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DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE ED AZIENDALI "M.FANNO"
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

TESI DI LAUREA

**POPULISM IN EUROPE:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON ESS DATA**

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ANNO ACCEDEMICO 2019-2020

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Introduction

In the last 20 years we have witnessed the rise of populism, a phenomenon with a fluid definition. From the end of the 1990s to the present day, this political ideology has been capable of an incredible transformation, from a phenomenon reserved for members of the most extreme fringes of the political spectrum to a tsunami capable of increasing its political support and obtaining relevant positions in the governments of 11 countries of the European Union. In recent years the attention on the phenomenon by politics, journalism and the scientific community has been very high. Despite this, its definition is still smoky because populism ramifies over and over making life difficult for those who pursue the goal of labelling it. Its chameleonic nature, however, derives from its survival instinct, in fact one of the common traits among the various populist parties is to try to "always be on the piece", keeping up with the hot topics of the moment regardless of their nature.

In the first chapter the focus is on literature about Populism. A common definition for populism and its ramifications is first sought. We then proceed with the analysis of the two main currents of thought on this phenomenon, one that exalts its usefulness by describing it "as a process regenerating democracy, which, by cleaning it of all its waste, recovers its true principles and values." while the other defines populism "as a real threat to democracy: the calling to forms of direct democracy would imply the downsizing of constitutional guarantees, the very bulwark of democratic systems".

This will then open the debate on Euro-sceptic ism and the extreme right, which are very often linked to populist parties. And finally, a review of some important works on populism conducted in Europe, mainly from an empirical point of view.

The second chapter will present the dataset used for the analysis. In the first section we will explore the dataset and the most interesting variables contained in it. In the second section we will explain how the independent variables used in the various models have been constructed and how the pre-existing variables in the starting dataset have been recoded in order to make

their effect more easily interpretable.

In the third chapter the models used in this study are discussed and socio-economic explanations are sought from the analyses. This chapter is subdivided into three subsections each for the categories of parties of interest (populist and/or extreme right-wing and/or Eurosceptic parties). For each subsection we have regressed 4 different dependent variables. One for the feeling of closeness to a party, one for the vote declared in the previous elections while the two remaining explained variables are indexes for the closeness to the ideology for the party of that section, constructed through the use of attitudinal variables.

Finally, we conclude with some considerations on the results and their implications.

Chapter 1

Literature review

Populism is a complex phenomenon, to which sociologists, political scientists and economists have never managed to give a definitive connotation, further considering the heterogeneity of the individual developing contexts particularly in the last twenty years.

Numerous scholars over the past few decades have emphasized that populism is a phenomenon and a concept that is difficult to define. In his book “*Populism 2.0*” Revelli underlines how populism runs the risk of becoming a catch-all word:

“a word that has caught all old and new things, as if they belonged to the same nature, radical protests from the day before yesterday and forms of electoral revolts today and perhaps tomorrow, the nineteenth-century Russian populists and the Italian apolitical [...] Everything is outside and (but not always) against the so-called establishment” (Revelli, 2017)[27].

In 1963 Isaiah Berlin compared the search for a definition of the concept of populism “*to the attempt of many bridesmaids to wear Cinderella’s shoe*” (Pinelli, 2010)[25]: a vain search for reconciliation between the theoretical model and the changing heterogeneity of the subjects examined.

In a short 2010 essay entitled “*Populismo, una definizione indefinita per eccesso di definizioni*”, Ilvo Diamanti notes that the term is used mainly in a critical sense, to indicate “*a system, or a political subject, not very liberal and tendentially authoritarian*” (Diamanti, 2010)[5]; in this work Diamanti lists some of the possible, or at least real, uses of the concept under examination.

He notes how the word populism is commonly used to indicate:

“a wide range of political actors from the European extreme right. Shared by a xenophobic and, at the same time, anti-globalist, as well as anti-European [...] speech. Others also refer the League to this type of political entity [...]; there is also talk of populism to define not only parties or movements, but leaders. In general, the leaders who have invested heavily in direct dialogue with the citizens are populists” (Diamanti, 2010)[5].

Of a similar opinion, Nadia Urbinati claims that *“populism is today one of the most used and least meaningful words because it is too full of contrasting signifiers”* in the preface of the Italian version of *What is populism?* (Müller, 2017)[24].

In her book *“What is populism?”* Jan-Werner Muller highlights how *“every time we talk about populism [...] it is far from obvious to know what we are talking about”*. One of the causes, probably the main one, of the indeterminacy of populism, of its *“indefinite-definition”*, is to be found in the very definition of *“the people”*.

In the attempt of a global understanding of the phenomenon it becomes essential to start from its etymological root, the population; the latter is an imagined community, it is a construction open to a plurality of definitions. I therefore believe it is impossible to identify a common denominator for all the cases of populism mentioned in the literature or to find a single essence behind all the consolidated uses of the term. For this reason, I think it is more useful to try to divide populism into various subsets.

1.1 Populist families

The term was used for the first time in Russia, *narodničestvo*, by a political and cultural movement of the late nineteenth century which aimed to redeem the dignity of rural communities. Initially, populism represented an ideological and political position whose main depository of positive moral and cultural values was the population, in opposition to particularistic institutions and powers. In analogy to what was happening in Russia, in 1891, the People’s Party was founded in Cincinnati(U.S.A.). This group, consisting of an aggregation of farmers, opposed the overwhelming power of the banking system and great finance which undermined the interests of the category. The People’s Party, formally disappeared in 1912, turned into a purely xenophobic and nationalist movement in the following years (Taguieff, 2003)[38].

Starting from this brief historical reference, it is interesting to explore M. Canovan’s vision: we can divide populism into two large families:

- agricultural populism (which includes “*the original populisms*”, the Russian and American ones mentioned above);
- political populism (linked “*to direct democracy devices [...] , to the mobilizations of mass passions, to the idealizations of the man on the street*”) (Canovan, 1981)[3].

“*From these two macro-categories Canovan derives all possible meanings of the phenomenon under study: thus from the agrarian one derives the radicalism of the peasants (well represented by the People’s Party), the movements of the farmers (typical form of the populisms of Europe of east of the nineteenth century) and agricultural intellectual socialism (such as the movement of the Russian populists), while “populist dictatorship (it is the case of Peron) would descend from political populism”; populist democracy (in which referendums such as Switzerland are widely used) reactionary populism (such as that of George Wallace in Alabama); and the populism of politicians (that is, the style in which politicians turn to the people to increase their consensus)*” (Tarchi, 2004)[39].

Tarchi also points out that the English author distinguishes four prevalent uses of the word people, to which four different types of populism refer.

The first possible meaning for the English author is “*united people, or the nation understood as a cohesive entity that the vocation of parties to partisanship tends to divide [...] ; a second populist way of referring to the people consists in understanding it as common people, the populace of the dispossessed, the poor, workers of humble conditions whose resentment is used in the controversy against the ruling class, which exploits the power to enrich itself behind the others. If the appeal favors extraordinary people [...] the target of populists is the entrenchment of professional politicians*” (Tarchi, 2004)[39].

The fourth, and last, form of appeal to the people that Margaret Canovan recognizes as proper to populism is the appeal to the people understood as “*ethnic people*”, characterized by an identity and a tradition that have particular roots (Tarchi, 2004)[39]; this last variation leads us to ethnopopulism (example: Lega Nord during the Bossi era).

The exaltation of the populace is therefore at the center of the populist debate, which celebrates their values, beliefs and group identity. They are represented as the better part in continuous contrast with strong powers that represent the political establishment and in recent years, banking systems, bureaucracy, state centralism and supranational orders.

Two other important authors Y. Mény and Y. Surel, believe of distinguishing three unique categories of people that often get confused (Mény, 2000) [19]:

-
- (i) the sovereign people intended as the legitimate actor and founder of the political order;
 - (ii) the nation-people, determined by geographic, linguistic or ethnic characteristics that define a common time;
 - (iii) The people-class, in the socio-economic sense (the plebs, the humblest part of the population).

Populism gives to this term a new connotation which, leveraging a partial component, the plebs, populates automatically, legitimizing to govern the entire community, thus inhibiting the individual and polarizing society into two macro groups, Elite and ordinary people.

In populist rhetoric the Elite is an indistinct entity made up of traditional politicians, national and supranational government institutions (national Parliament, European bodies), banks, multinationals etc.

Populist politics aims to eliminate the pluralistic aspect of a community, replacing it with a voice, a leader and an ideology. In this scenario, populism creates a simplified ideological chain of events that corrodes the system described above, streamlining relations between social forces and highlighting the people in the immediate condition of understanding which part is defending the *plebs*. This simplification leads to two opposing elements, the *plebs* on one hand and an enemy (a not always defined one) to be defeated on the other hand, both of them polarizing the political arena in an attempt to concentrate the consent of the electorate around the figure of the leader, the spokesman for the malaise of the population against the injustices of the system. The populist phenomenon therefore finds its ideal environment in the democratic system.

Consequentially, to understand populism, a broader understanding of the relationship between itself and democracy is needed. To do this it is necessary to understand whether populism is consequence and stimulus for democracy or it's antithesis.

1.2 Populism: two currents of thought

Mény and Surel both put emphasis to the fact that "*the populist phenomenon*" could be identified as a beneficial consequence of the democratic model. According to the two scholars, populism is seen as a process "*regenerating democracy, which, by cleaning it of all its waste, recovers its true principles and values*" (Mény, 2000)[19]. When the balance between the two corner-

stones of democracy falters, a sense of precariousness arises in the masses that often originates resentment of populist connotations.

The Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, in his work entitled *The Populist Zeitgeist: Government and Opposition* (2004), states that “*populism tries to shorten the growing gap between politics and citizens by referring to the moral infallibility of the people*” (Mudde, 2004)[21].

As part of the debate, we find two opposing ideologies. The first one identifies populism as a real threat to democracy: the calling to forms of direct democracy would imply the downsizing of constitutional guarantees, the very bulwark of democratic systems.

The second one considers that populism means appealing to the population, which has been kept away from the management of public affairs, thus making the populace participant and not only spectator. This current finds among its greatest exponents Ernesto Laclau who, in his work entitled *Larazón populista*, defines the phenomenon “*a social practice, a way of building political space*”. The Argentine philosopher drastically opposes the identification of populism with negative terms. Justifying the populist phenomenon, he defines the people “*a real relationship between social agents*”; according to Laclau, it is the sum of individuals and their needs that create the people. These needs, expressed singly by the individuals, once added together turn into a global demand, the aim of which is to eradicate the ruling class.

Obviously, to achieve this goal the people need a charismatic leader or leadership capable of channeling dissent, creating an anti-elitist front. According to this rhetoric, the leader embodies the expectations of the individual through the direct leader/people relationship. Because of this, some authors call the populist vote “*an acclamation rather than an election*”.

According to this interpretation, populism therefore does not aspire to radically transform the political system but to denounce its malfunction, making internal contradictions emerge (Laclau, 2012)[14].

1.3 Populism in Europe between far right and Euroscepticism

Populism constitutes the phenomenon characterizing the last twenty years in the context of European democracies. Its form varies according to the national contexts in which it occurs.

Despite the ideological reference guidelines of the various populist formations, there are common denominators characterized by marked antagonism towards traditional political par-

ties. The development of forms of direct democracy or mechanisms that guarantee citizens greater representativeness as like the fight against corruption or the adoption of social safety nets to protect the less well-off classes. Those people were the first victims by the global economic crisis effects resulting from the collapse of subprime mortgages and then by the sovereign debt crisis that hit the eurozone. In fact, for these reasons, it has begun to divide countries into “*winner against losers*” of Globalization (Kriesi, 2012)[13]; this helped/contributed to redefine the social geography of the traditional constituencies. Moreover, as consequence of the crisis and of the gradual decay of the European social democracies, populism has assumed a different connotation toward the traditional political parties belonging to Europe’s right wing;

In *the extreme right* parties we find xenophobic connotations, related to the massive movement of migrants towards Europe. Some populist parties in Western Europe that have received the most attention in academic literature (eg.: Mudde 2007[22]) are undoubtedly belonging to the extreme right.

However, we must remember that populism is not necessarily a characteristic of the radical right; there are various cases of left-wing populism (eg.: Linke in Germany or the 5-star movement in Italy). We can therefore say that literature now certainly considers certain parties to be Populists including the French Front National, the Belgian Flemish Interest , the Austrian Freedom Party, the Italian Lega Nord , and the Danish and Swiss People’s Parties, but there are still some factors that makes the construction of an encyclopedia of all populist parties complicated (Van Kessel, 2015)[41].

A first key issue is that populist rhetoric can be used at various levels, so it is not clear when a political party should be classified as really populist or not. A second problem often correlated with the previous one, is that populist rhetoric can be added and removed from the repertoire of political actors in a relatively simple way, making classification for some political parties/parties impossible.

Furthermore, another difficult issue arises from the fact that populist parties focus on issues relevant to their particular political context and adopt an ideological program consistent with the electorate to which they address. We must also remember that the rise of nationalism in Europe has influenced in a decisive way, the spreading of *Euroscepticism*.

Many of these parties/movements complain of a reduction in the decision-making autonomy of the individual country and the inability of the Brussels leaders to respond to the expect-

tations of European citizens. Euroscepticism is a widely shared term that describes negative attitudes towards European integration. Taggart was the first scholar to define it, he suggested that Euroscepticism is "*the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration*" (Taggart, 1998)[35].

In 2001, the collaboration between Taggart and Szczerbiak led to a more evolved version of the definition of Euroscepticism that presents a differentiation between hard (principled) and soft (contingent) Euroscepticism.

Hard Euroscepticism indicates the "*total rejection of the entire political and economic European integration project and opposition to their country that joins or remains member of the EU*" (Taggart, 2001)[36].

Vice versa weak Euroscepticism is "*not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU*" (Szczerbiak, 2008)[34].

Szczerbiak and Taggart's definition of Euroscepticism is the most widely accepted in literature for a number of reasons, also because it successfully identifies Eurosceptic tendencies in countries and party systems.

Another aspect of the question lies in the fact that during the last decades, in the entirety of advanced industrial society, huge cultural changes have occurred leaving deep scars in more traditionalist individuals. Migration flows, especially from low-income countries, have changed the ethnic composition of advanced industrial societies. These new "*European citizens*" speak different languages, have different religions and lifestyles than the native population. This phenomenon generates the impression in the native population that traditional norms and values are rapidly disappearing.

According to Ronald F. Inglehart, the rise of populist parties reflects, above all, a reaction against a wide range of rapid cultural changes that seem to erode the basic values and customs of Western societies (Inglehart, 2016)[11].

Inglehart suggests that the rise of populism does not only come from economic inequalities but also from some psychological factors.

The older and less educated support parties and leaders who focus on traditional cultural values, nationalism and xenophobia. Populists support charismatic leaders, reflecting a deep distrust of the establishment and mainstream parties who are led by educated elites with progressive cultural visions of immigration and society.

According to Inglehart all this leads to significant implications:

- *“the growing generational gap in Western societies is likely to increase the salience of the cultural split in party politics in the future, regardless of any improvements in the underlying economic conditions or any potential slowdown in globalization;*
- *the orthogonal attraction of cultural policy generates tensions and divisions within traditional parties, as well as allowing new opportunities for left and right populist leaders to mobilize electoral support, although it still remains difficult for populist parties to build an organizational base and support any temporary discoveries if they enter government coalitions and become part of the establishment. The net result is that Western societies face more unpredictable competitions, populist challenges against the establishment to the legitimacy of liberal democracy and potential interruptions of established competition models between parties” (Inglehart, 2016)[11].*

1.4 Relevant analysis on European data

I will now proceed to report some of the most relevant empirical studies on Populism in Europe.

The first author I want to present is Stijn van Kessel , in his works he points out how diversities of the programmatic offers proposed by populist parties are the reflection of the subtle ideological or chameleon-like character of populism (Mudde, 2004)[21] (Stanley, 2008)[33].

According to van Kessel, the choices made by populist political parties are not random but focus on four fundamentals themes: culture and ethnicity, economic difficulties, European integration, corruption. He considers these four subjects compatible with the subtle ideology of populism, which according to the political context, was presumed to be relevant also for the electoral success of the populist parties. Van Kessel believes that the four themes mentioned above have a positive effect on bringing an inactive electorate to the polls. In order to study the electoral performance of populist parties in Europe, van Kessel uses an explanatory model which included three general conditions: the electoral system; the reactivity of the established parts; and the offer of credible populist parties. In particular, he believes that the credibility of the populist parties depends to their electoral *“appeal”* and organizational cohesion (Mudde, 2007)[22].

Especially, in case of these issues being dear to a part of the electorate and that at the same time the traditional parties were perceived being perceived incapable of finding a solution to the

current situation. In his research the author notes that it is possible to distinguish different paths for populist success or failure, depending on the social, economic and political context in which they operated.

The results of his research show how populist parties have performed well in the last parliamentary elections in several post-communist or Mediterranean countries affected by the crisis, where an offer of credible populist parties has been combined with high levels of perceived corruption and economic difficulties or high levels of nativist sentiments and Euroscepticism (eg Greece, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia). To the contrary of any prediction some parties have also been successful in contexts where low levels of nativism were combined with a relatively European population, or low levels of perceived corruption (for example Belgium, Denmark and Norway) (Van Kessel, 2015)[41].

At the same time, in some countries populist parties have not been successful despite a seemingly favourable opportunity structure: for example, where high levels of perceived corruption have been combined with high levels of nativism or economic difficulties (eg Portugal and Slovenia).

Ultimately these results indicate that populist success or failure is not necessarily related to general economic conditions or dominant public attitudes towards issues central to the appeal of many populist parties.

In a nutshell, *populist parties can be successful if they manage to concentrate the unsatisfied electorate vote* (Van Hauwaert, 2018)[42].

In his most famous work, "*Populist Parties in Europe, Agents of Discontent?*", Van Kessel develops three case studies, focusing on populist parties in the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. The results of his analysis showed that populist parties aimed to compete with established ones based on typical populist themes: culture and ethnicity (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), economic difficulties and corruption (mainly Poland) and European integration (the United Kingdom and, subsequently, the Netherlands).

The results of the three case studies brought these results: in the Netherlands and Poland, populist parties have been successful in capitalizing on the lack of response, or lack of integrity, of the political establishment. In Poland, populist parties rode the wave of dissatisfaction due to the high levels of corruption attributed to traditional parties. In the UK populist parties were able to attract a considerable part of dissatisfied voters in the elections for the European parliament but at the same time, they failed sensationally in the national elections, as the Conservative Party

managed to recover a large part of the votes (which had merged into BNP and UKIP) adopted a Eurosceptic attitude and a restrictive position towards immigration (Lynch, 2013)[17].

