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Displacement and Assimilation: Forced Migrations and Russification of Ukrainians from 1930 until 2023

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Acknowledgements

У всіх, навіть найважчих умовах,

Ви збережіть свою українську душу і вірте в нашу перемогу.

(Автор невідомий)

To all Ukrainians, indebted to the Armed Forces of Ukraine for being alive

Thanks to the bravery of each Ukrainian soldier, my family, friends, and I are still alive and can proudly call ourselves Ukrainians. I am immensely grateful for having my home free and independent. I hope that soon, every Ukrainian will have their home liberated.

To all the deceased Ukrainians, victims of years of oppression, assimilation, and brutal violence by Russians.

This thesis covers a broad range of years, reflecting the Ukrainian struggle for independence. Being alive and well today, I feel obligated to continue learning and discovering the fates of those who did not survive Russian oppression.

While I can study, work, and graduate in 2023, not everyone will have that opportunity. Hence, I dedicate this thesis and my graduation to those young Ukrainian students who, unfortunately, will not be able to write their theses or receive their long-awaited diplomas.

To those who supported me on this journey.

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Last but not least, I am thankful to my family: my mom, dad, and sister, who bravely remained in Ukraine during the full-scale invasion to support our family and friends, and to Petro, who joined the Ukrainian Army to protect our homeland. Я вас дуже люблю, і вдячна за вашу підтримку!

Слава Україні! Героям Слава!

Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!

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Abstract

The topic of the russification of Ukrainians is explored from various angles, however, there is limited coverage of the nexus between displacement and assimilation in the context of forced migrations and russification of Ukrainians. The imperialistic ideology which guided Russia throughout the history of its statehood resulted in the implementation of various assimilation strategies. In this thesis, I will focus on Ukraine and the implications of russification policies in the context of forced migration in the period from 1930 until 2023.

Starting with Soviet times, I will present the mechanisms of forced migrations and tools of russification implemented by the communist government. I argue that apart from the ethnic cleansings aimed at identity erasure, other types of forced migrations were also tightly connected to russification. Therefore, various deportees and their families, especially minors, were targeted by the various assimilation and russification strategies, which are analysed in the contexts of language, education, religion, and identity.

Nowadays, similar mechanisms of russification are applied by the Russian Federation not only on its territory, but also on the occupied Ukrainian lands: Crimea, Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. Therefore, I argue that Russia by using similar mechanisms of deportations and russification continues the assimilation policies of the Soviet regime, and as a result, Ukrainians "disappear".

Introduction

The beginning of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022, a war which started in 2014 with the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, has boosted numerous research in history, political studies, international relations, sociology, and many other fields. One of the main academic interests is the development of the relations between Ukraine and Russia throughout history. The ongoing debate on the dynamic between the two countries facilitates important questions such as whether Ukraine can be considered a Russian/Soviet colony, whether Russia is an Empire which developed and grew in various forms and contexts since the times of the Tsarist Empire and many other questions. Different aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian historical interconnection are equally important and help understand today's reality and the complexity of the current war.

The difficulty of the relations between the two independent countries is explained by the long Russian rule over the Ukrainian people, starting with the Tsarist times and developing through the Russian Empire and the later formed USSR with the Ukrainian territories as part of it. The discussion of a failed Ukrainian fight for its independency is out of the scope of this thesis, therefore, I will simply mention that Ukraine finally got its full and long-awaited independency in 1991. While politically it was organised peacefully and without open Russian opposition, Moscow's influence over Ukraine after 1991 was noticeable. The Russian Federation became the successor of the USSR, and partially connected to this, the Russian political elite considered the countries that were part of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation's sphere of "interests" or "influence". At the same time, many of the newly established republics were often considered as naturally subordinated to Russia. Such an international belief was beneficial for Moscow as it could continue dictating the rules and requirements to its neighbouring countries.

Those countries which had a big proportion of Russians or Russian-speaking minorities residing on their territories or those who were highly assimilated into the Russian identity, culture, and language found themselves in an even tougher situation. These states became significantly reliant on the Russian state, remaining subject to its indirect control and influence, which created a dynamic close to a relationship of subordinate authority.

Unfortunately, Ukraine was quite close to such an inevitable situation as well. Today various researchers are exploring the reasons for such a tendency, describing numerous factors which influenced this development or are still influencing and boosting the dependency. To my mind, one of such aspects is the historically intensive and continuous migration and consequential assimilation of the population which led to a mixed society and a fluid national identity. In all historical periods, Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups were developing side by side influencing one another, whilst the domination of the Russian group over the Ukrainian has clearly created aspects which are important to explore and discuss. As a result, the main research question of this thesis is the interrelation between the displacement and

assimilation of Ukrainians within the context of Russian-Ukrainian history. This investigation seeks to untangle the complex web of connections that exist between these two phenomena, shedding light on the implications they have had on the Ukrainians. My focus lays specifically on the forced types of mobility which were often decided by the government, but the voluntary-compulsory and voluntary migrations which were occasionally connected to the compulsory ones will also be analysed. To discover the multidimensional influence of displacement and assimilation, this study will concentrate on two lengthy periods: the Soviet times and the post-1991 era. The first period is marked by the intensive governmentally organised mobilities and deportations which are tightly engaged with the assimilation policies, often described as sovietisation. The years after the Soviet collapse are interesting due to the emerging mass voluntary migration and later mobilities influenced by the Russian-Ukrainian war which started in 2014. From my point of view, such a broad time span will facilitate a deeper understanding of the applied russification and assimilation strategies in the context of migration.

