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Human Rights and Multi-level Governance**



**The Anatomy of Successful and Failed Protests:
Lessons from the 2019 Hong Kong and Chile Protests**

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They say, ‘write what you know’, and so I used this research to answer some questions that stayed with me after witnessing Hong Kong’s massive protest movement. During my exchange in the city, I remember being impressed by the level of organization and commitment of the protesters, many fellow classmates of mine who advocated for their freedoms. It was impressive to see how Hongkongers adapted to circumstances and shifted strategies as they saw fit. So, when the protests eventually ended, I was left with unease. If such a movement could not make a change, which one could? What should protesters do differently? After a lot of work, this thesis helped me answer a bit better those questions for myself.

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Abstract

This thesis intends to dig deeper into what factors influence the success of a protest through the qualitative analysis of two protest movements: the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests and Chile's Estallido Social, both of which took place in 2019. The case study analysis is based on Charles Tilly's WUNC framework (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, Commitment), a theory that claims that the strength of a protest relies on the dynamics of these four components. This framework has remained abstract for the most part, so in order to measure the presence of WUNC components, this theory has been linked to Gene Sharp's Methods of protest action.

The analysis consisted of coding articles from two local newspapers (SCMP and La Tercera). The articles were coded by assessing the presence of Sharp's methods of protest actions in the narration of the events. Each protest method reflected one or more WUNC factors, making it possible to evaluate the degree of presence of each factor per protest movement. Since Tilly's framework has seldom been applied empirically, this thesis brings an opportunity to test to what extent WUNC factors account for the success or failure of a protest. The analysis also assessed the influence of contextual factors by coding for possible contextual obstacles or advantages. The research found that the level of political opportunity does affect the extent of success of a protest. Moreover, it was found that the efficient display of WUNC factors can lead a movement to success, while an unbalance between the presence of these factors can hinder a protest from achieving its goals.

I. Introduction

This work intends to assess which factors affect the results of a protest movement. Two case studies are compared: the movement that took place in Chile and the protests that took over Hong Kong in 2019. Using different academic frameworks, the case studies are analyzed to determine to what extent it is protesters' behavior that determines their success (or lack thereof). The intention is to get a better understanding of under which conditions and to what extent protests are an effective tool to push for change. Given that protests have become commonplace in different corners of the world, it becomes relevant both for activists and policymakers to better comprehend the reach of such movements. However, the act of protesting is nothing new. Sociologist and writer Gene Sharp (1973) goes as far back as the Greeks and the Romans to give examples of protesting as he enlists methods of nonviolent resistance. The how and the why behind protesting varies across regions and throughout time, but the fact remains that, when people's grievances are not relieved, they will find a way to voice their concerns. While some protest movements have been squandered, neglected, or dissolved, many others have led to significant societal changes. The doubt then surges as to what leads a protest to success, and what pushes others to fail. Are there actions to be avoided or encouraged during protests? Is there a better timing in which to raise the people's concerns? These doubts become more relevant as protests become a global trend, steadily increasing in the last decades.

In the 2010's there was an unprecedented number of protests in a single time period. In 2019 alone there were anti-regime protests reported in 114 countries, marking it as 'the year of protests' (Brannen et al., 2020). The impact of the 2019 protests was intensified by what the authors call a 'contagion effect': with ideas of secession brewing from Barcelona to Hong Kong, and government distrust turning into anger from Beirut to Santiago, protesters mimicked techniques and learned from mistakes from movements taking place at other sides of the world. After analyzing the root causes of the 2019 movements, Brannen et al.'s (2020) observed that protests are very likely to continue increasing in the coming years. This boom of protest movements can be attributed to different reasons. The researchers argue that protests are now a global trend because the understanding of the government-

citizen relationship is changing. Instead of assuming that the people are there to serve the ruler, the perception that the government is there to serve the people is prevailing. Indeed, “protests sweeping the globe are born from a feeling that existing institutions and leaders are unresponsive and incapable” (Brannen et al., 2020). It is up to each government to ensure that they are actually listening to their constituents. Protests are thus seen by citizens as a means to achieve collective goals when the government is not fulfilling its role according to the community’s standards. Particularly in democratic societies, it is the responsibility of government officials to prioritize the interests of their constituents. Therefore, protests serve as a platform for various groups to highlight the government’s obligations towards the people, as discussed further below. Brannen et al. (2020) argue that any country is now prone to burst into protest if discontent arises. Thus, it is in the state’s best interest to address grievances properly. By doing so, they do not only guarantee better political stability, but an advantage over those countries that refuse to accommodate protest demands. Yet, this fact remains ignored by most governments, as many choose the coercive path as soon as discontent knocks at their door.

Without knowing how to (or without willingness to) alleviate social unrest properly, many countries have opted for increasing national security measures, such as the National Security law passed in Hong Kong in 2020, which criminalized different types of involvement in the 2019 protests. By the 1st anniversary of the law, 128 people had been arrested for charges of ‘subversion’, many of them journalists or students (Davidson & Ball, 2021). Minors have also been arrested under this framework, and left to wait on pre-trial detentions, violating the rights of the child (Bhartiya & Bansal, 2023). Others, like in Chile, have resorted to bringing military to the streets to stop and discourage people from protesting. In the turmoil, at least 11 people died in the hands of the government, and around 460 persons lost an eye to rubber bullet injuries (Gutiérrez, 2021; Rivera & Latorre, 2021). Indeed, as protests become a common avenue for citizens to raise concerns, the Right to protest has been put at risk by government policies, criminalizing the act of assembly.

The Right to protest is protected by articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 19 vouches for the individual right of freedom of

expression, including the freedom “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media” (UN, 1948). Some forms of protesting, such as banners and publications, as well as the right of journalists to report injustices committed in the framework of a protest, are protected by this article. Furthermore, article 20 states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association” (UN, 1948). Thus, individuals have the right to gather and perform peaceful acts of protests. However, the latest mass movements have also been tainted with acts of violence, opening the door for government repression. Politicians, scholars, and activists themselves are hence constantly debating on the validity and effectiveness of bringing violence to a protest.

On their comparative analysis, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) found that while there are examples of successful violent civil resistance, non-violent action has proven to be more effective. This goes hand in hand with Sharp’s (1973, 2005) theory of non-violent action, as he argues that actionists should completely refrain from violence if they are to seek success. Theory and evidence thus support the first pillar of Charles Tilly’s WUNC framework. Throughout his life’s work, Tilly presents a framework to evaluate the strength and chances of success of a protest: Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment (WUNC). The first component, Worthiness, refers to the dignity of the claimants and their claims. Worthiness is to be maintained by refraining from acts of violence or irrationality. Unity touches upon the (ideological) cohesiveness of the participants. Tilly also argues that a large protest has more chances of success (numbers). Lastly, Commitment refers to how far participants are willing to go for the cause. All these elements combined properly, states the sociologist, give protesters the opportunity to succeed. However, WUNC has seldom been tested empirically. This thesis intends to assess the validity of this framework.

1. Focus of the research

Through a comparative analysis of two case studies, the objective of this thesis is to dig deeper into the factors that determine the success of a protest, and it intends to answer the following research question: ‘*To what extent are the WUNC components determinant of a protest’s success?*’. Protest success in this paper is understood as the gaining of concessions, rather than the realization of long-term outcomes. Two mass protests from

2019 will be compared: the ‘Estallido social’¹ begun in Santiago de Chile, and the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. These two movements can be considered similar in magnitude. Regarding numbers, they mobilized a quarter of their cities’ populations at the largest protest events. Both lasted at least half a year, disrupting the daily rhythm, economy, transportation, and sense of security of whole populations. Despite cultural differences, both movements used similar strategies. Firstly, they were characterized as being leaderless, i.e. there was no one individual or organization calling to the streets. Instead, protesters used social media (facebook, telegram), oftentimes anonymously, to set times, and agree on course of action. The reasons for remaining leaderless varied across movements: Chileans distrusted politicians, so they wanted to display a collective voice rather than depend on yet another ‘representative’; meanwhile, Hongkongers feared targeted retaliation, and found safety in fighting in masses. Despite these differences, being leaderless helped both protests emphasize that they are voicing the interests of the people, not just a particular section of it. Secondly, Chilean protestors adopted many of the protest tactics used by Hongkongers such as building barricades or occupying symbolic areas. What is more so, both protests faced strong retaliation from officials, be it military or police. Hongkongers quickly developed methods to endure pepper spray attacks and protect themselves from water cannons. It is known that Chileans used Hong Kongese infographics to prepare against military repression (Brannen et al., 2020).

Despite similar strategy and magnitude, these protests differ significantly in one aspect: their degree of success. Hong Kong demanded five clear concessions, of which only one was conceded: the cancelation of an extradition bill that would allow for Hongkongers to be extradited for trial in China, where different laws apply. Not only were the other four demands ignored (one of which demanded a complete reform of the legislative system to ensure full democracy), but months after the protests ended, a new extradition bill was passed, erasing all the efforts made in 2019. On the other hand, Chileans to this day debate

¹ There is debate among Chilean participants, scholars, and politicians on what the right title of the movement should be. ‘Social outburst’, or ‘estallido social’ became the commonplace title, but some disagree with the implications of such a title. Also known as ‘the awakening’ or ‘2019 social unrest’, the movement is defined differently depending on personal political inclinations and interpretations of the events (Marín, 2021).

on what the true purpose of the social outburst was. The common denominator across all demands (which ranged from accessible transportation to an end to oligarchies), was the discontent with the government and the feeling of not being heard or taken into account. To such a strong and collective, yet broad, revolt, the government proposed the option of creating an entirely new constitution, one that could encompass all the claims. With the constitution now being rewritten a second time, it is hard to tell whether protesters will see the outcomes they envisioned, but one thing is clear: the protest succeeded in gaining the full attention of the opponent.

This thesis uses Tilly's work and Sharp's theory to examine these two case studies. First, Sharp's list of non-violent methods of action are analyzed in terms of the WUNC framework. By determining what WUNC factor each non-violent method displays, the list of actions will thus serve as a tool to codify and turn the abstract WUNC factors into observable behaviors. Then, two major newspapers, the 'South China Morning Post', reporting on Hong Kong, and 'La Tercera' reporting on Chile, serve as databases to collect evidence on the type of actions taken by protesters during the movement. The cases are thus evaluated by examining to what extent WUNC factors were present, hence determining whether these factors played a role in the final results of the movements.

This thesis is broken down into four parts. The following section presents the theoretical framework in which this research is based upon. It goes over the definition of 'protest' used throughout this paper, as well as the conception of protest success that will be used to assess the case studies. Later, the chapter outlines different theories that try to explain what determines the success of a protest. First, the theories that rely on contextual factors are presented, followed by the ones that argue for the importance of agentic factors. Then, the WUNC framework is presented in more detail, as this theory will be evaluated in the case study analysis. Finally, the chapter ends with a concise overview of theories that support the influence of both contextual and agentic factors in the results of a protest.

After the theoretical framework, the chapter covers the background in which each of the case studies develops. The context given includes a general background of the factors that led to the movement, some key events that marked the protests, the government's response to the

situation and the final outcomes of the movement. the objective of the chapter is to better explain the movements' background, their goals, and the results. The Analysis section presents the case studies in chronological order, starting with the movement in Hong Kong, and followed by the one in Chile. Later, a more detailed explanation on the type of analysis that was conducted is shown, as well as a table that shows the codification of methods of non-violent action as displays of WUNC. Then, the findings on the presence of WUNC factors in each case study will be displayed, breaking down the movement into its agentic conditions to see whether WUNC played a role in their resolution.

The final section, conclusion, serves as a space to elaborate on the findings of the analysis: to what extent can the question be answered? This chapter also covers the possible implications of the research findings, as well as the limitations of the validity of the results. Therefore, this last chapter presents the final conclusions that can be drawn from the conducted research, and the relevance they may have for academics as well as protest activists.

II. Theoretical Framework

This paper will go over what factors determine and intervene in the fate of a protest by looking into two case studies, one of success and one of failure. The protests addressed in this paper are not just pro-democracy movements, but rather protests that demand the guarantee of human rights, be it access to education & health, or freedom of expression. Indeed, the purpose of this research is to understand how/when protests can be used as a tool to advance the human rights agenda. By analyzing what factors allowed Chileans to push for a constitution with a human rights approach, and what factors hindered Hongkongers from a fair redress for police brutality, we hope to be one step closer to understanding what exactly turns a protest effective.

In order to do that, a definition for the term ‘protest movement’ will be given, as well as the conception of ‘protest success’ that will be used as baseline for this analysis. This will be followed by a discussion on the different theories in the literature that aim to explain protests and their impact. The literature debates on whether the reach of a protest is a matter of its context or its agency, and so an overview of these two perspectives will be provided. Furthermore, one agentic approach will be discussed more in detail: Charles Tilly’s WUNC framework (Tilly, 1998; Wouters & Walgrave, 2017) will be elaborated on to be used as a reference for the rest of the analysis. The WUNC framework has thus far only been discussed theoretically, so this paper aims to fill that gap and evaluate to what extent this framework can predict, so to speak, the success of a protest. Finally, a short discussion on the interaction between context and agency factors will be presented. Both context and agency have proven to play a role in the outcomes of a social movement and so this final section intends to address this interconnection.

1. Definition of a protest movement

In the studies of political action, protests are seen as one type of social movement (Tilly, 1998); that is, one way in which social movements may be displayed. McCarthy, & Zald (1977) define *social movement* as: “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward

distribution of a society” (p. 1217). Tilly (2004) further argues that social movements consist of:

- 1) a *campaign* -an organized public effort that makes collective claims to authorities;
- 2) a *repertoire* of forms of political action: special-purpose coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, statements to and in public media; and
- 3) participants’ public representation of the movement’s Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment (*WUNC*).

In other words, a social movement is a collective effort to push for a change through political action. Protests can indeed fall under this umbrella term. In this paper, we will understand a *protest movement* as a form of social movement that demands authorities to address a salient issue. Protesters have found different ways to exert pressure on authorities, moving beyond (but not setting aside) rallies and demonstrations. They are a tool for people to raise their concerns over certain public policies. To distinguish the term from rallies and demonstrations, we will refer to protests as the collective and consecutive political actions that fight for the same cause.

Protest movements are a key element of a democratic society². By pooling their voices, a group of people can voice to the government what changes they want. It reveals to policymakers what their constituents expect from them (Battaglini, 2017; Chenoweth et al., 2022). It is also a way for minorities or ‘non-mainstream’ citizens to signal their preferences (preferences that may otherwise be overlooked during elections). Indeed, “Protests—and government responsiveness to them—are often seen as a critical part of a healthy democracy” (Chenoweth et al., 2022, p. 1). Both case studies discussed here had that intention: to bring together the voices of the constituents and demand the respect of democratic values.

Pro-human rights protest movements like the ones in Chile and Hong Kong can also be understood under Sharp’s (2005) framework of ‘nonviolent struggles’. They are understood as a “technique of action by which the population can restrict and sever the sources of power

² although protests can (and often do) take part in authoritarian regimes, authoritarian governments by definition are not interested in listening to their constituents, while democratic regimes *are expected to*. As such, in democratic societies, protests are almost an expected consequence of public discontent.

of their rulers or other oppressors and mobilize their own power potential into effective power” (p. 1). Non-violent struggles, Sharp argues, are non-violent in their actions, not necessarily in their ideology (p.8). That is, it is not whether actors are inherently anti-violence, but whether they choose to push for change through non-violent means. Sharp explains nonviolent action as “a technique of struggle involving the use of psychological, social, economic, and political power in the matching of forces in conflict” (p.10). Thus, the non-use of physical violence does not mean alternative coercive means are not to be used. The author divides forms of non-violent action into three categories. The first one is ‘non-violent protest and persuasion’: “These are forms of activity in which the practitioners are expressing opinions by symbolic actions, to show their support or disapproval of an action, a policy, a group, or a government” (p. 4). Another group of actions worth mentioning is ‘economic noncooperation’, which encompasses economic boycotts and labor strikes. It is worth noting that Sharp acknowledges that non-violent tactics sometimes are mixed with limited violence instances (p. 4). Tactics and actions taken by protesters will be further discussed in the incoming chapters. Sharp’s concept of ‘nonviolent struggles’ illustrates how protests (and the vast repertoire of actions that come with them) can be useful tools for citizens to use to pursue change.

Chenoweth et al. (2022, p. 4) argue that protests are more likely to arise when a) the local salience of an issue is high and b) there are low levels of political trust. There are different theories that explain the logic behind individual participation, such as Rational Choice theory, which will be discussed shortly. One thing remains constant, the issue has to be moving: individuals have to sympathize with the cause and find the movement legitimate to get involved. In addition to that, there must be a certain degree of distrust in the system. That is, citizens do not expect the system to correct itself, the issue is to be raised by constituents for the government to address it. Due to this lack of trust, political action tends to be cumulative, as protesters do not expect a single event to reverse an injustice (Tilly, 1998). Consistency, Tilly argues, is key for a successful protest.

Now, when can we call a protest successful? This question allows for multiple answers. The intention here is to determine how success will be understood throughout this paper in

particular. Protesters expect their actions to bring about a particular outcome, for example: less inequality, a more just system, an end to corruption. In order to achieve these long-term, abstract outcomes, they tend to ask for specific concessions: to lower the price of public transport, to bring an accused to court, to set anti-corruption measures. On this research, the focus will be on the achievement of these demands, e.g. Did the protest movement convince the government to lower the price of buses? That in itself implies that this type of political action is influencing the authorities and bringing in results. Whether winning the demanded concessions eventually led to the desired societal outcome is a different discussion, one that falls outside the scope of this analysis but ought to be addressed in further research.

One last term that requires examination is ‘riot’. Both the protests in Chile and Hong Kong have been catalogued by different actors (government authorities, the media) as ‘riots’ (CNN, 2019; Reuters, 2022; Rui, 2019; Wong, 2022). Waddington (2015) explains riots as an “explosiveness” of action. The abuse of violent behavior such as attacking the police, or bystanders, or destruction or theft of property. These actions are considered by the observer as irrational and ultimately unjustified. Hence, the term ‘riot’ has a negative connotation, and it tends to imply an illegitimate use of violence. In the words of Gunning (1972), riots are “an unlawful act (or set of unlawful acts) committed in the presence of a crowd which is sufficiently large and/or sympathetic that ordinary law enforcement procedures are inadequate”. Note that riots are thus understood as unlawful- hence why governments are fast at labeling opposition protests as *riots*. The actions would then fall outside of the law, condemning the movement and delegitimizing what may otherwise be valid public claims. Indeed, ‘rioter’ is a term that tends to be given by the observer (journalists, politicians, bystanders) rather than by protesters themselves, as doing so would delegitimize their own actions. When protesters act in such ways, they often consider their behavior valid and/or purposeful. Distinguishing between acts of freedom of speech and self-defense from acts of preemptive violence has deemed crucial both on the studies of protest behavior, and in the prosecution of protesters (or rioters). What may seem like a justified action for one side may be perceived as irrational to the other and vice versa. Thus, rioting may be the result of unheard demands, or an extreme extension of a protest. Both case studies show signs of

rioting actions at some point in time (looting, use of violence). Yet, the centrality of such actions within the movements varied over time, and only a small portion of protesters were involved or supported rioting behavior. Thus, while some public figures have labeled these 2019 movements as riots, academia refers to them to date as protests (c.f. Brannen & Haig, 2020; Palacios-Vallárdez, 2020; Purbrick, 2019; Santibáñez-Rodríguez, 2022). Indeed, it is not this paper's objective to argue for or against protesting (or rioting, for that matter), but rather to discuss what circumstances make a protest movement effective.

2. Contextual factors

After the wave of protests during the 60's, studies on social movements have surged, offering different models to understand their behavior. Sociologists and political scientists have tried to explain to what extent social movements can exert power on the political arena. Some studies on the topic argue that it is the context in which social movements develop that determines the degree of success of the movement in gaining concessions.

Soule & Olzak (2004) argue that the success of a social movement largely depends on the political climate of the time: are politicians willing to listen? Are they able to stop the movement? Are there allies inside the government? The authors consider that Tarrow's (1994) Political Opportunity Structure (POS) explains why some movements achieved their goals and others failed. POS is understood as the "consistent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1994). Hence, POS theory maintains that social movement mobilization largely depends on how receptive the elites are, how capable they are to squash a movement, and whether some elites are allied to the cause³ (Soule & Olzak, 2004). In short, "POS theory suggests that the political climate, independent of movement mobilization, strongly affects the potential outcomes sought by movements" (Soule & Olzak, 2004, p.478). After conducting research, Soule & Olzak (2004) concluded that, while the presence of allies within the authorities proved not to be a determinant factor,

³ In their extensive statistical analysis of 223 civil resistance movements, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011, p.19) found that the POS theory does not fully hold, as some movements failed even when the timing seemed right, while others succeeded despite political circumstances being unfavorable.

the willingness of elites to either listen or squander the movement directly affected the results of the protest. Wouter & Walgrave (2017) further assert that protests have a larger impact when there is a divided government, support from public opinion, and/or favorable media coverage. In other words, they consider that POS goes beyond how authorities feel about the protest. Rather, the political opportunities may be generated by indirect factors, such as a preexisting crack in the government, or by actors external to the authorities, like the media or the larger public. That is, for protests to be effective, the political climate has to allow it.

