

*The renewal of the European strategic approach in West
Africa*

Internship : from 01 March 2023 to 31 July 2023, Dakar, Senegal.

Year 2022-2023

European and Global Studies program

Under the direction of Ekaterina DOMORENOK

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


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INTRODUCTION

In February 2022, the sixth European Union-African Union summit was held in Brussels¹. At this summit, the heads of state and government of the EU and the AU agreed on « a common vision for a renewed partnership »² based on shared priorities and values. The summit was organised under the Senegalese Presidency of the African Union and the French Presidency of the Council of the EU, which had made EU-Africa relations a priority at the time. The historical closeness between France and Senegal, but above all the closeness between Macky Sall and Emmanuel Macron, gave this summit a special symbolic importance. At the time, Emmanuel Macron declared that he wanted to build a "New Deal" with the African continent and use the summit to create « an ambitious, forward-looking alliance that will make it possible to build an area of solidarity, security, sustainable prosperity and stability »³. The summit was an opportunity for the European authorities to highlight the tools they have been working on in recent years : the new global strategy for Africa, the *Global Gateway*, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and the new *Team Europe* approach. The supply of at least 450 million doses of vaccine by mid-2022 and 150 million euros of investment were also promised, and issues of migration, mobility, peace and security were raised. The summit was also an opportunity for the European authorities to highlight the change of model and paradigm envisaged with a view to building a genuine partnership of equals with the continent, for « diversified, inclusive, sustainable and resilient economies »². In an interview with the newspaper *Jeune Afrique* in February 2022, Charles Michel declared that the summit would be the starting point for a « paradigm shift » and a renewal of the Euro-African relation, which would be necessary to establish a more equal partnership⁴.

¹ Official website of the European Council and the Council of the EU : « Sixième sommet Union européenne - Union africaine : une vision commune pour 2030 ». Press release, 18 February 2022.

² Official website of the European Council and the Council of the EU : « Sommet Union européenne - Union africaine, 17-18 février 2022 ».

³ Bloj Ramona. « La stratégie européenne pour un "New Deal" avec l'Afrique ». *Fondation Robert Schuman*, 14 February 2022.

⁴Caslin Olivier. « Charles Michel : ‘Le sommet UE-UA doit être le point de départ d’une nouvelle alliance’ ». *Jeune Afrique*, 05 February 2022.

LITTERATURE REVIEW

As the main historical victims of the imperialism of the great foreign powers and the main collateral victims of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, African countries have however not condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine. In fact, during the first vote at the United Nations General Assembly last February, 22 of the 54 African leaders did not condemn Moscow⁵. And Senegalese President Macky Sall, holding the presidency of the African Union, travelled to Russia last June to plead the African cause with Vladimir Putin, reminding him of the support that the majority of African countries had chosen to give him⁶. In the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, which profoundly weakened the continent, African states decided to assert themselves diplomatically, choosing to defend their interests independently of their historical ties with Europe⁷.

The African continent, which by 2050 will be home to a quarter of the world's population⁸, is a major player on the international stage. A stake that is well understood by the world's major powers, who are holding one meeting after another with African countries : the EU-AU Summit, the Russia-Africa Summit, the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the United States and Africa, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, etc. Africa has become the stage for a geopolitical competition in which the world's major powers are seeking to get closer to their leaders and strengthen their bilateral relations. While European countries have historically been a privileged partner, and remain so to this day, their presence on the continent is increasingly being criticised and called into question in favor of China, Russia and the United States, which are taking advantage of the erosion of European exclusivity to gain a foothold. This recent African stance at the United Nations raises questions about the role played by the EU on the African continent, and more generally about the future of the Euro-African partnership.

Through this literature review we will take stock of the links uniting the EU and the African continent since the independences. In the first part of the review, we will look at the historical roots of the ties that bind them, in the second part we will examine why Europe's presence on the continent is increasingly criticised, and in the third and final part we will look at how this cooperation is being rethought in the face of Neo-colonialism's accusations.

⁵ Breteau Pierre. « Résolution sur la Russie à l'ONU : quels pays ont changé de position depuis mars 2022 ? ». *Le Monde*, 24 February 2023.

⁶ Nembrot Lauriane. « Guerre en Ukraine : après la visite de Macky Sall en Russie, 'l'Afrique montre qu'elle veut peser dans les affaires du monde' ». *TV5 Monde*, 5th June 2022.

⁷ Bensimon Cyril and Vitkine Benoît. « Guerre en Ukraine : la difficile tentative de médiation des chefs d'Etat africains ». *Le Monde*, 19 June 2023.

⁸ « Un homme sur quatre sera africain en 2050 ». *Jeune Afrique*, 14 June 2013.

I) Europe-Africa, the challenge of the independence

Present since the 15th century with the first Portuguese trading posts, Europeans really invested the African continent in the 19th century throughout the colonisation. They never completely left the continent, even after independence, maintaining strong economic and cultural links with Africa right up to the present day.

A) « How do you leave while staying ? »

« How do you leave while staying ? » (« Comment faire pour partir en restant ? »), these are the words of Philippe Marchesin, doctor of political science, describing Europe's position at the time of independence in the podcast « Europe/Afrique, histoire d'une amitié intéressée » on France Culture⁹. Indeed, aware of the strategic, geopolitical, economic and cultural issues at stake, Europeans in post-colonial Africa developed a discourse based on solidarity in order to maintain close links with the continent. For example, the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community (EEC), already explicitly included an African dimension, with the introduction of a policy of economic aid for "development" for certain African countries¹⁰. Subsequent independence confirmed this link between the EEC and the former African colonies in the form of the "accords de Yaoundé" in 1970¹¹, and many others that followed. For Stefan Jonsson and Peo Hansen, the construction of Europe was at the heart of an imperial project's perpetuation, first with the EEC (European Economic Community) and the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), then with the European Union¹². The African dimension of the European treaties will establish the continuity of Europe's presence on the continent and perpetuate a dynamic deemed neo-colonial in the relations that Europe will maintain with these now independent countries.

B) Eurafrika : neo-colonialism or partnership ?

« Bless the independence of these peoples only if it makes it possible to safeguard, in new, more "modern", more "realistic", less shocking and less conspicuous forms, the postulate of the old spirit of domination and exploitation » (« Ne bénir l'indépendance de ces peuples que si elle permet de sauvegarder, sous des formes nouvelles, plus « modernes », plus « réalistes », moins choquantes et

⁹ Series « L'Europe, histoires des voisinages ». Episode 4/4 : Europe/Afrique, histoire d'une amitié intéressée. *France Culture*, 21 April 2022.
Quote from the archives of the *Comité national du patronat français*.

¹⁰ « Traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne ». Roma, 25 March 1957.

¹¹ « Convention de Yaoundé ». Brussels, 29 September 1970.

¹² Hansen Peo, Jonsson Stefan. Eurafrique. Aux origines coloniales de l'Union européenne. Paris, *La Découverte*, 2022. 358 pages.

moins voyantes, le postulat de l'ancien esprit de domination et d'exploitation »)¹³. This is how the newspaper *Présence africaine* defined the term neo-colonialism in 1960. And indeed, under the guise of development aid and trade cooperation, some European countries maintained a presence, mainly economic, in their former colonies after independence, and many European companies monopolised certain sectors such as minerals and plantations¹⁴. A system that has led to accusations of neo-colonialism. And while the term "Françafrique", describing the relations established by France in its former colonies at the time of independence, has fastly become popular, the term "Eurafrrique", mentioned by Aimé Césaire as early as 1954¹⁵, was much less so. It does, however, describe a similar phenomenon, but on a European scale. When colonisation came to an end, it was not only France that succeeded in retaining a form of influence over its former colonised territories. Many other European countries, and then the European Union as a political entity, developed new forms of domination and dependence, first economic, then cultural, military, political... In his article "Les origines inavouables de l'Union européenne", Lionel Zevounou denounces the neo-colonial essence of the creation of the European Community after the Second World War, and deconstructs the myth of a political project devoid of any ambition for power¹⁶.

II) Europe, a historic partner.

Accused of neo-colonialism, Europeans have maintained a strong presence in Africa, and the two continents are still closely linked today. So, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, no-one's relation with Africa today is as close as the one with Europe.

A) EU-Africa partnership : what legal framework ?

Cooperation between the European Union and African countries currently takes place within two main frameworks : the general framework of the Cotonou Agreement¹⁷, which governs relations between the EU and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, and the Joint Africa-EU

¹³ Ardant Philippe. « Le néo-colonialisme : thème, mythe et réalité ». *Revue française de science politique*, 15th year, n°5, 1965. Page 847.

¹⁴ Sindzingre Alice. « La dépendance vis-à-vis de l'aide en Afrique subsaharienne : éléments d'économie politique ». *Autrepart*, n°13, 2000. Pages 51 to 69.

¹⁵ Aimé Césaire, « Le colonialisme n'est pas mort », *La Nouvelle Critique*, n° 51, January 1954. Page 28.

¹⁶ Zevounou Lionel. « Les origines inavouables de l'Union européenne ». *AfriqueXXI*, 1st of July 2022.

¹⁷ « Accord de partenariat entre les membres du groupe des États d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique, d'une part, et la Communauté européenne et ses États membres, d'autre part ». Cotonou, 23 June 2000

Strategy¹⁸, which provides a formal framework and strategic guidelines for relations between the EU and African countries. In March 2020, the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) published the broad guidelines for the revision of this strategy. Entitled "Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa"¹⁹, it focuses on five main areas : ecological transition and access to energy, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace, security and governance, migration and mobility. The European Council has also adopted three regional strategies, focusing on the specific features of each sub-region (Horn of Africa²⁰, Gulf of Guinea²¹ and Sahel²²). More generally, relations between the EU and Africa take the form of formal dialogues, such as EU-AU summits. The most recent was held in Brussels in February 2022 under the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which made relations with Africa one of its priorities. At this summit, African and European leaders agreed on a common vision to renew their partnership, strengthen solidarity and promote more sustainable development. To this end, the EU pledged, among other things, to invest 150 billion euros in Africa by 2030 (as part of the *Global Gateway* project) and to send doses of vaccines to help the continent deal with the Covid-19 health crisis. But the European and African leaders also announced their desire to strengthen cooperation on peace and security, and on migration and mobility²³.

B) The EU-Africa partnership in practice

Today, European investment in Africa is more than five times greater than Chinese investment, and a quarter of African trade is with the EU, compared to 15% with China and just 2% with Russia²⁴. The European Union is the continent's leading investor and trading partner. It also accounts for around 80% of official aid to Africa, making it the main donor in this area, with funding coming mainly from the European Development Fund (EDF), of which sub-Saharan Africa is the main beneficiary. But while the Europeans are a major trading partner and a key player in the field of development aid, they also see themselves as a key player in peacekeeping and stabilising the continent. And at the recent EU-AU summit, the Europeans reiterated their "support for African-led

¹⁸ « Le partenariat stratégique Afrique-UE, une stratégie commune Afrique-UE ». Lisbon, 9 December 2007.

¹⁹ « Communication conjointe au Parlement européen et au Conseil. Vers une stratégie globale avec l'Afrique ». Brussels, 9 March 2020.

²⁰ « Cadre stratégique pour la Corne de l'Afrique ». Brussels, 14 November 2011.