To begin such examination, it is important to note that while imperialism and assimilation in the Russian-Ukrainian context are covered and discussed by various scholars, the combination of these notions with migration in general, and displacement in particular, got significantly less attention. One of the main obstacles to such an observation used to be a stereotype about "anti-imperial" communist ideas functioning in the USSR, and therefore, the belief of the inadmissibility of application of such notions as "displacement" and "assimilation" to the Soviet Union and Russia as its successor. Furthermore, it's essential to perceive Russia not as a newly established nation in 1991, but rather as a continuum of three historical epochs. These epochs encompass the Soviet era, the imperial period, and the tsarist regime, each leaving a unique imprint on today's Russian development and identity.[1]

Regarding the state of the art dedicated to the assimilation by the Russian Empire, the USSR, and the Russian Federation, it is covered by various authors from different perspectives. For example, a general overview of the nationalities and assimilation policies is done by Ben Eklof[2], Anders Henriksson[3], Geoffrey Hosking[4], Andreas Kappeler[5], Theodore Weeks[6], and others. A more detailed focus on different geographical areas and territories of the Russian Empire is done by the following researchers: the North Caucasus is covered by Dmitrii Arapov[7], Vladimir Bobrovnikov[8]; Baltic territories are described by

[1] Trenin, 'Russia's Spheres of Interest, Not Influence'., p.5
[2] Eklof, Ben et al. (eds.): Russia's Great Reforms, 1855–1881, Bloomington, Ind. 1994.
[33] Henriksson, A. (1993). Nationalism, Assimilation and Identity in Late Imperial Russia: The St. Petersburg Germans, 1906-1914. The Russian Review, 52(3), 341–353.
[4] Hosking, G. A. (1997). Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917. Harvard University Press.
[5] Kappeler, A. (2014). Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial past and Competing Memories. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 5(2), 107-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2014.05.005
[6] Weeks, T. R. (2004). Russification: Word and Practice 1863-1914. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 148(4), 471–489.
[7] Arapov D.Y., Musul'manskoe dvoryanstvo v Rossijskoj imperii. Musul'mane. – 2000. – p.4-5
[8] Bobrovnikov V.O. and Babich I.L., Severnyy Kavkaz v sostave Rossiyskoy imperii – Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007. – p.460

Mikhail Dolbilov[9], Darius Staliūnas[10], Edward Thaden[11]; Baltic Germans are observed by John A. Armstrong[12], Michael Haltzel[13], and many others. A specific interest in the works of Alexei Miller[14], Serhii Plokhii[15], Timothy Snyder[16], and others is dedicated to the Western territories of the Russian Empire.

The nationalities issues are also studied in the context of the Soviet Union, mainly researching the interconnections of the Soviet establishment and ethnic peculiarities. In general assimilation, sovietisation and related issues are mentioned in the contributions of Roman Solchanyk[17], Grigor Ronald Suny[18], Terry Martin[19], Hennadii Yefimenko[20], Lubomyr Hajda, Mark Beissinger[21], and many others.

While the assimilation and russification/sovietisation of some ethnic groups and nationalities were more visible, others had to make significant efforts to state their presence and relevance in this context, including Ukrainians. Nevertheless, academia presents different approaches and views on the matter. For instance, the complexity of the Ukrainian issue in the Russian Empire is covered by such researchers as Aneta Pavlenko[22], Volodymyr Danylenko[23], Kyrylo Mieliekiestsev, Nadiia Temirova[24], etc.

[9] Dolbilov, Mikhail. (2004) Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire's Northwestern Region in the 1860s. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (2004): 245-271. https://doi.org/10.1353/kri.2004.0022.

[10] Stalinas, D. (2007) Making Russians: Meaning and practice of Russifications in Lithuania and Belarus after 1863. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

[11] Thaden, E. C. (2014). Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914.

[12] John A. Armstrong (1978), Mobilized Diaspora in Tsarist Russia: The Case of the Baltic Germans, in Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael (New York: Praeger, 1978), 84.

[13] Michael H. Haltzel (1981), The Baltic Germans, in Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914, ed. Edward C. Thaden (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pre as, 1981), 122-23.

[14] Dolbilov M. D., Miller I. Aleksei (2006), Zapadnyye okrainy Rossiyskoy imperii Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye, - p.605.

[15] Plokhy Serhii (2006) Ukraine or Little Russia? Revisiting an Early Nineteenth-Century Debate, Canadian Slavonic Papers, 48:3-4, 335-353, DOI: 10.1080/00085006.2006.11092419

[16] Snyder, T. (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. Yale University

[17] Solchanyk, R. (2019). Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia: Imperial integration, Russification, and the struggle for national survival. In The nationalities factor in Soviet politics and society (pp. 175-203). Routledge.

[18] Suny, R. G. (1998). The Soviet experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the successor states (p. 234). New York: Oxford University Press.

[19] Martin, T. D. (2001). The affirmative action empire: nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Cornell University Press.

[20] Yefimenko, H., & Olynyk, M. D. (2017). Bolshevik Language Policy as a Reflection of the Ideas and Practice of Communist Construction, 1919-1933. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 35(1/4), 145-167.

[21] Hajda, L., & Beissinger, M. (2019). The nationalities factor in Soviet politics and society. Routledge.

[22] Pavlenko, A. (2011). Linguistic russification in the Russian Empire: peasants into Russians?. Russian Linguistics, 35(3), 331-350.

[23] Danylenko V. Ukrayins′ka i rosiys′ka natsional′ni spil′nosti a konteksti sotsial′no-demohrafichnykh zmin (50-80-i rr. KHKH st.) / V. Danylenko // Naukovyy chasopys Natsional′noho Pedahohichnoho Universytetu im. M.P. Drahomanova: Do 170-richnoho yuvileyu. Seriya 6: Istorychni nauky. - Kyyiv : NPU , 2006. - Vyp. 3. - S. 48-63

[24] MieliekiestsevK., & TemirovaN. (2022). The Policy of Russianization of Ukraine and Other European Territories of Russian Empire: Comparative Analysis. Eminak: Scientific Quarterly Journal, (2(38), 43-57. https://doi.org/10.33782/eminak2022.2(38).580

The later Soviet period is described in the research of Oleksandr Taranenko, Patrick Sériot[25], Yuri Shapoval[26], Marta D. Olynyk[27], Simone A. Bellezza[28], and many others.