Besides the political opportunity structure, the literature has discussed two other relevant context factors. Firstly, Mueller (2022) talks about the limits of state capacity. State capacity is “the state’s ability to deliver goods and services and carry out policies that matter to people” (Mueller, 2022, p. 3). Concessions will be granted if, and only if, the state has the material possibility to do so. If protesters are asking for a pension raise but there are no funds to grant it, it does not matter how willing or agreeing the government is, the concession cannot be granted. Secondly, Akhremenko et al. (2022) take a look at protest repression as a contextual factor that can stir the results of a movement. Strong repression actions are likely to polarize the situation. Akhremenko et al. (2022) argue that there are two possible outcomes stemming from heightened repression: a successful protest (maybe even leading up to a change in government), or a failed movement. After witnessing repression, protesters and bystanders are likely to either further support or increasingly condemn the protests. If the repression is strong enough to convince bystanders that the protests are unlawful, or to effectively stop protesters from mobilizing, the protest is likely to end. If, however, it is the repression that is perceived as unlawful, it might ignite further unrest. For example, if there are instances of police brutality, protesters are likely to demand justice for their actions, and bystanders may stop perceiving the authorities as a moral compass. Akhremenko et al. (2022) thus present repression as a decisive, yet unpredictable, factor in the development of a protest.

3. Agency Factors

We have explored how some scholars have focused on the context of a protest. Yet, others consider that it is the way protesters interact (as a group or as individuals) that determines

the effectiveness of the movement, i.e., the results of the protest are contingent of the agency. In the words of Wouters & Walgrave (2017, p. 2):

We contend that features of protest can alter the calculations, attitudes and ultimately even the behavior of those who observe protest [...] This way, movements can put pressure on a given set of constraints, can alter the power distribution in which they operate, and to some extent, be the agents of their own success.

One first approach to explain the power of the agency of a movement is the psychofunctional approach. This theory is mostly used to understand what drives individuals to participate. The protest is alive as long as people are mobilized, so understanding why people choose to join is the first step in evaluating the protest's strength. Psychofunctional theories argue that when people suffer relative deprivation or alienation, they experience grievances. Social movements surge from organized groups of people that share grievances and want to make it right (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Snow et al., 1986). Passarelli & Tabellini (2017, p. 905) maintain that political unrest is based on rationality, but largely motivated by emotions. That is, individuals are willing to participate in what they have weighed as costly protests because they are aggrieved and feel unfairly treated. The authors use Rational Choice Theory to explain an individual's choice to participate in a movement. For mobilization to happen, two conditions need to be met. The first is the structural factors that set the aggrieved group aside: poverty level, demographic structure, peer approval, to name a few. Secondly, there must be enough individual motivations that outweigh the personal risks of taking part in the movement (e.g., possible government retribution). So, individuals decide it is worth the risk when there is a significant amount of discontent with the status quo- the feeling of injustice is bigger than the costs of participation. Another incentive to participate could be the personal benefits to be earned, such as reputation among peers (Passarelli & Tabellini, 2017). While this approach addresses why aggrieved individuals decide to take political action, even when the costs are high, it fails to explain how some people that are not directly affected by the issue decide to get involved as well. Through Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), McCarthy & Zald (1977) try to find a more encompassing explanation for protests' mobilization.

RMT looks at the political arena as a set of players: individuals and organizations, be it government authorities, the media, or social movement organizations (SMOs). The theory assumes that there is a set amount of resources available in the environment, and some organizations control a share of these resources. To achieve their goals, organizations have to fight, compromise, and collaborate to have access to these resources. In order to take political action, SMOs need to control or mobilize certain resources (e.g., legitimacy, money, facilities, labor) (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1220). McCarthy & Zald divide individuals into different categories: adherents, constituents, bystanders, opponents, potential beneficiaries. They all have a different share of the resources pool (time, money, power, influence), and they may be hindered or benefited differently by SMO's actions. The SMO's first task is to convince individuals and organizations to believe in the goals of the movement, i.e. to become adherents. For instance, often SMOs intend to convey that their actions are for the greater good, bringing long-term benefits for all. Once a larger group is supportive of the movement's mission, they need to become constituents— encouraged to participate actively. Based on this theory, turning adherents into constituents is no easy task. As McCarthy & Zald argue that “since social movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will "on their own" bear the costs of working to obtain them” (1977, p. 1216). And so, the strength of a movement lays in its capacity to persuade others to contribute to the cause, and to prove that a win for the cause is a win for all. In contrast to the theory mentioned above, RMT asserts that supporters and participants of the movement may or may not be directly affected by the cause of the protest. Indeed, supporters can sympathize with the cause and be mobilized if the goal is attractive enough for them. Thus, the strength of the protest no longer is on how deep the grievance is, but how the grievance is presented to and perceived by others.

While RMT starts to shift the conversation from ‘what brings an individual to participate?’ to ‘how can other individuals and organizations be persuaded to participate?’, Snow et al.'s (1986) Framing theory takes it a step further. The authors argue that the aforementioned theories assume that existing grievances lead to political action but fail to explain how this

causal relationship takes place. Thus, the Framing theory intends to fill the gap and address what exactly translates a grievance into action.

To dive into this theory's arguments, we must first define 'frame'. Snow et al. (1986) define it as a 'schemata of interpretation' that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life. [...] By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective" (p. 464). In other words, a frame is the lens we use to interpret events. We then use these interpretations to decide our future actions. Our reaction to an event will depend on the frame we used to perceive it. Thus, the authors assert that for political action to happen, the grievance must be perceived, framed, in a particular way: "what is at issue is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 466). They argue that for action to be taken, the situation must be framed as unfair, action must be seen as justifiable, and change must be perceived possible, i.e., sympathizers must adopt an injustice frame.

For social movement organizers to mobilize observers, they need to transmit the 'injustice frame', and ensure that it aligns with the frames of potential participants. This is called the 'frame alignment process', when the individual and the social movement interpretative orientations (interests, values, beliefs, goals) are "congruent and complementary" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). Frame alignment is a necessary condition for participation – participants need to agree with the movement on a cognitive level to justify taking action to themselves. One thing to note is that frame alignment is subject to reassessment and so it should not be taken for granted (p. 476). A person may see the value in taking part in a silent vigil but may disagree with the use of violence in a protest. Hence, "prompt participation in one set of activities at one point in time may be irrelevant or insufficient to prompt subsequent participation" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 476).

There are different ways in which frame alignment can take place. The authors discuss four: frame amplification, frame bridging, frame extension, and frame transformation. The first form refers to 'amplifying' the significance that the frame has to an individual, so they

prioritize taking action. Snow et al. (1986) present two types of *frame amplification*. Firstly, value amplification: to highlight and idealize a value, so that it becomes a driver of action. The social movement should appeal to personal values. Individuals may have suppressed these values or lacked an organizational outlet (p. 469). Secondly, is belief⁴ amplification. While acting for a value is to act for a desired end-state, beliefs are the reasoning behind acting for a value. e.g., you believe that the government is responsible, so you will take action against them. Belief amplification is convincing the crowds that their actions will have the desired, significant, impact; that it is up to them to make the change, or else others will not take action. It justifies political actions, makes them 'proper'.

Frame bridging is the process of linking two frames, for example, a social movement's purpose with the personal feeling of injustice. Individuals may find a similarity between the changes in society they want and the changes in society that a movement is fighting for. *Frame extension* refers to enlarging the scope of a frame, i.e., making the cause larger to attract more people. For instance, turning a protest against an extradition bill into a protest in the name of democracy and against police brutality, like in Hong Kong. Lastly, *frame transformation* is when something that was already perceived as important is now understood differently- it is 'reframed'. The way in which a situation is defined changes. For instance, reframing something from unfortunate but tolerable, to unfair and inexcusable (p. 472-474). Reframing may also be a shift in the understanding of the root cause of a problem. The authors mention that such shift happened in Chile in the 70's as people began to recognize that the government structure needed to change for their personal problems to be addressed (p. 474). The authors argue that these changes in perception are a necessary mental step to go from feeling aggrieved to engaging in a protest. The situation must be perceived as unjust, the change must be seen as attainable, and the social movement activities need to be justifiable for the individual.

So far, we have discussed mobilization (the capacity to convince people to engage with the movement) as the point of strength of a protest. While the agency of a movement largely

⁴ Snow et al. (1986, p. 469) define belief as: "presumed relationships between two things or between some thing and a characteristic of it."

depends on the personal agency of each participant, there are other features of a protest that may determine its impact. Mueller (2022) explores how goal attainment depends on the clarity and cohesiveness of the goal. She argues that if a protest's concessions are too broad or too ambiguous, authorities are unlikely to grant them- not because they are unwilling, but because they might not understand the concessions in the first place, or it is unclear how to materialize them (p. 4). The author first talks about the importance of a cohesive crowd. If protesters are asking for different types of concessions, it is difficult for decision-makers to choose who to listen to. Indeed, it becomes hard to determine which of all the demands is more relevant and/or urgent for the general public. Her second point refers to ambiguity. Messages must be clearly articulated so that they are deemed "more credible sounding, less frustrating to interpret, and ultimately more persuasive" (p. 4). Mueller's (2022) findings show that one cohesive, clear goal makes it more computable, more tangible. Thus, it is easier to execute, unlike ambiguous, general targets.

On his work on nonviolent struggles, Gene Sharp (2005) also addresses several agentic factors to be considered in the evaluation of protest success. Based on his extensive cross-sectional case studies, he maintains that a strategy behind the course of actions can significantly boost the impact of a movement. He lists and examines 198 different methods of nonviolent action, arguing that "the methods chosen should strike at the opponents' vulnerabilities, utilize the resisters' strengths, and be used in combination with other methods in ways that are mutually supportive" (2005, p. 7). Thus, he considers that the success of a movement largely rests in the shoulders (and brains) of the protesters. The author further states that participants must be committed to the cause, in that they should be ready to face resistance and pressure from their opponents. Weakness, or lack of will to resist this pressure can result in movement failure. In his words: "There is no substitute for genuine strength and wise action in the conduct of nonviolent struggle." (2005, p. 6). A successful movement lies on the 'genuineness of the strength of the movement' which, Sharp argues, depends on the degree of fearlessness, discipline, and willingness to go on regardless of repression, as well as the strategy chosen (Sharp, 1973).

By strategy chosen, Sharp highlights the importance of a non-violent one. Especially when the opponent has coercive power at hand (e.g. governments), going the violent route can only lead to failure. Instead, Sharp considers that non-violent actions can be far more effective at taking such an opponent down. He calls this ‘political ju-jitsu’: when “brutal repression against disciplined nonviolent resisters does not strengthen the opponents and weaken the resisters, but does the opposite” (2005, p.10). When nonviolent actors are met with repression, the violent attitude of the opponent is seen as uncalled for, and thus, illegitimate by third parties, bystanders, and even members of the opponent group. When the opponent’s violence is deemed abusive, they lose their credibility, and with it, their power. Hence, Sharp states that to fight powerful opponents, one must adhere to nonviolence to have the upper hand. This *political ju-jitsu* can happen in three ways: first, actionists can win over uncommitted third parties, e.g., international support for the protest may put significant pressure on the opponent. Second, violent repression may bring up resistance in the opponent’s own camp. That is, members of the opponent group question the repression and begin to see actionists as the most reasonable party, thus leading to non-cooperation with the opponent. Third, it can increase support from the grievance group. Brutal repression is likely to anger the public and lead to a stronger, more united front (Sharp, 1973, p. 659-665).

One last characteristic of the protest that Sharp considers valuable is the size of the movement. He argues that numbers matter, as it becomes significantly harder for opponents to squander larger protests (2005, p.7). Thus, for a protest to be successful, the author calls for endurance, precise decision-making, and, when possible, a significant number of participants. However, the author emphasizes that quality trumps quantity. High numbers will not matter unless each participant is involved properly. For a protest to maintain its quality, everyone needs to share a similar understanding of the objectives and tactics to be used. The sense of fearlessness, discipline and restraint from violence needs to be passed on to new participants. Indeed, a high number of mobilized people is not valuable unless it can act as a united front.

Protest cohesion, commitment, and numbers are factors explored by many scholars in the discussion of protest’s impact. They are, in fact, some of the features of the agency of the

movement analyzed in Tilly's (1998, 2004) WUNC theory, which will be discussed in the next section.

4. WUNC

Charles Tilly was a sociologist and political scientist that focused on the behavior of social movements. Throughout his academic work, he described a framework to analyze the features that make or fail a social movement: WUNC (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, Commitment). However, the description of this framework is scattered across his texts, as he never wrote down a comprehensive piece to solely address WUNC. Wouters & Walgrave (2017) took on the mission to incorporate Tilly's scattered arguments into one framework in their article *What Makes Protest Powerful? Reintroducing and Elaborating Charles Tilly's WUNC Concept*. The Wouters & Walgrave (2017) compilation and interpretation will be used to go over the ramifications of WUNC. Each of these factors will be described and we will go over their interactions.

A social movement, as described above, is a campaign with a repertoire of political actions that display worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment – thus displaying a legitimate claim for change. According to Tilly (1999), the better displayed and managed WUNC factors are, the more likely a social movement is to achieve its goals. In the words of Wouters & Walgrave (2017):

Indeed, the effectiveness of the program claims a movement makes, depends in part on the effectiveness of prior cementing a strong collective identity and creating an image of being a recognizable and credible actor. This is exactly what the WUNC characteristics do: they convey the message that the protestors are serious claimants who legitimately speak on behalf of (a segment of) society [...] all four components increase the plausibility that the movement has the weight and is willing to use this weight 'to enter, realign, or disrupt the existing polity' (p. 3-4)

The first factor to dissect is *Worthiness*. It refers to the quality of the behavior displayed by participants. Worthy behavior is “eloquent, disciplined, and not disreputable”, while unworthy actions are “violent, disruptive” (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 5). For protests to be deemed worthy, they must be portrayed as a civilized response to injustices. Beneficiaries and participants have to be considered “deserving citizens” (p. 5). Worthiness “helps a

movement to gain recognition as a respectable player that should be listened to and interacted with. By showing restraint and controlling one's emotions and anger, protesters gain respect" (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 5). The authors argue that considering worthy behavior as a protest's asset goes in line with RMT (p. 6), that is, the value of the demands will only be seen as valuable as the demanders and their behavior. Worthiness is also seen by an asset by Sharp (1973, 2005), as he argues that nonviolent (worthy) actions are what grant legitimacy to the movement. Dignified action not only calls in supporters, but also shows the opponent that actionists are eager for reasonable dialogue.

This means that violent acts of protest would hurt the movement's worthiness. It could scare away (potential) participants, and it is more likely to be retaliated against by authorities. Violent action could result in marginalization and criminalization. However, Wouters & Walgrave (2017) point out that "what is worthy or not largely depends on the cultural context" (p. 6). Given that worthiness is context-dependent, some acts of violence may be more tolerated in one place, and even considered worthy under certain conditions. For instance, the authors argue that "relatively peaceful protests who are met by brutal violence will appear much more worthy" (p. 6). Lastly, they mention that worthiness may have a 'statute of limitations' so to speak. It is temporary, in that at any given point protesters may feel that peaceful assembly is not enough to be listened and that they need to exert more power: "We behave because we want to, but listen to us or we will stop behaving" (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 6). If committed social movements feel ignored, it is only a matter of time until they try different means to get what they want.

Second, we have *Unity*. This factor refers to the extent to which the core message/goal is shared among the participants. This factor cannot be observed directly. Protesters use behaviors to show their unity, for example: wearing matching outfits, singing chants, coordinating movements. Their performance should portray that they are a homogeneous group (homogeneous in their goals), "acting in unison" (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 6). That is, a collective identity needs to be created and broadcasted. People with different ideologies and backgrounds may come together because they share a common goal. This goes hand in hand with Snow et al.'s (1986) theory of frame alignment. It is not so much that

all participants have to be similar, but that their perceptions of the issue align (what causes it, how salient it is, what needs to be done). For unity to become an asset, differences in preferences need to be unperceivable for observers and opponents of the movement. This is what Tilly refers to as ‘mystification of unity’: it is “not whether they really have a unified, collective identity or not, but rather to what extent protesters are successful in making themselves appear as unified” (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 7). If it becomes apparent to outsiders that protesters differ in their opinions, the strength of the movement diminishes. As previously argued by Mueller (2022), non-cohesive goals are harder for authorities to understand; authorities are more unlikely to agree on multiple and diverse concessions. A common goal is easier to pursue, and a united front shows just how clear and relevant the issue is for participants.

The feature *Numbers* is, indeed, the number of people that take part in the movement. If the movement is large enough, it can claim legitimacy, or “public sovereignty” (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 7). “The more people protest, the larger the chance that the protesters represent a large, even a majoritarian, share of the population” (p. 7). That is to say, the larger the protest, the more power it can exercise over democratic authorities - it is *the people* demanding a change to happen. It is on the best interest of the parties in charge to listen to a protest, particularly when it represents a big share of the voters. Like with unity, it is not so much the actual numbers, but rather the perception of the massiveness that really matters. In their comparative statistical analysis, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011, p. 39) found that the larger a civil movement is, the more likely it will succeed, both against democratic and non-democratic regimes. Besides, larger protests are more likely to be broadcasted by the media, adding pressure to authorities. Finally, the size of a protest also reflects the level of organization of the movement. If they can organize a demonstration of a significant size, what else can they do? For how long can they keep the momentum? An organized movement, as discussed by Gamson (1975) below, poses a difficult opponent to tackle. However, as argued later on, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011, p. 39) disclose that large numbers alone are not enough for a movement to be successful. It is when quantity and quality of participation are strong that success can happen.

The C in WUNC stands for *Commitment*. This feature refers to how far protesters are willing to go for the cause, the seriousness of their stance. As Wouters & Walgrave (2017) phrase it, it is “the promise of a long term fight” (p. 8). First, protesters must deem the issue salient and worth standing out for. This process can be further explained through frame alignment (Snow et al., 1986). Commitment is shown in their determination and willingness to take costly or risky actions in favor of the movement. Following Sharp’s (1973, 2005) understanding, it is this determination, this commitment, the genuine strength of the movement. For instance, it can be displayed in overcoming (practical) obstacles to participate or choosing to engage at the expense of other interests e.g., students skipping class to go to a demonstration. The authors also note that very committed people who care deeply about the issue are also likely to take on unworthy behavior. This implies that there needs to be a compromise among these core features. The relation between them will be discussed further.

Wouters & Walgrave (2017) argue there is one more feature to take into account: *Diversity*⁵. They consider that a protest gains strength from the inclusion of participants from different societal groups – heterogeneity as an asset. To distinguish it from *numbers*, the authors state that “it makes this claim based on a logic of support across categorically different entities instead of simply more of the same or more of something unspecified” (p. 9). The idea is that if people from different backgrounds all see a problem and agree on a course of action (frame alignment), then the claim must be legitimate⁶. Furthermore, *diversity* differs from *unity* in that the latter looks into shared attitudes and beliefs, while the former looks at how many groups from the population support the claim. A common argument to discredit a social movement is that they are composed of a deviant part of the population, different from the rest of the citizens (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 8). By showing that people from different

⁵ Wouters & Walgrave (2017) thus present the conceptualization of dWUNC over WUNC. The analysis conducted is based on Tilly’s original ‘WUNC’ framework.

⁶ One may think of “intersubjectivity”: when different individuals come to a common, agreed-on conclusion; when objectivity is achieved through the consensus of cumulative subjectivities. If different groups of people come to the common conclusion that X needs to be changed, the claim becomes more truthful, and thus, more legitimate.

demographics are invested in the topic, the movement proves that the matter not only concerns a specific part of the public.

The conceptualization of dWUNC thus argues that all the components must be present for a protest to be impactful. The question now is, what minimum (or maximum) threshold of each component needs to be met? Firstly, it must be noted that Tilly emphasized the importance of the ‘mystification of WUNC’. As explained for *unity*, it is not a matter of how worthy or committed the actions are, but rather how worthy or committed the actions *are portrayed and perceived*. Hence, participants can manipulate and play with this portrayal, to exaggerate the movement’s dWUNCness. For instance, high numbers may result in less commitment from everyone involved- but it only needs to *look* like there is commitment. Thus, to answer the question, one must consider that these components are intertwined. They almost contradict each other in that the maximization of one may result in the nullification of another. For instance, as numbers or diversity grow, it is harder to ensure unity or worthiness, because it becomes more difficult to coordinate. Tilly (1998) considers that the real job of organizers is to find a balance between dWUNC, and to constantly negotiate the participants’ different agendas, while ensuring conflict stays away from the public eye.

While the increment of one component may result in the decrease of another, components can also compensate each other. For example, numbers may be low, but the actions taken may show high commitment and worthiness, strengthening the movement. For example, a hunger strike may be carried out by a small group, but because it comes with high risks it reflects high commitment. Besides, while disruptive, hunger strikes do not put other’s safety at risk, and so they can be considered worthy. Hence, regardless of being low on numbers, such actions can still convey high dWUNCness (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 10). This showcases how flexible dWUNC can be as an instrument for social movements. Having said that, Tilly (1998, 2004) does state that a minimum threshold of each component needs to be met for the protest to be rendered legitimate. This is because, the authors claim,

Extremely low scores on one component may nullify the effect of the others. [...] [For example,] completely unworthy or totally uncommitted participants (drunken dancers

in a public plaza). No matter how many, diverse or unified they are, the protest action is disqualified and loses impact (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 10).

Tilly (1998, 1999, 2004) thus presents a new instrument with which a protest's agency can be accounted for and evaluated. In fact, this framework has recently and increasingly been used by scholars (Kennedy, 2022; Wouters & Walgrave, 2015) to study the true agentic power of a social movement – how exactly can protests stir public opinion? Or what is more, affect public policy?