²¹ « Stratégie de l'UE sur le golfe de Guinée ». Brussels, 17 March 2014.

²² « Stratégie de l'UE pour la sécurité et le développement au Sahel ». Brussels, September 2011.

²³ « Sommet Union européenne - Union africaine, 17-18 février 2022 ». Site officiel du *Conseil européen et du Conseil de l'Union européenne*. Updated on 23th February 2022. Consulted on 12 May 2023.

²⁴ « L'Europe et l'Afrique, partenaires pour un avenir commun ». Official website of the *Diplomatic Service of the EU*. 07/09/2022.

peacekeeping operations"²⁵, particularly in West Africa, which faces numerous problems of governance, instability, breaches of the rule of law and violent extremism. Indeed, with the Cotonou Agreement, relations with the continent had been politicised and a framework for cooperation defined in terms of security. And with its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has strengthened its prerogatives in this area. Today, European support mainly takes the form of funding for peacekeeping operations and the provision of crisis management tools (civilian, military and humanitarian). In recent years, the EU has also launched a number of military missions in its own name, with the help of personnel made available by its Member States. The security threats affecting the region are all the more crucial for the EU because, over and above the strategic component of supplying Western countries with raw materials, they contribute to significant migration (both intra-continental and towards the EU). Just in 2021, 200,000 people attempted to reach Europe illegally by sea²⁶. Faced with this situation, and since the migratory crisis of 2015, the EU has endeavoured to take action by outsourcing the management of its borders and combating the root causes of migration in the countries of departure. Today, the main areas of cooperation between the two continents are trade (governed by the Cotonou Agreement), development aid (mainly financed by the European Development Fund), military and civilian peacekeeping and crisis management operations (under the Common Security and Defence Policy), support for border and migration management (with the Valletta Action Plan) and the fight against terrorism (particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel). But in the face of numerous failures and inconsistencies, this European policy in Africa is increasingly criticised and called into question.

III) Faced with criticism, the urge to rethink the relationship

European policy in West Africa is increasingly criticised, and against a backdrop of rising anti-Western sentiment, questions are being asked about its coherence and relevance. At a time when the question of the EU's strategic autonomy is re-emerging, a paradigm shift seems necessary if the EU is to maintain its privileged relationship with African states.

A) The main points of criticism of the European policy in Africa

As Africa's biggest investor and trading partner, the EU has a strong presence on the continent, but there are some who object to its position of strength and criticise it for imposing its own vision and monopolising the resources of African countries. Indeed, from the slave trade

²⁵ Ighobor Kinglsey. « Sommet UE-UA 2022 : l'UE veut être l'ami de l'Afrique dans le besoin - et en effet ». *Afrique Renouveau*, 21 March 2022.

²⁶ Official website of the *European Commission* : « Statistiques sur la migration vers l'Europe ». Consulted on the 13 June 2023.

through colonisation to the present day, Africa's history has been marked by the control and export of its resources by foreign powers, and the EU has played a predominant role in this endeavour. After independence, the Yaoundé Agreements and the various Lomé Conventions²⁷ (signed between 1975 and 2000) aimed to reduce poverty and support countries in their development. However, in reality they did not make it possible to break with dependence and even less to establish egalitarian relations, since they above all enabled Europeans to perpetuate a colonial tradition of control over raw materials. The Cotonou Agreement, which replaced the Yaoundé Agreement in 2000, has been criticised for the "negative and restrictive image of Africa"²⁸ it conveys, but above all for failing to achieve the desired objectives. Added to this are Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), signed in 2014, which aimed to develop free trade between the EU and the so-called ACP countries, but which, by putting in place a system of "generalised preferences", have had harmful consequences in the countries of West Africa, whose economies are largely dependent on agriculture²⁹. These agreements were denounced by the former Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, at the Lisbon Summit in 2007, a summit marked by a rejection of European paternalism³⁰. The implementation of asymmetrical agreements has profoundly weakened African states and led to situations of great economic and financial dependence where "the capacity of African players to influence the conditions of exploitation and the prices of their resources appears weak"³¹. But similar mechanisms are present on a much broader spectrum than the simple monopolisation of resources, and raise questions about Africa's lack of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the EU. At the recent EU-AU summit, for example, the Europeans pledged to increase their donation of COVID-19 vaccines to Africa, but refused to relinquish their intellectual property rights over them. This led the President of Sierra Leone, Maada Bio, to ask whether they were « equal partners in this affair »³². In addition, the EU's development policy on the African continent has attracted a great deal of criticism, particularly with regard to the funds allocated, which are deemed insufficient³³. Just as the lack of coordination and

²⁷ « Convention ACP-CEE de Lomé », Lomé, 28 February 1975.
« Convention ACP-CEE de Lomé II », Lomé, 31 October 1979.
« Convention ACP-CEE de Lomé III », Lomé, 8 December 1984.
« Convention ACP-CEE de Lomé IV », Lomé, 15 December 1989.

²⁸ Bouamama Saïd. *Résistances africaines à la domination néocoloniale*. Éditions du Croquant, 2021. « Chapitre 4. Les accords économiques Afrique-France, une histoire négative ». Pages 81 to 102.

²⁹ Coulibaly Souleymane, Kassa Woubet and Zeufack Albert. « Repenser le commerce de l'Afrique avec l'Union européenne et les États-Unis exige des réformes des deux côtés ». *Africa Can End Poverty*, 16 June 2022.

³⁰ Haddad Georgette. « Sommet de Lisbonne : les relations Europe et Afrique changeront-elles ? ». *Perspective Monde*, 27 January 2008.

³¹ Magrin Géraud. *Voyage en Afrique rentière*. Collection *Territoires en mouvements*. Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2013. « Chapitre 5. Les ressources africaines face aux acteurs mondiaux », pages 175 to 208.

³² Ighobor Kinglsey. « Sommet UE-UA 2022 : l'UE veut être l'ami de l'Afrique dans le besoin - et en effet ». *Afrique Renouveau*, 21 March 2022.

³³ Gijs Anne-Sophie, Gijs Camille. « Des défis structurels aux ambitions nouvelles. Le partenariat UE-Afrique du Sud comme archétype des relations UE-pays émergents ? ». *Politique européenne*, April 2018, n°62. Pages 80 to 119.

the asymmetry that persists in the relations that some of the Member States maintain with the continent have not made it possible to conduct coherent development policies and have led to real failures, particularly in the management of armed conflicts and peacekeeping missions. Moreover, the Europeanisation of African conflict prevention and management policies by the former colonial powers has been widely denounced³⁴, going so far as to prompt the French to leave Mali and Burkina Faso, and the EU to put an end to its training missions for the Malian army. These departures have left more room for paramilitary groups such as Wagner, deepening the crises and multiplying human rights violations. Neither financial aid nor the European presence in West Africa has brought any significant solution to the chronic insecurity affecting the region. And while the Common Foreign and Security Policy has laid the foundations for coordination in terms of strengthening African conflict management capabilities, in reality it has been « limited to the adoption of common positions (...) without the EU mobilising resources to have a more direct impact on the outcome of crises »³⁵. This failure is illustrated by the succession of coups d'état and attempted coups d'état in the region (7 in 18 months³⁶), as well as the accusations of poor management of migratory flows since 2015 by numerous associations and NGOs³⁷. Finally, the EU's democracy support policy in West Africa has also been the focus of much criticism. Claiming to be a conveyor belt for democratic and liberal values, the EU has focused its discourse less on principles than on how they are applied, and has cooperated closely with governments rather than with civil society³⁸. It has thus worked to promote government institutions rather than their democratic quality, which has been judged technocratic and ineffective, and is said to have contributed to worsening the problems of governance and transparency affecting the continent³⁹.

Ultimately, the EU's policy in Africa has not led to the full emancipation of the continent, nor has it been a vehicle for regional integration, and above all it has not prevented African states from becoming poorer. This failure has prompted the EU to rethink its relations with African countries so

³⁴ Caslin Olivier. « Afrique-Europe : enfin une approche d'égal à égal ? ». *Jeune Afrique*, 26 January 2022.

³⁵ Bagayoko-Penone Niagalé. « Les politiques européennes de prévention et de gestion des conflits en Afrique subsaharienne ». *Les Champs de Mars*, 02/2004, n°16. Pages 93 to 114.

³⁶ Pareja Nina. « En Afrique de l'Ouest, il y a eu sept coups ou tentatives de coups d'État en un an et demi. » *Slate*, 6th February 2022.

³⁷ « Libye. Les effroyables violations commises en détention font apparaître le rôle honteux de l'Europe dans les renvois forcés ». *Amnesty International*, 15/07/2021.

« Grèce. Les renvois forcés illégaux et les violences à l'encontre des personnes réfugiées ou migrantes sont devenus la règle ». *Amnesty International*, 23/06/2021.

³⁸ « La nouvelle stratégie de l'Union européenne pour l'Afrique– un véritable multilatéralisme efficace ? ». *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, work group on the

³⁹ Vandeputte Nathan. « Redynamiser le soutien de l'UE à la démocratie en Afrique ». *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, June 2020.

as not to lose its position as a privileged partner at a time when Europe is pursuing its own strategic autonomy⁴⁰.

B) A necessary paradigm shift

Referring to the extent of the asymmetrical relationship between Europe and Africa, the Bissau-Guinean economist Carlos Lopes told the newspaper *Jeune Afrique* that it was time to abandon the notion of assistance and « treat Africa as an adult »⁴¹. This was a view already shared by Jean-Claude Juncker in September 2018 when, while still President of the European Commission, he declared during his State of the Union speech that Africa « did not need charity » but a « balanced partnership », believing that it was time to do away with the « prism of development aid »⁴². This speech was made after the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission had announced the new impetus that was to be given to the Africa-EU partnership, in the wake of the revision of the Cotonou Agreement due to take place in 2020. It is against this backdrop that the EU's new strategy for Africa was born. As soon as she took office in December 2019, Ursula Von Der Leyen made Africa one of the European Union's priorities. In February 2020, she met African Union leaders in Addis Ababa, and in March of the same year the head of European diplomacy, Joseph Borrell, presented the new strategy, which incorporated the main elements unveiled at the meeting in Ethiopia. The new strategy is structured around five main areas, which served as a basis for discussion at the last EU-AU summit, held in Brussels in February 2022.

On the sidelines of this summit, Nigerian writer and journalist Seidik Abba said : « As an African, when we see the mobilisation of the West (...) to resolve the Ukrainian crisis, we can't help thinking of all the time we spent chasing the West to get it to give us the means »⁴³. These words, uttered against the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, describe the asymmetry that persists in relations between the two continents, and which was a major issue at the meeting. For Olivier Caslin, as for many others, now more than ever is the time for a « paradigm shift » and the establishment of a more egalitarian partnership⁴⁴. These comments were corroborated by Charles Michel who, in an interview with the newspaper *Jeune Afrique* in February 2022, spoke of the importance of the EU-

⁴⁰ Gijs Anne-Sophie and Gijs Camille. « Des défis structurels aux ambitions nouvelles. Le partenariat UE-Afrique du Sud comme archétype des relations UE-pays émergents ? ». *Politique européenne*, April 2018, n°62. Pages 80 to 119.

⁴¹ Caslin Olivier. « Carlos Lopes : 'L'Europe doit traiter l'Afrique en adulte' ». *Jeune Afrique*, 26 June 2020.