According to the author, the reasons for this failure should be sought in the lack of credibility of the populist parties themselves deemed incapable of managing the situation. In addition to credibility there is another important factor, as far as the longevity of a populist party is concerned; organizational stability (Mudde, 2007)[22].

In summary, *“All in all, the study has indicated that the more successful populist parties were those which could build up (lasting) electoral credibility, allowing them to seize the ownership of electorally salient issues and to appeal to dissatisfied voters. Their electoral breakthrough has been facilitated where established parties could be blamed for their unresponsiveness or - as was the case in Poland - for their more general lack of integrity. Once a populist party has established itself, traditional mainstream parties may not automatically win back the support of voters if they become more responsive”* (Van Kessel, 2015)[41].

It is also important to note that traditional parties are also able to take on populist connotations, so we can say that populist parties are therefore not the only *“agents of discontent”*. This implies that populist parties should not be studied separately from their party’s political environment and should not be treated as completely different *“animals”* from their electoral competitors (Van Kessel, 2015)[41].

Many scholars have decided to investigate how the implications of the Great Recession impacted on the vote for anti-establishment parties, as well as for general confidence and political attitudes.

Some authors have found a strong relationship between rising unemployment and voting for non-traditional parties, especially populist ones. Furthermore, according to researches carried out by Yann Algan et al., unemployment increases hand in hand with declining trust toward national and European political institutions, but there are only weak or no effects of unemployment on interpersonal trust. The correlation between unemployment and attitudes toward immigrants is muted, especially for their cultural impact. In the end, according to their analysis, economic insecurity resulting from the protracted economic crisis is a determining factor for populism and political distrust (Algan, 2017)[1].

As reported in the last paragraph, Inglehart and Norris note that cultural variables outweigh economic ones in the decision to vote for a populist party (rather than abstaining or voting for a non-populist party) (Inglehart, 2016)[11].

But according to Guiso et al. this weak direct effect stems from a failure to consider that economic security shocks significantly affect the decision to abstain (Guiso, 2017)[9].

According to them, in addition to a stronger direct effect of the economic shocks, by evaluating the turnout effect, a significant indirect effect is also evident: the shocks to economic security are responsible for a strong change in political confidence and attitudes in the vis-à-vis immigration, which means that these changes in these latter variables cannot be considered independent factors.

In their article, "*Populism :demand and supply*", Guiso et al. try to answer to three fundamental questions: *Why here is there increasing consensus for populist parties? why now? What is driving this global shift of demand?* (Guiso, 2017)[9]

The authors provide their definition of populism based on three important components: populists claim to promote the interest of common citizens against the elites (supply rhetoric); they pander to people's fears and enthusiasms (demand conditions); and they promote policies without regard to the long-term consequences (short term protections).

Their theoretical premise is that voters' primary choice is between voting and staying home, but, conditional on deciding to participate, they usually vote for the closest party to them ideologically, as long as no populist is present yet on the supply side. In a systemic crisis, which depresses the motivation to vote for traditional parties of both left and right, the disappointment generates an abstention-based entry space for a populist platform (Guiso, 2017)[9].

In this article the authors focus on the demand side and voting decisions to reduce bias and estimate the underlying demand for populism well. On the supply side they show us that populists strategically choose their orientation. From our point of view we are interested only in the demand side part.

Starting from what has been said, they aim to test hypotheses for the Demand Side:

1. the percentage of people voting for a populist party is increased by those who:
 - (a) were significantly affected by the crisis in terms of economic security (they should be most tempted by short term protections);
 - (b) have a low degree of trust in the traditional parties (they are most vulnerable to the manipulation of beliefs by populist rhetoric);
 - (c) have low education (because of their lower ability to evaluate long term consequences of populist policies).

-
2. Trust in traditional parties, institutions and politics are negatively affected by protracted crisis.

The authors use as main source of individual data about the voters the European Social Survey (ESS). Ess systematically tracks changing values, attitudes, attributes and behaviour patterns in European polities.

The, ESS asks people if they voted in the last parliamentary elections in their country and for which party they voted, giving them a turnout indicator.

Furthermore, the ESS keeps track of a large number of variables from which we select a subset to build proxies for the characteristics of voters influencing both the turnout and voting decisions. This vast data source has also been used to build four indicators composed from variables present in the ESS7 dataset (2014): *Economic insecurity, Trust in traditional politics and institutions, Perception of long-run costs, Time discounting and risk aversion.*

Going back to the initial hypotheses, we have that all these results are in general consistent with Hypothesis 1. The same goes for Hypothesis 2: they conclude that economic insecurity can be seen as a reason why people lose faith in politics, institutions and governments and increase aversion for immigrants across the board.

In conclusion in this paper the authors show that the drivers that reduce the propensity to vote are the same that increase the propensity to vote for populist parties. All these drivers are strongly related to the increase of economic insecurity. The rare combination of markets and governments inability to provide security in the last crisis leaves many people with unprecedented fears and create the condition for an increase in numbers of populist parties in Europe.

“The factor that we highlight as key for understanding both demand and supply of populism is electoral participation. We show that abstentionism, the disillusionment effect, which the literature generally ignores, makes economic insecurity appear to be the real driver of populism on the demand side. [...]

Examination of the interaction between this rhetoric (the key element of populist supply strategy) and economic insecurity (the key driver of populist demand) has been shown to be very useful in understanding how trust and attitudes towards migration evolves. Populism does not have cultural causes, but rather an economic insecurity causes, with an important and traceable cultural channel” (Guiso, 2017)[9].

Conversly, Bakker et al tried to investigate what leads to voting for populist parties from a psychological point of view. They theorized that a low score on the personality trait Agreeable-

ness should predict voting for populist parties;

“ individuals who belongs to this group are egoistic, distrusting towards other, intolerant, unco-operative and express antagonism towards others (McCrae 1996: 329); applying these traits in the political domain, low agreeable individuals are more distrusting of politicians (Mondak & Halperin 2008) and politics (Dinesen et al. 2014), less efficacious (Mondak & Halperin 2008) and more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Swami et al. 2010).” (Bakker, 2016)[2] This matches the essential common denominator of populist parties: the anti-establishment message (Rooduijn 2014)[28], which they combine with a host ideology and the portrayal of the political elite disinterested in common people and working for their own gain (Mudde 2004)[21].

This can be demonstrated also by the congruency principle, that states that voters select politicians whose traits match their own traits (Caprara & Zimbardo) [4]

Futhermore we need to mention a very interesting work by Ian R. Gordon, which although restricted to the UK scenario only and the Brexit vote has many revealing aspects on how and what pushes people to vote for populist parties.

Gordon tries to understand the geography of recent populist movements in Europe in terms of general political economy, paying attention to the interaction between political and economic processes on a subnational (local and/or regional) scale (Gordon, 2018)[8].

To state this Gordon tests 2 main hypotheses:

1. The internationalization that has taken place in recent decades has generated three types of shock or stress to certain communities, in particular to some groups that may be particularly exposed to them.
2. Given the shock, those who are more likely to support a populist movement will be those who have decided to pursue professions characterized by professional qualifications compared to a university career, and those not affiliated with civil society organizations (churches and unions).

The results of the study on Brexit vote and the 2014 European elections in the UK show that as regards the first hypothesis, on the groups that could react to particular stresses imposed on them through internationalization, only one is clearly supported by the evidence. The second hypothesis, on the meaning of the factors that can be associated with local rather than cosmopolitan orientations (types of qualification and/or organizational affiliation), the evidence provides much clearer support for the hypothesis. In conclusion, as already expressed in the

literature, Gordon points out that persistent patterns of uneven economic development among various regions could lead to a political crisis. The same goes for multiple micro-level guesses that link an anti-establishment revolt or economic vulnerability or working-class status. In the analysis of the support for populist parties, evidence was found of radically different responses by several groups to the same sources of cultural shock.

“In particular, this was found to apply to groups with different types of qualification, reflecting a localist/cosmopolitan divide associated with different kinds of stake in stability, but also to ones with differing trans-local connections. The balance between these is not, however, just an arbitrary fact about particular places but (we should assume) outcomes of the sequence of economic roles they have played (as Massey, 1995, proposed). This might perhaps explain why, when recent economic change seems fairly irrelevant to the local strength of populism, very long-term structural changes do seem to have a bearing (Langella, 2016)[15]” (Gordon, 2018)[8].

According to Yann Algan et al. the loss of confidence in national and European political institutions and the increase in populism are linked to the increase in unemployment caused by the crisis. Even a temporary rise in unemployment can lead to political spillovers, which in turn would result in anti-market policies that undermine long-term growth. In this case, a severe recession could have had negative economic repercussions (Algan, 2017)[1].

Dustman et al. (2017) [7] reach similar results showing that in the aftermath of the crisis mistrust of European institutions, largely explained by the poorer economic conditions of the Euro-area countries, is correlated with the populist vote.

So, we had to ask ourselves what can be done to reduce economic security and increase political confidence in Europe? Some proposals could be:

- as supported by many studies, given the high vulnerability of unskilled workers to the crisis, it would be appropriate to specifically support this population group (education and training);
- national and EU authorities should pursue supply-side reforms of labor, capital and product markets, as well as pan-European counter-cyclical fiscal policies;
- the EU should prioritize growth-enhancing investments such as research, innovation and public infrastructure to exploit economies of scale and cross-border externalities in Eu-

rope.

Werts et al. found that Euroscepticism actually helps explain the vote for a far-right party beyond the perception of ethnic threat and political distrust.

At the same time euro-scepticism is much less relevant than perceived ethnic threat in explaining why particular social categories, i.e. lower educated people, manual workers, unemployed people and non-churchgoers are more likely to vote for the radical right (Werts, 2013)[43].

As Immerzeel & Pickup point out (Immerzeel, 2015)[12] although some previous research has shown that much of the typical electorate for the populist radical right parties (PRR) is made up of low-educated unemployed workers and/or people with negative attitudes towards immigrants (Lubbers, 2002)[16], These groups aren't composed of inactive voters, indeed, most of the votes received by the PRR come from a segment of the population that from the beginning was voting, probably for another right-wing party (Van der Meer, 2012)[40]. These groups are not composed of inactive voters, in fact, most of the votes received by the populist radical right parties come from a segment of the population that was already part of the active electorate, so these votes were probably stolen from traditional right-wing parties (Van der Meer, 2012)[40].

The analyzes of Immerzeel & Pickup reveal the existence of a split between West and East Europe regarding the change in voter turnout when a new populist party (competitive/credible) is presented in the elections.

In Western Europe, we find that the likelihood of voting increases politically once a populist radical right parties is more successful; conversely, they note that in Eastern Europe typical PRR supporters are less affected by the increase in popularity. Furthermore, their results show that workers with a lower education level and blue collar workers are not generally concerned, while others with a higher education level and other sectors are generally demobilized by more popular PRRs.

"These negative effects of PRR success on voter turnout in Eastern Europe are an important indication that PRRs using a strong anti-rhetoric in countries with a shorter history of democracy may pose a 'threat to democracy'" (Immerzeel, 2015)[12].

Ultimately Immerzeel & Pickup speculate about differences in those affected by a successful PRR. From their results, we note that young Eastern European citizens who are relatively new to politics may be more strongly influenced by the negative anti-rhetoric of the Eastern European PRRs. Conversely, Western European youth are not influenced by popular Western

European PRRs. According to the authors, a possible explanation could be given by the fact that in Western Europe PRRs are seen as niche parties that should not be taken seriously and therefore do not really influence people's voting behaviour.

In conclusion, I would like to talk about the fact that part of the empirical literature has shown how women are less inclined to vote for populist parties. Mudde refers to the argument as the 'low efficacy theory' (Mudde, 2007) [22] and argues "that the gendered nature of support for the PRR may have less to do with the ideas of the parties in question and more to do with the image of the parties as radical or even extreme parties. Because women often have lower levels of political efficacy and lower levels of political interest, they are more likely to vote for established parties (Spierings, 2017)"[32] (Mudde, 2007)[22].

Chapter 2

Data

Data were derived from the European Social Survey (ESS), the richest social scientific endeavor to map attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns in Europe. The project is well known for the exceptionally high methodological standards of the design and of the operation of the project. It is part of the European Science Foundation's initiative to obtain a cross-cultural comparative research design. Data has been collected every two years, since September 2002, by face-to-face interviews. The ESS systematically tracks changing values, attitudes, attributes and behavior patterns in European polities. It covers all European countries, though not every country participates in every wave. Respondents were selected by means of strict probability sampling of the resident populations aged 15 years and older. Response rates of 70% apply to most countries. In total, 36 European countries participated in at least one of the eight ESS waves (in wave 9 "2018-2019" will become 38 with the addition of Serbia and Montenegro). To test our hypotheses, we use the eight available waves, the ninth is under construction and data are only available for a few countries, from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008-2009; 2010-2011, 2012-2013, 2014-2015 and 2016-2017). First of all, we selected the countries that had participated in all the ESS rounds; Only 15 countries have met this requirement. The countries are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Furthermore, a country must have at least one populist party and / or a radical right-wing party and / or a Eurosceptic party, because we are mainly interested in understanding what effects demographic, geographic, labor market and cultural variables have on proximity or on the vote for populist parties and / or a radical right-wing parties and / or a Eurosceptic parties; However, with the exception of Portugal where only the Eurosceptic category is present, the

other countries present all three categories. Table 2.1 highlights the density of observations for each country. Germany is the country with the most observations, conversely Slovenia is the one with the least observations among the 15 countries observed. (la Tabella è già stata inserita e modificata in data sul latex)

country	freq	pct	cumpct
BE	14343	6.23	6.23
CH	13860	6.02	12.25
DE	23342	10.14	22.40
ES	15501	6.74	29.13
FI	16200	7.04	36.17
FR	15051	6.54	42.71
GB	17626	7.66	50.37
HU	13132	5.71	56.07
IE	18247	7.93	64.00
NL	15186	6.60	70.60
NO	13248	5.76	76.36
PL	14124	6.14	82.49
PT	14988	6.51	89.01
SE	14390	6.25	95.26
SI	10914	4.74	100.00
Total	230152	100.00	

Table 2.1: Density by country

The questionnaire consists of a core module, constant from round to round and smaller rotating modules, repeated at intervals, on selected substantive topics. We will use only the core module because its presents in every round and covers a wide range of social, economic, political and demographic variables.

2.1 Independent variables

Demographic and socio-economic variables

The *demographic and socio-economic variables* examined were: age, gender, education, domicile, labor market variables and variables for economic insecurity.

The dataset is composed by 47,3% male and 52,7% female with an age between 14 and 123 years old. We create Male, is a dummy variable with score 1 for males and score 0 for females. Age was calculated based on year of birth and year of interview, 0.01% have more than 97 year and 0.21% more than 90. The average age of the respondents is around 48 which means that most people that responded to the questionnaire were adults and elderly people between 30 and 70 years old.




Figure 2.1: Distribution of respondents according to age




Figure 2.2: Distribution of respondents according to the level of education completed, expressed in years

Regarding the level of education, we decided to use the years of full-time education completed in order to have a more precise value of the person's level of education compared to the International Standard Classification of Education). The question from which it is derived is: *"About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling"*. *Employment status* is based on the item that asks respondents for the best description of their current main activity for the last 7 days. We recoded this item into different dummy variables with the following categories unemployed, actively searching for a job, unemployed, not actively searching for a job (inactive), employed, Education(student), retired and other (other /military service/housework). We used the other category as the reference category.




Figure 2.3: Distribution of "current main activity for the last 7 days"

We capture heterogeneity in **economic insecurity** with four measures. First, whether the respondent has ever been unemployed, forcing search for a new job; related question: *“Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months?”*.

Feeling about household’s income nowadays	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Living comfortably on present income	75,596	33.62	33.62
Coping on present income	104,328	46.40	80.02
Difficult on present income	34,547	15.37	95.39
Very difficult on present income	10,368	4.61	100.00
Total	224,839	100.00	

Table 2.2: Feeling about household’s income nowadays

Second, as a measure of perceived deprivation was measured by asking respondents how they felt about their households income nowadays, ranging from living comfortably on present income to finding it very difficult on present income.2.2 Related question: “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?”

We recoded this item into a dummy variable; this variable assume value 1 when respondents have some difficult on present income. For the third indicator we crossed occupation variables with type of contract variable in order to construct a dummy variable for permanent contract, 1 permanent 0 otherwise. As a last proxy for economic insecurity we have created a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if "The main source of income of households comes from investments, savings, etc , 0 "otherwise"; linked by question "Please consider the income of all household members and any income which may be received by the household as a whole. What is the main source of income in your household?". We have also added as control the variable income in classes which is based on the following question “please tell me which letter describes your household’s total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don’t know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income." The categories are national categories, based on deciles of the actual household income range in the given country. The deciles should be derived from the best available source for the country.

1 [national currency] = x.xx €.

The intervals of the categories in CARD 53 are:

CARD 53				
YOUR <u>HOUSEHOLD</u> INCOME				
	Approximate WEEKLY	Approximate MONTHLY	Approximate ANNUAL	
Showcard code				Data file code
J	Less than €xx	Less than €xxx	Less than €xxx	01
R	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	02
C	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	03
M	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	04
F	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	05
S	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	06
K	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	07
P	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	08
D	€xx to under €xx	€xxx to under €xxx	€xxx to under €xxx	09
H	More than €xx	More than €xxx	More than €xxx	10

Figure 2.4: Income in classes

The variable *Domicile* identifies the area of a respondent's residence and has five categories: in a farm/at the countryside, country village, town/small city, suburb/outskirts or big city. These are included as a series of binary variables with big city used as the reference category.




Figure 2.5: Distribution of domicile across the population

An interesting variable that we have tried to use in combination with domicile is the subjective perception of crime. It was measured by the question *Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark*, with an 4 point response scale 1 Very safe - 4 Very unsafe. We are interested in whether those who do not feel safe decide to change political alignment towards populist or far-right parties that often make "security" one of their flags. So, we recoded this variable in "feeling unsafe", 1 if respondent feels "unsafe" or "very unsafe".

feeling unsafe	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	182,076	79.71	79.71
1	46,347	20.29	100.00
Total	228,423	100.00	

Table 2.3: Distribution of feeling unsafe of walking alone in local area after dark

Anti-immigrant attitudes

Anti-immigrant attitudes measure the respondent's attitudes towards immigrants (Schneider, 2008) (Schneider, 2008)[30]. We use the following items that were available in all waves of the ESS: "Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?" with an 11 point response scale 0 bad for the economy - 10 good for the economy; "Would you say that [country's] cultural life is undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries" with an 11 point response scale 0 cultural life is undermined - 10 cultural life is enriched; "Is [country] made a worse or better place to live by people coming here from other countries?" with an 11 point response scale 0 worse place to live - 10 better place to live; "How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?" with an 4 point response scale 1 Allow many to come and live here- 4 Allow none;"to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?" with an 4 point response scale 1 Allow many to come and live here- 4 Allow none; and "How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?" with an 4 point response scale 1 Allow many to come and live here- 4 Allow none.