The current issues of Russian-Ukrainian relations are studied in different ways, including the perspective of the past assimilation and its outcomes nowadays. Consequently, their aspects are analysed by Oleksandr Taranenko[29], Volodymyr Kulyk[30], Lada Bilaniuk[31], Jaroslava Barbieri[32], David Teurtrie[33], Svitlana Savoyska[34], etc.

This overview of the current state of the art is a non-exhaustive compilation of relevant scholars in the field. While it provides several prominent names whose research has significantly contributed to the understanding of the subject matter, it's important to acknowledge that there are many other scholars whose works could be mentioned. At the same time, the stated authors have explored various views of the topic, including diverse perspectives, and contributing to the body of knowledge. Consequently, many of their publications will be used as secondary sources in this thesis to ensure a well-researched base for the examination of the nexus of migration and assimilation of Ukrainians, which is a focus of my study.

In order to answer the posed research question, I constructed this paper into three main chapters: the first chapter helps define the main connections between the concepts of migration and assimilation with a specific focus on russification and its contexts, the second chapter covers displacements of Ukrainians and russification implications which took place during Soviet times, while the third chapter explores the migrations and russification policies towards Ukrainians on the territory of the Russian Federation after the collapse of the USSR.

In the first chapter, I will define the general connection between forced mobility and assimilation, demonstrating the connection between these concepts and their variations in different states and time spans. The assimilation which was implemented by the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation is often covered by the phenomenon of "russification". The variety of terminology used in academia defining Russian assimilation policies such as mentioned "russification", but also "rosification",

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[25] Sériot, P. (2017). Language Policy as a Political Linguistics: The Implicit Model of Linguistics in the Discussion of the Norms of Ukrainian and Belarusian in the 1930s. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 35(1/4), 169–185.
[26] Shapoval, Y., & Olynyk, M. D. (2017). The Ukrainian Language under Totalitarianism and Total War. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 35(1/4), 187–212.
[27] Yefimenko, H., & Olynyk, M. D. (2017). Bolshevik Language Policy as a Reflection of the Ideas and Practice of Communist Construction, 1919-1933. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 35(1/4), 145–167.
[28] Bellezza, S. A. (2017). Wings to Lift the Truth Up High: The Role of Language for the "Shistdesiatnyky." Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 35(1/4), 213–232.
[29] Taranenko, Oleksandr. "Ukrainian and Russian in contact: attraction and estrangement" International Journal of the Sociology of Language, vol. 2007, no. 183, 2007, pp. 119-140. https://doi.org/10.1515/IJSL.2007.007
[30] Kulyk, V. (2021). Identity in transformation: Russian-speakers in post-Soviet Ukraine. In The Russian-speaking Populations in the Post-Soviet Space (pp. 156-178). Routledge.
[31] Bilaniuk, L. (2005). Contested tongues: Language politics and cultural correction in Ukraine. Cornell University Press.
[32] Barbieri, J. (2023). Raising Citizen-Soldiers in Donbas: Russia's Role in Promoting Patriotic Education Programmes in the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples' Republics. Ethnopolitics, 1-22.
[33] Teurtrie D. Russkiy vopros v postsovetskiy period // Vestnik SanktPeterburgskogo universiteta. Istoriya. 2017. T. 62. Vyp. 1. S. 43–56. DOI: 10.21638/11701/ spbu02.2017.104
[34] Savoyska S. V. (2017), International Academy of Personnel Management Rusyfication, Russianize Or Asymilation: To Define Concepts."

"russianisation", displays the broad range of understanding of this process. The main complications are connected to the content and intensity of the assimilation policies implemented by the Russian Empire, the USSR, and the Russian Federation not only in the different periods of history but also applied to the variety of territories and ethnic groups residing in them. Recognising the necessity to distinguish the differences among all the terms and practices, it is also important to provide enough space for the practical analyses of the implications and outcomes of the phenomenon. The term "sovietisation", which I describe with specific attention, plays an important role in the assimilation policies during the Soviet times, therefore, I compare it to policies of "russification" by the Russian Empire.

Additionally, apart from defining the terminology in the first chapter, I will contextualise russification within the framework which I will use through the following analyses. Even though russification can be looked at from various angles and characterised differently, I am focusing on the four main contexts that particularly capture my attention: language, education, religion, and identity. Each of them is those aspects of russification which played key roles in the assimilation process. Therefore, I describe their implications focusing on the root which often lies in the times of the Russian Empire and shortly mention their development in the Soviet times and current policies of the Russian Federation. These aspects will be important for the analyses in the next chapters. Towards the end of the first chapter, I also mention migration as one of the contexts for russification to underscore the significance of the interconnection between these two concepts, which will be the foundation for the subsequent sections.

The second chapter of this thesis will focus on the implications of mobilities and russification in the Soviet period. First of all, I will classify the mobilities which took place during those times. As I analyse the connection between assimilation and displacement, I will outline the peculiarities of the forced types of mobility during the Soviet regime. Additionally, I will cover the notion of voluntary-compulsory migration broadly implemented by the USSR. This type of mobility can be implemented particularly effectively in totalitarian systems where governments are creating an illusion of the possibilities of voluntary migration. Therefore, I adapt the notion of "voluntary-compulsory" mobilities, since despite their formal categorisation as voluntary, they are impossible to avoid or reject, hence they become compulsory in their nature.

As the next step, the chapter will describe in detail forced and voluntary-compulsory mobilities which took place in various time spans. For example, the 1920s-1930s were marked by the establishment of the Soviet regime, which included the policies of "dekurkulisation," Great Terror, outcomes of forced resettlements and repopulation of the areas where supposedly "non-reliable" groups were residing. Apart from that, since the mid-1930s the Soviet government often targeted specific ethnic groups during collectivisation, making some nationalities prosecuted significantly more often than others. In this way, for example, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in particular were deported with their families or were resettled from the frontier regions due to political accusations of "bourgeois nationalism". Consequently, a great amount of residents of the Ukrainian SSR found themselves living far away from their homeland.