⁴² « UE-Afrique : Jean-Claude Juncker appelle à une 'nouvelle alliance' ». *Jeune Afrique*, 12 September 2018.

⁴³ Éboulé Christian. « Comment la guerre en Ukraine a éloigné l'Afrique de l'Occident ». *TV5 Monde*, 24 February 2023.

⁴⁴ Caslin Olivier. « Afrique-Europe : enfin une approche d'égal à égal ? ». *Jeune Afrique*, 26 January 2022.

AU summit for the renewal of these relations⁴⁵. Indeed, during this meeting, African and European leaders agreed on « a common vision for a renewed partnership »⁴⁶ based on major themes such as solidarity, peace, sustainable development and security, and a €150 billion investment package was promised as part of the Global Gateway initiative.

All in all, this literature review has enabled us to frame our subject. Europe and Africa are closely linked by history, and many European states still have a strong presence on the continent. However, the neo-colonial nature of the policies pursued to date, and their lack of coherence and efficiency, call into question the relevance of their presence on the African soil. However, at a time when the Covid-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine have reminded us of the need for strategic autonomy, Europe cannot afford to lose this major ally. A paradigm shift is therefore necessary, and has begun in recent years with a renewed European approach to Africa. According to Anne-Sophie and Camille Gijs, this strategic reorientation has « undeniably produced tangible results »⁴⁷. In their view, even if the changes « will still require a great deal of time and effort to be translated into reality », cooperation with civil society and the deepening of bilateral discussions have made it possible to achieve common objectives⁴⁷.

The aim of this work will therefore be to find out to what extent the new European strategic approach is influencing EU policy in West Africa. To do this, we will look at whether the instruments of the new European strategic approach to Africa (which are : the new strategy for Africa, the *Team Europe* approach, the *Global Gateway* initiative and the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument) have been mobilised by the European delegation in Senegal since the announcement of the renewal of the partnership and their implementation.

Research question : To what extent have the instruments of the new European strategic approach to Africa been mobilised by the European Delegation in Senegal since 2021 and the announcement of their implementation ?

Our hypothesis are as follows :

First hypothesis : In defining the main priorities of its joint strategy in Senegal, the European Delegation seems to have followed the main guidelines of the new European strategy for Africa.

⁴⁵ Caslin Olivier. « Charles Michel : ‘Le sommet UE-UA doit être le point de départ d’une nouvelle alliance’ ». *Jeune Afrique*, 5 February 2022.

⁴⁶ Official website of the European Council and the Council of the EU : « Sommet Union européenne - Union africaine, 17-18 février 2022 ».

⁴⁷ Gijs Anne-Sophie and Gijs Camille. « Des défis structurels aux ambitions nouvelles. Le partenariat UE-Afrique du Sud comme archétype des relations UE-pays émergents ? ». *Politique européenne*, April 2018, n°62. Pages 80 to 119.

Second hypothesis : The EU's joint strategy in Senegal seems to have been influenced by the national priorities defined by the Senegalese authorities and by the economic and social diagnosis carried out by the Delegation in 2021, when their joint programming framework was revised.

Third hypothesis : In its policy in the country, the European Delegation in Senegal appears to be mobilising the other instruments of the new European strategy approach in Africa, namely : investments under the *Global Gateway* initiative, NDICI funds and *Team Europe* approach for project implementation and management.

RESEARCH PROTOCOL

Study framework :

We will opt for qualitative research, based on the study of the tools of the EU's new strategic approach for Africa. To do this, we will focus on the instruments of this new approach, which are : the EU's new common strategy with Africa, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the *Team Europe* approach and the *Global Gateway* initiative. We'll be looking at the specific case of Senegal, as I did my end-of-study internship there and because it is an interesting example of stability and democracy in the sub-region. What's more, it played a central role in Africa's recent move towards diplomatic independence, since the Senegalese president, who was then chairing the AU, travelled to Russia to meet Putin and assure him of the support of many African countries⁴⁸. It had already done so in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea. But despite this, the EU remains Senegal's biggest foreign investor, its biggest development partner and its biggest trading partner (32% of Senegal's exports go to the European continent). We have chosen to begin our work in 2021, as this is the year in which the new EU-Africa strategy was presented and the joint EU-Senegal strategy was reviewed. We will therefore look at the extent to which the European delegation in the country has taken these new instruments into account in reforming its joint strategy and in implementing it since 2021.

Data collection and analysis method :

in order to carry out this work, we will opt for a method of analysing scientific literature, press articles, legal texts and official treaties in order to study the deployment of the instruments of the EU's new strategic approach in Senegal. I will also draw on the transcript of the interview I had the opportunity to conduct with a member of the European delegation in Senegal : Stéphane Devaux, team leader of the Cooperation Section. We will analyse and compare the content of the common EU-Africa Strategy with the content of the Joint EU-Senegal Strategy, revised in 2021, and with the content of the Emerging Senegal Plan (the 'Plan Sénégal Émergent', or PSE, adopted in 2014, before the renewal of the partnership and during the first term of office of the current President Macky Sall). The aim is to highlight the major priorities common to the joint strategy and the overall EU-Africa strategy, as well as to the ESP, in order to see whether or not they have influenced the content of this joint document. We will then analyse a number of flagship projects, which reflect the main priorities of European policy in the country, in order to analyse the mobilisation of other instruments, namely

⁴⁸ Ndiaye Babacar. « Le Sénégal : la "voix" de l'Afrique dans la crise russo-ukrainienne ». *Institut Montaigne*, 21/07/2022.

the *Global Gateway*, NDICI and *Team Europe*, in the financing and implementation of European policy in the country.

This thesis will be structured as follows : after an initial section defining the subject of the dissertation, a second section will develop and compare the various instruments and strategies, and a final section will take stock. This is followed by the annexe's part and the bibliography.

FIRST PART : DEFINITION

Initiated in 2018 by Jean-Claude Juncker during his State of the Union address, the renewal of the EU-Africa partnership was pursued by Ursula Von der Leyen, who then booked her first official trip to the AU for 2019. Following this meeting, the new head of European diplomacy, Joseph Borrell, presented the EU's new strategy for Africa. This will be followed by announcements of the launch of the *Global Gateway*, the NDICI, the *Team Europe* approach, and a number of other instruments such as the new Strategic Compass and the new European trade strategy. While European policy in Africa has traditionally been conducted through the prism of development aid, it seems to have taken a different turn in recent years. In the wake of the revision of the Cotonou Agreement, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, declared that it was time to rebalance the relationship and to look at Africa not only through the « prism of development aid »⁴⁹. The most recent EU-AU summit in 2022, seen as a pivotal moment in terms of a change in the overall global strategic approach, will have enabled the European authorities to present their new flagship instruments, marking the renewal of the partnership.

Therefore, in the first part we will define the issues and objectives of the various objects of study in our work, namely the instruments of the new European strategic approach and the Emerging Senegal Plan (Plan Sénégal Émergent) .

New common Africa-EU strategy :

While the Cotonou Agreement was due to be revised, the European Commission and the European External Action Service published a communication entitled « Towards a global strategy with Africa » in 2021. Taking up the main elements unveiled at the end of February following the meeting in Addis Ababa between the African Union and the European Commission, this new strategy proposed by the EU defines the new guidelines for European post-Cotonou policy in Africa and should enable the partnership with African countries to evolve. The 19-page document sets out the EU's new global strategy for Africa, against a backdrop of a global health crisis, war in Ukraine and climate change. The new strategy is structured around five key partnerships, with a particular emphasis on sustainable and inclusive development⁵⁰ :

- A partnership for a green transition and a universal access to energy through technical and financial support for the ecological transition and sustainable development.

⁴⁹ « UE-Afrique : Jean-Claude Juncker appelle à une ‘nouvelle alliance’ ». *Jeune Afrique*, 12 September 2018.

⁵⁰ « Vers une stratégie globale avec l’Afrique ». Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels, 09 March 2020.

- A partnership for a digital transformation to support the digital transition and a regulatory convergence in this area.
- A partnership for a sustainable growth and long-term jobs through political, technical and financial support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
- A partnership for peace, security, governance and resilience, promoting good governance practices and supporting African capabilities in crisis management, peacekeeping, defence and security.
- And a partnership on migration and mobility by stepping up cooperation on migration issues and support for border management.

One of the central pillars of this new strategy is to build resilience and a strategic autonomy in order to reduce Africa's dependency, particularly on imports. Thus, according to the report presented by the Parliament in March 2021, « the EU-Africa relationship must go beyond the donor-recipient relationship » and support domestic production through sustainable investments (within the framework, among others, of the *Global Gateway*)⁵¹. The ecological and digital transitions are therefore fundamental to the continent's development. Indeed, sustainable development and environmental protection are at the heart of this new strategy. In an interview with the newspaper *Jeune Afrique*, Charles Michel insisted that the emphasis should be placed on sustainable development on a continent like Africa⁵¹. A continent which, as Fatih Birol explains in his article « Africa has the most to gain from the transition to clean energy », is the first victim of climate change, despite being responsible for less than 3% of cumulative global CO² emissions since the start of the industrial revolution⁵². Human development is also at the very heart of this new strategy, with the EU keen to invest in the resilience of societies. Last but not least, respect for democracy, encouraging the participation of civil society in governance and overhauling migration policy are key elements of this strategy, in order to establish a new partnership that is more open and participatory and better able to respond to local needs. All these broad guidelines were then used as a basis for discussion at the last EU-AU summit in February 2022.

Global Gateway :

Launched in 2021, the *Global Gateway* initiative is the EU's new connectivity strategy, one of the priorities of Ursula Von der Leyen, who wanted her Commission to be part of a geopolitical dynamic. This ambitious project is in direct line with the European Union's aspirations for strategic autonomy.

⁵¹ Caslin Olivier. « Charles Michel : ‘Le sommet UE-UA doit être le point de départ d’une nouvelle alliance’ ». *Jeune Afrique*, 5th February 2022.

⁵² Birol Fatih. « L’Afrique a le plus à gagner de la transition vers des énergies propres ». *Working papers*, 2022. Pages 1 to 2.

With this initiative, the EU hopes to compete with China's New Silk Roads and « consolidate its geopolitical influence through a vast infrastructure development programme in developing countries »⁵³. Investments are planned for sustainable infrastructure projects throughout the world, and particularly in Africa, where the *Global Gateway's* objectives are to invest in key areas such as the fight against climate change, the sustainability of cities and urban mobility, the improvement of health and education systems, the strengthening of the competitiveness and security of global supply chains, regional interconnections and the creation of decent jobs⁵⁴. The stated aim of this initiative is to stimulate the economies of African countries through sustainable investment in key areas designed to support sustainable and inclusive development, and to help them build resilience, particularly in the face of climate change. The Commission states that the investments made will always take account of the needs of the partner countries and will guarantee « sustainable benefits for local communities »⁵⁵. The *Global Gateway* also aims to support the integration of African countries by facilitating regional trade. But it is also a way for the EU to « consolidate its geopolitical influence » and to pursue its own strategic autonomy⁵³. But in order to mobilise investment (public and private) in the priority areas defined by the new strategy, the *Global Gateway* will rely on the new financial instruments of the 2021-2027 multiannual framework, including the NDICI. The EU pledged €150 billion in investment at the end of the last EU-AU summit, and in the wake of the new *Team Europe* approach, up to €300 billion in investment for sustainable projects will be released⁵⁶.