Aptitude and cultural variables

A very useful information for the purposes of our study is the political alignment of the interviewees. The possible responses were reported in the form of grades from 0 to 10 where 0 represent the left and 10 represent the right. The 10.95% of the sample population gave NA responses that were coded as missing values. Most the answers are located in the grades from 1 to 5 and the mean of the total answer is 5 which indicates that the majority of the population would place themselves between left and right.

Placement on left right scale	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Left	6,386	3.12	3.12
1	4,220	2.06	5.18
2	11,681	5.70	10.87
3	22,078	10.77	21.65
4	22,030	10.75	32.40
5	68,330	33.34	65.74
6	20,631	10.07	75.81
7	22,680	11.07	86.87
8	16,428	8.02	94.89
9	4,596	2.24	97.13
Right	5,879	2.87	100.00
Total	204,939	100.00	

Table 2.4: Placement on left right scale across population

To get a more drastic result also in this case the original variable was transformed into a dummy where 1 stands for affiliation with “extreme right partie” and 0 stands for affiliation with the “left parties”. The sub-categories “1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6” were added to “left” while the others sub-categories “7, 8 and 9” were added to “right”. From the analysis of the variable it seemed that the majority, 75.8% of the population, placed themselves into the left part while only 24.2% choose the extreme right.

Cultural variables related to the far-right ideology

In ESS there are relevant cultural variables related to the far-right ideology: To measure homophobic attitude we use the following question : *what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* with an 5 point response scale 1 Agree strongly- 5 Disagree strongly;

To measure attachment to traditions we use the following question: *“Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not*

like you. Use this card for your answer. Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family" with an 6 point response scale 1 Very much like me- 6 Not like me at all;

Authoritarianism (i.e. support for law and order) was measured with this item: "Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens" with an 6 point response scale 1 Very much like me- 6 Not like me at all. In a nutshell, people were asked to what extent they think it is important to behave properly, that the government is strong and ensures safety, and it is important to do what is told and follow the rules.

Extremist attitude was measured with this item: "what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned" with an 5 point response scale 1 Agree strongly- 5 Disagree strongly (present only in the first 5 rounds);

Measure of trust

In addition, there are many variables that measure trust and satisfaction for national and international politicians and institutions. Political distrust was measured using three items. Two of them were about trust: trust in politicians and trust in political parties and the other was about satisfied about how democracy works in your country. Measure of mistrust in national governance: "on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..politicians?" with an 11 point response scale 1 No trust at all- 10 Complete trust; "on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..political parties?" with an 11 point response scale 1 No trust at all- 10 Complete trust; "And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?" with an 11 point response scale 1 Extremely dissatisfied- 10 Extremely satisfied;




Figure 2.6: Box plot of trust in political parties




Figure 2.7: Box plot of trust in politicians

Measure of mistrust in Europe: on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..the European Parliament? with an 11 point response scale 1 No trust at all- 10 Complete trust;




Figure 2.8: Box plot of trust in European Parliament

and “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?” with an 11 point response scale 1 ‘Unification already gone too far- 10 Unification go further’.




Figure 2.9: Histogram of European unification go further or gone too far




Figure 2.10: Box plot of European unification go further or gone too far

2.2 Dependent variables

As already mentioned, the purpose of our research is to understand what factors can influence the closeness or the vote for three types of parties (*Populist, Far-right party, Eurosceptic*). To do this we based ourselves on the material present in the literature, in our case we decided to adopt what was done by "The PopuList Team"; The PopuList is the result of close cooperation between academics and journalists, initiated by The Guardian (Rooduijn, 2019)[29]. The list consists of European parties that can be classified as populist, far right, far left and/or Eurosceptic, and obtained at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998. The list has been thoroughly peer-reviewed by more than 30 academics. As we just said, Populist parties, Far-right party and Eurosceptic party were identified by more than 30 academics and to do that they use these three definitions:

Populist parties: parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people (Mudde 2004)[21].

Far right parties: parties that are nativist (which is an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that nonnative elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state) and authoritarian (which is the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely) (Mudde 2007)[22].

Eurosceptic parties: parties that express the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration. This includes both hard Euroscepticism (i.e., outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to ones country joining or remaining a member of the EU) and soft Euroscepticism (i.e., contingent or qualified opposition to European integration) (Taggart, 2004)[37].

The PopuList is supported by the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, The Guardian, and the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism and Democracy. In particular, The Guardian created a set of maps in order to track the success of populist parties in Europe.




Figure 2.11: Spread of populist consensus across Europe in 2002




Figure 2.12: Spread of populist consensus across Europe in 2016

Country	Party	Populist	Far right	Eurosceptic
Belgium	VB	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Belgium	PVDA/PTB			<i>x</i>
Belgium	LDD	<i>x</i>		
Belgium	FN	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Finland	Ps	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Finland	VAS			<i>x</i>
Finland	SIN	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
France	FN	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
France	PCF/FdG			<i>x</i>
France	FI	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Germany	Linke	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Germany	AfD	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Hungary	FIDESZ	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Hungary	Jobbik	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Hungary	MIÉP	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Hungary	MMP			<i>x</i>
Ireland	SF	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Ireland	SP			<i>x</i>
Netherlands	PVV	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Netherlands	SP	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Netherlands	PvdD			<i>x</i>
Netherlands	SGP			<i>x</i>
Netherlands	LPF	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Netherlands	50 PLUS			<i>x</i>
Norway	FrP	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Norway	SV			<i>x</i>
Norway	SP			<i>x</i>
Norway	Rodt			<i>x</i>
Norway	KrF			<i>x</i>
Poland	PiS	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Poland	Kukiz '15	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>

Poland	LPR	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Poland	Liberty		<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Poland	Razem			
Poland	SRP	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Portugal	BE			<i>x</i>
Portugal	CDU			<i>x</i>
Slovenia	ZdLe / L	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Slovenia	SNS	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Slovenia	LMS	<i>x</i>		
Spain	Podemos	<i>x</i>		<i>x</i>
Spain	IU			<i>x</i>
Sweden	SD	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
Sweden	V			<i>x</i>
Switzerland	SVP	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
United Kingdom	UKIP	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>
United Kingdom	Con			<i>x</i>
United Kingdom	DUP			<i>x</i>
Count:15	48	28	18	45

Table 2.5: Parties list

National election results since 1998 were then mapped on to the party definitions to show trends over time, we show only the snapshot situation in 2002 and 2016, the starting point and the end of our data. Figures 2.11 2.12 shows how populism flickered across the continent in the late 1990s before really catching on in eastern Europe throughout the 2000s. It spread north in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis before making substantial inroads in western Europe's major powerhouses in the past three years.

It is important to note that a single party may have one or more of these three attributes at the same time, this can be seen from the table 2.5

For example, in Germany "Alternative Fur Deutschland" has all three attributes having been classified as a populist, Eurosceptic and far-right party. Conversely, the Spanish "Podemos" was configured as a Populist party, Eurosceptic but not as an extreme right party. Thanks to this list and the Ess dataset, we have created 12 dependent variables, four types for each of the three

party categories (populist, Eurosceptic and far-right party).

The first type of variable is created through the following question: “*Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?*”, if the respondent answers “yes”, then the interviewer asks him to indicate which party in his country he feels close to at that specific moment. So, with this type of variables we can have an indication of how the respondent positions himself at that particular moment. In the following table we have some descriptive statistics of the three dependent variables that express **closeness to a party** belonging to the categories examined.

Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties	Freq.	Percent
Yes	113,804	50.28
No	112,548	49.72
Total	226,352	100.00

Table 2.6: Frequency table for the variable "Feel closer to a particular party"

In this variable, respondents who feel close to populist/radical right/eurosceptic parties received a value of 1, whereas the rest of respondents in the survey receive a value of 0.

Variable	n°oss	min	max	mean	sd
Close to pop	109324	0	1	0,13	0,33
Close to far right	109324	0	1	0,09	0,29
Close to eurosceptic	109324	0	1	0,19	0,4

Table 2.7: Descriptive table about closeness to populist, far right and eurosceptic variables

Variable	closeness to populist party	closeness to far right party	closeness to eurosceptic party
closeness to populist party	1.0000		
closeness to far right party	0.8329	1.0000	
closeness to eurosceptic party	0.7649	0.6575	1.0000

Table 2.8: Correlations between closeness to populist, far right and eurosceptic variables

Often populist parties have a far right and/or eurosceptic connotation, which explains the high correlations between the three dependent variables shown in table 2.8.

Conversely, the second type of variable is no longer based on where the interviewee is politically positioned at the moment but tells us what the individual's preference was in the last election. The second type of variables is created through the following question: "*Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?*", if the respondent answers "yes", then the interviewer asks him to **indicate which party did him/her vote for in that election.**

Voted last national election	Freq.	Percent
Yes	164,857	72.29
No	44,880	19.68
Not eligible to vote	18,297	8.02
Total	226,352	100.00

Table 2.9: Descriptive table about closeness to populist, far right and eurosceptic variables

In this variable, respondents who vote for populist radical right parties received a value of 1, whereas the rest of respondents in the survey receive a value of 0.

Variable	n°oss	min	max	mean	sd
Vote for pop	144024	0	1	0,13	0,33
Vote for far right	144401	0	1	0,1	0,3
Vote for eurosceptic	144987	0	1	0,19	0,39

Table 2.10: Descriptive table for vote for populist, far right and eurosceptic variables

Often populist parties have a far right and/or eurosceptic connotation, which explains the high correlations between the three dependent variables shown above.

Analysing the two tables about dependent variables means and std.dev. we notice that the percentages are very similar. The closeness to a populist party stands at 13% as well as the

Variable	vote for populist party	vote for far_right party	vote for eurosceptic party
vote for populist party	1.0000		
vote for far_right party	0.8492	1.0000	
vote for eurosceptic party	0.7764	0.6828	1.0000

Table 2.11: Correlations between vote for populist, far right and eurosceptic variables

indication of the vote. The same goes for the variables associated with the extreme right and Euroscepticism, which stand respectively at 10% and 19%.

For both types of variables we have a consistent number of observations. For the variables that express "closeness to a party" we have 109,324 observations, slightly less than half of the individuals in the original dataset (47.5%) expressed that they felt close to a specific party. We have a higher response rate than the previous one in the declaration of the vote in the last elections, where 62.7% of the respondents replied that they had voted and for whom.

Based on literature, we used some cultural attitudes and variables to define which people should, in theory, orient themselves towards populist and/or Eurosceptic and/or on the far-right ideologies. By analyzing these variables we created two indicators of affection for one of the three categories. The first one is based on exceeding a certain threshold while the second requires that the respondent presents all the characteristics under consideration. Let's now define which variables were used for the creation of the indicators and the thresholds for the first, the least stringent indicator.

For the creation of the closeness **indicator for populist ideology** we used a recoded version of the following variables:

ESS 1-8 variable	Question topic and range variable	Original Scale	Study re-coding(all variables are dummy)	Re-coding criteria
Mistrust in national governance				
trstplt	Trust in politicians	Scale 0-10	Mistrust in politicians	If trstplt < 3

trstprt(Note: ESS 2-8 variable)	Trust in political parties	Scale 0-10	Mistrust in political parties	If trstplt < 3
stfdem	How satisfied with the way democracy works in country	Scale 0-10	Dissatisfied with democracy	If stfdem < 5
Anti-Immigration				
impctr	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	Scale 0-4	Anti-Poor-Immigration	If impctr = 3or4
imbgeco	Immigration bad or good for country's economy	Scale 0-10	Immigration bad for economy	If imbgeco < 5
imueclt	imueclt Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Scale 0-10	Anti-Immigration culture	If imueclt < 5

Table 2.12: Recoding table, in the last column we report the conditions to be satisfied for the dummy variable to be equal to 1

Taking into account that the variable “*trstprt*” is not present in the first round, the indicator will have 2 different thresholds. For the data belonging to the first wave, it will suffice that at least 4 out of 5 dummy are verified to “turn on” our index. As for the subsequent waves, we will need at least 5 out of 6 dummy to obtain the same result. According to the constructed index, only 10.8% of respondents would be compatible with a populist alignment.

For the creation of the closeness indicator for the ideology of the far right we used a recoded version of the following variables, some of which are in common with the index for populism:

ESS 1-8 variable	Question topic and range ess variable	Original Scale	Study re-coding(all variables are dummy)	Re-coding criteria
Anti-Immigration				
impctr	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	Scale 0-4	Anti-Poor-Immigration	If impctr= 3or4 ~ 48%
imueclt	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Scale 0-10	Anti-Immigration culture	If imueclt < 5 25%
imsmetr	Allow many\few immigrants of same race\ethnic group as majority	Scale 0-4	No-immigr same	If imsmetr= 3or4 31%
imdfetr	Allow many\few immigrants of different race\ethnic group from majority	Scale 0-4	No-immigr diff	If imdfetr = 3or4 ~ 31%
imwbent	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Scale 0-10	Imm bad for country	If imwbent < 5 ~ 44%
Cultural values				
lrscale	Placement on left right scale	Scale 0-10	Right side	If lrscale > 6 ~ 24%

freehms	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	Scale 1-5	No gay	If freehms = 3 4 5 ~ 24%
Prtyban(note: present in round 1\2\3\4\5)	Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy	Scale 1-5	No Ban	If prtyban= 4 5 ~ 37%
ipstrgv	important that government is strong and ensures safety	Scale 1-6	Strong gov	If ipstrgv= 1 2 ~ 23%
imptrad	Important to follow traditions and customs	Scale 1-6	Follow Traditions	If imptrad= 1 2 ~ 48%

Table 2.13: Recoding table, in the last column we report the conditions to be satisfied for the dummy variable to be equal to 1

Taking into account that the variable “*Prtyban*” is present only in round 1 to round 5, the indicator will have 2 different thresholds. For the data belonging to wave 1 to 5, it will suffice that at least 7 out of 10 dummy are verified to “turn on” our index. As for the subsequent waves, we will need at least out of 6 out of 9 dummy to obtain the same result. According to the constructed index, only 10.3% of respondents would be compatible with a far-right alignment

Finally, we are now going to explain the variables used to construct the closeness indicator for Eurosceptic parties

ESS 1-8 variable	Question topic and range ess variable	Original Scale	Study re-coding(all variables are dummy)	Re-coding criteria
Mistrust in Europe				
trstep	Trust in the European Parliament	Scale 0-10	Mistrust in Eu Parliament	If trstep < 3 ~ 32%

eufft(Note: ESS 2-8 variable)	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	Scale 0-10	Stop Europe	If eufft < 3 ~ 27%
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Table 2.14: Recoding table, in the last column we report the conditions to be satisfied for the dummy variable to be equal to 1

If at least one of the two variables assumes value 1 then the index will indicate that the respondent is probably Eurosceptic. According to the constructed index, only 20% of respondents would be compatible with a Eurosceptic alignment.

Variable	n°oss	min	max	mean	sd
Idx pop	230152	0	1	0,11	0,31
Idx far right	225193	0	1	0,1	0,3
Idx eurosceptic	218489	0	1	0,2	0,4

Table 2.15: Summary statistics of our Indexes, simple type, based on population

As previously specified, this second indicator, **the strong index**, is by definition more stringent than the first one because it requires that all the previous characteristics occur.

Variable	n°oss	min	max	mean	sd
Strict idx pop	230152	0	1	0,04	0,2
Strict idx far right	230152	0	1	0,04	0,2
Strict idx eurosceptic	230152	0	1	0,13	0,33

Table 2.16: Summary statistics of our Indexes, strict type, based on population

Unfortunately for the indicator regarding the affiliation to the far right we had to slightly relax the threshold; as otherwise not even 0.01% of respondents would have been compatible. Therefore, for the data belonging to wave 1 to 5, it will suffice that at least 9 out of 10 dummy are verified to "turn on" our index. As for the subsequent waves, we will need at least out of 8 out of 9 dummy variables to obtain the same result.

For a better comparison between the results of the analyses derived from the variables feeling of closeness to the parties and the indexes, presented above, we have built two more indexes. These new indices are simply a sub-sample of those presented above. We have narrowed down the observations considering only who responded positively to the question: "Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?"

Variable	n°oss	min	max	mean	sd
Idx_2 pop	109324	0	1	0,08	0,27
Idx_2 far right	109324	0	1	0,11	0,31
Idx_2 eurosceptic	109324	0	1	0,18	0,4

Table 2.17: Summary statistics of our Indexes, simple type, based on respondents

Variable	n°oss	min	max	mean	sd
Strict idx_2 pop	109324	0	1	0,03	0,17
Strict idx_2 far right	109324	0	1	0,013	0,11
Strict idx_2 eurosceptic	109324	0	1	0,12	0,33

Table 2.18: Summary statistics of our Indexes, strict type, based on respondents



Chapter 3

Empirical analysis

The aim of the analysis is to study how certain socio-economic, geographical, attitudinal and cultural characteristics influence:

- the closeness to a party assimilable in one of the three categories listed above (populism, extreme right, Euroscepticism).
- the vote expressed in one of the three categories listed above. The vote in spite of the closeness could be influenced by other logics, for example the credibility of the party; if the interviewee believes that the vote could be wasted for some reason (e.g. difficulty in overcoming the barrier and/or inability to coalition with other political actors to govern), he could decide to invest his vote in another party, which is more credible than the party he feels closer to.

In addition, we created two types of indicators from opinion variables (attitudinal and cultural) that we considered relevant. Therefore, these indexes were created in such a way as to divide the sample into thought groups. The basic idea is to look for opinion and/or cultural variables that allow us to state, in a simplistic way, that an individual who meets these criteria can be catalogued as "close to the populist ideology" and/or extreme right-wing ideology and/or Eurosceptic ideology. For example, "Mr. White" is one of the interviewees, he expresses negative opinions about the arrival of new migrants in his country (regardless of whether they come from poor or rich countries, whether they are of his own ethnicity or not), supports homophobic positions, is in favour of restricting his and others' freedom in exchange for increased security, is a conservative and, finally, his declared political orientation is right-wing. So, given the premises, we assume that the individual "Mr. White" is probably close to ideologies ascribable to the ex-

treme right.

