociadores de la guerrilla del ELN, liderada por Pablo Beltrán, propone al ELN, a las FARC, a los grupos paramilitares, a las bandas urbanas y a todos los factores armados y formas de violencia en Colombia, a hacer un alto a la guerra y un pacto por la vida, y llama a que se realice el intercambio humanitario. Este llamado fue respondido por el grupo de jefes

se realice el intercambio humanitario. Este llamado fue respondido por el grupo de jefes paramilitares recluidos en Itagüí, quienes agregan que es necesario un acuerdo urgente por la paz y la reconciliación, al tiempo que abogan por una solución política para la liberación de todos los secuestrados en Colombia. Entretanto, Beltrán anuncia que aspira a que en el mes de julio se firme el acuerdo de cese de fuego y de hostilidades entre el gobierno y el ELN, con el compromiso de liberar a todos los secuestrados en su poder, a la vez que esperan la liberación de presos del ELN y ser retirados de la lista de organizaciones terroristas. El País, El Tiempo, Caracol - Radio, La W - Radio, El Heraldo, Rebelión, 28/06/07 - 04/07/07

Amnistía Internacional en su último informe sobre Colombia, establece que en los últimos 15 años han sido asesinados 2.245 sindicalistas, se han producido 3.400 amenazas y 138 han sido desaparecidos. Detrás de la mayoría de estas agresiones estarían fuerzas paramilitares respaldadas por el Ejército y fuerzas de seguridad. La ONG destaca que durante el tiempo de gobierno de A. Uribe, han sido asesinados 512 sindicalistas. Al conmina al Gobierno a dar garantías para la actividad sindical, a respetar la vida e integridad de los sindicalistas y a frenar la impunidad por los crímenes contra los mismos. El nuevo Siglo, El Espectador, El Tiempo, 04/07/07

Source: https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-semanal-22-de-junio-de-2007-al-05-de-julio-de-2007

This guilt continues to be seen towards the guerrilla groups, associating their crimes with negative impacts on Colombian society, the guerrilla groups demand the withdrawal of the military forces so as not to continue kidnapping and murdering, but the Armed Forces do not do so, which is why several international organizations begin to demand clarification from the Government of the facts of the military operations, likewise, the Government rejects any international aid to clarify these facts because it thinks that this gives the FARC a state of belligerence and the president of the time affirms that they will not carry out military clearances and asks Colombians to support his position of not bowing to the guerrilla

conditions to start peace talks, as he said in his mandate, the only thing he wants is for the guerrilla groups to demobilize without a peace agreement.

2.1.2.7. the Year 2009:

Source: https://www.elcolombiano.com/historico/seguridad_democratica_no_fracaso_en_la_ciudad-ILEC_64972

2009 is the final stretch of the presidency of Alvaro Uribe Vélez, it begins to confirm and reconfirm that security strategies are not a failure within the cities, always alluding and referring to statistics, the common denominator of the two presidential periods of Alvaro Uribe was the numbers, the people who have died did not matter, nor their human part, they were simply numbers to be shown to the press. The Police General stated that: "the impact of the reduction of violence in the cities is the direct impact of the Democratic Security policy", reference is made once again to the words "criminals" to generalize guerrilla groups, bandits, and all the other types of criminals that existed at the time, the "intensification" of military operations to capture more "criminals" is also made public, emphasis is placed on reinforcing security in the cities and the General also mentions that "it is going in the right direction" by giving results in the dismantling of criminal gangs and "lowering" of criminals.

2.1.2.8. the Year 2013:

Fuerza Pública neutralizó a 'Jhon 26', uno de los cabecillas del frente 53

26 dic 2013 - 8:04 p. m.
El Espectador

Estaba dedicado a la extorsión de empresas en Meta y Bogotá

Una operación conjunta del **Ejercito Nacional y la Fuerza Aérea Colombiana** (FAC), coordinada con la **Policía Nacional**, permitió la neutralización del segundo cabecilla del **frente 53 de las Farc, alias 'Jhon 26'**, y de por lo menos nueve guerrilleros más.

La operación se desarrolló la madrugada del pasado domingo en una zona rocosa de difícil acceso de Cubarral (Meta), a más de 3.000 metros de altura, donde, por información de la ciudadanía, fue localizado un campamento de ese frente.