The new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument

(NDICI) :

Introduced by the Commission with the end of the European Development Fund, the NDICI is the result of the reform and regrouping of the main European financial instruments into a single Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, adopted in June 2021. This new instrument has been « designed to be a more flexible instrument, capable of responding to new priorities and challenges in a rapidly changing world »⁵⁷ and will become the main financial instrument for the EU's external action. It aims a more concerted use of the EU's various financial instruments and a better coordination between private investors and national resources. However, for

⁵³ Giesen Christoph, Schaap Fritz, Schultz Stefan, Sauga Michael and Zand Bernard. « Géopolitique. Global Gateway, la riposte de l'UE aux routes de la soie chinoises ». *Courrier International*, 03 April 2023.

⁵⁴ Official website of the European Commission : « UE-Afrique : paquet d'investissement « Global Gateway' ». Consulted on 07 August 2023.

⁵⁵ Official website of the European Commission : « 'Global Gateway' : jusqu'à 300 milliards d'euros pour la stratégie de l'Union européenne visant à développer des liens durables dans le monde ». Press release, Brussels, 1st December 2021.

⁵⁶ Da Silva Lucas. « En Afrique, l'Union européenne promet au moins 150 milliards d'euros d'investissements ». *Toute l'Europe*, 11 February 2022.

⁵⁷ Official website of the European Council and of the Council of the EU : « IVCDCI - L'Europe dans le monde : feu vert définitif pour le nouvel instrument financier de soutien à l'action extérieure de l'UE ». Press release, 9th June 2021.

Mr Devaux, Head of the Cooperation Section at the European Delegation in Senegal, while « it has tended to be sold to us as a single instrument », it is in fact more of a « toolbox within which (...) there are still geographical pillars »⁵⁸. This instrument is structured around three main pillars : a geographical pillar to focus on the major strategic priorities in the ACP countries and the European neighborhood, which will benefit from enhanced political cooperation and support (financial envelope : 60,388 million euros, including 30,000 million for sub-Saharan Africa), a thematic coverage pillar that will fund actions linked to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (6,358 million euros allocated here), and a final rapid response pillar devoted to funding crisis management, conflict prevention and peacebuilding with actions that will aim to strengthen the resilience of countries affected by crises (envelope of 3,182 million euros). In that sense, up to €135 billion will be made available by the NDICI for investment in infrastructure, and up to €60 billion should be mobilised for external action to stimulate more responsible and sustainable investment, for the period 2021-2027 in Africa, and in particular in connection with the *Global Gateway* initiative. The priority areas for investment will be : agriculture, sustainable value chains, transport, clean energy, opening up rural areas by financing infrastructure, access to finance and financial guarantees, health, production of new-generation vaccines, water and sanitation, digital technology and private sector development. All this with a particular focus on women and young people⁵⁹.

Team Europe :

The new *Team Europe* approach involves pooling the resources and expertise of the various EU Member State delegations. Initially designed to ensure an effective and rapid response by the EU and its Member States to the Covid-19 pandemic and its consequences, this initiative aims to promote a more coordinated and coherent joint external action⁶⁰. The *Team Europe* brings together the EU Member States and their development agencies, as well as the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In this way, EU institutions, Member States and European financial institutions are brought together to collaborate with European companies, but above all with governments, civil society and the private sector in partner countries.

This new approach has rapidly become the cornerstone of the NDICI and its programming through the development of joint initiatives. *Global Gateway* projects will also be developed and implemented as part of *Team Europe* initiatives. It is presented as innovative by the Commission

⁵⁸ Refer to Annexe 1.

⁵⁹ Official website of the European Council and of the Council of the EU : « IVCDCI - L'Europe dans le monde : feu vert définitif pour le nouvel instrument financier de soutien à l'action extérieure de l'UE ». Press release, 9th June 2021.

⁶⁰ Official website of the European Commission : « Initiatives de l'Équipe Europe ». Section *Politiques*.

since, according to its website, « never before have the main European development players joined forces in such a coordinated and determined way to combine their resources and expertise »⁶². However, according to Mr Devaux, while « this does indeed seem new », there is « no fundamental revolution » since dialogue and consensus have always existed. According to him, they have « not waited for the *Team Europe* initiative to work together » and the content has always been « drawn up jointly with the national side and the beneficiaries ». According to him, it was the migration crisis of 2015 and the subsequent establishment of the *EU Trust Fund for Africa* that really marked a turning point, as it was at that point that they really began to work jointly through the cooperation agencies of the Member States, thus making « the link with what is now called the *Team Europe Initiative* ». However, he explains that the formalisation of the *Team Europe* concept has enabled a dialogue to be established « systematically with national partners on content », and that this has enabled the new strategy to be applied more concretely. While there is « a big difference between joint formulation and joint implementation », *Team Europe* facilitates joint implementation.⁶¹

Emerging Senegal Plan ('Plan Sénégal Émergent' in French) :

The Senegal Emerging Plan is not one of the instruments of the new European approach to Africa, but it is mentioned in the joint EU-Senegal strategy, which ensures that it is partly in line with the priorities of the Senegalese government, of which it is a part. The SEP is in fact the reference framework for the economic and social policies pursued by the Senegalese government with a view to the country's emergence by 2035. Signed in 2014, during the first term of office of the current President Macky Sall, its main aim is to combat inequality and social injustice through major structural reforms. It also aims to transform the Senegalese economy, promote the development of human capital, good governance and the rule of law⁶². And the joint EU-Senegal strategy is partly aligned with these national priorities⁶³. We will therefore be looking at in what extent those national priorities can be found within this joint strategy.

⁶¹ Refer to Annexe 1.

⁶² « Plan Sénégal Émergent - Plan d'Action Prioritaire 2019-2023 ». Dakar, December 2018.

⁶³ « Document de Stratégie Conjointe EU - Sénégal 2018-2023 (révisé pour 2021-2023) ». Dakar, 10 February 2022.

SECOND PART : THE JOINT STRATEGY

In this second part we will look at the joint EU-Senegal strategy, revised in 2021, in order to understand its main thrusts and priorities.

During our meeting, the Head of the Delegation's Cooperation Section, Mr Devaux, explained that Senegal had been « one of the very first countries to engage in joint programming » with the European Union. According to him, even though joint strategies have not replaced national diagnoses and each Member State continues, in parallel, to develop specific programming frameworks as part of their bilateral agreements, it was designed « to constitute the single programming framework » between the EU and its Member States, and remains a joint framework despite everything⁶⁴. The Joint EU-Senegal Strategy 2018-2023 was therefore signed in 2018 by Senegal and the EU, as well as by Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Austria, the Czech Republic and Romania. However, in view of the economic and social developments in Senegal since 2018, and in the context of the new 2021-2027 budget cycle, as well as the priorities of the NDICI, this joint programming document has been revised for 2021. All in line with the *Team Europe* approach. The document we will be studying covers the period 2021-2023 and is supposed to be aligned with the new global strategy for Africa as well as with the Senegalese government's priorities defined in the Emerging Senegal Plan⁶⁵, but also with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations' 2030 Agenda⁶⁶. The first pages of the joint strategy contain a joint diagnosis made by the delegation, which states that Senegal is a pole of stability and a model of democracy in a region affected by political, security and humanitarian crises, terrorism and instability. This stability enables Senegal to attract foreign investment and to be a major tourist destination. But above all, it is a stability that the recent demonstrations in the country do not seem to be calling into question in the long term. However, these recent events demonstrate the high level of economic and social frustration among the population, particularly among young people, who took part in the mass clashes, in the face of inequality, job insecurity and low incomes. Therefore, and given that the majority of Senegal's population is young (in 2020, more than half of the population will be under the age of 20⁶⁷), the lack of prospects for this part of the population is a

⁶⁴ Refer to Annexe 1.

⁶⁵ « Document de Stratégie Conjointe EU - Sénégal 2018-2023 (révisé pour 2021-2023) ». Dakar, 10 February 2022.

⁶⁶ Official website of the United Nations : « Sustainable Development Goals - The 17 goals to save the world ».

⁶⁷ National Agency for Statistics and Demography (or 'Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie' in French)

key factor to be taken into account in the policy that the EU wishes to implement in Senegal, and is then a cross-cutting issue for the various strands of the strategy. That said, other problems predominate, such as the exercise of democracy, which continues to present a number of challenges in Senegal, particularly in the face of corruption, inefficient administration, lack of impartiality and independence in the justice system, and the predominance of the informal economy. Fishing and agriculture also occupy an important place, as they are two of the main sectors of economic activity in Senegal. The strategy therefore aims to encourage their modernisation and the protection of resources through sustainable investment, among other things. Access to basic, quality public services such as water, sanitation, energy, transport and education are also key elements of the strategy. Obviously, the problems of poverty are mentioned, as are the challenges of resilience in the face of climate change and the problems of migration, particularly in relation to the lack of prospects for young people. Therefore, and among the many structural challenges Senegal is facing, the EU is supporting the Senegalese authorities in their structural reforms « aimed at strengthening inclusive, sustainable and job-creating growth, especially for young people », for more effective institutions, universal access to energy, modernised agriculture, sustainable management of marine resources, sustainable employment and strengthened local governance⁶⁸. This strategy obviously takes into account the events that have taken place in the country since March 2021, which have demonstrated strong economic and social frustrations from the population. Ultimately, it aims to support Senegal's emergence (within the framework of the Emerging Senegal Plan), to strengthen the country's stability (in a region marked by instability) and to support its post-Covid economic and social recovery (which has had a profound impact on the country and the region). It pays particular attention to respect for human rights, non-discrimination and the inclusiveness of its policies. Through its strategy, the EU is proposing a joint response based on 3 priorities, subdivided into 9 key sectors : pursuing green and inclusive growth to create jobs, fostering human development and supporting good governance.

⁶⁸ « Document de Stratégie Conjointe EU - Sénégal 2018-2023 (révisé pour 2021-2023) ». Dakar, 10 February 2022.

THIRD PART : COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This third part will analyse and compare the content of the joint EU-Senegal strategy (revised in 2021) with the content of the Emerging Senegal Plan and the new global EU-Africa strategy. It will also analyse a number of flagship projects carried out by the Delegation in the country in order to determine whether or not the other instruments of the renewed European strategic approach have been mobilised by the Delegation in Senegal.

The European Union's joint strategy document for Senegal states that joint programming is guided by the objectives of the Emerging Senegal Plan and the new global strategy for Africa. Thus, overall, the joint EU-Senegal strategy shares many of the same priorities as the global EU-Africa strategy and the ESP. It is also worth noting that the joint strategy, the global strategy and the ESP are based, for many of their priorities and key areas, on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Firstly, the global strategy mentions a series of measures to promote ecological transition and combat global warming, such as transport solutions for more sustainable cities, the fight against pollution and unsustainable and illegal fishing, a better governance of the oceans, building resilient infrastructures and populations, developing green and intelligent businesses and urbanisation models, establishing circular economies with sustainable value chains, fighting food insecurity and encouraging rural development (through sustainable and local farming and breeding models). Ultimately, this document aims to support the continent's environmental sustainability in the face of climate change. These objectives are also reflected in the joint EU-Senegal strategy, which, for example, supports better governance of the oceans and aims to promote the development of more sustainable fishing and a blue economy. For example, the European delegation has set up a partnership agreement with the Senegalese authorities on sustainable fishing, which aims to combat unregulated fishing and the overexploitation of fisheries resources⁶⁹. Under this agreement, the EU is helping the country to combat illegal fishing by providing support for aerial surveillance and participatory fishing (through local artisanal fishing committees). The agreement also stipulates that European boats are not allowed to fish certain Senegalese fish and that they must hire Senegalese personnel on board. In addition, and in connection with this agreement, a number of projects are being implemented to protect fishery resources, such as the installation of octopus pots in Senegalese waters to « create artificial reefs providing a favorable habitat for octopus reproduction »⁷⁰. To this end, the delegation

⁶⁹ « Accord de partenariat dans le domaine de la pêche durable entre l'Union européenne et la République du Sénégal », 23 October 2014.