5. When contextual and agency factors interact

We have now, on the one hand, discussed how the historical and political context can determine the extent of influence a protest may have. On the other hand, we have explored different ways in which a protest may mobilize individuals, as well as the different features of a protest that dictate its influence. While authors debate on whether it is the context or the agency what matters the most, evidence shows that both parts are, to some extent, determinant of the protest's impact. In fact, some researchers did come up with more integral theories that explore both context and agency, and their relationship to protest impact. One main research on the matter is Gamson's *Strategy of Social Protest* (1975). He compared 52 Social Movements that took place in the US and analyzed them based on features inherent to the movement, as well as contextual factors. He wanted to determine which of these factors, and under which conditions, stirred a social movement's impact. Based on his results, he argued for five distinct factors that affect the outcome of a protest: 1) the strategy of thinking small, 2) limits of solidarity, 3) success of the unruly, 4) combat readiness, 5) historical context of challenges. While his work has been criticized from a statistical point of view, his theory remains relevant in the social sciences. Scholars (Frey, et al., 1992; Steedly & Foley, 1977) analyzed his database using different statistical approaches and have found that most of his findings are sustained.

The first feature that Gamson (1975) describes asserts that the type of demands determines how achievable that goal is. Whether it is one or many, against or accommodating to the current power structure, or intending to replace or simply influence the elites. Gamson (1975) (as well as the scholars that cross-checked his work) found this feature to be highly

determinant of a protest's success (Frey, et al., 1992; Steedly & Foley, 1977). In line with Mueller's (2022) findings, movements with a single, specific demand are more likely to be successful. They also found that when the end goal is to displace the current elites, chances of failure are higher. Elites are, for obvious reasons, reluctant to give up their power. The factor '*limits of solidarity*' refers to the limitations people face to actively join the cause. If non-members of the SMO also benefit, they might choose to remain 'free-riders', and so incentives/benefits are needed to encourage them to be active. However, Frey et al. (1992) found no significance to support selective incentives to improve mobilization.

The third feature addresses the role of violence in a protest. Both Gamson's and further research found that the use of violence, either by the protesters or authorities, affects the outcomes of the movement. The use of violence may bring support towards the movement or the establishment, depending on which claim seems more legitimate to the public eye. This goes in line with Akhremenko et. al. (2022) argument on repression. Steedly & Foley (1977, p. 10) found that in general, any forms of exerting power (e.g., boycotts) tend to be more successful when the group is big enough to withstand retaliation. That is, as Tilly (2004) argues, numbers matter because they give the movement more leverage and legitimacy, making it more resilient. Under Tilly's framework, particularly when numbers are small, the use of violence is considered unworthy, and hence, damaging to the protest's legitimacy. The use of violence is likely to delegitimize the movement in the eyes of the authorities, the opposition, observers, and even participants (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 6). Thus, following WUNC's understanding, alternative ways of exerting power would result more effective than the use of coercive force.

Combat readiness refers to “degree of bureaucratization, centralization of power, and factionalism in the groups” (Steedly & Foley, 1977, p. 3). Namely, Gamson (1975) states that the level of organization and cohesion of the movement will determine how resilient it is. While there were weak results indicating the importance of bureaucratization, the several studies showed that factionalism (a split in the protester's opinion) is a strong determinant of failure. This goes in line with Tilly's (2004) concept of unity and Mueller's (2022) conclusions on goal cohesion. The last feature looked into the importance of the historical

context: whether there are crises at the time of mobilization. While Gamson found moderate positive effects of the context on the movement, Frey et al. (1992, p. 381) found it a weak positive effect.

Stedly & Foley (1977, p. 12) and Frey et al. (1992, p. 383) conclude that it is the type of goals (single objective to influence elites), tactics to exert power, and protesters' unity are the three most significant features for a successful protest. The results do not show a significant influence of the context on protest outcomes. Yet, it must be noted that this research only tested the effects of crisis times on the result of a protest, arguing that there must already be turmoil for a social movement to have an in in politics. A comprehensive study that takes into account other contextual factors (such as POS or state capacity) as well as agentic factors (e.g. WUNC) still remains to be done. In this paper we will attempt to address that gap in the literature.

In this chapter, a literature review on different relevant concepts has been given. Firstly, a definition for 'protest movement' has been set to use as a starting point for the rest of the paper. A variety of theories on social movements have been explored, concluding that one must pay attention to both the contingent factors and the active choices that a movement makes to fully comprehend a movement's success. Both approaches will be considered in the protests' analysis, as the intention is to find out whether agentic factors can overcome contextual barriers, e.g., was the 'failure' of the Hong Kong protests an outcome to be expected due to the lack of political opportunity? Or had the protesters acted differently, could they have gained more concessions? The next chapter will go more extensively over the methods to be used to conduct the analysis in order to address these questions.

III. Case Studies: Context

This research has an explanatory approach based on qualitative data, as its objective is to understand what are the main factors that affect the success of a protest movement. Two case studies will be compared: the protests in Chile and in Hong Kong. These two 2019 movements resembled each other in size, reach, and even tactics. Given that they happened simultaneously, evidence shows that these protests influenced each other (Brannen et al., 2020). One big difference between them, however, is that Chilean protesters got concessions granted, while in Hong Kong only one of five demands were met. The purpose of this research is to evaluate what makes some movements succeed and others fail. In this case, what made Chile stand out? What did the Hong Kong movement lack? Their context (such as the political opportunity structure) will be taken into account. Furthermore, to test the influence of agentic factors, the case studies will be evaluated based on the WUNC framework. While this framework has seldom been used beyond theoretical purposes, this research is a good opportunity to examine its feasibility to assess a protest's strength. Thus, both cases will later be broken down per component to then assess if the presence of WUNC was determinant on the protests' results.

This chapter will give a contextual background of the movements, to serve as reference for the analysis. It is divided into two parts, one per case study. Each section goes over different aspects of the protests. The *background* covers the sociopolitical situation of the region that led to the movement; *the spark of the movement* highlights the specific moments that gave rise to the protests; *Key events* give an overview of significant occasions that shaped the movement; *Government immediate response* discusses the government's reaction and interaction with the protests; and lastly, *Conclusion & aftermath* narrates how the movement ended and the some of the repercussions it had in the community.

1. Case study 1: 2019 Hong Kong Protests

On June 16, 2019, 2 million people took to the streets of Hong Kong— more than a quarter of the city's 7.4 million inhabitants at the time (Brannen, et al., 2020). The movement started

in March 2019, when the government announced an extradition bill that would permit Hongkongers to be extradited from Taiwan and Hong Kong and trialed in China. Citizens were concerned for the lack of transparency in the extradition and Chinese trial processes, possibly allowing the Chinese government to convict Hongkongers for acts that are only considered illegal in Mainland China. The movements (and the government repression) grew to a high point in June when police openly used coercive force to stop protests. Enraged by the government's response, on the 16th people took over the main roads of the city asking for five demands. Protests continued until the beginning of 2020, when the pandemic forced people to stay at home. To fully understand the demands and the sudden outburst in what was known as a peaceful city, it is necessary to understand Hong Kong's sociopolitical background.

1.1 Background

In 1842, the Chinese and British empires signed the Treaty of Nanjing, ending the 2nd Opium war. As part of the peace agreement, China ceded the Hong Kong territories to the British empire indefinitely. The Peking Convention of 1898 granted the British full control of the territories, as it stated that Hong Kong would be leased to Britain for 99 years (History, 2018). This period is often referred to in Chinese history as 'the hundred years of national humiliation' (Sinclair, 2020). With the lease expiration date nearing in 1984, discussions on the fate of Hong Kong began. In the Sino-British Joint Declaration Hong Kong was guaranteed self-ruling for 50 years, maintaining its social, political, and economic policies, to officially become part of China by 2047. The aim was to eventually achieve a seamless and pacific unification of the two regions, ending the times of the 'national humiliation' and symbolizing China's regained prosperity. In the words of scholar Harriet Sinclair (2020), following Beijing's narrative, "Hong Kong is a tangible representation of both the loss and restoration of power". However, Sinclair argues, for many Hongkongers the return of Hong Kong to Chinese hands meant "decolonization without independence", in that foreign occupiers stepped away, but local administration remained undermined (Sinclair, 2020). This arrangement was labeled as 'One country, two systems'. According to this principle, the region could maintain its own independent legal and economic systems, as well as its

own system of international trade, while responding to the National People's Congress (NPC)⁷.

Under the 'one country, two systems' regime, the Hong Kongese government is divided into different organs, two of which are appointed through voting: the Chief Executive (who acts as city governor) and the Legislative Council (LegCo). The election structure has changed over the years, but by 2017 it was set up as follows: Candidates are drawn up by an Election Committee and vetted by the Candidate Eligibility Review Mechanism, both of which are constituted partially by members of the NPC (Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, 2021). Hongkongers vote for the Election Committee representatives, who in turn vote for one of the pre-selected candidates. The selection of the Legislative Council representatives follows a similar logic. Some seats are reserved to be selected by different economic sectors, some seats are appointed by the NPC, and the Hong Kongese population votes only for a portion of the rest of the seats. Thus, while citizens have some say on who rules their city, it cannot be considered a full democracy, as they cede their voting power to representatives that have previously been approved by the NPC (Wong, 2019).

After Britain's withdrawal from the city in 1997, it did not take long for the Chinese government to attempt to have greater control over Hong Kong. Several policies and reforms have been pushed by Chinese officials to speed up the 'unification process'. In 2003 a new 'National Security Reform' was proposed and met with the first protests since 1989. This bill carried maximum life prison sentences for theft of state secrets, treason, sedition, and subversion. Hongkongers saw it as an attack towards their fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression- a trait that has distinguished Hong Kong from Mainland China. On July 1st, 2003, half a million people took over the streets in disagreement (CNN, 2003). Threatened by the size of the protest, the political party that pushed for the bill backed down, and so the reform was shelved indefinitely (Gunia, 2019).

⁷ The NPC is China's highest organ of state power. It is responsible for enacting and amending laws, overseeing the work of the government and judiciary, and making key decisions e.g. on national budget and foreign policy.

Hong Kong's way of living was threatened again in 2012, when an educational reform was introduced. The Moral and National Education initiative proposed to introduce China's history, culture, and national identity to the curriculum (Gunia, 2019). Students, parents, and teachers saw it as an attempt to 'brainwash' the Hong Kongese youth, who grew up with different shared values than those imposed by China. Students organized themselves, and the organization 'Scholarism' surged, led by then 15-year-old Joshua Wong. They protested and occupied the government complex during the summer of 2012, and by September the Chief Executive announced that it would be up to each school's discretion to adopt the new curriculum, turning it functionally obsolete (Gunia, 2019).

Soon after, in 2014 a reform to Hong Kong's electoral system was presented. It introduced the elections of candidates who had been pre-selected by the NPC. The reform claimed (yet failed) to preserve universal suffrage, causing significant harm to Hong Kong's democracy. Inspired by the success of 2012 protests, and concerned by what Beijing's influence could do to the city, students who took part in previous protests orchestrated the 'Occupy movement'. Largely led by student organizers such as Joshua Wong, protesters 'occupied' major streets of the city for 79 days. Police rapidly turned violent and used coercive tactics to push protesters away. The movement was widely known as the 'Umbrella movement' because protesters carried umbrellas to protect themselves from tear gas and police attacks (Bracanti, 2016). Just like Sharp's 'political jiu-jitsu' concept explains, the police's sudden violent approach only made the protests stronger, as protesters were seen as worthy claimants and police brutality was perceived as an abuse of power by bystanders, potential participants, and the international community. However, as days went by, the occupation not only affected government officials, but bothered citizens who could not cross town, and hurt the economy of the businesses in the area. On top of that, while protesters agreed on the root of the problem, they could not agree on what outcome they wanted – the demands remained unclear. Some wanted an alternative election process, others called for full autonomy from China. With demands unclear, and decreasing popularity, police forcibly removed protesters on the 79th day of occupation. Even though no concessions were achieved, signs were left behind around the city, promising: "We will be back" (Gunia, 2019).

The end of the Umbrella movement left a mark in the city. Not only did police use force at the time of the protests, but government officials made sure to prosecute the main leaders of the movement. Four of them made the headlines: Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Alex Chow, and Raphael Wong. All of them faced jail time in 2018 for being involved in the protests, and they, among other incarcerated students, served as an example of what is to happen when you disagree with the NPC (Amnesty International, 2018). Thus, what seemed like a sudden outburst in the Spring of 2019, was really the result of past experiences: unheard concerns, increasing fear of losing freedoms, and worry over what the government (be it the LegCo or the police) was capable next.

1.2 The spark of the movement

The unresolved issues caused by the implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ regime led to further social unrest in 2019, as protests took over the city for months. This round of protests stemmed from a murder. In 2018, a Hong Kongese couple, Chan Tong Kai and Poon Hiu-Wing, went to Taiwan, and only one of them returned to Hong Kong. One month later, Chan confessed to murdering his girlfriend. Despite his confession, due to local legislation, it was not possible for Hong Kong authorities to charge him for murder because it happened in Taiwan. Moreover, he could not be sent for trial to Taiwan because Hong Kong and Taiwan did not have extradition agreements (BBC, 2019). Thus, in 2019, Carrie Lam (the Chief Executive at the time) proposed an extradition Bill that would allow transferring suspects to Taiwan. That same bill would allow extradition to Mainland China, where different laws apply (Mackey Frayer & Talmazan, 2019). Hence, people feared being extradited for a particular crime and then charged for actions that are not considered crimes in Hong Kong. That is, Hongkongers did not trust the transparency and fairness of the Chinese justice system (Tsoi, 2019).

In March 2019, the first protests against the extradition bill took place in front of LegCo, as members of the legal sector, human rights organizations, and opposition parties expressed concerns for the proposed bill (Fittarelli & Tsui, 2023). As the date of the second bill reading approached, protest turnout grew, and on the 11th and 12th people occupied the area outside the Legislative Council and blocked the streets to express their discontent. Police used

extreme force against the protesters, and at least 81 persons were injured that day. On the 15th, Lam announced that the extradition bill was suspended- not withdrawn. The next day, around 2 million people took over to the streets, not only in disagreement with the bill, but angry at the protest repression. Protesters claimed that the use of force proved that there was no more real political freedom guaranteed, and so they asked for five demands (Wong, 2019):

- 1) A full withdrawal of the extradition bill
- 2) A commission of inquiry into alleged police brutality
- 3) Retracting the classification of protesters as “rioters”⁸
- 4) Amnesty for arrested protesters
- 5) Dual universal suffrage in the selection of the Legislative Council and Chief Executive

Thus, what began as anti-legislation protests turned into weekly protests against the decay of Hong Kongese democracy (BBC, 2019).

1.3 Key events

In the period of ten months, the movement took different shapes and sizes, at times responding to the approach taken by the government, at times trying new ways to exert pressure on their opponents. This section gives an overview of the highlights of the movement to show how it evolved over time.

The first date to note is June 9, days before the bill was read at LegCo, with a high likelihood of being passed. Over a million people took over the streets that day, but the government affirmed it would continue with the reading of the bill on June 12. Protesters occupied the government headquarters on the 12th and police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowds (Fittarelli & Tsui, 2023). Angered by the police response, Hongkongers organized themselves via encrypted social media (e.g., telegram) to demonstrate on June 16. These were some of the first pro-democracy demonstrations that would repeat themselves for the rest of 2019, all of which shared some traits.

⁸ In Hong Kong, ‘rioting’ may be charged with up to 10 years in jail.

One particular characteristic of this movement was its leaderless nature. In the aftermath of the 2014 Umbrella movement, the blame of the unrest was mostly laid on the protest leaders. Hongkongers learned from that experience, and by not giving faces or hierarchies to the 2019 protests, it became harder for authorities to target individuals to end the movement from the top, given there was not one person at the top. Covering their faces and wearing all black, demonstrators felt safe protesting in collective anonymity, and decisions were made based on consensus. So, from June 16, and for weeks on end, protesters gathered, chanting “Fight for freedom, Stand with Hong Kong”, and calling participants to “be water”⁹ (Hale, 2019): to adapt to any given circumstance and be resilient, like water. Participants would communicate via telegram threads and follow police alerts to know where (not) to go, and where to bring support. Protests became routine: during lunch breaks businesspeople, lawyers, and other white-collar workers would take over the streets- an unusual scene for the city; on the weekends, students, families, and the elderly would come to voice their concerns. This ‘schedule’ encouraged more people to participate and allowed for business to relatively run as usual.

However, not everyone agreed with the movement’s pro-democracy claims. A sector of the population happily embraced the unification with China (many of them having personal ties to Mainland China themselves), seeing it as an opportunity for harmony and prosperity (Tsoi, 2019). In fact, in a poll conducted by Reuters in December 2019, only 17% welcomed independence from China as an alternative (Pomfret & Jim, 2019). And so, an anti-protest, pro-government side surged, which condemned any disruptive actions taken by the movement. This population divide reached a high point on July 21, when a pro-government group of people in white attacked persons that they believed to be protesters at a metro station, while police stood by without intervening. From then on, the MTR (the city’s metro system) was perceived as to be colluding with police. While on July 21 MTR personnel did not intervene, on several other occasions it would support police protest containment strategies. This event changed the narrative, as it was no longer a protest against the authorities, but at times against fellow civilians too. To make sure to put pressure on the

⁹ ‘Be water’ is a famous Bruce Lee quote that alludes to being shapeless and adaptable, like water.

right people, protesters created a system called ‘yellow economic circle’. The idea was to support businesses that claimed to be pro-democracy, and to boycott those that supported the NPC and CCP (Chinese Communist Party), such as the MTR. The city became color coded: yellow represented businesses that are pro-democracy, and blue signified ownership or support of the CCP, or Hong Kong’s police, which must be boycotted. Businessowners at the time proudly displayed their colors, and a ‘yellowbluemap’¹⁰ was drawn up and continuously updated on google maps for people to know whose economy they were supporting (Lee, 2022).

By August, actions became more obstructive. On August 9, protesters organized a mass sit-in at Hong Kong’s international airport, which lasted five days. HK airport is one of the busiest in the area, and a key part of the city’s buzzing economic activities. Protesters intended to put pressure on the government by obstructing a significant location of the city, as well as gaining international visibility. On the last days of the sit in, clashes occurred between protesters and police, and airlines opted for cancelling almost 1000 flights (Low et al., 2019). Eventually, protesters were forcibly removed from the airport, ending the sit-in, but leaving quite an impression for the international community.

As the lines were defined on who was for or against the movement, the weekly protests turned more violent. Demonstrations often involved roadblocks and targeted looting happened at times, attacking mostly MTR stations or banks known to be linked to the CCP. At the same time, police response became more coercive. One particular date is remembered by participants: August 31. As protests escalated, police began arrests and shot two ‘warning’ live rounds. The crowds scattered and took to the metro, and clashes took place at main MTR stations. The MTR suspended the service so protesters could not leave the scene and police used extreme force to contain the situation (Chan, 2019). Since that date, it became usual for the MTR system to close down stations according to protest activity to refrain protesters from a swift exit from the scene. Rumors spread that three protesters were beaten to death that day,

¹⁰ The yellow-blue map was available on social media, and constantly added new businesses to the list well after the movement died down. The google maps link was active until mid-July, 2023, when the site was taken down.

reflecting the level of distrust that people had on authorities. The government has denied any death tolls, and to date no concrete evidence has confirmed the rumors (Leung & Lok-kei, 2019). Nonetheless, the indiscriminate use of force angered protesters even more, and looting, Molotov bombs, and the destruction of MTR stations became regular by September. Due to the escalation of events, on September 4 Carrie Lam announced the official withdrawal of the extradition bill, the trigger of the protests. However, the other four demands remained unanswered, and by then protesters were already too angry at the use of police force, as well as too concerned for the future of their freedoms. The government claimed that, with the bill withdrawn, protesters had no excuse 'to continue violence', giving an end to any kind of dialogue regarding the rest of the demands. Thus, the withdrawal of the bill was seen by many as 'too little, too late' (Chen & Cheung, 2019).

Other important dates were strategically used to call for more participants, such as China's National Day, on October 1st. Although a protest ban had been imposed by then, thousands of anti-government protesters organized simultaneous rallies across the city. The idea was to make it harder for police forces to coordinate their containment. As weeks passed by, protests gained more structure and became more radical, a trait that made them lose popularity among those who opposed obstructive protest tactics. For instance, police doxing became a practice, identifying and shaming those who had attacked protesters, and ostracizing them. Despite the intensity of the movement, it seemed that they had done little to persuade authorities to concede the remaining demands. Thus, a part of the movement, largely constituted by students, decided to put even more pressure on authorities by becoming more obstructive. And so, on November 11, protesters blocked the city's main roads and disrupted the MTR system. Simultaneously, six main universities in the city were occupied, among them, the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU), While authorities (be it university professors or police) struggled to make their way to the campuses, students took over the scene and barricaded the campuses. The CHUK and PolyU occupations were particularly disruptive, mainly because of their location. CUHK is located next to the highway that connects with Mainland China, while PolyU is by the most important tunnel that connects Hong Kong Island with

the rest of the city's peninsula. Police surrounded the campuses and at night tried to come in by using force, but the students were well prepared. With stocks of Molotov bombs, umbrellas, and promptly-built brick walls, student protesters remained in their place. The occupations turned into sieges, as police cordoned the area and only left one exit for protesters to come out from. Due to fear of prosecution, CUHK students evacuated the campus after five days, with sympathizing taxis and motorbike drivers waiting for them to drive them off, as they often did when the MTR was shut down. But at PolyU they chose to stay. On November 17, police tried to come in and gave them until 10pm to surrender, whoever was to stay behind would be arrested on sight and faced rioting charges. Many tried escape routes, like scaling down with ropes or going through the sewage. 800 people were arrested that day, and 100 were believed to have remained on campus (SCMP, 2019). The siege continued for two weeks, until protesters ran out of food and allowed mediators and medics to come in. Hongkongers were divided over the occupations, as some empathized with the protesters that were trapped for days, while others considered the occupation to have gone too far.