Inicialmente las aeronaves de la FAC ubicaron un campamento de ese frente y lo neutralizaron. Luego

Source: https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/fuerza-publica-neutralizo-a-jhon-26-uno-de-los-cabecillas-del-frente-53-article-466097/

Mindefensa dijo que el país no puede "poner su agenda en unos bandidos"

15 nov 2013 - 10:01 p. m.
El Espectador

Juan Carlos Pinzón dijo que "cuando se derrota un actor armado el Estado debe hacer presencia de inmediato".

Home > Política

9 may 2011 - 6:29 p. m.
El Espectador

Uribe se mantiene en no reconocer conflicto armado

"Reparemos a las víctimas, pero sin dar caminos de legitimación a los terroristas", dijo el expresidente.

Source: https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/mindefensa-dijo-que-el-pais-no-puede-poner-su-agenda-en-unos-bandidos-article-458655/

Finally, since 2011, former President Uribe continues to be a stone in the way for the following presidential terms, he continues to make his position public and use his hateful political language. It is important to mention that this president never wanted to acknowledge that in Colombia there was an internal armed conflict because this meant that it allowed the intervention of international organizations and that it could give rise to peace talks, it was very clear from the beginning that peace was not an obsession, in 2013 they were still "neutralizing" the guerrillas and re-affirming that "the country cannot place its agenda on some bandits", there were never any intentions to always negotiate to attack.

3. Chapter 3.

In this chapter, a relational analysis will be made between the interviews with the military and the media chosen in the previous chapter to identify common categories and likewise identify which were the psychological instruments used that leaked into daily life. of the Colombian population.

As Neyla Pardo (2005) mentioned in her research work "Representation of armed actors in conflict in the Colombian press", the media have undeniable importance and responsibility, they greatly influence the reconstruction of social reality since that social concept are loaded with meanings given by those who are presenting the news or public opinions, is a type of thought orientation mechanism, for this reason, the media are often used as ideological instruments with specific purposes, in which In the case of the Colombian armed conflict, it will be taken as a sample of the construction of collective imaginaries that spread and allow their reproduction, which in some way make said symbolic thoughts continue to circulate within the population.

3.1. Analysis.

It is very interesting to see how the armed conflict has been transformed in the eyes of those who have experienced it, it is very easy to see from a distance how it has been, its causes and consequences, but it is very important to see them from the experiences of society itself, in this case from the military and through public opinion in the newspapers taking into account these media also influence the configuration of the collective subconscious (Pardo Abril, N. G.; 2005). To understand the background of this, it is important to know its raison d'être, being the response found in ideology. In this research, a direct relationship was found between military ideology and the media that shape and generate social perceptions.

Although, indeed, the crimes committed by all the armed actors within the Colombian internal conflict have been cruel and the entire Colombian population has suffered the conflict directly or indirectly and there is no justification whatsoever for such acts, it is also

true that the "psychological operations" strategy within the population to have it in favor of the actions that the Colombian government decided to take. The media are part of these psychological operations, although no mention of this was found in the interviews, it was found in research on military institutions and in this thesis, he could see through a historiographical analysis.

The foregoing is justified by the newspaper samples that were taken from the 1960s to 2022, where the change in perception towards the conflict is quite interesting. In the '60s, the media were in charge of informing about everything that was happening in the country and internationally, in the same way, an inequitable influence was not seen in the sense that the need was shown, the riots, demonstrations, and bad social conditions that Colombian society lived in that decade, the discontent of the population towards the Government was openly expressed and social protest was strongly encouraged to demand civil rights.

In the 80s everything began to change, although global situations always have an influence, at this time the division between capitalism (USA) and communism (USSR) was much clearer, however, the focus was always on the USA. The US influence was becoming stronger and due to the different attacks that criminal groups were committing, Colombian society lived in fear all the time, according to interviews with the military, where most of them started their military careers. At the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s, it is agreed that everyone mentioned that these two decades were very strong in terms of political order and terrorism.

It is interesting to see how in the 80s and 90's there was a large entry of people into the military, as many of them mentioned, all men after finishing high school and graduating from college had to "do military service", Most of those interviewed agree that they were delighted with the structure, discipline, and thought within the Armed Forces, in the same way, the majority also agree that drug trafficking began to be the center of all problems, now the guerrilla groups They were also involved in drug trafficking and it is at this time that the US influence within the country becomes much stronger.

