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Comparative framing and collective action in favour of the wealth tax: The role of collective emotions and sense of responsibility

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INTRODUZIONE

Questo lavoro mira all'esplorazione del significato odierno della disuguaglianza economica e del suo derivato di classe sociale, con particolare attenzione all'uso del linguaggio e dell'effetto di quest'ultimo sulla propensione alla redistribuzione. L'elaborato è il risultato di un progetto di ricerca ideato con la collega Viola Bolli, coordinato dalla Professoressa Anne Maass e la Dottoressa Carmen Cervone. In particolare, si vuole rispondere al quisito su come l'effetto del framing comparativo possa influenzare la nostra intenzione di prendere o meno l'azione in merito alla redistribuzione, sotto forma di una maggiore progressività ed accordo con l'imposta patrimoniale, considerando anche il contributo di fattori quali emozioni e responsabilità collettive.

Il primo capitolo espone il presente stato della disuguaglianza economica ed il suo ruolo all'interno di un sistema che perpetua uno svantaggio strutturale per le persone appartenenti alla classe bassa. Come conseguenza, risultando in una percezione differente del mondo e del proprio vantaggio per la classe medio-alta. Inoltre, viene preso in considerazione il peso incontestabile del linguaggio per quanto riguarda la percezione della normatività e la legittimazione del privilegio. Viene anche indagata l'importanza delle emozioni quali colpa collettiva ed oltraggio morale nella presa di posizione rispetto all'azione collettiva in supporto all'imposta patrimoniale. Infine viene affrontato il tema della responsabilità in funzione della percezione della giustizia ed uguaglianza.

Il secondo capitolo introduce lo studio pilota, condotto assieme alla collega Viola Bolli. L'obiettivo dello studio pilota era di testare l'effetto della manipolazione sotto forma di "comparative framing", ossia la formulazione in termini comparativi del vantaggio oppure dello svantaggio della classe sociale considerata. Pertanto, viene studiato l'effetto della formulazione del messaggio sulla progressività di tassazione e l'azione collettiva normativa e non normativa riguardo all'imposta patrimoniale. Dallo studio risulta che le persone sono più favorevoli all'azione non normativa se il messaggio viene formulato in termini di svantaggio della classe bassa, dove la classe bassa riveste la posizione di soggetto all'interno della frase.

Il terzo capitolo entra nel merito della differenza tra gli effetti che si assume possa avere il "framing" sull'azione normativa e non normativa. Purtroppo non emergono

risultati significativi della manipolazione, tranne che un maggiore accordo con l'imposta patrimoniale nella condizione di vantaggio della classe media. Tuttavia viene evidenziato il ruolo fondamentale della colpa collettiva e dell'oltraggio morale in connessione all'azione normativa e non normativa rispettivamente. Infine, vengono presentati due modelli di mediazione, che includono entrambi la responsabilità assegnata alla classe media come fattore esogeno, l'oltraggio morale e la colpa collettiva come mediatori e l'azione normativa nel primo modello e non normativa nel secondo modello come fattori endogeni.

Il quarto capitolo è dedicato alla discussione generale, presentando sia i limiti che le implicazioni future dei risultati emersi. Viene discussa l'importanza delle emozioni e responsabilità collettive, a favore di un maggiore coinvolgimento in azioni mirate alla redistribuzione della ricchezza. Inoltre, si invita all'ulteriore esplorazione del significato dell'appartenenza di classe rispetto alla percezione ed impegno nel cambiamento sociale.

1. COMPARATIVE FRAMING AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
INEQUALITY KILLS

"Inequality kills" is a report released in January 2022 by Oxfam International, an international confederation of non-governmental organisations. As they claimed, *"inequality contributes to the death of at least one person every four seconds"* (Oxfam International, 2022, p.17). It is stated clearly that this is due to economic violence, which is both structural and systemic. As a consequence, inequality is not determined by chance, but it is a political choice (Oxfam International, 2022). On 19th January 2022 an open letter from over 100 millionaires addressed to the World Economic Forum was published, targeting the need for wealth taxes all over the world. They argued that the current system is *"unfair"*. Whereas ten richest men have doubled their wealth during the pandemic, the 99% of global population is worse off in terms of salary (Oxfam International, 2022). If Covid-19 pandemic only brought to light the already spreading out of inequality, acknowledging that the current distribution of wealth is unjust means that alternatives are thinkable.

On 7th January 2022 CEOs of Italian companies earned in a week as much as a median income earns during one year (Osservatorio JobPricing, 2022). The general distribution of wealth in Italy shows clearly that the economic inequality aggravated during the Covid-19 emergency. In particular, according to the report of Oxfam Italia (2022); *"At the end of 2020, the distribution of net national wealth saw the richest 20% of Italians holding more than 2/3 of the national wealth, the next 20% (fourth quintile) owned 18.1% of the wealth, leaving 60% of the poorest just 14.3% of national wealth"* (p.13). Indeed, the economic inequality has been growing over the last 21 years in Italy, with the top 10% showing an increase in *"2.5 percentage points in the 2000-2020 period, whereas the amount of the poorest half of Italians showed a decreasing trend, decreasing overall by 4.6 points in the last 21 years"* (Oxfam Italia, 2022, p.14).

If we think in terms of pre-pandemic mortality, in Italy there was already a 5-year difference in life expectancy between an unskilled worker and an executive (Costa, Bassi, Gensini, Marra, Nicelli & Zengarini, 2014). This used to follow an educational trend, where those who completed secondary education have 16% more dying probability compared to a graduated person, 46% for those who only completed the middle grade and

78% for elementary school (Volpato, 2019; Costa, et al., 2014). No doubt, this pattern probably aggravated during the pandemic. According to Volpato (2019) two factors explain this social gradient: *"material deprivation and psychosocial disadvantage"* (p.18). Whereas the former determines the access to better life quality in the form of social, healthcare and educational services, the latter is connected to our position in the society. If we consider the recent death of Lorenzo Parelli, who died on 21 January at only 18 years during a school internship at a metallurgical plant in Udine, this data may seem closer to us. According to INAIL (2022), between January and December 2021 there have been 1221 deaths at workplace.

Gallo and Matthews (2003) reviewed the scientific literature about socioeconomic status (SES) effects, such as income, education and occupation, on negative affects, like depression and anxiety, which in turn predict negative physical health outcomes causing mortality. In particular, they argued that low SES individuals may be more vulnerable to distress, in consequence of lower access to both material resources and higher impact of the events such as job loss, illness and the perceived lack of control. Further, thanks to Pickett and Wilkinson (2010) it is common knowledge now that inequality harms societies, in a way to create a general social dysfunction in the form of lower trust, worse mental health, lower social mobility and higher rate of homicides and prisoners as a consequence of a more punitive sentencing. These effects are argued to be connected also to psychosocial factors such as social evaluative threat i.e., to be *"negatively judged by others",* generating higher cortisol reactivity, the main stress hormone (Dickerson, 2008, p. 1363). However, as sustained by Buttrick and Oishi (2017) and Schneider (2012) it is primarily the perception of inequality as either just or unjust to predict individual happiness.

At the end of 2020, *"The top 10% (in terms of assets) of the Italian population owned more than 6 times the wealth of the poorest half of the population."* (Oxfam Italia, 2022, p.13). Even so, in the last two years of pandemic both large wealth tax proposed by Fratoianni and Orfini, and inheritance tax upon 1% of the richest proposed by Letta, have been rejected in Italian Parliament. Lately, a lot of attention was brought to the debate upon the current tax reform, approved on 30th December 2021. Even though during a press conference the Prime Minister argued that the Budget Law 2022 (published in

Gazzetta Ufficiale on 30th December 2022, n. 234) beneficiaries "*are pensioners and low-and middle-income workers*" (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2021)*,* Parliamentary Budget Office evidenced that this reform privileges the middle-upper class; "*A higher average tax reduction emerges for executives (about 368 euros), followed by that for white-collar workers (266 euros) and finally for blue-collar workers (162 euros)*" (Flash n.5/20 December 2021, p.12). The aim of this paper is to analyse the subtle ways through which the formulation of economic inequality may influence the propensity for a tax progressivity and collective action in favour of a wealth tax.

SOCIAL CLASS MATTERS

"*Maybe, sometimes, we lack words in this strange situation where the separation of classes has reinforced, but the dominant rhetoric is that the classes don't exist anymore*" - Volpato, 2019, p.52.

In this work, based on the Tajfel and Turner work (1978) definition, I conceive "*social categorization*" as: "*cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake many forms of social action. But they do not merely systematize the social world; they also provide a system of orientation for self-reference: they create and define the individual's place in society. Social groups, understood in this sense, provide their members with an identification of themselves in social terms.*" (p. 283)*.* In terms of intergroup comparisons, in order to question the status quo, the position of the advantaged group must appear as insecure, that is, cognitive alternatives must be thinkable. As a consequence, this may bring an insecure social identity to the former (Tajfel & Turner, 1978).

Social class is based both on objective factors, like material resources, and subjective factors, such as one's perceived rank within the society (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2012). Long-history Marx and Engels' (1973 ∕ 1848) conceptualisation of social class resides in labour relations between social agents. Weber further distinguished the concept of status and prestige, based on one's social position like the professional position or educational level (Weber, 1958). These two conceptualisations are often intertwined in social psychology research. However, one can easily distinguish between objective

socioeconomic status measures like education, income and occupation, and subjective socioeconomic status like MacArthur Scale i.e., asking participants to allocate themselves on a social ladder in comparison to others (Kraus & Stephens, 2012). Volpato (2019) based on sociologist Bourdieu (1979), evidenced how "*cultural capital incorporated*" is a capital interiorized by the individual across time – "*it requires a long-term self-investment, self-work, which becomes an integrative part of the person, perishes and dies with him/her; making it seem that the inherited advantages are innate and legitimizing in this way the patrimonial transmission*" (p.62).

In Andersen and Curtis (2011), the authors examined the identification with one's social class across 44 countries. In particular, they showed how household income can have an effect on one's social class perception, and how this is moderated by income inequality, strengthening one's consciousness about its position in the society. Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt and Keltner (2012) offered a very interesting framework upon how social class can influence not only our identity but also our world's perception and behaviour. Based on an empirical research review, they argued that whereas the upper class adopts a solipsistic cognitive tendency to interpret the world, the lower class adopts a contextualist one. This means that the upper class, because of greater access to material resources and enlarged sense of control (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2009), perceives the world through individualistic orientation and thus favours behavioural explanations which apply to internal attributions rather than situational influences. On the other hand, the lower class, used to external constraints and lack of individual control, perceives the world through contextual lenses (Kraus et al., 2012).

The authors further explored the influence of social class on self-concept, social perception and prosocial behaviour. Since the environment of the lower social class is more unpredictable, its members compared to upper class, show to be more vigilant to threat (Hajat, Diez-Roux, Franklin, Seeman, Shrager, Ranjit, … & Kirschbaum, 2010; Chen & Matthews, 2001), lower in personal control (Kraus et al., 2009), more communal and less agentic (Kraus et al., 2012; Stephens, Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Whereas communality refers to one's perception of interdependence with others, agency emphasises personal choice and autonomy (Krauss et al., 2009). Also, the lower class seems to be more empathetic (Kraus,

Côté & Keltner, 2010) and to prefer more constructivist rather than essentialist explanations about social categories (Kraus, 2010; Kraus et al., 2012). This may imply that the upper class prefers explanations about social categories that attribute abilities and attitudes to biological attributes rather than contextual. As a consequence, this may serve as an excuse against redistributive strategies (Kraus et al., 2012). Finally, they argued that lower class members show more prosocial tendencies and compassion (Kraus et al., 2012; Stellar, Manzo, Kraus & Keltner, 2011; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng & Keltner, 2010; Kraus et al., 2009).

Also, Dietze and Knowles (2016) brought evidence on differential social-information processing among different social agents. They conducted three experimental studies, showing that lower social class individuals compared to upper and middle class engaged in more visual attention to other people, observed the others longer, and that this happens at a very unconscious level of attentional selection. These findings can have a great repercussion on our understanding of the impact of social class membership. In Piff and colleagues (2010) study mentioned before, across four different studies lower class participants showed greater prosocial behaviour, in particular in the third study their prosocial trust behaviour was mediated by their egalitarian social values. However, when the upper class members were primed with feelings of compassion, they showed the same levels of helping behaviours as the lower class participants. On one part, this research shows that inducting feelings of compassion may be effective in awakening concern for the other among the upper-middle class. On the other hand, it exposes the underlying relational nature of lower class prosociality: "*rooted in a concern for others welfare and desire to enhance social relationships*" (Piff et al., 2010, p.780).

