


UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**Master's degree in
European and Global Studies**



Resilience – Shaping Security bottom-up

Case Studies from Ukraine

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A.Y. 2022/2023

Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis has – although being an honour- been challenging for me, to say the least, and has at times frustrated me, presented me with unknown obstacles, and demanded many hours of strenuous work. All the while I had the pleasure to be accompanied and supported by a great many people, probably too many to mention here, who have helped me all in their own way and capacity, to whom I am tremendously thankful and owe a lot of gratitude and my sanity to.

First of all of course, I would like to express my infinite gratitude to my parents; Danke Mama und Papa dafür, dass Ihr zu jeder Zeit daran geglaubt habt, dass Ich meinen Weg finde, diese Arbeit beenden kann, und mich dabei unermesslich und immer unterstützt habt. Danke, dass Ihr mir jeden Tag so viele Chancen ermöglicht und für mich da seid.

Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude to my academic supervisor, Prof. Farnesi- Camellone, who has not tired in supporting my ideas for this thesis and has been a guiding light on my path to complete this work. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dmitri Teperik and Tomas Jermalavičius, who have introduced me to the topic of resilience and have been encouraging in furthering my interest and have been an inspiration to me through their work.

Now, in no specific order, here is to the many others I owe my gratitude to. Thank you to my sister Judith, for paving the way in academia for me and being a constant source of aspiration and a dedicated supporter no matter how hard the times. Thank you to my fantastic flatmates who had to endure me during a couple of rather unpleasant weeks as I can imagine. To Marco, for being my home in a foreign country and always having a smile left over for me when I didn't. To Carlo, the most compassionate listener out there and setting the standards for writing a thesis, and whose enduring trust I admire. To Gabriele, for his constant efforts to understand me even when he wouldn't need to, and for the beautiful opera soundtrack that has accompanied parts of the writing process. To Rebecca, for her light-heartedness and constant reminders of brilliance. To Yasmine, for always showing a great interest when I'd ramble on for way too long, understanding the specific challenges that moving to Italy inherit, and the sheer infinite snacks. Grazie di tutto, mio amato Pietro Maroncelli 13b.

Thank you to all my great friends who have always supported and showed interest in me and what I do. Thank you to Fergus and Jason, Mathijs and Alex for being there for me and making Padova feel so warm and exciting and much less lonely at any time. To Deri and Lois, Lena and Mariona, Sofia, Eyup, Elham and Kimia, for so many fun days and nights in our favourite little Veneto City. To Emma, Gaia, and Viktoria for enduring a few too many lectures together with me and becoming fantastic friends at an unexpected time. To Julia, for your invaluable friendship and being so kind to introduce me so patiently to the country you love so much and all the treasures it holds; and for being an inspiration to this work. To Elias, Alžběta, Lars, Daniel, and so many others.

To Catherine, Iryna, Tetiana and Andriy, for being irrefutable proof of resilience through their everyday acts of defiance, who have certainly been a source of inspiration for this work.

Thank you all for helping me finishing this work in whatever capacity, I appreciate all of you and could not be more thankful for having you.

Lieben Dank, Thank you, Grazie mille, Дуже дякую!

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session 3° PERIODO (A) academic year 2022/2023

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Resilience - Shaping Security bottom-up: Case Studies from Ukraine

with supervisor Prof. FARNESI CAMELLONE

ACKNOWLEDGES AND ACCEPTS

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Abstract

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between resilience and security in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The study examines the hierarchical structure between these concepts and the role of the state and civil society within this framework. By analyzing the Ukrainian case, the research offers valuable insights for other former Soviet republics dealing with Russian aggression and provides lessons for Western countries experiencing relative peace. The work also addresses the need for conceptual clarity surrounding security and resilience, particularly in the context of national security strategies. Through an exploration of civil society's potential as a substitute for the state, the thesis contributes to policy-making and further research in the field of resilience within national security. By examining the events leading up to the Russian invasion and considering the Revolution of Dignity as a turning point in Ukrainian society, the study highlights the importance of understanding the dynamics between resilience and security and the evolving role of civil society in the face of hybrid warfare. Finally, the thesis challenges the conventional military-focused approach to security and advocates for a reconceptualization of security that encompasses a broader perspective, taking into account civil society's contributions to resilience and security.

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Introduction

„ (...) *Not only the resilience and endurance of our country, but also the security of the whole of Europe depend on the strengthening of the Ukrainian army.*” - President Zelenskiy on September 13th, 2022.

In an address on his Telegram channel, thanking Estonia and Denmark for their continued support to Ukraine, President Zelenskiy committed the Ukrainian audience to being resilient and enduring and linked the countries continued resilience and endurance to the strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). This is one of many instances in which the President spoke of the Ukrainian people as resilient, as did multiple other heads of state and International Organisations, in the months following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022.

While many international observers were fatalistic about the Ukrainian resistance to the unlawful Russian aggression, the Ukrainian people continue to the date of writing to resist the aggressor and stopped the advance of the Russian forces onto Kyiv and further Westwards. The exact mechanisms of, and strategies and tactics employed by the Ukrainian resistance in the face of a much larger aggressor will certainly be studied and discussed by military strategists and experts in their respective field in great detail; however, this shall not be the focus of this particular work. It is rather the clear distinction between resilience and security, two characteristics respectively possessed by “*Ukraine*” and “*the whole of Europe*” according to President Zelenskiy, that shall be the focal point of this endeavour. The concepts security and resilience were certainly not chosen coincidentally by President Zelenskiy, and while spatially separated between Ukraine and Europe, according to him the concepts are linked through the strength of the AFU.

The term resilience in recent years appears to have become kind of a buzzword, and the concept certainly has had a journey through a variety of disciplines behind it, finding itself at last in the field of security studies. Security as a concept meanwhile has a similar genesis and remains a contested concept to this day in a world that does not appear to come to a peaceful standstill anytime soon. While fields such as Human Security have emerged out of the security discourse, security, especially in connection with military aggression is still bound inextricably to the field of international relations, grand strategy,

and geopolitics. While certainly a valuable lens to discuss security, Yasser Munif (2020) criticises that using geopolitics as a lens for conflicts maintains the nation-state as the central actor at the expense of individuals and popular struggles that may not operate on the same plane. Against what he describes as the “Politics of death”- the macropolitics, he suggests focusing on the “Politics of life”, the micropolitical developments that happen on regional or even individual level. The nation-state in geopolitical analysis is often presented as an ahistorical entity.

President Zelenskiy also ascribes resilience as a characteristic to the country, arguably as the collective representative of the Ukrainian people, but still as the point of reference. Ukraine however is not a stable entity, the Ukrainian society has undergone a multitude of profound changes and rewritings of the social contract, democratic developments and unfortunately series of traumatic events in its recent history. And thus, while Munif (2020) warns against the reduction of the peoples of the Syrian civil war through the geopolitical lens that so often is tainted by the subtle 21st Century Orientalism of privileging the military aspect of the conflict with a focus on terrorism, fundamentalism, and sectarianism; it is essential to understand the war against Ukraine from a “Politics of life” perspective while not reasserting the synthetic association of lands that was invented by Enlightenment scholars to produce a general rubric of Eastern Europe as Wolff (2010) describes a Western view on Eastern Europe, the locality of this war.

Certainly, it would be nonsensical to ignore the military aspect of a war of aggression, and this is not the aim of this work. The questions that this work however seeks to explore relate to the linkage that President Zelenskiy himself made in his statement when he links the strength of the AFU to the concepts of resilience and security. The AFU as the extension of the state serve as the providers of both security and resilience, and therefore the state is the focal actor in this war. However, Ukraine in this statement appears to be lacking security but to have proven to be a resilient country. If we are to take seriously the criticisms of Munif, we establish that Ukraine as a nation is more than just the state but exists as the manifestation of millions of individuals who each struggle and organise themselves within the Russian war of aggression on all sorts of levels that exceed the state.

The aim of this work thus is to explore the relationship between the concepts of security and resilience that appear to follow a hierarchical structure, the role which the state and the civil society play within the conceptual framework and finally whether civil society can serve as a substitute for the state.

While several western liberal democracies such as the Netherlands (2023), the United Kingdom (2022) and others, as well as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Roepke & Thankey) and the European Union (EU) (European Commission 2020) have adopted resilience strategies or at least the concept of resilience into their national security strategies, the conceptualisation of both security and resilience remains rather vague. Through providing conceptual clarity and establishing the role of the different actors in the spheres of security and resilience, this work seeks to serve as a useful tool for policy making and furthering research into the applicability of the concept of resilience within national security.

While other Western democracies faced multiple challenges to their security in recent years, such as Israel or France, none have had to cope with such immense destruction and brutality as Ukraine in the face of the Russian invasion in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of 2022. The position of Ukraine and its history, while not equating all of these countries, make its example valuable for other former Soviet Republics suffering from Russian aggression and seeking to join the European Union and NATO such as Moldova and Georgia, while at the same time holding valuable lessons for those in the West who have fortunately lived in a period of relative peace and stability for the last several decades.

This work is the extension of two internships I was privileged to pursue in the summer of 2022, while the Russian invasion of Ukraine was at full swing. Especially an internship at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn, Estonia, has laid the foundation for the interest in the topics of resilience in the face of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Through the ICDS I came into contact with the program “Стійка Україна“-Resilient Ukraine, under the guidance of the ICDS. The program is a profound effort in measuring, strengthening and developing resilience in Ukraine and Estonia through exchange, research and expertise with the explicit support of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Resilient Ukraine, 2016). In November 2022, I had the privilege of attending the “International Autumn School Resilience League 2022”

organised by the ICDS, The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Tallinn, The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, NATO, and the Embassy of the United States of America in Estonia. An international symposium of researchers and experts from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Israel, Ukraine and others discussed the importance of resilience in the fight against Russian hybrid aggression, predominantly in the information sphere.

These experiences highlighted the importance and the actuality of resilience as a concept in both foreign and security policy to me and through the war against Ukraine emerged as a certainly urgent concept to address for a changing security architecture in Europe.

Historical Context

Although the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation started on February 24th after the declaration of a so-called “Special Military Operation” (Osborn, 2022), the Russian Federation had been waging a hybrid war against Ukraine since 2014 following the unlawful invasion and annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass. Arguably, the Russian Federation already launched a trade war against Ukraine in July of 2013 to successfully pressure Yanukovich from signing the EU Association Agreement (Financial Times, 2013). For the sake of clarity, this work considers the start of the war with the beginning of Russian military action towards Ukraine in 2014.

After the events of EuroMaidan, especially the brutal killings of protesters on Kyiv's Maidan Nezalezhnosti, and the subsequent ousting of then-President Yanukovich in Winter 2013/2014 by the Ukrainian civil society (Radio Free Europe, 2019), the Russian Federation started their assault on Ukraine between January and March 2014 first by bolstering local separatists (that had received prior training in Russian camps since 2006) through the arrival of Russian nationalists to take up commanding positions such as Pavel Gubarev, an activist for "Русское национальное единство" (translated as “Russian National Unity” or “RNE”) (Mitrokhin, 2014). From 2nd April 2014 onwards, troops without insignia, the so-called “little green men” arrived in Crimea (Shevchenko, 2014). These were Russian nationals the likes of former FSB Officer Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, and other Russian nationalist volunteers (Chalupa, 2014). In May 2014 the Russian Federation supplied separatist forces with anti-aircraft missiles such as MANPAD

systems and BUK missiles, which were later also used in the tragic downing of commercial airliner Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by Russian nationals Igor Girkin and Sergei Dubinskiy that amounted to the loss of 298 lives (Politie, 2023).

On the day of the inauguration of President Poroshenko in Ukraine, June 7th 2014, Russian Главное разведывательное управление (ГРУ) (translated as “Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” or “GRU”) spetsnaz forces of the “Vostok” battalion attacked the airport in Donetsk (Kuzio, 2017).

It was only in July and August 2014 that Russia intervened overtly in the war, as Ukrainian forces pushed back the Russian “separatist” forces. After a massive influx of arms and tanks led to a crushing defeat of Ukrainian forces in the battle of Ilovaisk, Poroshenko was forced to negotiate the Minsk-I accords (Kuzio, 2017).

Following the Minsk-I accords, the sham republics within the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine, unlawfully declared respectively the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) came under complete Russian economic and financial control (Kuzio, 2017).

Since the initial assault in 2014, Ukraine has been in a constant state of siege by the Russian Federation that has waged a hybrid war against its smaller neighbour. While Russian efforts to colonise and russify Ukraine and its people are almost as old as Muscovy (Plokyh, 2015), this work will consider the events described above as the starting point for the Russian aggression against Ukraine for the sake of the discussion that will follow. While the war against Ukraine is inextricably linked to the notions of tsarist Russia, of the policies of the Soviet Union, and the connections between an independent Russian Federation and an Independent Ukraine, these connections cannot, and will not be ignored or categorically denied, but considered only when directly relevant for the point made (as pertains for example Ukrainian military reforms and the Soviet legacy within the AFU).

While the Orange Revolution in 2004 certainly has been an important moment in Ukraine’s recent history and has had profound reactions in the Russian leadership back then, this work considers the most recent developments from the start of EuroMaidan, or what in Ukraine has been termed “The Revolution of Dignity”. The Revolution of Dignity

marks a point of profound change within the Ukrainian society and many, such as Channell-Justice (2022), Pishchikova& Ogryzko (2014), and Solonenko (2015) pinpoint it as the moment of rewriting of the social contract in Ukraine and the birth of the Volunteer movements. It is these Volunteer movements that have prompted the initial idea to further explore the relationship between resilience and security, and what role civil society and the state can exercise in these conceptions. While already a phenomenon that has sparked interest in the international, but especially in the Ukrainian, research community, the brutal full-scale invasion of February 24, 2022, has accelerated the developments and scaled them up.

The Emergence of Resilience

The Russian invasion in 2022 has prompted a surge in calls for increased military and defence spending in virtually all European States and in NATO allies (Detsch, Gramer& Mackinnon, 2023). The Social Democrat Government of the Federal Republic of Germany allocated a whopping EUR 100 billion special fund for its armed forces and called for a “Zeitenwende”, a turning point in thinking about defence, the military and security (SWR2, 2023). Traditionally neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden made a bid to join NATO (Posaner, 2022) and even Switzerland gave up on some of its long-standing commitments to neutrality in order to support Ukraine against the Russian aggression (Reussen, Kijewski& Camut, 2023). States on the eastern flank of NATO such as Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania massively increased their defence spendings and purchased multiple state-of-the-art arms and heavy weapons, despite tight budgets following a recession and the COVID-crisis (Lietuvos nacionalinis radijas ir televizija, 2022). Deterrence has returned to the centre stage of national security strategies, as highlighted by publications such as “Will the Eastern Flank be Battle Ready? Deterrence by 2030” by Sirotová et al (2023) for influential Slovak think-tank GLOBSEC. With these developments, many voices have raised criticism about the increased spending for military hardware in the face of recession and post-COVID recovery policies, bringing Europe back to the dilemma of guns and butter.

Simultaneously, people in Europe from Rome to Berlin have taken to the streets and demanded an end of arms supplies by their respective countries to Ukraine, with a range of diverse motives (Reuters, 2023). Many of these motives are the result of successful

Russian dis- and misinformation or the relics of socialist education as in the case of East Germany (mdr, 2022), but nonetheless there appears to be a rift between those who perceive security to be the result of increased arms and deterrence and those who perceive security as the result of less arms – at least for the victim of aggression. While there has been a tendency to conduct the topic of security primarily from a military perspective (Ullman, 1983), especially post-9/11, certainly for good reasons and with successes in research, the very concept of security is not precisely defined and possibly extends beyond a military realm.

For the reasons mentioned above, this work seeks to reconceptualise security through a connection with the concept of resilience and explore the role of civil society within this framework, in an effort to explore security policies that extend beyond the military realm. The ultimate effort in this endeavour is to question whether there is a possibility to reduce the absolutism of the guns and butter dilemma.

Structuring

Following this introduction, the literature review will introduce the genesis of the two main concepts who find consideration within this work, security and resilience. As security as a concept has been evoked in some form already in ancient Greece and possibly before, since it might be understood as the absence of violence, and violence itself may presumably be as old as humanity itself, an all-encompassing literature review would be too extensive for the purpose of this work, however, a concise introduction and presentation of the most important conceptualisations and turning points in the conceptualisations of security will be presented. Resilience as a concept will be presented similarly, showcasing its journey through a variety of disciplines and its current usage within the security discourse. Once we have produced an idea of the current conceptualisations of security and resilience, as well as the roles the state and civil society plays within these concepts, we may introduce the method of analysis to answer our research question. The analysis of secondary sources will be in the centre of these work, and further shortcomings and limitations will be elaborated upon in the methodology section. Once our methodology is established, we will proceed with the analysis of our data and present the findings in light of the previous literature review in order to establish conceptual connections between security and resilience from the case studies in Ukraine

and reconsider the roles of state and civil society within the conceptual framework. The third chapter is divided into multiple sections again that deal with different facets of the capacity of Ukraine's civil society to resilience. The first of these considers the military aspect that has emerged from the broad volunteer movements and the subsequent restructuring of state security services to incorporate these volunteers into the state structure, accelerated through a recent decentralisation reform. The second section considers the digital and information space that in times of hybrid warfare and grey zones become increasingly important, with a short overview of the changing in the Ukrainian mediascape and volunteer efforts for journalistic best practices in the face of adversary and oligarchy alike. In the third chapter Ukraine's largest civil society organisation, the orthodox church finds its place in the discussion, with the complex history of the multiple churches within the Ukrainian state and its attempt to decouple from the Russian Orthodox Church that seemingly supports the imperialist policies of the Kremlin. Finally, the conclusion will tie together the findings and the analysis and hopefully provide the basis for further resilience and security thinking to be put to use by rational policymakers and institutions.

Chapter 1

1.Literature Review

1.1The Concept of Security

1.1.1 The Origins of Security

When considering the concept of "security", Arends initiates the conversation by exploring several aspects of security in the European Tradition in his work "From Homer to Hobbes and Beyond" (2008). According to him, the history of security can be divided into two phases, the first one being dominated by the concept of 'securitas' coined by the Romans, being connected to religious connotations such as 'assurance of faith' and the 'divinity of the emperor'. Throughout this initial phase, the concept bore a certain ambiguity. However, it was replaced in the second phase, nearing the late Middle Ages, then by 'certitudo'. In this conceptualisation, security was related to Hobbes' 'Leviathan', the authoritarian super-state whose ultimate function was to prevent the outbreak of civil

war. Hobbes, influenced especially through Thucydides, in his conceptualisation revived an ancient Greek concept, 'ataraktisia', prevalent especially throughout the phase of Athenian Imperialism, which sought to guarantee stability within the empire. Arends arrives at the conclusion that our modern understanding of security therefore is derived of the ancient Athenian, Roman, and modern Hobbesian concepts alike. Herington (2012) attests that these ancient concepts in Arends work, both Roman and Athenian, describe a psychological quality related to an individual's acceptance of their position within the cosmic hierarchy, rather detached from physical and political realities, a notion expressed by the term 'Sicherheitsgefühl' (Rothschild, 1995).