We have created these indexes, both the simple and the rigorous version, using the entire sample. In a second moment we decided to perform the analysis also for a sub-sample of these indexes, that is we kept only the individuals who answered positively to the question "do you feel close to a party in your country?" in order to offer a more precise comparison with the other analyses.

In fact, in this chapter we will report only the results for the indices belonging to the second group; however, the analyses have been carried out for both categories and the results are reported in the appendix.

We would also like to point out that all the analyses were conducted both by country (as reported in this chapter) and by region, but since they were essentially identical we preferred to focus only on country analyses.

Given the high number of observations present in our sample, we decided to proceed through OLS analysis even if we are dealing with a binomial dependent response variable (i.e. vote for a populist / far-right / Eurosceptic party against any other party).

All the models built in this chapter are OLS probability models structured as shown in Equations 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4:

$$Y_{jh} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot X_{dem} + \beta_{c1} \cdot x_{country} + \beta_{c2} \cdot x_{wave} \quad (3.1)$$

$$Y_{jh} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot X_{dem} + \beta_2 \cdot X_{dom} + \beta_{c1} \cdot x_{country} + \beta_{c2} \cdot x_{wave} \quad (3.2)$$

$$Y_{jh} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot X_{dem} + \beta_2 \cdot X_{dom} + \beta_3 \cdot X_{mkt lab} + \beta_{c1} \cdot x_{country} + \beta_{c2} \cdot x_{wave} + \beta_{c3} \cdot x_{income} \quad (3.3)$$

$$Y_{jh} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot X_{dem} + \beta_2 \cdot X_{dom} + \beta_3 \cdot X_{mkt lab} + \beta_4 \cdot X_{cult val} + \beta_{c1} \cdot x_{country} + \beta_{c2} \cdot x_{wave} + \beta_{c3} \cdot x_{income} \quad (3.4)$$

where X_i is a matrix of predictors belonging to the set of variables specified by class i , Y_{jh} is the dependent variable (j refers to one out the three considered categories of political parties, h refers to type of dependent variable - closeness, vote, simple index or strict index), and β_i is a vector of coefficients estimated through OLS.

Coefficients labeled as $c1$, $c2$ or $c3$ refer to control variables, which will not be displayed in the model summary. Their purpose is to absorb effects which are not included in the analysis' perimeter directly, but they may influence the other coefficients. These variables, codified as categorical, are country, wave and income classes declared respectively.

The classes of independent variables are the same across all sections, but the predictors considered may vary depending on the studied model; for example, the analysis about the populism takes into account measures of distrustness about political parties and politics, whereas the analysis about far right takes into consideration the respondents' opinions about the importance of traditions and homosexuality.

Given the importance of the domicile of the residents in the analysis, we run two different models on two subsamples. The former is built from the observations of respondents living in an urban area (big city and suburbs), the latter is built from respondents living in a small or rural area (small city, country village and home in countryside). These two models differ only by the respondents' location, so we can compare the coefficients of these regressions analysing their confidence intervals.

We will report only the most interesting cases resulting from this comparison; for the complete results, see Appendix.

3.1 Populism parties

3.1.1 Closeness to populist party

VARIABLES	(1) Close to Populist party	(2) Close to Populist party	(3) Close to Populist party	(4) Close to Populist party	(5) Close to Populist party
<i>Demographic</i>					
Age	-6.85e-06 (0.000277)	-7.11e-05 (0.000278)	-0.000621* (0.000372)	-0.000558 (0.000384)	-0.000299 (0.000408)
Age ²	-1.48e-05*** (2.70e-06)	-1.42e-05*** (2.71e-06)	-1.03e-05*** (3.74e-06)	-1.01e-05*** (3.90e-06)	-1.30e-05*** (4.13e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00674*** (0.000242)	-0.00656*** (0.000247)	-0.00505*** (0.000284)	-0.00264*** (0.000294)	-0.00264*** (0.000311)
Sex(male)	0.0230*** (0.00186)	0.0229*** (0.00186)	0.0270*** (0.00205)	0.0273*** (0.00213)	0.0291*** (0.00226)
<i>Domicile</i>					
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00413 (0.00341)	0.00696* (0.00369)	0.00346 (0.00373)	0.00505 (0.00397)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00664** (0.00286)	0.00796** (0.00312)	0.00351 (0.00316)	0.00659** (0.00334)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0139*** (0.00290)	0.0167*** (0.00319)	0.00905*** (0.00326)	0.0107*** (0.00344)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.00321 (0.00413)	0.00449 (0.00448)	-0.000745 (0.00454)	0.00263 (0.00478)
<i>Market Labor</i>					
Low income (perceived)			0.0289*** (0.00315)	0.0120*** (0.00325)	0.0127*** (0.00345)
Employed			-0.0117*** (0.00393)	-0.0114*** (0.00399)	-0.0141*** (0.00425)

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Indefinite contract			-0.000581 (0.00307)	0.00263 (0.00308)	0.00499 (0.00327)
Being richer			-0.0179* (0.00963)	-0.0165* (0.00971)	-0.0233** (0.0105)
Student			-0.0309*** (0.00503)	-0.0193*** (0.00506)	-0.0211*** (0.00544)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			-0.00230 (0.00628)	-0.00399 (0.00635)	-0.00594 (0.00670)
unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			0.0200** (0.00856)	0.0156* (0.00868)	0.0153 (0.00930)
Retired			-0.00646 (0.00430)	-0.00911** (0.00442)	-0.0106** (0.00472)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0245*** (0.00250)	0.0227*** (0.00253)	0.0230*** (0.00268)
<hr/>					
<i>Cultural values</i>					
Mistrust in politicians				0.0418*** (0.00274)	0.0440*** (0.00398)
Mistrust in political parties					-0.00333 (0.00403)
Unsatisfied of democracy				0.0514*** (0.00264)	0.0508*** (0.00283)
Anti Poor Immigrant				0.0399*** (0.00239)	0.0406*** (0.00254)
Anti-immigr culture				0.0581*** (0.00293)	0.0584*** (0.00310)
Immigr is bad for economy				0.0290*** (0.00265)	0.0314*** (0.00283)
Feeling unsafe				0.00753*** (0.00292)	0.00702** (0.00311)
Constant	0.115*** (0.00827)	0.105*** (0.00860)	0.132*** (0.0118)	0.0382*** (0.0123)	0.0154 (0.0129)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412	85,437	76,017
R-squared	0.180	0.180	0.168	0.189	0.199

Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.1: Closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy

The overall effect of age remains significant through the nested models; sometimes the prevalent part of the effect is linear, sometimes the quadratic part lead the effect. Both have a negative effect on the probability to feel close to populist parties, which means that the probability to feel close to such parties is higher at a young age. For instance, a 20 years old has a +5.6% probability to feel close to such parties with respect to a 60 years old.

As we expect, the years of educations completed has a negative effect on this probability, whereas male respondents are more likely to feel close to this category of parties than female ones.

Regarding the domicile of the respondents, its effects and significance vary across the models considered. But an underlying pattern can be found: as we move away from the big cities, the probability to feel close to populist parties increases. The effect of this variable is complex, and related to other variables included in the some of the models considered: as we can see, between model (3) and (4) part of the effect is absorbed by aptitudinal and cultural values variables.

We have no statistical evidence to state that respondents living in a farm or an home in countryside are different from people living in a big city. A possible explanation about this phenomenon could be the following: people living in a big city are more likely to be open minded about different cultures, which are less perceived as a threat. In addition, poor immigrants, especially from different ethnicity, cannot afford to live in a big city, preferring less expensive houses in suburbs, small cities or country villages. For this reason, and for the closeness to manufacturing industries, these three types of locations experienced an increase in the share of foreign residents. This fact lead to a particular sensitivity about all the themes related to immigrants. This is confirmed by the significance of anti-immigration variables studied in the "cultural values" class of coefficients.

With respect of all the considerations above, we can argue that countrysides are less affected by these phenomena, due to the reduced job opportunities offered to its residents. Moreover, immigrants rely heavily on the social and familiar net with their peers. So, where they come to

settle down, they often try to build communities of same ethnic group. This fact makes homes in countryside less attractive to immigrants.

The analysis about market labor variables highlight that people with a high grade of economic insecurity are more likely to feel close to populist parties, as well as inactive respondents (people unemployed but not actively looking for a job), respondents who experienced an extended period of time as unemployed (three or more months) and people that feel difficult to live with their present income. Conversely, employed and retired people, as well as students are less likely to feel close to such parties.

As we stated during the analysis of domicile, the effect of variables regarding anti-immigrant aptitudes is positive, large and significant. Similar considerations can be made about mistrust in politicians and the grade of satisfaction about how democracy works in the respondent's country. Another positive and significant variable is the one measuring the level of security perceived by the respondents; we expected this kind of effect, since the theme of security is one of the main themes on the populist agenda.

3.1.2 Vote for populist party

The correlation between closeness to and vote for a populist party is really high (0.793): the results reflect this correlation, and are very similar to the ones presented in Subsection 3.1.1.

The effect of gender and education remains stable, while the linear effect of age is never significant. Conversely, the quadratic part of this effect remains negative and significant.

All the considerations about how the domicile of the respondents affect the probability to feel close to a populist party hold in this analysis, for the probability of voting for such parties.

About market labor, we are in the same situation, except for the variable "retired", which lose its significance in this analysis.

Also with regard to attitudinal variables, there are no significant variations between this model and the previous one.3.2.1

3.1.3 Indexes for closeness to populist ideology

The indexes considered in this Subsection are based on a set of variables which are considered by the existing literature good drivers of populism ideology. This entails that almost all apti-

tudinal and cultural values variables used in Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are not present in the models considered, since they are used to build the indexes.

As already described in Section 2.2, we created two indexes, a simple one and a stricter one: in this Subsection the results obtained from both indexes are highlighted and compared.

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(2) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(3) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(4) Closeness to Pop Party idx
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	0.00285*** (0.000239)	0.00278*** (0.000240)	0.00124*** (0.000311)	0.00161*** (0.000312)
Age ²	-2.87e-05*** (2.34e-06)	-2.80e-05*** (2.34e-06)	-1.36e-05*** (3.12e-06)	-1.79e-05*** (3.15e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00735*** (0.000209)	-0.00714*** (0.000213)	-0.00537*** (0.000237)	-0.00502*** (0.000238)
Sex(male)	0.00109 (0.00161)	0.00101 (0.00161)	0.00415** (0.00172)	0.0118*** (0.00175)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00529* (0.00294)	0.00699** (0.00309)	0.00864*** (0.00308)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00893*** (0.00247)	0.00921*** (0.00261)	0.0118*** (0.00261)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0166*** (0.00251)	0.0187*** (0.00266)	0.0249*** (0.00267)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.00313 (0.00357)	0.00626* (0.00374)	0.0124*** (0.00374)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0523*** (0.00263)	0.0492*** (0.00263)
Employed			-0.00834** (0.00329)	-0.00682** (0.00328)
Indefinite contract			-0.00248	-0.00259

			(0.00256)	(0.00255)
Being richer			-0.0131	-0.0145*
			(0.00804)	(0.00803)
Student			-0.0304***	-0.0288***
			(0.00420)	(0.00419)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			-0.00149	0.00102
			(0.00525)	(0.00523)
unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			-0.00771	-0.00670
			(0.00715)	(0.00714)
Retired			-0.00936***	-0.00895**
			(0.00359)	(0.00359)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0100***	0.00926***
			(0.00209)	(0.00209)
<hr/>				
<i>Cultural values</i>				
Feeling unsafe				0.0533***
				(0.00236)
Constant	0.104***	0.0920***	0.125***	0.0932***
	(0.00715)	(0.00743)	(0.00982)	(0.00993)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412	89,975
R-squared	0.048	0.049	0.057	0.063
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.2: 2nd Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy

Regarding the demographic variables, the linear part of the age effect remains positive and significant across the nested models, while the quadratic one remains negative and significant. The overall effect depends on the age of the respondent: considering model (4), the effect of age is a concave parabola with vertex (and maximum) in around 45 years. Therefore, a 45 years old respondent will have the maximum probability (due to age effect) to be close to populist

ideology. Recalling the example in Subsection 3.1.1, a 20 years old now has -0.8% probability to be close to populist ideology than a 60 years old, and -1.2% probability with respect to a 45 years old person.

The effects of education and gender remain the same as in Subsection 3.1.1.

The effect of domicile retains a similar pattern as presented in the last Subsections, with some exceptions: the category "Home in countryside" gains significance throughout the models, becoming highly significant in model (4). This phenomenon become evident after the addition of the only aptitudinal variable not used to build the indexes, which is the need of security perceived.

About the market labor variables, the effect are very similar to what we presented in the closeness to populist parties model, and we expected this kind of results.

Given the significance gained by the different categories of the variable "domicile", the comparison between the two distinct models for urban and rural residents gains value too. Figure 3.1 displays the visual difference in coefficients of these two models, showing the overlapping confidence intervals for each couple of coefficients (regarding the same variable).




Figure 3.1: Comparison between the coefficients of rural and urban models. dom_c refers to rural model, dom_u refers to the urban one

As already appointed in this Subsection, the further a person live from a big city, the greater the probability to be close to populist ideology. This phenomenon can be observed even in Figure 3.1, which shows an increase in the effect of the gender and low income perceived. These coefficients are significantly higher in the rural model than in the urban counterparts.

3.2 Far right parties

3.2.1 Closeness to far right party

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far right Party	(2) Closeness to far right Party	(3) Closeness to far right Party	(4) Closeness to far right Party
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	-0.000174 (0.000231)	-0.000338 (0.000232)	-0.00148*** (0.000309)	-0.000459 (0.000323)
Age ²	-8.59e-06*** (2.26e-06)	-7.02e-06*** (2.27e-06)	2.56e-06 (3.11e-06)	-9.37e-06*** (3.28e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00664*** (0.000202)	-0.00626*** (0.000206)	-0.00563*** (0.000236)	-0.00292*** (0.000248)
Sex(male)	0.0182*** (0.00155)	0.0179*** (0.00155)	0.0210*** (0.00171)	0.0183*** (0.00179)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00999*** (0.00285)	0.0108*** (0.00307)	0.00726** (0.00312)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0124*** (0.00239)	0.0127*** (0.00260)	0.00834*** (0.00265)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0240*** (0.00242)	0.0249*** (0.00265)	0.0158*** (0.00273)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0213*** (0.00345)	0.0209*** (0.00372)	0.0125*** (0.00382)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0171*** (0.00262)	0.00904*** (0.00273)
Employed			-0.00918*** (0.00327)	-0.00939*** (0.00334)
Indefinite contract			0.00117 (0.00255)	0.00672*** (0.00258)

Empirical analysis

Being richer	-0.00902	-0.0135*
	(0.00800)	(0.00810)
Student	-0.0350***	-0.0190***
	(0.00418)	(0.00423)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.0160***	-0.0121**
	(0.00522)	(0.00535)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.00645	-0.00443
	(0.00711)	(0.00726)
Retired	-0.00742**	-0.00840**
	(0.00357)	(0.00371)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0104***	0.0148***
	(0.00208)	(0.00212)

Cultural values

Feeling unsafe		0.00809***
		(0.00245)
Nogay		0.00749***
		(0.00233)
Rightwing self-placement		0.0827***
		(0.00196)
Anti Poor Immigrant		0.0186***
		(0.00260)
Anti-immigr culture		0.0483***
		(0.00260)
Immigr is bad for economy		0.0219***
		(0.00233)
Anti-immigr same race		-0.0105***
		(0.00273)
Anti-immigr diff race		0.0285***
		(0.00293)
Immigr make cntry worse		0.0320***
		(0.00246)
Authoritarian gov		0.0149***
		(0.00215)
Constant	0.115***	0.0977***
		0.127***
		0.00997

	(0.00691)	(0.00718)	(0.00977)	(0.0103)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412	81,027
R-squared	0.240	0.241	0.220	0.253
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.3: Closeness to Far-right party, OLS regression country dummy

The overall effect of age remains significant through the nested models; sometimes the prevalent part of the effect is linear, sometimes the quadratic part lead the effect. Both have a negative effect on the probability to feel close to far right parties, which means that the probability to feel close to such parties is higher at a young age.

As we expect from literature, the years of educations (completed) has a negative effect on this probability, whereas male respondents are more likely to feel close to this category of parties than female ones.

Regarding the domicile of the respondents, its effects and significance remain stable in all the models considered. As like populism analysis 3.1.1 an underlying pattern can be found: as we move away from the big cities, the probability to feel close to far right parties increases.

The effect of this variable is complex, and related to other variables included in the some of the models considered: as we can see, between model (3) and (4) part of the effect is absorbed by market labor first and aptitudinal and cultural values variables later. We notice that the bigger effect is in "Country village".

A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be the following: people living in a big city are more likely to be open-minded towards different cultures and different ways of living (such as homosexuality).

In addition, as discussed extensively in the previous section, poor immigrants, especially those of different ethnicity than native residents, cannot afford to live in a big city, preferring cheaper houses in the suburbs, small towns or country villages. For this reason, and because of their

proximity to manufacturing industries, these three types of locations have seen an increase in the share of foreign residents. This fact has led to a particular sensitivity on all issues related to immigrants. This is confirmed by the relevance of the anti-immigration variables studied in the class of "cultural values" coefficients that in this section also take into account the distinctions between types of immigrants and their effect (perceived by residents) on the culture and economy of the country of arrival.

The analysis of labour market variables shows that people with a high degree of economic insecurity (e.g.: people struggling to make ends meet) are more likely to feel close to extreme right-wing parties, as are those interviewed who have experienced a long period of time as unemployed (three months or more) during their lives. On the contrary, the employed, unemployed (actively looking for a job) and retired people, as well as students, are less likely to approach such parties.

Let us now explore the effects of attitudinal and cultural values variables.

The issue of security is an evergreen on the agenda of far-right parties (as it is in many far-right populist parties). As we expected, the variable that measures "the level of security perceived by respondents" is significant and positive, confirming that not feeling safe to go out after dark in one's own neighborhood can lead one to associate with a party that makes increased security a pivotal point.