⁷⁰ Official website of the European Délégation in Senegal - EEAS : « Les pots à poulpe au Sénégal ». 29 January 2020.

is encouraging the fight against environmental crime and the introduction of binding standards to strengthen Africa's climate resilience. The global strategy and the ESP also mention the pursuit of a green and inclusive growth, which creates jobs but is also sustainable and respectful of the environment and the country's resources. In order to pursue green and inclusive growth, the European delegation is helping Senegal to create sustainable value chains that will guarantee food security and decent nutrition for its population. To this end, the delegation is working to develop the attractiveness of rural areas and support the country's agro-ecological transition, guaranteeing sustainable production and local consumption while strengthening the resilience of populations in the face of climate change. The delegation is also working to strengthen the private sector to create jobs. It supports reforms aimed at transforming and formalising the Senegalese economy, with particular emphasis on access to finance, improvement of the investment climate and digitalisation of the economy. All of this will help to create decent and lasting jobs (particularly for young people and women), while also preventing irregular migration (particularly from rural areas). In this respect, we can take as an example the support provided by the EU to the Agropoles, and in particular to the Agropole Centre in the Kaolack region, to illustrate the delegation's policy in the country. The Agropoles are agro-industrial convergence and processing platforms located in the rural part of Senegal and used to support training missions, project leaders and small and medium-sized enterprises in the food economy sector. The main objective of these Agropoles is to develop the attractiveness of rural areas in a sustainable way by facilitating territorial interconnections, efficient conservation of produce and access to inputs. They also facilitate access to appropriate financial services. And indeed, when I spoke to Mr Devaux, he stressed out the problems surrounding the access to credit, which is a key factor in a country's development⁷¹. Access to credit is one of the objectives of the Agropoles, which help to structure and group together small-scale producers, thereby facilitating access to finance. But beyond the creation of value chains, this project is effectively preventing migration from these rural areas by strengthening food security and resilience in the face of climate change, as well as creating sustainable and decent jobs, with women and young people as the primary beneficiaries. It will also help to reduce the country's dependence on imports of agricultural and food products, and attract financing for private investment projects. Senegal thus

aims to create Agropoles in all areas of the country (South, Centre and North) as vectors for sustainable and inclusive industrialisation. Agropoles are also mentioned by the Emerging Senegal Plan, which has made them one of its priorities, as they reflect the challenges of food sovereignty and

balanced regional development. The delegation is also working to defend the building of sustainable

⁷¹ Refer to Annexe 1.

infrastructures and the digitalisation of the country, notably through the *Global Gateway* initiative. In line with the common strategy to support African countries in mobilising funding for sustainable projects, the EU in Senegal is working to promote the sustainability of towns and cities, to improve the living environment of local populations and to strengthen the balance between regions. One example of this is European support for the project to restructure public transport in Dakar, through financial backing for the Regional Express Train (RET) and the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)⁷² projects, which I worked on during my internship in Senegal. The aim of these projects is both to provide Senegal with sustainable infrastructure that will give the population better access to basic public services, and to build sustainable cities that are resilient in the face of the effects of climate change. Finally, there is the urban restructuring project in the town of Thiaroye-sur-Mer, on the outskirts of Dakar, a project on which I also worked on during my internship and which the EU is supporting financially. The aim of this project is to improve the overall living conditions of the population, but also to help them building resilience against the effects of climate change⁷³.

Secondly, with regard to the second axis of the joint strategy, the development of human capital, there are many points in common with the three documents. Indeed, in this area, the joint strategy mentions improving people's living conditions. To this end, it seeks to improve access to drinking water and functional sanitation, in particular through green investments in urban and rural areas. But it is also focusing on the quality of Senegal's education and training systems, with the aim of boosting the employability and professional integration of young people. In addition, it is helping the country to strengthen its national social protection system in order to provide Senegalese people with a better access to health services and thus increase their overall resilience. These issues are reflected in the overall strategy of the EU in Africa, which mentions strengthening access to basic services, such as efficient education and training systems, health and energy, as well as the need to support green finance and investment in sustainable projects. But the joint strategy document also mentions the delegation's desire to support Senegal in relaunching its production and pharmaceutical industry so that it can acquire pharmaceutical and health sovereignty. Access to vaccines is a crucial issue in Africa, and one which caused particular tension at the last EU-AU summit, when the EU refused to concede the intellectual property rights of the Covid-19 vaccines, prompting Maada Bio, the President of Sierra Leone, to denounce the asymmetry in the relation⁷⁴. With this in mind, one of the EU's major projects in Senegal consists of a logistical and financial support for the revival of the

⁷² Official website of the European Investment Bank : « Sénégal : Global Gateway - l'Équipe Europe s'associe au Sénégal pour promouvoir des

transports plus propres, sûrs et abordables à Dakar ». 28 February 2023.

⁷³ Urban restructuring project for Thiaroye-sur-Mer and the surrounding area, October 2022.

⁷⁴ Ighobor Kinglsey. « Sommet UE-UA 2022 : l'UE veut être l'ami de l'Afrique dans le besoin - et en effet ». *Afrique Renouveau*, 21 March 2022.

Senegalese pharmaceutical industry, in line with the ambitions of the Emerging Senegal Plan and the African Union's Vaccine Manufacturing Partnership (VMP). As part of the *Global Gateway*, the EU and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have been key partners in the implementation of the MADIBA (Manufacturing in Africa for Disease Immunization and Building Autonomy) project, led by the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), which will see the construction of a vaccine manufacturing plant in Diamniadio⁷⁵. The aim here is to enable Senegal to guarantee its pharmaceutical and health sovereignty by developing Africa's leading vaccine production value chain.

The EU's Common Strategy on Africa also devotes an entire section to digital transformation, in which the digitalisation of administrations and regulatory convergence, particularly with regard to the protection of personal data, are encouraged. Digitalisation is one of the key challenges of the Emerging Senegal Plan, but also a cross-cutting element of the common EU-Africa strategy, all with a view to boost economic growth in the countries concerned. To this end, as with the first axis of this strategy, a number of flagship projects can be mentioned. For example, the delegation in the country is supporting the Senegalese government in its process of overhauling the Single Code of Social Security and strengthening its social protection system⁷⁶. To this end, the delegation is assisting the authorities in adopting a unified budget instrument and a multi-year financing strategy, with the aim of enrolling self-employed workers and other informal sector players in the programme. More generally, all three documents share the common objectives of creating decent and sustainable jobs, supporting the private sector, improving the investment climate and access to credit, as well as regional and trade integration (through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)). As far as

AfCFTA is concerned, both European strategies (the joint for Senegal and the global for Africa) advocate for free trade and continental integration. The European Union is providing political and financial support for the creation of the AfCFTA, and the European delegation in Senegal is backing it through structural projects such as the Agropoles and the preferential trade regime from which Senegal benefits (the "Everything but Arms" system). The aim is to develop common trade interests, encourage European investment in Africa, support the continent's industrial development and, ultimately, connect the European domestic market to the AfCFTA. The Emerging Senegal Plan also mentions the objective of African integration among its priorities. But more transversally, this free trade area aims to achieve an inclusive and sustainable economic development, the formalisation of economies, the creation of sustainable jobs and a human and social development in the region, which

is fully in line with the objectives pursued by these three documents. These are cross-cutting issues

⁷⁵ Official website of the European Investment Bank : « Sénégal : la BEI finance à hauteur de 75 M€ l'Institut Pasteur de Dakar ». 02 June 2022.

⁷⁶ Official website of the European Délégation in Senegal - EEAS : « L'Union européenne et le Sénégal ». 05 August 2021.

for the two strategies (joint and global), as well as for the ESP, which aims for strong, inclusive growth creating long-term jobs. With this in mind, the delegation is supporting the *Consortium Jeunesse Sénégal* in implementing the Yaakar project, which aims to inform, engage and equip young people in the suburbs of Dakar so that they can find jobs and have access to entrepreneurship⁷⁷.

And finally, the third and last axis of this joint strategy focuses on governance. In its joint strategy, the European delegation in Senegal supports first and foremost the principles of a good administrative and economic governance, and backs the country's efforts to reform its public administration. It places particular emphasis on formalising the economy, combating corruption, improving the investment climate, and ensuring the efficiency and the good governance practices of administrations in order to guarantee a high-quality public service. This brings us back to the common challenges of digitalising and modernising public administrations, as well as improving the public service as a whole, which are key objectives of the EU-Africa global strategy. The delegation also supports the principles of good democratic governance, the aim being to strengthen the operation of institutions by cultivating their accountability, efficiency and transparency. These issues are among the priorities of the Emerging Senegal Plan, which aims a strong and democratic political system that respects the principles of good governance and the rule of law. But we also find the notions of transparency, democracy and Rule of law present in the overall EU-Africa strategy. This global strategy for Africa devotes a large section to peace, security and governance, in which the European Union undertakes to defend human rights, democracy, accountability, justice and gender equality. It also states that crisis resolution and the strengthening of African capacities in terms of defence, security and resilience will be at the very heart of European diplomacy on the continent. Indeed, at a time of strategic autonomy and renewal of the Euro-African partnership, Brussels intends to establish itself as one of the guarantors of peace and democracy at global level. However, while the EU wants to focus a large part of its action on maintaining the security and internal stability of African countries, Senegal is a relatively democratic and politically stable country in the region and is therefore less concerned by these issues. Despite this, the Emerging Senegal Plan mentions them and places the guarantee of security and peace among its priorities. Then there is the important section devoted to civil society, since the two European strategies (common and joint) emphasize the fact that the partnership must be with the government authorities, of course, but also with the civil society and the private sector. In a series of videos published on the delegation's official website, the EU ambassador to Senegal emphasized that the partnership with Senegal was, of course, made with

the Senegalese government, but also with the civil society organisations and, more

⁷⁷ Official website of the *Consortium Jeunesse Sénégal* : « YAAKAAR ».

generally, with all the actors that make up Senegal, in order to strengthen local governance (« set up a structured and regular dialogue with civil society »⁷⁸). A statement also emphasized by Mr Devaux during our interview when he explained that the delegation was involved in a dialogue with the government and the local authorities on each of its projects, but also with the civil society, associations and NGOs⁷⁹. And indeed, one of the biggest critic levelled at the EU is to deal more with governments than the civil society, whereas the challenges of good governance and transparency affecting the African continent require the latter to be taken into account. The European delegation in Senegal is therefore focusing in particular on youth, women and civil society. Partnership with civil society, the Senegalese authorities and the local associative fabric is one of the delegation's priorities in the country. And in this goal, the roadmap of the EU and its Member States' commitment to civil society in Senegal, updated in 2021, is a strategic instrument for implementing and coordinating support for civil society⁸⁰. Taking account of and including civil society in the decision-making process is one of the cornerstones of European policy in the country. This is mentioned on the delegation's official website, but it was also made very clear during my interview with the head of the delegation's Cooperation Section, Mr Devaux, when he explained that in the major programmes in which the EU was involved, during steering committees among other things, « there were local elected representatives, the sub-prefect and civil society organisations around the table... They were all involved ! (...) We are obliged to go through negotiations with civil society organisations, for example »⁸¹. We can also mention the Gender Action Plan III (GAP III), which makes gender equality a cross-cutting and systematic priority in all the external actions that the European Union carries out in the country⁸⁰, as well as the EU's support for credible electoral and democratic processes, as was the case in Ziguinchor, in the south of the country.