The war-related time of the 1940s and 1950s (mass counterinsurgency operations ended in Soviet Ukraine only during the early 1950s) is highlighted by some of the toughest years of Stalin's rule. Apart from the great population losses during World War II, deportation policies were commonly applied to different ethnic groups. Some of the minorities, such as Crimean Tatars were collectively punished for a supposed "collaboration with Hitler". Others were accused of similar actions based on their affiliations with some partisan or anti-Soviet movements. One of the most common accusations for Ukrainians in those years was the membership or support of various nationalist groups which were often not only anti-USSR but more importantly in favour of Ukrainian independence. Such people were often referred to as "Banderites" regardless their affiliation to Bandera. Interestingly the myth about Ukrainians being fascist because of using Bandera as a symbol of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian struggle exists until today and is still commonly used by the Russian propaganda against Ukrainians.

After the deportation of thousands of non-reliable nationalist residents from the Ukrainian SSR, policies of repopulation were implemented. One of them was a strategy of mixing different nations and ethnic groups, therefore, the various Ukrainian regions were resettled with people from various areas of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Simultaneously, people from the RSFSR and other Russian-speaking groups were invited to settle in Ukraine in order to create a more stable and Soviet-oriented, often Russian-speaking, social layer.

The decades from the 1960s until the 1980s are considered "easier" years for the Soviet population. Due to Stalin's death and occasional ideological and political reliefs, there was a tendency to release individuals from their places of deportation and re-evaluate their criminal cases. By the beginning of the 1960s even though the deportation places were not that common anymore, they did not get empty completely. A wave of prosecutions of dissidents and oppression of members of human rights organisations began. The victims of this wave of prosecution in Ukraine were named *shistdesiatnyky*, from Ukrainian "people of the 1960s." One of the punishments for such dissidents was the resettlement to working camps, which created an influx of newcomers at the places of deportation.

Throughout these decades special attention was paid to assimilation policies which were applied to the deportees and resettled people. In a separate part of the second chapter, I am taking a look at the russification and contexts in which it was applied to the people who were forcefully migrated outside of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. I anticipate that the lack of minority rights was especially felt by the deportees. Regardless of the fact that in such settlements people from all over the USSR were present, they were often limited in practicing their native languages, traditions, etc.

Ukrainians were in a special position due to the linguistic and cultural proximity to Russians, consequently, while some ethnic groups were simply ignoring the Russian language or schools with Russian language of instruction, Ukrainian communities had higher chances to assimilate and get russified. Additionally, I will pay special attention to the upbringing of Ukrainian children, their chances to be raised in their native linguistic surroundings, have books and other media in Ukrainian, attend

school, practice Ukrainian traditions, etc. Through such analysis, I will describe the russification processes of deported people and their families during Soviet times and analyse the strategies and tools commonly used by the government. Later, in the next chapter, I will try to identify the similarities in the applied techniques of assimilation and russification in order to observe the continuation of these processes.

The last chapter of this thesis will be dedicated to the events that followed the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The change in the political and economic structures influenced mobilities in particular. Ukraine faced the consequences of decades of forced migration implemented by the former Soviet regime. The high level of in- and out-migrations is explained by the repatriation movements of various groups of society, such as return migration to Ukraine of Ukrainians residing in other post-Soviet republics, emigration of minority groups who were willing to settle in their newly created independent countries, the return of deported groups who were not allowed to return safely to Ukraine under the Soviet government. At the beginning of the 21st century, these types of mobilities significantly changed the ethnic and linguistic composition of Ukraine which is important for further analyses of the implications of russification.

After the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, the migration flows were again influenced by coercion. As a result, thousands of people fled the war zone, relocated to find economic and social stability, avoided political prosecution, or were detained and deported. It is believed that in general all types of mobilities which are done in the context of the military conflict should be considered as forced mobilities as none of them are planned through free will. Examples of migration which are especially important in the scope of this work are the migrations to the Russian Federation. Around two million Ukrainians have moved to Russia since 2014 and thousands were deported, including children. The deportation of minors by Russia is under a thorough observation of the world and is considered by many international institutions, such as Council of Europe, the Human Rights Council of the UN, the International Criminal Court, as a war crime against Ukraine.

In the context of russification, forced migrations after 2014 are of specific interest, as the Russian Federation adapted and applied various assimilation tools which were already active during Soviet times. Apart from the previous lack of support for the Ukrainian diaspora residing in Russia, Ukrainian refugees and deported children were targeted by the various adaptation and integration policies which are russification activities in nature. Such implications will be analysed within the framework which I formulated at the beginning of this thesis, focusing on the contexts of language, education, religion, and identity. I will create parallels to the practices during Soviet times, indicating the continuity of the russification strategies applied to Ukrainians by governments in Moscow throughout the last hundred years.

Regarding the approaches and materials, exploring the topic of displacement and russification of Ukrainians from the Soviet times till today I will be using various methods and sources. To discover the mobility aspects during USSR rule I will use the accessible online archival materials on the webpage of

the Digital Library of Historical Documents (Rus. Электронная библиотека Исторических документов - Elektronnaya biblioteka Istoricheskikh dokumentov).[35] Thanks to this project various primary sources, which were previously identified and published in limited print runs, were digitalised and became available to historians from all over the world. The archival materials published there will be used to discuss orders, rules and processes which were applied during various acts of displacement throughout the whole period of Soviet rule.

Other materials used in this work are memories and photos of Ukrainian survivors of working camps and places of deportation. These types of sources are available thanks to the projects which are collecting, classifying, and publishing pieces of oral and visual history. I am using the materials of the project "European Memories of the Gulag: An Alternative Form of Scholarly Publication" and the initiative "After Silence", both of which are recording and publishing materials regarding experiences of displacement for scientific and educational reasons.

The analyses of migrations of modern times are based on the available statistical data, including the Ukrainian census of 2001, and all-Russian censuses of 2002, 2010 and 2020, data of which are available for quantitative analysis and overview on the governmental websites.