Finally, as confirmed by Volpato, Andrighetto and Baldissarri (2017), based on Andrighetto, Baldissarri and Volpato study (2016), "*the objectification of workers is embodied in the characteristics of the work itself"* (p.200)*, both for the worker and those in higher positions (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Thus, this may result in "*decreased belief in personal free will and self-objectification due to low-status work activities could have a role in the maintenance of status quo"* (Volpato, 2017, p. 202; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008). At this point, it suits distinguishing between social class and social power. Indeed, social power conceptualisation is different from

social class, since the former tends to vary "*as a function of a given relationship and/or context*" (Rucker & Galinsky, 2017, p. 27)*.* Whereas social identity provides one's with *"construction of meaning"* in the social context (Simon & Oakes, 2006, p.108), social power can be understood as mutual dependence, where one subject has asymmetrical control over resources. In this sense, power, in contrast to mere influence, is also intended as structural (Simon & Oakes, 2006; Dépret & Fiske, 1999). However, Simon and Oakes (2006) argued that social power is primarily rooted in a shared identity; "*higher-level identities* (such as national or organisational identity) *represent the legitimized resolution of previous A/B conflicts and thus give legitimacy to any inequality inherent in the differentiation between A and B*" (Simon & Oakes, 2006, p.122). A shared-identity contributes to *"infrastructure for consensus and influence; where identity differentiates there is the potential for conflict and the resort to coercion"* (Simon & Oakes, 2006, p. 116). From this perspective, making alternative identity salient, may be effective in unfolding unequal wealth distributions.

NORM THEORY AND LINGUISTIC NORMS

When a perceiver tries to explain an event there are different factors that can play a role in the explanation. Kahneman and Miller (1986) hypothesised that when thinking of the causes of the event, people tend to pursue counterfactual thinking i.e., evoking possible alternatives to an event. *"A counterfactual possibility should appear "close" if it can be reached by altering some mutable features of reality"* (Kahneman & Miller, 1986, p. 142)*.* They also proposed the "*atypicality*" and "*mutability*" concept as one of the factors that can justify why we focus on different aspects of a probe in order to make sense of an event (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). For example, when explaining the gender gap, one may focus either on why females earn "*less than*" men, or why men earn "*more than*" females. It was demonstrated that scientific literature focuses mainly on women as subjects of the comparison, while investigating the gender gap (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006). This has been shown to have important consequences for redistribution strategies, proposing solutions aimed at women rather than the system itself (Bruckmüller & Braun, 2020). This pattern seems to be transversal for different social groups, where the group that is considered more "*abnormal*" or "*atypical*" is more frequently used as "*the effect*

to be explained" i.e., the subject of the comparison (Bruckmüller & Abele, 2010, p. 1425). Since group status can be also seen as "*determinant of normativity*" (Bruckmüller, Hegarty & Abele, 2012, p. 210), Hegarty and Bruckmüller (2013) suggested that this tendency is transcendent in conversational norms for different social groups.

Hegarty and Prato (2001) argued that the content of the explanations can be affected both by group size and the availability of the unmarked group. Also, in Miller, Taylor and Buck (1991) study, the context affected the explanation of the number of annual medical visits of men and women, depending on whether they were elementary school teachers or college professors. Participants were more likely to focus the explanation on men when their presence was uncommon in a social environment such as elementary school. In general, also the across-group comparisons are considered more informative than within-group comparisons, when the subject of the explanation is atypical for the event (Grier & McGill, 2000). Indeed, social categories such as being male or white may "*go without saying*", while the opposite happens to lower-status categories, which may become important for the explanation (Prato, Korchmaros & Hegarty, 2007, p. 232). These categories are often used in communication to establish the 'common ground' and increase the informativeness during a conversation, whereas being male or white is rather typical (Prato et al., 2007). Bruckmüller and colleagues (2012) hypothesised that identities such as gender, whiteness and heterosexuality represent "*cultural default values*" with higher social status and so are more likely to be taken as the norm in the comparison (p. 211). In this concern, Volpato (2019) brought an enlightening argument, based on Smith (2017) novel, that "*race is a variant of social class*" (p. 60). However, Kraus and Stephens (2012) noticed how social class is partially different from gender, race and ethnicity, since it is a more malleable social category and less marked by physical aspects.

COMPARATIVE FRAMING AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

In July 2021 the porters of university residences of Padua went on strike for three days in a row. As they claimed: "*we are employed by three different companies, but we all provide the exact same service. It would all seem quite normal if it were not for a small*

detail. ESU employees earn around 40% **more than** *workers from other private companies*" (Seize the time, 2021). One could also say that workers from private companies earn 40% "*less than*" ESU employees. From a semantic perspective these two sentences are the same, but the syntactic formulation one adopts may imply different associations. When the formulation has a logically unjustified effect upon our beliefs, we call it "*framing effects*" (Kahneman, 2012, p. 402; Tversky & Kahneman, 1985).

Bruckmüller and Adele (2010) demonstrated that whether the group assumes the position of the subject of the comparison or the referent, could have an effect in the perceived power intergroup relations. In their study they compared both real (economic and law students) and fictitious groups, that participants did not belong to. In the first experiment the participants saw the implicit norm - the referent of the comparison, as higher in status, more powerful and more agentic. This effect was reproduced for fictitious groups, where the perception of the norm group as more powerful mediated the attribution of agency to the norm group. However, Bruckmüller, Hegarty and Abele (2012) specified that category-norms could be again context-specific. When comparing women to men in the leadership condition, participants saw the latter as more powerful, greater in status and higher on agentic traits. Nevertheless, the opposite happened in the leisure context, where men were perceived as more powerful when they were in the subject position. Eventually, participants attributed more gender stereotypes traits when their gender group was the norm in the comparison in the leisure condition framing.

In Chow and Galak (2012) conservative participants reduced their opposition to the redistribution strategies when they read a description of how much "*more*" the top earners made compared to the median wage earner, rather than how much "*less*" a typical person earns compared to a rich person. Also, internal attributions to the success of the wealthy were high among participants who read "*less than*" description. This may imply that in the "*more than*" condition participants were more eager to question the higher-status group's success. Although, in Bruckmüller, Reese and Martiny (2017) it was the "*more than*" framing that contributed to higher legitimisation of inequality. In the first study they asked participants about how legitimate they considered unequal distribution of tax wages for rich and poor people, framing this distribution both in "*more than*" and "*less than*" ways. Participants who read the "*less than*" description perceived higher

inequality as less legitimate. In their second study they compared a higher salary of a permanent to a temporary worker within the same company. Again, when a temporary worker was described as perceiving *less than* a permanent worker, participants legitimised the inequality *less* (Bruckmüller et al., 2017).

However, it could be argued that these studies focus on different questions. In Chow and Galak (2012) participants had to focus on whether a new tax for people with incomes over 1$ million was necessary, whereas Bruckmüller and colleagues (2017) asked how much the participants reputed the inequality as illegitimate. As a matter of fact, in another study of Lowery, Chow and Crosby (2009) participants were more likely to make a larger correction in the higher wage salary when the unjust difference between two actors was formulated in "*more than*" terms. However, they were also more likely to give more to lower earner if the difference was formulated in "*less than*" terms. Therefore, based on the perspective we adopt the results may vary.

A final insight into the comparative framing efficacy can be drawn from Dietze and Craig (2021). They performed five different experiments testing the efficacy of both frames, "*more than*" (advantage) and "*less than*" (disadvantage), with a particular consideration for both the social class membership and ideology influence. In all of the five experiments conducted on different online platforms, they accessed both more privileged and less privileged populations. The most effective framing was "*less than*". In the first experiment participants preferred the government to reduce the poverty, rather than the general gap and viewed the government as more efficient in reducing poverty rather than the gap itself (Dietze & Craig, 2021). In the second experiment, it was shown that participants were more motivated to collective action if the inequality was formulated in terms of *disadvantage* of the lower class. In study 3, adding the perception of injustice, rendered the inequality framing no longer significant, showing its role as mediator between the framing and collective action. In the fourth study participants engaged more with content on Facebook formulated in terms of the disadvantage about life expectancy of the lower class compared to the upper class, rather than the opposite. This effect was also stronger than the control condition formulated in terms of general inequality based on income. The fifth study replicated the results of the second one, without including

information about health access inequality. Furthermore, these effects were stable, regardless of the class membership nor ideology (Dietze & Craig, 2021).

Still, the authors also manipulated the perception of privilege and only the fourth experiment explicitly compared the lower class to the upper class. As a result, the upper class advantage frame could contribute to the invisibilisation of the lower class disadvantage. Nevertheless, these results confirm the Bruckmüller and colleagues (2017) research, where participants in the "*less than*" framing showed lower legitimisation of inequality. Even if, in Chow and Galak (2012) the "*more than*" framing seemed to diminish the conservatives' opposition to redistribution, Dietze and Craig (2021) demonstrated that the "*less than*" frame could be more effective in terms of redistribution strategies across different social classes and ideologies.

COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS: COLLECTIVE GUILT AND MORAL OUTRAGE

In Leach, Snider and Iyer (2002), the authors evidenced how the advantaged group is not always conscious about its privilege, either because its members do not identify with the group, because the advantaged group goes more often unmarked or because its members rarely "*compare themselves to the disadvantaged*" (p.137). As a consequence, "*the normativity of the superior category renders its privileged position invisible, while simultaneously marking the difference of the inferior category*" (Leach et al., 2002, p. 137). There are different factors that can play a role over the recognition of one's advantage, as; self or other-focus, perceived control and perceived security over one's position as stable and legitimate (Leach et al., 2002). Leach and co-workers (2002) examined different feelings that can be elicited by a downward comparison. Among these, they theorised guilt as focused on illegitimate and unstable position of the advantaged, but with a high degree of control, thus a higher probability to feel responsible over the situation. In the meanwhile, moral outrage was theorised as implicating a high degree of control, but unstable social position with an other-focus orientation (Leach et al., 2002).

"*From an attribution perspective, guilt occurs when an internal attribution is made for a controllable negative outcome that results in harm to another*" (Branscombe, Slugoski & Kappen, 2004, p. 16). However, guilt can be also experienced on behalf of

one's social group. Ferguson and Branscombe (2014) distinguished three different antecedents of collective guilt: collective identity, harm responsibility and harm legitimacy. In order to feel collective guilt its members must self-categorize as pertaining to the advantaged group. Indeed, Branscombe and colleagues (2004) showed that collective guilt was different both from trait and state guilt, since it was based on category membership. Higher levels of in-group identification can bring higher levels of collective guilt (Dosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 2006), especially when the source of information about a group's advantage is a member of the in-group. Anyway, in Powell, Branscombe and Schmitt (Experiment 2, 2005) a condition that evidenced the white privilege compared to black disadvantage condition was also linked to higher disidentification with one's racial group and higher collective guilt, because the collective self was more salient.

Acknowledgment of one's privilege as unfair and illegitimate is another important antecedent for collective guilt to be felt (Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2006). Harth, Kessler and Leach (2008) showed that highlighting the inequality was not enough to provoke collective emotions such as guilt or sympathy, but either advantage or disadvantage must be considered as illegitimate. Miron, Branscombe and Schmitt (2006) found that the effect of legitimacy over inequality on collective guilt was mediated by a self-focused distress, but not by empathy. Another important antecedent of collective guilt is responsibility (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2014). In this concern, Darby and Branscombe (2014) based on Young (2010) and Rawls (1971) work, outlined how the political responsibility over inequality stands not only in the social institutions and unjust social structures, but also in one's "*participation as citizens in a political system of social cooperation that facilitates the existence of structural injustices*" (p.131).

As claimed before, moral outrage compared to collective guilt is a "*system-focused response*", whereas the latter is based on self-blame (Iyer, Leach, Pedersen, 2004; Leach et al., 2002). Since moral outrage is based on a violation of a moral standard (Batson et al., 2007), it requires the perception of the inequality as unfair and illegitimate. In Wakslak, Jost, Tyler and Chen (2007) participants were presented with one of the two different scenarios: "*high-system-justification*" condition describing personal achievement, or a situation of unfair impoverishment – "*low-system-justification*"

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condition (p. 269). The priming of unfair condition of the disadvantaged elicited moral outrage, which in turn predicted "*support for programs to help the disadvantaged*" (Study 2, Wakslak et al., 2007, p. 273). In Montada and Schneider (1989) the authors assessed participants' reactions to less fortunate people's lives, outlining that moral outrage was the best predictor of commitment to prosocial activities such as participating in a demonstration, compared to other emotions. Also, moral outrage was related to assigning responsibility to others over inequality, compared to existential guilt which involved self-attribution.