Another issue that is very much present in the rhetoric of extreme right-wing parties is immigration. In this model we test the effect of six anti-immigration variables. The analyses show that all the anti-immigration measures are significant, all but one have a positive effect on the probability of voting for a far-right party. The variable with a negative effect is the one that attests the intention not to accept migrants even if they are of the same ethnic group, which is generally not consistent with far-right rhetoric. In fact, far-right parties emphasize how immigrants, especially those from poor countries, "steal work" from the indigenous population, do not fit into our "host country" culture and are a threat to the cultural values of these "host countries". Conversely, this rhetoric is not applied between countries that share the same ethnicity, such as Belgium and France or Denmark and Sweden.

All the variables of opinion analysed are significant and have a positive effect on the probability of feeling close to an extreme right-wing party. Among them we find: the variable for control over homophobia, which is based on the question "Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish", which is very significant but whose effect is not very strong. On the other hand, the variable in which is recorded if the respondent is positioned to the right or left of the political spectrum is not only very significant but its effect is huge, +8.3%. Last but not least we have the control for "a more authoritarian government" which is significant and with a positive effect in the closeness to an extreme right party.

3.2.2 Vote for far right party

The correlation between closeness to and vote for a far right party is really high (0.830): the results reflect this correlation, and are very similar to the ones presented in Subsection 3.2.1. The effect of gender and education remains stable as in the last model 3.2.1. The overall effect of age remains significant through the nested models; sometimes the prevalent part of the effect is linear, sometimes the quadratic part lead the effect. Both have a negative effect on the probability to feel close to far right parties, which means that the probability to feel close to such parties is higher at a young age.

All the considerations on how the domicile of respondents affects the probability of voting for an extreme right-wing party remain unchanged. The same applies to the significance and effect of these variables reported in the analyses that can be consulted in the appendix.

As far as work on the market is concerned, we are in the same situation, except for a small variation in the magnitude of the effects.

As we expected, given the very high correlation between the variable "feeling close to an extreme right-wing political party" and "I voted for an extreme right-wing party in the last elections". The situation with regard to the attitudinal variables and variables associated with cultural values also remains unchanged compared to the previous section.

3.2.3 Indexes for closeness to far right ideology

The indexes considered in this Subsection are based on a set of variables which are considered by the existing literature good drivers of far right ideology. This entails that almost all aptitudinal and cultural values variables used in Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are not present in the models considered, since most of them are used to build the indexes.

As already described in Section 2.2, we created two indexes, a simple one and a stricter one: in this Subsection the results obtained from both indexes are highlighted and compared.

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far-right Party	(2) Closeness to far-right Party	(3) Closeness to far-right Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	-9.79e-05 (0.000275)	-0.000291 (0.000276)	-0.00176*** (0.000362)
Age ²	1.42e-05*** (2.69e-06)	1.61e-05*** (2.70e-06)	2.62e-05*** (3.65e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00876*** (0.000241)	-0.00835*** (0.000245)	-0.00746*** (0.000276)
Sex(male)	0.00954*** (0.00184)	0.00915*** (0.00184)	0.0130*** (0.00199)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		-0.00203 (0.00338)	0.000654 (0.00358)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00553* (0.00283)	0.00829*** (0.00303)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0185*** (0.00288)	0.0214*** (0.00310)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0278*** (0.00410)	0.0306*** (0.00435)
<i>Market Labor</i>			

Low income (perceived)			0.0339***
			(0.00307)
Employed			0.00240
			(0.00382)
Indefinite contract			-0.00544*
			(0.00297)
Being richer			0.00499
			(0.00933)
Student			-0.0395***
			(0.00487)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			-0.00147
			(0.00610)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			-0.0102
			(0.00832)
Retired			0.00394
			(0.00419)
Unemployed (3 months+)			-0.0113***
			(0.00243)
Constant	0.127***	0.116***	0.175***
	(0.00820)	(0.00853)	(0.0114)
Observations	107,027	106,917	89,485
R-squared	0.067	0.067	0.070
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.4: 2nd Index of closeness to Far-right party, OLS regression country dummy

As regards demographic variables, the linear part of the age effect becomes significant, with negative effect, only in the last model while the quadratic part remains positive and significant in all models. Let's proceed with an easy example to understand how the effect applies to reality. Taking for example the model (3) the difference in probability, to feel close to the extreme

right ideology, between a 20-year-old and a 60-year-old is equal to +1.35%; therefore the linear part of the age effect takes the lead.

The effects of education and gender remain the same as in Subsection 3.2.1.

The effect of domicile maintains a trend similar to that presented in the last subsections 3.2.1 3.2.2 , the further you move away from the city the more likely you are to feel close to extreme right-wing ideologies but with one exception: the "Suburbs" category is never statistically different from baseline (big city).

As we also expected for labour market variables, the effect is very similar to what we presented in previous models.

Given the significance gained by the different categories of the variable "domicile", the comparison between the two distinct models for urban and rural residents gains value too. Figure 3.2 displays the visual difference in coefficients of these two models, showing the overlapping confidence intervals for each couple of coefficients (regarding the same variable).




Figure 3.2: Comparison between the coefficients of rural and urban models. dom_c refers to rural model, dom_u refers to the urban one

As already appointed in this Subsection, the further a person live from a big city, the greater the probability to be close to far right ideology. This phenomenon can be observed even in

Figure 3.1, which shows an increase in the effect of the gender, low income perceived and employed. These coefficients are significantly higher in the rural model than in the urban counterparts.

3.3 Eurosceptic parties

3.3.1 Closeness to eurosceptic party

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Eurosceptic Party	(2) Closeness to Eurosceptic Party	(3) Closeness to Eurosceptic Party	(4) Closeness to Eurosceptic Party
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	-0.000350 (0.000332)	-0.000527 (0.000333)	-0.000663 (0.000447)	-0.00147*** (0.000538)
Age ²	-9.40e-06*** (3.25e-06)	-7.73e-06** (3.26e-06)	-6.74e-06 (4.50e-06)	-2.95e-07 (5.44e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00485*** (0.000291)	-0.00444*** (0.000296)	-0.00327*** (0.000342)	-0.00214*** (0.000399)
Sex(male)	0.0183*** (0.00223)	0.0179*** (0.00223)	0.0191*** (0.00247)	0.0164*** (0.00290)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00157 (0.00409)	0.00159 (0.00444)	-0.00284 (0.00520)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00924*** (0.00343)	0.00995*** (0.00376)	0.00532 (0.00437)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0180*** (0.00348)	0.0214*** (0.00383)	0.0133*** (0.00449)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0339*** (0.00496)	0.0364*** (0.00538)	0.0207*** (0.00635)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0303*** (0.00378)	0.0186*** (0.00454)

Empirical analysis

Being richer			-0.00125 (0.0116)	-0.00858 (0.0138)
Employed			0.00510 (0.00473)	-0.00104 (0.00556)
Indefinite contract			-0.00789** (0.00369)	-0.00115 (0.00427)
Student			-0.0140** (0.00604)	-0.0118* (0.00713)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.0107 (0.00755)	0.00642 (0.00880)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			0.0397*** (0.0103)	0.0309** (0.0123)
Retired			0.00199 (0.00517)	0.00109 (0.00621)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0241*** (0.00301)	0.0210*** (0.00351)
<i>Cultural values</i>				
EU gone too far				0.0991*** (0.00343)
Mistrust in EU parliament				0.0897*** (0.00337)
Constant	0.0968*** (0.00993)	0.0835*** (0.0103)	0.0806*** (0.0141)	0.0474*** (0.0166)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412	64,359
R-squared	0.143	0.143	0.142	0.159
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.5: Closeness to Eusceptic party, OLS regression country dummy

The overall effect of age remains significant through the nested models; in the first two models the prevalent part of the effect is quadratic, in the second one, model 3 and model 4, the linear part of the effect take the lead. Both have a negative effect on the probability to feel close to eurosceptic parties, which means that the probability to feel close to such parties is higher at a young age.

This goes against our expectations because the young Europeans, "the Erasmus generation", are the ones who have the most chance of obtaining benefits and opportunities from the European Union.

Although given the high correlation that there is between the three variables of closeness to the parties, it could happen.(see Table2.8)

I would like to remind you that the same party often "turns on" more than one categorical indicator, in fact, out of 49 parties analyzed across Europe, 45 are Eurosceptic but only 18 of them are purely Eurosceptic (and not even populist and/or extreme right wing).

I would like to say that, today, many populist and far-right parties declare themselves Eurosceptic just for convenience. In their narrative, the European Union is an enemy to fight and the cause of many economic and social evils. These parties create slogans like: "Immigrants? It's Europe's fault, we don't want them" or "The economy's going badly! It's all the fault of the euro" etc. Unfortunately, the lack of variables of opinion about this theme makes the analysis of Euroscepticism less stringent than the previous ones.

As we expect, the years of educations completed has a negative effect on this probability, whereas male respondents are more likely to feel close to this category of parties than female ones.

The effect of domicile maintains a trend similar to that presented in 3.2.3, the further you move away from the city the more likely you are to feel close to eurosceptic ideologies but with one exception, the "Suburbs" category is never statistically different from baseline (big city). Moreover, the effect of this variable is further reduced after the introduction of the attitudinal variables about Europe.

The analysis of labour market variables shows that people with a high degree of economic insecurity(low income perceived) are more likely to feel close to eurosceptic parties, as are those interviewed who have experienced a long period of time as unemployed (three months or

more) during their lives or are unemployed but not actively looking for a job. On the contrary, the employed with an indefinite contract, as well as students, are less likely to approach such parties.

The attitudinal variables in this model are two. The first one measure mistrust in the European Union as a governmental entity using the next question as a proxy "*and their opinion on the process of European integration "on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..the European Parliament?"*". The second helps us to understand whether they think that the process of European integration should continue or whether they regret it. Both variables are positive and important effect, between 9/10%, on the probability of feeling close to a Eurosceptic party.

3.3.2 Vote to eurosceptic party

The correlation between closeness to and vote for a eurosceptic party is high (0.79), results reflect this correlation, and are very similar to the ones presented in Subsection 3.3.1.

All the considerations on how the domicile of respondents affects the probability of voting for an eurosceptic party remain unchanged. The same applies to the significance and effect of these variables. The results of the analysis are given in the appendix.A.24

As far as labour market variables are concerned, we note that in the model (3) both unemployed people actively seeking work and those not actively seeking work are more likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party. This effect remains only until the introduction of the attitudinal variables on Europe that absorb the effect that was previously captured by these variables. Other variables remain significant in all models as drivers for Eurosceptic voting: - having experienced unemployment for more than 3 consecutive months. - Being retired - and have a low income (perceived) Conversely, if you are a student you are less likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party and the significance of this variable increases with the introduction of the variables about Europe.

The effect of attitudinal variables on voting is significant and positive but the magnitude of the effect is smaller than in the previous model 3.3.1.

3.3.3 Indexes for closeness to eurosceptic ideology

The indices considered in this subsection are based on two proxies on the fiducian towards Europe and the European integration process. Although they are only two questions they are extremely precise and consistent with our hypothesis of affiliation to a Europeanist ideology. As already described in Section 2.2, we created two indexes, a simple one and a stricter one: in this Subsection the results obtained from both indexes are highlighted and compared.

VARIABLES	(1) Idx closeness to euscept Party	(2) Idx closeness to euscept Party	(3) Idx closeness to euscept Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	0.00646*** (0.000347)	0.00621*** (0.000347)	0.00570*** (0.000460)
Age ²	-5.37e-05*** (3.40e-06)	-5.14e-05*** (3.41e-06)	-4.80e-05*** (4.64e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00901*** (0.000301)	-0.00848*** (0.000306)	-0.00645*** (0.000348)
Sex(male)	0.0238*** (0.00231)	0.0233*** (0.00231)	0.0295*** (0.00252)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00205 (0.00422)	0.00836* (0.00453)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0147*** (0.00354)	0.0183*** (0.00383)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0242*** (0.00360)	0.0301*** (0.00391)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0433*** (0.00513)	0.0494*** (0.00550)
<i>Market Labor</i>			
Low income (perceived)			0.0533*** (0.00389)
Being richer			-0.0127

			(0.0118)
Employed			0.00632 (0.00483)
Indefinite contract			-0.0123*** (0.00375)
Student			-0.0208*** (0.00616)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			-0.00199 (0.00770)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			0.0130 (0.0105)
Retired			-0.00351 (0.00532)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0134*** (0.00307)
Constant	0.145*** (0.0103)	0.126*** (0.0107)	0.126*** (0.0145)
Observations	104,510	104,411	87,808
R-squared	0.057	0.058	0.064
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 3.6: 2nd Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, OLS regression country dummy

Regarding the demographic variables, the linear part of the age effect remains positive and significant across the nested models, while the quadratic one remains negative and significant. The overall effect depends on the age of the respondent: considering model (4), the effect of age is a concave parabola with vertex (and maximum) in around 59 years. Therefore, a 59 years old respondent will have the maximum probability (due to age effect) to be close to eurosceptic ideology. Recalling the example in Subsection 3.3.1, a 20 years old now has -7.4% probability to be close to eurosceptic ideology than a 60 years old.

The effects of education and gender remain the same as in Subsection "feel close to eurosceptic parties" 3.3.1.

The effect of domicile retains a similar pattern as presented in the last Subsections, with some exceptions: the category "Suburbs" gains significance throughout the models, becoming significant in model (2) and (3).

About the market labor variables, the effect are very similar to what we presented in the closeness to eurosceptic parties model, and we expected this kind of results

Given the significance gained by the different categories of the variable "domicile", the comparison between the two distinct models for urban and rural residents gains value too. Figure 3.3 displays the visual difference in coefficients of these two models, from 2nd strict index of closeness to eurosceptic ideology, showing the overlapping confidence intervals for each couple of coefficients (regarding the same variable).




Figure 3.3: Comparison between the coefficients of rural and urban models. dom_c refers to rural model, dom_u refers to the urban one

As already appointed in this Subsection, the further a person live from a big city, the greater

the probability to be close to eurosceptic ideology. This phenomenon can be observed even in Figure 3.3, which shows an increase in the effect of the gender. These coefficients are significantly higher in the rural model than in the urban counterpart.

3.4 Control variables

In all the models carried out we always checked for the effect of the data collection round and the country where the individuals observed were interviewed. In addition, in all models that included labour market variables, a check for the declared income class was added. In the next tables we will investigate the effects of these variables in the regression for the feeling of closeness to the parties. For a better understanding of the phenomenon we have decided to produce three separate tables; the data refer to the models (4) in closeness to Populist party 3.1, closeness to Far-right party 3.3, closeness to Eurosceptic party 3.5.

Variables	(1) Close to populist party	(2) Close to far right party	(3) Close to eurosceptic party
2.Switzerland	0.246*** (0.00591)	0.189*** (0.00457)	0.183*** (0.00772)
3.Germany	0.125*** (0.00547)	0.00848** (0.00426)	0.111*** (0.00692)
4.Spain	-0.00981* (0.00596)	-0.0333*** (0.00472)	0.0601*** (0.00769)
5.Finland	0.0440*** (0.00547)	0.0179*** (0.00435)	0.0987*** (0.00714)
6.France	0.0311*** (0.00566)	0.0414*** (0.00453)	0.103*** (0.00730)
7.United Kingdom	-0.0126** (0.00574)	-0.00756* (0.00449)	0.326*** (0.00758)
8.Hungary	0.580*** (0.00738)	0.559*** (0.00627)	0.590*** (0.00983)
9.Ireland	0.0975*** (0.00649)	-0.0285*** (0.00533)	0.106*** (0.00841)
10.Netherlands	0.189*** (0.00559)	0.0531*** (0.00433)	0.177*** (0.00728)
11.Norway	0.141*** (0.00556)	0.129*** (0.00431)	0.352*** (0.00737)
12.Poland	0.345*** (0.00762)	0.283*** (0.00595)	0.387*** (0.0100)
13.Portugal	-0.0839*** (0.00723)	-0.0558*** (0.00558)	0.0915*** (0.00908)
14.Sweden	0.0700*** (0.00550)	0.0637*** (0.00431)	0.0807*** (0.00716)
15.Slovenia	0.0134* (0.00754)	-0.0364*** (0.00594)	0.0566*** (0.00982)
Constant	0.0154 (0.0129)	0.00997 (0.0103)	0.0474*** (0.0166)
Observations	76,017	81,027	64,359
R-squared	0.199	0.253	0.159

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.7: Country dummy in closeness to populist/far right/eurosceptic parties

The country chosen as the baseline was Belgium. The most important effects were those for Hungary, Switzerland, Poland. Hungary and Poland in particular have experienced a huge increase in voting for these types of parties.

Variables	(1) Close to populist party	(2) Close to far right party	(3) Close to eurosceptic party
1.income	0.00299 (0.00573)	-0.0127*** (0.00462)	-0.000929 (0.00772)
2.income	0.0146*** (0.00521)	0.000418 (0.00417)	0.00591 (0.00692)
3.income	0.00402 (0.00479)	-0.000359 (0.00377)	0.00750 (0.00630)
4.income	-0.00501 (0.00462)	-0.00459 (0.00361)	1.47e-05 (0.00604)
6.income	-0.0129*** (0.00468)	-0.00699* (0.00366)	-0.0100 (0.00612)
7.income	-0.00871* (0.00466)	-0.00506 (0.00366)	-0.0147** (0.00609)
8.income	-0.0124*** (0.00451)	-0.00855** (0.00350)	-0.0149** (0.00586)
9.income	-0.0218*** (0.00488)	-0.0229*** (0.00385)	-0.0317*** (0.00637)
10.income	-0.0377*** (0.00507)	-0.0366*** (0.00405)	-0.0490*** (0.00665)
Constant	0.0124 (0.0125)	0.0227** (0.00999)	0.0483*** (0.0160)
Observations	76,017	81,027	64,359
R-squared	0.199	0.253	0.159

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.8: Classes of income dummy in closeness to populist/far right/eurosceptic parties

The income class chosen as the baseline was the fifth. From the above table we note that high income classes significantly decrease the probability of feeling close to the three types of parties taken in exam. On the contrary, this does not happen for the income classes lower than

the median income class (used as a baseline) which are not significant.