Things calmed down in late November, as district council¹¹ elections approached, as the government threatened to cancel elections if there was unrest. District councils are not involved in the legislation of the city; however, they are the only organ of the government in which universal suffrage applies— one person, one vote. Thus, the elections were seen as an opportunity to really gauge what public opinion was like, as both sides claimed to have the city backing them up. On November 24, there was a record turnout of 70%, showing the population's interest in democratic avenues. The opposition (pro-democracy) won by a landslide, securing over 90% of the seats (Griffiths, 2019). By comparison, in 2015 the pro-democracy side had only secured over 25% of the seats (SCMP Graphics, 2019). If anything, the elections showed that pro-Beijing parties had lost their grip on the city. Such a win encouraged protesters to continue with demonstrations. Hitting the 6-month mark, on December 8 around 800,000 gathered on the streets again for a peaceful demonstration. By New Year's, what started as peaceful marches turned into barricades and clashes with police

¹¹ Hong Kong is divided in 18 districts. The district councils decide on local affairs.

once more (Time, 2020). 2020 began with unrest, and it seemed like the movement would see no end.

1.4 Government immediate response

When the protests first started, Lam's administration could not have imagined the magnitude they would reach. Hoping the issue would go away, police were sent in to swoop away protesters as soon as demonstrations grew. However, as discussed before, police use of force only angered participants. Protests were not just about the extradition bill anymore, but on making police accountable for their actions. To calm the waters, Lam first announced the suspension of the extradition bill, and eventually its withdrawal. Yet, a space for discussion on the other four demands was never opened. By recognizing the extradition bill as the only grievance, Lam stated that with the bill withdrawn, no more violence would be tolerated, referring to any further events as 'riots' with signs of 'terrorism'. On a similar note, in October 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that any attempt to divide China would end with "shattered bodies and shattered bones" (BCC, 2019). To emphasize his statement, Chinese military was deployed to the Shenzhen-Hong Kong border, awaiting further orders. Although the Chinese military is not to be active in the territory (and in fact never engaged), the imminent threat of their nearby presence brought fear and rage to protesters. Arrests (often arbitrary) for public disruption or looting, became more common as protests escalated. To make arresting more efficient, police used water cannons to mark with blue dye fleeing protesters so they could be identified in the crowds. At times, use of indiscriminate violence at the hands of police happened. Cases of police violence during detainment have emerged as well, with some amounting to torture (Amnesty International, 2019).

Due to the level of police violence, protesters' demands included asking for an independent organ to investigate police abuses. The government created an organ to investigate the cases of police abuse, but this organ was far from autonomous, and so their engagement was not taken seriously by movement sympathizers. The 'Independent Police Complaints Council' (IPCC) is comprised of members directly appointed by the Chief Executive to "observe, monitor and review the handling and investigation of Reportable Complaints against the

Police” (IPCC, 2023). Besides issues with its autonomy, the IPCC has been criticized for not having any real investigative powers (Marlow, 2020). Instead of providing a path to accountability, the Special Tactic Squad, a section of the police, was ordered not to wear their ID tags, allowing arbitrary arrests and abuse of force to happen in anonymity (Purbrick, 2019; Tsoi, 2019). Another containment tactic used by the government was to ban actions that were recurrently part of the movement. For instance, permissions for all kinds of public gatherings (e.g., religious) were denied, criminalizing the meetings and rallies. Furthermore, in October, in an attempt to identify protesters better, a mask ban was introduced. No one was allowed to cover their faces at public assemblies anymore, or they would risk detention. Yet, by November that year the supreme court ruled this ban unconstitutional. In short, the government's stance towards the movement was to contain it and repress it, asserting that the remaining demands were not subject to negotiation.

1.5 Conclusion & aftermath

Public demonstrations only came to a halt at the end of January 2020, when the first case of COVID-19 was reported in the city. The coronavirus outbreak reminded the city of the deadly 2003 SARS pandemic, and Hongkongers quickly took to isolation. Small rallies still took place, many mostly in disagreement with the government’s handling of the epidemic. Yet, links have been found between the anti-government protests and anti-COVID measure protests. For instance, it took several weeks before the Shenzhen-Hong Kong border was officially closed, only after the healthcare service protested for it, asking for seriousness in the matter. Governmental decisions over the pandemic were closely observed, as the past year had made Hongkongers weary of public officials (McLaughlin, 2020).

To give closure to the chain of events, the IPCC issued their final report in May 2020. After analyzing all the cases of alleged police violence brought forward to the IPCC, the organ released a report that largely exonerated police from any wrongdoings. The report states that any use of force was done as a response to protesters’ violent actions. The paper calls for a reassessment of the toxicity levels of tear gas permitted, and better communication training for police so crowd control can happen without much escalation. In response to the lack of

police involvement in the July 21st mob attack, the report acknowledged deficiencies from the police department, but lacked owning responsibility. No accountability was taken regarding the August 31st police clash at the MTR, simply claiming that there should have been better communication with the fire department to ensure speedily medical attention. The report puts all the blame on protesters for instigating police in the first place and brought little sense of accountability to the people (Marlow, 2020).

With everyone forced to stay inside, the police quickly arrested anyone known to be involved. What is more, knowing people could not organize themselves as before, a National Security Law was passed in June 2020. The details of the law were kept secret until after its approval. The law criminalizes any act of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces (Tsoi & Lam, 2022). Beijing would have power over the law's interpretation, and if the law clashes with Hong Kongese law, Chinese law takes precedence. Anyone suspected of breaking the law may be subject to wiretapping and surveillance, and the law is also applicable to non-residents. Furthermore, the law allows the Chief Executive to appoint the judges that oversee National security cases, raising fears about judicial autonomy. Last but not least, the law allows for some 'serious' cases to be sent and tried in Mainland China. That is, un-transparent extradition possibilities that were feared in early 2019 are now a reality. The one concession that had been granted thanks to the protests was now revoked. Hundreds of protestors, activists, journalists, and former opposition lawmakers have been arrested since the law came into force (Tsoi & Lam, 2022). Many participants and sympathizers have gone on exile abroad, mainly to Taiwan, Australia, Canada, and the UK. But that has not stopped the local government from following up with their cases. For instance, a boat with 12 protesters shipping towards Taiwan was stopped by the coast guard. The protesters were held in an unknown location and eventually were charged under the new security law. An SCMP's analysis of the arrests done from 2020 to 2023 show that "so far, all cases brought before the courts have involved non-jury trials, as provided for in the law, and the conviction rate has been 100 per cent" (Wong, 2023). The Hong Kong administration has gone as far as offering bounties for eight prominent pro-democracy activists that continue their activities from abroad. The bounties, offered early July 2023, are set at "HK\$1 million

(US\$127,750) for information leading to each arrest of the eight – an amount higher than what authorities had previously set for murderers and rapists” (Wong, 2023). These bounties show the willingness of the administration to squander the movement once and for all, as well as to show the citizens the severity of going against the government.

2. Case study 2: Chile’s ‘Estallido Social’

In October 2019, the Chilean society erupted, or so the title ‘Estallido social’ suggests. The 30CLP (0.4\$) increase on the price of metro tickets was not well received, and students organized themselves to oppose it. Police tried to quickly kill the movement by using force, a strategy that backfired. People from all sectors of society took to the streets not only to show solidarity towards the student protesters, but to take the opportunity to remind the government of all kinds of unaddressed injustices. Indeed, the movement was a social outburst in that peoples – students, workers, the elderly, indigenous groups – were too fed up with the government to take it.

Chile struggles with high levels of socioeconomic inequality, which is negatively reflected in various aspects of society: unequal access to quality education, healthcare, or affordable daily mobility. While elites can easily enjoy social services, the lower tier of society struggles to get by. Hence why the rise of metro tickets angered many. While low-income working families already spend around 11.3% of their income in metro transport (Cádiz, 2019), elites do not even use the service, opting for private means of transportation. The public transport increase only highlighted the different realities experienced in the country. A higher transportation fare was the last straw for too many Chileans. What started as an economic boycott against the public transport system, turned into weeks of demonstrations and barricaded assemblies. Each protester demanded a different claim, yet they all agreed that it was high time the government listened to their constituents.

2.1 Background

The current Chilean constitution was drafted and enacted in 1980, under Augusto Pinochet’s military regime. Although the constitution has been reformed over twenty times since it was

first drafted, it is still considered to carry the legacy of Pinochet's dictatorship (BCN, 2023). An example of this is the privatization of several basic services, such as water and electricity, which was one of Pinochet's constitutional pillars. The constitution establishes a 'Subsidiary state', meaning the state does not provide direct social services, like health, education, or social security, but instead only monitors how private entities provide them (BBC, 2021). By 2019, the socioeconomic disparities exacerbated by this neoliberalist approach led to mass street demonstrations.

But the 2019 social unrest was not the first instance in which these concerns were voiced. In different instances in 2006, 2011, and earlier in 2019 students had also taken to the streets to demand a betterment of social welfare. The 'penguin revolution'¹² took over Santiago in 2006, when more than a million students went on strike to demand better quality public education, turning into the largest strike in Chile's history by then. The gap between public and private schools was tangible in that only 50% of public-school students were accepted in colleges, while private schools enjoyed over 90% acceptance rate. Student protesters, whose average age was 16, also demanded "free use of public transport, lower fees for college entrance exams and a voice in government policy" (Franklin, 2006). The student strikes moved older Chileans, who sympathized with the cause and thought it was high time the educational gap across social tiers was closed. Schools were closed for several days, and police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse crowds. After weeks of protests, however, the government agreed to sit down with protesters and find suitable solutions. The government created a Presidential Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education, inviting main actors and experts of the education system to propose reforms. This resulted in a new General Law of Education, promulgated in 2009 (Donoso, 2013). While the results of the education reforms are still contested, this protest was a breakthrough in Chilean social movements, displaying how far a strike can go in advancing policymaking.

In 2011, students rose up again, this time at universities. As many had taken part in the penguin revolution, protesters this time around protested due to a delay in the scholarships distribution. Demonstrations turned into a national strike demanding better quality public

¹² The title of the protests makes allusion to the students' uniforms.

education for all. By 2011 the government only financed 25% of the public schools' budget, and the rest had to be covered with student quotas, meaning that education was not free or accessible for everyone. Reforms to leave Pinochet's educational system behind were demanded, and marches of up to 1 million people took over the country. Due to the lack of results that followed the 2006 protest negotiations, this time protesters were reluctant to negotiate with anyone from the 'traditional political class'. Hence, Donoso (2013) explains, "the student movement demanded not only public, free and high-quality education, but also a new political constitution that allows for more citizen participation". That is, already in 2011 eyes were set on the issues that Pinochet constitution brought: a neoliberal regime that inhibited the maturity of a welfare state, as well as the lack of possibilities for citizen participation and dialogue with authorities.

One last protest worth mentioning is the one against the Aula Segura policy in 2019. The law 'aula segura', or 'safe classroom' in English, "allowed high school authorities to expel students accused of carrying concealed weapons and participating in school occupations and protests where violence occurred" (Palacios-Valladares, 2020). Forcibly prohibiting students from organizing themselves, this law was widely rejected and as explained by Palacios-Valladares (2020), it "provoked fierce student-police confrontations several months before October, leading to numerous student expulsions and some criminal prosecutions of activists". This recent history of protests, alongside the feminist and LGBTQ+ movements that gained several concessions in 2018, laid the groundwork to the Estallido social. Not only did they give Chileans a chance to test different protest tactics or showed young students how to battle against police, but it also gave them hope (Palacios-Valladares, 2020). It proved to them that policymaking did not have to be left to politicians to figure out, but that their voice could (and should) be accounted for.

2.1 The spark of the movement

As discussed above, turmoil on the streets had already become the alternative option for the youth to voice their concerns. When the public transport fare rise was announced, high school students saw it as yet another proof that government action was only widening the inequality gap. Students had been protesting for better welfare and social services for years

now, and this was not the exception. On October 6th, 2019, high school students in Santiago called citizens to ‘evade’ and not pay metro tickets (Márquez et al., 2021). For days, students and sympathizers jumped the metro turnstiles, rejecting the new fares and screaming “Evadir, no pagar, otra forma de luchar” (Evade, don’t pay, another way of fighting) (Gómez Aguilera, 2020). As protests arose around metro stations, so did police repression. Violent clashes between students and police lead to the government’s closure of some metro stations. This, in turn, angered more people, and a wider range of protesters seized metro stations across the city. The government then decided to close down the entire metro system. Resentment grew and students called for massive protests on October 18, when as Arias-Loyala (2021) puts it, the population “awoke”, and thousands took over the streets to join the students’ cause.

Although it was the ticket price increase and the subsequent ‘Evade’ movement that sparked weeks of unrest in the capital, it would be simplistic to assume that was the only cause. Behind anger towards the new fare laid 30 years of socioeconomic inequality. Palacios-Valladares (2020) argues that:

economic growth has occurred against a backdrop of significant inequality and economic segregation, as well as the increasing precariousness of middle-class status (a result of flat wages, expensive access to basic services, and high levels of indebtedness). Second, citizens perceive the elites who control Chile’s major economic and political institutions to be self-serving, abusive, greedy, and out of touch.

Indeed, discontent against the institutionalized unequal access to opportunities had been building up for years. Furthermore, a UNDP report on the protests maintains that “it is not just that economic circumstances trigger unrest, but that perceptions of unfair treatment and a lack of opportunity and social immobility exacerbate societal tensions” (Brannen et al., 2020). That is, it was not so much the reinforced inequality that triggered the social outburst, but rather the perception of such existing inequalities and the creation of a frame that blamed the political class and institutions for the faults in the system.

2.2 Key events

No son 30 pesos, son 30 años, or rather “it is not 30 pesos, but 30 years” was shouted over the streets since early October. 30 years had passed since Pinochet’s regime had ended,

“30 years since the promise of democracy and a dignified life was betrayed due to the forced deepening of neoliberalism and its violent malaises” (Arias-Loyola, 2021). The anger that the fare rise brought was fueled in response to the rhetoric the government used to address the ‘evade’ movement. Upon the rise of backlash against the fare increase, the minister of economy invited users to ‘wake up at dawn’ to catch the metro at an hour when the price is lower. This narrative only showed a lack of understanding and empathy towards the average citizen. As if speaking from privilege, the minister stressed how it was up to metro users to organize their finances and themselves, rather than the government’s responsibility to ensure an accessible service (Márquez et al., 2021). It was remarks of the like that shaped the protest. As the public transport protests turned into a larger movement against institutionalized inequality, everyone that joined the streets on October 18 brought forward a different grievance. Banners on the streets called for all kinds of reforms: better health services, quality education, affordable transportation, gender equality, poverty alleviation, etc. What brought them all together was the sense that the government owed them a dignified treatment- what Chileans felt to be lacking in their lives was dignity. The movement was hence appointed as a ‘social outburst’ because it demanded a change in several aspects of society in which dignity had been left aside (Márquez, et al., 2021).

On that day, alongside the peaceful demonstrations and pot banging, conflict escalated, as radical protesters built barricades and resorted to arson (Palacios-Valladares, 2020). Trying to bring the protests to a halt, president Piñera declared a State of Constitutional Exception on 19 October, bringing military to the streets for the first time since the dictatorship. The 15-day emergency state brought heavy restrictions on urban mobility, including a curfew (Arias-Loyola, 2021; Palacios-Valladares, 2020). The military deployment only escalated the situation, as angry protesters screamed “they took everything, even our fear” and confronted police and soldiers, sometimes violently. Protesters defied the instated curfew and continued demonstrating, daily at first, taking over Santiago’s square Plaza de Italia – renamed Plaza de la dignidad (or dignity square) by protesters. Violence escalated and by the first week of daily protests 18 casualties had already been reported (Bunyan, 2019). Parallely to the escalation on the streets, the social movement began taking shape as territorial assemblies sprung out across the city and the country. Neighbors started to meet

up on a regular basis, creating a space for citizens to discuss their grievances. Realizing that individual concerns converged, assemblies were used to “develop strategies to deal with food shortages and violence, to organize protests against the state, and to start working toward a citizen-led constituent convention” (Palacios-Valladares, 2020). Everyone was welcome to these assemblies, and decisions were made through democratic voting. This process happened independently from political parties, as the traditional political party structure was seen as part of the problem. Party leaders were shamed and denied public participation in the movement (Palacios-Valladares, 2020). Eventually, assemblies began coordinating across each other, creating larger representation groups, such as the Mesa de Unidad Social (Social Unity Table). Decisions voted for at territorial assemblies were passed to the larger groups, where voting would occur again to determine the protests’ new course of action. It was through the Mesa de Unidad Social that the national march on October 25 was organized.

After days of simultaneous peaceful and violent protest actions, the president declared on the 21st: “we are at war against a powerful enemy” (Arias-Loyola, 2021). Echoing Pinochet’s rhetoric and opening a collective wound, Piñera’s war declaration against his own constituents was taken personal by many Chileans. The speech highlighted the perceived divide between the ruling elite (the *we* in *we are at war*) and the neglected population (the *enemy*). So, when the Mesa de Unidad Social called for a national march on the 25th, over a million people showed up on the streets only in Santiago, a sixth of the city’s population (Sherwood & Miranda, 2019). Demonstrators waved national flags, danced, banged pots, and bore placards that urged for social and political change (The Guardian, 2019). Protests emerged in other parts of the country as well. Truck and taxi drivers blocked highways in protest against the rise of highway tolls, which already made up for a significant part of their expenses. Meanwhile, in Valparaíso, protesters try to force their entry to Chile’s congress, calling for more dignified legislature (The Guardian, 2019). As protests continued, so did acts of violence, as masked individuals looted and raided stores and committed arson, oftentimes not fully in act of protest, but rather taking advantage of the chaos of the situation. These actions delegitimized the movement, as well as demanded a quicker response from the government.

By then, some assemblies had realized that most of the various claims could all be traced back to lack of proper representation in government or outdated legislation, both of which resulted from the 1980 constitution. On 10 November, Piñera announced that a new constitution would be drafted, hoping to calm down the waters. A plebiscite was scheduled to take place April 2020, when Chileans could vote whether they approved the new draft of the constitution or not. Yet, the announcement was not as well received as expected. For one, not everyone agreed that starting a constitution from scratch was the best alternative. Moreover, a lot of the discontent of the people stemmed from a lack of trust on the current legislative system and political representatives, who they did not consider fully represented the current Chilean society. Thus, on 12 November, the Mesa de Unidad Social called for a general strike. The strike demanded that the rewriting of the Constitution was conducted by a Constituent Assembly instead of the current legislative congress, to ensure a more open and participative drafting (Cué, 2019). Given the unclarity of what the promise of a new constitution implied, protests continued on a weekly basis. As expressed by Taub (2019),

In the chaos [protesters] see a settling of scores. The promise that political leaders from both the left and right wings have made for decades –that the free market would lead to prosperity and that said prosperity will take care of other problems– has not been fulfilled.¹³

Demonstrations took place every Friday at the Plaza de la Dignidad, where the square would be occupied for a few hours, often barricading the place. As it had been the case thus far, the protests were organized via social media, a platform for everyone to share their thoughts and to get a consensual sense of the direction of the movement (Taub, 2019). Protesters organized themselves in brigades, some taking turns to be at the ‘front lines’, others acting as first aiders working around the clock to take care of the wounded. Protests went on steadily until December, adding ‘justice’ and ‘end of police brutality’ to the long list of claims. Police and military regularly used pellets and water cannons to disperse crowds, angering the population. With many injured and the death toll rising to 23 by end of November, people

¹³ Translation by the author.

continued going to the streets until the beginning of summer, despite the many promises of change by the authorities (Urrejola, 2019).

2.3 Government immediate response

As expected by many Chileans, from the early days of ‘evade’ police was already sent out to deal with the problem. Riot police, or ‘pacos’ as they are more commonly known in Chile, crashed with high school students and arrested many in the hopes to squander the protests. Police excessive violence against minors, just like in Hong Kong, was not well perceived by the population. Instead of scaring off the crowds, such reaction only proved to Chileans that the government was not interested in listening.

In a tit-for-tat fashion, when daily protests blew up, Piñera’s administration escalated the situation even more by declaring the emergency state. With the military now involved, the violence of the protest repression became severe, as it criminalized the act of protesting.

According to Palacios-Valladares’ figures (2020):

Between October and December of 2019 alone, tens of thousands of protesters, including 4,080 minors, were arrested. More than 3,000 civilians were injured (405 lost their eyes to rubber bullets, and 253 suffered burning due to aggressive tear gas), and four civilians died as a result of excessive police force. During the same period, the Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (INDH) filed 770 torture and 158 sexual violence lawsuits.

Some of the rallies explicitly addressed police brutality, such as the ones organized to ask for justice for Gustavo Gatica, a photographer that was shot with pellets in both eyes, rendering him blind. The INDH (Chile’s NHRI), the Interamerican Human Rights Court, and Amnesty International, among other human rights institutions, condemned the excessive use of force against civilians (Urrejola, 2019).

Seeing that mitigating by use of force would not work, Piñera opted to grant certain concessions. After angering the crowds with his ‘we are at war’ remark on 20 October, three days later he apologized for his statement and vouched to make reforms on certain social welfare areas such as pension, health insurance, a standardized minimum wage, term limits and salary reductions for elected officials, and better support for small businesses (Buyan, 2019; Palacios-Valladares, 2020). But as already mentioned above, the distrust in the administration was such that these promises did not reassure protesters. As days went by, the government looked for other options for reconciliation and invited opposition parties to

discuss the possibility of rewriting the constitution. On 15 November, the government and opposition agreed to proceed with the process of a new constitution, by announcing that a plebiscite would be held on 26 April 2020, when citizens could vote on for or against drafting a new constitution (Palacios-Valladares, 2020).