There was a constant question while I was analyzing the interviews and the newspapers: Is it society that determines (specific social situations) the configurations and perspectives that the media present? To understand how this works, it must be taken into account that all the media identify with some political position. In the case of Colombia, it was interesting to see

how all the reviewed newspapers (El Tiempo, El espectador, El Colombiano, and La Revista Semana) from a little before the 70s and onwards, put aside the opinions of the guerrilla groups or social opinions before they had a public voice where they expressed their displeasure towards the Government and as time went by they positioned themselves as an "enemy en común", in a danger for the entire Colombian society, they no longer had a valid (legal) public voice to show or that had the importance of being seen by millions of Colombians as before, but now they were publicly silenced and recognized only by the crimes they constantly committed.

In this sense, one can read between the lines that the media is beginning to be an instrument of psychological warfare. Psychological operations were always one of the most important operations by the Colombian State because the support of Colombian society was needed to make military operations more effective, due to concerns about the "penetration of communist ideology within society" these psychological operations had to have a special development plan, as mentioned in the bibliographic review, civil-military campaigns began to be carried out to demonstrate to society in remote regions that the State was there to assist them in their needs. As mentioned in the interviews, the Professional Officers of the Reserve are those civilians who attend military courses to participate within the institution as professionals of different careers who go to remote regions to assist the population in their needs, wear the uniform of the army because its purpose is for the population to identify the Army as a servant for them.

Likewise, and according to the analysis made of the newspapers, there is no doubt that the media were part of these psychological operations, by positioning, building, and spreading out the "enemy," first explaining how to identify him, then how to evade or denounce him, and The latter rejecting it, it is very interesting to see in the newspaper analyzes how the Army's strategies are never publicly questioned, the operations are never made visible and the army is always shown as the one that defends and never the one that attacks, instead the attacks, crimes, and adventures of guerrilla groups, drug traffickers, criminal gangs, etc., although all of them are under the same category and that is "criminals" or "criminals".

"In the terms of the Revolutionary War theorized by the French, the enemy infiltrates the population, hides in it, and seeks to manipulate it ideologically. In the population is where

the enemy draws its strength and reproduces" (Sala, L. Y.; 2018), here is the importance of psychological operations through the media, the reproduction of communist thought should be stopped, "The population it appears as a malleable force, the enemy's infiltration field and, therefore, the battlefield of war. It will then be about destroying the terrain or conquering it" (Sala, L. Y.; 2018), which is why "mental control of the population" is one of the most important objectives for the Colombian Armed institutions.

The change in perception of the conflict begins radically in the new millennium, according to interviews and newspapers of the time, in the year 2000 violence in Colombia had reached unimaginable levels before since the 90's the guerrillas the FARC entered the list of terrorist groups made by the US And after the attack on the twin towers in New York in 2001, a public statement was made from Washington in which the president on duty said where there was going to be a "strong hand" against the terrorist groups, it does not seem by chance that the presidential candidate whose political motto was "democratic security" above all, won the presidential elections in 2002, totally changing the course of the armed conflict in Colombia,

> "In his first speech at the United Nations, in 2002, the president compared 9/11 to a terrible massacre by the FARC in Bojayá, Chocó. And a year later, on the same stage, he uttered the word "terrorism" 26 times.
>
> "Our problem is an international threat. If Colombia does not destroy drugs, drugs will destroy the Amazon basin. If Colombia does not stop terrorism, it will put the democracies of the region in difficulties," he told the UN".

<div align="right">(Pardo Danie, BBC; 2021).</div>

In the interviews with the military, none mentioned any changes in strategy against the guerrillas or about the new way of waging war, even when they were asked about the subject, there was always evasion on their part, unlike what was shown in the newspapers and that responds to the main objective of this thesis, between 2002 and 2011, the Colombian press was aligned with the "anti-terrorist" thought, it showed a great increase in military operations and much success by the Armed Forces Against "criminals", the Colombian press also focused a lot on statistics as support for the success of military operations, there was no longer a flesh and blood "enemy", only numbers of casualties in combat.

As for the interviews, all the soldiers interviewed lived at this time of the conflict, and all of them were very satisfied with their work, they mentioned security and democracy a lot, the

main concepts that were the strong points of government policy in the years 2002-2010, and they referred to their adversaries as "bandits" or "criminals", what was found in common was that neither the soldiers interviewed nor the media at this time mentioned the crimes that the State was committing through the Armed Forces; On the contrary, the military stated that they never committed any type of crime and for them, the work done to defeat the criminals was fine. Even though armed confrontations are the main interaction of the war, unfortunately, the civilian population had and has to experience it as well. During and after Uribe Vélez's term, the Colombian population was divided, with the former president having more support. even to this day.