For Hobbes, security was an absolute value, the most fundamental provision of the state to the individual. Ullman (1993) quotes Hobbes' *Leviathan* to illustrate the fundamentality of security for Hobbes: "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." (From Hobbes, 1651, *Leviathan*, Chapter 13).

The idea of security as an absolute value emerges in different points throughout the discussion about the concept. Brodie (1950) quotes General Jacob L. Devers, according to whom: "We shall either be secure, or we shall be insecure. We cannot have partial security. If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all." (Brodie, 1950). After all, the semantics of the term imply an absolutism themselves, something is either secure or insecure. When faced with the idea of absolute security however, most agree that absolute security is a state unattainable, and even undesirable at that (Baldwin, 1997). Humanity has always accepted challenge, risk and doubt in pursuit of new grounds to live and for the sake of exploration, as to quote Dahl: "Men are not lotus-eaters" (Dahl, 1992).

1.1.2 Security from the Enlightenment onwards

The modern conceptualisation of what we consider as security today began, according to Rothschild (1995), as the consequence of the catastrophic wars that ravaged Europe in the 17th Century and ended in the Westphalian Peace. From the mid seventeenth-century onwards through the French Revolution, the understanding of security considered security as an objective of both, states and individuals alike (Rothschild, 1995). With the onset of the Napoleonic wars, security shifted more into the realm of military policies and the pursuits of states. For the scholars of enlightenment such as Montesquieu and Leibniz, security was an inherent part of the state as its common objective and the condition for freedom (Rothschild 1995). Therefore, an individual seeking security can only be guaranteed said security through institutions, giving legitimacy to the forming of a state, in pursuit of exactly this security.

The aforementioned Westphalian Peace was not only the end of the Thirty- and Eighty-Years wars but has been credited as being the point of inception for the framework of modern International Relations (Patton, 2019). From this point on onwards, security had been intrinsically linked to the field of international relations, as argued for by Walt (1991). Within this field, security has mainly been regarded as a concept pertaining to the integrity of the nation state. Security became more and more coterminous with the idea of national security and the concept developed into this direction.

Amidst the hottest phase of World War II, in 1943, Lippmann wrote that a nation would possess security if it were not to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and could when faced with war, maintain this interest by overcoming the enemy. This conceptualisation of security is reflected still today in the reemerging ideas of deterrence and superior military power to defeat a violent enemy on the battlefield.

In 1952, at the onset of the Cold War, Wolfers (1952) wrote his influential piece “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”. Security being ambiguous does not mean that it is an essentially contested concept to Wolfers. He suggests that security in objective terms is the “absence of threats to acquired values” and in subjective terms the absence of fear of threats to those values (Wolfers, 1952). In the idea of subjective perception of security

as the absence of fear of threats, rather than the actual absence of threats, Wolfers invokes earlier notions of a *Sicherheitsgefühl*.

Wolfers conceptualises security as a negative value, as the absence of “the evil of insecurity”. He challenges the notion that security guided policy is to mean policy based on power and pursuing military goals. Criticising those who follow in the footsteps of Machiavelli by considering the protection and preservation of national core values as ends in themselves, and thus placing either the prince, the state, or the nation at the top of the hierarchy, Wolfers suggests that security is to serve the core values as a means. In his considerations he invokes a notion of what had been coined *Security Dilemma* only few years prior by German scholar John H. Herz, and is a theory mainly followed by realist scholars in the field of international relations.

The *security dilemma* holds that in a world of anarchy and without monopoly over violence (e.g. a world-government), states are responsible for their own security. In pursuit of increasing their own security, states take measures that may prompt other states to take similar measures (e.g. subsequent nuclear armament), thus in effect leading to a situation in which security has decreased for both states objectively.

Wolfers attests that without knowing a neighbouring states intention, an accumulation of power can again lead to increased insecurity, as there is no exact way to differentiate between the ‘power of aggression’ and the ‘power of resistance’. Thus, for Wolfers security, or national security, rises and falls with the aggressive intent of the neighbouring state, or any potential aggressor. Measures to increase security by decreasing aggressive intent of the potential adversary therefore may be an effective, and cost effective, way of increasing one’s own security without falling into the trap described by the *security dilemma*. Finally, Wolfers warns against following any simple panacea, even if it self-describes as a realist policy solution for national security.

1.1.3 The State in Security

Building on Wolfers, Buzan published an influential book in 1983, “People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations” (Buzan, 1983). The concept of security he outlines in his book challenges the state-centric approach. Although for him security is an “essentially contested” concept, he centres his concept around the

absence of threat. The specific requirements for security thus vary depending on the nature of the entity that is either secure or insecure (referred to as the referent). At the individual level, security involves the protection of individuals from physical harm, economic instability, and the enjoyment of basic freedoms. Buzan acknowledges that individuals are the ultimate referent objects of security, and their security is essential for the overall security of states and societies. Therefore, security means something different on each level of referent.

At the state level, the defence of territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty are at the core of security. Buzan further recognises that threats for the state can extend beyond the military realm and include such non-military threats as economic crises, resource scarcity, and social unrest, which may undermine the stability of a state.

Furthermore, Buzan introduces the concept of social security in his book, putting the security of a society as a whole into the centre, rather than the state. Threats for society cannot only emanate from outside entities, but the source of such threats may well be seated within a society, including identity conflicts, inequality, and degradation of the environment. Thus, to reach social security, there appears to be a need for maintaining economic stability, social cohesion, and the protection of human rights.

The different contexts in which security must be understood are manifold, according to Buzan, and therefore he also proposes an understanding of security in regional contexts. Since security issues are often the result of interconnectedness within specific geographical regions, regional security complexes that extend beyond state borders may form. The dynamics in one region has potential to produce spill over into neighbouring regions, and thus lead to an intricate network of complex security interdependencies.

Finally, Buzan also addresses an overarching global level of security, thus recognising that some threats easily transcend national boundaries and require the efforts of international cooperation. According to him, such challenges to global security are nuclear proliferation, terrorism, economic instability, pandemics, and climate change. The scale of these security threats is so large that they necessitate collaborative efforts among states to address them in an effective manner.

Buzan also forms part of what in security studies came to be known as the 'Copenhagen School', whose scholars hold the belief that security issues are constructed socially and through "emergency measures" demarcated from normal politics (Herington, 2012). Emergency measures of the state oftentimes are connected to a trade-off between what is deemed security, and civil liberties.

1.1.4 Security by and from the State

Ullman (1993) points out that in any society, individuals and groups seek out security against the state, as much as they turn to the state to provide them with security from (perceived) outside threats to their security. Security is thus defined through the threats to it. Especially since states often claim their foreign enemies receive funding or other support from within their own country, and in consequence clamp down on their own population in pursuit of security, human rights and security are intimately related (Ullman, 1993). Ullman proposes to examine security not only from a perspective of trade-offs made from civil liberties and therefore as a goal that states seek to reach, but also as a consequence. It is only when confronted with the loss of security that one may realise the importance of security.

Ullman recognises that there appears to be a tendency to treat security mainly through the perspective of assessing military threats and treating national security as the security against foreign military aggression. Foreign military threats carry with them a level of convenience for the state, as the consequences of military invasion are relatively apparent and will work their harm quite rapidly (Ullman, 1993). Deeming them threats to national security, as well as taking measures against these threats therefore becomes relatively uncontroversial (Ullman, 1993).

Furthermore, he attests that states thus create a hierarchy, in which foreign threats are somehow deemed more severe or more important as compared to threats emanating from the inside. This is the consequence of foreign military threats being quite convenient to ruling politicians, as it is much simpler to define the "public good", sacrifice is expected and not asked for, particular interests are co-opted or overridden far simpler, dissent can be cracked down with less resistance for the sake of national consensus, and interrupting "business as usual" does not seem to be an unexpected disruption (Ullman, 1993).

Ullman's definition of national security threats implies a predetermined assessment of their significance, which overlooks threats that may gradually degrade the quality of life for a state's inhabitants. Only threats that have a rapid and drastic impact are considered, and those that moderately limit policy choices are excluded. This approach, shared by Buzan and Ullman, appears to dismiss the existence of minor or trivial national security threats through conceptual imposition.

Instead of relying on a prevalent conception of security through a military lens that defines itself through the threat of foreign military aggression, Ullman proposes the following definition of security: “a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.” (Ullman, 1993).

For Ullman security is not an “essentially contested” concept as it is for Buzan, however he further raises the issue of the unquantifiability of security. To visualise this idea, he brings up the example of the purchase of an F-14 fighter jet. While the F14 is clearly meant to protect the state from a foreign military aggression, its best use would be to never be used. Its ultimate contribution would be to deter a foreign adversary from carrying out an act of aggression against the state.

However, without the act of aggression occurring, one may not effectively know the exact, quantifiable effect the purchase has had on the security of the state. Certainly, one can measure the technical supremacy over one weapons system over the other, or the size of a military force over the other, as has been done frequently throughout the Cold War. However, one may never know the exact contribution to security for the purchase of this specific F-14.

In contrast, when the amount of money that was spent on the F-14 would have been spent on a childcare centre or a clinic, it would be relatively simple to measure reliable data about the security these institutions provide for the citizens of the state. Thus, on the level of spending it is possible to quantify data and invoke the guns and butter trade-off,

however at the level of outcome, Ullman finds it impossible to quantify the level of security that has been provided by the purchase of an F-14.

1.1.5 The Emergence of Human Security

From Buzan and Ullman's attempts to break away from the monocausal lens of military aggression as the prevalent threat to security, the idea of Human Security gained traction especially in the 1990s and peaked when the United Nation's Development Programme (UNPD) 1993 *Human Development Report* announced that there must come about a change of defining security not only as national security (absent from the threat of foreign military aggression), but by stressing people's security. Away from security through armaments and territorial integrity to security through human development, food, employment and environmental security (UNPD, 1993).

The following report in 1994 was dominated by the idea of Human Security, which it defined as "safety from the constant threats of hunger, crime, disease, and repression" and "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions to the patterns of our daily lives – whether in our home, in our jobs, in our communities, or in our environment" (UNPD, 1994).

Based off this broadening of the concept of security, some nations such as Canada included the concept of human security in their foreign policy strategies. The Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade had published a report outlining five policy priorities to guarantee human security. These five policies were namely protection of civilians, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, public safety, and peace and support operations (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002).

It is the title of the report "Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security" that is interesting in regard to the earlier mentioned idea of *Sicherheitsgefühl*, the subjective feeling of security that does not necessitate an actual absence of threats to security but is grounded rather in the individual's perception of threat. This idea will be explored in depth further on when discussing the origins of the concept of resilience in clinical psychology.

1.1.6 Rise of the Realists

Simultaneously another school of thought about security gained traction, rooted in the thought of Hans Morgenthau, realism. Realists perceive the world to be in a state of constant anarchy, in which nation states vie for power, as the accumulation of power, military power in particular, would be the best guarantor for security (Schmidt, 2016). Thucydides has been described as the Ur-Realist, claiming that “The strong do what they will, the weak do what they must” (Thucydides, 1954).

Hobbes himself described this anarchy in the idea that in the world “war of all against all” was a distinct feature (Hobbes, 1651). Within realism, of course there is more nuance to the discussion than simply advocating for the accumulation of most military power, especially since there is huge scholarly debate about what constitutes the concept of power.

A structural realist for example would try to determine a state’s power by its capabilities, including factors such as territory, population size, wealth, and military strength (Schmidt, 2016). Classical realists such as Morgenthau included a multitude of other factors as well, such as industrial capacity, morale, geography, natural character, military preparedness, and natural resources (Schmidt, 2016). While military power is considered to be the *ultima ratio*, it still emerges as the most crucial factor in assessing a state’s relative position within the international system and its relative power in comparison to others. This conceptualisation, however, cannot explain how such militarily superior nations as the United States are unable to achieve their foreign policy goals, such as famously in Vietnam or Iraq (Schmidt, 2016).

While states, in their quest to attain more and more power, risk the security of others, they may destroy what realists coined the balance of power. As there is no overarching international system that can protect or punish states, states form temporary alliances in order to fend off others that have become too powerful, such as Germany brought together France and Great Britain before World War I, as realists argue (Schmidt, 2016). Within realism, there are two approaches to ensure security, dividing those who consider themselves realists and neorealists into offensive and defensive.

Defensive realists claim that the most effective way to guarantee security is to keep the balance in the above-described system of power balance and thus maintain the status quo (Grafov, 2019). Offensive realists in contrast believe that the only way for states to attain security is by maximising their power (Grafov, 2019).

A famous proponent of this school of thought, offensive realism, is John Mearsheimer, whose own website features an image of himself as Machiavelli, self-described as Mearchiavelli (Mearsheimer.com, 2023). Mearsheimer, whose 2001 book “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” has been described as a worthy successor to Morgenthau (Kaplan, 2022), believes that “Great Nations” (without providing a definitive explanation of what makes a nation great), compensate their fear for survival in the state of anarchy by expanding their control over territory, eventually clashing with other “great nations” pursuing the same strategy, thus inevitably leading to war – the tragedy of great power politics (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Mearsheimer’s lecture titled “Why is Ukraine the Wests Fault” from 2015, at the University of Chicago has received more than 29 million views on the video streaming platform YouTube to the day of writing, and argues, in line with his realist theory, that the Russian aggression against Ukraine is the result of “NATO expansion” into “Eastern Europe”, which Mearsheimer deems the “sphere of influence” of Russia, which he perceives to be one of those illusive great nations which seek to eliminate security threats by expansion (Mearsheimer, 2015).

While Mearsheimer received a fair amount of criticism for his western-centric theories that take away the agency of those living in what he considers “Eastern Europe” and Russia’s sphere of influence, especially from a broad coalition of scholars of European origin, may it be Poles, Slovaks, Czechs, Ukrainians, or others (see Kostelka, 2022, Kaplan, 2022, Smoleński & Dutkiewicz, 2022).; the point of criticism most valuable for the discussion of security for the purpose of this work is the determinism that lays at the basis of Mearsheimer’s theory.

For Mearsheimer, there is no choice for nations to pursue their security but follow in the path that he determined for them, it does not matter whether the ruler in the Kremlin is a dictator, whether it is Stalin, or Khrushchev, or Gorbachev, or Putin (Kaplan, 2022), or whether the White House is occupied by Clinton, W. Bush, Obama, or Trump. But this is

where realists' theories become reductionist to a point where they fail to recognise actors with agency, such as the governments of the state, and rather ascribe to the states a notion of a naturalistic determined path.

Baldwin (1997) especially criticises neorealists for using the term security excessively without providing an ample conceptualisation themselves. He finds that observations the likes of Waltz' that "in a state of anarchy, security is the highest end, and only when survival is assured states may pursue other goals", is simplistic for the explicit purpose of building a theory (Baldwin, 1997). To him, assured survival is a goal that may be approximated but never attained, and therefore the crucial question is not whether security can be assured, but rather how much assurance is enough (Baldwin, 1997). When realists describe states as competing with one another, Baldwin suggests, it implies that for the realists, security is a zero-sum game, and therefore a state would ultimately be secure if it were surrounded by insecure states (Baldwin, 1997).

1.1.7 Securing Core Values

While we will come back to Baldwin, let us continue with the journey through concepts of security with the work of Leffler, who manages to find an approach that combines multiple levels of analysis and thus bridges the divide between external and internal variables (Schmidt, 2016). Leffler's approach, based on the concepts of both Wolfers and Buzan, defines security as the protection of domestic core values from external threat (Leffler, 2004).

This conception of security fills the gap that the reductionist approach of Mearsheimer leaves open, the government, the people living in the states and their agency, their values, lay at the core of this conceptualisation. To understand the structure of the international system, one must understand domestic ideas and interests shaping policy first (Leffler, 2004). Only through examining the inside of states, exploring the actors, ideas, interests and processes that lead to the formulation of a society's core values, can the core values be determined and understood (Leffler, 2004).

According to Leffler, core values are "(...) the goals that emerge as priorities after the trade-offs are made; core values are the objectives that merge ideological precepts and cultural symbols like democracy, self-determination, and race consciousness with

concrete interests like access to markets and raw materials; core values are the interests that are pursued notwithstanding the costs incurred; core values are the goals worth fighting for” (Leffler, 2004). And thus, an external threat only emerges in relation to what a state may deem its core values, and the risk the external threat poses to those values (Schmidt, 2016). Furthermore, Leffler acknowledges the important role of individuals within the decision-making process and their threat perception to the security of the state (Leffler, 2004).

While Leffler attests that core values are pursued notwithstanding the costs incurred, a rational policy maker will always consider costs to a certain degree, as Baldwin criticises (Baldwin, 1997). When discussing the concept of security, Baldwin considers what value to ascribe to security itself and considers three separate approaches, namely 1) the prime value approach, 2) the core value approach, and 3) the marginal value approach. Asserting the primacy of security would be non-sensical, comparable to asserting either the primacy of water, or food, or air, as all of these are needed to some extent for survival, and even things considered to be a source of good can be too plenty and even harmful, a lesson King Midas would be all too familiar with.

Given his criticism about the occurring costs and the subsequent allocation of resources, Baldwin ultimately considers the marginal value approach the only one feasible for policy making. Rather than being based in the assertion of the value all actors give to security at all times, the marginal value approach is rooted in the assumption that the law of diminishing marginal utility is applicable to the value of security as it is to other values as well (Baldwin, 1997).

According to this approach then, security is only one of several policy options that are constantly competing with one another for the allocation of scarce resources available to the state. Given the historical context, the value of an increment of national security thus will vary from country to country, depending on the amount of security a country already has and then further still seeks to attain. Only as long as the marginal return for security is greater than the marginal return for other policy options will rational policy makers consider security more important than other values (Baldwin, 1997).

1.1.8 Reliability as the determining Factor

Finally, it is Herington (2012) who through reviewing the formerly mentioned concepts of security provides a concept himself and seeks to find common ground. Herington finds that all concepts of security (as a state of being) share the claim that what being secure for some entity is to hold a set of conditions or goods reliably (Herington, 2012). Therefore, at the heart of modern conceptions of security is reliability. Like the dichotomy of security/insecurity, reliability/unreliability suggests a binary state, Herington however rejects this notion on the same grounds as absolute security has been rejected previously. Security then is being specified around the notion of reliability by identification of a referent and a set of conditions said referent must hold reliably (Herington, 2012).

While the standard referents can be individuals, states, societies, and communities, accounts of security of those referents do not have to necessarily conflict with one another (Herington, 2012). It is possible for both an individual and a state to be considered secure at the same time, as long as neither claims absolute security.