Variables	(1) Close to populist party	(2) Close to far right party	(3) Close to eurosceptic party
2.wave	0.0204*** (0.00458)	-0.00324 (0.00358)	-0.00496 (0.00537)
3.wave	0.0177*** (0.00416)	-0.0160*** (0.00365)	-0.00546 (0.00514)
4.wave	0.0145*** (0.00411)	0.00564 (0.00360)	0.00504 (0.00509)
5.wave	0.00556 (0.00430)	0.00312 (0.00374)	0.00704 (0.00617)
6.wave	0.0265*** (0.00408)	0.0120*** (0.00355)	0.0121** (0.00504)
7.wave	0.0646*** (0.00407)	0.0395*** (0.00356)	0.0558*** (0.00502)
8.wave	0.0735*** (0.00413)	0.0526*** (0.00360)	0.0655*** (0.00509)
Constant	0.0154 (0.0129)	0.00997 (0.0103)	0.0474*** (0.0166)
Observations	76,017	81,027	64,359
R-squared	0.199	0.253	0.159

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.9: wave dummy in closeness to populist/far right/eurosceptic parties

As you can see from the table 3.9 all the most recent waves are significant and with a positive effect on the feeling of closeness to the three types of parties considered. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the vote for these parties has more than quadrupled in the last twenty years.

The fact that control variables like wave dummy, country dummy and income classes dummy are significant makes us understand that there are factors that influence these variables that are not explicitly contained in our models.

Conclusion

The vote for a party, like the closeness to it, is not only a function of measurable objective variables (e.g. unemployment, type of employment contract, etc.) but is also part of the cultural values of the individual and the community to which it belongs.

Some of these influences are unfortunately not measurable through the data provided by ESS. Because of this lack of information we find some discrepancies between the results of the influence of the variables studied on the "vote, proximity to the parties examined" and the results obtained "from indices constructed for proximity to ideology". Populist rhetoric is not only based on proposing temporary solutions without taking into account long-term costs, "simplistic" remedies to complex problems, and the opposition between Plebs and Elite, but also on other elements which cannot be investigated with the data taken in exam, such as the role of the figure of the "charismatic leader", very present in extreme right-wing parties, on the aggressive propaganda that all too often resorts to "fake news".

As regard the factors that relate on proposing temporary solutions without taking into account long-term costs, "simplistic" remedies to complex problems and the opposition between Plebs and Elite we were able to report their effects. For example, a certain level of education allows individuals to recognize these "easy solutions" and "temporary remedies" that involve very high costs for the population in the medium to long term. In fact, education has proved to be significant and always with a negative effect in each model examined.

The results about the effect of gender on the vote for populist and/or far-right parties reflect what was expected and demonstrated in literature. Empirical studies have shown that far-right populist parties receive more votes from men than from women than traditional parties. According to the authors the main motivation derives from the fact that men and women cover different socio-economic positions, in fact women are more likely to be employed in the public sector, therefore less likely to be employed in labour-intensive jobs (such as factory work) and therefore less likely to be threatened by deindustrialization. This also leads to a lower perception of

the threat from immigrants. This difference makes it less likely that women feel close to populist radical right-wing parties.(harteveld,2015)[10](immerzeel,2015)[12](spierings,2015)[31] In addition, there are also theoretical reasons to expect women to be more motivated to control prejudice than men. Women have been argued to place a greater importance on interpersonal relations and generally score higher on empathy.(Harteveld,2015)[10](Pratto,1997)[26] It is therefore reasonable to expect a stronger focus on interpersonal relations to be associated with a greater commitment to the goal of acting without prejudice toward others. And also for the latter reasoning we think it reasonable that women are on average less likely to feel close to parties that attack weaker sections of society and propose inhumane solutions (e.g. think of the humanitarian consequences caused by the "closed ports" policy in Italy and the related cases of the ship "Diciotti" in June 2018 and the ship "Gregoretti" in July 2019).

Another aspect that we investigated extensively was the effect of the area of residence of the respondents; the effect of this variable is complex and related to other variables included in some of the models considered. Basically, as we move away from the big cities, the probability to feel close to the three categories of parties taken in exam increases. A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be that people living in a big city are more likely to be open minded towards different cultures, which are less perceived as a threat. In addition, poor immigrants, especially from different ethnicity, cannot afford to live in a big city, preferring less expensive houses in suburbs, small cities or country villages. For this reason, and for the closeness to manufacturing industries, these locations have experienced an increase in the share of foreign residents. This fact leads to an increase in negative attitude regarding all the immigrants-related themes. Immigration is in fact one of the main issues used by these types of parties. This is confirmed by the results of anti-immigration variables studied in the "cultural values" class across the models. With respect to all the considerations above, we can argue that rural areas are less affected by these phenomena, due to the reduced job opportunities offered to its residents. Moreover, immigrants heavily rely on the social and familiar net with their peers. So, when they come to settle down, they often try to build communities of individuals belonging to the same ethnic group. For this reason big cities and sometimes countryside are less attractive to immigrants. In addition, there is a certain degree of anomie in cities, as cultural clashes between native and foreign communities are less frequent. Conversely, in smaller communities, which are generally more cohesive, less accustomed to the new and whose residents on average are less open-minded than residents of large cities, the arrival of these foreigners inevitably causes

a certain degree of conflict. Unfortunately, it is this mentality also creates economic damage, as immigration has been shown to offer much to both cities and rural areas.(Dustmann,2007)[6] Just think of the cost in human capital of caring for people who are not completely autonomous (the elderly, children), thanks to immigration you have access to a service at a lower cost than before the arrival of migrants, and this allows you to employ all the active members of the family in work instead of having to sacrifice one to play the role of nanny/caregiver. Ultimately, in our analyses we have found confirmation that distrust of national and supranational institutions are associated with an increase in the possibility of joining Populist and/or Eurosceptic parties. With this data is not possible to investigate the relationship between the role of the figure of the "charismatic leader", the presence of "fake news" within the political discourse, the inconsistency due to the continuous variations in the positions expressed by the party, which vary according to the "hot" topics of the moment and the vote for/closeness to the three categories of parties taken in exam . But the fact that control variables like wave dummy, country dummy and income classes dummy are significant makes us understand that there are factors that influence these variables that are not explicitly contained in our models. In conclusion it would be very interesting to try to expand this study by integrating it with particular datasets that allow us to investigate these very particular phenomena that have such a great impact on our lives.



Appendix

Populism

VARIABLES	(1) Close to POP party	(2) Close to POP party
Demographic		
Age	0.000633 (0.000707)	-0.000840* (0.000497)
Age ²	-1.72e-05** (7.23e-06)	-9.95e-06** (5.02e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00265*** (0.000507)	-0.00258*** (0.000389)
Sex(male)	0.0251*** (0.00389)	0.0304*** (0.00277)
Market Labor		
Low income (perceived)	0.00528 (0.00594)	0.0151*** (0.00422)
Employed	-0.0161** (0.00734)	-0.0128** (0.00519)
Indefinite contract	0.00369 (0.00556)	0.00628 (0.00403)
Being richer	-0.0312** (0.0152)	-0.0163 (0.0142)
Student	-0.0123 (0.00865)	-0.0245*** (0.00699)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00875 (0.0113)	-0.00385 (0.00830)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.0156 (0.0159)	0.0152 (0.0114)
Retired	-0.0153* (0.00844)	-0.00788 (0.00569)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0259*** (0.00457)	0.0214*** (0.00329)

Cultural values

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Mistrust in politicians	0.0303*** (0.00687)	0.0501*** (0.00486)
Mistrust in political parties	0.00341 (0.00696)	-0.00612 (0.00493)
Unsatisfied of democracy	0.0466*** (0.00494)	0.0526*** (0.00344)
Anti Poor Immigrant	0.0361*** (0.00451)	0.0419*** (0.00308)
Anti-immigr culture	0.0656*** (0.00576)	0.0557*** (0.00368)
Immigr is bad for economy	0.0291*** (0.00515)	0.0324*** (0.00339)
Feeling unsafe	0.0157*** (0.00498)	0.00144 (0.00395)
Constant	0.0112 (0.0219)	0.0314** (0.0154)
Observations	23,928	52,089
R-squared	0.180	0.211
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.1: Closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vote for POP	Vote for POP	Vote for POP	Vote for POP	Vote for POP
	party	party	party	party	party
<i>Demographic</i>					
Age	9.30e-05 (0.000266)	2.65e-05 (0.000267)	0.000152 (0.000333)	4.29e-05 (0.000346)	0.000193 (0.000367)
Age ²	-1.09e-05*** (2.53e-06)	-1.02e-05*** (2.54e-06)	-1.36e-05*** (3.31e-06)	-1.15e-05*** (3.48e-06)	-1.35e-05*** (3.68e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00660*** (0.000211)	-0.00641*** (0.000215)	-0.00472*** (0.000250)	-0.00270*** (0.000260)	-0.00279*** (0.000275)
Sex(male)	0.0222*** (0.00157)	0.0222*** (0.00157)	0.0262*** (0.00175)	0.0273*** (0.00183)	0.0292*** (0.00194)
<i>Domicile</i>					
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00674** (0.00294)	0.00860*** (0.00321)	0.00518 (0.00327)	0.00611* (0.00348)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00670*** (0.00246)	0.00649** (0.00271)	0.00243 (0.00276)	0.00546* (0.00292)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0147*** (0.00249)	0.0152*** (0.00275)	0.00966*** (0.00283)	0.0117*** (0.00299)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.000524 (0.00350)	0.000968 (0.00382)	-0.00321 (0.00391)	0.000106 (0.00412)
<i>Market Labor</i>					
Low income (perceived)			0.0248*** (0.00268)	0.0133*** (0.00279)	0.0133*** (0.00295)
Employed			-0.00892*** (0.00339)	-0.00708** (0.00346)	-0.00819** (0.00369)
Indefinite contract			-0.00185 (0.00259)	0.000471 (0.00262)	0.00387 (0.00278)
Being richer			-0.0191** (0.00903)	-0.0155* (0.00917)	-0.0192* (0.00990)
student			-0.0251***	-0.0170***	-0.0226***

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			(0.00461)	(0.00467)	(0.00503)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.00594 (0.00550)	0.00572 (0.00561)	0.00628 (0.00593)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			0.0146** (0.00730)	0.0124* (0.00747)	0.0121 (0.00797)
retired			0.000597 (0.00365)	-0.000359 (0.00379)	0.000961 (0.00404)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0188*** (0.00212)	0.0176*** (0.00216)	0.0188*** (0.00229)
<i>Cultural values</i>					
Mistrust in politicians				0.0303*** (0.00227)	0.0336*** (0.00343)
Mistrust in political parties					-0.00646* (0.00345)
Unsatisfied of democracy				0.0377*** (0.00220)	0.0365*** (0.00236)
Anti Poor Immigrant				0.0306*** (0.00203)	0.0307*** (0.00216)
Anti-immigr culture				0.0433*** (0.00248)	0.0425*** (0.00262)
Immigr is bad for economy				0.0220*** (0.00224)	0.0250*** (0.00239)
Feeling unsafe				0.00586** (0.00247)	0.00527** (0.00264)
Constant	0.125*** (0.00792)	0.115*** (0.00817)	0.101*** (0.0105)	0.0246** (0.0110)	0.0336*** (0.0116)
Observations	142,774	142,622	119,364	112,392	99,946
R-squared	0.239	0.239	0.199	0.205	0.220
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.2: Vote for Populist party in last election, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Vote for POP party	(2) Vote for POP party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.000663 (0.000647)	-0.000145 (0.000444)
Age ²	-1.29e-05** (6.53e-06)	-1.24e-05*** (4.44e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00281*** (0.000459)	-0.00284*** (0.000341)
Sex(male)	0.0261*** (0.00342)	0.0303*** (0.00234)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0126** (0.00529)	0.0128*** (0.00355)
Employed	-0.00575 (0.00662)	-0.00901** (0.00444)
Indefinite contract	0.00468 (0.00486)	0.00395 (0.00337)
Being richer	-0.0270* (0.0149)	-0.0128 (0.0132)
Student	-0.0157* (0.00804)	-0.0246*** (0.00647)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	0.00303 (0.0105)	0.00821 (0.00716)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.00199 (0.0141)	0.0172* (0.00964)
Retired	-0.00917 (0.00744)	0.00498 (0.00480)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0159***	0.0199***

	(0.00404)	(0.00277)
<i>Cultural values</i>		
Mistrust in politicians	0.0287*** (0.00612)	0.0358*** (0.00414)
Mistrust in political parties	-0.00479 (0.00615)	-0.00746* (0.00416)
Unsatisfied of democracy	0.0408*** (0.00426)	0.0349*** (0.00283)
Anti Poor Immigrant	0.0328*** (0.00393)	0.0300*** (0.00259)
Anti-immigr culture	0.0499*** (0.00499)	0.0401*** (0.00309)
Immigr is bad for economy	0.0202*** (0.00444)	0.0270*** (0.00283)
Feeling unsafe	0.00559 (0.00435)	0.00454 (0.00329)
Constant	0.0462** (0.0202)	0.0431*** (0.0137)
Observations	30,230	69,716
R-squared	0.203	0.229
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Vote for Populist party in last election, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(2) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(3) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(4) Closeness to Pop Party idx
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	0.00525*** (0.000179)	0.00518*** (0.000179)	0.00311*** (0.000245)	0.00340*** (0.000247)
Age ²	-5.16e- 05*** (1.80e-06)	-5.10e- 05*** (1.80e-06)	-3.18e- 05*** (2.53e-06)	-3.50e- 05*** (2.55e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00893*** (0.000171)	-0.00870*** (0.000174)	-0.00660*** (0.000200)	-0.00618*** (0.000200)
Sex(male)	0.000592 (0.00127)	0.000523 (0.00127)	0.00351** (0.00140)	0.0122*** (0.00143)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00326 (0.00238)	0.00597** (0.00258)	0.00812*** (0.00258)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0106*** (0.00196)	0.0112*** (0.00214)	0.0143*** (0.00214)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0159*** (0.00198)	0.0201*** (0.00217)	0.0275*** (0.00218)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0103*** (0.00288)	0.0167*** (0.00311)	0.0236*** (0.00311)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0606*** (0.00201)	0.0572*** (0.00201)
Employed			-0.00564** (0.00262)	-0.00414 (0.00262)
Indefinite contract			-0.000459 (0.00207)	-0.000446 (0.00207)
Being richer			-0.0179*** (0.00640)	-0.0183*** (0.00639)

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Student			-0.0364***	-0.0352***
			(0.00329)	(0.00328)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.00289	0.00521
			(0.00395)	(0.00394)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			-0.00630	-0.00458
			(0.00525)	(0.00524)
Retired			-0.00481	-0.00537*
			(0.00297)	(0.00297)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0126***	0.0120***
			(0.00168)	(0.00168)

Cultural values

Feeling unsafe				0.0555***
				(0.00185)
Constant	0.0793***	0.0670***	0.107***	0.0732***
	(0.00528)	(0.00555)	(0.00761)	(0.00770)
Observations	227,427	227,096	178,781	177,779
R-squared	0.054	0.055	0.065	0.070
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4: Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(2) Closeness to Pop Party idx
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.00342*** (0.000423)	0.00344*** (0.000302)
Age ²	-3.26e-05*** (4.38e-06)	-3.67e-05*** (3.11e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00575*** (0.000317)	-0.00673*** (0.000253)
Sex(male)	0.00835*** (0.00241)	0.0138*** (0.00176)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0506*** (0.00341)	0.0601*** (0.00248)
Employed	-0.00557 (0.00443)	-0.00371 (0.00322)
Indefinite contract	-0.00254 (0.00345)	-5.20e-05 (0.00255)
Being richer	-0.0242*** (0.00913)	-0.0153* (0.00870)
Student	-0.0294*** (0.00521)	-0.0388*** (0.00417)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00174 (0.00663)	0.00727 (0.00486)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.0104 (0.00876)	-0.00223 (0.00647)
Retired	-0.000233 (0.00518)	-0.00770** (0.00362)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.00891*** (0.00282)	0.0133*** (0.00207)

Cultural values

Appendix

Feeling unsafe	0.0517*** (0.00292)	0.0547*** (0.00235)
Constant	0.0753*** (0.0130)	0.103*** (0.00909)
Observations	52,954	124,825
R-squared	0.072	0.069
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5: Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	0.00266*** (0.000116)	0.00263*** (0.000117)	0.00188*** (0.000160)	0.00205*** (0.000161)
Age ²	-2.66e- 05*** (1.17e-06)	-2.63e- 05*** (1.17e-06)	-1.94e- 05*** (1.64e-06)	-2.13e- 05*** (1.66e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00390*** (0.000112)	-0.00381*** (0.000113)	-0.00282*** (0.000130)	-0.00261*** (0.000131)
Sex(male)	0.000940 (0.000826)	0.000926 (0.000826)	0.00300*** (0.000910)	0.00728*** (0.000930)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00208 (0.00155)	0.00218 (0.00168)	0.00334** (0.00168)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00595*** (0.00128)	0.00694*** (0.00139)	0.00846*** (0.00140)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.00672*** (0.00129)	0.00875*** (0.00141)	0.0124*** (0.00142)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.00437** (0.00187)	0.00730*** (0.00202)	0.0107*** (0.00203)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0272*** (0.00131)	0.0257*** (0.00131)
Employed			-0.00389** (0.00171)	-0.00311* (0.00171)
Indefinite contract			0.000651 (0.00135)	0.000603 (0.00135)
Being richer			-0.00880** (0.00417)	-0.00854** (0.00417)

Appendix

Student	-0.0152***	-0.0146***
	(0.00214)	(0.00214)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00589**	-0.00480*
	(0.00257)	(0.00257)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.000941	0.00172
	(0.00342)	(0.00342)
Retired	-0.00248	-0.00260
	(0.00193)	(0.00194)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.00476***	0.00435***
	(0.00110)	(0.00110)

Cultural values

Feeling unsafe				0.0279***
				(0.00121)
Constant	0.0125***	0.00677*	0.0227***	0.00522
	(0.00344)	(0.00361)	(0.00496)	(0.00502)
Observations	227,427	227,096	178,781	177,779
R-squared	0.027	0.027	0.033	0.036
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	(2) Closeness to Pop Party strong idx
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.00189*** (0.000269)	0.00212*** (0.000198)
Age ²	-1.83e-05*** (2.78e-06)	-2.27e-05*** (2.05e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00198*** (0.000201)	-0.00305*** (0.000167)
Sex(male)	0.00308** (0.00153)	0.00903*** (0.00116)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0182*** (0.00216)	0.0287*** (0.00163)
Employed	-0.00293 (0.00281)	-0.00351* (0.00212)
Indefinite contract	-0.000307 (0.00219)	0.00108 (0.00168)
Being richer	-0.00830 (0.00580)	-0.01000* (0.00572)
Student	-0.0113*** (0.00331)	-0.0169*** (0.00274)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00322 (0.00421)	-0.00567* (0.00320)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.00526 (0.00556)	0.000118 (0.00426)
Retired	-0.000227 (0.00329)	-0.00372 (0.00238)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.00429** (0.00179)	0.00442*** (0.00136)