It is not denied that the social conditions of the country before Uribe's rise to power were the perfect environment to carry out aggressive and ruthless policies to finish off the enemy, but likewise, the consequences of these were very high, however even Today the Colombian population, even having evidence of the crimes committed, is still divided and believes that the social phenomenon of "false positives" (example) is complicity and devirtualization of the leftists to control the population and have it in their favor.

By everything mentioned above, the following symbolic instruments were identified, understanding this in the sense that military ideology gave them a particularly important meaning within the armed conflict, being found in Colombian newspapers and interviews. It is necessary to understand that the following categories are correlated and the set of them is the one that allows a global visualization of the understanding of the same instruments.

3.2. Analysis categories
3.2.1. Militarization of everyday life

This category is due to the transfer of the armed conflict from the place called "the jungle" to the cities, it is important to take into account that this category is visible and physical and at the same time symbolic, as a military interviewee mentioned, the association that the population It has concerning the uniform it is an alert, that something is happening, however, it I,s perceived at the same time with a feeling of protection, the two senses are juxtaposed in social life and when they are so common, the presence of the military in all areas of daily

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life. As mentioned by an interviewee in his story, his desire to be a military man was because he saw the "heroes" in his community and his only desire was to be like them an example of this normalization of the military and of the violence transferred to live. "normal" from day to day, many children reported that sometimes they played guerrillas and police or military, without even someone around them questioning the reason for this. This daily visibility is synonymous with the legitimizing use of domination and violence since although it causes alertness at the same time it causes relief as they are the ones who protect, perhaps it is for this very reason that it is so difficult for the Colombian population to recognize the serious crimes against humanity carried out by the Colombian Army.

In the same way, the normalization of militarization begins with the civil-military brigades, however, since the presidency of former President Uribe, relations have changed, "The very concept of "democratic security" is, in essence, a transformation in the scale of military, strategic and security intervention that makes the citizen and his daily life, also, part of the theater of operations" (Castillejo-Cuéllar, A.; 2013). As a strategy to change the perception of the population towards the military, the institution of Professional Reserve Officers was created, to associate military aid with benevolent acts, "This militarization was based on the messianic idea of total good against absolute evil." (Castillejo-Cuéllar, A.; 2013).

Being one of the main policies on the part of the State:

> "To counteract violence and other factors that threaten public order and citizen security, all the constituent elements of the military and police structure will jointly direct their efforts to enrich the integration of the public force with the community, contributing so that every day the presence of the State is more visible, representative and effective throughout the national territory"

<div align="right">(Betancur, J. G. B.; 2004).</div>

As seen in this thesis, it has had an effective application.

3.2.2. Religion

In my opinion, religion is one of the most important and solid symbolic instruments within military ideology. In the interviews with the military, the vast majority referred to God as their protector, their motivation, and their healer, however, it is not by chance that the catholic religion (mainly) is in the life of the military. In other investigations, interviewed soldiers identified themselves as belonging to the Catholic religion, the institution itself has prayers crying out to God to help them in their struggle, the Political Constitution of Colombia begins: "In the exercise of its sovereign power, represented by its delegates to the National Constituent Assembly, invoking the protection of God, and to strengthen the unity of the Nation and ensure life, coexistence, work, justice, equality, knowledge, freedom, and peace, within a legal, democratic and participatory framework that guarantees a just political, economic and social order, and committed to promoting the integration of the Latin American community decrees, sanctions and promulgates the following…" (Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991), having the approval of God, of a superior being, is a way of saying that what they are doing is right and there is no room for doubt.

Religion is perhaps the most effective symbolic instrument in wars and is specifically used by right-wing or conservative political parties,

> "Religion, seen from the sense of its instrumentalization, becomes a powerful weapon to face the enemy and sacralize the partisan community to which it belongs since it allows the creation of ties between the sacred (represented in the religious symbol) and the earthly (the political party), ties that allow the Conservative Party to justify its actions since it becomes the representative of the divine on earth".

(Salazar, J. Ó. P.; 2014).

This is how the good, what comes from God, is associated with political parties that defend "the already established order."

Religion in a country like Colombia is fundamental and generally accepted within society, in a society like Colombia there is also a tendency to godify ordinary people, in the case of military ideology, in historical accounts and in the narratives of the construction of national identity, the pro-independence military leaders are deified and shown as saviors, in contemporary times the character who became more than a president and became a kind of god was Álvaro Uribe Veléz, in the sense that he is not questioned his way of acting and his way of thinking, and is seen as the savior of the country since crime and terrorist acts

decreased in his presidential term and security within the country increased as never before, although this was seen stronger in his presidential terms, even today, his followers continue to see him this way, a clear example of the use of religion by these political parties and replicated and the collective subconscious, through the use of political speeches and the press.