Both moral outrage and collective guilt are aversive feelings, which people usually avoid. However, Leach and colleagues (2006) argued that collective guilt has a "*low action potential*" compared to anger (p. 1234), since it is less connected to physical agitation (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Fridja, Kuipers & Schure, 1989). As a matter of fact, in their study guilt was a worse predictor of willingness for political action and its effect was mediated by the abstract intent of compensation (Leach et al., 2006). Also, in Iyer, Leach and Crosby (2003) group-based sympathy was a better predictor for equal opportunity policies, whereas collective guilt better predicted compensatory action. On the other hand, it is not clear whether moral outrage is distinct from emotions such as empathetic anger, or whether it is just a theoretical distinction (Batson et al., 2007). As a matter of fact, both scales of anger and outrage over inequality used in scientific literature often include both conceptualisations (Cervone, Suitner, Carraro & Maass, 2021, Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020; Wakslak et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). A question that remains unanswered is whether it is possible to assess anger over inequality without establishing a moral violation, or to measure moral outrage without an intrinsic base of anger. Thomas and McGarty (2009) conducted an interesting experiment in respect, establishing opinion-based groups among students which had the aim to agree over best strategies to promote a movement against waterborne disease in developing countries. When participants were instructed that the best strategies would be the one provoking outrage, these participants reported most action intentions after the experiment. In particular, in this experiment the participants shared opinion over the existing disadvantage before the interaction, but this was utterly straightened afterwards, through an internalization of a moral norm (Thomas & McGarty, 2009).

Finally, Krauth-Gruber and Bonnot (2020) assessed both moral outrage and utterly distinguished collective guilt between collective guilt for action and collective guilt for inaction. Whereas the former implies reproducing inequalities because of one's behaviours (e.g., discriminating the poor), the latter implies not doing enough to fight inequality. In their study collective guilt was predicted only by in-group responsibility, where moral outrage was predicted both by system responsibility, in-group responsibility and negatively predicted by the poor's responsibility. As a consequence, they affirmed that moral outrage is a system-level emotion, whereas collective guilt is necessarily connected to one's perception of responsibility as being part of the privileged group. Also, they found that system justification efficiently mediated for the effect of responsibility on collective guilt. In their second study they accessed two different framing manipulations, focusing either on the system's responsibility over the inequality and social exclusion or their in-group's responsibility. Collective guilt for action in the in-group responsibility condition predicted prosocial tendencies favouring the poor. Instead, in the system responsibility condition, participants reported more moral outrage than collective guilt either for action or inaction (Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020).

Together, these studies suggest that in order to acknowledge the in-group privilege, it must be perceived not only as illegitimate, but also under control. As a result, collective guilt and moral outrage may arise. The former is a form of self-focused distress, resulting mainly in compensation type of strategies for redistribution (Miron et al., 2006; Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2006). The latter is established on a breach of a moral standard, leading to collective action supporting the disadvantaged (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Wakslak et al., 2007). Also, the differential attributions of responsibility may arouse collective emotions in various manners. When the collective self is involved, like in the case of in-group responsibility, one may expect collective guilt. In case of third-party responsibility, like the unfair distribution of resources attributed to the system, moral outrage is more common (Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020).

Collective action has been conceptualised differently in social psychology research based on the aim of the research, the socio-cultural context and the type of disadvantage to overcome. Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008) distinguished between structural disadvantage and incidental disadvantage. Whereas structural disadvantage consists of structural group status based on group membership, incidental disadvantage is appraised by a concrete and unjust situation (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). They argued that it is harder for structural disadvantage to provoke emotions such as anger and as a consequence collective action, since it implicates the challenge of the status-quo. Another complexity in regard to collective action is whether an intentional, attitudinal or behavioural approach is adopted. Nevertheless, in Van Zomeren and colleagues' meta-analysis (2008) the three different types of collective action mentioned above have been all predicted by the perception of injustice, efficacy and social identity. Based on these assumptions, they proposed the *"Social Identity Model of Collective Action"* (SIMCA, Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Also, they verified that both a politicised identity (identification with a social movement) and affective justice (e.g., established on group-based emotions), predicted better the collective action compared to a non-politicised identity and non-affective justice (e.g., based on cognitions alone, Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

In Van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears and Bettache (2011) correlational study, the violation of moral convictions predicted collective action and this effect was partially mediated by group-based anger, group efficacy and the identification with the disadvantaged group. However, this poses a methodological issue, whether the identification with the disadvantaged group is based on the effective group membership or could it be better defined as empathy. In order to take action against inequality one must first recognize it as existing and illegitimate, though its membership as pertaining to higher status group must remain salient (Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020; Dosje et al., 2006; Leach et al., 2002). Another confounding factor in measuring collective action is whether a person will not be involved in collective action because they do not approve the type of action suggested in the research or because they are not in accord with the moral cause underneath (Cervone et al., 2021).

In order to solve this methodological bias, Cervone and colleagues (2021) developed a measurement of collective action composed of two parts. In the first part, after reading a short description on the social issue addressed in the research, participants must express whether they consider themselves in accord or disaccord with the current issue (e.g., whether they consider poverty as a problem or as a necessary state of things). Afterwards, they must answer about their willingness to take action supporting their position. The authors also differentiated between normative action, such as signing a petition, and non-normative action, for example occupying a building. Across studies conducted in Italy and UK (Cervone et. al., 2021) anger, described through items such as "outrage", was the best predictor of collective action, although also guilt reached significance.

The current research aims at exploring the belief-aligned collective action theorised by Cervone and colleagues (2021) in favour of the wealth tax. In Scheve and Stasavage (2016) the authors outlined the most common fairness arguments in favour of progressive taxation and wealth tax throughout history, such as "*ability to pay*" and "*compensatory theory*". The ability to pay argument is based on the statement that those who have more should pay more because they can afford so, since they are less hurt by taxes. Whereas compensatory theory states that the rich should pay more because they should compensate for their advantages. However, some of the arguments found in contemporary research, showed that people may act against their self-interest based on fairness motives such as "*equal treatment*", and choose a proportional or flat tax, even if they find themselves in the disadvantaged position (Scheve & Stasavage, 2016). As a matter of fact, it seems that people may justify inequality, if the underlying process of the distribution is perceived as "*fair*" (Starmans, Sheskin & Bloom, 2017).

Distinguishing between procedural and distributive justice sheds further light on the perception of fairness and equality. Norton and Ariely (2011) showed not only that the participants in their American sample were unaware about the degree of wealth inequality, but the majority, either poor or rich and liberal or republican, also preferred higher equality like the one in Sweden. As argued by Tyler (2011) people are mainly concerned with procedural justice, i.e., "*whether the procedures through which allocations occur are or are not fair*" (p.15), whereas Norton and Ariely (2011) focused

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mainly on distributive justice. One may claim that inequality is necessary to some degree because of the intrinsic motivation for industriousness, thus allowing a "*meritocratic mobility*" (Starmans et al., 2017). Indeed, exposing participants to "*low social mobility frames*" resulted in lower justification of the system and approval of meritocratic beliefs both for conservatives and liberals in Day and Fiske (2017, p. 272).

Kay and Friesen (2011), based on Jost and Banaji's (1994) system justification theory, sustained that people tend to justify the system more if: they perceive a threat to the system they depend on, the system is perceived as inescapable and if they perceive low personal control. The belief in a just world, based on Lerner's theory (1980) is grounded on the assumption that those who are disadvantaged deserve it, whereas those who are advantaged have earned their position (Jost, Gaucher & Stern, 2015). According to system justification theory, people are motivated to "*defend and bolster the societal status quo*" (Jost, Becker, Osborne & Badaan, 2017). In Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Sidanius, Van Der Toorn and Bratt (2012) the authors distinguished between disruptive and non-disruptive protests. They examined the protest behaviour both among American students and political activists like the one in Greece on the occasion of May Day, and British teachers before a strike. System justification was inversely associated with collective protest and this was true especially with the disruptive form like occupying a building. This behaviour could be thought as a form of non-normative action, aimed at system-challenging. Indeed, the participants were more prone to take action in disruptive protest in the system-rejection condition (Study 3, Jost et al., 2012).

It is interesting to note how in Wakslak and co-workers (2007) study mentioned before, participants felt moral outrage especially in the low-system justifying condition. The same result was encountered in Krauth-Gruber and Bonnot (2020) in case of system responsibility framing condition, with participants feeling more moral outrage rather than collective guilt. As a consequence, one may hypothesise that moral outrage is especially connected to non-normative action and disruptive type of protests, compared to collective guilt. Indeed, the latter being associated with compensation type of strategies, does not necessarily involve rejecting the system and the current status-quo.

RESPONSIBILITY AND EGALITARIANISM

One can either distinguish between "*backward-looking responsibility*" and a "*forward-looking one*" (Darby & Branscombe, 2014). The former binds the responsibility to its cause, thus assigning blame and determining guilt. The latter brings forward the argument that if inequality is based on the basic structure of society we live in, we "*share responsibility for its outcomes*" (p.133), as citizens participating in the system that sustains us. Indeed, Darby and Branscombe (2012) evidenced shifting standards for the advantaged and disadvantaged in concern with inequality. Whereas the former may engage in "*self-serving attributional pattern*" (Darby & Branscombe, 2012; Loughan, Kuppens, Allik, Balazs, De Lemus, Dumont, ... & Haslam, 2011), the disadvantaged are more sensitive to circumstances. When discussing egalitarianism of chance, named also as luck egalitarianism, "*unjust unequal distributions will be considered just if they are caused by choices rather than circumstances*" (Darby & Branscombe, 2012, p.19). However, Darby and Branscombe (2012) argued that this ideal condition, based on choice, is distant from reality and oversimplified, since it does not consider how the environment can shape our decisions and stimulate self-fulfilling prophecy effects (Darby & Branscombe, 2012; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).

Kiatpongsan and Norton (2014), showed clearly that across 40 countries, including Italy, people preferred far more equal payes between a CEO and unskilled worker than the estimated ones. From a political philosophy point of view, Néron (2015) offered an interesting perspective over income inequality. On the example of Anderson's work (2009), he distinguished beyond distributive egalitarianism e.g., based on fair distribution of resources, and instead proposed a relational egalitarianism e.g., considering fairness in terms of equal relationships, thus taking into account both power and status asymmetries. From this point of view, considering modern corporations similar to "private governments" or "political communities", huge income disparities between CEO and workers are not only unjust from a distributive perspective, but because they unfairly reproduce asymmetries in authority and political power (Néron, 2015). Indeed, he argued, the success of big companies depends not only on leadership, but on the interdependent effort of its workers involved (Néron, 2015). We should then focus not

merely on the motivations of agents, but on the form of relations in which they are involved.

2. PILOT STUDY

AIMS OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH

This project was inspired by the work of Bruckmüller, Reese and Martiny (2017), investigating the possible differential effects of comparative framing on economic inequality legitimisation. The aim of the current research was to explore how framing the inequality in terms of the advantaged agent having "*more than"* the disadvantaged one, or the disadvantaged one having "*less than"* the advantaged one, may shape the intention to engage in collective action in favour of redistribution strategies. On the one hand, the explanation is usually centred on the most mutable and atypical social category, thus contributing to the invisibilisation of the middle-upper class privilege (Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013). On the other hand, "*less than"* framing could better elicit the unjust lower class disadvantage, thus making salient the need for redistribution (Bruckmüller et. al, 2017; Dietze & Craig, 2021). As a consequence, in the pilot study I assumed that participants would be more prone to engage in collective action in case of the "*less than*" framing. However, I formulated differential hypotheses for the main study, discerning between normative and non-normative action, in order to better understand the comparative framing effects.

Whereas the purpose of the pilot study was to test the effects of the framing manipulation constructed ad hoc for this research, the main study additionally explored the role of collective emotions and responsibility. In particular, the pilot study tested the manipulation's effect both on tax progressivity and belief-aligned collective action in favour of wealth tax, with legitimacy and compensation as potential moderators. Next, the main study's aim was to test the comparative framing effect on belief-aligned collective action in favour of the wealth tax, testing both for moral outrage and collective guilt as mediators, and responsibility as a potential moderator. Since moral outrage and collective guilt revealed to be an important driving force for collective action in the past (Leach et al., 2006; Wakslak et al., 2007; Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020), I wanted to comprehend their mobilising nature concerning both normative and non-normative action.

THE PILOT STUDY: AIMS AND HYPOTHESES

To this study's purpose I analysed the framing manipulation formulated in terms of comparison between middle and lower class. The overall manipulation was theorised together with my colleague Viola Bolli. Also, we assumed that participants would identify with the middle class regardless of the manipulation condition, since there seems to be a general tendency to identify with the middle class, rather than upper and lower class (Sosnaud, Brady & Frenk, 2013; Evans & Kelley, 2004). Moreover, based on Bruckmüller and colleagues (2017) suggestion, "*an important task for follow-up research is to investigate the role of group membership, which may mean that additional variables and processes such as self-interest or collective emotions come into play*" (p.777), we wanted to study the effects of comparative framing for the middle class members, in which participants would inevitably identify. In particular, I considered that participants would focus on their self-interest in case of "*more than*" framing, standing as the subject in the sentence, whereas they would be more concerned about the others in case of "*less than*" framing.

HYPOTHESES

1. I assumed that participants would be less concordant with tax progressivity and less motivated to act in the "*more than*" condition, because they would think about their advantage in terms of self-interest. On the other hand, they would be more prone to act in the "*less than*" condition, since it would evidence the worse conditions of the lower class.

2. I hypothesised that participants would legitimise the inequality more in the "*more than*" condition, defending their self-interest and so they will be less motivated to act.