While the proposition of a plebiscite showed the willingness of the government to address the claims and put an end to the movement, it had its shortcomings. Firstly, while many of the protesters perceived that the problems stemmed from the constitution, not everyone agreed that redrafting it completely was the most efficient solution. Aware of the lengthiness of a constitution-drafting process, many considered that reforms in certain sectors needed to be made soon, and reforming certain laws could be a faster route. More importantly, protesters did not trust that the current congress members fully represented Chileans or had their best interests at heart (Cué, 2019). Thus, they feared that the new constitution would bring a different version of the same problems. The government eventually agreed to also consult on the plebiscite if citizens wanted congress or a citizen-built constituent assembly to draft the new constitution. Secondly, the plebiscite proposal addressed the socioeconomic claims of the protest, but failed to address other claims, such as justice over police brutality. However, the proposition was already perceived by the government as the ultimate and final concession they could grant. That is, with a new constitution on the horizon, there were no more legitimate reasons for protests to go on, thus criminalizing those who continued to protest. For instance, some laws were implemented to allow the government to squander the protests, which had also been plagued by unworthy actions of looting and arson. An anti-looting law was passed, as well as increased penalties for protestors that covered their faces or targeted the 'pacos'. Resources were allocated for surveillance and prosecution (Palacios-Valladares, 2020). Arrests and protest mitigation tactics went on until 2020, when the protests came to an effective halt due to the pandemic.

2.4 Conclusion and aftermath

The lively weekly protests that took over the city during late 2019 started to fade out as Summer arrived. Due to protest fatigue, and the long-awaited summer break, smaller action

took place by the end of December and January 2020. However, Santiago citizens seemed to be in agreement that this fade out was only a pause. By February, as life returned to the city, so did the protests. The demonstrations were exacerbated once more in response to the killing of a man by police in a hit and run (HRW, 2021). The movement continued on, delegitimized now and again by delinquents that profited from a messy environment and stretched-out police to loot stores. Big turnout protests happened on March 8th, linking the estallido social to the annual feminist march, and the 11th, marking Piñera's two-year anniversary in office (Reuters, 2020).

However, protests came to a decisive halt on March 13th, when the coronavirus spread posed a larger threat to Chilean health. The government forbode public gatherings and, as the situation worsened, opted for delaying the plebiscite voting from April to the 25 October, 2020. The pandemic only exacerbated the already severe inequalities that citizens were protesting for. While some could continue to work or study from home, others lost their sources of income, and largely depended on the fragile public health institutions. Those in the lower tier went on with protests in April, uncertain whether the promised plebiscite would take place (Paúl, 2020). Yet, it can be said that lockdown times pushed most of the population to wait for the results of the October plebiscite, hoping a new constitution could change things.

When October 25th arrived, the plebiscite for the new constitution made history. Chileans that went to vote had to answer two questions: 1. Do you want a new constitution, and 2. What type of convention should draft the new constitution? There were two types of conventions to choose from:

a mixed constitutional convention made up of 172 members, of which one half would be members of Congress selected in a parliamentary plenary session and the other half citizens directly elected by the people, or a constituent constitutional convention composed solely of 155 directly elected citizens (Seminario & Neaher, 2020).

In total, 51% of the Chilean population went to vote, out of which 78,28% voted yes for a new constitution. The plebiscite also showed the public interest in having the new constitution drafted by a constitutional convention (Márquez et al., 2021). The real possibility for a new constitution brought hope to Chileans, who were fed up with the

socioeconomic crisis brought by the pandemic. Citizens would have the chance to vote again on whether they approved the new draft or not. The new draft of the constitution was presented in July 2022, and on September 4 another plebiscite was scheduled to approve or reject the draft. With only 38% approval rate, the draft was rejected by the population, and a new drafting committee had to be drawn up (Quintana Barney, 2022). In December 2022 it was decided that the new constitutional committee would be conformed by 24 experts designated by the congress, and 50 elected representatives. The new draft will be proposed on the 21 October 2023, and the ratifying plebiscite will take place 26 November 2023 (González, 2022). Thus, Chile still has a long way to go before these legal amendments have an impact on the daily life of Chileans.

While it still remains to be seen whether the incoming constitution will effectively alleviate the socioeconomic inequalities or ameliorate the trust in political institutions, the fact remains that the Estallido Social shook the country enough to push for an entirely new constitution. Indeed, these demonstrations prove that social movements can influence policies and politics.

IV. Analysis

1. On the analysis

As mentioned in the introduction, this qualitative research addressed the following question: *What factors determine the success of a protest?* More specifically, we want to know whether WUNC components (the agentic factors) can stir the impact of a movement, regardless of contextual barriers. Thus, based on the theoretical framework, the question is broken down into two parts:

1. To what extent are the WUNC components determinant of a protest's success?
2. To what extent is the context determinant of a protest's success?

Based on the theory, evidence of political opportunity must be present in the Chilean case and lacking in Hong Kong. Besides, WUNC components are expected to be significantly portrayed by protesters in both cases, yet more effectively applied in Chile. Many similarities can be found across the main traits of these movements, so preliminary examination points to the fact that it was the contextual obstacles that hindered Hongkongers from achieving their goals. Through this research it is intended to find out whether the movement could have acted differently to achieve substantial results, as well as to learn from Chilean choices along the way.

Data was collected from two nationwide newspapers: the South China Morning Post, reporting on the Hong Kong movement, and La Tercera, which followed the protests in Chile. These newspapers were selected for being similar in reach, for adhering to neutrality, and for their extensive follow up on the protests' events. Tilly's (1998) framework argues that it is not the actual level of WUNCness, but rather the general perception of the components what really influences the strength of the movement. Hence, media articles were used as an instrument to gauge the general perceptions of the protests. In total, 50 articles per case study were used for the analysis. The articles were selected through a google advanced search and screened to ensure that they were topic-relevant to the research. They were selected in order of appearance of the search results, alluding to the salience and relevance of the first fifty articles that are at hand on the matter. For the first case study, the following search was done:

protest + Hong Kong + number range 2019-2020. The results were limited to the site www.scmp.com and published between March 1st, 2019, the month the protests started, and March, 1st, 2021. For the second case study, the following search was conducted in Spanish: protesta + estallido social + number range 2019-2020. Results were limited to the site www.latercera.com, published between October 6th, 2019, when *Evade* began, and October 6th, 2021. A two-year publication range was given as oftentimes anniversary articles are published, giving an overview of the whole movement or reflecting on the aftermath of the events.

To analyze if the WUNC factors were present, two steps were followed:

- 1) Sharp's (1973) list of non-violent forms of protest action have been used as reference of a repertoire of actions that display WUNC. A selection of these actions has been made, and each selected action will be paired with the WUNC factors that it most displays.
- 2) The pre-selected actions will be used as codes to search for in the newspaper articles in order to evaluate whether and how these WUNC displays were employed at the key events.

Gene Sharp put together a non-exhaustive list of 198 non-violent types of action that activists can employ to put pressure on their opponents (1973). I have made a selection of 23 relevant actions to be used as search tags for this qualitative research. Linking Sharp's list to Tilly's understanding of 'repertoire of political actions', I have come up with the following table to showcase how each of these actions works as a display of one or two of the WUNC factors.

Table 1: protest methods in relation to WUNC factors

Method	Explanation	Code words	Factor 1	Factor 2
Group or mass petitions	Addressed to the opponent but may have indirect influence on wider public. Shows unity in that signing means you agree with the stated demand.	petition, signature	N	U
Slogans, caricatures & symbols	images that "foster the spirit of resistance"	slogan, caricature, meme, symbol, icon	U	U
Banners, posters, displayed communication	Announces, shows presence. Persuades by appealing to emotion and/or logic. It can be emotive, contain facts, or tell a novel narrative. It supports the frame alignment of the protest.	banner, poster, sign	U	W
Leaflets, pamphlets and books	Key in frame alignment.	leaflet, pamphlet, book, flyer	W	U
Newspapers and Journals	To inform of advancements of the movement without bias from the government	newspaper, journal, mass media	U	W
Group lobbying	assembly representatives at negotiations with the government. Showing unity in an organized way also portrays commitment to the cause	lobbying, negotiation	U	C
Displays of flags and symbolic colors	emotive, shows united front	flag, uniform, outfit, color	U	U
Paint as protest	appeals to the emotions	paint, drawing, mural	W	W
Performance	Using performing arts, such as acting and dancing, to convey the protest demands to the audience, appealing to emotions	Performance, dance	W	W
New street signs and names	Claiming back a place or a narrative	street sign, street name	W	U
Taint officials	to mock and insult officials (including police). It taps into shame. It shows commitment in that people are willing to challenge officials, putting themselves in a vulnerable position.	mock, taint, insult	C	C
Singing	Emotive for the actors, brings them together.	sing, song, chant, hymn	U	W
Marches	group of actionists marching from or towards a significant location	march, demonstration	N	U
Assemblies of protest	group of actionists meet up at a significant location	assembly, group, rally	N	U
Protest meetings	Rallies. Space for protesters to organize themselves	meeting, rally	C	U
strike	When members of an institution (office, school, etc.) agree on stopping activities in gesture of protest	strike	C	U
social boycott (ostracism)	Refusal to continue usual social relations with someone. To induce particular persons to refrain from/cease special collaborations or services to the opponent group.	boycott, ostracism, doxxing	C	C
Consumers' boycott	refusal to purchase certain goods or services: a) the price is seen as too high; b) the item is not available to everyone on equal terms; c) symbolic act to express a wider grievance with the status quo; d) objection to the use of the profits; e) political differences. The worthiness of the act can be argued, as economic boycott can become unworthy, while economic support is a worthy tactic.	boycott, economic boycott, economic support	C	W
Sit-in	on a road, on the ground. Refusal to leave.	sit-in, occupy	C	C

psych intervention: self-exposure to elements/destruction of own property/ disrobing/fasting	self-retribution involves putting psychological, moral, or emotional pressure on others to induce them to change their attitudes or to take certain action, by voluntarily taking discomfort, humiliation, penalties, or suffering upon oneself. Tilly talks about protesters showing commitment while remaining outside despite unfavorable conditions (e.g., bad weather).	exposure to elements, bad weather, fasting, humiliation, obstacles, discomfort	C	C
nonviolent occupation	linked to a nonviolent raid. To remain in a symbolic place after claiming its possession. may involve technical trespass/violation of other laws. e.g., occupying universities	possession, raid, occupy, occupation, trespass	C	C
Alternative social institutions	when their creation and growth challenges previous institutions, the new ones constitute nonviolent intervention. e.g., providing institutional implementation of the actionists' principles, increasing the effectiveness of other methods of nonviolent action.	organization, groups, support group, coordination	C	U
alternative communication system	disrupt the regime's control/monopoly over the communication of information and ideas. e.g., use of telegram or other forms of encrypted social media/organization through fb groups	communication, social media, information, encrypted	U	U

As shown in Table 1, codes have been created based on Sharp's methods to analyze the WUNCness of the movement displayed on the articles. Given that Sharp considers violence to be detrimental to a social movement, the code 'Unworthy' has been drawn up to tag any evidence of violent/unworthy behavior in the hands of protesters. To complete the analysis, codes have also been created to assess the prevalence of contextual obstacles such as the tactics used by the opponent to mitigate the protests or the lack of political opportunity. These codes are further explained in Table 2.

Table 2: Codes related to Contextual factors

Contextual factor	Explanation
(Lack of) political opportunity	The extent to which the protesters and/or demands are well received by the current government. Depends on the government's willingness to recognize the legitimacy and urgency of the claims.
(No) space for negotiation	Closely related to political opportunity, refers to whether the demands raised are open for discussion or not.
Government's capabilities for crackdown	Range of tools and powers that the government is capable of using to put a halt to the protests e.g., activating a State of emergency
Protest crackdown	The measures used to stop protesters, e.g., police force, arrests.
Change of narratives	To alter the protesters' narrative in the government's benefit
Citizens' costs	Refers to all the costs that citizens have to endure due to the movement, and the protest fatigue that may come with it. e.g., economic recession, property damage, disruptions.
COVID-19	Obstacles caused by the pandemic and pandemic restrictions. e.g., prohibition of public gatherings

The 100 selected articles have been coded and analyzed on Atlas.ti, a coding software to conduct qualitative research. In the following section the codes found have been dissected and compared to understand to what extent the context or the agency dictated the results of these protest movements.

2. Case study 1: Key findings and WUNC framework


After conducting the qualitative analysis of the 50 selected SCMP articles, 560 code tags were made. The most recurrent code tags found were: 44 ‘protest crackdown’, 34 ‘unworthy’, 23 ‘economic boycott’, 20 ‘citizens’ costs’, 17 ‘social media’, and 15 ‘march’. These preliminary findings already show the salience of contextual obstacles, which will be discussed further below. This list also captures what appear to be the three main pillars of the movement tactics: social media as an alternative communication institution, economic boycott as a noncooperation tactic to exert pressure, and the fluid marches and road occupations that took over the streets for months. Each of these pillars showcases different levels and sides of WUNCness.

Theory argues that the degree of WUNCness may fluctuate over time. To get an overview of how WUNC was displayed throughout the length of the protests, Table 3 and Graph 1 show WUNC over time. The articles found were grouped per month of publication. Given that the movement mostly came to a halt in January, the remaining articles found that were written in 2020 are grouped together.

Table 3: Codes found per WUNC factor over time

Component	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	2020	total
Worthiness	13	0	8	4	7	3	2	6	4	47
Unity	47	2	26	11	12	9	11	5	14	137
Numbers	20	1	5	1	4	4	8	2	4	49
Commitment	22	5	14	11	14	10	9	7	13	105
Total	102	8	53	27	37	26	30	20	35	338

Figure 1: Codes found per WUNC factor over time



Firstly, the table showcases that unity and commitment were the most prominent factors in the protest. At first glance, we can also observe on Table 1 that in comparison to other months, Numbers were particularly relevant in June, when the marches first gained considerable strength. Another first note is the sharp decrease in codes in July. This may be due to the fact that the sample does not include an even number of articles published per month, as the articles were chosen randomly. To account for the disparities of code tags per month, Table 4 shows, in percentage, the proportion of codes that each WUNC factor had per month. That is, in August, 49% of the codes found on protest tactics referred to Unity, and only 15% of the codes signaled Worthiness. Based on this table, we can see that although the ratio of prevalence of each factor varies per month, the relationship remains similar through time. Namely, Unity and Commitment were the most prominent factors, followed by Worthiness. It was expected that the proportion of ‘Numbers’ would be lower since there are few codes related to this factor (see Table 1). Yet, the relatively small presence of ‘numbers’ in the article does not necessarily indicate that the factor played a smaller role in the chain of events.

Table 4: Ratio of code tags of WUNC factor per month (%)

Component	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	2020	Total
Worthiness	12.7	0	15	15	19	12	6.7	30	11.4	13.9
Unity	46.1	25	49	41	32	35	37	25	40	40.5
Numbers	19.6	13	9.4	3.7	11	15	27	10	11.4	14.5
Commitment	21.6	63	26	41	38	38	30	35	37.1	31.1

There are some points worth noting, such as the lack of ‘Worthiness’ tags in July, a month in which Commitment peaked and accounted for 63% of the tags. While in June significant attention was given the large number of people drawn to the streets, by July the emphasis was not anymore on calling more people to join, but rather showing the authorities that the present group is united, and more importantly, committed for the long haul. Article #18 reads: “A squad of radical protesters fancying themselves as martyrs, willing to die to draw global attention to their cause, led the violent siege of Hong Kong’s legislature”. Lastly, we can see that Unity does fluctuate over time, peaking in August. By then, the rhythm of the demonstrations was already established, protesters knew exactly what to do and how to look: as “hard-hatted, goggled, face-masked, black-clad Hongkongers” (Art. #13).

To delve deeper into the findings, this section is first divided per WUNC factor in order to assess their relevance in the movement. The role of social media will be discussed in the ‘unity’ section, while the magnitude of the marches will be mostly addressed in ‘numbers’. Finally, given the controversy the economic boycott brought, a special section on ‘economic boycott and unworthy behavior’ will cover these findings.

2.1 Worthiness

The worthiness of the Hong Kong protests has been oftentimes contested by authorities, fellow citizens, and observers from abroad. The failure of the 2014 “Occupy” movement has been attributed largely to the fatigue of inhabitants whose lives and businesses were harmed by the occupation of a significant crossroads for 79 days. The level of disruption deemed the movement illegitimate, ‘unworthy’, and the government had no more impediments to forcibly remove the protesters. As highlighted in article #25: “protesters had learned the lessons from 2014 when ordinary people grew angry with them for causing great

inconvenience. This time, the protesters knew when to retreat and advance, hardly overstaying their welcome at each location”. Indeed, most protesters saw the importance of acting worthy in order to have a moral ground to stand on when demanding the government to do better. Article #34 quotes a post made in a protest forum: “We have to minimise impacts on ordinary people to avoid losing the battle of public opinion”. Thus, part of their ‘Be water’ strategy was to be fluid and adapt to the circumstances, knowing when not to cross a line. During the first weeks of the protests, worthiness was in the protesters’ mouths, asking fellow radical protesters to stand back and ensure to remain on the righteous side of the narrative.

Besides online statements of restraint, worthiness was displayed by the movement through different methods. Coding shows that the two most prominent methods used were *slogans, caricatures & symbols*, and *banners, posters, and displayed communication*. Both methods were widely used during the weekly street demonstrations, but also on the recurrent ‘Lennon walls’ that popped up over the city. These ‘walls’ are displays made of post-its and stickers, with different demands, phrases, and facts displayed for everyone to read. Leaflets were also used to spread information, but most of the information dissemination was done digitally, such as through social media or even transmitting images to people around via iPhone’s Airdrop feature (Art. #13). The recurrent displayed communication was mostly used to emphasize the demands of the protesters, to tell their side of the story. Indeed, to narrate the worthiness of their claims. Article #13 tells us how a whole group of participants dedicated themselves to creating visuals to be used in future demonstrations: memes, posters, infographics.

Another significant display of worthiness used was *singing*. The song ‘Glory to Hong Kong’ became a sort of “de facto national anthem” for protesters (Art. #4). Singing the anthem became a way of showing support for those who could not join the front lines. It was a dignified, non-disruptive way of demonstrating interest in the movement. One last relevant display of worthiness present was ‘economic support’. This tactic was part of the ‘yellow economic circle’ strategy, stemming from the growing social divide between those who agree or disagree with the movement. Economic support consisted of engaging with those businesses who supported or were involved with the cause. Worthy in that the sole intention

of the action is to activate the local economy, the yellow economic circle also opened a safe haven for protesters in 2020, when the protest crackdown strengthened, and arrests became routine. For instance, article #7 goes over vocational trainings offered by a ‘yellow’ business to:

help young people affected by the ongoing social unrest to equip themselves with skills and become financially independent [...] Because of this unrest, many young people have become jobless, penniless, 'school-less' or even homeless, as some have even been evicted by their families. I want to make them feel that they can still find hope in their lives.

What these last two WUNC displays have in common is that they do are not only worthy forms of protest, but they also strengthen and showcase *unity*.

2.2 Unity

The preliminary tables 3 & 4 show just how relevant unity was for the Hong Kong movement. Already in June it accounted for almost half of the WUNC displays. Likely due to the correlation to the 2014 Occupy movement, symbols, flags, and icons to represent the protest quickly helped participants display one united front. *Symbolic colors* were adopted really fast, yellow symbolizing resistance & democracy, and black attire mimicking the mourning of decaying freedoms. Flags were also often used, not just to unite the crowds, but also to unite the cause to others abroad. For example, the American and British flags were often waved during demonstrations to ask these countries to support their call for democracy (Art. #28). Indeed, it was through the marches, assemblies, and rallies that unity was broadcasted—were the banners, chants, and flags showed how much the black-dressed crowd agreed on the importance of meeting the demands. This sense of unity was emphasized by the fact that the movement relied on being leaderless. That is, there was no one acting as spokesperson. Being a decentralized movement highlighted that the protests interests were in fact the interests of the people (Art. #34).

Yet, the most important *unity* method was not the marches nor the rallies, but rather the coordination that was behind them. Lacking a leader, protesters had to find a way to agree on tactics. This is where social media comes in. Social media platforms, in particular telegram and a reddit-like forum called LIHKG, are often mentioned in the articles as

critical tools for the movement as they play a double role: an alternative communication institution, and an alternative social space. Namely, on the one hand, social media as an alternative communication institution helped disseminate information to bystanders and other stakeholders (e.g. the international community), without the biases or filters set on mainstream media. For instance, the June 12th march that caused commotion in the city, being the first faced with police brutality, was streamed on Twitch. This platform usually streams videogamers, but this time Hongkongers opted to livestream the happenings on the streets to show an uncensored version of the events (Art. #17). On the other hand, these online forums served as an alternative place for protesters to socialize. They could anonymously post possible tactics and others could vote thumbs up or down, bringing a sense of consensus on what the next steps should be. It gave protesters the opportunity to gauge what fellow participants were inclined to, and to voice their perceptions too. This is how the united front was shaped (Art. #15). Lastly, social media presented a speedy, safe (i.e., encrypted) way to coordinate during critical moments. Through LIHKG, protesters would call for backup or alert where to retreat, enabling the ‘be water’ mantra (Art. #15).

2.3 Numbers

Table 4 shows that numbers had a lower ratio of tags in comparison to Worthiness and Commitment. This may be due to the fact that, based on table 1, there are few methods that showcase numbers. Although few in code tags, the actual number of participants in the pro-democracy movement was record high in the territory. The first display and use of numbers was the signing of mass petitions, mostly taking place at the beginning to show solidarity with the cause. Article #29 refers to “hundreds of online petitions that emerged last month [in May] to oppose the bill, and were signed by students, university alumni and housewives”. Furthermore, article #26 talks about the petitions signed among the art organizations of the city to show support to protesters. When the movement blew up in June, the protests made the news around the world due to the large scale of people taking to the streets. The June marches from the 9th, 12th, and 16th are quoted by eight of the selected articles, making reference to the magnitude of the congregation. On the 9th one million people took over the streets the weekend before the extradition bill was voted for. On the 12th a crowd similar in

size demonstrated the day the bill would be revised at LegCo. Given the abuse of police force witnessed on the 12th, and the suspension – not withdrawal – of the bill, the 16th two million people participated in the march. That is, one in four of the Hongkongers went to protest that day. Protest attendance remained high throughout the weekly protests (marches, assemblies, rallies) that steadily went on until November.