Herington also makes a valuable distinction between the object of security and the beneficiary of said security. While the object of a policy may be to make the state more secure, the beneficiary of said policy may well be the individual. When considering the conditions of being secure, Herington summarises that the necessary conditions appear to be, throughout most conceptualisations, the possession of a specific set of goods. An account of security for an individual may encompass physical safety, access to sufficient food and shelter, and the freedom to engage in community life without fear of persecution or condemnation, and in some conceptualisations also good health (Herington, 2012).

However, the possession of these goods per se does not indicate the level of security, but rather the reliability of their possession. It is not the absence of violence today, but the reliability of absence of violence tomorrow and any other day following that evokes security. This idea evokes again the initial notion of *Sicherheitsgefühl* for security as a state of being. The reliability of a good, according to Herington, is depending on considerations of what may occur, and the less sensitive to luck, the more reliable the good is (Herington, 2012).

A second factor in reliability is the robustness of a factor. It is not the sensitivity to luck, but the capacity to be available in different possible futures that makes a good more or less reliable. Therefore, the more reliable a good, the more things must change in order for it to no longer be held by the referent (Herington, 2012).

Herington relates the notion of reliability to the idea of tension between objective and subjective realisation of security. Considering that the objective security of a referent is reasonably unknowable, justified beliefs must act as proxies (Herington, 2012). Therefore, a referent of security, may it be an individual or an organisation, must seek out the best available evidence rather than accepting the first or most conveniently available evidence (Herington, 2012).

In his conceptualisation, Herington therefore leaves us with three major features to constitute the structure of security: “: (1) the referent object, (2) the conditions that must be reliable for a referent to be secure, and (3) the subjective and objective realisation of those conditions.” (Herington, 2012).

From Herington’s use of robustness as a factor for reliability, we may bridge the concept of security to the concept of resilience. While robustness may not be equal to resilience, resilience features certain aspects that it shares with robustness and arguably share a common root in material sciences and engineering (Stricker& Lanza, 2014).

1.2 The Concept of Resilience

1.2.1 The Origins of Resilience

Resilience, from its point of departure in material sciences was primarily used in engineering design for the description of material’s specific properties and behaviours related to specific purposes such as usage in support beams and bridges (Martin-Breen& Anderies, 2011). A material’s resilience is measured in the amount of stress (force) it can endure without breaking or permanently altering its shape, and the extent to which it bends and changes shape when under stress, as well as the time it takes to reconstitute into the original shape after stress has been relieved (Fjäder, 2014). Therefore, making use of its conceptualisation within the material sciences, an entity would be resilient if it

were to withstand a large amount of stress and in a short time were to reconstitute its original shape once the stress has been relieved.

1.2.2 Resilience in Ecology

The concept of resilience then changed discipline from one natural science to another one, when Holling (1986) introduced the term in ecology to describe the mediating property for the shift between alternating systems as “the size of a stability domain or the amount of disturbance a system could take before it shifts into alternative configuration.” (Holling, 1986). Holling was trying to review a range of ecosystems in a pursuit to better understand the impact of climate change, when he discovered that those ecosystems who were under periodic disturbances would exhibit four distinct and sequential phases of change in their structures and their functions (McLellan, 2012).

In the first phase of this process, called early succession, solar energy is converted into biomass by plants present in the ecosystem, thus subsequently inducing a change in the soil and microclimate (Holling, 1986). Competition for limited resources by the prevalent species is the defining characteristic of this phase and the winners in this ecosystem are those who are able to process the most energy in a pursuit of accumulating biomass. The effect of these developments are rapid growth and a change in structure of the ecosystem, leading to accumulation of structure, homing in the second phase, called conservation phase (Holling, 1986).

In this second phase, the ecosystem becomes more interconnected and less flexible, thus increasing vulnerability to external threats such as forest fires, pest outbreaks, harvesting, and forest fires. These external disturbances set in motion the beginning of the third phase, the omega phase.

Within the relatively short omega phase, such outside disturbances as forest fires or pest outbreaks destroy in rapid time a great deal of the formerly accumulated structure and expose internal vulnerabilities. The destruction of the omega phase is then quickly followed by the final phase in Hollings resilience framework, the alpha phase.

Throughout this phase a new system emerges that reorders the destruction of the previous one and leads to the growth phase of a new cycle. Although the new growth phase may

be similar to the previous trajectory of the ecosystem, it is also possible for a whole different system to emerge from the destruction. Thus, after going through these four phases, an ecosystem has undergone an entire adaptation cycle according to Holling (Holling, 1986).

From this idea in ecology, others have observed quite similar dynamics in the cyclical developments of other systems during the growth and conservation phases, such as in human organisations, modern cities, and ancient cultures (McLellan, 2012).

Despite the developments described occur cyclical, they are not necessarily bound to specific durations, as some properties of ecosystems tend to change slowly and constantly, while other appear to be changing abrupt or sudden (McLellan, 2012).

According to the conceptualisation of Holling of resilience in the field of ecology thus follows that it is important to understand resilience not as an outcome, but as a process of constant adaptation to a positive trajectory of functioning following disturbance and destruction.

Change and adaptation are part of the natural process and one's capacity to adapt and flourish despite threats and hazard is what lies at the core of resilience. In this conception also lies the notion that some hazards will occur to the ecosystem and are unpreventable.

1.2.3 From Ecology to the Humanities

While important to the study of ecology, resilience has found its way especially from the study of resilience of coastal areas into the realm of social sciences and human resilience, as humans often populate coastal areas that are often at the centre of natural disturbance, such as the Hurricane-rich coasts of Florida. Proponents of resilience thinking inserted themselves into the discourse on climate change with the ideas of adaptability and adaptation, sparking a discussion on the position of humans within nature and their capacity of combining knowledge and experience to adapt to drastic changes and external disturbances in ecosystems (Keck& Sakdapolrak, 2013).

A first definition of what would become social resilience was established by Adger (2000) who considered it to be a community's ability to withstand external shocks to their social infrastructure. Based on this assumption, Cutter et al (2008) develop the concept to mean

a social system's ability to respond and recover from disasters, including such inherent conditions allowing the system to absorb the impacts of disaster, as well as the existence of adaptive processes facilitating the system's ability to re-organise, change, and learn from the experiences of a threat. Keck and Sakdapolrak (2013) provide us with the further ideas in the sphere of social resilience that underline the anticipatory capacities of social actors and a system's ability to learn from hazardous events.

Based on the notions of anticipation and learning abilities, Obrist et al (2010), define social resilience "as the capacity of actors to access capitals in order to – not only cope with and adjust to adverse conditions (that is, reactive capacity) – but also search for and create options (that is, proactive capacity) and thus develop increased competence (that is, positive outcomes) in dealing with a threat". Through this conceptualisation, the key question in resilience becomes the question for ways to increase the capacities of actors within society to better deal with future threats (Keck& Sakdapolrak, 2013).

1.2.4 What makes a Resilient Society?

From these ideas of Obrist et al, Keck and Sakdapolrak (2013) extrapolate three capacities of a resilient society: coping capacities, adaptive capacities, and transformative capacities. While coping capacities describe absorptive measures adopted by individuals in the immediate event of hazard with the use of directly available resources for the sake of quickly returning to the present-level, adaptive capacities refer to the longer-term measures people take to learn from the hazardous event (Keck& Sakdapolrak, 2013).

The central difference between coping and adaptation is the temporal scope, while coping happens immediately, adaptation is longer-term and geared towards incremental change, including strategic agency (Keck& Sakdapolrak, 2013).

The final capacity, transformative, refers to people's ability to access assets from wider political actors such as the government by participation in decision-making processes and establishment of new institutions to increase individual welfare and specially build up robustness in the event of future hazard (Keck& Sakdapolrak, 2013). While adaptation seeks to secure an individual's well-being, transformation seeks to enhance it in the face of future hazard and therefore invokes again the capabilities described in the ecological concept by Holling.

1.2.5 A Critique of Resilience in the Humanities

The transformation of the concept from ecology into the social sciences, however, has been addressed quite critically by several academics, such as the ecologists Brand and Jax (2007) who advocate keeping the concept of resilience within the realms of ecological science for the sake of conceptual clarity.

According to them, the descriptive capacity of the concept was lost in transferring it to the social sciences (Brand & Jax, 2007). By uncritically transferring the concept from natural to social sciences, there is not only the risk of simple inadequacy, as geographers Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010) criticise, but more severely, there is a risk of a “re-naturalisation of society” (Lidskog, 2001) and simplistic naturalistic determinism (Judkins et al., 2008).

The danger of naturalistic observations transferred to the realms of social sciences lay in what the naturalistic fallacy tries to constrain. The naturalistic fallacy prohibits researchers to derive value statements that are loaded with a sense of morality, asserting things to be “good” or “bad”, from simple empirical observations about nature, most commonly evolution (Teehan & DiCarlo, 2004).

Naturalistic simplification lays at the basis of social Darwinism, which in turn experienced its most extreme interpretation in the ideas of 20th Century eugenics and especially German *Rassenlehre*, in which Darwin’s ideas about survival of the fittest and the struggle for existence were severely misinterpreted and then applied to human societies, resulting in the industrial destruction of millions of lives in the Shoah (Porges, 2021). Criticisms on the basis of simplistic naturalistic determinism therefore should be taken into account with the utmost seriousness, especially when considering concepts such as security which inherit discussions over human rights and civil liberties as well.

In a similar vein, MacKinnon and Derickson (2012) criticise the notion that communities should be resilient not only as empty and widespread, but especially critical in the face of a decade of strengthened neoliberalism and severe austerity measures. According to them,

the application of the ecological idea of resilience to social contexts is ill-suited for twofold reasons.

First, the concepts ecological roots simply make it too simplistic for social dynamics, and secondly the concept has been co-opted by neoliberalist forms of governance, revealing its inherent conservatism in the emphasis on return to an equilibrium condition rather than profound change (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2012). Ideas of resilience would accentuate recovery more than fundamental change and thus are prone to rather support incremental change rather than profound reform according to Jerneck and Olsson (2008).

As a response to the criticisms of an implicit conservatism within the concept of resilience raised by those mentioned above, adherents of resilience adopted to social systems have added the notions of transformation and transformability to the concept.

Based on Hollings conclusions about constant adaptation, Folke et al (2010) conclude that adaptation and transformation are essential for social systems to be classified as resilient. According to them, social change, profound social change even, is a necessary requirement for a resilient system to persist, and therefore the system actively pursues active transformation by introducing one or more state variables at a lower scale, while maintaining resilience at higher scales (Brown, 2013).

Social-Ecological Systems possess multiple potential stable states, or basins of attraction, that together constitute the “stability landscape” (Gallopín, 2006). Following exposition to a specific shock or external disturbance, or even through changes in internal structures, the system may move from one basin into another, exhibiting changes in functionality (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013).

1.2.6 Communal Resilience

From societal resilience, the concept evolved to the idea of communal resilience. Pine (In McLellan, 2012) establishes that in order to recover successfully from disaster, all levels of community must be engaged and is determined by the strength and diversity of the local social-culture, economy, and environmental resources.

When considering “economy” in this context, it includes commerce and industry, as well as government and even non-profit organisations. Included within this concept are also

such infrastructures as roads, rails, ports, airports, bridges, hospitals, schools and communication and utility operations (McLellan, 2012).

Environmental resources refer to such resources as agriculture, timber, fishing, oil and other extraction operations prevalent within a community.

According to Pine, a community is resilient if it had learned and anticipated possible threats to the community and can continue accessibility of environmental resources for the economy. Only through an inclusive process of communication and mutual learning can communities develop plans for their communities, powered by an information system that includes a multitude of diverse stakeholders in the community (McLellan, 2012).

Pine describes resilience as a process of self-reliance and a willingness to contribute and thus remarks that distrust between institutions and organisations may increase during a crisis situation as the result of relentless top-down management. Recognising this hindrance to effective resilience building is especially important in local contexts as larger organisations or institutions may simply be too far removed from the local context to recognise pre-existing relationships of mutual trust and understanding (McLellan, 2012).

Interesting explorations of community resilience for our purpose of conceptualising resilience in a context of security comes mainly from Israel, where scholarly efforts have focused on analysing community resilience to missile attacks. Braun-Lewensohn and Sagy (2013) consider that the context of a community has influence not only on the immediate reaction to crisis, but also to the processes of coping and adjusting.

When studying the individual responses to missile attacks in urban and rural communities in Israel through the lens of social cohesion, Braun-Lewensohn and Sagy discovered that urban residents had weaker communal resources available to them while simultaneously suffering from more severe reactions.

In rural communities, factors of social-community and leadership-emergency had stronger scores, suggesting that rural community residents had more trust in their community leaders and felt better prepared for crisis (Braun-Lewensohn & Sagy, 2013).

A sense of cohesion appears to be an important coping factor, and thus sense of cohesion simultaneously evokes a more resilient response to threat and crisis in communities, such

as higher trust in community leadership, community preparedness for emergency, and social-community activities (Braun-Lewensohn & Sagy).

1.2.7 National Resilience

From the lessons of the concept of community resilience, let us again widen our lens to an entity that entails certainly more than one community, the nation. In recent years, discussions and conceptualisation of national resilience have gained traction, especially in the wake of the realisation that absolute security is an illusion, evoked by series of terror attacks on western democracies.

Defining a nation as a concept is another exercise that would exceed the framework of this work, and there certainly is a discussion to be had about it and its influence in the national security and national resilience discourse certainly, as the term nation makes up half of the whole concept.

Nations are not naturally given and rise from pre-existing foundations of shared blood, language or culture, but are conjured through rituals and symbols (Linger, 2007). National identity and patriotic feelings are part of individual attitudes and feelings (Parmak, 2015). The nation is not a natural or inevitable social unit, but the result of a particular history rooted in the fall of monarchy and empires, coupled with advancements in literacy, technology, and capitalism to form a cultural construct, as proposed by Anderson (1983) in his work "Imagined Communities". Confronted with the dreadful reality of the transience of human existence, people identify within a national community, so that following their passing they continue to live on in spirit long after having been forgotten as individuals through the continued existence of the nation and the cultural characteristics connected to it (Anderson, 1983).

National resilience relates to the idea of shared vision and values in society at the level of the nation (Parmak, 2015).

Canetti et al (2014) explore the concept of national resilience in their comparative study on the United States of America and Israel, selected for being democracies that face national threats of war and terrorism. Based on a conceptualisation of resilience in

psychology, Canetti et al (2014) suggest “(...) that resilience is not only the outcome of an appropriate adjustment to adversity but also a process occurring while facing an ongoing threat or after experiencing a stressful and unusual event.”.

Their final conceptualisation defines national resilience as the ability of a society to withstand diverse adversities by the implementation of changes and adaptations, while maintaining the values and institutions at the core of society (Canetti et al, 2014). They attest to the psycho-political dimensions of resilience, as individuals do not have direct influence on the national security in their conceptualisation.

They find that high levels of patriotism and “love of the country” reflect the inhabitant’s willingness to make sacrifices for their country, as for in the case of Israel living under rocket attacks. The constant exposure to terror consequently leads to people developing these psycho-political capabilities and allow the citizens to adapt, thus forming the base of resilience (Canetti et al, 2014).

When comparing American and Israeli understanding of national resilience, the American concept appears to be more abstract, and Carnetti et al (2014) suggest that may be connected to the American participants not being exposed to the existential level of threat that the state of Israel faces from its many adversaries. The concept of resilience in the American understanding can be summarised as the nation's capacity to overcome challenges and threats while remaining united.

The Israeli conceptualisation of national resilience in contrast involves the nation's ability to tackle both external and internal threats and problems, encompassing political, social, and economic aspects, while maintaining unity, patriotism, and a spirit of volunteerism (Carnetti et al, 2014). Trust in national institutions, patriotism, acknowledgment of threats, and optimism as a coping mechanism were common components in their definitions.

These results allow us to arrive at a practical conclusion about national resilience as a concept that describes nation's capability to effectively deal with adversities such as terrorism, corruption, or poverty, while preserving its social cohesion (Carnetti et al, 2014).

Parmak (2015) explores the concept further and analyses what national resilience means in multinational societies. This idea is important especially for our purpose when considering the example of Ukraine, as much of the Russian propaganda denies claims of Ukrainian nationhood, argues all Ukrainians are “little Russians” living in Малороссия, “Little Russia”, and simultaneously that Russians and Ukrainians are Slavic brothers. Through its русский мир “Russian World” ideology it is argued that those Russian-language speakers in Ukraine were ethnic Russians and therefore under the responsibility of the Russian Federation, denying their Ukrainian citizenship and nationality (Kuzio, 2017).

First, Parmak (2015) establishes that a community made up of resilient individuals does not mean that the community itself is resilient, and in turn a nation made up of resilient communities does not equal a resilient nation.

Excluded or un-integrated sub-communities may well be resilient in and of themselves, however, in times of national crisis the dynamic may prove to provide an additional threat to political instability (Parmak, 2015). She holds that while it is challenging to measure resilience, definitions of national resilience summarily tend to include sustainability and strength in realms such as patriotism, optimism, social integration, and trust in political institutions (Parmak, 2015).

She proposes a multi-layered framework with an emphasis on the interactional relationship between enabling factors and the capacities present at society’s different levels (Parmak, 2015). As not all groups within a nation are affected similar, or even necessarily exposed to the same threats, different groups develop different coping abilities.

Referring back to the idea of *Sicherheitsgefühl*, Parmak (2015) establishes that one of the functions of community and national resilience alike is to provide its members with a feeling of security, a sense of belonging (see also Braun-Lewensohn & Sagy, 2013), as well as social identity, the cornerstones of the nation and national security in her conceptualisation.

Understanding the interaction between society and the state as interactional in the sense of mutual reciprocity becomes key when trying to understand national resilience, and thus

at the national level, nation-building projects become a crucial effort in multinational societies to establish the values citizens are willing to stand for, understand their willingness to connect with which group, and to understand how individual and collective futures are constructed (Parmak, 2015).

As already seen in Braun-Lewensohn & Sagy (2013), trust in community leadership is an important factor within community resilience, and while trust in political institutions and leadership constitutes an important factor for national resilience, leadership should decrease ambiguity in the face of crisis with a clear inward-looking approach.

According to Parmak (2015), organising ambiguity can be done in three subprocesses: First, correct framing helps to distinguish between significant and non-significant elements to establish shared focus within the nation; second, awareness of interconnections fosters a mutual understanding of the level of risks and danger involved; and third, adjusting in the sense that constant awareness of the surrounding circumstances leads to continued reassessment and reconsideration of the situation and the threats involved.

As the compositions in multinational societies are constantly changing, Parmak (2015) finally advises to consider the following concerns when establishing a national resilience strategy. Cultural concerns referring to the sense of loss of control to the markers of one's identity, social concerns meaning the costs to the relative social "constancy" and familiarity in neighbourhoods, economic concerns referring to the perceived high economic costs of integration and the redistribution of resources, and finally political concerns consisting of the public's loss of confidence in the ruling classes and supranational bodies (Parmak, 2015).