3. I predicted that participants would agree more with compensation in the "*less than*" condition since they should feel the necessity to compensate for the worse conditions of the lower class. As a consequence, compensation would enhance the collective action.

PROCEDURE

The Pilot study was projected with my colleague Viola Bolli and the website we utilised for data collection was created by computer technician Stefano Andriolo. The participants were recruited through convenience sampling in June and July, 2020, via WhatsApp and Telegram messages, as well as through announcements on Facebook and Instagram. Participants spread the questionnaire to their families and friends, creating a snowball effect. Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. In particular, the study had a form of a 2x2 design, varying the frame ("*less than*" vs. "*more than*") and the type of comparison (middle class and upper class vs. middle and lower class). Whereas Viola Bolli focused on the middle-upper class comparison, the object of my interest was middle-lower class framing. Therefore, the following analysis concerns only this type of comparison. The time to fulfil the whole questionnaire was around 15 minutes.

Participants. The total number of participants was 341, but for this study I examined the middle-lower class comparison only, so 160. Among these, I did not include those who failed the attention check (17) and the manipulation check (48). Finally, I considered only those who identified with the middle class, so the final sample consisted of 78 participants; which 35 participants in the advantage condition and 43 in the disadvantage condition. As seen in *Figure 1,* on a continuous scale from 1 (left-wing) to 100 (right-wing) the final sample was mainly left-oriented ($M = 20.71$, $SD = 18.85$). Participants were mainly post-graduate students with a mean age of 35, but the median was 29. Participants were requested to sign an informed consent before starting the questionnaire. They were instructed about the aim of the study, namely: to better understand the personal perception of economic resources distribution in the society. Contacts were provided in case they would like to receive additional information. Subsequently, they were introduced to the manipulation.

Figure 1. Political orientation distribution, 0=left-wing and 100=right-wing.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Manipulation. In all, four different conditions were created, based on which comparison ("*more than*" or "*less than*") and social classes (upper compared to middle vs. middle compared to lower classes) were included. Participants were either assigned to one of the two conditions where middle class was compared to the upper class, or middle class was compared to the lower class. Also, the two conditions (middle-upper and middle-lower) were furthermore divided into two different framing conditions, "*more than*" or "*less than*". Whereas my colleague focused on the conditions framing the inequality in terms of the comparison between middle and upper class, I considered the two conditions framing middle and lower class. So, the middle class was always the advantaged group, compared to the lower class. However, the comparative framing was formulated in a way to highlight either the advantage of the middle class - "*more than*", or the disadvantage of the lower class - "*less than*".

The manipulation scenario was presented as a brief description of what emerges from recent sociological studies in Italy about social classes standing. Both scenarios were interspersed by images, with the aim to render the text effortless while reading. Here is an extract of the framing manipulation in the advantaged condition "*more than*", followed by the "*less than*" condition:

"*The middle class lives in **more** privileged conditions than the lower class. The middle class enjoys **better** goods, services and facilities than the lower class. (...) For*

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these reasons, the middle class has a longer life expectancy than the lower class." (MORE THAN)

*"The lower class lives in **less** privileged conditions than the middle class. The lower class enjoys **worse** goods, services and facilities than the middle class. (...) For these reasons, the lower class has a shorter life expectancy than the middle class." (LESS THAN)*

Also, every page was named with a title, coherent with the manipulation condition, in order to maintain its effect ("*the lower class has **less than** the middle class*" or "*the middle class has **more than** the lower class*").

The manipulation was followed by a categorical *identification* measure. Participants could identify in one of the two social classes present in the comparison. We included only those participants in the analysis that identified as middle class. Since we chose to use a categorical measure in order to test the participant's identification, from a methodological point of view this measure was a subjective perception of rank of one's position in the society (Kraus & Stephens, 2012).

After the manipulation the participants were introduced to the two dependent variables: *tax progressivity* and *belief-aligned collective action in favour of the wealth tax*. These variables were presented to the participants in a randomised order. Also, between the two independent variables, there was a brief reminder of the scenario they had read in the beginning (as seen in Appendix, p. 72).

Tax progressivity. This measure was assessed through an interactive graphic, using three different moving sliders for each social class. First, participants were asked to imagine that they have been invited as a consultant to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and that they had important decision-making power with respect to the distribution of tax percentages (%) in Italy. Then, participants could distribute the tax burden as they preferred to the three different social classes (upper class, middle class, lower class). The tax percentages in the three sliders reproduced the IRPEF taxation in Italy before its change on 30th December 2021 by the Law n. 234. However, it was assembled in a way that there were only three brackets - 28 000€, 55 000€ and 150 000€,

corresponding to the three social classes each. As shown in *Figure 2*, participants could see both how much each agent would contribute (in blue), and how much income would remain (in grey). Participants were instructed to click on the slider to move the cursor horizontally to the point they considered appropriate. In this way they could decide how much of the income would be allocated in taxes.

Figure 2. Interactive graphic of tax progressivity as dependent variable.

Reddito: 28.000 euro

    -    +   Percentuale: 25
                  Tasse: 7000
                  Reddito rimanente: 21000

Reddito: 55.000 euro

    -    +   Percentuale: 31
                  Tasse: 17050
                  Reddito rimanente: 37950

Reddito: 150.000 euro

    -    +   Percentuale: 38
                  Tasse: 57000
                  Reddito rimanente: 93000

Belief-aligned Collective Action in favour of the wealth tax (BCA). This variable was designed and validated in Italian by Cervone, Suitner, Carraro and Maass (2021). It was composed of two parts. First, participants had to read a text exposing the two main positions in favour and in disfavour of the wealth tax (e.g., "*According to some, the wealth tax is necessary, because it prevents the excessive accumulation of wealth and reduces inequalities [...] According to others, the wealth tax is counterproductive, because it acts on an already taxed and earned wealth and discourages investment*"). This was followed by a stance (BCA stance) expressing two opposite positions regarding the wealth tax. Participants had to rate their agreement with the wealth tax as either *"necessary"* or *"counterproductive"* on a 6-point Likert scale. Subsequently they had to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale their likelihood to engage with normative and non-normative actions in favour of the wealth tax. The normative actions (normative BCA) regarded socially and legally accepted actions as "*I would sign a petition in favour of my position*" and they

were accessed by 6 different items (α = .94). Whereas non-normative actions (non-normative BCA) concerned radical actions, such as "*I would carry out an illegal act as part of a protest in favour of my position*", on 3 items (α = .97). The overall alfa was α = .95. In the end there was also an attention check, where participants were asked to indicate "3", to prove that they were paying attention.

MODERATORS

Legitimacy. This scale was constructed ad hoc with my colleague, based on the one used as a dependent variable in Bruckmüller, Reese and Martiny (2017). Participants were asked to answer 8 items inspecting the degree they legitimise the current tax distribution in Italy on a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., "*Certainly, there are good reasons for the difference in tax rates between the various classes*", α = .74).

Compensation. The compensation is a subscale from a tax motives scale (Scheve & Stasavage, 2016). This construct examines whether the upper class should compensate for its advantage. It was investigated through only two different items (e.g., "*Wealthy sections of the population should be taxed more to equalise the current state of resource inequality*", "*The rich people should be taxed more in order to compensate for the advantages they have thanks to their status*" $r(78)$ = .813, p < .001).

Manipulation check. At the end of the questionnaire participants had to choose the correct answer about which way the description about inequality was formulated in the beginning (e.g., "*The lower class lives in less privileged conditions than the middle class*" or "*The upper class lives in more privileged conditions than the lower clas*s").

Demographics. Lastly, participants were requested demographic information. They had to indicate their gender, age, educational level, social class, working and economic conditions. Participants were also asked about their political orientation, both in general, as well as concerning policies about economic (e.g., taxes, public expense) and social issues (e.g., social rights, migration). They could quantify their agreement about left or right-winged orientation on these topics through a bipolar slider, one for each section (α = .84).

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics. Participants reported to want to engage in both normative (*M* = 3.90, *SD* = 1.88) and non-normative actions (*M* = 2.49, *SD* = 2.17, *Table 1*). The overall tax progressivity, computed as the difference between the highest bracket and the lowest one, was quite low (*M* = 25.18, *SD* = 14.67).

Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of Belief-Aligned Collective Action (BCA), Belief-Aligned Normative Collective Action (normative BCA), Belief-Aligned Non-normative Collective Action (non-normative BCA), tax progressivity (dependent variable), legitimacy (moderator) and compensation (moderator).

	Min	Max	Mean	St. Deviation
BCA	1	7	3.43	1.82
Normative BCA	1	7	3.90	1.88
Non-normative BCA	1	7	2.49	2.17
Tax progressivity	0	80	25.18	14.67
Legitimacy	1	7	4.39	1.06
Compensation	1	7	5.65	1.60

T-test. First, in order to test hypothesis 1, I performed independent t-tests on the dependent variables. The only significant effect was for non-normative BCA. In partial support of H1, participants were more ready to get involved in non-normative action in the "*less than*" condition than in the "*more than*" condition, as shown in *Figure 3*, $t(72) = 2.632$, $p < .05$, with Welch's correction. However, no equivalent results were found for normative action.

Figure 3. BCA and subscales in function of "less than" and "more than" condition.

Correlations. BCA was positively associated with tax progressivity, $r(78) = .42$, $p < .001$. Also the two subscales, normative BCA and non-normative BCA were positively correlated with tax progressivity, respectively: $r(78) = .36$, $p < .01$ and $r(78) = .43$, $p < .001$. Compensation was highly correlated with political orientation, $r(78) = -.71$, $p < .001$ (negative correlation means right-wing orientation was negatively correlated with compensation). However, there was no significant association between BCA and compensation, nor legitimacy. Although there was a positive tendency between legitimacy and normative BCA, $r(78) = .19$, $p = .093$.

MODERATION BETWEEN CONDITION AND COMPENSATION

Regression models. I tested different models, including either condition, legitimacy or compensation as antecedent variables and BCA as consequent variable. First, in order to test whether legitimacy or compensation played the role of the moderator in the study, I performed a series of regressions. To do so, both legitimacy and compensation were centred. Then, a product term was created between condition and legitimacy, and between condition and compensation in order to create the interaction effect.

Afterwards, I tested different combinations of condition and legitimacy or condition and compensation as independent variables, for both tax progressivity and BCA as dependent variables. The only significant model included condition and compensation interaction effect, with non-normative BCA as criterion variable. As seen in *Table 2,* there

was a main effect of the condition shown before, where being in the "*more than*" condition negatively predicted non-normative BCA. Unexpectedly, also compensation negatively predicted non-normative actions.

Table 2. Model 2 with non-normative BCA as outcome variable.

Variable	B	SE	β	t	p
Condition (*"more than" vs. "less than"*)	-1.20	.47	-.28	-2.56	.013
Mean Compens. Centred	-.40	.19	-.30	-2.17	.034
M.C.C*Condition	.63	.30	.29	2.10	.039

The interaction was significant, therefore there was a moderation effect. This model (2) fitted the data better than the one not including interaction, since it was 2 AIC (Akaike Information Criterion, Akaike, 1974) units lower than the one with only the main Condition and Compensation effect (Model 1) as shown in *Table 3.*

Table 3. The relative weights of model 1, with only the independent effects of condition and compensation, and model 2, including the interaction effect.

	AIC	DELTA	WEIGHT
MODEL 2	340	0.00	0.753
MODEL 1	342.2	2.23	0.247

As shown in *Figure 4*, with increasing Compensation participants tended to be more inclined to non-normative actions in the "*more than*" condition. As for the participants in the "*less than*" condition, they were less disposed to non-normative action with increasing compensation.

Figure 4. MODEL 2, with non-normative BCA as consequent variable.

DISCUSSION AND LIMITS

In line with hypothesis 1, participants were more motivated to act in the "*less than*" condition. However, this effect was significant only for non-normative action. Contrary to hypothesis 2, compensation enhanced the non-normative action for the "*more than*" condition. Nevertheless, legitimacy had no effect for neither of the dependent variables. Also, there was no effect on tax progressivity, but this variable was positively correlated with BCA. Possible limits of this study, further explored in the last section, could be an unclear conceptualisation of legitimacy and unfamiliarity of the participants with the tax distribution.

3. MAIN STUDY

AIMS AND HYPOTHESES

Based on the pilot study research, I chose to formulate differential hypotheses for normative and non-normative collective action subscales. Since in the pilot study participants were more prone to act in the "*less than*" condition in regard to the non-normative action, I assumed that participants would be more motivated to act in a non-normative way in this framing condition. As seen in Chapter 1, moral outrage is a system-focused response (Leach et al., 2002; Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020), and non-normative action like disruptive protests can be regarded as system-challenging (Jost et al., 2012). As a consequence, I assumed that the "*less than*" framing effect on non-normative action would be mediated by moral outrage and reinforced by the responsibility assigned to a third party. However, considering that compensation enhanced the collective action for "*more than*" condition, I hypothesised that in the "*more than*" condition, participants would feel more collective guilt, as this condition would highlight their privilege as part of the middle class. Therefore, they would be more likely to engage in normative collective action, feeling more responsible for the current inequality. Finally, I decided to add an egalitarianism scale for exploratory reasons, since it was initially measured as moderator in Bruckmüller and colleagues (2017) study.