With elections coming up late November, protesters agreed to keep a low-profile days before the elections so as to not jeopardize them. When election results came out, reflecting the significant pan-democrat victory, it seemed that the protests would dissolve. However, in December, large marches continued, mostly in relation to demanding justice for the displays of police brutality during the siege of the universities (Art. #28). The New Year's Eve authorized march had an attendance of over a million people, asking for a year of democracy and freedom (Art. 46). The consistent numbers made it seem like the protests were nowhere near the end. However, by January the numbers dwindled, as protest fatigue grew, and the coronavirus appeared on the scene. Article #46 argues that by the spring of 2020, the possibility of a National Security Law gave plenty to talk about, but very few protesters made it to the streets, with many of them being arrested on the spot (Art. #46). When we refer to the end of the protests, it is not based on a lost sense of unity or commitment (the yellow economic circle was still active until mid-2023), but rather due to the loss in numbers. With the National Security Law, to declare yourself pro-democracy or to show support for the movement makes you a target, and so participants stopped broadcasting their numbers, ending the streak of demonstrations.

2.4 Commitment

Alongside unity, Commitment was highly present throughout the whole duration of the movement. Although not stressed in the matrix table of protests methods and WUNC, one common topic found in the qualitative analysis was the continuity of the demonstrations. Tilly argues that part of a display of commitment is to show endurance through time and broadcast that participants are in for the long haul. 64% of the analyzed articles that were published in 2020 allude to the continuous commitment shown by protesters, at least for the most part of 2019. The resilience of the protest is worth mentioning as many argue that Lam's

administration original strategy was to wait for protests to die down on their own– which they did not (Art. #5).

Alongside resilience, protesters displayed commitment by engaging in tactics of non-cooperation. Hongkongers seemed to have understood Sharp's concepts on the coercive power of collective non-cooperation with the opponent. According to article #34, a post on LIHKG in June 2019 read "The warfare in fact consists of serial non-cooperative campaigns and besiegement, which aim at slowing down and even paralysing the government, to force it to meet people's demands". From then on, the coding analysis shows that protesters stuck to this non-cooperative strategy, as the most recurrent 'commitment' codes found were *economic boycott*, *occupation*, and *sit-in*. Given the particular salience of *economic boycott* and its special relationship with unworthiness, this method will be discussed separately. It is worth noting now that this method was oftentimes applied as part of the street occupations. As part of the demonstrations, protesters would barricade and occupy main roads for hours. During this time, they would target buildings and businesses labeled 'blue' (pro-Beijing), boycotting their economic activities.

Sit-ins and street occupations became a standard procedure of the movement. One significant event (and a major display of commitment) was the days-long sit-in at the airport in August. Knowing the day-to-day significance of Hong Kong's airport, protesters paralyzed the airways for days hoping to get international attention, risking retaliation. The levels of displayed commitment were even higher when acts of occupation implied *psychological intervention*. Namely, when protesters were actively putting themselves in situations of discomfort or sacrifice, such as marching in the summer heat or skipping work to be present. For instance, the break-in at LegCo on July 1st was strongly condemned by pro-government observers and pacifist protesters due to its illegal nature (including trespassing, vandalism, looting). Besides unworthy behavior, what radical protesters really showed that day was their commitment to the cause. They knew the legal and physical risks they were facing and decided to go through with it. As quoted before, the title of article #18 reads "Radical core of Hong Kong protesters who trashed city's legislature were 'prepared to die for their cause'". Another vivid example of the protesters' commitment to the movement was the occupation of the university campuses. In November, student protesters weighed in their


options and opted for sacrificing the rest of the semester and taking over their universities to regain momentum. Risking arrest, many stayed put inside the premises for up to two weeks. Article #23 highlights the severity of the circumstances: “The two sides traded tear gas for bricks and Molotov cocktails, as campuses descended into smoking battlegrounds; makeshift fortresses for a hard core of demonstrators who vowed never to give in”. Displays of *psychological intervention* went to the extreme on a couple of occasions, in which protesters committed suicide alluding to the political state of the city (Art. #39).

Besides these big displays of commitment (some coming close to unworthiness, as discussed below), the analysis brings forward another tactic related to the ‘C’ factor: *social boycott*. This method took place as ‘ostracism’, cutting someone off from any social relations; and ‘doxing’, exposing the identities of those who hurt or criticize the movement, becoming the protesters’ new boycott targets. Article #50 showcases how ostracism against policemen operated, as it narrates how a police officer asked his family not to tell people he had been hurt by protesters, “fearing outsiders would mock them for having a policeman in the family”. The article also argues that people were willing to leave friendships behind based on political inclinations. Examples like this expose the social divide created by the movement, and how participants were willing to go for the cause.

2.5 Unworthy behavior and economic boycotts

Protesters understood they needed the general public to back them up. Thus, when the protests first took off in June, protesters alluded to several displays of worthiness (see Table 1). Yet, the government was reluctant to listen to peaceful marches and soon enough unworthy displays of commitment increased. Figure 2 shows how ‘commitment’ and ‘unworthy behavior’ codes fluctuated similarly over time. In this case, ‘unworthy behavior’ refers to looting, destruction of property, and other forms of violent behavior by protesters.

Figure 2: Commitment and Unworthiness over time



Indeed, most of the displays of unworthy behavior cited in the sample refer to displays of commitment, such as *occupation* and *economic boycott*. The latter is an interesting case, given that Sharp's idea of economic boycott in no way involved violent behavior. According to Sharp (1973), economic boycott consists of targeting particular businesses or economic sectors to put pressure on the opponents. Boycotting a business can take many shapes: not consuming a specific product or service; not engaging in business with opponents (or opponent sympathizers); stopping a specific business from operating. The conducted analysis shows that 60.8% of the economic boycott mentioned in the Hong Kongese newspaper included unworthy behavior, while 41% of the unworthy behavior coded referred to economic boycott. That is, almost 2/3 of the acts of economic boycott involved looting or property damage, which accounted for almost half of the displays of unworthy behavior. In Hong Kong, the economic boycott was mediated by the 'yellow economic circle' that had been mapped out. To follow the circle not only meant supporting yellow, pro-democracy, businesses, but also boycotting blue 'pro-Beijing' businesses. Looting and destroying private property do not fall into Sharp's definition of this method, however, it is how the looting and disruption was executed that sets it apart from acts of widespread violence. That is, instead of destroying aimlessly, protesters made sure to target blue establishments only,

affecting their business in the long run. Article #1 refers to some boycott ‘guidelines’ posted on LIHKG in October, indicating to:

trash only businesses run by gangsters, as well as government offices and offices of pro-Beijing politicians. Shops and restaurants owned by Beijing-friendly businessmen should only be “decorated” with graffiti and “Lennon Walls” of colourful sticky notes bearing anti government and pro-democracy messages.

The post shows protesters’ intent to refrain from collateral damage. While the economic boycott did not turn violent against local pro-government businesses, big chains with direct financial ties to mainland China, like snack chain Best Mart 360, China Mobile and Chinese-based banks, turned into looting targets at the weekly demonstrations (Art. #28). The looting of MTR stations followed a similar logic: not to mention the MTR’s financial links to China, after the July 21st incident of mob attacks towards protesters, the transport conglomerate was labeled as blue. Attacking metro stations served both to hurt the company financially and to disrupt the city further, exerting more pressure. We can see how this type of unworthy behavior increased August onwards, once the MTR was consolidated as a protesters’ target, due to its suspected links to the government.

Opting to target economic avenues was no chance. Hong Kong is widely known as a financial hub, and Hongkongers strongly believe it is the city’s economic circumstances that make it so relevant for China. Article #46 argues that “Many thought Beijing would not do such a thing [impose a National Security Law] to Hong Kong, the financial lung of the country” (art. #46). Recognizing their economic power, protesters saw the relevance of hurting the city’s financial status in order to coerce the government to concede to their demands. Whether this meant hurting the tourism sector by putting the airport to a halt or forcing the largest closure of bank branches in the history of the city (art. #9), protesters were willing to pay the price.

It can be argued that the willingness to engage in illegal/immoral behavior is in itself a display of commitment, however misguided. As explained in Tilly’s WUNC framework, an issue that arises with high levels of commitment is ensuring that it does not hurt the other factors. He argued that illicit acts of commitment hurt the legitimacy, and with it the worthiness, of the movement. Crossing a moral line might also divide the once united front and shrink the number of participants. Indeed, according to Tilly, unworthy displays of

commitment can become detrimental for the movement. It can be argued that Hong Kong's movement followed a similar path. The occupation of the university campuses and the recurrent looting of businesses degraded the legitimacy of the protests. Participants were increasingly divided on what to do next, and numbers eventually decreased (art. #37; art. #46). Simply put, the analysis shows that agentic factors, namely engaging in unworthy behavior, did push the movement towards failure. The following section will discuss the found contextual factors that played a role in the eventual dissolution of the movement.

3. Case study 1: Contextual factors

The qualitative analysis not only highlighted the degree of WUNCness of the movement, but also made it possible to assess the contextual obstacles that the protest faced. The most coded obstacles were the lack of political opportunity, encompassing lack of representation at the local government and no space for negotiation (20); protest crackdown, including use of police force and arrests (44); citizens' costs, regarding the costs that protests brought to the city, and the inevitable protest fatigue (20); and altering of narratives in the hands of the Chinese government (20). The presence of these factors fluctuated over time, responding to the different phases of the protest.

To better break down these variables, we can also take a look at the stakeholders involved in the process. Four main stakeholders were identified, who influenced how the protests developed: the local government, mediating the POS and blocking negotiation; Police, at the front lines of the protest crackdown; the international community, to whom the government needed to reassure that the situation was under control; and fellow citizens, facing the daily disruptions.

From the moment the protests expanded in June, the government made their stance clear: There was no space for negotiation, their position was inflexible. Article #5 recalls that in 2003 the sheer presence of half a million people on the streets protesting against an extradition agreement was enough for the agreement to fall through. That was not the case in 2019. By mid-June, Lam agreed to shelf the extradition bill, but not to withdraw it, which protesters found unacceptable and demanded that all five claims were met. However, what

they were asking for seemed to be beyond what the government was willing to bargain, leading negotiations to a stall. Article #20 argues that:

it has been difficult to reconcile the seemingly incompatible demands of the two sides. Hongkongers fear the loss of their local identity and seek more say over what happens in their city. Beijing will not allow threats to its political rule and seeks options that bring Hong Kong closer to the mainland in anticipation of full integration in 2047.

The lack of political opportunities for protesters to advance their claims became more apparent in October. By then, the push and pull between police and protesters had been going on for over four months, with no end in sight. While the local government agreed in September to withdraw the infamous bill, the remaining demands largely depended on China's approval, in particular the claim for universal suffrage. Articles #1 and #45 highlight the Chinese government's inflexibility over the matter, claiming that "Beijing was unwilling to make concessions to the protesters' remaining demands, particularly their call for political reform". With little leverage to pull from, Hongkongers had the odds against them.

Since there was no room for negotiation, police were called to the streets to mitigate the protests. The level of protest repression played a crucial role in the development of the movement. Following Sharp's *political jiu-jitsu* concept, the use of police force against peaceful protesters in June only strengthened the movement rather than squander it. The use of force was rendered illegitimate and abusive, giving more reasons for the people to protest. With time, some radical protesters engaged in unworthy behavior (e.g., storming the LegCo), giving space for police forces to intervene. As protesters deemed more pressure had to be exerted, so did the police. As article #36 explains "police are now finding new strength in their role as the last line of defence to prevent total chaos in the absence of a political solution". The protest crackdown steeply increased in October, after Lam's administration withdrew the bill and made it clear that that was the one and only demand they would agree to. With the proclamation of the mask ban, and the denial of multiple public gathering authorizations, street demonstrations basically became illegal. These measures gave full range for police officers to use force and arrest participants. Stats on police activity during the protests show that (art. #2):

Police responded by firing 16,223 rounds of tear gas, 10,108 rubber bullets, 1,885 sponge grenades, 2,033 beanbag rounds and 19 live bullets between June 2019 and May 2020. A

total of 8,981 people were arrested over that period for offences including rioting, common assault and arson.

The crackdown also divided protesters. Some, as discussed in the commitment section, felt the need to see the movement through, regardless of the costs. Other sympathizers felt the line had to be drawn and by 2020 the amount of the people on the streets had largely reduced. The intensity of the protest crackdown raised many eyebrows across the international community. Hongkongers abroad began lobbying with other nations, asking for their intervention (art. #44). Demonstrations called for the US and the UK to act as the ‘beacons of democracy’ they claimed to be and put pressure on the Chinese government. Trump’s administration listened, and economic sanctions were en route. With the international community watching, the NPC opted to take control over the narrative of the situation. Two versions on the roots and causes of the movement were spread. The first one claimed that what Hongkongers were actually angry about was not their loss of political freedoms, but the lack of economic ones. Back in mainland China, Hong Kong’s unequal economic opportunities and unaffordable housing market were blamed for the youth’s anger. Article #24 tells that “The official Xinhua news agency and the People's Daily, as well as the hardline Global Times tabloid [Chinese media platforms] simultaneously singled out unaffordable housing as a "root cause" of the protests in Hong Kong”. The second version makes allusion to the interest of foreign powers in the region and argues that it is a foreign attempt to separate Hong Kong from China. China’s top diplomat in the city, Xie Feng, claimed:

The true motive of the opposition in Hong Kong and the foreign forces behind them is to mess up the city, overthrow the legitimate government, seize jurisdiction, and ultimately destroy 'one country, two systems' by turning Hong Kong into an independent or semi-independent political entity. (art. #45)

As argued by Snow’s framing theory, how you conceptualize and understand a problem, that is, how you frame it, will also dictate what solutions you look for. By focusing on the economic struggles, the first version of the problem would call for economic reforms, not political ones. Buying the first narrative is to delegitimize the political claims of the protesters. The second version of the problem argues that the pent-up anger is not intrinsic, and rather Hong Kong became another pawn to be used by foreign powers, pushing for

separatism (art. #45). For one, separatism claims call for a stronger response from the government. Secondly, by placing the interests abroad, this version also fails to acknowledge the intrinsic reasons each protester had to join the cause. Thus, by sticking to these two narratives, the government justified their inflexibility and severity to their own Chinese constituents and to anyone watching abroad.

Throughout the ups and downs of the protests, citizens had to endure the disruptions the movement caused. The costs were immediate. Tourism and retail dropped since June, worsened by the airport strike in August. With two very important sectors on halt, after two months of mass demonstrations, “Hong Kong’s Financial Secretary Paul Chan Mo-po warns the city is on the brink of a recession and job losses” (art. #8). Conscious of the economic toll of the movement, for the first months protesters intended not to disrupt office work hours. Yet, in November protesters grew tired of waiting for dialogue and opted for a more disruptive approach. The occupations of the university campuses were accompanied by mass roadblocks and the suspension of MTR services, bringing the city to a halt for a whole week (art. #9). The coding analysis shows that from November onwards, there was a sharp increase in the discussion and perception of the costs citizens had to bear due to the protests. As expressed in article #37 “The time when violence was useful in the protests, if there was one, has long since passed. It is now becoming damaging to the protesters' cause and to Hong Kong as a whole. Moreover, article #23, titled *Poor, disabled, old: the forgotten voices of the Hong Kong protests*, dives into the impact that disruptions have had on the most vulnerable sectors of the population. For instance, unreliable public transport increased the commute fares, elderly preferred to skip doctors’ appointments than risk being trapped by demonstrations, and many who depended on their daily wage were let off due to shrinking business. Indeed, the January articles stress the protest fatigue that bystanders experienced, tired of breathing tear gas and being exposed to danger (art. #42). The tiredness of a sector of the population was yet another significant blow to the protests. Hurting businesses in particular, as argued before, had political value, for better and for worse. Heads of businesses sectors hold seats in the LegCo, and unlike in 2019 when they showed concerns over the

extradition bill, in early 2020 when talks on a National Security Law began, they were reluctant to oppose it (art. #46).

One last contextual factor that highly affected the movement was the rise of the coronavirus pandemic. In fact, many largely blame the pandemic for the end of the movement (art. #5; art. #46; art. #50). It gave the government the perfect opportunity to set measures that finalized the protest crackdown quickly and effectively. Public gatherings were strictly forbidden, and the public's attention was drawn in a different direction. However, it cannot be said that the pandemic was the only or main reason the protest failed. Had the pandemic not come at that time, the situation might have stagnated for a few more weeks, if any. Protest fatigue was already looming, protest violence had cost them their worthiness, and, besides the withdrawal of the bill, the government remained reluctant to address the other demands. The efficient crackdown conducted via the national security law only highlighted where the government interests lay. The intention to listen to the people's demands to improve democracy was never a subject of discussion, nor was it intended to be. Without the political opportunity nor the public support they once had, and with China's readiness to use their coercive force against the opposition, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which protesters would have all their concessions granted.

4. Case study 2: Key findings and WUNC framework

After conducting the qualitative analysis of the 50 selected La Tercera articles, 490 code tags were made. The most frequent tags found were: 56 'unworthy', 51 'protest crackdown', 33 'demonstration', 30 'alternative solution', 28 'citizens' costs', and 25 'social media'. At first glance, the magnitude of the events can already be perceived. On the one hand there are people repeatedly protesting whether virtually or on the streets, and on the other, authorities that acknowledge and intend to manage the movement, whether squandering it or proposing ways to compromise. The interaction between these two actors will be broken down in the coming sections to gather how Chilean protesters gained concessions.


To understand how Chileans got to an alternative solution, the WUNCness of the movement will be assessed. Table 5 gives an overview of how WUNC was displayed and portrayed

during the protests, and in the discussions on the aftermath of the events. The articles found were grouped per month of publication during the core of the Estallido social. Since the main events abruptly stopped with the arrival of the pandemic, the articles published during the 2020 lockdown were grouped together. Articles from October 2020 set apart, as this month marked the anniversary of the beginning of the protests, as well as the date of the plebiscite on the redrafting of the constitution. The last group represents the articles found that were published in 2021, which revisited the happenings of the 2019 movement.

Table 5: Codes found per WUNC factor over time

Component	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	COVID	Oct 2020	2021	total
Worthiness	2	13	12	1	15	3	3	8	57
Unity	6	26	24	24	24	7	13	11	135
Numbers	4	11	12	9	6	2	5	2	51
Commitment	2	12	5	6	9	0	12	7	53
Total	14	62	53	40	54	12	33	28	296

Figure 3: WUNC factors over time



Both Table 5 and Figure 2 illustrate the presence of all WUNC factors since the social unrest began. The numbers show a decline on WUNCness during the lockdown, as issues related to the pandemic took over. However, it should be noted how as the postponed plebiscite came to realization in October 2020, and as matters on the drafting on the new constitution

continue to date, debate over what happened back on the streets in 2019 continued (as seen on the right end of Figure 3). The graph also highlights the prominence of Unity throughout the Estallido. Data on the table show an even amount of total codes related to the other three factors (Worthiness, Numbers, and Commitment), although they seem to have fluctuated over time. To fully grasp the fluctuation of the presence of WUNC factors over time, Table 6 accounts for possible code quantity disparities per period of time. The table shows, in percentage, the proportion of codes that each WUNC factor had per time span.

Table 6: Ratio of code tags per WUNC factor per time span

Component	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	COVID	Oct 2020	2021	Total
Worthiness	14.3	21	22.6	2.5	27.8	25	9.09	28.6	19.3
Unity	42.9	41.9	45.3	60	44.4	58.3	39.4	39.3	45.6
Numbers	28.6	17.7	22.6	22.5	11.1	16.7	15.2	7.14	17.2
Commitment	14.3	19.4	9.43	15	16.7	0	36.4	25	17.9

It can be observed that, indeed, Unity was the most coded factor in all time spans. Based on this table, we can see that the ratio of prevalence of the rest of the factors varies a bit per time span, as Worthiness and Numbers intercalate level of relevance during the months of the Estallido. It is interesting to note the lack of ‘Commitment’ codes during the COVID lockdown. Although conversations went on about what the movement meant for the future of Chile, and what the future of the pandemic meant for the movement, The articles found show that the lockdown turned people’s focus to more immediate problems. Article #41 narrates the surge of a different wave of anti-lockdown protests, as many were left without jobs or income due to the measures. Thus, commitment displays at the time (such as gathering despite risking infection) were unrelated to the original movement. Commitment reappears in the October 2020 discussions, as past events are reevaluated, and writers try to piece together what the plebiscite will bring for Chile. As discussed in the subsequent section on contextual factors, the pandemic marked the end of the Estallido as it was first formed, and so the articles found from then onwards mostly review what happened at the end of 2019. Thus, the numbers shown in Table 6 for ‘October 2020’ and ‘2021’ mostly reflect how Chileans perceived the WUNCness of the original 2019 social outburst on hindsight.

To fully dissect the findings, this section goes over each of the WUNC factors to assess their relevance in the movement. Starting with Worthiness, this subsection first covers the duality of significant presence of both worthy and unworthy behavior, dedicating a special space to discuss what, or rather, when are actions considered unworthy, a critical debate in these protests. Then, in Unity we will touch upon the large efforts that were made to bridge together all the spread out, individual demands, into a cohesive, collective one. The magnitude of the marches and demonstrations will be addressed in Numbers, and finally, three sides of Commitment will be reflected upon: the economic boycott that sparked the protests, the constant tainting and mocking of authorities, and front line that disputed roughly with police.