1.2.8 Resilience in Security

Now from the concept of national resilience that already tapped into the security discourse and is grounded in the identification of the same external threats as the examples of missile attacks for Israel or terror attacks for the USA show, the concept of resilience has found its way into the security discourse in recent years.

From roughly 2010 and onwards, resilience has been adopted into the national security discourse and since it is a rather ambiguous concept, has found its way into issue specific discussions within national security including fields as diverse as emergency management, protection of critical infrastructure, global prosperity, conflict management, climate change and global development (Svitková, 2017). Svitková (2017) elaborates that resilience in the national security discourse overreaches by far government or military authorities in terms of scope and objectives, extending past the simple material dimension of security by highlighting the interconnectedness of the natural, environmental, demographic and social domains.

National security strategies that incorporate the concept of resilience tend to include language of threats, risks and vulnerabilities juxtaposed to the principles of resilience (Svitková, 2017).

In relation to the referent objects of security (states, individuals, critical infrastructure networks) protection, adaptation, collaboration, empowerment and capacity building are recurrent themes in national security strategies that consider resilience (Svitková, 2017).

In her comparative study of 2017, Svitková analyses the national security strategies of the US and the UK, as well as the strategies of supranational institutions NATO and the EU.

In the US, resilience is perceived as both a goal and a means, and strong and resilient institutions, economy, individuals, and society are considered prerequisites for the US to attain national security; and thus, within the US, resilience becomes a value and a desired characteristic of the constitutive elements that make up the United States (Svitková, 2017).

The British understanding of resilience in national security appears to be more related to creating and maintaining a structure that is able to deal with a widening range of threats and hazards while plugging in to local, national, and international partners; rooted in the complexity-based assumption of resilient systems being interconnected on various levels (Svitková, 2017).

While sharing similar assumptions (most centrally the notion of continuation of business), the US-American and the British approaches to resilience in security differ mainly ontologically, with the American conceptualisation being oriented more towards values

and normativity while the British conceptualisation is focused much more on practicability and an implementation of resilience rather than a philosophy (Svitková, 2017).

1.2.9 Resilience in Supranational Security

When comparing the attitudes of two supranational organisations, Svitková, (2017) found that in the run up to the 2016 NATO-Warsaw summit, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Jamie Shea declared resilience to be a core element of collective defence in a complex globalised world that needed constant adaptation to newly emerging threats and vulnerabilities (Svitková, 2017).

NATO perceives resilience through the lens of deterrence, claiming that resilient civilian-military cooperation would reduce the likelihood of attack, even declaring it to be an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence (Svitková, 2017). The commitment to resilience is inextricably connected to upholding NATO's core values of individual liberty, democracy, and rule of law.

In the communique Nr. 73 of the summit, NATO members concluded that the alliance and its members may be considered resilient if they're able to maintain resilient critical government services; resilient energy supplies; the ability to deal with uncontrolled movement of people; resilient food and water resources; the ability to deal with mass casualties; resilient civil communications systems (cyber); and resilient transport systems (for NATO's purposes) (Shea, 2016).

Simultaneously to NATO, the EU made a shift to resilience in 2016, including the Joint Framework for Hybrid Threats as well as the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, and the Joint EU-NATO declaration made in Warsaw 2016 (Svitková, 2017).

The EU defined resilience as "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises" (EU, 2016), and furthermore that a resilient state is a secure state and a resilient society were to feature democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development at the heart of its state (EU, 2016).

The EU centres the security around societal resilience, maintaining the idea that a society cannot be truly resilient unless it considers humanitarian issues, trade, development, infrastructure, investment, education and health (Svitková, 2017). The core values of the EU, multilateralism, rule of law, development, and human rights clearly emanate from this conceptualisation. In the context of security, the EU stresses internally two dimensions of resilience, critical infrastructure and emergency management, while externally focussing on the four dimensions of conflict management, climate change, global development, and global prosperity (Svitková, 2017).

When comparing NATO and the EU, Svitková (2017) thus establishes that both organisations adhere to their traditional focusses and core values, with NATO applying resilience to defence cooperation, deterrence, and new challenges of an infrastructural, environmental, or demographic nature; and the EU in contrast applying resilience to good governance, state-building efforts, human rights, and sustainable development. Resilience has reached the security discourse in both national and supranational structures and has become an integral basis of security strategies.

Christie& Berzina (2022) further explore the concept of resilience within NATO and establish that while resilience in traditional defence discourse is understood as the armed force's ability to fulfil their tasks and civil society's ability to recover from attacks to further enable the armed forces and not unduly divert resources to civilian emergencies, NATO understands these abilities as civil preparedness and sees resilience rather as the combined effect of civil preparedness and military capacity (Christie& Berzina, 2022).

A resilient civil society can respond to shocks and absorb them without suffering from severe fractures and then continue to recover, meaning not only to return to the initial state, but rather to learn, build back better and bounce back forwards, being prepared for a possible reoccurrence of shock (Christie& Berzina, 2022).

While this conceptualisation does overlap broadly with the idea of civil preparedness, resilience includes a much wider and diverse range of actors who come together during crisis, including individuals, civil society organisations, public institutions, and private enterprises. A resilient nation thus can draw on all levels of society to resist, recover, learn, and adapt in an attempt of mitigating harm to the nation and the society while

supporting the continued work of essential public services, including security and defence (Christie& Berzina, 2022).

As in previous conceptualisations too, the notion of *Sicherheitsgefühl* finds itself also within NATO's conceptualisation of resilience, extending beyond technical factors and including such intangible assets as social bonds and social trust between individuals, individuals and civil society, as well as the private and public sector, creating a web of bottom-up and top-down responses (Christie& Berzina, 2022).

While Christie& Berzina (2022) appreciate that bottom-up approaches from civil society can be both materially useful, as well as a boost of morale for the armed forces, they establish that the largest elements for enablement of the armed forces are civilian public bodies and major corporations that can feasibly be subjected, if appropriate, to either civilian or military authority.

While not fully disclosing the guidelines and criteria for their requirements entirely to the public, NATO on their website have published the seven requirements they deem as necessary for a resilient nation. They include “Assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis; Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders; Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO's military deployments; Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage; Ability to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure; Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity” (NATO, 2022).

In this conceptualisation of a resilient nation, the functioning state under control of continued governance is at the centre of efforts and the necessity for provision of essential services and infrastructures lays with the state as well. A possible inclusion of civil society is not directly obvious, and references to civilians are made mainly as the victims of harm, including as mass casualties, uncontrolled migrants, and obstacles to the armed forces.

Christie& Berzina note that in the baseline requirements of NATO, cybersecurity is not considered as its own requirement, as it is an essential element for maintaining resilience across the other requirements, from government websites, banks, utilities, energy pipelines, media outlets, water and sanitation facilities, critical energy infrastructure, hospitals and so on, while a cyberattack on any of these services could potentially lead to illness or loss of life on par with a kinetic attack (Christie& Berzina, 2022). They warn that the increased roll-out of the internet of things and further digitalisation of services such as government services will lead to an increased interconnectedness between societal resilience and cybersecurity.

Psychological defence therefore must be considered more intensively as it currently is, following the example perhaps of NATO-prospect member Sweden that has a unique institution for this purpose, the Psychological Defense Agency (Myndigheten för Psykologiskt Försvar–MPF).

The morale of the civilian population, its resilience to dis- and misinformation, and a willingness to volunteer for the nation are basic components within psychological defence and become increasingly important in times of hybrid warfare (Christie& Berzina, 2022).

In a study focused on resilience against disinformation, Teperik et al (2022) propose the maintaining and increasing of national and local quality media to involve other language communities (e.g. Polish-speakers in Lithuania or Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia), publishing education materials for younger and older generations, a holistic approach of interconnectedness of various stakeholders, capacity building in strategic and crisis communication, and the introduction of result-oriented training courses on cognitive security into formal and informal education.

The report further suggests that there must be an increased interconnection between a multitude of stakeholders, within the government (inter-agency and between regional/national authorities), between the government and academia, research institutions and think-tanks, civil society organisations and volunteers, the business sector and civil society, the media sector and academia, and finally between civil society and the media sector (Teperik et al, 2022).

Finally, Christie & Berzina (2022) conclude that NATO were well advised to add three new requirements to their baseline requirements, namely payment systems, psychological defence, and the continuity of data and infrastructure software, each of these requirements addressing an important aspect of societal resilience while simultaneously being relevant for the enablement of defence.

In contrast to NATO, the EU delivered its most recent work with a focus on resilience in December 2022, the Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC.

Within the Directive, the EU provides a clear definition of resilience as “the ability to prevent, resist, mitigate, absorb, accommodate to and recover from an incident that disrupts or has the potential to disrupt the operations of a critical entity” (Directive 2022/2557). The focus of the Directive, as the title states, is the protection of critical entities, meaning entities that provide essential services to citizens of the EU, on a national and cross-national level. Within the Directive it is established that protection is but one element of resilience thinking combined with risk prevention and mitigation, business continuity, and recovery (Directive 2022/2557).

Resilience is conceptualised here in response to an increased number of threats, it is an approach that should provide better security for critical entities given the multitude of diverse threats such as natural hazards exacerbated through climate change, state-sponsored hybrid actions, terrorism, insider threats, pandemics, and industrial accidents (Directive 2022/2557).

The directive establishes eleven sectors that include critical entities, namely energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, drinking water, waste water, digital infrastructure, public administration, space, and finally production, processing, and distribution of food (Directive 2022/2557).

While mentioned in Directive 2022/2557, both banking and financial market infrastructure are covered especially again under the EU Financial Services Aquis and the Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending

Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011.

Given these recent developments and the adoption of both Directive 2022/2557 and Regulation 2022/2554, the EU has included some of the points Christie & Berzina (2022) recommended for NATO to adopt in the future, namely payment systems and continuity of data and infrastructure software. This may well be the result of the EU considering resilience in a larger perspective than the defence focused approach of NATO, as also Svitková (2017) argued.

1.2.10 Making Sense of the Differences between Security and Resilience

This development of supranational and national governments to consider an all-hazards approach is in line with the increasingly common direction of resilience in security according to the predictions of Fjäder (2014).

In his conceptual analysis, Fjäder argues that the difference between security and resilience are evidently the spatial and temporal scope, as well as the objectives, despite being interconnected.

While security is proactive and preventive in nature to protect the state and individuals within the state borders against threats assessed by intelligence or risk assessment, resilience combines proactive and reactive measures with the aim of reducing the impact, but not preventing threats (Fjäder, 2014).

Unlike security, resilience inherits the ability to adapt to disruptions and recover from them by learning in order to guarantee the continued functioning of essential services; as opposed to the security approach of defeating the source of the threat, as resilience thinking acknowledges the impossibility of absence of threat (Fjäder, 2014). Fjäder (2014) argues that while security and robustness are elements of resilience through the specific aim of reducing the likelihood of a threat manifesting and limiting its impact to avoid irreparable damage and loss of life, resilience itself is an integrated element of national security in the sense that it aims to provide a solution for preparedness against unforeseeable risks against which a preventive security approach may be cost-ineffective or simply impossible.

According to this conceptualisation, a resilient nation would thus be able to avoid total failure by bouncing back when faced with unexpected hazards, as well as maintain a degree of stability through securitisation of a reliable minimum of basic services; or what Fjäder calls a “cost-effective insurance protection against the perceived challenge of uncertainty.” (Fjäder, 2014).

Through implementation of resilience strategies, the state becomes increasingly more replaced by other actors to be fully effective in an effort to adopt a pragmatic response to hazards. This development however requires a new social contract between the states and its citizens based on a mutual understanding that the state retreats from a preventive security approach to threats for the sake of a management approach (Fjäder, 2014).

The extensive literature review leads us now to the research question.

Chapter 2

2.1 Research Question

2.1.1 Summarising the Concepts

To summarise, the concepts of both security and resilience have been contested to say the least and have continually been elaborated and worked on, to finally find each other embedded within themselves.

Security, as conceptualised by the works quoted above can summarily be conceptualised as both the absence of threats to acquired values, such as territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty, as well as a psychological quality, encompassing the absence of fear and the perception of safety; the feeling of protection and the assurance of reliable conditions that allow individuals to live without constant threat or disruption.

The objective and subjective aspects of security are interconnected, and their realisation requires the allocation of resources and the pursuit of policy options. Security is a complex concept involving the reliable protection of core values, the absence of threats, and the perception of safety. It encompasses individual and collective well-being, extends beyond physical harm to include economic stability and freedom, and is essential for the

functioning and stability of societies and states. While states play a crucial role in ensuring security through institutions and governance, individuals and groups also seek security against the state.

Resilience on the other hand may be summarised as the ability of objects, individuals, systems, or societies to withstand and absorb external shocks, respond and recover from disasters, and navigate through ongoing threats. Resilience involves constant adaptation, learning from hazardous events, and engaging diverse stakeholders in inclusive processes. It extends beyond material security and incorporates social bonds, trust, and shared values.

A resilient entity demonstrates the ability to maintain critical services, ensure energy, food, and water resources, and effectively manage movements of people. It encompasses preparedness, mitigation, business continuity, and recovery measures while acknowledging the interconnectedness of natural, environmental, demographic, and social domains.

Resilience includes a combination of proactive and reactive measures, aiming to reduce the impact of threats and maintain the functioning of essential services. It is an integral element of national security and collective defence, emphasizing the importance of democracy, sustainable development, and collaboration at local, national, and international levels. Overall, resilience represents a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to navigating adversity, fostering adaptability, and promoting positive outcomes in the face of challenges.

Within these two conceptualisations we can perceive overlap certainly, as resilience has become a part of national security. First, both security and resilience aim for the preservation of core values; and while security aims at the absence of threats to such values as territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence, resilience aims to withstand and absorb external shocks to preserve societal values.

Secondly, both concepts seek to provide stability and well-being to their referent objects, with security encompassing both individual and collective well-being extending beyond physical harm to freedom and economic stability; and resilience promoting adaptability

and positive impacts in the face of severe challenges to maintain stability and functioning when threatened with total collapse.

Finally, security and resilience on a national level are both subject to resource allocation. Measures of preparedness, deterrence, mitigation, and recovery ultimately at the state level boil down to policy options, which in a rational discourse and according to the law of diminishing marginal utility, always necessitate the allocation of scarce resources.

2.1.2 Crucial Differences between Security and Resilience

However, resilience and security are not synonymous and there are some crucial differences between them. On the one hand, security is focused on the absence of threats and the provision of a subjective perception of safety, addressing a fear of threats and seeking to provide a sense of protection and reliable conditions. Resilience on the other hand puts its emphasis much more on the adaptation to ongoing threats, learning from disruptive events, and gaining the ability to withstand and recover from shocks; in turn placing less emphasis on the subjective perception of safety through the absence of threat, but rather through the provision of the ability to navigate challenges and maintain functioning.

Furthermore, the scope and focus of security and resilience differ slightly, and while security has a broad scope encompassing both subjective and objective aspects from territorial integrity to psychological well-being, resilience has a narrower focus on the ability to withstand, respond to, and recover from shocks and disruptions.

Finally, the role of the state differs in our current conceptualisations of security and resilience. Security as a concept highlights the role of the state as the primary provider of security to both society and individuals. An emphasis is placed on the state's responsibility to guarantee the absence of threats and the protection of core values.

Within the concept of resilience, while certainly acknowledging the role of the state, the importance of diverse stakeholders, be it individuals, civil society organisations or private enterprises, is not only recognised but emphasised. Inclusive processes and cooperation and collaboration at various levels, extending beyond the state, is a core element of resilience.

2.1.3 The Role of Civil Society

Now this final element of difference between security and resilience, the role of civil society is the focal point of this work, as we shall seek to explore the capabilities of civil society within security. If resilience has become an integral part of security, and resilience stresses the involvement of various stakeholders at the sake of diminishing influence of the state, the state in turn should be possible to substitute through a resilient society.

With the first and second invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2014 and February 2022 subsequently, the Ukrainian state has been challenged immensely and repeatedly and continuously has its sovereignty violated by brutal, large-scale inhumane aggression and continues to fight back. The Ukrainian state sees the sovereignty of provision of security to its citizens continuously meddled with by other actors threatening to jeopardise the lives of Ukrainian forces and civilians alike.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian society has showed an immense resolve and through its own resolve and efforts driven the aggressor out of the Kyiv and Kharkiv Oblasts. Among the first on the frontlines in 2014 were volunteer fighters, often based on local football hooligan clubs and other local actors. During the 2022 full-scale invasion, large volunteer efforts provide services to Ukrainians in the free and the occupied territories of Ukraine, as well as the Gray zone, from feeding abandoned domestic animals, over providing arms and material to fighting units, mapping bombing shelters, and rescuing the cultural heritage of Ukraine from destruction and theft by the occupiers.

2.1.4 Research Question

These efforts by Ukrainian civil society under the lens of the potentially diminishing role of the state in security through the increased role of resilience within national security give way to the research question:

Can a resilient civil society substitute for the state within the concept of security?

The results of this research aim to add to an increasingly growing body of literature on the importance of the concept of resilience in security, as promoted through the Resilient Ukraine Project by the International Centre for Defense and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn and other European and Cross-Atlantic initiatives.

Developing more resilient societies becomes increasingly important in a world more prone to catastrophic events exacerbated by the climate crisis, as well as in the face of an increasing number of hostile actors waging hybrid war against NATO and EU Member States and other democracies globally. Security is an important concept under the guise of which there have been waged war, suspended civil liberties, and redirected enormous amounts of resources into defence and arms, and therefore it should be a concept that includes clear aspects.

2.2 Methodology

2.2.1 Conceptual Analysis

To answer our research question, we will apply the method of conceptual analysis to understand whether our current understanding of the concepts of security and resilience have constrained our view and led to a situation where certain policy courses are dismissed for the simple reason of being considered out of scope of the conceptual reality of security.

As the name suggests, Conceptual analysis is the analysis of concepts, terms, variables, constructs, definitions, assertions, hypotheses, and theories by examining those for their coherence and clarity, critically scrutinising their logical relations, and finally the identification of assumptions and implications (Petocz& Newbery, 2010). The purpose of the conceptual analysis is to establish the position of the civil society within the concept of security and explore whether civil society is solely the referent object and beneficent of security, or whether civil society can become a focal actor within the concept of security itself.

Conceptual analysis has been chosen to develop a clear and concise understanding of the concept for application derived from reliable sources. This is not a simple exercise in semantics however, it is the basis of providing a better understanding, aiming at the eradication of misunderstanding between scholars and difficulty for distinguishing between policy options for policymakers (Baldwin, 1997).

A conceptual analysis of security may seek to identify those features of the concept that make it applicable for those operating within the realm of international relations, security, and foreign policy.