HYPOTHESES

1. On the one hand, I hypothesised that in the advantaged position ("*more than*"), the middle class participants should feel more collective guilt and, as a result, be more motivated to engage in normative collective action (Belief-aligned Normative Collective Action, normative BCA).

2. On the other hand, the participants should be more motivated to act more non-normatively in the disadvantaged condition ("*less than*") than in the advantaged condition (*"more than"*), feeling morally outraged.

3. I assumed that collective guilt would have a stronger effect on normative BCA and moral outrage will better explain the non-normative BCA.

4. I hypothesised that higher responsibility on the system, upper class and middle class for the existing and reducing the inequality, would straighten the motivation to act on BCA. Whereas, assigning more responsibility to the lower class, would lower the effect on BCA.

5. Also, I hypothesised that higher responsibility of the middle class, implying higher perceived control over the inequality, would be more associated with collective guilt. On the other hand, higher responsibility attributed to the system and upper class would be more associated with moral outrage.

6. I expected that participants with stronger egalitarianism would be more inclined for redistribution in both normative and non-normative actions.

PROCEDURE

Participants. The questionnaire was created using Qualtrics online platform. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee (Protocol N. 4233) on 8th July, 2021. Participants were gathered through convenience sampling, using both QR-codes and social media. The peak of diffusion was reached when an activist publicised the questionnaire on his personal page, allowing for reaching a larger audience. However, this resulted in a predominantly left-wing sample as seen in *Figure 5*. The initial sample was of 318 participants, but only 196 completed the questionnaire and one did not give the consent. Among those who finished the questionnaire, 179 participants passed the attention check and only 155 completed also the manipulation check. However, only 113 participants identified as middle class, so the final sample was composed as follows: 91 women, 21 men and 1 non-binary person, with a mean age of 26.15 ($SD = 6.97$). Most of the participants were left-oriented, on a scale ranging from "0" - left wing to "100" - right wing, the mean was 16.37 ($SD = 19.49$). The analysis was performed by SPSS and JASP software.

Figure 5. Political orientation of the participants, on a scale ranging from "0" – left wing to "100" – right wing.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION

First, participants were asked to sign an informed consent which explained the aim to investigate economic inequality and redistribution strategies in the modern society. Then, the manipulation framing was introduced.

Manipulation. As in the pilot study, depending on the randomised condition they were in, participants were invited to read one of the two inequality scenarios. Both framing scenarios included a comparison between the middle and the lower class. One condition, "*more than*", highlighted the better standing of the privileged group (middle class as subject). Whereas the other one - "*less than*" condition, framed the differences in terms of the worse standing of the disadvantaged group, the lower class. Also, in every page there was a title that varied according to the condition, in order to preserve the manipulation effect (e.g., "*The lower class has less than the middle class*" or "*The middle class has more than the lower class*").

Next, the class *identification* of the participants was assessed, through a categorical measure, the same as the one used in the Pilot Study. They could identify either as middle or lower class. Again, the final sample consisted only of those who identified as middle class.

Subsequently, participants were asked about their agreement with affirmations inherent in the text they have just read. Then, moral outrage was assessed, followed by guilt - the two potential mediators in the study.

MEDIATORS

Moral outrage. It was measured through four statements. An item example was: "*I am outraged that the lower class is disadvantaged compared to the middle class*". The items were constructed so that they reflected the condition participants were assigned to, using either the disadvantage or advantage phrase construction. The scale was investigated on a 7-point Likert scale ($\alpha = .93$).

Collective guilt. It was assessed with six items from Krauth-Gruber and Bonnot (2020), translated into Italian. This scale was intended to measure the collective guilt for action and inaction on behalf of one's group. Collective guilt for action (CG action) refers to actively reproducing inequalities through one's actions (e.g., *"I feel guilty when I realise that poor people are rejected because of their status, even though I never had that kind of attitude"*, $\alpha = .85$). Whereas collective guilt for inaction (CG inaction) applies to not spending enough time and energy in order to reduce inequalities *(e.g., "I feel guilty for the fact that we, the less disadvantaged, don't spend enough efforts to reduce inequalities between poor people and us"*, $\alpha = .86$). Again, the items were formulated in terms of advantage or disadvantage, depending on the condition the participants were assigned to. It was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (the overall $\alpha = .91$).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

After completing the first part, the main dependent variable was introduced: *Belief-aligned Collective Action in favour of the wealth tax.*

Belief-aligned Collective Action in favour of the wealth tax (BCA). This scale was the same as the one used in the Pilot Study, adapted from Cervone and co-workers (2021). Again, after reading a short text exposing two different currents of thought concerning the wealth tax, participants had to rate their agreement with the wealth tax as either "*necessary*" or "*counterproductive*" (BCA stance). It was measured through a Likert scale ranging from 1 (necessary) to 6 (counterproductive). Afterwards, they were invited

to indicate the likelihood that they would engage in collective actions in favour of the wealth tax, on a 7-point Likert scale. The actions could be either normative (6 items, e.g., "*I would write to institutions and newspapers to bring forward my position*", α =.90) or non-normative (3 items, e.g., "*I would block the access to a building or public area with my body to defend my position*", α =.92). The overall alfa was α = .93. Also, there was a final attention check, where participants had to press "3" to show that they were paying attention.

MODERATORS

Responsibility. This measure was adapted from Krauth-Gruber and Bonnot (2020), it measured two different aspects of responsibility on a continuous scale. The first question asked participants to assign responsibility for the "*existing*" inequality to each agent: system, upper class, middle class and lower class, on a scale from 1 to 100. The second item examined the responsibility to "*reducing*" the current inequalities in Italy. Again, participants had to quantify the amount of responsibility of each agent.

Egalitarianism. This scale was translated into Italian from Bruckmüller, Reese and Martiny (2017), who also used this measure as moderator in their study about comparative framing effect on inequality. In particular, participants had to express their agreement with 7 items adapted from the Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale of Katz and Hass (1988), on a scale ranging from 1 to 7. An example was: "*One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself*" (α = .87).

After the moderators, participants were asked to remember how the message about inequality was formulated at the beginning of the questionnaire, which constituted the manipulation check. Finally, participants were asked some demographic questions such as gender, age, educational level and working status (e.g., "*Compared to the average Italian family, how is your family financially?*"). The political orientation was studied through three different continuous measures, inspecting political orientation in general, economic issues and social issues (α = .93). They were also asked about their social standing and annual income. At the end of the questionnaire, the aim of the study was explained. The two manipulation conditions were clarified, asking the participants for a final consent.

RESULTS

Unfortunately, I encountered a higher drop-out in the disadvantaged position, just after the participants saw the manipulation, giving a total of 113 participants, 44 in the "*less than*" condition and 69 in the "*more than*" condition. However, participants in the two conditions were similar in age, educational level, social standing, political orientation and gender distribution, as seen in *Table 4*.

Table 4. Two-sample t-test for "more than" and "less than" conditions on sociodemographic variables. There is no significant difference between the conditions.

	t-test	Df	Sig. (two-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std Error Difference
Age	-1.30	111	.198	-1.74	1.34
Gender	-.10	111	.920	-0.01	.08
Educational level	-.08	111	.937	-.02	.19
Social standing	.50	111	.621	1.59	3.21
Social class	.25	111	.986	.00	.13
Political orientation	1.36	111	.178	5.07	3.45

Also, participants scored high on almost all the variables, except non-normative BCA ($M = 2.65$, $SD = 1.75$, on a scale ranging between 1 to 7), which is not surprising since it involves radical actions. However, the participants placed themselves in the middle which is still high compared to the past research (Cervone et al., 2021).

MANIPULATION

T-test. First, a series of t-test was run to study the different effects of the manipulation on the variables present in the study, as shown in *Table 5*. The mean difference regards "*less than*" condition minus "*more than*" condition. So, in case of positive difference, the mean was higher in "*less than*" condition rather than in the "*more than*" condition. The only significant effect was on BCA stance. Participants considered the wealth tax more as necessary in the "*more than*" (rather than in the "*less than*" condition), t(67) = 2.44, p < .05 (with Welch's correction). It is important to remember that high values on BCA stance indicate that participants considered the wealth tax as counterproductive. In partial support of H1, there was a tendency of participants to feel more collective guilt for inaction in the "*more than*" condition, *t*(111)= -1.67, *p* = .098. However, with regard to H1 and H2, there was no significant effect for normative BCA and non-normative BCA.

Table 5. independent t-test for "more than" and "less than" conditions on the mediators (Moral Outrage - MO and Collective Guilt - CG) and the dependent variable (Belief-aligned Collective Action - BCA).

	t-test	Df	Sig. (two-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
MO	1.17	111	.246	.345	.296
CG	-1.47	111	.145	-.382	.261
CG ACTION	-1.12	111	.263	-.333	.296
CG INACTION	-1.67	111	.098	-.432	.259
BCA STANCE	2.44	66.74	.018	.639	.283
BCA	-.99	111	.326	-.292	.310
BCA NORM	-1.17	111	.244	-.363	.339
BCA N-NORM	-.45	111	.654	-.152	.338

* p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001; †p < .10

Correlations. All the correlations between variables considered below (*Table 6*), were significant. Participants who retained the wealth tax as necessary were also motivated to collective action (BCA). BCA was positively correlated with both moral outrage and collective guilt. Also, collective guilt was positively associated with normative and non-normative actions. Moral outrage was correlated both with normative and non-normative BCA.

Table 6. Correlations between mediators and the dependent variables (BCA): Moral Outrage (MO), Collective Guilt (CG), Collective Guilt for action (CG action) and Collective Guilt for inaction (CG inaction), BCA stance - considering wealth tax as counterproductive, Belief-aligned Collective Action (BCA), Belief-aligned Normative Collective Action (BCA NORM), Belief-aligned Non-normative Collective Action (BCA N-NORM). n=113

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1.MO	-	.37***	.34***	.36***	-.41***	.40***	.36***	.40***
2.CG		-	.95***	.93***	-.37***	.40***	.42***	.29***
3.CG ACTION			-	.77***	-.33***	.36***	.38***	.26***
4.CG INACTION				-	-.37***	-.39***	.41***	.28***
5.STANCE BCA					-	-.53***	-.53***	-.41***
6.BCA						-	.96***	.87***
7.BCA NORM							-	.70***
8.BCA N-NORM								-

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; †p < .10

Multiple regression. Although the manipulation had no effect on the normative and non-normative BCA subscales, still the two mediators were significantly correlated with the dependent variables. So, I performed a simple regression on both dependent

subscales, in which moral outrage and collective guilt served as predictors, and normative BCA and non-normative BCA as criterion variable. Indeed, in line with H3, collective guilt better explained the normative BCA, compared to moral outrage, where moral outrage best explained the non-normative BCA, as seen in *Table 7*.

Table 7. Standardised regression coefficients on normative BCA and non-normative BCA, with moral outrage (MO) and collective guilt (CG) as predictors.

Predictor	Normative BCA		Non-normative BCA	
	β	t	β	t
MO	.23	2.57*	.34	3.62***
CG	.33	3.68***	.16	1.75†

* p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001; †p < .10

RESPONSIBILITY

First, it must be said that the sample of responsibility for existing inequality and reducing inequality is slightly different from the whole sample, since this measure was not mandatory and, as a consequence, not every participant moved the slider. However, I chose to analyse this variable excluding those participants who did not interact with the variable, so the sample for responsibility over existing inequality was composed of 102 participants and the one for reducing inequality was composed of 96.

ANOVA 2x4. Subsequently, I performed a 2 (Condition) x 4 (Agent: system, upper class, middle class, lower class) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the latter variable, to test if participants assigned different degrees of responsibility to different agents based on the condition they were in. This was done on both responsibility for the *existing* inequality and *reducing* the inequality.

In regard to the responsibility of the <u>existing</u> inequality, participants assigned different degrees of responsibility to different agents, $F(3, 252) = 264.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p =$ .73. As shown in *Figure 6*, they attributed the highest responsibility to the system in both conditions ($M = 84.71$, $SD = 19.80$ and $M = 92.98$, $SD = 9.33$, in the "*less than*" and

"*more than*" condition respectively), followed by the upper class (*M* = 80.82, *SD* = 20.80 and *M* = 82.50, *SD* = 24.54) and the middle class (*M* = 49.26, *SD* = 24.72 and *M* = 54.14, SD = 25.97). The lowest responsibility of the current inequalities was assigned to the lower class (*M* = 17.53, *SD* = 22.24 and *M* = 15.36, *SD* = 20.11). Although the interaction was not significant, t-test comparing the two conditions in the responsibility assigned to the system showed that participants attributed higher responsibility to the system in the "*more than*" condition rather than in the "*less than*" condition $t(47)$ = -2.45, p < .05 (equal variances not assumed, Welch's correction).