Cultural values

Appendix

Feeling unsafe	0.0234*** (0.00185)	0.0297*** (0.00155)
Constant	0.00938 (0.00823)	0.0178*** (0.00598)
Observations	52,954	124,825
R-squared	0.033	0.037
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.7: Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(2) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(3) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(4) Closeness to Pop Party idx
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	0.00285*** (0.000239)	0.00278*** (0.000240)	0.00124*** (0.000311)	0.00161*** (0.000312)
Age ²	-2.87e- 05*** (2.34e-06)	-2.80e- 05*** (2.34e-06)	-1.36e- 05*** (3.12e-06)	-1.79e- 05*** (3.15e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00735*** (0.000209)	-0.00714*** (0.000213)	-0.00537*** (0.000237)	-0.00502*** (0.000238)
Sex(male)	0.00109 (0.00161)	0.00101 (0.00161)	0.00415** (0.00172)	0.0118*** (0.00175)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00529* (0.00294)	0.00699** (0.00309)	0.00864*** (0.00308)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00893*** (0.00247)	0.00921*** (0.00261)	0.0118*** (0.00261)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0166*** (0.00251)	0.0187*** (0.00266)	0.0249*** (0.00267)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.00313 (0.00357)	0.00626* (0.00374)	0.0124*** (0.00374)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0523*** (0.00263)	0.0492*** (0.00263)
Employed			-0.00834** (0.00329)	-0.00682** (0.00328)
Indefinite contract			-0.00248 (0.00256)	-0.00259 (0.00255)
Being richer			-0.0131 (0.00804)	-0.0145* (0.00803)

Appendix

Student	-0.0304***	-0.0288***
	(0.00420)	(0.00419)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00149	0.00102
	(0.00525)	(0.00523)
unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.00771	-0.00670
	(0.00715)	(0.00714)
Retired	-0.00936***	-0.00895**
	(0.00359)	(0.00359)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0100***	0.00926***
	(0.00209)	(0.00209)

Cultural values

Feeling unsafe				0.0533***
				(0.00236)
Constant	0.104***	0.0920***	0.125***	0.0932***
	(0.00715)	(0.00743)	(0.00982)	(0.00993)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412	89,975
R-squared	0.048	0.049	0.057	0.063
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.8: 2nd Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Pop Party idx	(2) Closeness to Pop Party idx
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.00132** (0.000519)	0.00178*** (0.000388)
Age ²	-1.27e-05** (5.28e-06)	-2.08e-05*** (3.89e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00465*** (0.000371)	-0.00548*** (0.000303)
Sex(male)	0.0117*** (0.00288)	0.0118*** (0.00218)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0418*** (0.00433)	0.0527*** (0.00329)
Employed	-0.00259 (0.00542)	-0.00928** (0.00408)
Indefinite contract	-0.00775* (0.00415)	-0.000141 (0.00320)
Being richer	-0.0183 (0.0112)	-0.0120 (0.0111)
Student	-0.0241*** (0.00640)	-0.0317*** (0.00546)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00384 (0.00842)	0.00326 (0.00660)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.0114 (0.0116)	-0.00514 (0.00895)
Retired	-0.00937 (0.00616)	-0.00918** (0.00441)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.00592* (0.00340)	0.0111*** (0.00262)

Cultural values

Feeling unsafe	0.0511*** (0.00361)	0.0530*** (0.00306)
Constant	0.0911*** (0.0162)	0.120*** (0.0120)
Observations	28,136	61,839
R-squared	0.063	0.063
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.9: 2nd Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	Closeness to Pop Party strong idx
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	0.00147*** (0.000151)	0.00145*** (0.000151)	0.000931*** (0.000197)	0.00111*** (0.000198)
Age ²	-1.53e- 05*** (1.47e-06)	-1.51e- 05*** (1.48e-06)	-1.08e- 05*** (1.98e-06)	-1.28e- 05*** (2.00e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00310*** (0.000132)	-0.00301*** (0.000134)	-0.00217*** (0.000151)	-0.00203*** (0.000151)
Sex(male)	0.00124 (0.00101)	0.00123 (0.00101)	0.00337*** (0.00109)	0.00663*** (0.00111)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00284 (0.00186)	0.00177 (0.00196)	0.00249 (0.00196)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00610*** (0.00156)	0.00651*** (0.00165)	0.00764*** (0.00166)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.00786*** (0.00158)	0.00902*** (0.00169)	0.0118*** (0.00170)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.00117 (0.00225)	0.00142 (0.00237)	0.00402* (0.00238)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0216*** (0.00167)	0.0203*** (0.00167)
Employed			-0.00195 (0.00208)	-0.00149 (0.00208)
Indefinite contract			-0.00114 (0.00162)	-0.00114 (0.00162)
Being richer			-0.0115** (0.00510)	-0.0127** (0.00510)

Appendix

Student			-0.0117***	-0.0111***
			(0.00266)	(0.00266)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			-0.00133	-0.000367
			(0.00332)	(0.00332)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			5.08e-06	0.000323
			(0.00453)	(0.00453)
Retired			-0.00124	-0.000959
			(0.00228)	(0.00228)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.00235*	0.00195
			(0.00132)	(0.00133)

Cultural values

Feeling unsafe				0.0231***
				(0.00150)
Constant	0.0258***	0.0196***	0.0299***	0.0159**
	(0.00451)	(0.00469)	(0.00623)	(0.00631)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412	89,975
R-squared	0.022	0.023	0.028	0.031
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.10: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to Pop Party strong idx	(2) Closeness to Pop Party strong idx
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.000880*** (0.000315)	0.00120*** (0.000250)
Age ²	-8.49e-06*** (3.21e-06)	-1.48e-05*** (2.51e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00152*** (0.000226)	-0.00236*** (0.000195)
Sex(male)	0.00475*** (0.00175)	0.00748*** (0.00141)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0106*** (0.00263)	0.0246*** (0.00212)
Employed	-0.00105 (0.00330)	-0.00226 (0.00263)
Indefinite contract	-0.00348 (0.00252)	0.000200 (0.00206)
Being richer	-0.00953 (0.00682)	-0.0152** (0.00716)
Student	-0.00823** (0.00389)	-0.0128*** (0.00352)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.000532 (0.00512)	-0.000137 (0.00426)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.00325 (0.00706)	0.00162 (0.00577)
Retired	-0.00342 (0.00374)	-0.000162 (0.00284)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.000123 (0.00207)	0.00308* (0.00169)

Cultural values

Appendix

Feeling unsafe	0.0214*** (0.00219)	0.0240*** (0.00197)
Constant	0.0123 (0.00985)	0.0297*** (0.00774)
Observations	28,136	61,839
R-squared	0.026	0.033
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

Far Right

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far- right Party	(2) Closeness to far- right Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	1.78e-05 (0.000536)	-0.000691* (0.000401)
Age ²	-9.38e-06* (5.49e-06)	-9.28e-06** (4.06e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00267*** (0.000387)	-0.00311*** (0.000315)
Sex(male)	0.0155*** (0.00293)	0.0191*** (0.00223)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.00791* (0.00446)	0.00900*** (0.00342)
Employed	-0.0118** (0.00551)	-0.00809* (0.00416)
Indefinite contract	0.00559 (0.00417)	0.00769** (0.00323)
Being richer	-0.0117 (0.0113)	-0.0140 (0.0112)
Student	-0.0178*** (0.00646)	-0.0188*** (0.00551)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.0198** (0.00855)	-0.00798 (0.00676)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.0165 (0.0116)	-0.0146 (0.00916)
Retired	-0.00976 (0.00634)	-0.00689 (0.00456)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0157*** (0.00343)	0.0142*** (0.00265)

<i>Cultural values</i>		
Feeling unsafe	0.00879** (0.00373)	0.00531* (0.00317)
Nogay	0.00686* (0.00404)	0.00782*** (0.00285)
Rightwing self-placement	0.0733*** (0.00329)	0.0867*** (0.00242)
Anti Poor Immigrant	0.0171*** (0.00439)	0.0187*** (0.00320)
Anti-immigr culture	0.0528*** (0.00463)	0.0465*** (0.00314)
Immigr is bad for economy	0.0244*** (0.00403)	0.0213*** (0.00284)
Anti-immigr same race	-0.0110** (0.00481)	-0.00998*** (0.00331)
Anti-immigr diff race	0.0268*** (0.00507)	0.0290*** (0.00358)
Immigr make cntry worse	0.0241*** (0.00431)	0.0355*** (0.00299)
Authoritarian gov	0.0161*** (0.00358)	0.0146*** (0.00267)
Constant	0.0352** (0.0168)	0.0185 (0.0126)
Observations	25,519	55,508
R-squared	0.238	0.261
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.12: Closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Vote for far- right Party	(2) Vote for far_right_le Party	(3) Vote for far_right_le Party	(4) Vote for far_right_le Party
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	5.28e-05 (0.000221)	-9.12e-05 (0.000222)	-0.000529* (0.000276)	0.000192 (0.000293)
Age ²	-8.21e- 06*** (2.10e-06)	-6.76e- 06*** (2.11e-06)	-4.10e-06 (2.75e-06)	-1.20e- 05*** (2.95e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00603*** (0.000176)	-0.00572*** (0.000179)	-0.00510*** (0.000207)	-0.00308*** (0.000221)
Sex(male)	0.0152*** (0.00131)	0.0151*** (0.00131)	0.0186*** (0.00145)	0.0178*** (0.00155)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.0117*** (0.00245)	0.0116*** (0.00266)	0.00845*** (0.00275)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0105*** (0.00205)	0.00896*** (0.00225)	0.00635*** (0.00233)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0206*** (0.00207)	0.0190*** (0.00228)	0.0130*** (0.00238)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0154*** (0.00291)	0.0129*** (0.00317)	0.00865*** (0.00331)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0122*** (0.00222)	0.00638*** (0.00237)
Employed			-0.00979*** (0.00281)	-0.00926*** (0.00293)
Indefinite contract			-0.00297 (0.00215)	0.000520 (0.00220)
Being richer			-0.00916 (0.00749)	-0.00786 (0.00775)

Appendix

Student	-0.0259***	-0.0139***
	(0.00382)	(0.00392)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.0140***	-0.0111**
	(0.00456)	(0.00476)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.00785	-0.00765
	(0.00606)	(0.00632)
Retired	-0.00774**	-0.0101***
	(0.00303)	(0.00321)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.00701***	0.00993***
	(0.00176)	(0.00182)

Cultural values

Feeling unsafe			0.00561***
			(0.00210)
Nogay			0.00580***
			(0.00203)
Rightwing self-placement			0.0662***
			(0.00173)
Anti Poor Immigrant			0.0114***
			(0.00224)
Anti-immigr culture			0.0324***
			(0.00223)
Immigr is bad for economy			0.0172***
			(0.00197)
Anti-immigr same race			-0.00999***
			(0.00233)
Anti-immigr diff race			0.0232***
			(0.00252)
Immigr make cntry worse			0.0253***
			(0.00210)
Authoritarian gov			0.0167***
			(0.00188)
Constant	0.123***	0.108***	0.105***
	(0.00658)	(0.00679)	(0.00868)
			0.0117
			(0.00934)

Observations	143,143	142,991	119,649	106,003
R-squared	0.318	0.319	0.263	0.266
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.13: Vote for Far-right party in last election, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Vote for far-right Party	(2) Vote for far-right Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.000689 (0.000505)	-6.27e-05 (0.000358)
Age ²	-1.26e-05** (5.12e-06)	-1.14e-05*** (3.60e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00304*** (0.000360)	-0.00322*** (0.000276)
Sex(male)	0.0154*** (0.00266)	0.0187*** (0.00189)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.000977 (0.00411)	0.00793*** (0.00289)
Employed	-0.00437 (0.00512)	-0.0111*** (0.00355)
Indefinite contract	-0.000819 (0.00377)	0.00127 (0.00270)
Being richer	-0.0146 (0.0113)	-0.00209 (0.0105)
Student	-0.00649 (0.00615)	-0.0168*** (0.00507)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.0157* (0.00819)	-0.00877 (0.00582)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.000735 (0.0108)	-0.0108 (0.00776)
Retired	-0.0117** (0.00576)	-0.00910** (0.00387)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0115*** (0.00312)	0.00888*** (0.00223)
<i>Cultural values</i>		

Feeling unsafe	-7.35e-05	0.00694***
	(0.00336)	(0.00265)
Nogay	0.0107***	0.00402*
	(0.00371)	(0.00243)
Rightwing self-placement	0.0612***	0.0684***
	(0.00304)	(0.00211)
Anti Poor Immigrant	0.0114***	0.0112***
	(0.00395)	(0.00271)
Anti-immigr culture	0.0363***	0.0307***
	(0.00415)	(0.00264)
Immigr is bad for economy	0.0138***	0.0188***
	(0.00359)	(0.00236)
Anti-immigr same race	-0.0120***	-0.00916***
	(0.00432)	(0.00277)
Anti-immigr diff race	0.0270***	0.0218***
	(0.00456)	(0.00302)
Immigr make cntry worse	0.0254***	0.0258***
	(0.00385)	(0.00250)
Authoritarian gov	0.0202***	0.0153***
	(0.00329)	(0.00228)
Constant	0.0293*	0.0214*
	(0.0159)	(0.0112)
Observations	32,286	73,717
R-squared	0.256	0.272
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.14: Vote for Far-right party in last election, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Closeness to far-right Party	Closeness to idx_right Party	Closeness to idx_right Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	0.00124*** (0.000177)	0.00113*** (0.000177)	-0.000161 (0.000248)
Age ²	4.39e-06** (1.79e-06)	5.41e-06*** (1.79e-06)	1.35e-05*** (2.55e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00769*** (0.000169)	-0.00740*** (0.000172)	-0.00664*** (0.000201)
Sex(male)	0.00962*** (0.00125)	0.00940*** (0.00125)	0.0125*** (0.00140)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		-0.00483** (0.00235)	-0.00264 (0.00259)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.00556*** (0.00194)	0.00811*** (0.00215)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0131*** (0.00196)	0.0161*** (0.00218)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0218*** (0.00284)	0.0258*** (0.00312)
<i>Market Labor</i>			
Low income (perceived)			0.0323*** (0.00203)
Employed			-0.000729 (0.00263)
Indefinite contract			-0.00466** (0.00208)
Being richer			-0.0107* (0.00642)

Student			-0.0325***
			(0.00329)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			-0.00506
			(0.00397)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			-0.00826
			(0.00529)
Retired			0.00569*
			(0.00300)
Unemployed (3 months+)			-0.00899***
			(0.00169)
Constant	0.0753***	0.0660***	0.119***
	(0.00521)	(0.00547)	(0.00766)
Observations	222,584	222,274	175,837
R-squared	0.060	0.061	0.064
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.15: Index of closeness to Far-right party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far- right Party	(2) Closeness to far- right Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	-4.72e-05 (0.000415)	-0.000174 (0.000305)
Age ²	1.32e-05*** (4.29e-06)	1.32e-05*** (3.15e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00548*** (0.000311)	-0.00737*** (0.000256)
Sex(male)	0.00684*** (0.00233)	0.0150*** (0.00174)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0195*** (0.00336)	0.0377*** (0.00252)
Employed	-0.0117*** (0.00437)	0.00410 (0.00326)
Indefinite contract	-0.00155 (0.00340)	-0.00702*** (0.00258)
Being richer	-0.0111 (0.00898)	-0.0119 (0.00881)
Student	-0.0294*** (0.00513)	-0.0351*** (0.00422)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.0106 (0.00656)	-0.00319 (0.00493)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.0185** (0.00867)	-0.00370 (0.00659)
Retired	-0.00516 (0.00512)	0.00930** (0.00367)
Unemployed (3 months+)	-0.00338 (0.00278)	-0.0114*** (0.00210)
Constant	0.128***	0.133***

	(0.0126)	(0.00914)
Observations	52,597	123,240
R-squared	0.065	0.062
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.16: Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

Appendix

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far- right Party	(2) Closeness to str_idx_right Party	(3) Closeness to str_idx_right Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	-0.000102* (5.85e-05)	-0.000106* (5.87e-05)	-0.000254*** (8.24e-05)
Age ²	3.45e-06*** (5.89e-07)	3.49e-06*** (5.91e-07)	4.69e-06*** (8.49e-07)
Education (years)	-0.000606*** (5.61e-05)	-0.000594*** (5.70e-05)	-0.000518*** (6.73e-05)
Sex(male)	0.00288*** (0.000415)	0.00287*** (0.000416)	0.00325*** (0.000470)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		-0.00153** (0.000781)	-0.00162* (0.000867)
Domicile = 3, Small city		-0.000459 (0.000643)	-7.12e-05 (0.000720)
Domicile = 4, Country village		9.68e-05 (0.000649)	0.000774 (0.000729)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.00109 (0.000943)	0.00200* (0.00104)
<i>Market Labor</i>			
Low income (perceived)			0.00292*** (0.000676)
Employed			0.000838 (0.000880)
Indefinite contract			-0.000128 (0.000697)
Being richer			-0.00160 (0.00215)
Student			-0.00319*** (0.00111)

Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.000124 (0.00133)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			-0.00105 (0.00176)
Retired			0.000464 (0.000999)
Unemployed (3 months+)			-0.00217*** (0.000566)
Constant	0.00178 (0.00173)	0.00188 (0.00182)	0.0102*** (0.00256)
Observations	227,427	227,096	178,781
R-squared	0.013	0.013	0.013
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.17: Strict Index of closeness to Far-right party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far- right Party	(2) Closeness to far- right Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	-0.000319** (0.000138)	-0.000233** (0.000102)
Age ²	5.22e-06*** (1.42e-06)	4.51e-06*** (1.05e-06)
Education (years)	-0.000405*** (0.000103)	-0.000579*** (8.59e-05)
Sex(male)	0.000866 (0.000774)	0.00431*** (0.000583)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.000885 (0.00111)	0.00388*** (0.000839)
Employed	-0.000271 (0.00145)	0.00129 (0.00109)
Indefinite contract	0.00113 (0.00113)	-0.000820 (0.000868)
Being richer	-0.00164 (0.00300)	-0.00167 (0.00295)
Student	-0.00296* (0.00171)	-0.00345** (0.00142)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	0.00182 (0.00218)	-0.000776 (0.00165)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.000568 (0.00288)	-0.00128 (0.00220)
Retired	0.000524 (0.00170)	0.000229 (0.00122)
Unemployed (3 months+)	-0.00171* (0.000927)	-0.00227*** (0.000704)
Constant	0.0137***	0.00948***