Through reviewing the literature, we have already been able to extrapolate concepts for both security and resilience, and in the following chapter explore their assumptions through case studies from the ongoing war against Ukraine as a recent example that holds a variety of valuable lessons.

In this approach we are guided by Oppenheim, who established that the explication of concepts is subject to the criteria that they should be operational in the broadest sense (although not necessitating quantifiability), should preferably establish definitional connections with other terms, draw attention to theoretically important aspects, and finally not preclude empirical investigation and remain reasonably close to ordinary language (Oppenheim, 1975).

The use of conceptual analysis especially in this context guides possible future research with clear conceptual ideas about security and resilience and allows for quantifiable, quantitative research based on the ideas of the qualitative approach taken here. Certainly, there are constraints to the method and to the approach taken within this work.

2.2.2 Limitations of Conceptual Analysis

Conceptual analysis does not lend itself to the creation of new concepts, it is only that we seek to validate or refine previous concepts. Conceptual analysis is a descriptive method, it does not seek to propose solutions to any problem other than clarification, and it does not inherit any moral judgement over the concepts (Bennett, 2017).

Furthermore, it does not provide us with any guidance on which concept we should apply, as beautifully showcased in the article “What Are Dandelions and Aphids?” (Janzen, 1977), where Janzen describes that the asexual reproduction of dandelions is conceptually within the realm of growth rather than reproduction, as the offspring of the dandelion are parts of it that have simply disseminated and therefore all the dandelions in one’s yard may be actually part of just one dandelion (Janzen, 1977).

Folk conceptualisation would clearly presume that the dandelions are different individual dandelions, although conceptually they may not actually be, and therefore there is a discussion to be had about which concepts are applicable and useful ultimately, and which ones only serve the clarification for the purposes of scientific research.

Buzan (1983) also raised the concern that security was an “essentially” contested concept, a concept that, according to Gallie (1956) is so laden with value that no amount of argument or evidence may lead to an agreement on one single version or standard use. To drive this conclusion into the extreme were to take a nihilistic approach and consider the conceptualisation of security and the subsequent choice of one or another concept of security a futile, groundless effort.

However, the effort undertaken here has as its aim to improve on current usage of the concept, not to identify a single best conceptualisation. To illustrate the idea of a concept, Gallie makes example of the concept of a “champion” in sports, someone or a team who or which is better at playing the sport than any other person or team (Gallie, 1956).

The usage of the concept of security by neorealists seems to imply that they consider security the highest attainable goal of a state, while Wolfers holds that states widely vary on the value that states place on security and therefore would rather for example seek to acquire new values. From Gallie's perspective, the different usage of the concept of security by these two however, does not imply that it is contested, as neither side seeks to engage truly with the usage of others (Baldwin, 1997).

2.2.3 Other Limitations

Now, besides the constraints of the methods inherent to it, there are obviously limitations to this work emanating from the author as well as the circumstances.

As my understanding of both the Ukrainian as well as the Russian language is rather basic, this work relies mainly on sources written in English, German, or Dutch, limiting the number of available sources greatly and diminishing the diverse perspectives of stories and literature available from the subjects of possible case studies.

Where sources in either Ukrainian or Russian were used, automated translations through the help of software with a basic revision by me were used, increasing the chance of

erroneous translation and certainly missing a fair amount of nuance and cultural implications that have been lost by these translations.

Furthermore, the ongoing war obviously limits the availability of field work or interviews with people on the ground, as they are currently occupied with the defense of their country and therefore, this work relies only on available literature. As the current war has been accelerated with the full-scale invasion of February 2022, most available sources were produced only recently as news articles and statements from NGO's and Government bodies which have not been peer reviewed or qualify as scientific literature. Finally, as the war is currently ongoing at the point of writing, there has not been a clear outcome, however, this is not a main concern for the purpose of this work.

Following this section, there will be presented several cases of civil society engagement with national security since the beginning of EuroMaidan in 2013, based on the review of scientific literature as well as primary sources such as news articles, websites, and social media postings.

Chapter 3

3.1 Analysis

3.1.1 Volunteer Brigades and Territorial Defence Forces

As we discuss security and seek to find new aspects in its conceptualisation through knowledge gained by the experience of Ukraine, we must certainly review the national security strategy of Ukraine to properly understand the context of the developments described herein.

The Law on National Security (as revised in 2020) is the most central piece of legislation concerning Ukraine's National Security and seeks to set out the basic provisions as well as the normalisation of the challenges posed after the invasion and temporary occupation of Crimea, parts of Donetsk and Luhansk following 2014. The law defines a multitude of terms, such as national security, and in Article 2 enshrines the provisions of the legal basis of state policy in the areas of national security and defence (Zahorulko, 2020). Article 3

states the principles of state policy in the realm of national security and defence (Zahorulko, 2020).

Ukraine's modern security policy interestingly distinguishes between state security and national security, with state security containing elements as the protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order and other vital national interests from real and potential threats of a non-military nature; whereas national security is concerned with the protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order, and other national interests of Ukraine from real and potential threats (Chaliuk, 2020).

Chaliuk (2020) establishes that the Ukrainian defence and security sector consists of four interrelated elements, the security forces, the defence forces, the defence industry complex, and finally the citizens and public associations that voluntarily participate in the ensuring of national security. It is the establishment, use, and motivation of this fourth element of the security sector that shall be discussed more in depth in this part of the analysis.

The large-scale mobilisation of Ukraine's civil society and the drive to volunteer are the result of developments that started with EuroMaidan and its tragic aftermaths (Puglisi, 2015). Following the decision of then-President Yanukovich not to sign the EU Association agreement in 2013, the protests on Maidan Nezaleshnosti began and kept growing, fuelled by all parts of society with different agendas and diverse backgrounds (Solonenko, 2015). The protests that erupted on Maidan can be considered a manifestation of the increasing rupture between the citizens of Ukraine and the state, whose regime was perceived to overtly not be acting in the people's best interest, culminating in the overthrow of the state as represented by the Yanukovich regime (Channell-Justice, 2022). Ukrainian civil society pre-Maidan had been described as "weak" based on the Western understanding of the functioning of a "post-Soviet" model in which formally registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs) consisting of small or even non-existent membership networks operated within an aid-bubble created by mainly western donors while enjoying minimal support from actual civil society (Pishchikova & Ogryzko, 2014).

While Ukraine experienced the Orange Revolution in 2004, EuroMaidan differed significantly in that it was not a demonstration but a real standoff between protesters and government forces, with civil society leading in front of established opposition parties, not vice versa (Pishchikova& Ogryzko). Despite the Orange Revolution in 2004, EuroMaidan was an unprecedented volunteer movement and already after the first violent crackdown of Police against protestors on November 30th, 2013, the so called “Civil Sector of Maidan” emerged, consisting of some 30 coordinators and roughly 100 full-time volunteers (Pishchikova& Ogryzko, 2014). The violence exerted by the state against the student protesters was instrumental in fostering wide-scale support by broader civil society and bringing more people out onto the streets (Channell-Justice, 2022). The police brutality led to an increasingly militant attitude within the population and civil society, since as Cardinal Lyubomyr Huzar of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church argued in January 2014 “When the government resorts to excessive violence, the people have the right to defend themselves with the use of force. Everyone has the right to defend himself. There is no need to write that in the constitution: it is the law of nature. I have the right to defend myself and my loved ones, as does every human being” (Quoted in Kurkov, 2014, p.79). In late November 2013, the volunteer movements on EuroMaidan started to organise groups tasked with the security of the protestors from the police and violent provocateurs, and inspired by the Cossack tradition of Ukraine divided them into *sotnya* (hundreds) (Puglisi, 2015). As of January 1st, 2014, some 3713 civic protection units had formed in Ukraine for the explicit purpose of keeping public order, consisting of more than 79.000 members, with the *Samooborona Maidana* (Maidan’s Self-Defence) composed of 39 *sotnya* (roughly 12.000 individuals) being the largest such unit (Council of Europe, 2014, and Puglisi, 2015). The *sotnya* movement was self-described non-partisan and aimed at protecting the sovereignty and unity of the Ukrainian state, protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens, and guarding its pro-European choice (as the whole protest movement erupted from Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU-Association agreement) (Puglisi, 2015).

As stated earlier, these *sotnya* drew on ideals and images of the Ukrainian Cossacks, most prominent between the 15th and 18th Century, who fought for freedom from Russian imperialism in formations circled around a notion of a proto-state and invoked notions of

hyper militarised masculinity and traditional role models of men as protectors and women in supportive roles (Bureychak& Petrenko, 2014). To counter this effect, women self-organised again and in response created their own, at least five, *Zhinocha sotnya* (Women's Brigades), with one particular brigade created by feminists and labour activists named after the late-nineteenth Century Ukrainian feminist Ol'ha Kobylians'ka, theoretically ready and armed to move to the frontlines that had already developed following the (not so) covert Russian invasion in the winter and early spring of 2014 (Onuch& Martsenyuk, 2014, and Channell-Justice, 2022). The brigade organised self-defense trainings, film screenings, lectures, and safe-spaces to share experiences of discrimination and sexism in protester-occupied buildings around Maidan (Channell-Justice, 2022).

Besides these *sotnya*, there were also other initiatives that were seeking to meet the violence of the police and state with resistance, such as an initiative supported by many leftist students called *Varto u Likarni*, the Hospital Guard, who organised after protesters had first been brutalised by *Berkut* Riot Police on Hrushevs'koho street and subsequently arrested or in some cases even kidnapped from the hospitals they were brought to afterwards (Channell-Justice, 2022). The volunteers of this initiative ensured that there would at all times be a protective presence in the hospitals of Kyiv, by recording names and other identification details and information, to then pass on to the families and other initiatives such as *EuromaidanSOS*, completely taking over the Oleksandrivs'ka hospital in the centre of Kyiv (commonly referred to as the "October Hospital" after its Soviet name based on the honouring of the October revolution) (Channell-Justice, 2022).

As Maidan was, contrary to Russian propaganda, not only a Kyiv-based event but led to protests and the spread of self-organisation and volunteering in the whole country, other volunteer forces besides the *sotnya* followed suit. After the Yanukovich government had been ousted, great parts of the internal security forces either defected to the Russian side or laid down their work, fearing retaliation (Channell-Justice, 2022). Some of these defected police forces were redeployed in occupied regions of Ukraine, mainly in Kherson, by the Russian occupiers in 2022 (Tahanovych, 2022). With the disappearance of many security forces, Ukrainian civilians self-organised and self-defence organisations

started patrolling the streets. When Police resumed their work, they were constantly shadowed by people exercising the *narodnyi control* (The people's control) and civilians even participated in police operations against arms and drug trafficking or poaching (Puglisi, 2015), all based on their interpretation of the 2000 law *On Citizens' Participation in the Defence of Public Order and State Border* (Law No. 1835-III of 22 June 2000).

When, following the ousting of Yanukovych, the covert Russian offensive on Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk began, the Ukrainian military appeared shocked, unorganised, unprepared, and unable to repel the enemy. To understand the state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2014, one must consider its development since Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 through a formalised referendum. Ukraine inherited a massive force from the Red Army (800.000 active personnel in 1991) and deceived by the international security environment following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, opted for non-alignment, followed by the submission to nuclear disarmament and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 (Polyakov, 2018).

Due to massive budget constraints, most key developments the Armed Forces aimed at were met only partially, and already in the early 2000's the troop size was reduced by almost half the total number to roughly 200.000 men (Polyakov, 2018). Given the widespread unpopularity of the mandatory military service among the Ukrainian population, a large body of the available troops consisted of either fairly unmotivated soldiers and their junior and middle-rank officers demoralised by poor social conditions, while the top brass of the military leadership has been described to consider the Armed Forces more as a rent-seeking revenue, copying their civilian masters (Polyakov, 2018). Under the leadership of the Yanukovych regime then, the threat assessment did not even include a possible conflict with the Russian Federation and a reduction in size to roughly 100.000 all-volunteers was proclaimed. While prior to Yanukovych, the Ukrainian military appeared to be underfunded and undertrained, however still sizeable and properly equipped, the Yanukovych term transformed the institution into a symbolic institution comprised of skeleton units capable of carrying out only limited missions of border

control and peacekeeping rather than repelling an actual invasion force by a neighbouring country (Polyakov, 2018).

The Ukrainian military in 2014 was still based on a threat assessment deriving from the Soviet era, with a focus on internal security threats and thus a strong internal security force, rather than considering external threats, with no substantial force even based in the east of the country, in Donetsk or Luhansk oblasts (Käihkö, 2018). Another legacy of the Soviet era, in which any institutions dealing with defence and enforcement of security were firmly subordinated to Communist Party rule, was the as perfunctory described democratic oversight over the Armed Forces that had been left mainly to the executive, meaning the President as Commander-in-Chief, and on his behalf on his unelected administration (Puglisi, 2015).

With the 2014 invasion by Russian forces and their proxies that had been trained in and supplied by the Russian Federation for years (Kuzio, 2017), many members of the *sotnia* who had just been in Kyiv or other cities out on the streets to secure their fellow citizens from the police brutality of the state under the Yanukovych regime, suddenly found themselves organised in Volunteer Battalions on an actual battlefield, engaged in the defence of their nation (Käihkö, 2018). This was particularly the case for members of the *Samooborona*, and *Pravyi Sektor* (Right-Sector).

With the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian state remained mostly idle, the soldiers in the barracks were ordered not to engage and the interim President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, admitted that “our country had neither the government system, nor the defence system back then.” (Hladka et al., 2017, p.30). The invasion and annexation of Crimea was an act of hybrid warfare, executed following meticulous planning and reconnaissance, facilitated by the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet by the Russian Federation who secretly increased the number of Russian servicemen and armaments on the peninsula. Special Forces financed and inspired marginal local parties and organisations and tried to spark separatist sentiments, building structures of armed formations called Crimean Self-Defence, and then ultimately on the night of February 27th-28th captured the building of the local parliament and government of the autonomous Republic of Crimea in Simferopol (Horyń& Tomasik, 2022). The Ukrainian units’

commands who were stationed in Crimea received no orders or guidelines on how to proceed and thus stood by, while the Russian aggressor simultaneously launched a major disinformation campaign on the events, trying to divide the Ukrainian population and halting potential outside support for Ukraine by creating the image of a spontaneous, democratic, grass-roots movement in Crimea (Horyń& Tomasik, 2022).

The military indecisiveness of the political leadership of the Ukrainian state following the invasion of the Donetsk Oblast led to the emergence of multiple para-military group of volunteers, comprised of Ukrainian citizens who capitalised on their right to self-defence (Bulakh et al., 2017). The previous experience of the state's failure to prevent the annexation of Crimea and the generally perceived shock or paralysis encouraged the citizens of Ukraine to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state themselves (Käihkö, 2018). The Volunteer battalions in the first phase of the conflict undertook a major part of the fighting (Kuzio, 2017), guaranteeing through their efforts that the state would not be idle this time around (Käihkö, 2018).

Different from what Russian propaganda and overrepresentation in western media of few specific units suggest, the Volunteer Battalions consisted of a largely heterogenous group of Ukrainian citizens. The battalions consisted of both Ukrainian and Russian-language speakers (Kuzio, 2017), with more than 33% of volunteers being Russian-speakers, undermining the widespread myth that the Volunteer Battalions were made up from only Ukrainian-speaking nationalists; and 75% being residents of central and southern Ukrainian oblasts, contrary to the Russian propagated myth that it were mainly people from the most western oblast of Lviv who fought in these battalions (Bulakh, 2018). While not romanticising the cohesiveness and diversity of these volunteer battalions, personal reports also bring up that some units included a variety of people under the context of fighting the Russian aggressor that would make for usually unlikely bedfellows, such as Jewish and Muslim minorities fighting alongside units sporting symbols connected to the far-right (Käihkö, 2018). The core members of these units were often previously engaged in Maidan protests and as diverse as the *sotnia* were thus the Volunteer Battalions, often including for example a core of hooligans and fans of specific football clubs with both right- and left-wing political affiliations such as "Secta-82" supporting Metalist Kharkiv (Gozma, 2022) and other supporters of Dynamo Kyiv such

as current Asov commander Denys Prokopenko, or the anarchist “Hoods Hoods Klan”, supporters of FK Arsenal Kyiv (Hanrahan, 2022).

From the very beginning of the emergence of these Volunteer Battalions the state tried to integrate all units into its own structure, confronted with the loss over the monopoly over violence, and although these structures were created in relatively short time, it is difficult to track the development of every single Volunteer Unit, due to several factors such as the rapid development of military events, the high level of hostile propaganda emanating from the Russian Federation, constantly changing government policy towards the units, and finally a lack of reliable and open information available to the public regarding the sources of funding of particular volunteer units (Bulakh, 2018).

Although the Ukrainian leadership immediately requested support from the signatories of the Budapest memorandum and other friendly governments in the EU and NATO, not much feasible support followed given the uncertainty of the US administration at the time, and therefore Ukraine was bound to defend itself without much help, quickly utilising available human resources such as reservists and volunteers (Polyakov, 2018).

In April 2014, President Poroshenko announced that the Ukrainian Security Service Служба безпеки України (SBU) would launch their Anti-Terrorist Operation against those violently pursuing Moscow’s forced annexation of Crimea and armed subjects who were seizing territory in Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (Kuzio, 2017). Among those who participated in these operations were many volunteers, who in the span of roughly a year would be integrated into the state structures in varying forms. The state understood the urgency and the need for the Volunteer Battalions to exist, and therefore set up different ways to integrate them into their security architecture, effectively having several institutions even compete for them to join. In the wake of the ATO, volunteers were organised in one of four distinct types of formations, either as a Territorial Area Defence Battalion (ADB) under the control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD); a Reserve Battalion of the National Guard of Ukraine; a Special-Purpose Battalion under the Ministry of Interior (MoI); or within the *Pravyi Sektor* Volunteer Corps that was not subordinated to any state structure (Bulakh, 2018).