Figure 6. Responsibility for existing inequality assigned within participants to different agents for both less than and more than participants' condition. n=102

Error bars: 95% CI

As can be seen in *Figure 7*, with respect to responsibility in <u>reducing</u> inequality, again participants assigned different degrees of responsibility to different agents, $F(3, 239)$ = 112.18, p < .001, η^2_p = .54. This time, there was also an interaction effect $F(3, 239)$ = 3.82, p = .015, η^2_p = .04. However, between-subjects effects were not significant. Again, participants attributed the highest responsibility to the system (*M* = 95.53, SD = 8.84 and *M* = 97.32, SD = 5.86, "*less than*" and "*more than*" condition respectively). Also, participants in the "*more than*" condition attributed higher responsibility to the

upper class ($M = 80.07$, $SD = 23.04$), compared to participants in the "*less than*" condition ($M = 70.31$, $SD = 31.20$).

Figure 7. Responsibility for reducing inequality assigned to the different agents within subjects and between the two different conditions. n=96

Error bars: 95% CI

Correlations. As shown in *Table 8* and in line with hypothesis 4, responsibility for inequality assigned to the system, upper class and middle class, was positively associated with BCA and inversely associated with considering wealth tax as counterproductive. Also, assigning high responsibility to the upper class was significantly correlated with moral outrage and collective guilt. In support of H5, participants felt more collective guilt when the responsibility was put on the middle class. On the other hand, assigning responsibility for inequality to lower class was negatively correlated with BCA, moral outrage and collective guilt. In accord with H6 egalitarianism was strongly connected both to normative and non-normative action.

Table 8. Correlations between responsibility for existing inequality assigned to the system (RG S), to the upper class (RG UC), to the middle class (RG MC), to the lower class (RG LC), Moral Outrage (MO), Collective Guilt (CG), BCA stance (STA_BCA), normative BCA (BCA NORM), non-normative BCA (BCA NNORM) and Egalitarianism (EGA), n=102.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1.RG S	-	.36***	.23**	-.28***	.29***	.33***	-.49***	.37***	.41***	.22***	.39***
2.RG UC		-	.53***	-.11	.43***	.27***	-.39***	.46***	.47***	.34***	.34***
3.RG MC			-	.02	.49***	.48***	-.51***	.49***	.51***	.36***	.40***
4.RG LC				-	-.38***	-.22***	.26***	-.23***	-.23***	-.17**	-.46***
5.MO					-	.43***	-.45***	.42***	.38***	.43***	.68***
6.CG						-	-.49***	.42***	.44***	.28***	.51***
7.STA_BCA							-	-.59***	-.60***	-.45***	-.50***
8.BCA								-	.96***	.86***	.49***
9.BCA NORM									-	.70***	.48***
10.BCA NNORM										-	.41***
11.EGA											

* p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001; †p < .10

An interesting result was that attributing responsibility for *reducing* the inequality to the system, was not significantly correlated with BCA, as seen in *Table 9*. It was, however, positively correlated both with moral outrage and collective guilt. Similar results were encountered for the upper class, but this time there was a positive correlation with BCA normative. Overall, participants who hold the middle class responsible for reducing

inequality were also the only one motivated to act to reduce inequalities in BCA, probably because they identified themselves as more responsible.

Table 9. Correlations between responsibility to reducing inequality assigned to the system (RR S), to the upper class (RR UC), to the middle class (RR MC), to the lower class (RR LC), Moral Outrage (MO), Collective Guilt (CG), BCA stance (STA_BCA), normative BCA (BCA NORM), non-normative BCA (BCA NNORM) and Egalitarianism (EGA). n=96.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1.RR S	-	.16	.13	-.18†	.39***	.29***	-.25*	.06	.06	.05	.04*
2.RR UC		-	.65***	-.17†	.33***	.24*	-.08	.19†	.21*	.13	.27**
3.RR MC			-	.43***	.34***	.43***	-.17†	.24*	.24*	.21*	.37***
4.RR LC				-	-.21*	-.01	.26*	-.03	-.01	-.06	-.12
5.MO					-	.38***	-.44***	.39***	.35***	.39***	.64***
6.CG						-	-.42***	.41***	.43***	.30**	.52***
7.STA_BCA							-	-.56***	-.56***	-.46***	-.45***
8.BCA								-	.97***	.87***	.47***
9.BCA NORM									-	.71***	.45***
10.BCA NNORM										-	.41***
11.EGA											-

* p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001; †p < .10

Multiple regression. In order to compare the predictive strength of responsibility for existing and reducing inequality toward collective guilt and moral outrage I performed a

multiple regression. I considered the different agents for both existing and reducing inequality as predictors and collective guilt and moral outrage as criterion variable. In *Table 10* I reported the standardised beta coefficients. In agreement with H5, higher responsibility attributed to the middle class best explained the collective guilt both in case of the existing inequality and reducing inequality. Nevertheless, in regard with existing inequality, moral outrage was predicted both by middle class responsibility and inversely predicted by the lower class, but not by the system, nor upper class. In respect with reducing inequality responsibility, moral outrage was predicted both by the system, middle class and again inversely predicted by lower class responsibility.

Table 10. Standardised regression coefficients on collective guilt and moral outrage with responsibility for existing inequality and responsibility for reducing inequality as predictors.

	Collective guilt		*Moral outrage*	
RES existing inequality	β	t	β	t
System	.19	2.04*	.03	.38
High Class	-.07	-.68	.17	1.69[†]
Middle Class	.48	4.84***	.41	4.44***
Low Class	-.19	-2.14*	-.36	-4.45***
RES reducing inequality	β	t	β	t
System	.20	2.13*	.27	2.98**
High class	-.13	-1.14	.09	.79
Middle class	.58	4.47***	.39	3.14**
Low class	-.20[†]	-1.95[†]	-.34	-3.46**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; [†]$p < .10$

MODELS

I chose the responsibility for existing inequality assigned to the middle class, which was initially conceptualised as moderator, as exogenous variable, to explore if

moral outrage or collective guilt could mediate its effect on the main consequent variables in the study: normative BCA and non-normative BCA.

First, as shown in *Figure 8*, I tested a model including responsibility assigned to the middle class as predictor (x), moral outrage and collective guilt as mediators and normative BCA as outcome variable (y). The effect of the middle class responsibility on moral outrage, collective guilt and normative BCA was significant. However, moral outrage was not a significant predictor of normative BCA. The total effect of x on y was also significant *(B =.50, BootLLCI = .02, BootULCI = .04)* and there was a partial mediation of collective guilt *(B =.12, BootLLCI = .02, BootULCI = .23)*.

Figure 8. Partial mediation of collective guilt on normative BCA, with middle class responsibility as exogenous variable.

In the second place, I included responsibility assigned to the middle class again as predictor (x), moral outrage and collective guilt as mediators and non-normative BCA as the outcome variable (y). As shown in *Figure 9*, controlling for moral outrage and collective guilt, the regression of middle class responsibility on non-normative BCA was not significant, even if its separate effect on non-normative BCA in the antecedent analysis resulted significant. This time neither collective guilt was a significant predictor of non-normative BCA. The total effect of x on y was significant *(B = .35, BootLLCI =*

.01, *BootULCI* = .04) and there was a full mediation of moral outrage (*B* = .14, *BootLLCI* = .05, *BootULCI* = .24).

Figure 9. Mediation model of moral outrage on non-normative BCA, with middle class responsibility as exogenous variable.

DISCUSSION AND LIMITS

Overall, the manipulation only affected BCA stance, in a way that participants were in accord with a wealth tax more in the "*more than*" condition than in the "*less than*" condition. However, it must be said that only 14 participants considered the wealth tax as counterproductive. As a consequence, I could not confirm neither of the first two hypotheses concerning the differential effects on normative and non-normative action. Probably, this was partly due to a highly leftist sample. However, the H3 was confirmed, since collective guilt better predicted normative action and moral outrage was better connected to non-normative action. Nonetheless, no causal conclusions can be drawn.

In regard of responsibility, participants assigned significantly different amount to different agents, mostly blaming the system and upper class. There was a condition effect for responsibility assigned to the system for existing inequality, with higher responsibility attributed to the system in case of "*more than*" condition. It could be assumed that the "*more than*" condition elicited the advantage, so the participants assigned more

responsibility in this condition. In particular, this framing may have enhanced the privilege of the middle-upper class which goes more often unmarked. The attribution of responsibility to the system was also associated with higher agreement with a wealth tax and collective action, so the "*more than*" condition may have strengthened the need for redistribution.

However, the middle class responsibility was the best predictor of moral outrage and collective guilt, compared to responsibility of other agents like the system, upper class and lower class. Therefore, I constructed two different models with responsibility assigned to the middle class as exogenous variable and moral outrage and collective guilt as mediators for the both normative and non-normative action. As for the normative action, there was a partial mediation of collective guilt. In respect of non-normative action there was a full mediation of moral outrage. These models will be further discussed in the last chapter.

4. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The aim of this research was to disentangle the differential effects of comparative framing manipulation upon Belief-aligned Collective Action in favour of the wealth tax (BCA). First, a pilot study was conducted in order to test the manipulation efficiency, in collaboration with Viola Bolli. Secondly, a main study was carried out to explore the diverse effects for normative and non-normative action. In particular, in accordance with the hypotheses, in the pilot study the participants were more likely to act in favour of the wealth tax in the "*less than*" condition and that was especially true for the non-normative action. However, when testing for the interaction effect of compensation, along higher compensation attitudes the participants were more prone to act in the "*more than*" condition. Given this unexpected result, in the main study I hypothesised that participants would be more eager to engage in normative action in the "*more than*" condition, since it presupposes the recognition of one's privilege and, as a consequence, a willingness for compensation in form of the wealth tax. I assumed this effect would be mediated by the collective guilt and moderated by the responsibility assigned to the in-group. Furthermore, I hypothesised that the participants would be more predisposed to act in a non-normative way in the "*less than*" condition, since the unfair worse-off condition of the lower class would awaken moral outrage amid the participants, moderated by a third party responsibility.

Unfortunately, in the main study the manipulation had an effect only on the stance toward wealth tax, the introduction to belief-aligned collective action. This effect was higher for participants in the "*more than*" condition. However, a very small number of participants were in disfavour of the wealth tax. Also, there was a tendency for participants to feel more collective guilt for inaction in the "*more than*" condition. Perhaps, this condition primed the privilege associated with the advantaged group. Considering that "*more than*" condition also influenced the attribution of responsibility of inequality toward the system, this condition may have reinforced the awareness of the unequal distribution of resources amid social classes. More research is needed in order to assure the comparative framing effects.

Nonetheless, as hypothesised, moral outrage better predicted the non-normative BCA, whereas collective guilt was a better predictor for normative action. In the past research collective guilt was seen to be mediated by self-focus distress, principally resulting in compensation strategies (Leach et al., 2006; Iyer et al., 2003). In the meanwhile, moral outrage was shown to have major effects upon mobilising general support toward the disadvantaged (Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Wakslak et al., 2007). Also, collective guilt was seen to be associated mainly with in-group responsibility in the past research, whereas moral outrage was better predicted by a third party responsibility, such as the system (Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020). In the present study collective guilt indeed was better predicted by the in-group responsibility both for the existing and reducing inequality. Nevertheless, this was true also for moral outrage, even if this emotion was also better predicted by the inverse lower class responsibility, especially in the case of reducing inequality – where there was only a tendency for collective guilt.

Since the manipulation has not had major effects upon the dependent variables, I chose to further explore the role of responsibility for existing inequality assigned to the middle class. Considering that the middle class was the most advantaged one in the comparison, one could further hypothesise that this manipulation had an effect on the participants' perception of their rank in society. As a consequence, as in Piff and colleagues (2010) rank manipulation, participants were positioned as the most advantaged, priming also the upper class advantages and though the in-group responsibility for inequality. In this concern, I was eager to explore the model with responsibility assigned to the middle class (in-group) as predictor, and moral outrage and collective guilt as mediators for both normative and non-normative action. The first model, which included collective guilt and moral outrage mediating the effect of in-group responsibility towards normative action, resulted in a partial mediation of collective guilt. The second model showed a full mediation of moral outrage towards non-normative action. The latter shows that the middle class responsibility effect was fully explained by moral outrage. Although moral outrage has been mainly connected to system-responsibility in the past (Cervone et al., 2021; Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020; Leach et al., 2002), taking consciousness about one's responsibility in perpetuating the current system could still elicit moral outrage directed towards changing the system.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The limitations of this study are that both in the pilot study and in the main study I encountered a very leftist sample, probably because economic inequality and redistribution strategies are mainly of interest to left-wing ideology (Jaime-Castillo & Sáez-Lozano, 2016) and because of the diffusion strategies I adopted. Also, tax progressivity measures and legitimacy have not had significant effects in the pilot study. As for tax progressivity, maybe the dynamic conceptualisation of the tax weight distribution is still less accessible to the participants, compared to the wealth tax concept, targeting only the upper level of society. In regard to the second study, as seen before, the manipulation did not influence the dependent variables. It would be interesting though for the future research, to test an additional condition where the participants do not identify with the agents of the comparison, to compare how the salience of one's membership could influence the differential effects of the comparative framing.