3.2.3. Fear/danger/threat

The symbolic construction of fear is the basis of the need for "protection" to build and institutionalize security regardless of the necessary actions that must be done for this, fear narratives are created in the press mostly that are spreading rapidly among society Colombian society, "The fight against terror -he adds- facilitated Uribe's speech that 'here there is not a civil war, but a terrorist threat', and that for this reason the enemies are stripped of ideology, first, and of a due process, after" (Pardo Daniel, BBC; 2021).

After the decade of the 80s, the perception towards the "leftist" ideology is based more on fear, which coincides with the increase in criminal acts that the guerrilla groups, drug traffickers, paramilitaries, etc., were committing, using more attacks, bombs, kidnappings, extortion, etc., as well as the excessive use of political weapons and the transfer of war to the cities, the battlefield is no longer a distant place but the danger is felt within any city In Colombia, the media show more and more concern about the spread of communist thought and try to make it look like "a common evil" which should not be tolerated.

This is how fear becomes the founder of the political order in the sense that:

> "... the only rational argument that could induce men to obedience, to the acceptance of power above them or to renounce their total freedom, is the terror of their death, an imminent and continuous situation where sovereignty is in the dispute and consequently prevail the states or situations of war. The desire to live, the passion for physical preservation, the fear of not being able to enjoy the results of work or of losing what one has at the hands of any enemy, that permanent feeling of insecurity, of insecurity, of contingency, is what comes to constitute the foundation of the political order in modernity".

(Uribe, M.; 2002).

Within the Colombian armed conflict, the actors have exercised fear in the entire Colombian population, however, once again, in the press or interviews with the military, the army or the

State is not the one that provokes this fear, even when it uses the same methods of irregular warfare, the blame is solely on the part of the armed actors other than the state, making it easier to build security that only the state can provide.

3.2.4. Enemy

The construction of the enemy is quite peculiar since it needs other symbolic concepts and also corresponds to all the events that occur globally, the "internal enemy" of Colombia "by chance" is the same in several Latin American and Western countries It is very important to take into account that the indoctrination process to build a "common enemy" was a process developed in the western part of the planet. In the case of the Colombian armed conflict, since the 1960s the enemy was clear and solid, being communism; In the decade of the '80s and '90s, in addition to communism, there was drug trafficking, self-defense groups, and criminal gangs, but all of them were enclosed under the same terms "terrorists" and "criminals" (even today).

To achieve the destruction of the enemy, it was first necessary to go through a process of dehumanization, which is where we find characteristics such as "uncivilized", "poor", "atheists", "drug addicts", etc., it is necessary to understand that the recurrent use of these adjectives attributed to the "enemy" made the task of "annihilation" easy. It was then necessary to build or establish a "something" that must be protected because it means everything to Colombians and the mere fact of imagining the destruction of this "treasure" was the loss of the very essence of the human being as such. It is then that this enemy becomes a threat to daily life, to ways of life, to the known order, to the family, to private property, to freedom itself.

> "For this reason, the definitive victory could only be achieved by developing a system capable of influencing, as General Roberto Viola affirmed, "the human mind, the internal system of convictions of each man". This interpretation has its correlate in the way of conceiving the enemy in the doctrinal update that served as the basis for the self-styled "National Reorganization Process." As Ana Jemio points out, in the military regulations of subversion it is no longer limited to the armed "communist enemy", but rather it stands as the complete opposite of "being national", "Western and Christian".

(Sala, L.Y.;2018).

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The media, outside the strategies of the military institution, had a key participant in the construction of this symbolic instrument within Colombian society, "The publishing industry, even, was part of this ideological wave, where the country was divided between "patriots" and "terrorists", and where certain forms of violence, for example, kidnapping, literally accumulated more symbolic capital" (Salazar, J. Ó. P.; 2014). All the events that occurred were pillars for the construction of the "enemy" both the crimes that were being committed by illegal groups and the strong propaganda that the army was spreading within the population.

This was reflected in the interviews with the military and in the newspapers analyzed, the strong political division within the Colombian population was transferred to life itself, relating this political "enemy" with enemies in daily life, it is like a neighbor or a work colleague became an "enemy in everyday life" it was no longer just a war between two political sides but it expanded to a war between ordinary people. This political and social division is present today and is reflected in all levels of life, from politics to the family.