Finally, the joint EU-Senegal strategy devotes an entire section to the management of migration and mobility, and the delegation in the country is endeavouring to support the government authorities in this respect. The global EU-Africa strategy states that the EU will work with countries of origin, transit and destination to improve the governance of migration and border management. It also states that the EU will fund long-term solutions through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to tackle the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration. As Senegal is a country of departure, transit and reception for refugees and asylum seekers, the management of migratory flows is a

⁷⁸ Official website of the European Délégation in Senegal - EEAS : « L'Ambassadeur de l'UE au Sénégal répond à vos questions ! (1/3) ». 10 May 2023.

⁷⁹ Refer to Annexe 1.

⁸⁰ Official website of the European Délégation in Senegal - EEAS : « L'Union européenne et le Sénégal ». 05 August 2021.

⁸¹ Refer to Annexe 1.

priority issue. The European delegation is supporting the Senegalese authorities in the fight against illegal migration by taking into account the root causes of irregular migration, such as the lack of economic and social prospects and the idealisation of Europe, and by strengthening the resources and cooperation of the police, gendarmerie and internal security services, including within a regional framework. But it also supports them in developing channels for regular migration (training, university exchanges, etc.). The concepts of combating migrant smuggling, preventing irregular migration and developing legal channels for migration are therefore common to both strategies. However, it should be emphasized that migration and mobility issues are not among the priorities defended by the Emerging Senegal Plan, and those issues for the EU are dealt with to a greater extent in the Valletta Action Plan⁸². This action plan includes a set of concrete measures tackling the root causes of irregular migration and stepping up cooperation on legal migration and mobility. But it also strengthens protection arrangements for migrants and asylum seekers, and ensures decent conditions for return and reintegration⁸³. The European delegation is therefore working with its Member States to define regular migration routes, particularly in the field of education with the Erasmus+ programme, but also to reintegrate and readmit migrants on their return. It is important to emphasize that the European delegation is not working on primary or secondary education issues in Senegal, but is developing a major Erasmus scholarship programme enabling African students to go in Europe for studying. As the majority of Senegalese migrants are young (over 75% in the 15-29 age bracket⁸⁴) and most have a low level of education, the delegation provides cross-functional support for the professionalisation and formalisation of the economy in order to create job opportunities for these young people. To this end, it is carrying out a number of projects in Senegal, for example in the Sédhiou region, in the south of the country, where the delegation is funding a project to provide vocational training for young people in forestry, as well as an agro-ecological farm project where young people are being trained to work in sustainable sectors⁸⁵.

Overall, inclusiveness and sustainability appear to be two themes that cut across the different strands of the three strategic documents we have analysed. The two strategies and the ESP promote growth that is respectful of the environment and the people : sustainable and inclusive. Gender

⁸² Official website of the European Council and of the Council of the EU : « Sommet de La Valette sur la migration, 11-12 novembre 2015 ».

⁸³ « Qu'est-ce que le Plan d'Action Conjoint de La Valette ? ». *Rabat Process, Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development*.

⁸⁴ « Document de Stratégie Conjointe EU - Sénégal 2018-2023 (révisé pour 2021-2023) ». Dakar, 10 February 2022.

⁸⁵ Officiel website of the European delegation in Senegal - EEAS : « L'Ambassadeur de l'UE au Sénégal répond à vos questions ! (1/3) ». 10 May 2023.

equality and investment in young people⁸⁶, on a continent where they represent 60% of the population, are also at the heart of three documents. Just as the consideration and integration of civil society in the decision-making process is a common feature. In fact, strengthening civil society and cooperating with it seems to be a cross-cutting issue in the various strands of these planning documents, as are the concepts of resilience of countries and populations, particularly in the face of climate change, and good governance practices. And finally, the issues of digitalisation, migration and democracy can be found in all three strategies. However, certain elements present in the global EU-Africa strategy are not clearly or not at all mentioned in the joint EU-Senegal strategy. For example, the fight against desertification is not clearly mentioned in the joint strategy, nor is digital equality or energy efficiency, which are nonetheless important points in the global strategy. Indeed, while digitalisation and inclusiveness are cross-cutting concepts in the joint EU-Senegal strategy, access to digital technology for all at an affordable cost is never mentioned. Furthermore, while climate change and environmental protection are absolutely central and very often mentioned in the common EU-Africa strategy, they are less clearly mentioned in the joint EU-Senegal strategy. Of course, the environmental sustainability of the projects undertaken and the protection of the environment are cross-cutting aspects of this joint document, but the fight against global warming seems less central. However, although it is not clearly mentioned, many actions are being taken in this direction, for example to combat pollution (projects to regenerate the Great Green Wall, to limit coastal erosion (with the replanting of mangroves, for example), for a better solid waste management (as in Hann, in the suburbs of Dakar), awareness campaigns, etc.). There are also education issues, which are a bit special because the EU in Senegal is involved in education issues, but only to a certain extent, as they are not involved in primary and secondary education, which are nonetheless fundamental, as Stéphane Devaux was able to explain to me during our discussion on the subject⁸⁷. And finally, as far as peace and security issues are concerned, while they are very present in the overall EU-Africa strategy, they are much less so in the joint EU-Senegal strategy. At a time of strategic autonomy, EU-led military missions are taking on a whole new importance. However, Senegal is an example of democratic and security stability in the region, and while its neighbours

have recently experienced a succession of coups d'état and attempted coups d'état, the country remains relatively untouched by these phenomena, and the various events and political tensions that have taken place since March 2021 do not seem to call this into question (the recent events remaining a rare occurrence for the country). Thus, although mentioned in the joint EU-Senegal strategy, these

⁸⁶ Noualhat Laure. « L'Afrique confrontée au boom de sa population ». *Reporterre, le média de l'écologie*, 1st July 2022.

⁸⁷ Refer to Annexe 1.

issues are not an absolutely major priority for the European delegation in the country. The maintenance of security and stability is indeed mentioned in the joint strategy, but most of the specific issues of the common strategy, such as the resolution of inter-community conflicts, the control of the proliferation of armed groups, the fight against terrorism and transnational crime, the issues of territorial control, the management of endogenous extremism, etc. are not mentioned. Secondly, we can take into account the elements that are present in the joint strategy but not in the overall one. These include access to water and sanitation, which may be included in the objective of access to basic services in the global strategy for Africa, but which are specific to Senegal. There are also the issues of competitiveness of the national economy and the improvement of the population's living conditions, which are specific to Senegal and are not included in the common strategy. Finally, it is important to emphasize that many of the national priorities of the Emerging Senegal Plan are reflected in the joint EU-Senegal strategy. Indeed, the major objectives set by the ESP, such as inclusive, sustainable and job-creating development, a democratic political system respecting the principles of good governance and the Rule of law, guaranteed peace and security, rural development, digitalisation, food and pharmaceutical sovereignty, etc., are issues that are common to both documents. Agriculture and fisheries, as key elements of the Senegalese economy, occupy an important place in the sustainability and competitiveness objectives of the ESP (notably through the Green Senegal Plan, or 'Plan Sénégal Vert' in French), but are also obviously part of the EU's joint strategy. The major projects that the EU is carrying out in the country and the content of the agreements the delegation is signing with the Senegalese authorities reflect the importance of these issues. The strategy aims to encourage the modernisation and protection of resources through investment, among other things. And the Agropoles, for green agriculture and decent jobs, but also the Agreement on sustainable fisheries or projects supporting the development of sustainable and digital cities are emblematic examples. This is the case, for example, for certain environmental issues such as the fight against poaching and mining or chemical and industrial pollution, but it is also the case for many other elements such as tourism, housing or the guarantee of national cohesion. But overall, and although some objectives are not among the issues clearly taken into account by the European delegation in its policy in Senegal, the objectives of the ESP are intertwined with the main priorities defended by the joint EU-Senegal strategy. We can also see the ESP imprint on the joint strategy through the vocabulary used : 'strong economic growth' or 'promotion of citizenship and solidarity', which are formulations clearly found in the ESP planning document. These affiliations

are, in any case, clearly announced in the joint EU-Senegal strategy, where it is stated that the strategy is aligned with the main priorities of the ESP and the new European global strategy for

Africa. It is also important to note that these three documents share references to international commitments such as the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the African Union's Agenda 2063.

Having focused on the new global EU-Africa strategy and the ESP, we will now turn our attention to the other instruments. These are the *Global Gateway* initiative, *Team Europe* approach and the new financial instrument (NDICI). The first thing to note is that when investments are mentioned, they are most of the time linked to the *Global Gateway*, from which the funds used come from the NDICI⁸⁸. We can also see that most of these projects are implemented and managed by *Team Europe*. One example is the project to restructure public transport in Dakar, with its two flagship projects : the Regional Express Train (RET) and the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), which were largely financed by the EIB as part of the *Global Gateway*, and for which the European delegation's *Team Europe* was heavily involved. The aim of this restructuring project was to provide the country with sustainable infrastructure to give the population better access to public services, and also to combat pollution and traffic congestion in Dakar. It is one of the flagship projects financed by the EU in Senegal. We can also mention the Agropoles, and in particular the Agropole Centre, for which *Team Europe* has been a great support in the implementation and which has been, within the framework of the 'Green Economy in Senegal' initiative, largely financed by the *Global Gateway*. In that sense, some colossal investments in the agricultural and renewable energy sectors have been undertaken throughout the country, in this case in the Kaolack region in the centre of the country⁸⁹. In addition, and in a post-pandemic context, the *Team Europe* supports Senegal's ambition to relaunch its pharmaceutical industry, with the aim of achieving pharmaceutical and health sovereignty, in line with the ambitions of the Emerging Senegal Plan. To this end, the EU and the EIB, once again as part of the *Global Gateway*, have supported the implementation of the MADIBA (Manufacturing in Africa for Disease Immunization and Building Autonomy) project for the construction of a vaccine manufacturing plant in Diamniadio⁹⁰. Finally, there is the EU's financial support for the integration of regional economies (through AfCFTA), which is one of the priorities of the common EU-Africa Strategy and the ESP, but also one of the major objectives of the *Team Europe's* interventions in Senegal. This is largely achieved through technical assistance programmes

⁸⁸ Official website of the European Commission : « Global Gateway ». Consulted on 28 July 2023.

⁸⁹ « Kaolack : Oulimata Sarr visite des réalisations de Global Gateway ». *Agence de Presse Sénégalaise*, 5 May 2023.