Unfortunately, there was only one census implemented in Ukraine since independence in 1991, therefore, the quantitative data after 2001 are available from surveys and research conducted by sociological institutions and organisations, among which the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

In Russia, censuses were implemented three times after 1991: in 2002, 2010 and 2020, which provide scholars with a broad range of information for research of the various phenomena developing in Russia, including the process of assimilation and russification of minorities residing in its territory. At the same time, it is important to mention that sociologists believe that the census of 2020 might provide distorted numbers as a large amount of the population did not participate in surveying. Regardless of the announcement by the government that the turnout of the population was 99%, the Levada Centre, a Russian non-governmental research organisation, comments that among the interviewed people, 42% of respondents reported that they did not participate in the recently completed census. The organisation adds that most probably a big part of the data was collected administratively by rewriting data from the available datasets leaving big gaps in understanding of the real state of the society.[36]

Additionally, while analysing the implications of russification in the 21st century, apart from the quantitative data, I will use articles of various Ukrainian and Russian media, as well as international organisations' reports and interviews provided by the victims or their relatives. The experiences of the people directly affected by russification provide practical examples of the applied assimilation strategies

[35] 'Elektronnaya biblioteka istoricheskikh dokumentov'.
[36] Zaharov and Churilova, 'Uchastiye rossiyan v perepisi'.

and I will compare them to those applied by the Soviet government. Talking about russification examples, I will focus on the mentioned in the previous parts contexts which are at the core of this thesis: language, education, religion, and identity. Such an approach will demonstrate the similarities between the russification implications applied by the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, which will help display the continuity of the assimilation policies in general.

While the research is tackling an important topic which remains understudied, it is important to mention the initial limitations which could be overcome in future research works. First of all, the period of the Russian Empire, which is a big and important part of the discussion of assimilation and russification of Ukrainians, will not be covered in this thesis. Whilst I am briefly mentioning the implications of these processes in the first chapter, a deeper contextualisation of mobility and migration should be made. The broad range of resettlements of the Ukrainians to Central Asia, Siberia, the Far East, etc. can be analysed from the perspective of russification in both aspects: often Ukrainian peasants were russified in Ukraine and assimilated into a correspondent Russian environment of the new lands they resided in; simultaneously, Ukrainians played the role of assimilators and russifiers towards local population in the new lands as the Russian language was perceived as a lingua franca for the mixed population.

Additionally, while talking about current times, I only briefly mention the applied russification techniques within occupied areas. While migration and mobility are not connected to this topic at first glance, from my point of view, apart from the possibility that the migrated people are settled willingly or forcefully in occupation zones, there is an additional context of imposed mobile borders. Due to the occupation, borders are changed, and people appear in a different social and political context compared to the times before the war. Consequently, Ukrainians in occupation find themselves in the Russian legal, political, and ideological systems, as if they moved to Russia, without actually actively experiencing mobility. This aspect is out of the scope of this thesis, however, to my mind, russification and assimilation processes can be also analysed from this perspective and be compared to the Soviet rule over the Ukrainian territory.

That being said, it is important to highlight one more time that the displacement and russification of Ukrainians by the Russian state is still ongoing at this very moment. Therefore, the examples mentioned in this thesis are not exclusive. Consequently, the return to this topic at a later stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war is important and should be considered in the near future.

I. Russification and migration

Assimilation and integration in relation to migration

Migration and assimilation or integration are processes which are tightly connected to each other. On the one hand, it is impossible to imagine human mobility without witnessing signs of people adapting or becoming part of the host society. On the other hand, displacement and mobility can be used by governments for purposeful assimilation. To effectively navigate these concepts and intertwining scenarios, it's essential to first establish clear definitions of assimilation and integration. This foundational understanding will serve as a crucial step in shedding light on the nuanced relationship between migration, assimilation, and integration.

Even though dictionaries show the verbs "to assimilate" and "to integrate" as synonyms with the meaning a) to absorb into the cultural tradition of a population or group; b) to make similar,[37] researchers of migration explore and study the differences between these two notions. One of the first descriptions belongs to social psychologist John W. Berry, who argued that the adaptation of migrants to the hosting places is more complex than the process described by the previously famous Gordon's theory. While the theory of Gordon, with his seven stages of assimilation, which were believed to be natural and inevitable by the scholar, is not relevant to the modern days, suggestions of Berry are still used and considered.[38]

John W. Berry developed a two-dimensional analysis which visualises the main strategies of acculturation. He describes two key dimensions: cultural adaptation to the host society and maintenance of the heritage culture.[39] In his analysis, Berry produces the following concepts: "*integration* (maintaining original culture while adopting key aspects of the host culture, and interaction with the host population); *assimilation* (relinquishing original culture, adopting the host culture and interacting with the host population); *separation* (maintain original culture without adopting the host culture and little interaction with host population); and *marginalisation* (reject both the host culture and original culture, and do not interact with the host population)."[40]

This classification highlights the differences between the terms "assimilation" and "integration": both have elements of adoption of the host culture and interaction with the surrounding population; however, assimilation requires the abandoning of the original culture and integration supports maintaining the original culture with adopting partial elements of the hosting culture. Such distinguishing is still supported by researchers and implemented in various national policies all around the world in the contexts of acculturation of migrants and refugees.

[37] 'Assimilate'.
[38] Houtkamp, 'Beyond Assimilation and Integration'., p.75
[39] Berry, 'Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation'., p.9
[40] Berry, 'Acculturation: Living Successfully in Two Cultures'., p.704-705

At the same time, the classification of Berry was criticized for certain aspects. For example, Christopher Houtkamp describes an important aspect. Berry's idea assumed a free choice of a newcomer to choose the acculturation strategy, while Houtkamp emphasises that often these people must adapt to the already established national acculturation norms which are chosen by the majority's culture and policies, and not by the migrants themselves.[41]

Additionally, for the future discussion of assimilation and integration, it is useful to look at the article of Bourhis et al. (1997). The group of researchers presented an overview of the interactions of the three main parties in the process of acculturation: the host majority group, the minority group (migrants in their examples) and the state. Among this, the authors proposed a visualisation of how the policies of a state are related to the acculturation process.[42]

Moreover, the article is interestingly presenting definitions of minority group and its role in the hosting society. For instance, the authors provide a literature overview on the two important notions for implementing state integration policies: the external boundaries of a country and internal boundaries that define who can be and who should be accepted as rightful and authentic citizens of a country.[43] According to this overview external borders help identify who is considered as a majority culture or cultures if there are a few native groups on the territory and how they are all positioned relatively towards each other. For example, indigenous minority groups might be added to the equation which complicates the strategy of state integration policies.