In the same way, the dehumanization of the enemy is in all areas of life, this being a great influence in the perception of justice and impunity, in the normalization of violence in daily life, and the lack of empathy towards the direct victims. of the armed conflict.

3.2.5. Disinformation

Disinformation was key to the process of building the enemy and the development of the war within the armed conflict, although at first the media also made visible the voice of the guerrilla groups (the 1960s), after the 1980s this became completely diluted, now all the media spoke only of the great work being done by the military forces and the atrocious crimes committed by illegal groups against Colombian society. In the interviews with the military, there was a lot of misinformation regarding what was happening in other spheres of the country, for them, only crimes committed by illegal groups existed and not crimes committed by the State, all referred to this as a "media attack", "disinformation from the enemy", "a media war".

It is important to highlight that this misinformation was not only at the level of the armed institutions, it was also within the population. In the years 2002-2010, the political bias that the country was experiencing at that time did not allow the population to conceive the magnitude of the crimes that were being committed behind the scenes, the population was always bombarded with news of murders, massacres, terrorist attacks committed by illegal groups, the propaganda of these years was very strong in the sense that the Armed Forces were always positioned as the only saviors and heroes of the nation. There was a lot of propaganda on television that showed the military leaving their families in important events to go defend the country, ending with the phrase: "Colombia's heroes do exist," or much propaganda that incited guerrilla groups to demobilize.

All of the above was like a smoke screen, if it came to saying that the Uribe government was committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, they would be classified as "leftists", "criminals" or "bandits" who only wanted to discredit the good name and work that the State was doing. This invalidation of claims and concern for very small sectors of society also generated misinformation, since the Colombian population at one point no longer knew what to believe.

This disinformation is usually related to "false information" or "lack of information", however, according to the Armed Forces, it is done only to protect the development of operations of the Armed Forces:

> "The Ministry of National Defense will seek total harmony with the media and public opinion and will provide objective, real, and timely information, as long as it does not endanger the security and confidentiality of military and police operations.
>
> The Military Forces and the National Police will be vigilant to distort possible misinformation about the mission, objectives, procedures, achievements, qualities, and attitudes of the public force".

(Betancur, J.G.B.; 2004).

This disinformation is also due to what former President Uribe Vélez said by not recognizing that Colombia had an internal armed conflict but attacks by terrorist groups, unlike the other presidents, intensifying propaganda and disinformation about all the political events that were taking place in the country. country at that time. The same thing could be identified in the interviews conducted with the military, they mentioned all the time the cruel acts carried

out by the illegal groups, alluding to the fact that since they were not institutional, everything they did was wrong.

3.2.6. Security

The concept of Security in this analysis takes on key importance, security is everything that the Colombian population needs, everything that the military mentioned in the interviews about the development of their work, but Security for whom? Security for whom? , within the results found it was very clear to whom and for whom, the illegal groups that have been transformed from "communism" in general, then the guerrillas, then the drug traffickers, then the self-defense groups and criminal gangs; and security for the Colombian population, intending to protect the civilian population mainly. However, according to the analysis of the Colombian press, mainly in the 1960s, it was clearly shown that state protection and security was only for large companies to cover their effective production, protecting them from social protests and discontent among the population. They are currently categorized as "enemies", often going so far as to attack the civilian population.

When the conflict moves to the city and criminal and terrorist acts manifest themselves within the city centers, leaving thousands of innocent lives (civilians) dead in their wake, protection, and security became for political officials and continued. being for the producing companies.

Even though all the soldiers interviewed stated that their job was to protect "the homeland" and the Colombian population, it can be seen that security is also relative and it is a concept that is transformed in history and that surely always changes the objective to protect. , this supposes a danger since the innocent civilian population that does not have the means or instruments to protect itself is not the real objective to protect, since it is not supposed that security by the State is for those who do not have the means to protect themselves? The Colombian armed conflict has made it very clear that the answer to this question is negative, as a palpable example of this is the multiple cases of extrajudicial executions that are still being investigated today and multiple human rights violations.

The "democratic security" policy of this century is not exempt from the interests behind said security, the increase in foreign investment, the multiple free trade agreements that Colombia made in this period, and the increase in the economy, were not given if it were not for the development of military operations that guaranteed "economic security" to investors.