⁹⁰ Fox Benjamin. « Sommet UE-Afrique : à la recherche d'un partenariat constructif ». *Euractiv*, 11 February 2022.

such as *Aid for Trade*, which aims to provide institutional support for improving transport infrastructure and the competitiveness of the national economy. *The West Africa Competitiveness Programme* (WACOMP), which intend to promote value chains as engines of growth (the project will, for example, help mango producers to organise themselves into cooperatives), the *West Africa Trade Facilitation Programme*, whose ambition is to modernise customs IT systems in order to facilitate trade at regional level, and finally the regional '*Fit for Market*' programme, which aims to strengthen the competitiveness and sustainability of the fruit and vegetable sector. These various programmes are being implemented by *Team Europe* in Senegal as part of the *Global Gateway*. In fact, for Stéphane Lelux, CEO of Tactis and interviewed by Ali Laidi on *France 24*, the *Team Europe* are « the conductors of the *Global Gateway* »⁹¹.

In conclusion, we can say that most of the major priorities of the EU's global strategy with Africa and the Emerging Senegal Plan are taken up by the EU's joint strategy in Senegal, as indicated in the foreword to the document. Stéphane Devaux seemed to confirm this during our interview : « We are making sure that two things come together : the national strategies, through the Emerging Senegal Programme, which we are partly inspired by and which we support in principle, and then the priorities of the new European strategy for Africa. (...) During programming, we are making sure that all this is reflected and converges »⁹². Furthermore, we can conclude that the *Team Europe* in Senegal is mobilizing and implementing the structuring projects launched by the EU in the country. These are projects launched, for the most of them, as part of the *Global Gateway* initiative and the targeting key areas and sectors of it. We've mentioned a few here, but there are many others. It should be borne in mind that the funding mobilized for *Global Gateway* investments comes from funds released by the NDICI. But if we were to cite an example of projects carried out outside the framework of the *Global Gateway*, and therefore solely within the framework of the NDICI, we could talk about the "NDICI - Regional support for youth in Africa - 2023" project. This project aims to support the participation and commitment of young people to climate change, human rights, social cohesion, intercultural dialogue... but also to improve their access to employment opportunities and socio- professional integration. And this project was financed by the new European financial instrument, outside the framework and objectives of the *Global Gateway*⁹³. However, it should be emphasized that, overall, the flagship projects carried out by the European delegation in Senegal are financed by

⁹¹ Laidi Ali. « Global Gateway : la stratégie de l'UE face aux Nouvelles routes de la soie chinoises » - Interview with the CEO of Tactis, Stéphane

Lelux. *France 24*, 25 April 2023.

⁹² Refer to Annexe 1.

⁹³ Official website of the French Republic : « Soutenir la jeunesse en Afrique », section *Porteur d'aide public*. 30 April 2023.

the *Global Gateway*, through funds released from the NDICI, and are implemented by the *Team Europe* in the country.

FOURTH PART : CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we can say that while some elements of the Global Strategy for Africa and the Emerging Senegal Plan are not present in the joint EU-Senegal strategy, the majority of the main priorities of these two documents are included. This indicates that, obviously, the joint strategy is based on the major priorities and challenges defined by the EU in West Africa, but that the delegation also takes into consideration the national priorities defined by the Senegalese authorities. More generally, the renewed European approach in Africa seems to have been taken into account by the delegation, since both the common strategy and the new implementation and financing tools have influenced the content of the coveted programming and have been mobilized by the delegation in the country. Indeed, during my interview with Mr Devaux, he explained that the joint strategy had been reviewed in 2021, because they wanted to align with the EU's new multi-annual financial programming for 2021-2027, but also in order to adapt their strategic priorities to the new global strategy and to the political and economical changes that have occurred in the country since 2018 and the entry into force of the original strategy⁹⁴. We can therefore confirm our three hypotheses, namely that the main guidelines of the new European strategy for Africa and the national priorities defined by the Senegalese authorities in the Emerging Senegal Plan have been taken into account by the European delegation in defining the main priorities of its new joint strategy in Senegal, revised in 2021, but also that the delegation is mobilizing the other instruments of the new European strategy approach in the main projects it is carrying out in the country, which are : the *Global Gateway* initiative, the NDICI and the *Team Europe* approach.

ANNEXE

Annexe 1 :

Interview with Stephane Devaux, Team Leader for *Employment and Inclusive Growth - Cooperation Section*, European Delegation to Senegal. Conducted on Monday 10 July 2023.

The interview was conducted in French, so the transcript was written in French and translated into English. The interview has not been transcribed in full, only the extracts validated by Mr Devaux are transcribed here.

Partial transcript of the interview with Mr Devaux :

F.A. = Faustine Amard / S.D. = Stephane Devaux

S.D. : On a régulièrement des échanges avec Sciences Po Paris et avec les 5 établissements accrédités UE du type « Bruges » : le CIFE basé à Nice (qui a développé un partenariat avec Sup de Co Dakar), le Collège d'Europe, l'institut de Florence... Ils nous ont notamment demandé de participer à un certain nombre de rencontres, d'échanges (...). Il y a aussi Erasmus+ qui est un gros programme qui offre des opportunités pour des étudiants sénégalais, chaque année, d'obtenir des bourses et d'aller poursuivre des études ou des formations.

S.D. : We have regular exchanges with Sciences Po Paris and with the 5 EU-accredited establishments of the 'Bruges' type : the CIFE based in Nice (which has developed a partnership with Sup de Co Dakar), the College of Europe, the Florence Institute, etc. They have asked us to take part in a number of meetings and exchanges (...). There's also Erasmus+, a major programme offering opportunities for Senegalese students every year to obtain grants and go on to further study or training.

S.D. : Team Europe Initiative effectivement ça semble nouveau... Pour construire et renforcer la dimension Team Europe le processus est passé par plusieurs étapes, nous avons commencé par la programmation conjointe et désormais la mise en œuvre conjointe qui est beaucoup plus complexe mais plus intégrée et devrait permettre un meilleur alignement sur les grands principes comme ceux de Paris. (...) Mais il y a une grande différence avec nos États membres entre formulation conjointe et puis mise en œuvre conjointe.

S.D. : To build and strengthen the *Team Europe* dimension, the process has gone through several stages. We started with joint programming and now with joint implementation, which is much more complex but more integrated, and should enable better alignment with major principles such as those set out in Paris (...) But there is a big difference with our Member States between joint formulation and then joint implementation.

S.D. **À propos de l'IVCDCI** : On a eu tendance à nous le vendre comme un instrument unique, en fait c'est une boîte à outil, à l'intérieur de laquelle (...) il y a quand même encore des piliers géographiques.

S.D. **About NDICI** : It has tended to be sold to us as a single instrument, but in fact it's a toolbox, within which (...) there are still geographical pillars.

S.D. : Le Sénégal a été un des tout premiers pays à faire de la programmation conjointe. (...) La stratégie conjointe a été conçue, à l'origine, pour constituer le cadre unique de programmation pour nous et nos États membres, dans la réalité elle ne s'est pas substituée aux diagnostics spécifiques, elle demeure un cadre conjoint... mais chaque État membre a parallèlement développé un document spécifique de programmation dans le cadre de ses accords bilatéraux avec le Sénégal.

S.D. : Senegal was one of the very first countries to engage in joint programming. (...) The joint strategy was originally designed to provide a single programming framework for us and our Member States, but in reality it has not replaced the

specific diagnoses. It remains a joint framework... but each Member State has also developed a specific programming document under its bilateral agreements with Senegal.

S.D. : La stratégie conjointe initiale (2018-2023) a dut être toilettée pour la faire correspondre à la nouvelle programmation financière pluriannuelle de l'UE 2021-2027. Nos cadres de partenariat et de programmation financière ne correspondent pas toujours en termes de calendrier, on a du donc effectuer des rapprochements et des adaptations. (...) En fait, le FED s'arrêtait, on rentrait dans la période NDICI donc il était important, avant de faire une nouvelle programmation, qu'on mette à jour notre état des lieux, notre diagnostic et nos priorités. Considérant que depuis 2018 il s'était passé un certain nombre de choses : Covid, crispations politiques autour de l'emploi des jeunes, émeutes en mars 2021... Donc il était important d'actualiser ce document.

S.D. : The initial joint strategy (2018-2023) had to be revised to bring it into line with the EU's new multiannual financial programming for 2021-2027. Our partnership and financial programming frameworks do not always correspond in terms of timetable, so we have had to reconcile and adapt. (...) In fact, the European Development Fund was coming to an end and we were entering the NDICI period, so it was important, before making a new programme, that we updated our inventory, our diagnosis and our priorities. Considering that a number of things had happened since 2018 : Covid, political tensions around youth employment, riots in March 2021, etc. So it was important to update this document.

F.A. : Et lors de cette actualisation justement, est ce que vous avez pris en compte les objectifs de la nouvelle stratégie pour l'Afrique ou est ce que vous êtes plus basés les priorités nationales ?

F.A. : And when you updated the strategy, did you take into account the objectives of the new strategy for Africa or did you base your work more on national priorities ?

S.D. : On fait en sorte que se rejoignent deux choses : les stratégies nationales, à travers le programme pour le Sénégal émergent dont on s'inspire en partie et qu'on soutient par principe, et puis les priorités de la nouvelle stratégie européenne pour l'Afrique. (...) Lors de la programmation, on fait en sorte que tout cela se reflète et converge.

S.D. : We are working to ensure that two things come together : national strategies, through the Emerging Senegal Programme, from which we draw some inspiration and which we support as a matter of principle, and the priorities of the new European Strategy for Africa. (...) At the programming stage, we are working to ensure that all this is reflected and converges.

S.D. *À propos de l'initiative Team Europe* : On a pas attendu les Team Europe initiative pour travailler conjointement. (...) Mais la création du EU Trust Fund pour l'Afrique en 2015 a clairement marqué un tournant. Avant on le faisait mais beaucoup moins, voire très peu. C'était de la coopération traditionnelle, c'est-à-dire à peu près 60% d'aide budgétaire et le reste sous forme d'aide projet : des partenariats avec des ONG, des bureaux d'études, des partenaires... Quand je dis bureaux d'études c'est à chaque fois des appels d'offre ! Et là on a vraiment connu un tournant très important qui a fait un peu le liant de ce qu'on appelle maintenant Team Europe initiative. C'est-à-dire qu'on travaille de plus en plus à travers nos agences État membre. Et là où intervient concrètement le concept de Team Europe c'est que c'est plus un seul État membre, c'est souvent plusieurs. (...) Ça a renforcé le travail en *Team Europe* car nous avons de plus en plus travaillé en confiant des tâches aux agences de coopération de nos Etats membres à partir de cette période. (...) Il n'y pas de révolution fondamentale je dirais. (...) C'est souvent plus rapide, ça nous permet de nous jouer d'une certaine lenteur. Mais je dois reconnaître que ça n'a pas changé énormément de choses.