4.1 Worthiness

As shown in Table 6, displays of Worthiness accounted for almost 20% of the WUNC code tags. The most recurrent displays of worthiness recorded were: song (16), book (11), mural (11), and performance (7). That is, the sample shows how Chileans used art as a worthy form of protest. Graffiti popped up on the streets, reading ‘it’s not 30 pesos, it’s 30 years’, reflecting the real level of discontent of the people – namely, years of neglect from the elites (art. #40). As expressed by one street artist in article #40: “What we have seen on the streets is an emotional response, right from the belly. Is to take the brush, the can of spray and to write the discontent on the walls”¹⁴. Murals and posters covered the walls of the cities, showing icons of the protest such as the ‘perro matapacos’ a dog that defended protesters from police in past movements and became a symbol of resistance (art. #40). Art was used as a channel to translate the people’s disgruntlement into a cause worth listening to, and concessions worth granting. In other words, artistic displays played a significant role in the frame alignment of the collective demands. Protesters took to the streets for different reasons (from contesting the transport to the pension system), yet they shared both a feeling of frustration towards the status quo and a desire for dignified treatment. It was through art that they found these similarities, and through art that they voiced their feelings to the authorities.

¹⁴ Quote translations done by the author.

The most impactful display of worthiness was music. Several songs became ‘hymns’ of the demonstrations, appealing towards the emotions of the opponents. Some of the most salient ones were *El derecho de vivir en paz* (The right to live in peace), *Cacerolazo* (alluding to the pot banging) and *Plata ta tá*, sang by Mon Laferte, a Chilean-Mexican singer that showed her support for the movement from the beginning (art. #16). But by far, the most relevant song of the movement was *El balie de los que sobran*- The dance of those left behind. This song written in 1986 talks about the pains that inequality brings to those at the bottom tier. A song that was already popular at its time, turned into 2019’s hymn precisely because of how relevant the lyrics remained. As expressed by many, it hurt to realize that not much had changed in 35 years (art. #10, #12). The impactfulness of the song was even analyzed in the book ‘To jump the turnstile’¹⁵, which explains that the song “seems to explain the consequences of the so called “false promise” of neoliberalism and its incidence in the 2019 protests” (art. #12). *To jump the turnstile* was one of the many books published with the intention of transcribing protesters’ displays of discontent into words (art. #12, #18, #19). As such, they present yet another example of frame alignment, as they showcase why the massive demonstrations are legitimate, worthy.

Another example of the use of artistic methods to transmit the movement’s message was the employment of performances as part of the demonstrations. The most notorious one was *Un violador en tu camino* (a rapist on your way), by the collective Lastesis. This feminist group has been a prominent actor of the feminist movement in Chile, and in this performance, they display the disinterest of authorities to protect their citizens, and the impotence that women feel to help their situation – a similar feeling to those who were left out of Chile’s unequal economic boom. The performance was first presented in front of a police commissary in Valparaíso on November 18, and later replicated on larger scales across the country, as well as around the world (art #11, #16, #18). All these artistic displays of worthiness served as a tool to tap into the emotions and empathy of the authorities, as protesters demanded to be addressed with dignity for once.

¹⁵ In Spanish: ‘Saltar el Torniquete’

4.1.1 What is unworthy? The role of ‘unworthiness’ in the Estallido

In the sample, unworthy behavior was mentioned 56 times, mostly regarding arson, looting, property damage, and the Front Line, that physically confronted police during the demonstrations. Almost half of the code tags (27) were recorded on the articles published from October 2020 onwards, recalling all the damage caused by the movement. However, the presence of unworthiness does not seem to have hurt the movement in the same way it did the Hong Kongese one. In this subsection we will delve into the role of unworthiness in the Chilean protests.

Back in October 2019, when Chileans finally had enough with the increasing costs and pains of daily life, people found different ways to express their discontent. Claiming back their streets, some banged pots, others spray painted monuments, and another few went after the metro stations (c.f. art. #5, #18, #34, #40). A multitude of protest actions took over at once, both worthy and unworthy: songs and flags, as well as looting and rioting covered the main cities of the country. The extent of it alarmed the government, who called for a state of emergency right away, setting curfew and military on the streets. Protests went on regardless, now also questioning President Piñera’s authority to use and abuse the state’s force. In the middle of the clashes, some people damaged property, committed looting or even arson for personal gain or for reasons that were not directly related to the protests (art. #25, #43, #46, #50). As violence on both sides increased, it was the perception of the existence of an uncontrollable criminal minority that, on the one hand, justified the continuation of protest repression, and on the other ensured that such unworthy behavior would not taint or delegitimize the movement.

This ‘two parallel situations’ narrative was not only sustained by many protesters and the media, but also by Piñera, in an interview he gave in December in attempts to justify his decision to call on the military. Article #43 quotes Piñera’s perception of the events:

Almost seven weeks ago, two simultaneous situations arose, but of a very different nature. The first thing that emerged was a very strong demand of all the citizens to make Chile a more just, more inclusive country, with less tolerance to abuses, with more equality before the law, and with more respect towards the citizens [...] that is a thing I see as very positive [...] simultaneously, a wave of brutal violence was unleashed, in which small groups exercised violence without God or law. They burnt everything that was on their way, the

metro stations, the hospitals and supermarkets, trying to cause damage to destroy the system.

In this excerpt we can see that while indeed arson and looting were deemed unjustifiable, Piñera recognized the efforts of the worthy methods of protest and understood the legitimacy of Chileans' concerns. Thus, the significant presence of unworthiness does not seem to have hurt the chances of the movement getting to a compromise with the authorities.

A possible explanation on why unworthiness did not hamper the movement significantly is the fact that unworthy is a flexible term. Wouters & Walgrave (2017) consider that the boundaries of what is unworthy depend on the cultural context, stating that "in some contexts even violent behavior may be an understandable and even worthy means of expression". Article #9 touches upon the tolerance of Chileans towards violence, as young adults were interviewed to gauge their perceptions of the Estallido. The article found that only 33% of young Chileans were against the creation of barricades to occupy the streets, and 30% did not condone the confrontations and provocations towards police. 14% considered that the fires at the metro stations were justified, while 12% condoned looting activities. In article #50 it is argued that "in the frame of social unrest such as ours, two things happen: the tolerance towards social violence rises (including looting carried out by ordinary people) and the tolerance threshold towards the police use of force decreases". Thus, it can be argued that in Chile there is an existing tolerance towards violent, unworthy behavior if motivated by the right reasons.

The debate on 'what is unworthy?' is very present in the articles of sample, symbolizing that there is no consensus on the boundaries of the protests among Chileans. Articles #5, #21, and #40 discuss the worthiness of protest graffiti, or graphic interventions on property of the city. During the protest times, many sculptures were damaged or altered, as well as walls of government buildings. The articles debate whether these should be understood as displays of worthy or unworthy behavior. For instance, in article #40 an academic explains that in monuments:

desires of representation and links are crystallized. The interesting thing is to see the distances there are with some historical subjects that in their time were lifted as heroes without discussion and now they are violently taken down from their pedestals.

Seconding that argument, another sociologist added that (art. #40):

Today there are movements that frame the graffiti as a new ‘social heritage’ that deserves to be valued as part of the appropriation of the city by the people. I think that what should be done is to recognize these expressions as a new way of heritage.

That is, sculptures and monuments can be used by the people as symbolic spaces to express their interests and ideals. Understanding public heritage as a shared forum would turn graffiti and alterations into a worthy method of protests. However, in that same article other specialists pointed out that altering museums or other public buildings was intolerable. Article #5 goes deeper into the damage caused to monuments, statues and public buildings, as well as the financial cost of restoring the pieces. Different interviewees in articles #5, #21, and #40 expressed the importance of recovering their original monuments, perceiving the alterations as acts of violence and condemning the damage of public property. In other words, they maintain that such protest method is unworthy. Hence, while this action brought some discomforts and costs for the population, the fact that there was an open debate about its worthiness, and many who did perceive the action as worthy turned it into an effective tool to advance the protest. Firstly, its disruption raised attention and called for discussion and awareness. Secondly, it remained at a symbolic level, without causing direct harm to individuals and rather appealing to the emotional side of the audience.

4.2 Unity

As Figure 3 illustrates, unity was the most salient WUNC factor throughout the protests. This may seem contradictory considering that unity has to do with the level of agreement on a common claim, and something characteristic of the movement was its variety of claims—thus resulting in a social ‘outburst’. Article #30, for instance, enlists the claims of betterment of healthcare, education, pension funds, the impeachment of Piñera, and changes in the constitution. Although at first glance it seems that the protest is covering too many sides, it was through the creation of alternative social spaces and the artistic displays discussed above that Chileans found common ground. For example, the author of one of the books published on the matter commented that “we wanted to deliver, through this book of pictures and chronicles, an explanation for the reader regarding this [the motives of the movement]. We

began to realize that these were not disaggregated demands” (art. #18). The article concludes that the book served as a tool to contextualize the social mobilization. Indeed, it was a process of frame alignment that allowed protesters to see that all these demands converged in a fight for dignity and equality. There are two alternative social spaces worth exploring. The first is the significant role that social media played in the movement. Just like the protest in Hong Kong, this movement operated without leaders. Instead, protesters refer to the events as ‘autoconvocados’ or ‘self-summoned’. Namely, it was the population summoning itself to the streets. This was made possible through the use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter (art. #8, #14, #30, #32, #42). But not only was social media used to invite people to join demonstrations, but also as a new space to conduct protests and debates. For example, on October 19, 4 million users on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram expressed strong opposition against the military deployment on the streets (art. #13). The platforms were used as a space to share the slogans such as #ChileViolatesHumanRights, #PiñeraRenuncia (Quit Piñera), and #QueSeVayanLosMilicos (Soldiers, leave). Moreover, during the lockdown, social media allowed for the conversation to continue (art. #6). The second alternative social space is the one created by the cabildos (neighborhood assemblies), in which neighbors created a safe space to share their concerns with the status quo and come up with solutions to demand to move forward (art. #50). It became the perfect setting for protesters to align their efforts and expectations, and direct the movement based on the resulting consensus. Thus, through active efforts of engaging in dialogue, protesters came together to the conclusion that changes in the system as a whole had to be made, starting with the constitution.

This united front became the most visible throughout marches and demonstrations, which were coded 13 and 33 times, respectively. In Santiago, people would gather around the renamed Plaza de la Dignidad, while in other cities people would demonstrate in the city center or in front of police stations or other significant buildings such as the legislative council. The demonstration of October 18 was of particular significance, as it ended in clashes with police and scattered fires and called for the deployment of military on the streets. Its relevance is such that many use 18-O as a synonym to Estallido social, i.e., another title of the movement. The salience of the 18-O demonstration is evident in the sample as 40

out of 50 (80%) of the articles allude to the event in one way or another. The strength of the unity displayed in those first days of the Estallido cannot be ignored, as it was such unity that provoked Piñera to ‘declare war’ against such a *strong* enemy. That is, the president acknowledged just how united the protest was.

4.3 Numbers

‘Numbers’ was, by a slight difference, the component with less code tags on the analysis. In Figure 3 it can be observed that this component was mostly prominent in the first months of the Estallido, when the most disruptive events took place. Its role should not be overlooked, as the magnitude of the demonstrations was historic (art. #19). As presented in the ‘unity’ subsection, demonstrations and marches were one of the main protests methods of action used during the movement. The loudest display of this WUNC factor was the march on October 25, when it is estimated that between one and one and a half million people took to the streets in Santiago and walked towards the Plaza de la Dignidad to ask for proper dialogue instead of the militia. The numbers of the march were so significant that later on people would refer to the event as the ‘march of the million’, ‘march of the million and a half’, or simply, ‘the largest march in [Chilean] history’ (art. #3, #13, #19). The numbers of the movement were not only reflected on the amount of people that concentrated in one day, but in the amount of people that took part of the movement at some point in time. Article #9 compares the statistics of the 2019 movement with the 2011 student movement, which shook the country at the time and found that: “in 2019, 61% of the youth between 18 and 29 years old took part in a demonstration in the public road, number that almost doubles the 32% of 2011”. That same article found that 67.3% of the youth took part in either a street demonstration or engaged in other protest activities such as dialogues in social media or cabildo discussions. That is, two thirds of the youth were actively engaged in the movement. Such numbers reflect the level of dissatisfaction with the system that young Chileans are living in, as well as a significant interest in ensuring a more just environment for all.

Another dimension in which numbers were displayed was in the abundant use of social media as a platform for digital protest. The government was very much aware of the relevance of the presence of the protests in social media, and a detailed study on big data

was put together in December 2019- and later leaked. Article #8 goes over the findings of such study, highlighting how numbers were perceived by the opponent (the government). Some of the stats found showed that only between the 18 and the 25 of October, there were 4 million retweets calling for mobilization on the streets. This data reflects the size of the support for the mass protests. Another stat shows that tweets on the discourse against Piñera had over 6 million comments, portraying the magnitude of the discontent of the people. Overall, these findings display the relevance of Numbers on the core months of the movement. As alternative solutions were developed, and with the coming pandemic which will be discussed on a later section, the presence of this component became less significant. However, articles published in later years still recall the magnitude of those early days. For example, article #46 refers to the rising protests in October 2020, which linked the grievances of the lockdown, with the tensions of the coming plebiscite on the constitution and speculates what would happen were the coming constitution not to satisfy the people. The Numbers of 2019 serve as a reminder of how large the issue can grow if not attended.

4.4 Commitment

As observed in Tables 5 and 6, displays of Commitment fluctuated over time. They are mostly notorious in the articles published after the Estallido, meaning that the acts of commitment made were memorable and worth bringing up in the coming discussions. The level of commitment can be appreciated in the continuity of the events, and the resilience of protesters to continue the conversation even after an alternative solution was already on the table. There were three main types of display of commitment: the economic boycott towards the metro ticket price, heavy tainting and mocking of authorities, and the disruption caused by the front line at the barricades. Each of these actions put a different type of pressure on the government, yet all of them defied and questioned the power of the State.

The economic boycott in early October 2019 marked the beginning of a new Chile. Or at least that is how it was phrased, when protesters claimed that during the outburst: ‘Chile despertó’ - Chile woke up (art. #18). And if Chile woke up, it was because some high school students boycotted the metro ticket price by skipping the turnstiles (art. #17, #30). This first act of protest, which was considered worthy by 80% of the youth (art. #48), triggered an

immediate response from the police. As student protesters continued the evasions and did not back down, the larger population was moved by such display of commitment and seized the opportunity to raise their own concerns (art. #17). Thus, 'evade' marked the first defiance towards the government.

A second type of defiance was the open mocking and tainting of authorities, be it the president, ministers, or the unwanted 'pacos' (police). Leaving behind fears of repression or retaliation, people on the streets and online called Piñera to step down, accusing him of foul management of the instances of human rights violations caused by military and police (art. #8, #10, #13, #14). Some public figures explicitly called him out on mass media, such as Jorge González, the writer of 'El balie de los que sobran', or famous pop singer, Mon Laferte, both of which expressed concerns at interviews (art. #10, #16). Mon Laferte was later called forward by the police to rectify her statement, proving the weight of her word (art. #16). Linked to the accusatory tone of the protesters, another side of the protest was the use parody, mocking authorities for their mistakes (art. #20, #36). In fact, many of the graffities and alterations to monuments shared a mix of tainting and mocking (art. #21, #50). In sum, Chileans showed no fear of speaking up for what they thought righteous. This was made clear on the daily protests that occurred when the curfew and state of emergency were already set in place. Citizens were committed to the cause to the point of defying the soldiers on the streets (art. #33).

Yet, the largest displays of commitment regarded the level of disruption of the movement. For instance, there was a significant number of strikes that surged to show solidarity with the movement (art. #6). On the first months, some protesters targeted highway tolls to cause disruptions in transportation, showing their anger towards the increasing price of mobility (art. #44). However, the largest disruptions were those caused by the 'Front line' at demonstrations. The pattern became clearer in Santiago, where protesters would gather at the Plaza de la Dignidad (art. #19). At the time of assembly, barricades would be raised, and the front line was in charge of maintaining police at bay to secure the square (art. #9, #11). In short, it was the front line that would clash with police and, in some instances, recur to arson and Molotov cocktails. Not only did they risk arrest, but these protesters were also the most exposed to police repression in all its forms, as discussed later on. The front line

became even a symbolic act of commitment, as article #32 reads: “the Front line represents all the physical and psychological effort that is needed to go forward in life”. Indeed, it was the actions of the front line, and the images of clashes with police that are the most recalled displays of commitment in the later 2020 and 2021 articles.

5. Case study 2: Contextual factors

Throughout the qualitative analysis, the influence of contextual factors was also assessed. In this section, the contextual factors found are split into two parts in order to discuss the role that contextual factors played in the resolution of the protests. First, the contextual obstacles that the movement faced will be broken down. Second, the contextual advantages that the movement counted with will be discussed.

5.1 Contextual Obstacles

In total, 111 code tags on context obstacles were found. The most tagged obstacles were protest crackdown (51), referring to the police and military use of force, as well as arrests; citizens’ costs (28), encompassing damages to the city or direct negative effects that the protest had on the population, whether intended or not; government capabilities for crackdown (16), which include the legal options that the government had available to squander the movement; and the control of narratives (8), as the government attempted to gain advantage over the official version of the events. Most of the presence of these obstacles were concentrated on the core months of the movement, from October to December 2019. The salience of each of these obstacles fluctuated over time, depending on how the movement reacted to the circumstances. The factors will thus be discussed in chronological order of salience.

As argued in the Commitment subsection, when the Evade movement appeared at metro stations, the government’s first reaction was to send police and forcibly stop the payment evasion and demonstrations. This forceful approach continued on and grew in strength as demonstrations moved to the main roads. Rather than mitigating the movement by discouraging people from engaging, Sharp’s *political jujitsu* phenomenon happened. Namely, seeing minors attacked and arrested by police not only did not scare off

empathizers, but rather pushed them to support the cause more actively. The police use of force (often indiscriminate) brought people together as it put the government's intentions in a bad light. It signaled to people what they already felt: that the authorities had no interest in listening, that their voices were simply pushed aside (art. #2).

As the protests grew in size, so did the protest repression. The military and police applied different protest containment tactics such as the use of tear gas and pellet bullets. The effects of the indiscriminate levels of repression left many wounded, and even some casualties. Among the most recurrent wounds was the loss of sight due to pellet bullets that hit the eyes of protesters. The case of Front-line participant Gustavo Gatica became particularly famous, turning into a symbol of the movement. The 21-year-old was shot by police in both eyes with pellet bullets, leaving him blind (art. #13, #19). By March 2020, the INDH numbers reported 460 people with ocular trauma (art. #49). It has been argued that bullet wounds in the face were no accident, but a deliberate action of the armed forces (art. #2, #49). Amnesty International 2020 report on the matter highlighted the lack of efforts of the administration to mitigate violations of human rights in the hands of police, such as the prohibition of pellet bullets which went "against the international standard of use of force" (art. #49).

Alongside the protest crackdown, Piñera's administration made use of their capability to call for a State of emergency. This meant that for days, the military was surveilling the streets, engaging in protest mitigation, and a curfew was set (art. #24, #33, #43). Such actions brought back memories of dictatorship times, only 40 years ago (art. #33). Such strong response from the armed forces gave Chileans more reasons to fight, and strengthened the argument that the current government was still being backed down by dictatorial institutions (e.g., the constitution and the military). Thus, the forceful approach proved not to be effective in calming down the masses.

In an attempt to regain control of the situation, president Piñera and the administration tried to reign in the narratives. The most notorious example is the interview that Piñera gave to a Spanish radio chain, Ser, in December 2019 (art. #43). In it, he tries to justify his rough approach toward the protests. For instance, he claimed that he did not see the Estallido

coming and that many of the issues raised were result of previous mandates¹⁶. He made allusion to the ‘irrational’ violence that took over the streets and referred to the actions as a parallel situation provoked by delinquents. Portraying violent protesters as criminals, Piñera reasoned that the armed forces were the only way out.

Another contextual factor that shaped the perception of the protests was the costs that citizens had to bear due to the demonstrations. During the first months of the movement, daily activities seemed to have paused or slowed down. From the temporary closing of schools and sporadic strikes to the cancelling of concerts and events, citizens seemed willing to sacrifice their plans for the cause (art. #24, #39). In fact, articles did not begin to discuss the costs of the movement until January 2020, when fatigue was starting to wear down protesters and sympathizers, and the costs began to accumulate. Many articles touch upon the negative influence of the Estallido on Chile’s economy, as it slowed down productivity and unemployment grew. This occurred due to the closure of small businesses, as clientele wore down in key parts of the city, where demonstrations had taken over (art. #23, #29, #35). February 2020 statistics also showed the toll on mental health that the movement had had on the population, as anxiety and depression increased due to the mental fatigue of continuous stress (art. #4). The instances of chaos and violence were becoming too heavy to bear.

It was around this time of uncertainty on the future of the movement when COVID hit Chile. Even though some claimed that the government initially used the pandemic as an excuse to wear down the public demonstrations (art. #14), for the most part Chileans respected the enforced lockdown to contain the spread of coronavirus. The pandemic both forced people to stay inside and to focus their attention on more urgent matters, such as increasing unemployment and concerns about healthcare (art. #19, #37). Thus, it can be said that the movement was shut down due to COVID. Yet, to that statement we must add the fact that fatigue was already looming, as alternative solutions were already on the table and so demonstrating on the streets did not seem as necessary nor effective to achieve their goals – the constitutional plebiscite opened a separate forum for dialogue.

¹⁶ Piñera had been Chile’s president before, from 2010 to 2014. In his previous mandate he had been famous for lifting Chile’s economy.

5.2 Contextual advantages

Throughout the analysis, contextual advantages were also identified, which allowed protesters to push for the granting of their concessions. The code tags found in the analysis were: political opportunity, space for negotiation, pressure on political authorities, and distrust on the traditional political structure. Together, they show that the political climate became favorable for the movement.