Internal boundaries provide information on who is considered to be the outsiders (immigrants, refugees, guest workers, etc.). Such a migration process can influence not just the integration strategy choice but also the self-identification of the host society. For instance, the authors believe that "immigrants, by their very presence as newcomers, may trigger a redefinition of the collective identity of the dominant host society. In some cases, the arrival of substantial numbers of immigrants may challenge the founding myths of the nation, based, for example, on the ethnocultural homogeneity of the host majority".[44]

Another important aspect of this topic is the choice of strategy for the state integration policies which depends mainly on the ideology, political and economic situations, etc. Bourhis et al. describe the main 4 vectors, such as pluralism, civic, assimilation and ethnist ideologies. They can be visualised in the table (See Table 1), where the main aspects are to which extent migrants are expected to adopt the public norms and majority's culture, whether the state is going to intervene in the migrant's private sphere of life and if the financial and social support for the cultural pluralism is foreseen.[45]

[41] Houtkamp, 'Beyond Assimilation and Integration'., p.76
[42] Bourhis et al., 'Towards an Interactive Acculturation Model'., p.371
[43] Bourhis et al., p.370
[44] Bourhis et al., p.372
[45] Bourhis et al., p.373-375

Aspects	*Pluralism ideology*	*Civic ideology*	*Assimilation ideology*	*Ethnist ideology*
Adoption of the public norms and majority's culture	Expected	Expected	Expected	Obligatory
Intervention in private life of migrants	No	No	Partial	Yes
Financial and social support for the private activities of minorities	Yes	No	No	No

Table 1. State integration policies in dependents on the ideology.

The authors additionally stress that shifts from one ideology to another by the state are possible. Moreover, it can be done in different variations. For instance, the policies can be changed by the government or with the change of the government due to the numerous political, economic, and social events. The general international situation and case-by-case situations can also change the general policy approaches. In this way, at a certain point in time, some countries have a different degree of support regarding specific acculturation measures based on various preconditions. Furthermore, it is not rare to see a gap between the state policy strategy and the orientations of the majority of society, which can be more or less progressive in its views compared to the government. The authors believe that due to the educational system, media, public government and other variables, people can have different attitudes and beliefs towards migration and acculturation plans.[46]

Before going into exploring the assimilation strategies in the context of this thesis, it is useful to look at colonisation and acculturation strategies in the context of empires and land occupations. Empires used to choose various strategies regarding their occupied lands and people. While some empires tended to keep fixed hierarchy between the centre and periphery in order to have a clear cut between the superior power of the conqueror and the inferior position and development of the conquered, others were using assimilation and integration to grow in land and size of population. Since the latter is comparable to the position of Ukraine in the dynamics of relationship between Ukraine and Russia, I will focus more on this strategy and its implications in history.

[46] Bourhis et al., p.375

The examples of empires and assimilation going hand in hand could be found in various cases: starting from the Roman Empire, the British and French empires, and even later in US policies. And even though the term "assimilation" might be used slightly different or be covered by various terms, the general idea of the process of acculturation stays quite similar.

For example, the Roman Empire was once called "the most powerful engine of assimilation that the world has ever seen" meaning the creation of a similar system of administration, a common system of law and common citizenship in its Empire.[47] The assimilation of that time was perceived as the idea of brotherhood of people and served the empire as a concept of unity, solidarity, and allegiance to Rome.[48]

Christianity brought another wave of assimilation and its understanding. This time the religious idea of being the same in front of God inspired the spread of Christianisation first in Europe, and later to the non-European lands.[49] The reason for Christianisation of those lands is a topic of numerous research. In the scope of this thesis, it is only important to highlight that the process of Christianisation was another example of assimilation. Its approach was, for instance, classified in the work of José de Acosta. He claimed that there are three types of societies for which Christianisation should be different: (1) "highly civilized" societies which could be convinced by preaching; (2) "complex societies", which needed a Christian leader to be guided; (3) "underdeveloped societies" without kings or laws which had to be Christianised by force.[50] In this way Christianity was imposed on occupied lands as a consolidation idea practiced by the colonisers and occupiers.

Regarding later times, Saliha Belmessous describes assimilation in her book as "inclusionary projects [which] had […] a normative discourse of cultural homogeneity [in common]."[51] While talking about 17th- and 18th-century New France, 19th-century British Australia, and 19th and 20th-century French Algeria, she explains that such assimilation projects could have the adaptation of the norms of clothing, religious practices, bodily disciplines, laws, etc. as a goal. Moreover, referring to the ideas of Frederick Cooper, she talks of two opposing purposes of empires: enforcing uniformity while maintaining the difference in suspension.[52]

A similar idea is presented by Richard Hingley. Discussing the "failure" of the British Empire to assimilate India compared to the Roman Empire's "success", Hogarth in his address on "Assimilation" to the Classical Association in 1910 claims that "all imperial people have begun with a period of non-assimilation[…] they have then passed on to a second stage characterised by a desire to assimilate and further stages of successful assimilation and the production of a more or less complete social uniformity."