An important aspect to consider is whether one manipulates only syntactic aspects, or whether there is a differential emphasis upon advantage and privilege. Studies enhancing only the advantage/disadvantage of one of the agents, without posing the referent to the sentence, may bring confusion to the debate (Bruckmüller, et al., 2017; Dietze & Craig, 2021). More research is needed in order to understand whether comparative framing is merely dependent on the question one aims to answer, or does it truly have differential effects apart from priming the advantage/disadvantage. Indeed, framing inequality in terms of "*more than*" framing may cause dysphoric feelings such as collective guilt, and this could be especially true for conservatives' further propensity to redistribution (Chow & Galak, 2012). On the other hand, this framing could be more easily legitimised since economic inequality is based on a system we depend on, satisfying our epistemic, existential and relational needs (Jost et al., 2015; Bruckmüller et. al, 2017). Another aspect to take into account for future research is the effective importance of collective emotions in mobilising action towards redistribution strategies through a feeling of collective involvement such as in-group responsibility. Also, further exploring the role of one's membership in a social class is a challenge that social psychologists are called to respond to.

CONCLUSION

The intent of this work was to deepen our understanding of how comparative framing works, thus how simple change in words can shape our perceptions of inequality and as a consequence, mobilise to collective action in favour of wealth tax. The first chapter examined in depth the meaning of social class in social psychology and the communication norms which shape our perception of inequality and social categories. I also exposed the differential influence upon collective action of collective emotions such as moral outrage and collective guilt. Moreover, the role of responsibility was scrutinised, involving the collective self to act. The second chapter brought to light the results of the framing manipulation I created ad hoc with my colleague Viola Bolli, favouring non-normative collective action upon "*less than*" framing. In the third chapter I exposed the results of the main study. Unfortunately, the manipulation had scarce effects. However, the role of collective emotions and responsibility assigned to the in-group, revealed to be fundamental. It is the task of the future research to further explore how collective identity such as membership to a social class can influence the perception of inequality through comparative framing and the unique role of collective emotions and responsibility. In particular, as suggested by Leach and Zeineddine (2021), it is essential to comprehend the dynamic nature of collective emotions, emerging from mutual influence within socio-political contexts. Finally, taking consciousness about the intrinsically unfair world we live in, yells for action, since we take responsibility over our choices, based on the inner freedom of our existence (Sartre, 1993). This freedom is not intended in the sense of the modern consumerism idea of choice, but in taking action against constraints of economic inequality which permeate the unequal relations in our ever-day life.

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APPENDIX

PILOT STUDY

Informed consent

Gentile partecipante,

Con il presente documento Le chiediamo di fornire il Suo consenso informato a partecipare alla ricerca, coordinata da Anne Maass, delle laureande Sandra Klaudia Sosnierz e Viola Bolli in merito alla disuguaglianza economica ed alla redistribuzione della ricchezza.

L'obiettivo della ricerca è quello di comprendere la percezione della distribuzione delle risorse economiche all'interno della società.

METODOLOGIA DI RICERCA: Durante la ricerca Le verrà chiesto di rispondere ad un questionario relativo alla disuguaglianza economica nella società odierna ed al sistema di redistribuzione della ricchezza. Le verranno inoltre presentate delle domande di carattere socio-demografico.

LUOGO E DURATA DELLA RICERCA: La ricerca sarà svolta attraverso una Piattaforma Online e avrà una durata complessiva di **max 15** minuti.

RECAPITI:

Responsabili della ricerca:

Anne Maass; 0498276579; *anne.maass@unipd.it*; Dipartimento di Psicologia dello Sviluppo e della Socializzazione – Università degli Studi di Padova; Via Venezia 8, Padova;

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Responsabili della raccolta dati:

Sandra Klaudia Sosnierz; *sandraklaudia.sosnierz@studenti.unipd.it*;

Viola Bolli; *viola.bolli@studenti.unipd.it* .

CONSENSO ALLA PARTECIPAZIONE E AL TRATTAMENTO DEI DATI:

La/il sottoscritta/o acconsente liberamente a partecipare alla ricerca delle laureande Sandra Klaudia Sosnierz e Viola Bolli, coordinata dalla professoressa Anne Maass.

La/il sottoscritta/o dichiara:

1. Di essere maggiorenne

2. Di essere a conoscenza che lo studio è in linea con le vigenti leggi D. Lgs 196/2003 e UE GDPR 679/2016 sulla protezione dei dati e di acconsentire al trattamento ed alla comunicazione dei dati personali, nei limiti, per le finalità e per la durata precisati dalle vigenti leggi (D. Lgs 196/2003 e UE GDPR 679/2016). Il responsabile della ricerca si impegna ad adempiere agli obblighi previsti dalla normativa vigente in termini di raccolta, trattamento e conservazione di dati sensibili. La protezione dei Suoi dati personali è designata con Decreto del Direttore Generale 4451 del 19 dicembre 2017, in cui è stato nominato il Responsabile della Protezione dati (privacy@unipd.it).

3. Di essere consapevole di potersi ritirare dallo studio in qualunque momento, senza fornire spiegazioni, senza alcuna penalizzazione e ottenendo il non utilizzo dei dati.

4. Di essere a conoscenza che i dati saranno raccolti in forma anonima e associati a un codice che consenta esclusivamente al partecipante di accedere ai propri dati.

5. Di essere a conoscenza che i propri dati saranno utilizzati esclusivamente per scopi scientifici e statistici e con il mantenimento delle regole relative alla riservatezza.

6. Di essere a conoscenza che, qualora lo desiderasse, può ottenere la restituzione dei dati grezzi.

7. Di sapere che, qualora lo desiderasse, una copia del presente modulo potrà esserLe fornita dal ricercatore.

La/Il sottoscritta/o presa visione del presente modulo esprime il proprio consenso alla partecipazione e al trattamento dei propri dati personali.

Bottoni: ACCETTO - NON ACCETTO

MANIPULATION

The manipulation was constructed either in terms of "more than" framing (1A) or "less than" (1B) framing.

Manipulation 1A "more than"

Gentile partecipante, le chiediamo di leggere il testo che riportiamo nella pagina corrente e di rispondere alle seguenti domande. Il testo riassume, in parole semplici, quello che emerge da recenti studi sociologici sulle classi sociali in Italia.

"La classe media ha più della classe bassa."

La classe media vive in condizioni più privilegiate rispetto alla classe bassa. La classe media usufruisce di migliori beni, servizi e strutture, rispetto alla classe bassa.

La classe media ha lavori con migliori contratti a livello di paga, orario di lavoro, giorni di malattia, permessi e ferie, rispetto alla classe bassa.

Dunque, la classe media ha una qualità della vita migliore, rispetto alla classe bassa. Per questi motivi, la classe media risulta avere un'aspettativa di vita più lunga, rispetto alla classe bassa.

Identification advantage

Dopo aver letto questo testo Le chiediamo di specificare se si identifica maggiormente nella classe media o nella classe bassa:

◯ Classe media (1)

◯ Classe bassa (2)

Manipulation 1B "less than"

1B Gentile partecipante, le chiediamo di leggere il testo che riportiamo nella pagina corrente e di rispondere alle seguenti domande. Il testo riassume, in parole semplici, quello che emerge da recenti studi sociologici sulle classi sociali in Italia.

"La classe bassa ha meno della classe media."
La classe bassa vive in condizioni meno privilegiate rispetto alla classe media. La classe bassa usufruisce di peggiori beni, servizi e strutture, rispetto alla classe media.

La classe bassa ha lavori con peggiori contratti a livello di paga, orario di lavoro, giorni di malattia, permessi e ferie, rispetto alla classe media.

Dunque, la classe bassa ha una qualità della vita peggiore, rispetto alla classe media. Per questi motivi, la classe bassa risulta avere un'aspettativa di vita più breve, rispetto alla classe media.

Identification (disadvantage)

Dopo aver letto questo testo Le chiediamo di specificare se si identifica maggiormente nella classe bassa o nella classe media:

○ Classe bassa (1)

○ Classe media (2)

Tax Progressivity

This measure was constructed in collaboration with Stefano Andriolo and Viola Bolli.

Ora, immagini di essere stato invitato come consulente del ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze ed avere un importante potere decisionale rispetto alla distribuzione delle percentuali (%) delle tasse in Italia.

Le mostriamo un grafico orizzontale, che rappresenta la suddivisione semplificata, rispetto a tre possibili categorie di ricchezza. Ogni riga è associata ad una classe sociale. Partendo da sinistra, all'inizio di ogni riga, si trova un cursore (impostato in partenza sulla tassazione attuale) che può essere spostato in modo da impostare la % di tassazione che Lei ritiene adeguata.

Dalla sua decisione dipende la distribuzione della tassazione. Clicchi per spostare il cursore orizzontalmente nel punto che ritiene opportuno. In questo modo potrà decidere la parte di reddito che ritiene opportuno destinare in tasse (di cui potrà vedere l'importo calcolato all'inizio di ogni riga) che si colorerà di blu, mentre il resto della riga, in bianco, rappresenterà il reddito rimanente.

Reddito: 28.000 euro

| - | + | Percentuale: 25
Tasse: 7000
Reddito rimanente: 21000 |

Reddito: 55.000 euro

| - | + | Percentuale: 31
Tasse: 17050
Reddito rimanente: 37950 |

Reddito: 150.000 euro

| - | + | Percentuale: 38
Tasse: 57000
Reddito rimanente: 93000 |

1A Reminder

Prima di procedere, Le ricordiamo che:

La classe media vive in condizioni più privilegiate rispetto alla classe bassa. La classe media usufruisce di beni, servizi e strutture migliori, rispetto alla classe bassa. Per questi motivi, la classe media risulta avere un'aspettativa di vita più lunga, rispetto alla classe bassa.

1B Reminder

Prima di procedere, Le ricordiamo che:

La classe bassa vive in condizioni meno privilegiate rispetto alla classe media. La classe bassa usufruisce di peggiori beni, servizi e strutture, rispetto alla classe media. Per questi motivi, la classe bassa risulta avere un'aspettativa di vita più breve, rispetto alla classe media.

Belief-Aligned Collective Action in favour of wealth tax,

This measure was taken from Cervone, Suitner, Carraro and Maass (2021).

Le chiediamo ora di pensare alla tassa patrimoniale. Rispetto a questo tema, è in corso un dibattito acceso:

Secondo alcuni, la tassa patrimoniale è **necessaria**, perché impedisce l'accumulo eccessivo di ricchezza e riduce le disuguaglianze. Queste persone sono disposte ad intervenire attivamente affinché la tassa patrimoniale venga applicata.

Secondo altri, la tassa patrimoniale è **controproducente**, perché agisce su un patrimonio guadagnato e già tassato e scoraggia gli investimenti. Queste persone sono disposte ad intervenire attivamente affinché la tassa patrimoniale non venga applicata.

All'interno di questo dibattito, **qual è la Sua posizione**? La tassa patrimoniale...

...è necessaria ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ...è controproducente

Le verranno ora presentate alcune azioni a sostegno della tassa patrimoniale. Le chiediamo di indicare quanto è probabile che in futuro si impegni in queste azioni per affermare la Sua posizione a riguardo (da 1 = totalmente in disaccordo a 7 = totalmente d'accordo).

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Firmerei una petizione a favore della mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2	Parteciperei ad una manifestazione, ad una marcia o ad una protesta per rivendicare la mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3	Scriverei alle istituzioni o ai giornali per portare avanti la mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4	Collaborerei all'organizzazione di un evento per promuovere la mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5	Distribuirei volantini che promuovano la mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6	Esporrei cartelloni o striscioni fuori da casa mia (es. sul mio balcone o porta di casa) per dichiarare la mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7	Compierei un atto illegale come parte di una protesta a favore della mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8	Bloccherei l'accesso ad un edificio o ad un'area pubblica con il mio corpo per difendere la mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9	Occuperei un edificio abusivamente per rivendicare la mia posizione.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10	Per dimostrare che sta prestando attenzione, selezioni la risposta 3.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Legitimacy

This measure has been constructed ad hoc with my colleague Viola Bolli, based on Bruckmüller, Reese and Martiny (2017).