Ideology and indoctrination to obey without question are what sustain this sense of security,

> "It is then a broad and openly legitimized political proposal in Colombia, a country exhausted by an incessant war, and therefore needs to question the pillars on which the prolonged armed conflict is based, and if there is even the slightest suspicion that — behind each bullet thrown, each explosive detonated, each landmine trodden on, each dismembered body, each displaced family, each disappeared person, each plundered land— there are interests that in turn are based on ideals configured as ideology and political or economic proposal…"

(Chaverra Agudelo, R.;2017).

This is how this construction of "security" has backgrounds not based on the protection and common good of the Colombian population but on the protection and common good of the economy. It is a false sense of security with quite specific objectives.

3.2.7. Respect and honor towards the armed forces

Within the interviews conducted with the military, all of them stated that they felt very proud, and happy, and felt incredible love for the institution, respect, admiration, and gratitude, they also expressed their love for the country and that the primary reason for carrying out their work was that of love for the country. In the same way, this is reflected in the press and other Colombian media, for example in the propaganda about the sacrifice and service of the military, which is closely related to the construction of a hero.

Although the word hero was mentioned many times in the interviews with the military, in the reviewed Colombian press no such mention was made, however, the "respect, honor and gratitude" to the armed forces for their cunning in combat, unlike how illegal groups appear, the armed forces show prestige, they are the embodiment of love for the country, the protection of life itself, it is the work that very few want and can do. On the other hand, this instilled respect and honor is dangerous at the same time because you put the armed

institution in a situation of superiority, what the military does cannot be questioned since their actions are "good" and they always think of you. The common good, so it would be unthinkable to say that they also commit crimes against the population.

Spreading this thought puts the Armed Forces in a position of responsibility since it is their responsibility to maintain public order, and society is only shown the results but never the development they had to do to achieve them, this is how a community lives blinded by military ideology, in the sense that they only base the creation of their thoughts according to what they (Government) want to show, they present themselves in one way but under this failed there are other acts. The danger of this conception is also the great confidence that society places in the Armed Forces since they are the ones who turn to when there are problems that cannot be resolved in the first instance, this honor and respect put them in a place of salvation where they are not touched and are not questioned.

4. Conclusion

The development of the thesis left interesting conclusions, since everything shown in this investigation fits into what is called psychological warfare, understood as "those programs that seek to annul enemies, not through their physical elimination, but also their psychic conquest" (Martín-Baró, I.; 1990), although from the beginning of the conflict psychological operations by the communist guerrillas and the National Army were always key strategies to defeat each other's enemy, from the beginning of this millennium, these psychological operations were established and made visible when they were strongly appropriated by the Government of the day.

As mentioned in the analysis of this thesis, the most common and perhaps the most effective instrument was the press, which is the perfect means of communication to start making social constructions with large symbolic charges that are spread within the population. , to prevent support for the "enemy", "in other words, what is sought is the support of the population, not satisfying their demands, but winning their minds and hearts, even when their situation and

conditions do not change and their needs are unsatisfied" (Martín-Baró, I.; 1990), that is, the population is an instrument, not the main reason to protect and improve when the war is won.

> "It is important to clarify that psychological warfare is not limited to the sphere of public opinion, as might be believed, or that its methods are limited to propaganda campaigns; psychological warfare aims to influence the whole person, not just their beliefs and views, and uses other means than propaganda campaigns".

(Martín-Baró, I.; 1990).

As shown in the previous quote and as shown in this thesis, the symbolic instruments on which the State was based are those found in the relational analysis of military interviews and in the Colombian press, they are the same as those based on psychological warfare as a strategy to win over the "enemy", the creation of fear, insecurity, militarization as a synonym for security and the others mentioned in this chapter, all these conceptual instruments brought to people's daily lives are that influence to reproduce the war.

This is how this war begins to establish itself within Colombian society, alluding first to what the country longed for so much at the beginning of the millennium, "democracy" and "security", a legitimizing process of the war begins using democratizing processes so that the military victories also become political victories, always alluding to "security and democracy" mainly, making the Colombian population part of this. As mentioned in the thesis, it is no coincidence that all the political and social processes that took place in Colombia came from nowhere, everything has been a historical process with great international involvement, mainly from the United States and with an economic objective.

Although in Colombia it has not been recognized that psychological warfare existed or exists, the study of this thesis shows that many of its strategies are related to it, thus being the Colombian population the victim of symbolic violence,

> "In a similar way to Galtung, for whom cultural violence belongs to the invisible region of the triangle, Pierre Bourdieu characterizes symbolic violence as non-explicit, a doxa, that is, a pre-conscious or even unconscious dimension of discrimination, exclusion, and distinction (Bourdieu, nineteen ninety-five). This aspect is relevant not only because of the tangible effects that discrimination produces but also because of the invisible effects, because of the daily and "naturalized" practices and behaviors of exclusion".