While some of the formations joined the state structures early on, such as the Donbas Battalion established on April 12th, 2014, who joined the National Guard of Ukraine on

May 29th, 2014 as Battalion “Donbas – Ukraina”, it took the state much longer to establish actual control over them (Käihkõ, 2018). The National Guard consisted from its beginning of Internal troops of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Ukraine, including EuroMaidan participants as well as the volunteers of the Territorial Defence volunteer battalions “Azov”, “Dnipro-1”, “Peacekeeper”, “Kharkiv”, and multiple others (Prykhodko, 2019). National Guard units were equipped only with light infantry weapons and received armoured vehicles and mortars only during combat operations, often times supplied through the efforts of other civilian volunteers (Bulakh, 2018). The National Guard of Ukraine itself was established only on March 13th, 2014, as a military structure with law enforcement functions serving under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (Prykhodko, 2019). The primary objective of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) is to execute responsibilities encompassing the defense and preservation of citizens' lives, rights, freedoms, and lawful interests, as well as upholding public safety and order. Collaborating with law enforcement agencies, the NGU actively engages in specialized operations aimed at ensuring national security, safeguarding the state border, and countering illegal armed factions, terrorists, and criminal entities. Additionally, the NGU assumes vital roles such as safeguarding critical state facilities, nuclear installations, and specialized cargoes, and has participated in combat operations in the east of Ukraine prior to the full-scale Russian invasion (Prykhodko, 2019), and are actively engaged in the fight since February 2022, notably in the defence of the Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol by the Azov Regiment and the 12th Brigade of the National Guard (AP News, 2022). Azov battalion under the control of the National Guard structure was also responsible for the initial recapture of Mariupol on June 13, 2014, and multiple of the volunteer battalions participated in the decisive defence of Donetsk airport for 242 days between may 2014 and January 2015, showcasing their high level of dedication and their professionalism (Kuzio, 2017). The incorporation of the Volunteer Battalions mitigated fears that they might evolve into oligarch-controlled private armies (Kuzio, 2017), or develop into political extremists bound to not submit to Kyiv’s authority (Bulakh, 2017).

The creation of the ADBs was provided for in the General staff’s mobilisation plan, appointing at each military registration and enlistment office ADB officers, the legal basis for the creation of the ADBs being the Law on the Defence of Ukraine (Zakon Ukraïni No 1932-XII, 1991) and the Decree on Partial Mobilisation (Zakon Ukraïni No 1126-VII,

2014). These ADB units could be mixed, comprising a variety of volunteers and conscript elements among their ranks, but there were several units, such as the 20th Battalion (Dnipropetrovsk Region), the Kyivan Rus 11th Battalion (Kyiv Region), and the Aidar 24th Battalion (Luhansk Region) who consisted entirely out of volunteers (Bulakh, 2018). In total, 33 such units were formed during the period of their operation with the explicit tasks defined in Article 18 of the above mentioned law, such as protection and securing of the state border; securing conditions for undisturbed functioning of state authority bodies and military commands; protection and defence of important objects and communication hubs; fight against subversive and reconnaissance forces, other aggressor's armed formations, and anti-state illegal armed groups; and maintaining legal order in the realities of martial law (Horyń& Tomasik, 2022).

The geographical structure of the ADBs corresponds to the administrative territorial divisions of Ukraine, and under martial law the heads of the regional state administration and sub-regional state administration are appointed the heads of the corresponding military administration, thus becoming responsible for the ADBs (Romanova, 2022). Therefore, it is also important to consider the recent decentralisation reforms in Ukraine since 2014 following the Revolution of Dignity as an often-underappreciated aspect of resilience against the Russian aggression (Romanova& Umland, 2023). Research on decentralisation in Italy had proven that engagement in local decision-making is key to the creation of resilient communities (Boulègue & Lutsevych, 2020). One of the main efforts of the reforms were the amalgamations of multiple small and poor districts into institutionally and financially stronger amalgamated territorial communities (ATCs) to increase efforts of public provision of basic services such as education, healthcare, administrative services, and social protection (Romanova, 2022). Following the completion of this process of voluntary amalgamation, the formerly 490 districts had become 136 new subregions roughly corresponding to the EU's NUTS-3 level, increasing the legitimacy of the local authorities, as their election had been the result of democratic processes which often also included demonstrations especially in Kherson region (Romanova, 2022), whose inhabitants continued to exercise their democratic right to demonstration even under the extreme repression of the Russian occupation authorities (New York Times, 2022). The Kherson Territorial Defence Unit, following the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Kherson on March 2nd, 2022, continued to resist the

Russian occupier and defend the city when the Russian armed forces entered Kherson in tanks, leading to the entire unit – up to 300 military personnel - falling in battle (Romanova, 2022).

The model chosen by the Ukrainian state to organise the Territorial Defence Forces through military mobilisation centres and only after the declaration of a state of war does allow for full control, but has been criticised for not allowing to harness the full potential of Ukraine's civil society through other models of continuous volunteer staffed independent organisations such as adopted for example in Estonia through the “Estonian Defence League” (Teperik et al., 2022). Two weeks prior to the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022, General Zaluzhnyi stated that only 13 oblasts on the border had reached maximum 70 percent of their peacetime capacity, and large cities were falling behind the mobilisation plan as in Kyiv, Mariupol, or Odesa (Kudelia, 2022). This lagging mobilisation of the Territorial Defence Forces was emblematic of the failure to defend cities and towns in Southern Ukraine in the face of a quick Russian advance, leading to the early capture of the city of Kherson (Kudelia, 2022). This however is not to repeat the widespread notion that civil society in Southern (or Eastern) Ukraine were passive or indifferent, as even before the full-scale invasion 49% of inhabitants expressed their readiness to contribute to ensuring security in their local and municipal communities (Teperik et al., 2018).

By April 8th 2022, more than 110.000 civilians had joined various ADBs all over Ukraine (Romanova, 2022) after the government had eased the criteria and simplified the procedure to join on February 25th, 2022, following the full-scale invasion on the previous day. Generally speaking, most of the volunteers, not only in ADBs but also in other volunteer units are young, and motivated by ‘patriotic feelings’, and the desire to protect their homes, families, and values (Bulakh et al., 2017), which especially in the context of localised territorial defence units bears immense significance, as they are not defending their home in a metaphysical sense describing their native Ukraine, but their actual home regions where they and their families live.

Following the full-scale invasion, legislative changes allowed the ADBs to deployment in combat zones, with expanded armaments, leading to the transfers of several ADBs from Western oblasts to the active combat zones in the East, South, and North where they

participated in the recapture of territories from the Russian occupiers (Kudelia, 2022). Many of the ADB fighters arrived in combat zones rather poorly equipped and trained, leading to a higher number of casualties than with the regular Armed Forces of Ukraine (Kudelia, 2022).

While the ADBs correspond to the locals of specific ATCs, several groups that used to be organised already prior to the invasion and for a completely different context, tend to join ADBs collectively, diversifying the fabric of Territorial Defence forces significantly. Whether it is eco-anarchists from the “eco-platform” (Pramen, 2022) or troves of the Romani minority mainly from the Carpathian regions (Holoc Karpat, 2023), multiple parts of Ukrainian civil society that have many reasons to be critical and sceptical about the Ukrainian state decided to join the ADBs in the common effort to defend their way of life from the Russian aggression. Many women also took up arms and joined the struggle to defend their way of life from the Russian aggression, either in the Armed Forces or in the ADBs (2022), with so many joining the ranks and making their demands heard that the Ukrainian Armed Forces in August 2023 for the first time issued a summer uniform made tailored specifically for the proportions of women rather than issuing men’s uniforms to them (Rennolds, 2023).

In the wake of the unprecedented volunteer efforts by various members of Ukrainian civil society to take up an armed struggle against the Russian aggressor many more similarly felt compelled to volunteer in some way, and in the comet’s tail of the volunteer battalions a whole ecosystem of volunteers emerged. In the beginning the volunteer efforts were still quite rudimentary and with a specific local focus. It was mainly local citizens who sought to supply the often poorly equipped volunteer battalions and AFU forces with basic necessities such as food, shelter, hygiene requirements, warm clothing and sufficient materiel such as spades, blankets and boots to alleviate their immediate needs (Boichak, 2017). Quickly the supplies networks transformed however, and the volunteers became better specialised to recognise specific needs of the local volunteer battalions, as well as identifying their own capabilities and resources given their diverse makeup and their horizontal organisation. Some specialised in the supply of much-needed automobiles, some into high-tech such as night-vision or heat-detection equipment, tactical medicines to combatants, drones, camouflage nets and meshes (Asmolov, 2022). Some even went so far as to organise their own patrols to ensure the provision of supplies and proper

maintenance of equipment (Teperik et al., 2022). With only limited resources available to themselves, these volunteers quickly mobilised their networks, both on the ground, as well as in cyber space. Through the use of social networks, especially Facebook following the ban of Russian social media VKontakt, volunteers quickly constructed elaborate social infrastructures to leverage technological and physical resources, as well as knowledge sharing (Boichak, 2017) or the establishing of charity funds or crowdsourcing (Asmolov, 2022).

The niches that some of these volunteer initiatives have found has led to an incredibly diverse provision of services with an utmost specialisation, such as service delivery to veterans and their families, people suffering from PTSD and other forms of combat-induced trauma, or legal help as exemplified through the initiative “The Legal Hundred” (Yurydychna Sotnya). This group that had been established during EuroMaidan already (hence the sotnia naming) which evolved from a group of pro bono lawyers that offered their services to EuroMaidan victims of police brutality into a non-profit organisation that now provides legal aid to veterans, drafts laws and advocates for legal reform in Ukraine (Boulègue & Lutsevych, 2020).

And even outside of the state’s structures as ADBs or the National Guard, under the severe repression of Russian occupation, Ukrainian resistance to the aggressor remains vital in a variety of forms. In cities such as Kherson, Melitopol, and Berdiansk, citizens staged demonstrations and protests urging the Russian occupiers to leave (Kudelia, 2022). The violent oppression of these demonstrations forced the resistance movement to the underground and reinforced their radicalisation that would eventually end in armed resistance in a Guerilla warfare on the occupied territories. There is the “Yellow Ribbon Movement” that gained traction especially in occupied Kherson. Activists of the movement would disperse symbols and writings of peaceful resistance to the occupation, reminding both the occupier as well as the oppressed local society that Kherson oblast is Ukraine and will remain part of Ukraine, giving people hope in a dire situation (euronews, 2023).

Parallel to the peaceful resistance, several partisan movements have also developed however, dealing several blows to the Russian occupiers through a multitude of assassinations of high-level personnel especially in Kherson (Reuters, 2022) and Crimea,

and the destruction of railway and supply lines deep into occupied territory. These partisan movements again appear to be of a diverse make up, as far as it is possible to tell, given the secrecy and their disclosure to protect their members and ongoing operations. The Guerilla-movement “Artesh” has gained some prominence within this context, consisting mainly of Crimean Tartars, a national minority and the indigenous inhabitants of the Crimean Peninsula, operating within the occupied territories of Kherson oblast and Crimea (EuroMaidanPress, 2023).

The aforementioned decentralisation reform again also plays a part in the organisation of resistance within the occupied territories, as mentioned before with the organisation of large-scale protests in the city of Kherson (BBC News, 2022), but also resistance from the local governments. Both the Kherson and the Mykolaiv regional council met in session on March 12th and April 26th respectively to announce its disapproval of any attempts by the occupation authorities to conduct referenda proclaiming any sorts of “People’s Republics” (Romanova, 2023) as the Russian occupants had already done in Donetsk and Luhansk and would eventually conduct in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in September of 2022 (The New York Times, 2022), mere weeks before the liberation of Kherson City on November 11th, 2022 (Miller, 2022). Local governments also continued to provide essential services to the citizens in order to prevent humanitarian catastrophes as long as they could, as again in Kherson where the local council operated even under occupation until April 26th, 2022, or in Chernihiv, where, following Russian bombardment and encirclement, water shortages, electricity blackouts and a lack of basic medicine provisions had occurred, whilst the municipality however continued to diligently remove trash of the streets to prevent the outbreak of disease and infestations (Romanov, 2023). Due also to the effects and the learning processes that had occurred during the implementation of the decentralisation reform, mayors and local councils increased their exchange and contact each other to identify their most pressing needs and support each other with resources as well as important learnings and know-how gained from their experiences (Romanov, 2023).

3.1.2 The Information War

The war the Russian Federation wages against Ukraine since 2014 however has not been carried out solely on the battlefields on Ukrainian soil, but also in the digital realms, from

cyberattacks to influence operations and mis- and disinformation campaigns. As General Gerasimov, a tank commander by training, put it in his speech, that has since found its way falsely into the mainstream as “The Gerasimov Doctrine” (Galeotti, 2018) , “(...) the role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.” (Galeotti, 2022, p. 167). Prior to the 2022 bans of several Russian disinformation and propaganda channels in the European Union such as *Russia Today* or *Sputnik* (Chee, 2022), these channels would invent and accelerate Russian disinformation campaigns against Ukraine and Ukrainian Volunteers to discredit their efforts of fighting the unlawful Russian invasion, such as the now infamous crucifixion incident, in which Russian propaganda channel *Novaya Gazeta* outright fabricated a faux story of Azov Battalion fighters crucifying a little boy in Slovyansk (Maticzak, 2014). With the beginning of the 2022 full-scale invasion Russian dis- and mis-information efforts started to gain traction again with campaigns spanning a plethora of issues from allegations about the destruction of Nordstream I (Stöcker, 2022), over the impact of Russian theft of Ukrainian agricultural products (Heins, 2022) for the Global South (European External Action Service, 2023), to the downplaying of Russian war crimes both in Ukraine and Syria, as well as other places (Wahlstrom et al., 2022). In their efforts to produce, amplify and spread distorted or even outright false narratives, the Russian Federation employs a diverse mix of artificial and fake accounts, anonymous websites as well as official state media sources (Cadier et al., 2022).

The Ukrainian state has since 2014 adapted to the changing nature of warfare and with the help of allied governments such as Estonia (ERR, 2022), European leaders in digital governance and cyber security (Gaskell, 2017), and private stakeholders such as Microsoft constantly worked on Ukraine’s cybersecurity (Smith, 2022) and efforts to contain mis- and disinformation. Whereas Russia appeared to be an early adopter of cyber warfare with attacks against multiple EU and NATO members such as notably against Estonia in 2007 (Aday et al., 2019), Ukraine has effectively fought off Russian cyber attacks and fights a narrative war in the digital realm as well. Given the emergence of a new, tech-savvy class of politicians surrounding President Zelenskiy, the Ukrainian government has effectively managed to create a synergy between the state and civil

society, catalysing the bottom-up mobilisation that has been taking place in Ukraine (Asmolov, 2022).

When it comes to the realm of digital information warfare, both the state and the civil society in Ukraine have mobilised since 2014. Within short time from February 2014, multiple people with diverse backgrounds in journalism, programming, military, and media business colluded and formed several platforms to counter Russian dis- and misinformation (Teperik, 2018). Within weeks of the initial invasion such groups as *Euromaidan Press*, *InformNapalm*, *FakeControl.org*, *Ukraine Crisis Media Centre*, and *Information Resistance* emerged and have since become an invaluable part of the Ukrainian civil society's resistance against the Russian aggression and the spread of false narratives and hostile disinformation. Organisations that started out as non-profits and crowdfunded developed into trusted sources that produced their own content and simultaneously debunked Russian dis- and misinformation, accessible also to a foreign audience. The *Ukraine Crisis Media Centre* eventually was not only used by volunteers to spread information, but eventually was used by state authorities for strategic communication in the wake of the ATO (Teperik, 2018). *Euromaidan Press* has developed into a respected and credible news agency that has to this day been cited by several news outlets such as the *BBC*, *CNN*, *The Guardian*, *euronews*, and *Forbes Magazine* (Euromaidan Press, 2014). *InformNapalm* publishes information and news on Ukraine and Russia's war against Ukraine in several languages, making it accessible to a wide international audience, and has earned international respect through their OSINT reporting, with several of their analyses being used in PACE and NATO conferences, notably their reporting on the use of high-tech weapons systems "Torn", "Lorandit", and "Infauna" by Russian forces in occupied Donbass (Burko, 2016).

This ongoing development is a remarkable feat of Ukrainian civil society and the journalistic profession in general in a country where the media sector still struggles with corruption and media empires are concentrated within the hands of few industrial oligarchs depending on political favouritism, presenting a major obstacle to the freedom of press (Ryabinska, 2011). Prior to EuroMaidan, the Ukrainian media landscape was partitioned primarily between six groups that were all mainly owned by oligarchs who had made their fortune in the heavy industry or with railway infrastructure: *InterMedia* mainly owned by Dmytro Firtash, *1+1 Media* owned mainly by Ihor Kolomoj'skyj,

MediaGroup Ukraine mainly owned by Rinat Akhmetov, *StarLightMedia* owned by Viktor Pinchuk, *Ukrainian Media Holding* owned primarily by Serhiy Kuchenko (Szostek, 2014), and finally *Kanal 5 TV Channel*, mainly owned by Petro Poroshenko, who would become President in 2014 and remained in his position as the owner despite the conflict of interest (Rybak, 2018). Both Akhmetov and Firtash were sympathetic to Yanukovich and also financially supported his Party of Regions substantially, while the rise of Kurchenko has been attributed mainly to his connections with Yanukovich's son Oleksandr (Levinskii, 2014). Pinchuk is known for being the son-in-law of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma (Szostek, 2014). Szostek (2014) identified three main factors that contributed to the erosion of Presidential control over the media sphere in Ukraine. The dissenting journalistic community (1) had become increasingly aware of the power of social media and independent online platforms and could quickly identify traditional media omitting and deliberately misreporting important information (2). Finally, the oligarchs who held control over the media landscape had become increasingly aware of their public, as well as international reputation (3), and sought to position themselves with the side they figured would emerge successful from the tumultuous developments on EuroMaidan (Szostek, 2014). Following the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in 2022, Akhmetov handed over his media licenses and Poroshenko-owned stations reportedly toned down their criticism of President Zelensky, while Kolomoj'skyi has been described as the key-backer of Zelensky in 2019 (Kutznetsov, 2023).

Another example of how the Ukrainian media landscape has transformed following the events of EuroMaidan and built itself more resilient against Russian aggression as well as oligarch control and corruption is the episode between the *Kyiv Post* and the *Kyiv Independent* only weeks before the full-scale invasion commenced. The independent media outlet *Kyiv Post* was acquired in 2018 by businessman Adnan Kivan, who pledged to keep the editorial independence of the newspaper intact (Myroniuk, 2021). Three years later however, the manager of a local Odesan newspaper also owned by Kivan and clearly editorially influenced by the businessman, announced the launch of a Ukrainian-language outlet under the *Kyiv Post* brand without any prior notice to anyone at the *Kyiv Post* (Myroniuk, 2021). Following opposition by the team at the *Kyiv Post*, primarily the editorial board, Kivan laid off 30 of the journalists and editors, who subsequently went

on to found the English-language media outlet *Kyiv Independent* on November 11, 2021, under the leadership of Olga Rudenko as editor-in-chief after her ten years as editor-in-chief at the *Kyiv Post* (The Kyiv Independent, 2021). To guarantee financial independence from oligarchs or other wealthy individuals, as well as staying clear of outside influence on the editorial decisions, the *Kyiv Independent* announced to operate crowdfunded and run commercials, as well as remain partially owned by the journalists themselves (The Kyiv Independent, 2021).