	(0.00419)	(0.00306)
Observations	53,282	125,499
R-squared	0.018	0.012
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.18: Strict Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far- right Party	(2) Closeness to far- right Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	-0.000945 (0.000585)	-0.00204*** (0.000455)
Age ²	2.10e-05*** (5.94e-06)	2.76e-05*** (4.56e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00617*** (0.000420)	-0.00839*** (0.000356)
Sex(male)	0.00970*** (0.00320)	0.0146*** (0.00251)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0203*** (0.00492)	0.0403*** (0.00387)
Employed	-0.0118* (0.00616)	0.00936* (0.00480)
Indefinite contract	-0.000150 (0.00471)	-0.00933** (0.00376)
Being richer	0.00408 (0.0127)	0.00623 (0.0131)
Student	-0.0337*** (0.00726)	-0.0434*** (0.00641)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00245 (0.00957)	-0.00131 (0.00777)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.0221* (0.0132)	-0.00532 (0.0105)
Retired	-0.0160** (0.00700)	0.0114** (0.00519)
Unemployed (3 months+)	-0.00797** (0.00386)	-0.0128*** (0.00307)
Constant	0.157***	0.205***

	(0.0182)	(0.0140)
Observations	28,064	61,421
R-squared	0.072	0.068
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.19: 2nd Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

Appendix

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far- right Party	(2) Closeness to str_idx_right2 Party	(3) Closeness to str_idx_right2 Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	-0.000327*** (0.000101)	-0.000333*** (0.000102)	-0.000628*** (0.000133)
Age ²	5.15e-06*** (9.90e-07)	5.21e-06*** (9.94e-07)	7.95e-06*** (1.34e-06)
Education (years)	-0.000996*** (8.87e-05)	-0.000977*** (9.03e-05)	-0.000832*** (0.000102)
Sex(male)	0.00264*** (0.000680)	0.00263*** (0.000681)	0.00339*** (0.000734)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		-0.00363*** (0.00125)	-0.00330** (0.00132)
Domicile = 3, Small city		-0.00125 (0.00105)	-0.000976 (0.00112)
Domicile = 4, Country village		-0.000392 (0.00106)	0.000240 (0.00114)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.00106 (0.00151)	0.00247 (0.00160)
<i>Market Labor</i>			
Low income (perceived)			0.00311*** (0.00113)
Employed			0.000468 (0.00141)
Indefinite contract			0.000106 (0.00110)
Being richer			-0.00183 (0.00344)
Student			-0.00569***

			(0.00180)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			-0.00222 (0.00225)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			-0.00246 (0.00306)
Retired			-0.000861 (0.00154)
Unemployed (3 months+)			-0.00223** (0.000895)
Constant	0.0119*** (0.00303)	0.0127*** (0.00315)	0.0265*** (0.00421)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412
R-squared	0.018	0.018	0.018
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.20: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Far-right party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to far- right Party	(2) Closeness to far- right Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	-0.000376* (0.000215)	-0.000739*** (0.000167)
Age ²	5.01e-06** (2.18e-06)	9.20e-06*** (1.67e-06)
Education (years)	-0.000699*** (0.000155)	-0.000911*** (0.000131)
Sex(male)	0.00114 (0.00118)	0.00452*** (0.000925)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.00226 (0.00181)	0.00386*** (0.00142)
Employed	-0.000550 (0.00227)	0.00115 (0.00177)
Indefinite contract	0.000536 (0.00174)	-0.000462 (0.00139)
Being richer	-0.00396 (0.00469)	0.000333 (0.00482)
Student	-0.00581** (0.00268)	-0.00566** (0.00236)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	0.000106 (0.00353)	-0.00367 (0.00286)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	-0.00108 (0.00487)	-0.00324 (0.00387)
Retired	-0.000351 (0.00257)	-0.00125 (0.00190)
Unemployed (3 months+)	-0.00241* (0.00142)	-0.00200* (0.00113)
Constant	0.0268***	0.0260***

	(0.00669)	(0.00515)
Observations	28,288	62,124
R-squared	0.028	0.016
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.21: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

Euroscepticism

VARIABLES	(1) Idx closeness to eu- roscept Party	(2) Idx closeness to eu- roscept Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.00563*** (0.000775)	0.00586*** (0.000569)
Age ²	-4.56e-05*** (7.88e-06)	-5.06e-05*** (5.73e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00647*** (0.000552)	-0.00672*** (0.000442)
Sex(male)	0.0231*** (0.00421)	0.0331*** (0.00313)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0462*** (0.00649)	0.0567*** (0.00484)
Being richer	-0.0233 (0.0168)	-0.00748 (0.0164)
Employed	-0.00378 (0.00812)	0.0116* (0.00599)
Indefinite contract	-0.00805 (0.00619)	-0.0164*** (0.00467)
Student	-0.0115 (0.00954)	-0.0283*** (0.00798)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00411 (0.0126)	-0.00219 (0.00967)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.0342** (0.0174)	0.00115 (0.0131)
Retired	-0.0147 (0.00924)	0.000193 (0.00651)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0117** (0.00508)	0.0138*** (0.00382)
Constant	0.141***	0.153***

	(0.0241)	(0.0176)
Observations	27,566	60,242
R-squared	0.067	0.062
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.22: 2nd Index of closeness to Euseptic party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Closeness to eu- roscept Party	(2) Closeness to eu- roscept Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	-0.00112 (0.000952)	-0.00167** (0.000649)
Age ²	-8.15e-07 (9.70e-06)	2.42e-07 (6.55e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00133** (0.000670)	-0.00284*** (0.000492)
Sex(male)	0.0178*** (0.00513)	0.0158*** (0.00351)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.00707 (0.00806)	0.0237*** (0.00549)
Being richer	-0.0156 (0.0205)	-0.00238 (0.0187)
Employed	-0.00298 (0.00987)	0.000408 (0.00672)
Indefinite contract	0.00110 (0.00744)	-0.00214 (0.00518)
Student	0.000418 (0.0116)	-0.0215** (0.00903)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	0.0133 (0.0152)	0.00266 (0.0108)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.0158 (0.0215)	0.0387*** (0.0150)
Retired	0.00634 (0.0114)	-0.00103 (0.00740)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0209*** (0.00616)	0.0208*** (0.00426)
<i>Cultural values</i>		

EU gone too far	0.0899*** (0.00635)	0.103*** (0.00407)
Mistrust in EU parliament	0.0945*** (0.00615)	0.0876*** (0.00402)
Constant	0.0521* (0.0291)	0.0637*** (0.0196)
Observations	20,339	44,020
R-squared	0.118	0.182
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.23: Closeness to Euseptic party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Vote for eurosceptic Party	(2) Vote for eu- sceptic Party	(3) Vote for eurosceptic Party	(4) Vote for eurosceptic Party
<i>Demographic</i>				
Age	6.75e-06 (0.000315)	-0.000197 (0.000316)	0.000257 (0.000396)	-0.000792* (0.000477)
Age ²	-7.78e- 06*** (3.00e-06)	-5.82e-06* (3.01e-06)	-1.16e- 05*** (3.95e-06)	-3.14e-06 (4.78e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00533*** (0.000251)	-0.00489*** (0.000255)	-0.00356*** (0.000298)	-0.00266*** (0.000347)
Sex(male)	0.0177*** (0.00187)	0.0174*** (0.00187)	0.0187*** (0.00208)	0.0152*** (0.00245)
<i>Domicile</i>				
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00468 (0.00349)	0.00475 (0.00382)	0.00198 (0.00447)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0103*** (0.00292)	0.0101*** (0.00323)	0.00531 (0.00376)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0201*** (0.00295)	0.0211*** (0.00327)	0.0173*** (0.00384)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0335*** (0.00413)	0.0359*** (0.00454)	0.0264*** (0.00532)
<i>Market Labor</i>				
Low income (perceived)			0.0230*** (0.00319)	0.0123*** (0.00383)
Being richer			-0.00204 (0.0107)	-0.00429 (0.0130)
Employed			0.00359 (0.00403)	0.00203 (0.00476)
Indefinite contract			-0.00658** (0.00308)	-0.000472 (0.00356)

Student			-0.0102*	-0.0163**
			(0.00549)	(0.00648)
Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.0147**	0.0127*
			(0.00653)	(0.00769)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			0.0292***	0.0165
			(0.00866)	(0.0104)
Retired			0.00840*	0.0119**
			(0.00435)	(0.00525)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0178***	0.0173***
			(0.00252)	(0.00294)
<hr/>				
<i>Cultural values</i>				
EU gone too far				0.0765***
				(0.00287)
Mistrust in EU parliament				0.0697***
				(0.00280)
Constant	0.111***	0.0955***	0.0574***	0.0737***
	(0.00938)	(0.00967)	(0.0125)	(0.0147)
Observations	143,707	143,554	120,021	84,682
R-squared	0.194	0.194	0.168	0.184
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.24: Vote for Eusceptic party in last election, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Vote for euroscep- tic Party	(2) Vote for euroscep- tic Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	-0.000260 (0.000849)	-0.00105* (0.000574)
Age ²	-3.73e-06 (8.55e-06)	-2.65e-06 (5.75e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00219*** (0.000590)	-0.00329*** (0.000427)
Sex(male)	0.0128*** (0.00440)	0.0168*** (0.00295)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.00416 (0.00699)	0.0150*** (0.00457)
Being richer	-0.0147 (0.0198)	0.00501 (0.0174)
Employed	0.00443 (0.00869)	0.00166 (0.00568)
Indefinite contract	0.00567 (0.00633)	-0.00397 (0.00429)
Student	-0.000724 (0.0105)	-0.0262*** (0.00826)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	0.0298** (0.0139)	0.00545 (0.00922)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.0189 (0.0185)	0.0159 (0.0125)
Retired	0.0104 (0.00983)	0.0114* (0.00620)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0161*** (0.00529)	0.0174*** (0.00354)
<i>Cultural values</i>		

EU gone too far	0.0722*** (0.00539)	0.0790*** (0.00339)
Mistrust in EU parliament	0.0748*** (0.00519)	0.0676*** (0.00331)
Constant	0.0862*** (0.0261)	0.0915*** (0.0173)
Observations	25,748	58,934
R-squared	0.154	0.201
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.25: Vote for Eusceptic party in last election, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

Appendix

VARIABLES	(1) Idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(2) Idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(3) Idx closeness to eu- scept Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	0.00814*** (0.000238)	0.00794*** (0.000239)	0.00699*** (0.000333)
Age ²	-6.71e-05*** (2.41e-06)	-6.51e-05*** (2.42e-06)	-5.72e-05*** (3.45e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00970*** (0.000226)	-0.00919*** (0.000229)	-0.00677*** (0.000268)
Sex(male)	0.0214*** (0.00167)	0.0210*** (0.00167)	0.0284*** (0.00187)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00425 (0.00313)	0.0103*** (0.00345)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0157*** (0.00258)	0.0178*** (0.00287)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0249*** (0.00261)	0.0291*** (0.00291)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0478*** (0.00379)	0.0533*** (0.00417)
<i>Market Labor</i>			
Low income (perceived)			0.0614*** (0.00272)
Being richer			-0.00949 (0.00859)
Employed			0.000528 (0.00351)
Indefinite contract			-0.00855*** (0.00276)
Student			-0.0248*** (0.00440)

Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.000375 (0.00530)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			-0.00196 (0.00707)
Retired			-0.00342 (0.00403)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0180*** (0.00225)
Constant	0.139*** (0.00703)	0.119*** (0.00737)	0.131*** (0.0103)
Observations	216,047	215,770	171,744
R-squared	0.063	0.064	0.070
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.26: Index of closeness to Euseptic party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) Idx closeness to eu- roscept Party	(2) Idx closeness to eu- roscept Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.00662*** (0.000583)	0.00727*** (0.000405)
Age ²	-5.29e-05*** (6.04e-06)	-6.03e-05*** (4.20e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00682*** (0.000433)	-0.00701*** (0.000337)
Sex(male)	0.0231*** (0.00324)	0.0313*** (0.00229)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0565*** (0.00470)	0.0631*** (0.00332)
Being richer	-0.0240* (0.0125)	-0.00343 (0.0116)
Employed	-0.0122** (0.00609)	0.00626 (0.00429)
Indefinite contract	-0.00605 (0.00473)	-0.0117*** (0.00338)
Student	-0.0184*** (0.00715)	-0.0296*** (0.00555)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	-0.00822 (0.00913)	0.00259 (0.00648)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.000655 (0.0121)	-0.00374 (0.00866)
Retired	-0.0117 (0.00716)	-0.00147 (0.00487)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0177*** (0.00388)	0.0173*** (0.00276)
Constant	0.163***	0.150***

	(0.0177)	(0.0121)
Observations	51,436	120,308
R-squared	0.076	0.067
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.27: Index of closeness to Euseptic party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

Appendix

VARIABLES	(1) idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(2) idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(3) idx closeness to eu- scept Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	0.00697*** (0.000190)	0.00683*** (0.000190)	0.00634*** (0.000272)
Age ²	-6.10e-05*** (1.91e-06)	-5.97e-05*** (1.92e-06)	-5.48e-05*** (2.81e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00428*** (0.000182)	-0.00397*** (0.000185)	-0.00331*** (0.000222)
Sex(male)	0.0321*** (0.00135)	0.0318*** (0.00135)	0.0349*** (0.00155)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		0.00270 (0.00254)	0.00782*** (0.00287)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0112*** (0.00209)	0.0135*** (0.00238)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0145*** (0.00211)	0.0198*** (0.00241)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0349*** (0.00306)	0.0401*** (0.00345)
<i>Market Labor</i>			
Low income (perceived)			0.0342*** (0.00223)
Being richer			-0.00721 (0.00711)
Employed			0.00424 (0.00291)
Indefinite contract			-0.00752*** (0.00230)
Student			-0.00525 (0.00365)

Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.00517 (0.00438)
unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			0.00358 (0.00583)
Retired			0.000774 (0.00330)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0148*** (0.00187)
Constant	0.102*** (0.00562)	0.0893*** (0.00590)	0.0789*** (0.00846)
Observations	227,427	227,096	178,781
R-squared	0.065	0.066	0.070
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.28: Strict Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(2) idx closeness to eu- scept Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.00570*** (0.000479)	0.00667*** (0.000330)
Age ²	-4.84e-05*** (4.94e-06)	-5.80e-05*** (3.40e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00366*** (0.000360)	-0.00331*** (0.000279)
Sex(male)	0.0275*** (0.00269)	0.0387*** (0.00189)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0308*** (0.00388)	0.0357*** (0.00272)
Being richer	-0.00943 (0.0104)	-0.00871 (0.00958)
Employed	-0.00593 (0.00506)	0.00887** (0.00354)
Indefinite contract	-0.000490 (0.00394)	-0.0121*** (0.00282)
Student	-0.00499 (0.00595)	-0.00659 (0.00460)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	0.00816 (0.00757)	0.00282 (0.00535)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.00684 (0.0100)	0.00172 (0.00714)
Retired	-0.00374 (0.00590)	0.00137 (0.00398)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0138*** (0.00323)	0.0148*** (0.00229)
Constant	0.122***	0.0846***

	(0.0146)	(0.00992)
Observations	53,282	125,499
R-squared	0.069	0.070
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.29: Strict Index of closeness to Euseptic party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

Appendix

VARIABLES	(1) idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(2) idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(3) idx closeness to eu- scept Party
<i>Demographic</i>			
Age	0.00588*** (0.000289)	0.00570*** (0.000290)	0.00547*** (0.000391)
Age ²	-5.24e-05*** (2.83e-06)	-5.07e-05*** (2.83e-06)	-4.88e-05*** (3.93e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00526*** (0.000253)	-0.00490*** (0.000258)	-0.00411*** (0.000298)
Sex(male)	0.0297*** (0.00194)	0.0294*** (0.00194)	0.0321*** (0.00216)
<i>Domicile</i>			
Domicile = 2, Suburbs		6.70e-05 (0.00356)	0.00525 (0.00388)
Domicile = 3, Small city		0.0119*** (0.00299)	0.0148*** (0.00328)
Domicile = 4, Country village		0.0168*** (0.00303)	0.0223*** (0.00335)
Domicile = 5, Home in countryside		0.0297*** (0.00432)	0.0364*** (0.00470)
<i>Market Labor</i>			
Low income (perceived)			0.0323*** (0.00331)
Being richer			-0.0110 (0.0101)
Employed			0.00787* (0.00413)
Indefinite contract			-0.00911*** (0.00322)
Student			-0.00611 (0.00528)

Unemployed, actively looking for job			0.00744 (0.00659)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job			0.0196** (0.00899)
Retired			0.00247 (0.00451)
Unemployed (3 months+)			0.0131*** (0.00263)
Constant	0.118*** (0.00865)	0.105*** (0.00899)	0.0903*** (0.0123)
Observations	108,404	108,291	90,412
R-squared	0.062	0.063	0.068
Country dummy	YES	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	NO	NO	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.30: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Euseptic party, OLS regression country dummy

VARIABLES	(1) idx closeness to eu- scept Party	(2) idx closeness to eu- scept Party
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age	0.00499*** (0.000656)	0.00577*** (0.000483)
Age ²	-4.35e-05*** (6.65e-06)	-5.22e-05*** (4.84e-06)
Education (years)	-0.00421*** (0.000471)	-0.00426*** (0.000379)
Sex(male)	0.0247*** (0.00359)	0.0361*** (0.00268)
<i>Market Labor</i>		
Low income (perceived)	0.0278*** (0.00551)	0.0348*** (0.00411)
Being richer	-0.00887 (0.0143)	-0.0159 (0.0139)
Employed	-0.00582 (0.00691)	0.0145*** (0.00511)
Indefinite contract	-0.00153 (0.00530)	-0.0142*** (0.00402)
Student	-0.00465 (0.00816)	-0.00938 (0.00684)
Unemployed, actively looking for job	0.0104 (0.0107)	0.00481 (0.00827)
Unemployed, NOT actively looking for job	0.0417*** (0.0148)	0.00813 (0.0112)
Retired	-0.00814 (0.00783)	0.00608 (0.00551)
Unemployed (3 months+)	0.0127*** (0.00434)	0.0133*** (0.00328)
Constant	0.127***	0.0995***

	(0.0204)	(0.0149)
Observations	28,288	62,124
R-squared	0.067	0.068
Country dummy	YES	YES
Wave dummy	YES	YES
Income classes dummy	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.31: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy

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