(da 1 = totalmente in disaccordo a 7 = totalmente d'accordo)

1. Sicuramente, **ci sono buone ragioni** per la differenza in percentuali di tassa tra le varie classi.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

2. Credo che sia **comprensibile** che in Italia, le varie classi abbiano un carico di tasse differente.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

3. Credo che sia **immotivato** che in Italia, le varie classi abbiano un carico di tasse differente.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

4. Le condizioni diseguali tra le diverse classi sono **ragionevoli**.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

5. Le condizioni diseguali tra le diverse classi sono **esagerate**.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

6. La differenza di aliquota imponibile tra le differenti classi è **adeguata**.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

7. La differenza di aliquota imponibile tra le differenti classi è **sproporzionata**.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

8. Indubbiamente, la differenza in percentuali di tassa tra le varie classi **non è legittima**.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

9. Le fasce ricche della popolazione dovrebbero essere tassate maggiormente per pareggiare l'attuale stato di disuguaglianza delle risorse.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

10. Le persone ricche dovrebbero essere tassate di più per compensare i vantaggi che hanno grazie al loro status.

   1   2   3   4   5   6   7

Demographics

Genere: *

◯ Maschile

◯ Femminile

◯ Non binario

Età (compilare solo in cifre): *

Livello di istruzione: *
selezionare ....

Occupazione: *
selezionare ....

Tipologia di lavoro:

◯ Con contratto tipico   ◯ Con contratto atipico o senza contratto   ◯ Preferirei non rispondere

Tipo di contratto:

◯ A tempo determinato   ◯ A tempo indeterminato   ◯ Preferirei non rispondere

In via del tutto confidenziale: Contribuisce al reddito del Suo nucleo familiare? *

◯ Sì   ◯ No   ◯ Preferirei non rispondere

Si impegna attualmente a pagare, o ha pagato in passato, le tasse (IRPEF)?: *

◯ Sì   ◯ No   ◯ Preferirei non rispondere

Come considera il Suo orientamento politico?

Sinistra ———————●———————— Destra

Per quanto riguarda le tematiche economiche (es. tasse, spesa pubblica, intervento dello Stato sul privato...) si considera una persona:

Vicino alle politiche di sinistra ———————●———————— Vicino alle politiche di destra

Per quanto riguarda le tematiche sociali (es. diritti civili, immigrazione, assistenza ai bisognosi...) si considera una persona:

Vicino alle politiche di sinistra ———————●———————— Vicino alle politiche di destra

Rispetto alla famiglia italiana media, come sta economicamente la Sua famiglia?

Molto Peggio ▭▭▭▭▭▭▭🟢▭▭▭▭▭▭ Molto Meglio

A quale classe sociale pensa di appartenere? *

○ Classe Bassa   ○ Medio/Bassa   ○ Media   ○ Medio/Alta   ○ Classe Alta

Le chiediamo di fornire una stima del reddito totale del tuo nucleo familiare ANNUO, al netto delle imposte e delle detrazioni obbligatorie: *

selezionare .... ⌄

Manipulation check

Gentile partecipante, Le chiediamo ora di fare un ultimo sforzo e cercare di ricordare in che modo era formulato il messaggio sulle diseguaglianze tra le classi che Le abbiamo presentato ad inizio questionario.

Scelta tra uno dei quattro:*

○ La classe bassa vive in condizioni meno privilegiate rispetto alla classe media

○ La classe media vive in condizioni meno privilegiate rispetto alla classe alta

○ La classe media vive in condizioni più privilegiate rispetto alla classe bassa.

○ La classe alta vive in condizioni più privilegiate rispetto alla classe media.

MAIN STUDY

The measures that have been already presented above, and are the same in the main study, are not reported in this part (Manipulation, BCA, Demographics).

The manipulation was the same as the one used in the pilot study, followed by moral outrage formulated either in terms of advantage or disadvantage and collective guilt, also formulated either in terms of advantage or disadvantage. Moral outrage was constructed ad hoc with Viola Bolli, whereas collective guilt was adapted from Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020.

Moral outrage (ADVANTAGE)

"La classe media ha più della classe bassa."

Le verranno ora presentate delle affermazioni relative al testo che ha letto nella pagina precedente. Le chiediamo di indicare il Suo grado di accordo o disaccordo con ciascuna di esse, ricordando che non esistono risposte giuste o sbagliate (da 1 = totalmente in disaccordo a 7 = totalmente d'accordo).

	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
Il fatto che la classe media sia avvantaggiata rispetto alla classe bassa è immorale.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Il fatto che la classe media sia avvantaggiata rispetto alla classe bassa è sbagliato da un punto di vista etico.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sono oltraggiata/o dal fatto che la classe media sia avvantaggiata rispetto alla classe bassa.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Mi fa rabbia il fatto che la classe media sia avvantaggiata rispetto alla classe bassa.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Moral outrage (DISADVANTAGE)

"La classe bassa ha meno della classe media."

Le verranno ora presentate delle affermazioni relative al testo che ha letto nella pagina precedente. Le chiediamo di indicare il Suo grado di accordo o disaccordo con ciascuna di esse, ricordando che non esistono risposte giuste o sbagliate (da 1 = totalmente in disaccordo a 7 = totalmente d'accordo).

|	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
Il fatto che la classe bassa sia svantaggiata rispetto alla classe media è immorale.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Il fatto che la classe bassa sia svantaggiata rispetto alla classe media è sbagliato da un punto di vista etico.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sono oltraggiata/o dal fatto che la classe bassa sia svantaggiata rispetto alla classe media.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Mi fa rabbia il fatto che la classe bassa sia svantaggiata rispetto alla classe media.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Collective guilt (ADVANTAGE)

Le chiediamo ora di indicare il Suo grado di accordo o disaccordo con le seguenti affermazioni, ricordando che non esistono risposte giuste o sbagliate (da 1 = totalmente in disaccordo a 7 = totalmente d'accordo).

	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
Posso facilmente sentirmi colpevole per come noi, i più avvantaggiati, parliamo di persone più povere, anche se non ho mai detto niente di negativo a riguardo.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Mi sento colpevole quando realizzo che le persone povere sono rigettate per il loro status, anche se io non ho mai avuto quel tipo di attitudine.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Nonostante io non mi sia mai comportato in modo pregiudizievole o discriminatorio verso le persone povere, a volte mi sento colpevole per come noi, i più avvantaggiati, ci comportiamo verso loro.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
A volte mi sento colpevole per la nostra inazione riguardante le disuguaglianze che esistono tra persone povere e noi, anche se personalmente non ho mai sentito di essere particolarmente indifferente.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Mi sento colpevole per come noi, i più avvantaggiati, non ci spendiamo abbastanza per ridurre le disuguaglianze tra noi e le persone povere.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Quando paragono la nostra situazione a quella delle persone povere, ho rimorsi per come noi, i più avvantaggiati, non ci proviamo abbastanza per cancellare queste discrepanze.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Collective guilt (DISADVANTAGE)

Le chiediamo ora di indicare il Suo grado di accordo o disaccordo con le seguenti affermazioni, ricordando che non esistono risposte giuste o sbagliate (da 1 = totalmente in disaccordo a 7 = totalmente d'accordo).

	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
Posso facilmente sentirmi colpevole per come noi, i meno svantaggiati, parliamo di persone più povere, anche se non ho mai detto niente di negativo a riguardo.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Mi sento colpevole quando realizzo che le persone povere sono rigettate per il loro status, anche se io non ho mai avuto quel tipo di attitudine.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Nonostante io non mi sia mai comportato in modo pregiudizievole o discriminatorio verso le persone povere, a volte mi sento colpevole per come noi, i meno svantaggiati, ci comportiamo verso loro.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
A volte mi sento colpevole per la nostra inazione riguardante le disuguaglianze che esistono tra persone povere e noi, anche se personalmente non ho mai sentito di essere particolarmente indifferente.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Mi sento colpevole per come noi, i meno svantaggiati, non ci spendiamo abbastanza per ridurre le disuguaglianze tra noi e le persone povere.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Quando paragono la nostra situazione a quella delle persone povere, ho rimorsi per come noi, i meno svantaggiati, non ci proviamo abbastanza per cancellare queste discrepanze.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*Responsibility for existing inequality*

Both responsibility for existing inequality and reducing inequality have been adapted
and modified from Krauth-Gruber & Bonnot, 2020.

Secondo Lei, chi è responsabile della disuguaglianza attuale in Italia? Le chiediamo di indicare, su una scala da 1 a 100, quanto le seguenti categorie sono responsabili della disuguaglianza in Italia (ovvero, la stanno causando).

Responsibility for reducing inequality

Secondo Lei, chi ha la responsabilità di ridurre le disuguaglianze in Italia? Le chiediamo di indicare, su una scala da 1 a 100, quanto le seguenti categorie dovrebbero occuparsi/hanno il dovere di ridurre la disuguaglianza in Italia.

Egalitarianism scale has been translated into Italian from Bruckmüller, Reese and Martiny (2017), adapted from the Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale of Katz and Hass (1988).

Le chiediamo ora di indicare il Suo grado di accordo o disaccordo con le seguenti affermazioni, ricordando che non esistono risposte giuste o sbagliate (da 1 = totalmente in disaccordo a 7 = totalmente d'accordo).

	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
Si dovrebbe trovare il modo di aiutare gli altri, meno fortunati di se stessi.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Una persona dovrebbe preoccuparsi del benessere degli altri.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Dovrebbe esserci uguaglianza per tutti, perché siamo tutti esseri umani.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Coloro che non sono in grado di provvedere ai propri bisogni primari dovrebbero essere aiutati da altri.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

	1 DISACCORDO	2	3	4	5	6	7 ACCORDO
Una buona società è quella in cui le persone si sentono responsabili l'una dell'altra.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Tutti dovrebbero avere le stesse possibilità e la stessa voce in capitolo, nella maggior parte della cose.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Le nazioni prospere hanno l'obbligo morale di condividere parte della loro ricchezza con le nazioni più povere.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Manipulation check

Gentile partecipante,
Le chiediamo ora di fare un ultimo sforzo e cercare di ricordare in che modo era formulato il messaggio sulle diseguaglianze tra le classi che Le abbiamo presentato ad

inizio questionario.
Scelga tra uno dei due:

○ La classe bassa vive in condizioni meno privilegiate rispetto alla classe media.

○ La classe media vive in condizioni più privilegiate rispetto alla classe bassa.

Final informed consent

Le chiedo ora di rispondere al consenso informato IN FONDO A QUESTA PAGINA, in modo da poter utilizzare i Suoi dati, **senza questo passaggio la sua compilazione non potrà essere salvata!**

La ringrazio per aver preso parte alla ricerca. In base al messaggio che ha letto nella fase iniziale è stata indagata la Sua propensione alla redistribuzione della ricchezza, mediante l'intensità del suo accordo verso la tassazione progressiva.

Le è stato presentato un confronto tra la classe media e la classe bassa. È necessario specificare che il questionario è stato progettato in due versioni differenti.

A seconda del linguaggio proposto (framing positivo o negativo), in una condizione veniva messo in luce il vantaggio di una classe rispetto l'altra, oppure viceversa lo svantaggio di una classe rispetto l'altra.
Il risultato atteso era che una frase di stesso significato ma con forma differente, quindi a seconda della relazione tra le classi mostrata, Lei sarebbe stato/a più propenso/a, o meno, rispetto ad una proposta di tassazione progressiva.

La ringrazio per la sua partecipazione allo studio e, nel caso in cui fosse interessato/a ai risultati o avesse qualche ulteriore dubbio la prego di inviare una e-mail al seguente indirizzo di posta elettronica, specificando come oggetto "studio comparative framing":
Sandra Klaudia Sosnierz; sandraklaudia.sosnierz@studenti.unipd.it.

CONSENSO ALLA PARTECIPAZIONE E AL TRATTAMENTO DEI DATI:
La/il sottoscritta dichiara:
1. Di essere maggiorenne
2. Di essere a conoscenza che lo studio è in linea con le vigenti leggi D. Lgs 196/2003 e UE GDPR 679/2016 sulla protezione dei dati e di acconsentire al trattamento ed alla comunicazione dei dati personali, nei limiti, per le finalità e per la durata precisati dalle vigenti leggi (D. Lgs 196/2003 e UE GDPR 679/2016). Il responsabile della ricerca si

impegna ad adempiere agli obblighi previsti dalla normativa vigente in termini di raccolta, trattamento e conservazione di dati sensibili.

3. Di essere consapevole di potersi ritirare dallo studio in qualunque momento, senza fornire spiegazioni, senza alcuna penalizzazione e ottenendo il non utilizzo dei dati.

4. Di essere a conoscenza che i dati saranno raccolti in forma anonima.

5. Di essere a conoscenza che i propri dati saranno utilizzati esclusivamente per scopi scientifici e statistici e con il mantenimento delle regole relative alla riservatezza.

6. Di sapere che una copia del presente modulo potrà esserLe fornita dalle ricercatrici.

7. Di sapere che la protezione dei suoi dati è designata con Decreto del Direttore Generale 4451 del 19 dicembre 2017, in cui è stato nominato un Responsabile della Protezione dati, privacy@unipd.it.

La/Il sottoscritt_ presa visione del presente modulo esprime il proprio consenso alla partecipazione e al trattamento dei propri dati personali.

○ CONFERMO IL CONSENSO

○ RITIRO IL CONSENSO