[47] Hingley, *Roman Officers and English Gentlemen*., p.48
[48] Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory 1890–1914*., p.11
[49] Betts., p.12
[50] Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire*., p.4
[51] Belmessous., p.2
[52] Belmessous., p.2

Hogarth concludes "the British Empire was still in the first stage or the opening of the second, while Rome attained its 'conspicuous success' in assimilation during the third."[53]

Coming back to the topic of this thesis, it is important to mention that I will be looking at the case of Russian-Ukrainian relations to a certain extent as the dynamic between the centre and periphery and consequently I will describe various assimilation implications in the context of migration in particular. In this case, russification in relation to migration can be analysed from both sides: out-migration of Ukrainians to the external territories (Russia in particular) and following assimilation/russification processes, and another approach is connected to in-migration of Russians and assimilation/russification of Ukrainians on their ethnic territories. The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war adds another dimension: assimilation in connection with the immobility of the population. Due to the occupation of the Ukrainian territories by the Russian Federation, those people who did not leave the territory of occupation are facing the pressure to assimilate and russify according to the laws and rules of the aggressor state. The aspect of the russification in occupation lays out of scope of this thesis, however, in my opinion, it should be deeply researched and included in the context of the Russian assimilation policies in the future.

The state of the art of the assimilations implemented by the Russian state is still developing, as for a long time Russian imperial strategies were researched only in the period of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, the policies regarding the "same by different" ethnic groups and various assimilation practices are present in all stages of the development of the Russian statehood: the Russian Empire, the USSR, and the Russian Federation. The propagated similarities or the encouraged differentiation were used by Russian capital in different political, economic, and social contexts. The russification[54] is mainly analysed from the perspective of Central and Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, etc. Currently, more and more research is being conducted on the russification of Central Asian countries such as Qazaqstan[55], Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc. Meanwhile, the russification of Ukraine is often under-researched by academia due to the misunderstanding of the specificities of the position and role of Ukraine in the Russian Empire, the USSR and in relation to the Russian Federation these days.

In the upcoming sections, I will explore the assimilation strategies employed in relation to Ukrainians. This examination will include definitions of key concepts such as russification and sovietisation, which represent the primary assimilation processes within the scope of my analysis – specifically, during the era of the USSR and in the post-1991 Russian Federation. This examination aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of these assimilation practices and their implications on minority groups in general and Ukraine in particular.

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[53] Hingley, *Roman Officers and English Gentlemen*., p.50

[54] Or russianization, or sovietization. The terms will be deeper analysed in the next section.

[55] Qazaqstan is used in this work instead of Kazakhstan due to the ongoing decolonization process and changing Qazaq language from the Cyryllic to the Latin alphabet. Related historical naming issues are described in the article here: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan_passport_latin_alphabet/2301523.html

Defining russification

In the exploration of the assimilation policies and the intricate historical ties of these policies to migration, it is important to make a comprehensive examination of the terminologies of such a multi-layered process as assimilation. The various terms serve as a foundation for understanding the ways in which Russia has sought to assimilate populations throughout its history. However, the significance of these terms goes beyond nomenclature; it extends into the broad political landscapes in which they are employed. The political context is a dynamic and influential factor that can significantly alter the connotations and implications of these terms. As such, this inquiry seeks not only to categorise and clarify terms of "Russification," "Russianisation," "Rossification," and "Sovietisation", but also to briefly investigate the evolution of these terms throughout history. By tracing their transformations and adaptability, we gain a deeper understanding of how state policies have interacted with linguistic, cultural, educational, and identity-related assimilation, and how these interconnections have shaped the Russian-Ukrainian dimension of history and its complex relationship with migration.

Russification, Russianisation, and Rossification

The assimilation in the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation was implemented under various terms. One of them is "russification" – русифікація [rusyfikatziia] (Ukr.), or "russianisation" – "зросійщення" [zrosiyshchennia] (Ukr.). The dictionary states that both words which derive from the verbs "russify" and "russianise" mean the same: the process of making something or someone Russian.[56] At the same time, in academia there is an ongoing debate regarding the potential disparities between these terms.

According to Brazel: "Russification is a term used to describe efforts to impose Russian language, ideals and beliefs on non-Russian communities".[57] In parallel, Yakovlev combining the ideas of Miller, Thaden and Dziuba defines russification as "a set of state measures aimed at the Russification of the non-Russian population […], which included strengthening the role of the Russian language and culture […] and creating conditions for Russian linguistic and cultural hegemony that encouraged non-Russian ethnic groups to adopt the Russian language and culture."[58]

Another variation of the term is russianisation. The main difference between russification and russianisation is usually seen in whether the policy was targeting language and culture only or attempted to reidentify the population. For instance, Petr Dostál and Hans Knippenberg state that "Among the avowed social policies of the Soviet Union are modernisation and industrialisation, which may be

[56] 'Russianize'.
[57] Brazel, 'Russification Efforts in Central Asian and Baltic Regions'., p.4
[58] Yakovlev, 'Radyanizatsiya, Rusyfikatsiya Ta Deradyanizatsiya Yak Katehoriyi Politychnoyi Postkolonial′noyi Istoriyi Krayin Tsentral′no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy'., p.26

combined under the label of Sovietisation, and the spread of Russian language and culture within the USSR, which may be termed Russianisation. But there is also a third process at work in which non-Russians lose their ethnic identity in favour of identification with Russian culture. This process, may be called "Russification".”[59] Meanwhile, Raymond Pearson believes that “Russians lacked the ability to assimilate non-Russians.” Therefore, he proposed the term "russianisation", which would mean a policy of dominance of the Russian language, culture, and institutions. According to him, russification included not only the assimilation of peoples, but also the formation of the very idea of "Russia" and "Russians" as a historical community in the Eurasian arena and the redefinition of Ukrainians, Rusyns, "Cherkasy", and "Cossack people" as "Little Russians".[60]

Apart from that, another term - “Rossification” - was also used as a variation of the assimilation strategy. For instance, Szporluk quotes Kristof explaining the term: “Rossification […] meant the development of an unswerving loyalty and direct attachment to the person of the tsar, by God's will the sole powerholder (*samoderzhets*) and head of the Church.” Additionally, Szporluk believes that in a sense continuation of the policy of rossification can be traced in the later policies of Sovietisation (which I will discuss later). According to him, such policies meant obeying the government and its ideology, communism in the case of the USSR, rather than the attempt to russify all citizens of the country. Szporluk also says that the process of “russification" also existed in the USSR and its goal was to make the non-Russian people residing in the USSR Russian in cultural, linguistic and identity contexts.[61]