(Marín Mesa, I.A.; 2013).

In other words, the use of symbolic instruments of the military ideology within Colombian society has left psychological consequences within the population that could be called symbolic violence, since the perception of war, violence, empathy, and justice that Colombian society has greatly influenced the post-conflict process that the country is currently experiencing since impunity and corruption continues to be a great obstacle to achieving a stable and lasting peace.

4.1. "Culture of war"?

"There was always a justification within reach of the armed actors, no matter how horrifying the violent events committed. We can formulate this justification as follows: one must defend oneself from the "other evil", responsible for everything that happens and who must be counterattacked until annihilated" (You will not kill, Truth Commission; 2022), the naturalization of violence played a very important role in the armed conflict. The conflict in Colombia, having lasted so long and even still to this day, has generated a change in perception of violence, which has even been one of the reasons for so much impunity both within the institutions and on the part of the society.

Defending yourself from the "evil other" is what has always been present in the spread of the conflict, the danger of this thought is that many innocent lives were taken, based on stories or stereotypes that spread and defined the "evil other" making the impunity and injustice grow to unsuspected levels. "As long as the accumulated damage of lies is not made visible and the construction of the constructed "common sense" is not unmasked, the antagonisms and hatred will continue at all levels, since society, the State, and the armed groups participate in the same matrix of meaning" (Truth Commission; 2022).

Following the above, the strategy that was manifested in Colombia can be defined as "psychological warfare", understanding it as:

> "three fundamental principles of psychological warfare. The first principle refers to the treatment of supporters, who must receive permanent social, material, or moral compensation, to guarantee their adherence. Propaganda and opinion campaigns about achievements and possible threats are included importantly. The second principle is to reinforce and accelerate indirect actions through secret agents: rumors, movements, etc.,

which feed "the war of nerves". The third principle is to confuse public opinion with waves of news, true or false: this process can be expressed in the concepts of "break" and "disintegration".

(Lira; 1990, p. 19)

Barrero (2008) talks about how this psychological warfare has been a factor that has caused the naturalization of violence to spread rapidly, "For years we have gotten used to seeing images of political violence in our country. The psychological warfare that is transmitted through these images leads, without realizing it, to the institutionalization of excluding practices that range from the physical elimination of the other to their denial and symbolic disappearance" (You will not kill, Truth Commission; 2022).

In the example of extrajudicial executions, "It is pertinent to recognize false positives as biopolitical psychological warfare devices that have been used against the civilian population" (Grajales; 2015). Throughout this thesis, an attempt has been made to demonstrate the process and the reason for the creation of the National Security Doctrines, which have been the main doctrines that have justified so many (questionable) actions of the State, however, these doctrines do not They were only in the institutions of the armed forces, but were also used as an element of war within society:

> "…elements of psychological warfare such as institutionalized lying, the friend-enemy relationship, the symbolic war transmitted by action or omission through intermediate institutions such as the media, the disqualification of the adversary and the role of rumor, all of this in close contexts. (Tinoco. 2004), (Peña, Casas & Mena, 2009), (Blanco, A. Sabucedo, J. Barreto, I. Borja, H. López, W & Durán, M., 2012) and (Castillo, Santa & Courteous. 2012)".

(Grajales; 2015).

The dehumanization of the victims was what had the most involvement in Colombian society, the relationship of the ideology of the "enemy" who is the one who carries out "illegal" activities or who causes harm to members of society, was the main justification for the "protection of civil society". Being casualties in combat by the State, the veracity was taken as a valid fact, is it not the State that must protect citizens? This is how the State also took advantage of this power not only institutional but also psychologically, to once again validate acts that go against human rights.

"There are several factors to take into account here: First, the justification for the death of the unwanted is evident, thus also seeking symbolic death, this to avoid clarifying the facts and try to close the cases so that the truth is not found. responsibility of state agents" (Grajales; 2015), this abuse of power, seeks, on the contrary, to blame the same victim, leaving aside the need for justice, clarification of the facts, and safeguarding the validity of the State.

The last invitation of this thesis is to continue investigating the psychological part that the armed conflict in Colombia has left due to all the uses and modes of warfare that have been applied to it since once again innocent lives are affected in all areas of life. Continue investigating those things that seem "normal" and "natural" within society but that have deep processes, are well thought out, and with quite specific objectives.

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