S.D. *About Team Europe* : We didn't wait for the *Team Europe* initiative to start working together. (...) But the creation of the *EU Trust Fund for Africa* in 2015 clearly marked a turning point. Before that, we were doing a lot less, if not very little. It was traditional cooperation, i.e. roughly 60% budget aid and the rest in the form of project aid : partnerships with NGOs, consultancies, partners... When I say consultancies, I mean tenders every time! And that's when we really hit a major turning point, which to some extent formed the basis of what we now call the *Team Europe* initiative. In other words, we are working more and more through our Member State agencies. And where the *Team Europe* concept comes into its own is that it's no longer just one Member State, it's often several. (...) This has strengthened the work of *Team Europe*, because we have been working more and more by entrusting tasks to the cooperation agencies of our Member States since this period. (...) I wouldn't say there has been any fundamental revolution. (...) It's often quicker, it allows us to act quicker. But I have to admit that it hasn't changed a great deal.

S.D. : On a des accords de pêche, avec le Sénégal et d'autres pays de la sous région, qui sont parmi les plus transparents. (...) Il y a des évaluations partagées de la ressource disponible, de comment les pêcheurs peuvent intervenir, et puis on a l'obligation de faire travailler a bord des navires du personnel sénégalais et des contre parties qui permettent de financer des programmes de développement dans le secteur de la pêche (des infrastructures, etc)... C'est connu, c'est négocié, c'est publié, c'est transparent.

S.D. : We have some of the most transparent fishing agreements with Senegal and other countries in the sub-region. (...) There are shared assessments of the available resource, of how the fishermen can intervene, and then there is the obligation to have Senegalese personnel work on board the vessels and counterparts that enable the financing of development programmes in the fisheries sector (infrastructures, etc)... It's known, it's negotiated, it's published, it's transparent.

S.D. : Par exemple, pour un de nos gros programmes agricoles, on avait des comités de pilotage trois fois par an. Il y avait autour de la table les élus locaux, le sous-préfet, les organisations de la société civile... Ils étaient tous impliqués ! Les organisations professionnelles aussi l'étaient.

S.D. : For example, for one of our major agricultural programmes, we had steering committees three times a year. Local elected representatives, the sub-prefect, civil society organisations were all around the table... They were all involved ! The professional organisations were too.

F.A. : Mais cette approche plus axée autour du dialogue entre les différents acteurs du développement au Sénégal, vous diriez qu'elle est récente, ou du moins qu'il y a eu un changement avec la nouvelle approche et le renouveau du partenariat avec l'Afrique ?

F.A. : But would you say that this 'more dialogue-based approach' between the various development players in Senegal is a recent development, or at least that there has been a change with the new approach and renewed partnership with Africa ?

S.D. : Nan elle a toujours existé ! Déjà à l'époque du FED on élaborait conjointement les contenus avec la partie nationale et les bénéficiaires. (...) D'abord on a des obligations dans l'élaboration de nos orientations stratégiques, on a des check list, on est obligés de passer par la case par exemple négociations avec les organisations de la société civile (combien de réunions on a eu, les comptes rendus, qu'est ce qui s'est dit, qu'est ce qui a été pris en compte ou pas...). Depuis toujours, donc ça c'est un mauvais procès. Alors parfois un peu long, voire laborieux, mais tout cela débouche sur un contenu qui est le fruit d'un consensus.

S.D. : No, it has always existed ! Even at the time of the European Development Fund, we were already working out the content jointly with the national side and the beneficiaries. (...) First of all, we have obligations when we draw up our strategic guidelines, we have checklists, we have to go through negotiations with civil society organisations (how many meetings we've had, the reports, what was said, what was taken into account or not...). So that's a bad trial. So sometimes it's a bit long, even laborious, but it all leads to content that is made out of a consensus.

S.D. **À propos du Global Gateway** : On se positionne sur des enjeux qui ne sont pas que nationaux mais qui permettent de créer des interactions, de renforcer les synergies, à l'intérieur des régions dans un même pays et entre les régions de différents pays. (...) En Afrique de l'Ouest il y a une logique d'intégration, les gens circulent, font du business d'un pays à l'autre, depuis longtemps. (...) Donc voilà, je veux dire ces interconnexions sont facilitées et encouragées, pour soutenir l'intégration (...) et Global Gateway c'est ça. (...) En fait, le Global Gateway se concentre sur la stratégie de 'passerelles mondiales' de l'Union européenne et sur son rôle dans la promotion des investissements mondiaux. Quand on parle d'investissements, on parle d'investissements dans les infrastructures, centré autour de ses thématiques prioritaires : numérique, énergie, climat, transport, santé, éducation, recherche... Ce partenariat est appuyé par le Paquet d'Investissements Europe-Afrique du Global Gateway, de 150 milliards. Et les Team Europe sont pleinement incluses dans le processus, le tout avec la participation du secteur privé notamment.

S.D. **About Global Gateway** : We are positioning ourselves on issues that are not just national but which help to create interactions, strengthen synergies, within regions in the same country and between regions in different countries. (...) In West Africa there is a logic of integration, people have been moving around and doing business from one country to another for a long time. (...) So there you have it, I mean these interconnections are facilitated and encouraged, to support integration (...) and that's what *Global Gateway* is all about. (...) In fact, *Global Gateway* focuses on the European Union's 'global gateways' strategy and its role in promoting global investment. When we talk about investment, we're talking about investment in infrastructure, centred around its priority themes : digital, energy, climate, transport, health, education, research, etc. This partnership is supported by the *Global Gateway's* Europe-Africa Investment Package,

worth €150 billion. And *Team Europe* is fully involved in the process, with the participation of the private sector in particular.

S.D. : Je me suis occupé pendant de très nombreuses années, et toujours aujourd'hui, de sécurité alimentaire. Ce qui a le plus contribué à réduire l'insécurité alimentaire et à réduire les crises alimentaires dans le Sahel ces 40 dernières années c'est l'ouverture des frontières et la libre circulation des produits. (...) Et par exemple je parlais d'Agropole centre (...), ici on soutient dans certaines filières (rizicole notamment mais pas seulement) des engrais organiques pour contrebalancer l'importation de fertilisants qui coûtent de plus en plus chers parce que tributaires des hydrocarbures (en particulier du gaz ukrainiens et russe). L'idée avec ça c'est qu'on puisse nourrir le pays, mais aussi tout ceux de la sous région.

S.D. : For many years, and still today, I have been involved in food security. And what has contributed most to reducing food insecurity and food crises in the Sahel over the last 40 years is the opening up of borders and the free movement of products. (...) And for example I was talking about Agropole centre (...), here we support organic fertilisers in certain sectors (particularly rice, but not only) to counterbalance the import of fertilisers that are increasingly expensive because they depend on hydrocarbons (particularly Ukrainian and Russian gas). The idea with this is to be able to feed the country, but also all those in the sub-region.

S.D. : On est pas présent dans le domaine de l'éducation, on a le très gros programme de formation professionnelle et Erasmus+, mais on est pas sur l'éducation primaire ou secondaire.

S.D. : We are not present in the field of education, we have the very large vocational training programme and Erasmus+, but we are not involved in primary or secondary education.

S.D. : On accompagne les réformes et les engagements prioritaires du gouvernement. Le mot réforme est très important, c'est-à-dire que tous les grands secteurs dans lesquels on est impliqués ont besoin de réformes, d'adaptation des textes, etc. (...) Il y a toujours des réformes clés à engager et donc quand on parle d'appui budgétaire (...) on parle de sceptres qu'on considère comme prioritaire. Donc on va transférer des ressources, par tranches, et les tranches sont délivrées si des éléments de stratégies et de gouvernance globale sont respectés. (...) La vision du moment c'est de concentrer nos ressources (...), c'est-à-dire que plutôt que de se disperser, d'opérer sur des chaînes de valeur différentes, on se concentre sur celles qui ont le plus de chances de produire du revenu, de nourrir efficacement la population, donc par exemple la filière riz. (...) Là aussi il y a des réformes clés à entreprendre pour justement ne pas concurrencer de manière déloyale la production nationale par les importations de riz parfumé thaï qui coûte beaucoup moins cher.

S.D. : We support the government's reforms and priority commitments. The word reform is very important, meaning that all the major sectors in which we are involved need to be reformed, texts adapted, etc. (...) There are always key reforms to be undertaken and so when we talk about budget support (...) we are talking about sceptres that we consider to be priorities. So we are going to transfer resources, in tranches, and the tranches are delivered if the elements of strategy and global governance are respected. (...) The vision at the moment is to concentrate our resources (...), in other words, rather than spreading ourselves too thinly, operating in different value chains, we're concentrating on those that have the best chance of generating incomes and feeding the population effectively, so for example the rice sector (...) Here too there are key reforms to be undertaken, precisely so that we don't compete unfairly with national production by importing Thai flavoured rice, which costs much less.

F.A. : J'ai un peu l'impression que vos actions se concentrent principalement à Dakar et dans sa banlieue ou région proche... Est ce que c'est une impression faussée ?

F.A. : I have the impression that your actions are mainly concentrated in Dakar and its suburbs or nearby regions... Is this a false impression ?

S.D. : Alors par exemple l'Agropole centre c'est celui qui a le plus gros potentiel parce qu'il y a les ressources, parce qu'il y a les interconnexions avec le reste du pays et de la région, et c'est très bien, mais nous on se bat pour qu'on continue à faire des choses dans la région de Matam/Podor, dans la région du tiers sud, en Casamance en particulier, parce que là il y a des disparités importantes et l'émergence ne pourra se faire que si on ne laisse personne sur le bord de la route.

S.D. : So, for example, the central Agropole has the greatest potential because it has resources, because it has interconnections with the rest of the country and the region, and that's all very well, but we're fighting to ensure that

things continue to be done in the Matam/Podor region, in the southern third of the region, in Casamance in particular, because there are major disparities there and emergence will only be possible if we don't leave anyone by the wayside.

S.D. : L'accès au prêt, est un problème énorme. (...) Donc on ouvre des lignes de crédit, on les sécurise, on les garantie... on met ce qu'il faut autour, c'est-à-dire assistance technique, accompagnement, appui conseil pour faciliter l'accès de leurs adhérents, etc.

S.D. : The access to loans is a huge problem (...) So we open lines of credit, we secure them, we guarantee them... we put in all the necessary support, i.e. technical assistance, guidance, advisory support to make it easier for their members to access loans, and so on.

S.D. **À propos de la collaboration avec les autorités sénégalaises** : On ne va pas leur dire comment procéder mais on dit : voilà, pour nous ce sont des aspects importants, parce que ça a un impact social, économique... Et c'est pas à nous de vous dire ce que vous avez à faire et comment vous avez à le faire, mais par rapport à nos engagements, on a des principes qui sont aussi des éléments importants et qui déterminent un petit peu jusqu'où on veut aller dans un partenariat en fonction de jusqu'où le pays partenaire respecte ces aspects là, et les prend en considération. (...) Donc nous, notre rôle, c'est de rappeler les principes et les engagements qui sont importants pour nous, qui conditionnent notre partenariat. Et on est dans un pays qui se sait un des pays stables de la région, (...) et quelque part il l'a mérité aussi.

S.D. **About the partnership with the Senegalese authorities** : We're not going to tell them how to go about it, but we do say that these are important aspects for us, because they have a social and economic impact... And it's not up to us to tell you what you have to do and how you have to do it, but in relation to our commitments, we have principles which are also important elements and which determine to some extent how far we want to go in a partnership depending on the extent to which the partner country respects these aspects and takes them into consideration. (...) So our role is to remind people of the principles and commitments that are important to us and that condition our partnership. And we are in a country that knows itself to be one of the stable countries in the region, (...) and in a way it has deserved it too.

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