The full-scale invasion saw an unprecedented public effort to establish channels, platforms, and media resources to spread awareness of the conflict, the situation on the ground, and to counter the massive propaganda effort by the Russian Federation and remain in control of the narrative, as well as document and disseminate evidence of war crimes committed by combatants of the Russian Federation to a national as well as international audience. Most of these efforts again were initiatives of civil society and private business, although the state also put many resources into the cause and to this day tries to support many of the initiatives. Shortly after the full-scale invasion had been launched by the Russian Federation, all major TV channels of Ukraine broadcasted the same content under the name *UA Razom (United News) Marathon* 24 hours a day, with the channels being allocated a slot each daily that would be broadcasted simultaneously on all other channels, organised jointly by the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting, as well as the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (Detector Media, 2022). On March 18, 2022, the initiative was signed into law by Presidential Decree under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to allow a unified information policy (Decree of the President, No. 152/2022, 2022). Simultaneously, on February 27th, the state-operated mobile application *Diia* of the Ministry for Digital Transformation of Ukraine, which allows the citizens of Ukraine to digitally interact with the government, access their documents digitally and many other useful features, started running a radio and TV news channel through the app that allows people to access fact-checked current news about the war free of charge and without connection (Diia, 2022), making it an invaluable tool especially for those citizens who would have to live under the occupation regime of the Russian Federation and were constantly exposed to the propaganda and disinformation of the Russian occupiers.

The *Ukraine War Today* website initiated by the Ukrainian Institute for Remembrance and the Ukrainian Women's Guard presents an interactive map of Russian war crimes as well as a tracker for Russian equipment and personnel losses, a searchable database of the occupying forces, operational information, as well as a digital form to report war crimes (WarToday.Info, 2022).

The *Virtual Museum of Russian Aggression* project serves as a database about the events surrounding EuroMaidan and the subsequent 2014 Russian invasion, together with a chronology of the events and a term and organisations database to help English-speaking foreigners navigate the complex details of the events in order to restore justice and overcome the Russian aggression (The Virtual Museum of Russian Aggression.com, 2021). The initiative was launched by a combination of actors, among them also state agencies such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prosecutor General's office, and the Mission of the President of Ukraine to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Prosecutor's Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Most importantly, the website also features a collection of oral testimonies that especially in the advances in the approaches of oral history in recent years will remain important evidence of the crimes committed by various actors during 2013 and 2014.

The tourism platform *DiscoverUA* and photographer Mykola Omelchenko used their experience and resources to launch their own project called *Війна Впритул – War up close* through which virtual tours to the scenes of Russian war crimes committed against Ukrainians and Ukraine such as Bucha or Mariupol are accessible to a general audience, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Emergency Service, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (War up Close.com, 2022). The collection is extensive, complete with photographic and drone-videographic evidence and a collection of 3D-models of destroyed and damaged buildings such as the historic library in Chernihiv that was destroyed by the Russian forces using a 500-kilogram high-explosive bomb on March 11, 2022.

Founded and run mainly by a group of women on February 27th, 2022 and subsequently supported by the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, the *Dattalion – Ukraine's Data Battalion* project serves as the largest free and independent open-source database of

photo and video footage and database for verified eyewitness accounts of Russian war crimes, providing footage to international media and even arranging expert and witness interviews upon request to document and spread the truth about Russia's invasion of Ukraine and make it accessible to a large international audience (Dattalion.com, 2022).

While there's multiple other platforms with a similar purpose, such as the by category database of war crimes *RussiasWarCrimes.ua* or the multimedia and downloadable collection of photo and video evidence of Russian aggression under *war-evidence.mkip.ua*, the mosaic of platforms and volunteer initiatives in the online space is enormous and also takes up many other cultural spaces, such as the project *Mucmeymbo nepemozu – Victory Art*, that allows users to upload their own artwork and contribute to an increasing database of murals, posters, illustrations, paintings, caricatures, and even memes. This platform, as well as the *War Art Collection* that includes poems and other pieces of writing and song, fulfils three separate functions. First and foremost, the capacity of art and creating artwork to help people overcome and deal with trauma has been recognised (Lobban& Murphy, 2018), and the capacity to create and share art with others through these projects is a way of overcoming and trying to cope with the trauma and constant stress of the Russian invasion. Secondly, the availability of these artworks still serves a similar purpose as the previously mentioned photos and videos, being a testament to the Russian aggression against Ukraine and helping to spread awareness of the brutality to a wider, international audience, as visual art can mostly be understood by easily avoiding language barriers. Finally, as the Russian leadership tries to uphold the lie of the unique brotherhood between Russians and Ukrainians, and claiming that Ukraine possesses neither a singular history, nationhood, or culture separate from Russia (Perrigo, 2022); creating distinctively Ukrainian art that depicts and deals with the unique Ukrainian experience of the Russian full-scale invasion of 2022, reinforces the ideas of exactly that unique history, statehood, and culture and defies the efforts of Putin and many others before him to erase it.

3.1.3 A Holy War

As is the case in many conflicts around the world, religion plays a role within the Russian aggression against Ukraine and topics of belief and confession heavily play into some of the narratives employed, as well as the operations on the ground. As of 2022, according

to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 72% of people in Ukraine identify themselves as Orthodox, 10% as atheists, and 8% as Greek Catholics (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2022). Of these 72% of people identifying as Orthodox Christians however, there is a divide between 54% claiming to be specifically identifying themselves as members of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and only 4% claiming to identify as member of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, a stark reduction from the 18% who claimed so the previous year before Russia's full-scale invasion (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2022). According to the report, the rest identifies as Orthodox without making reference to a specific patriarchate. These developments are remnants of the centuries long struggle and efforts by Moscow to subjugate Kyiv and the Ukrainian people and erasing their distinct culture, as well as their nationhood.

Religion has been wielded as a tool for colonisation and conquest for hundreds of years by Moscow, which understands itself as the successor to Byzantium, and reimagined itself as the Third Rome, a new Jerusalem, and the only true successor of the Byzantine empire, making it the only Orthodox empire in the world, since the early sixteenth century (Plokhy, 2018, p. 20-24). In 1598, Moscow was self-declared the seat of its own Orthodox patriarchate, which in a spiritual sense was the junior of the much longer established patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, but nonetheless wielded much more real power as it was both the largest and the richest patriarchate, with its real power stemming from the tsar (Plokhy, 2018, p.25). As the dictum of Iosif Volotskiy, which would later be canonised by the Russian Orthodox Church, claims, the tsar was apparently "man in essence but his power is that of God" (Goldfrank, 1975). Muscovy claimed to fight its wars with the Catholic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the seventeenth century in order to save and later rehabilitate the Orthodox believers of Belarus and Ukraine (Plokhy, 2018, p. 35), although it took the Russian Orthodox Church until 1686 to acquire the authority to appoint the metropolitans of Kyiv (Sherr& Kullamaa, 2019, p. 9).

It would take however until Tsar Peter I (The Great) to turn the Russian Orthodox Church into a state department by replacing the Patriarchate with a Holy Synod in 1721, while simultaneously proclaiming the establishment of a Russian Empire, which would be continued under Catherine II (The Great), and summarised by Nicholas I.'s court ideologist and minister of education Sergey Uvarov in the quasi-mystical triad

“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nation”, as brilliantly explained by Sherr and Kullamaa (Sherr& Kullamaa, 2019).

Following the Soviet Century, in which it was heavily infiltrated by the KGB and acting in the state’s interest (Popescu, Liik, Metodiev, 2019), the Russian Orthodox Church emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union, and in January 1992, then Metropolitan Kiril, who today is the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church since 2009, spoke at a convention of military commanders. In his speech, Kiril presented Church, army, and state authority as the pillars of the Russian motherland, that were transcending the Imperial, Soviet, and democratic constitutions of Russia, as well as invoking the historical communion of the “Slavs who were christened in the common baptism of Kiev”, making explicit reference to the unity of Russians and Ukrainians (and Belarusians) (Sherr& Kullamaa, 2019, p.4-5). This is the exact language and ideas that would only two decades later be used by Russian President Putin and the government to justify the initial invasion and occupation of Crimea, and the subsequent full-scale invasion in 2022 under the pretext of unifying a partitioned people, whose bounds transcend the imaginary nature of and so-called lie of Ukrainian state- and nationhood, as expressed by Putin in his speech on February 22, 2022, just prior to the full-scale invasion.

The idea of *russkiy mir*, meaning, depending on the interpretation, Russian world or Russian community, invokes these ideas of a shared Russian identity of those Eastern-Slavic people living in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other former parts of the empire such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or Moldova alike, transcending national borders, being rooted in a shared ethno-cultural community (Zabirko, 2018). It even found its way into the founding documents of the sham republics set up by the Russian forces and their proxies in occupied Donetsk, in the preamble of a document that should serve as a “constitution” to the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic/ DPR” (Zabirko, 2018). The remarkable difference to other such projects of similar transnational character, such as *Francophonie* or the *Commonwealth of Nations*, is the explicit role of religion and the Russian Orthodox Church, marking the territory of the *russkiy mir* as a sacral and Christian space, which makes the precise geographical boundaries of the space a contested idea that is being transcended by the concept of the sacral and *Holy Rus*. Since its inception, this holy concept has served as the Russian antitheses to the decaying and morale free West (-ern Europe), and the legitimising essence of this idea fits seamlessly

into modern Russia's anti-European propaganda with a self-understanding of the *russskiy mir* as the last bastion of Christianity and pureness against moral decay and "Gay-rope" (Zabirko, 2018). In 2018, Patriarch Kiril was found joining the *collegium*, a sort of advisory board for the Russian Ministry of Defence and certainly an institution more concerned with matters of geopolitics and military than with spirituality and belief, similar to the quite unspiritual act of blessing missiles destined for Syria and Crimea, as Russian Orthodox Priests occasionally have done (Popescu, Liik, Metodiev, 2019).

This self-understanding of the Russian aggressor led to a twisted reality in which Russian President Putin compared Russian soldiers to martyrs, and more quasi-religious language found its way into official Kremlin communication, including references of the so-called "special military operation" as a holy war, Ukrainians and the collective West as demons, President Zelenskiy as the devil, and finally also the emergence of a new religion in Ukraine -*Ukrainism*- that were to be a mixture of neo-paganistic Satanism, exoteric Nazism and a dash of Viking Culture (Siegień, 2023).

Shortly before Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, the Russian Orthodox Church created an autonomous branch, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, which took over many parishes and territory from the Russian Orthodox Church (Derkach, 2023). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, submissive to the demands and on line with the ideas of Moscow and the new *russskiy mir* project, were the only church in Ukraine to oppose the events of Euromaidan, and presented itself as the vanguard of pro-Russian demonstrators and encouraged their parishioners to join the fights on the pro-Russian side, or even saw sacristans joining in themselves, sometimes working as FSB detachments (Butusov, 2016) or as personal security details for Igor Girkin, who served as the Defence Minister of the "DPR" (Girkin, 2018).

Even though relations between the Kyiv and the Moscow Patriarchates were severely strained since the events of 2014, Moscow's last minute declining of attending the Pan Orthodox Church Council in Crete 2016 due to the placing of discussions surrounding the autocephaly of the Kyiv Patriarchate on the agenda had severe consequences in the form of the convening of a synod by the Ecumenical Patriarch on October 11, 2018, that decided to reestablish Constantiople's jurisdiction over Kyiv and then proceeding with

the *tomos* (Sherr& Kullamaa, 2019) that was finalised in 2019 and granted Ukraine its own official and recognised Orthodox Church, opposed only by the Russian Orthodox Church on the grounds of the apparently “schismatic” nature of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The political reactions to the start of the *tomos* were extreme, as Russian President Putin specially convened a Security Council meeting, while his spokesman Dmitry Peskov reaffirmed the defence of Russians, Russian speakers and the Russian Orthodox, and Foreign Minister Lavrov declaring the *tomos* a provocation with support from Washington (Sherr& Kullamaa, 2019). Similarly extreme were the words used by Patriarch Kiril in conversation with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartolomew, in a meeting in 2018 shortly before the granting of the independent status of the Ukrainian orthodox Church, where Kiril threatened that autocephaly granted for Ukraine meant the unavoidable spilling of blood (Popescu, Liik, Metodiev, 2019).

Bartolomew justified the granting of autocephaly amongst other reasons by claiming that not only the 40 million strong parishes and church authorities had requested autocephaly, but also the President of Ukraine, Poroshenko in 2018, as well as the Parliament, and the project therefore enjoyed wide-scale support (Popescu, Liik, Metodiev, 2019).

Popescu, Liik, and Metodiev (2019) argue that the importance of the establishment of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church lays in the role of the Church in mainly Central- and Eastern European countries as the bearer of national identity (e.g. the Catholic Church in Poland or the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria) and guardian of national consciousness, creating a community with immense soft power, explaining that the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church marks an important step into the becoming of a Ukrainian nation-state independent from Russia. In extension, this process is part of the Ukrainian society’s rejection of becoming part of the *russskiy mir* project by declining the claim that the spiritual and sacral character of the *russskiy mir* would be transcending national borders as a much older and powerful source of community. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church functions as a sort of antitheses to the Moscow Patriarchate’s enlisting as an obedient supporter of the Russian Federation’s hybrid war and supporters of insurgency in an attempt to further and foster the *russskiy*

mir project, the employment of the church and its personnel as ideologists, propagandists, and even fighters in the *russkiy mir*.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, attitudes towards the Moscow Patriarchate have changed even more extreme, and the state in coordination with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has taken several steps to contain the threats to the security of Ukraine by the Moscow Patriarchate. Shortly after the full-scale invasion, 15 dioceses severed their ecumenical ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and around 100 clergymen left the Moscow Patriarchate, however, others were quite outspoken about their support for the invasion such as Metropolitan Yelisey of Izyum, Metropolitan Iosif of Romny and Buryn, and Archbishop Arkady of Rovenky (Rogoża, 2023). While the Moscow Patriarchate has officially severed ties with the Russian Orthodox Church in May 2022 over the unprovoked invasion, several investigations and raids by combined security services of Ukraine such as on November 22, 2022, of around 350 facilities of the Moscow Patriarchate brought to light numerous pro-Russian publications and instructions for pro-Russian sermons, more than US\$ 150.000 in cash, Russian passports, propaganda material, and photocopies of the IDs of Russians who took part of the hostilities against the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Query, 2022). Other investigations found clergymen of the Moscow Patriarchate collecting intelligence for the Russian Federal Security Service and adjusting enemy fire (Derkach, 2023).

The most public dimension of this struggle between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian state however is the most recent episode of eviction of the Moscow Patriarchate from the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, one of the oldest Orthodox shrines in Ukraine and a massive monastery complex that has been added to the UNESCO World Heritage sites in 1994. The monastery complex had been leased by the Moscow Patriarchate from the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, which however terminated the lease with a deadline on March 29, 2023, following government audits into irregular activities aimed primarily against the abbot Metropolitan Pavlo (Rogoża, 2023). In order to avoid a more physical confrontation with the inhabitants of the Lavra, mainly monks, the Ukrainian government chose to end the lease contract and proceed by law rather than police action, which led to several of the institutions and monks present in the Lavra complying. The Metropolitan however refused to leave and since then had been placed under house arrest (Rogoża, 2023).

While freedom of religion is of course guaranteed both through international, as well as national law of Ukraine, and clergy and followers of Orthodox Christianity are not subject to persecution on the grounds of their religious affiliation, the Ukrainian government follows the desire of most Ukrainian Orthodox parishioners and actively seeks to decouple the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as minimise security risks and threats to the social cohesion of the social fabric of Ukraine as a nation, by keeping a close eye on the activities of the Moscow Patriarchate and limiting its secular and political influence within Ukraine.

Chapter 4

4.1 Discussion

Returning to the research question of whether a resilient civil society can substitute for the state within the concept of security using the case studies from Ukraine between 2013 and the ongoing war of aggression by the Russian Federation waged against Ukraine, the previous three dimensions of societal resistance by a resilient civil society may provide fuel for the discussion of the matter.

First, the Ukrainian civil society must be established as resilient in order to become a relevant object for the pursuit of properly impacting the concept of security as established before. Throughout the events of EuroMaidan, Ukrainian civil society through its capability to mobilise thousands of people in an effort to drive out the government of President Viktor Yanukovich, has resisted the outside pressure of the Kremlin that the Yanukovich government itself was not able to resist. The organising and mobilising of multiple, diverse groups who provided not only physical protection but a variety of services from legal aid to civic education, help for detainees, and a growing information space in the first weeks of the Euromaidan shows a capability to absorb external shocks and adapt to evolving threats. The capabilities of the Ukrainian civil society to deal with and adapt to even growing external shocks and disasters has been proven through the continuous fight the Ukrainian people put up against a foe that has much larger material and human capabilities to wage a traditional war of aggression, as well as a hybrid war. The evolving of the *sotnya* defence groups, who were founded in an effort to protect democratic protesters exercising their constitutional right to protest from the police

brutality of evidently pro-Russian Berkut and other police forces in late 2013, into volunteer brigades that defended their native Ukraine from Russian funded and trained troops, as well as regular Russian Armed Forces in 2014, into the incorporation of many of those troops into a reformed system of security forces within a Ukrainian state that has since improved democratic oversight over its Armed Forces and continues with success to organise themselves after a system of volunteering into Territorial Defence Battalions, into a force that has repelled and taken back large amounts of territory from the Russian occupiers since 2022 is a remarkable showcasing of the ability of Ukrainian civil society to not only absorb external shocks, but to constantly adapt, learn, reduce threats, and strengthen democratic inclusiveness. The increase in the diverse composition of the volunteer troops, especially the Territorial Defence Forces, may it be in the dimensions of gender, language-affinity, geographical dispersion, or minority group membership, is testament to shared ideas and values, emphasising the importance of democratic development and inclusion, as well as showcasing the importance of cohesion on multiple levels, not only national, but also regional and local.

After the dismal state the Armed Forces of Ukraine found themselves in during the beginning of the initial invasion of 2014, unable and unwilling to react, the massive incorporation of volunteers into the ranks of the National Guard and Territorial Defence Forces meant a strengthening not only of the forces in fire- and manpower, but rather a strengthening of the forces through members motivated by the desire to defend their way of life and their recently acquired independence rather than simply for payment, more democratic decision making, and supported by the majority of the Ukrainian population, both in spirit and through the provision of much needed material. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, not only through these developments, became a fighting force that today carries out missions to the highest NATO standards and managed to not only defend the Ukrainian capital and much of the country from the materially superior Russian Federation, but to even actively drive back the enemy forces and liberate occupied territory. The Ukrainian state realised the immense power that the trust in the volunteer movement by the civil society had and quickly began to integrate these naturally grown structures into their policy. A positive net effect of this development can be observed even in policies that on the surface don't necessarily correspond to matters of national security, such as the previously discussed decentralisation reform, that strengthened both the

organisation of the Territorial Defence Forces, as well as the democratic accountability and resilience of the people in the newly amalgamated oblasts, making use of their democratic right to protest and continuing to do so even under the hardship of Russian occupation.