The first element to come into play is the general distrust that the population had towards the administration and the existing political parties. In article #48, a study shows that more than half of the population (56%) pointed at politicians as the source of their discontent. A later study published in January 2020 showed that 67% of the youth could not identify a leader they trusted, and that only 10% trusted the police forces (art. #9). As discussed before, a large reason why the protests were characterized as ‘leaderless’, is that they refused to let traditional politicians take the credit for the movement. It is often argued in the sample that neither right wing nor left wing politicians could be trusted, and both sides struggled to profit from the movement (art. #3, #9, #28, #45). This pattern is reflected in 2020 polls, which showcased that only 20% of the population identified themselves with a political party (art. #45). With such low rates of approval, political parties were forced to listen to their constituents. As part of the democratic process, without a significant number of people backing them up, all parties were at risk of losing their power. In an article published closer to the date of the plebiscite (art. #38), the head of a left-wing political party reflected on the impact that the Estallido had had on the parties’ approach to policymaking, as the increasing distrust pushed them to look inwards. He stated that “it has been a period of taking charge of all the responsibilities that correspond to all of us in the political world” (art. #38). And so, it was the loudly voiced distrust that opened the political opportunity for protesters to gain their claims. A political opportunity that gave way to the discussions on the plebiscite in November 2019, a given solution that will be addressed in the coming section.

6. Case study 2: Alternative solution

The Estallido social covered a lot of ground. There was not one singular demand, meaning there was not an individual, easy fix that the government could enact to calm down the

waters. Instead, people took the chance to bring to the surface all the issues they had faced with institutions, which had piled up over the years. Protesters themselves did not have a clear idea of what solutions they wanted to implement, but rather painted a picture of what they did not want anymore. It was up to the authorities to turn that discontent around.

After consecutive days of demonstrations and clashes with police, Piñera announced a package of social reforms, e.g., improvements in the pension system. He claimed that the government “reacted with a strong political agenda, making an enormous effort to listen with humility to what the people were telling us” (art. #43). However, after the strong protest repression, the promised reforms were not enough to put protesters at ease. By November 10, the government expressed being open to work on a new Constitution, and two days later Piñera called for an “agreement for peace”, as protests continued to escalate despite the declared state of emergency (art. #28). A vast group of political parties got together and worked on an agreement to jumpstart the process of a new constitution. On November 15, 2019, they announced a plebiscite that would allow Chileans to vote, first, on whether they wanted a new constitution, and second, on whether they wanted it drafted by experts and politicians, or by selected citizens (art. #28). This constitutional process offered Chileans the “opportunity to give an institutional conduit to a social discontent” (art. #39), which is still ongoing, as the later draft of the constitution is yet to be approved by the population.

The space for negotiation that first gave way to the reforms, and later on to the plebiscite, surged from the decreasing support that politicians had, combined with the strong WUNCness displayed. Some argued that it was the increasing violence that forced politicians to listen to the people. For instance, article #38 argues that “there are some who believe that by taking care of the people’s demands, the violent groups can be isolated”. Sociologist Manuel Canales seconded that statement, considering that “in this country, if they don’t fear you, they don’t listen” (art. #3). Commitment was also shown as protests went on even after the announcement of the constitution. Given the lack of trust in the government, protesters wanted to make sure that the plebiscite would happen, and in the most democratic conditions (art. #14). The Worthiness displayed through the multiple artistic protest methods effectively conveyed the message to authorities: that they are relevant and urgent concessions to attend to. These two components, combined with strong

displays of Unity and Numbers, showed the government how many, and how much people were invested in the matter – systematic inequality could no longer be ignored. Thus, the successful proposal of a new constitution emerged from the movement’s proper use of WUNCness, as well as the political opportunity that a democratic regime brought to Chileans.

7. On Diversity

Throughout the analysis, we have discussed the four main components that Tilly presented in his framework on protest strength. As presented in the theoretical framework, Wouters & Walgrave (2017) consider that there is a fifth component that determines the strength of a protest: diversity. In this section the impact of this component on the movement will be assessed. This factor was not touched upon in Sharp’s work, and so his methods of action do not necessarily reflect the level of diversity of a protest group. While this component could not be coded following the same structure as the other ones, the code tag ‘diversity’ was made. The tag marked down the times the diversity of the demographics was used as an argument that proved the scale of the movement. 8 code tags were identified in the Hong Kong sample, and 4 in the Chilean one, already demonstrating that this factor was more salient in the first case study.

One important element of the Hong Kong protests was the fact that people from all backgrounds united to demand the withdrawal of the extradition bill. The June 9 march was memorable not just for the number of people that joined it, but for the “wide spectrum of people who joined hands” (art. #29). “Hongkongers – young, old and across the political spectrum – had come together to fight one single cause” states article #29 of the SCMP. The recurrent protests that set off in June were characterized by the variety of people with different profiles that agreed on the importance of the matter. Article #30 cites the variety of protest groups that joined the movement, “including teachers, parents, religious officials and lawmakers”. The diversity of the protest complicated the authorities’ desire to control the narratives. Unlike in past movements, the blame could not be put on political extremists or rebelling students who do not know any better. It was the Hong Kongese population, as a collective, that disapproved of the government’s actions, such as their approach to the

protests. For instance, when students took over campuses in November, the government's narrative of the movement claimed that it was uncontrollable young students who had to learn about limits. However, December protests were also joined by elderly and parents with children, demonstrating once again the scope of the movement (art. #28).

The diversity of the Chilean protests was a bit more hidden. Articles seldom directly referred to the diversity of the demographics. However, this diversity can be inferred from the diverse types of demands that the movement claimed for: "the bad quality education that on top was charged for, the indebtedness at all scales, the undeserving pensions, [...] the salaries, feminism, the Mapuche people" (art. #18). Each of these demands concerns different demographics, and indeed called different groups to the streets: students, the elderly, workers, indigenous peoples (art. #19). Yet, the emphasis of the demographics was put on the youth, as over 60% of the young population (those younger than 35) took part in the protests (art. #9, #48). It is often argued that the Estallido was initiated, and later fueled by the Chilean youth, who understood the impact that unjust legislation had on everyone. Art. #48 mentions the level of empathy shown by young protesters, who went to the streets to demand better pension and accessible pharmaceuticals for their grandparents. Hence, the sample shows that diversity played a smaller role in the Chilean movement than it did in Hong Kong, a case in which the variety of backgrounds brought legitimacy to the cause.

8. Conclusions of the findings

This section has discussed the different findings that were captured through the qualitative analysis. Both case studies were analyzed by coding protest methods that reflected the WUNC components, as well as contextual factors that altered the dynamics of the movement. The analysis shows, as expected, multiple similarities across cases, as well as differences in the relationship between the coded components. The first similarity to note is the repeated themes across case studies. Both cases presented a high number of codes for marches and social media, reflecting the two main platforms used for protest. That is, both movements recurred to two spaces: the streets and the web. This implies that both movements used Numbers, and the recurrent presence of masses (physically and virtually) to put pressure on authorities. The active use of social media is a factor present in movements

of the last decade, and it is a factor that should not be underestimated. Not only does it serve as a second platform in which Numbers can be displayed, it works as an alternative social system, allowing protesters to coordinate efficiently, and in the case of Hong Kong, safely, as participants could engage anonymously. Thus, social media serves as a tool to foster Unity and keep unworthy behavior at bay by communicating across protesters. Another two relevant themes present in both movements are protest crackdown and unworthy behavior. As argued above, these two go hand in hand in that the unworthy protest actions called for a coercive protest crackdown, which in turn fueled larger displays of unworthy behavior. This pattern held true in both cases. However, unworthy actions unfolded differently in each case. In Hong Kong, most acts of unworthiness were tied to displays of commitment, namely looting related to the economic boycott. As such, the unworthiness displayed was an inherent part of the movement. In Chile, many narratives implied that unworthy actions were only indirectly linked to the movement. That is, unworthiness took place because rule of law was already ineffective and people took advantage and raided stores for personal gain; or it was only a radical few that engaged in unworthy protest action, as most protesters adhered to worthy methods of protests. Hence, the negative effect of unworthy displays weighed more importance in the dissolution of the Hong Kongese movement than in its Chilean counterpart.

Besides the WUNC dynamics, the analysis showed that context did play a part in both movements' results. Yet, each movement encountered a different political scenario. As portrayed in the background, the coding analysis confirmed that Hongkongers faced contextual barriers that deterred them from achieving their goals. There was no political willingness to negotiate, and with citizens growing tired of the displays of unworthiness, the protest lost all traction. On the other hand, the Chilean government faced a population that had lost all sympathy for their administration, and so the government welcomed negotiations that would improve their stance and end with the disruptiveness of the movement. Thus, the presence of political opportunity allowed for the constitutive process to begin. In sum, the analysis demonstrated that the proper display of WUNC as well as a somewhat favorable POS is needed for a movement to gain concessions.

V. Conclusions

In this qualitative analysis, two social movements have been studied, the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement, and Chile's social outburst of 2019. Throughout the analysis, many similarities have been found between the case studies, as well as differences, the most notorious one being the outcome of the movements. In this final chapter, the salient factors that ultimately determined the level of success of these movements are discussed, in an attempt to respond to the research question "To what extent are the WUNC components determinant of a protest's success?". Finally, the possible implications of these findings, as well as the limitations that this study faced, are addressed.

1. Discussion

At first glance, both of the studied movements seem very similar. In both cases, a significant part of the population organized themselves via social media to demonstrate on the streets; and in both cases the government's first reaction was to forcefully repress the protests. These similarities were sustained by the qualitative analysis. Firstly, in the two cases the numbers displayed proved to be an effective argument to get the government to listen. In Hong Kong, the magnitude of the protests in the first few weeks forced Lam's administration to withdraw the extradition bill. In Chile, it was such the amount of people involved in the movement that the whole country came to a halt for days. Another point of convergence is the significant role that social media played on the movements. The use of these virtual platforms served different purposes. Firstly, it worked as a communication and coordination tool that operated outside the sphere of mass media, which was not fully trusted in either scenario. Secondly, it opened an alternative social system, in which protesters could socialize and support each other, a role particularly important in Hong Kong, where many engaged in the movement anonymously. Thirdly, social media feeds became another front in which to protest. Chile's twitter stats demonstrated that the government was at a losing battle against well-versed digital protesters. Hence, numbers not only mattered on the streets, but also online.

Unity was another very relevant component present in both protests. Both movements displayed very high levels of unity, as it accounted for more than 40% of the WUNCness

displayed in each case. That is, both cases portrayed a very large, united front. This gave power to the movements by showing that a considerable portion of the population agreed that the issues had to be addressed. In a democratic environment, such argument cannot be ignored, as it is in the authorities' best interests to keep voters on their side.

The two instances faced similar threats; however, these threats affected the movements differently. For instance, the two most tagged codes in both analyses were 'protest crackdown' and 'unworthy behavior'. This finding already signals that clashes with authorities were a big part of the protests. Yet, protest crackdown looked slightly different across the cases. In Chile, police, and eventually military, were immediately sent to deter protesters from demonstrating. The violence of the repression was significant, as many were severely injured, and some protesters lost their lives in the front lines. Although many were arrested on the days of the protests, most were immediately released, and by 2021 only five were still convicted on charges in relation to rioting. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, police repression was highly present, but the number of injuries and casualties was significantly lower. When it comes to arrests, though, the crackdown of the protest still continues. Many who were arrested in the moment were speedily released for being minors at the time, but they are being prosecuted now. To the day of writing, there are bounties offered for information on relevant fugitives linked to the 2019 protests. Thus, protesters faced a different type of threat when contradicting their government. Namely, Chileans faced unsupervised police turned violent, later reigned back in by authorities; while Hongkongers confronted a system that catalogues and treats protesters as enemies of the state.

A second obstacle that both of these movements encountered was the coronavirus outburst. The beginning of the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown meant that public gatherings were not an option anymore. In Chile, demonstrations on the matter effectively ended. As the lockdown worsened the inequalities and put pressure on the lower tier of the population, the efforts focused on ensuring the plebiscite on the constitution took place. COVID showed the cracks in the neoliberal system, proving the need for a new constitution. The pandemic did cause a delay in the plebiscite, which was moved from April 26, 2020, to October 25, 2020. This brought up some protests in early October, demanding confirmation of the plebiscite, however, the estallido as it first was had effectively ended. So, while the pandemic

wrapped up the movement, it did not negatively affect the gains of the protests. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, protests immediately came to an end due to the pandemic, before any concessions were granted. With the excuse of the emergency sanitary situation, protest crackdown became more effective, and the new National Security Law was passed during lockdown, discouraging people from demonstrating. In fact, many perceive the pandemic as the final blow against the 2019 movement.

One last contextual issue that both cases encountered was the increasing costs that citizens had to bear due to the protests. When the movement exploded in Chile, a majority of the population sympathized with the cause. Many were willing to sacrifice and pause their jobs or their education. Besides, many who did not fully engage understood why others opted for disruptive demonstrations. Thus, in the first critical months, citizens were willing to bear the costs. By the time that neighbors began to get tired of the commotions, the government was already sitting at a negotiating table. It was only in the coming years that numbers reflected the real impact that the Estallido had on Chile's economy and social environment. In Hong Kong, the burdens that people had to bear became too heavy: a plummeting economy, a marked social division, and the increasing damages to public and private property. At the beginning of the movement, protesters were highly aware of the importance of keeping citizens on their side, and they set measures to contain and direct their disruptions towards their real targets. Yet, the more the protests escalated, the less justifiable their actions seemed to many fellow citizens. Protest fatigue became a big issue for the movement, and numbers started to dwindle. The perceived unworthiness not only cost the protests their popularity, but also permitted the government to intervene more strongly.

This point brings us to a substantial difference between the two movements: the balance in their display of WUNC factors. As mentioned above, both movements display strong unity, however, the proportions of the other factors vary across the cases. In the first case study, Commitment was the second most displayed component, accounting for 37% of the protests' WUNCness. This means that the Hong Kong movement characterized itself for a unified front that was committed to the cause, willing to go the extra mile. As explored in the analysis, this Commitment often led to acts of unworthy behavior, such as looting and strong disruptions to the city. Not only were there significant displays of unworthiness, the use of

protest methods that were linked to Worthiness were relatively little, as Worthiness only accounted for 11.4% of the displayed WUNC, alongside Numbers. And so, although a large, unified (and to some extent diverse) front was portrayed at first, the cause was quickly labelled as unworthy by the government, and eventually by fellow citizens too. The second case study presented a more balanced WUNCness. Numbers and Commitment accounted for over 17% of the WUNC displayed each. Meanwhile, Worthiness represented almost 20% of the WUNCness. Thus, not only was the Estallido a large, united, and committed front – it was a front worthy of being listened to. This disparity in Worthiness between case studies is one of the findings of this analysis that may explain why, unlike Hongkongers, Chileans got concessions granted.

Another main reason why one movement succeeded and the other was squandered is the differences in political climate that the movements faced. The stance of Hong Kong's administration was very clear from the beginning: democratic reforms were not up for negotiation. This stance included backing down all police action, and so they also consistently refrained from addressing the demands regarding police brutality and the treatment of protesters as rioters. The lack of interest in negotiating can also be explained by the fact that it was mainland Chinese politics that had the real leverage in the situation. In the current governmental system, it is not the people who ultimately decide who rules Hong Kong, but the Chinese party. Thus, authorities have no interest in changing the status quo, and the demands were considered separatist and threatening to the state. With the power of the party supporting the protest repression, the demands of the movement seemed to be too far from reach. On the other hand, Chile's government quickly felt obliged to find a middle ground with protesters. The power of the police repression had turned the international media against them and had done little to stop people from demonstrating. On top of that, action had been taken to discuss the dismissal of Piñera. With little left to do without being deemed an illegitimate presidency, the administration resorted to the proposal of a new constitution, hoping to cover most of the demands, which had all been acknowledged as worthy and necessary for the wellbeing of the people.

To answer the research question, it can be concluded that the WUNC factors do determine to some extent the level of success of a movement. Confirming Tilly's and Wouter &

Walgrave's understanding of the workings of WUNCness, a strong, yet balanced, display of WUNC components can give a protest the cutting edge to persuade their opponents. On the other hand, if one element is lacking or overshadowed by other actions, the protest's strength might be nullified, getting nowhere. However, the analysis also found that contextual factors, such as the POS, also delimit the extent to which a protest can achieve its goals. That is, if the opponents do not perceive any value in attending to the protesters' demands and/or the losses they would suffer from agreeing to the concessions are too great, it is unlikely that they will open the door for negotiations. This is especially true when they have significant capabilities at their disposal to squander a movement. In conclusion, both agency and context determine the success of a movement.

2. Limitations

Given the complexity of the topic, there are limitations to the analysis conducted. Most of the limitations encountered are related to the chosen methodology. Firstly, by selecting newspaper articles as the primary source of data, the study had to adhere to the information that had already been filtered by the journals. Thus, any biases that the authors may have had in their writing might have resulted in an altered portrayal of the movements. Given that the strength of WUNC relies on how it is perceived by the audience, such biases do not necessarily hinder the findings, as they reflect how the WUNCness of the movement was interpreted and presented by the media. However, a significant limitation that comes with that is that the study relied on the events that the media decided to write about. That is, given the sample design, it was not possible to ensure the compilation of all the protest actions that took place throughout the timeframe of the movement. Thus, the results show only a portion of the movement's behavior.

The selection of the articles of the sample also came with limitations. The articles were selected by order of appearance at the google search, prioritizing the relevance of the articles according to the search engine. That meant that there was an uneven number of articles per month of publication. This made it hard to make a reliable comparison of WUNC over time, as well as a longitudinal comparison between cases. A big difference between the samples is that in Case 1 no articles published in 2021 were identified, while Case 2 encompassed

seven articles published in that year. Hong Kong's events sharply stopped as soon as the pandemic started, and with the National Security law passed in June 2020, the only further events related to the movement were arrests. The security law also hindered the freedom of press, and so the articles published on the topic diminished quickly after the bill was passed. This is a possible explanation why the article sample used for this thesis did not include any articles published in 2021. On the contrary, the Estallido social brought major changes to the Chilean establishment. With the new constitution still being redrafted at the time of writing, the events that took place late 2019 and early 2020 are still very much relevant in today's Chile. Thus, many of the articles that form part of the sample used were published in 2021, many of them revisiting the Estallido Social episode.

Another limitation was found during the code analysis. Although both protests were significantly large, the quantity of codes related to Numbers do not reflect such a picture. Numbers accounted for 11.4% of WUNC in case 1, and 17.2% in case 2. A possible explanation for this is that in the matrix of methods of protest action only three out of 23 methods of action were considered to display Numbers, thus limiting the possibilities for coding. Thus, even if the salience of the event was the number of people that attended (such as in Santiago's one-million march on October 25), it would only count as one code tag. Thus, the framework created to evaluate the proportion of WUNC has its limitations and so the numbers are mere approximations, lacking statistical reliability. Future research on the strength of a protest should look into a more intricate statistical design in order to draw more reliable and valid conclusions on the importance of a protest's agency.

3. Implications

Hong Kong's and Chile's examples of WUNC displays demonstrate that how protesters choose to behave ultimately affects the impact of the social movement. An important implication that can be drawn from this finding is that for protests to be successful, the WUNC factors should be properly portrayed and applied. The matrix presented in the methodology, linking Sharp's list of methods of protest action with WUNC factors, gives a good overview of what actions can be taken in order to evenly display WUNCness in a movement. Social movement organizers should take these components into consideration

when planning and managing the development of a protest. Another important implication of this research is that the impact of the protests on all stakeholders should be taken into account. That is, it is not just about how WUNC is perceived by the opponent, but also by bystanders and the general audience. Protesters must take into account how others are affected by their actions for two reasons: to not alienate them and eventually turn them against them, and to ideally persuade them into supporting the movement as well.

One final implication of the findings is that violence is not the best route towards gaining concessions. Based on the sample it is difficult to get to a definite conclusion on the effectiveness of recurring to violence, yet it should still be noted that the main advances were made in spite of the violence used. For instance, in Hong Kong the Numbers and Unity displayed, together with the committed disposition of the protesters, were enough to convince Lam of withdrawing the bill in September, up to when unworthy behavior had been kept at bay, as seen in Figure 2. The impact that violence had on Chile's success is blurrier. In the official narrative, most acts of unworthiness were understood as something separate, yet parallel to the movement. This meant that the claims were not tainted by the violence and were still perceived as worthy. Piñera himself voiced that the concerns of the people would be listened to, while the delinquents would be put to blame for the looting. However, given that the levels of violence happened *because* of the circumstances created by the protests, it is not possible to conclude that the violence conducted by citizens had nothing to do with the government's willingness to negotiate. If anything, it gave the government more reasons to conclude the movement fast in order to restore the rule of law, even if to end it they had to attend to the protesters' demands. Having said that, it is still clear that violence was not the sole or main reason why the government gave in. Rather, it was the proper combination of WUNC factors that demonstrated to Piñera's administration that it was high time to listen to the constituents.

This paper also brings up new questions that should be considered for future work. For one, the full weight of the role of Diversity in a movement still remains to be analyzed. What is more, further research may look into how to ensure that WUNC is used appropriately in order to gain concessions even when political circumstances seem to be unfavorable. One must recall that, as Brannen et al. (2020) pointed out in their work "The Age of Mass

Protests: Understanding an Escalating Global Trend”, protests are here to stay. Thus, it is up to all relevant actors to better understand them and learn how to effectively profit from their actions. Whether it is a government administration that seizes the opportunity to listen to the interests of the people, or a group of citizens demanding their human rights violations to be addressed, the act of protesting has become and will continue to be a significant part of the political space.

VI. Appendix: List of analyzed articles

Case study 1

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