The efforts of many civil volunteers to provide the volunteers in the Armed Forces, as well as the regular Armed Forces of Ukraine, with material much needed when the state could not provide it is demonstrated collaboration and the quite niche specialisations that several volunteers have found themselves in, such as providing drone equipment or specific night-vision equipment shows the ability to identify critical needs of those on the frontlines, problem-awareness, and a continuous process of adaptation and learning to optimise positive outcomes. While not fully operational and at the height of its capacity, the system of the Territorial Defence Battalions adopted by the state after the self-organisation of Ukrainian volunteers in 2014, arguably provided a necessary degree of preparedness against the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation, with Territorial Defence Forces putting up fierce resistance and running successful operations in the face of a much more numerous aggressors. The preparedness did arguably suffer through the reform and the set-up of the Territorial Defence Forces not being completed as of the start of the Russian full-scale invasion, however, the successful activities of various partisan networks still operating in the currently and previously occupied territories hints again at a certain level of preparedness, as well as again the societies capability to adapt and respond to external shocks.

Mayors and city councils of occupied cities keeping systems of trash collection, water, and electricity running while simultaneously declaring their political allegiance to the Ukrainian nation and the state demonstrate the ability to at least momentarily maintain critical services operational through local and national collaboration, while emphasising the importance of democracy. Equally emphasising the importance of democracy are those Ukrainian citizens who even under Russian occupation came out to demonstrate and proclaim their allegiance with the Ukrainian nation and state such as for example in the temporarily occupied city of Kherson.

The multitude of independent news agencies and online platforms publishing information and evidence of war crimes committed by combatants of the Russian Federation,

accessible to an international audience emphasises the democratic nature of Ukrainian civil society that, even in a mediascape dominated by an oligarchic class intertwined with the highest political offices, seeks to establish institutions that operate according to highest journalistic standards and apply checks and balances to the national environment. Simultaneously these independent institutions find themselves at the forefront of the information war, learning throughout the years how to not only identify, but dispel Russian mis- and disinformation, effectively counter it, and document and disseminate the crimes actually committed by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. For the information sphere, the functioning of critical and independent media is an essential entity, and the Ukrainian civil society has grown confident into establishing their own institutions in the face of extreme adversary both by external actors or even by internal actors such as rich businessman and the oligarchic class, as the episode surrounding the founding of the *Kyiv Independent* showed. While Ukrainian civil society is still fighting an uphill battle against the propaganda machinery and the troll farms of the Russian Federation (Kao& Silverman, 2022), the multiple diverse efforts to document and share the war crimes committed by combatants of the Russian Federation through different ways from photo evidence, 3D-models, and oral testimony to OSINT reports documenting the presence of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine from the beginning of the war in 2014, the narrative of the war appears to be changing or at least not being dominated solely by the fog of war and obfuscation that the Russian propaganda actively spread throughout the last years. Despite severe problems with democratic oversight, until now even the oligarchic media-owners appear to have also felt the need to collaborate at a national level and supported the state by means such as the 24-hour tele marathon from the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The Ukrainian state appears to try and support most initiatives by the civil society through their Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, as well as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The possibility to cope with trauma and the experience of war, destruction, and death by creating and sharing art online through other platforms initiated by the Ukrainian civil society while simultaneously providing a possibility to showcase the unique character of Ukrainian art and thus break the Russian narrative of a common, russified culture shows the immense diversity of the initiatives and the multifaceted approaches to cope with external shock and recover from disaster.

That the Ukrainian Civil Society can arguably be described as resilient is also proven by the largest national community of people within Ukraine that exceeds the state, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, who struggled and ultimately managed to separate from the Moscow Patriarchate and thus in consequence from the Russian Orthodox Church and the border-transcending idea of the *russskiy mir*. Despite sharing the same spiritual belief, the harmful impact for the security of the Ukrainian community by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church was identified and mitigated by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its parishioners, absorbing the initial shock of the Moscow Patriarchate supporting the 2014 invasion and instead building a more democratically coherent institution that does not propagate the image of a sacral *russskiy mir* that is in opposition to the “West” with liberal and democratic values. That is not to say that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is the pinnacle of liberalism and tolerance, but it showcases that civil society in Ukraine seeks to build its own institutions in opposition to the illiberal Russian counterparts. In this effort, it has been supported substantially by the Ukrainian state at least since the 2018 letter of support by then President Poroshenko. As the church is not a critical entity per se if speaking in terms of national security such as the electricity grid or water works, it nonetheless provides a critical service for many severely affected mentally by the shock and the trauma of the Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church allows for millions of people to take up this service without risking being exposed to Russian propaganda or other influences of the hybrid war waged by the Russian Federation through its own Orthodox Church.

Considering the above mentioned aspects, it would be justified to ascribe the label of resilient to the Ukrainian civil society, as it has proven continuously and through a multi-dimensional approach, that since the beginning of EuroMaidan until the current struggle against the full-scale Russian invasion, the civil society has absorbed the external shocks it was subjected to by the Russian Federation, mitigated some of its effects, learned how to adapt and overcome the multiple domains in which the Russian Federation has waged its relentless war of destruction against it (such as the physical, the cyber, and the cultural space), and finally build back better institutions and organisations under democratic oversight and a system of checks and balances.

Regarding the substitutability of the state by this resilient civil society, multiple aspects have to be considered. Within the concept of security as defined previously, pertaining to

the absence of threats to acquired values including political independence and territorial integrity, psychological qualities such as the absence of fear and the perception of safety, freedom and economic stability; the state especially is involved in the protection of the core values, the allocation of resources, and the pursuit of policy through institutions and governance. Security however also perceives the citizen also as an entity that must be protected not only by the state but from the state alike.

While democratic states have checks and balances guaranteed in their constitutional rights, as does Ukraine, a resilient society may serve as an additional layer against the corruption and misuse of democratic offices, as happened in Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity. As Czech statesman and opponent of the Soviet occupation and its puppet regime in Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, already wrote in his famous 1979 work *The Power of the Powerless*, “The key to a humane, dignified, rich and happy life does not lie either in the constitution or in the criminal code. These merely establish what may or may not be done and, thus, they can make life easier or more difficult. They limit or permit, they punish, tolerate, or defend, but they can never give life substance or meaning” (Havel, “The Power of the Powerless”, 2018, p.111). And in a similar credo as Havel’s, the Ukrainian people acted according to their sense of freedom, democracy, and ultimately dignity in 2013. While pre-Maidan Ukraine was certainly not a perfect and transparent democracy, and still is not, the citizens of Ukraine struggled for democratic values in opposition to the Kremlin-obedient ruling class of oligarchs and defended themselves from excessive amounts of police brutality by organising themselves in the *sotnya*, finding their niches relatively quickly, and finally ousting President Yanukovich. The subsequent external shock of the invasion that followed in 2014 left the state institutions such as the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a state of paralysis. It was through the efforts of the volunteer brigades, often assembled and organised already through the *sotnya* or other social groups such as football fan clubs, that the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state and the freedom of most of its inhabitants was guaranteed. The organised civil society led the charge against the Russian invaders and the Ukrainian state institutions only then followed suit, declared the Anti-Terror operation, and started to integrate the volunteer units into the Armed Forces.

While the full restoration of the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state could not be achieved during the Anti-Terror operation when the Russian forces overtly intervened

such as in Illovoysk, the volunteer brigades halted the Russian charge and managed to protect most of the territory and inhabitant of Ukraine. The reforms of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that were pursued after 2014 are partly based on the experience of the volunteer brigades and saw their incorporation into the Armed Forces, making for an arguably more pluralistic and diverse force. The inclusion of many women for example saw the State institutions catering more to the demand of women in the Armed Forces and issue uniforms tailored specifically for female proportions. Simultaneously, the experience of local volunteers willing to take up arms to defend their home led to the subsequent organisation of the Territorial Defence Forces which serve to this day as a guarantor for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, again a more diverse force based on democratic principles operating in a local context, organised according to the decentralisation reform, that in turn again allows for more democratic participation of the citizens of Ukraine. Through the Territorial Defence Forces, Ukraine was arguably better prepared for the shock of the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion and has been able to partially repel the attack and liberate large swathes of territory and cities. The main brunt of the fighting is of course done by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but the volunteer spirit of taking initiative in early 2014 led to the subsequent restructuring of the Armed Forces and the general defence policies of Ukraine being better equipped to deal with the renewed Russian aggression in 2022.

While the majority of funding for the Armed Forces of Ukraine comes from the state budget and outside assistance, the value of civil volunteers must not be underestimated, especially in providing the Ukrainian fighters with specialised material such as drones or night vision, making them better adapted to 21st Century warfare. Given the niche many civil volunteers found in procurement and production of specialised material and supplies, as well as the local context in which most volunteers operate, volunteer help often reaches the units fast and with the exact needs fulfilled.

By setting up and operating several different independent and transparent media sites such as *Euro Mайдan News* or *InformNapalm*, the Ukrainian civil society guaranteed that no matter the Russian influence onto the oligarchic media-owners within Ukraine, the publication and dissemination of real news rather than Russian dis- and misinformation would be guaranteed even without the state. Political independence, as well as freedom of thought, are two aspects of security that the Ukrainian civil society has been able to

provide since the beginning of EuroMaidan through these independent media outlets. The efforts of volunteers have later even found support by the government of many such projects and has arguably inspired government initiatives such as the *Diia* app news channel as the worth of independent and reliable news is linked to the political independence of Ukraine. The effort of documenting and publishing evidence of war crimes committed by combatants of the Russian Federation of course is also the task of the state, however, the many projects and initiatives by the Ukrainian civil society allow for a multidimensional approach and showcase that accountability for the crimes can be guaranteed even if the state should fail.

Finally, with the policy of independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its millions of parishioners have acted in a way that seeks to reclaim political independence from Moscow, territorial integrity by evicting the Moscow Patriarchate from the territory of Ukraine, and through their spiritual support can partly help in alleviating fears of the parishioners. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has initiated the process that has led to government policy trying to limit the threat emanating from the Moscow Patriarchate since 2018, with a notable uptick since the beginning of the full-scale invasion given the more serious threats to security emanating from the Moscow Patriarchate that go beyond spreading propaganda to adjusting fire for the Russian Armed Forces.

With these different cases of civil society claiming the role of the state and leading the way for the state to follow, be it in feasible action such as organising volunteer battalions or a general policy direction such as establishing an independent church, it can be argued that civil society indeed can substitute for the state within the concept of security for a while. However, given that in a functioning state the monopoly over violence lays with the state, the volunteer forces had to be quickly integrated into state structures and have arguably contributed to the improvement of the general capabilities and force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is within the domain of the information war that independent, civil society-organised institutions are most independent from the state and continue to work effectively and according to the highest journalistic standards, substituting for the state in matters such as crisis communication and at least paralleling it in the collection, documentation, and dissemination of evidence of war crimes.

To provide an answer for the initial research question whether a resilient civil society can substitute for the state within the concept of security, the analysis has show that a resilient civil society is at least partially capable of substituting for the state in a diverse range of fields over a short time, and more often than not paves the way for the state to follow and then take over, adapting the structures and mechanisms of the civil society and thus in turn also becoming a changed entity, better equipped and adapted to deal with external shock. The state itself has arguably become resilient. Thus, if we understand security as the absence of threats to acquired values, such as territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty, as well as a psychological quality, encompassing the absence of fear and the perception of safety; the feeling of protection and the assurance of reliable conditions that allow individuals to live without constant threat or disruption, acquired through the allocation of resources and the pursuit of policy options; the state is not a necessity in this conceptualisation but rather a variable. The volunteer efforts of the Ukrainian people show that resilience within the concept of security is not the certainty of the absence of threat, but the certainty to overcome the threat. Perhaps, as the institution with most resources to allocate and the monopoly over law-making processes and violence, the state has the largest capacity to provide security for citizens, however it is neither the sole provider of security, nor irreplaceable.

This substitutability per se is neither negative nor positive, it is simply an aspect of the concept of security. It is not the aim of this work to establish whether to consider it an outsourcing of security matters by the state to save on costs, efforts, and accountability or rather the emancipation of a democratic society. For the case of Ukraine, there is an important debate to still be had whether the phenomenon of volunteering is the result of people trying to serve a population that may have been neglected to the extent of death otherwise; or whether it is a critique of the state through filling the gaps it left in many areas; the expression of a vision of a future free of war and in critical, democratic interaction with the state by the Maidan generation (Channell-Justice, 2019, p. 223-225); or something different entirely.

Conclusion

Throughout human history, security has been defined and redefined, and renewed experiences continuously add on to the conceptualisation of security. As war and other catastrophes unfortunately continue to persist on our planet and impact human life severely, it is crucial that we constantly improve and maintain our understanding of the dynamics of security and how to cope with threats to it.

It is hard to overstate the significance of a resilient civil society in the context of modern security challenges. The Ukrainian example offers valuable lessons that extend beyond the immediate crisis it faced. In an era marked by rapidly evolving threats, global interconnectivity, and the growing unpredictability of international relations, the role of civil society in enhancing security should not be underestimated.

The unprovoked, illegal war of aggression that the Russian Federation has been waging against Ukraine and the people of Ukraine has made it clear that even in the 21st Century the threat of war and armed aggression is not only a thought-experience or a topic of debate, but a harsh reality that we are facing to this day. Simultaneously, the people of Ukraine have managed to defy the Russian aggression to an extent that may serve as an example of how to cope with catastrophe and threats to security in a manner that allows for the absorption of shock, the adaption, and the subsequent rebuilding. The examples provided by the Ukrainian people from the first groups self-organised on the Maidan square in the late months of 2013, to the reformed Armed Forces of Ukraine and the civil society supporting them in their fight against the Russian aggressor in 2023, showcase the importance of a resilient civil society and the place it can inhabit within the concept of security. Acknowledging the adaptability and determination of the Ukrainian people as a source of inspiration for future policy might be the first step to approach security discourse. Their ability to organise and mobilise demonstrates that a resilient civil society can act as a buffer against external aggression. It is essential to recognise that this resilience did not emerge overnight; but rather was the product of years of civic engagement, social cohesion, and a shared commitment to safeguarding their nation's sovereignty.

Moreover, the Ukrainian experience challenges conventional wisdom regarding the state's monopoly on security provision. While states remain crucial actors in maintaining security, they are not the sole entities responsible for the safety and well-being of their

citizens. The Ukrainian case exemplifies that a resilient civil society can complement state efforts, filling gaps and providing critical support during times of crisis.

That the state can be replaced by a resilient society allows for a new angle to consider security on many levels, from a local to a supranational level, and is certainly not limited to the fields of war and military. From the concepts of individual and communal resilience up to deterrence and defence of a military alliance such as NATO, a resilient civil society can find a niche and cover fields of action that other actors may simply not be prepared to, or lack the means, willingness, or creativity to do so.

This perspective becomes increasingly relevant in the face of a rapidly changing global landscape. Climate change, economic volatility, and the proliferation of hybrid threats require an approach to security that can be considered holistic. A resilient civil society has the capacity to play a pivotal role in responding to a multiplicity of challenges. Its capacity to absorb shocks, adapt to new circumstances, and engage in proactive problem-solving offers a valuable resource for states striving to enhance their security in an uncertain world.

Circling back to the statement made by President Zelenskiy, in the sense of *Sicherheitsgefühl*, the capacity of the Ukrainian civil society that it has showcased in the face of Russian aggression is certainly an important factor in Ukraine's struggle for security, and perhaps those in Europe that seek to attain security for themselves today might take a more severe interest in the concept of a resilient civil society.

For policymakers, trying to understand the mechanics and the importance of the effects of a resilient civil society onto the concept of security might be a worthwhile consideration when faced with an ever-increasing complexity of the threats states are subjected to. Understanding the mechanisms behind a resilient civil society's impact on security is paramount. A multidisciplinary approach that combines insights from political science, sociology, psychology, and international relations is crucial to attain this goal. Empirical research is essential to uncover the intricate mechanisms at play and identify best practices to foster resilience within societies.

International organisations and alliances such as NATO might find it useful to recognise the strategic importance of resilient civil societies within its member states. A strong civil

society can serve as a deterrent against potential aggressors, signalling a nation's capacity to withstand external shocks and demonstrating a collective commitment to security.

Resilience against dis- and misinformation, against hostile narratives, against social disruption are important factors to be prepared for in a day and age in which states wage hybrid wars against each other and seek to destabilise one another through such covert actions. In the digital age, hostile narratives and dis- and misinformation pose a severe threat to both national, as well as international, security and deserve policymakers' attention. Civil society can act as a vanguard against these hostile influences, promoting critical thinking, media literacy, and fact-checking initiatives, as for example the Ukrainian initiative *Minzmin* provides through online safety courses and media literacy programs for children, parents, and educational institutions (MINZMIN, 2019). By nurturing these capacities, societies can better protect themselves against the destabilising effects of propaganda and misinformation campaigns.

Given that this piece of writing deals mainly with questions pertaining to the conceptualisation of security and resilience, there is certainly much more work to be done to establish empirical evidence of the mechanics and processes that led to the resilience of the Ukrainian civil society and on the effects of Ukraine's capacity to wage a defensive struggle against the Russian Federation. The topic offers such diverse angles for researchers to grasp it and develop useful strategies that it is certainly still at the beginning of its development.

Following this research, there are plenty of directions to pursue from the basis of this conceptualisation with a multitude of certainly interesting questions themselves. The sources of resilience in Ukraine are not yet fully explored, and neither is the possibility of how to transfer the knowledge gained into policy in other states, may they be post-Soviet or not. Another strain of research may well deal with the exploration of the democratic mechanisms behind resilience in security, and whether it is a mere phenomenon in democratic societies or whether other forms of government may also coexist or produce a resilient society. While research into societal resilience is already a prominent discourse in the Baltic states and others on the Eastern Flank of NATO, other partners might benefit from learning from the Ukrainian example as well, not only in terms of military threat, but also in the realm of civil protection. Whether strengthening

resilience rather than deterrence might be a credible response to conflict points on this globe that appear to be heating up, particularly in the struggle for Taiwanese independence between the People's Republic of China, The USA, and Taiwan, is another aspect that deserves further exploration. Other fields in the resilience domain are also still less explored in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine, such as psychological resilience in both combatants as well as civilians in Ukraine; or ecological resilience of the environmental space that has suffered immensely through the Russian aggression in the form of mines, incendiary ammunition, artillery, plutonium-depleted ammunition, and the catastrophe that is the deliberate explosion of the Kakhovka dam by the Russian Federation.

In conclusion, the Ukrainian experience underscores the indispensable role of a resilient civil society in modern security paradigms. It challenges traditional notions of state-centric security and calls for a broader, more inclusive approach. Policymakers and researchers must further explore the mechanisms that underscore societal resilience and its impact on security outcomes. By doing so, it will be possible develop more effective strategies to confront the complex and ever-evolving challenges facing our world today, ensuring a safer and more secure future for all.

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