Simultaneously, David F. Marshall claims that to his mind “russification" and "assimilation" should be perceived as synonymous, while “rossification” represents “the appreciation of nationality and language rights, combined with political loyalty to a supranational union (USSR) of equal nationality republics. In the spectrum ranging from total assimilation to secession, Rossification stands midway. A speaker of language X could thus choose to be Russified and possibly assimilate, be Rossified and be bilingual in language X and Russian (the so-called "internationalist language" of the USSR), or be monolingual, bilingual or multilingual, the latter choice representing a person's probable opting out of union (then interrepublic and now commonwealth) participation.”[62]

And even though the distinction between the political and assimilative natures of the terms “rossification” and “russification” looks logical and well-argued, it is hard to determine to which degree population had a free will in choosing whether to be or not assimilated, to be or not bilingual, etc. It is often the choice of the government of the oppressing state whether, at a certain point, it is needed, valuable and efficient for the country to fully “russify” (assimilate) a group or rather enough to “rossify” (integrate) it in a political sense of the term.

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[59] Dostál and Knippenberg, ‘The “Russification” of Ethnic Minorities in the USSR’.
[60] Mieliekiestsev and Temirova, ‘The Policy of Russianization of Ukraine and Other European Territories of Russian Empire: Comparative Analysis’., p.47
[61] Szporluk, ‘The Imperial Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem’., p.9
[62] Marshall, ‘The Role of Language in the Dissolution of the Soviet Union’., p.38

Another prominent researcher of Russian assimilation, historian Aleksei Miller, described a need to talk about "russifications" in plural and not just "russification" in singular due to the variety of the understandings, meanings and processes which are analysed under this term. The scholar describes his understanding of russification as an evaluative term which needs to have clear defining criteria for the formation of its judgments. Additionally, he believes that it is important "to differentiate whether we evaluate the intentions of the authorities or the "objective" content of the process."[63] Guided by these ideas, Miller is taking a deeper look into the linguistic differentiation of two old Russian words which meant "to make Russian" and "to become Russian".[64] Such a linguistic background helps to better understand the differences and attitudes towards the policies of russification, which still lead to the various understandings of this term.

Regarding the overview of the types of russification, it is generally accepted by historians that the best attempt to classify the russification belongs to Edward Thaden who described this process in the following categories: "(a) spontaneous russification, a process that began as early as the sixteenth century and continued at least to the early twentieth century; (b) the administrative russification as part of the policy of the absolutist administrative centralisation that began in the second half of the eighteenth century, continuing to the reign of Alexander II, and which particularly characterised policy in the Baltic provinces; and (c) forced cultural russification (an effort to impose Russian language and the Orthodoxy) beginning already under Alexander II and continuing into the nineteenth and early twentieth century."[65]

Even though the classification describes the russification during the times of the Russian Empire, there are attempts to use it for the russification policies during the Soviet times as well. For instance, Yakovlev compares it with the peculiarities of sovietisation, a notion which will be discussed in the next section.[66]

Coming back to the classification of Thaden, due to its limitations, there are numerous critics and adaptations. For example, Miller criticises Thaden's demarcation between the voluntary and enforced natures of the russification, as well as its lack of the regional particularities of the assimilation processes.[67] It is indeed important to differentiate the objectives of the russification/assimilation and rossification in different regions in different periods of the development of Russian statehood. Miller correctly highlights that "it has to be clearly defined whether we speak of assimilation, acculturation, colonisation or some other processes."[68]

All the above-mentioned aspects are important and significant for a better understanding of the assimilation nature and ideas of russification policies. However, the discussion of the term should not

[63] Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism*., p.46
[64] Miller., p.50
[65] Miller., p.46
[66] Yakovlev, 'Radyanizatsiya, Rusyfikatsiya Ta Deradyanizatsiya Yak Katehoriyi Politychnoyi Postkolonial′noyi Istoriyi Krayin Tsentral′no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy'., p.25-26
[67] Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism*., p.47
[68] Miller.p.47

overcomplicate the fact that assimilation has indeed occurred and continues to occur, taking various forms within different contexts and regions. In my work, I will be using the term "russification" in its broad understanding of the assimilation implemented on different levels by the USSR and the Russian Federation in regard to the Ukrainian population. At the same time, the usage of the term needs deeper research, especially in the context of the field of Russian imperialism and the de-colonisation of the occupied by Russian state lands and nationalities.

Sovietisation

The process of assimilation during the USSR times was deeply embedded in the Soviet regime, despite its efforts to construct a narrative and image of an anti-imperial and anti-colonial political union. The Soviet type of assimilation was implemented under the term "sovietisation". Literally, according to the dictionary, the word means a) to bring under Soviet control; b) to force into conformity with Soviet cultural patterns or governmental policies.[69]

According to researchers, the process of Sovietisation can encompass various actions and policies. This includes the imposition of economic structures in production and agriculture, the implementation of a communist-style market, enforcing the use of the Cyrillic alphabet for written languages, the de-nationalisation of people's identities, etc.

Yakovlev classifies the actions and policies within the process of "sovietisation" and claims that there are the following three groups: political-administrative, economic, and cultural sovietisation.[70] Yakovlev's article describes each factor comparing them with the classification of russification created by Thaden. For instance, the author describes political-administrative sovietisation mentioning that it "was the spread and introduction of political, administrative, organisational forms and legal norms for organising the social and political life of a country and public administration in it."[71] Thaden in his classification also describes administrative russification as part of the centralisation policy. Cultural sovietisation is explained by Yakovlev as "the imposition of Soviet ideological principles based on Marxist-Leninist ideology and characterised by a high degree of collectivism, denial of individuality, the cult of leaders, atheism, etc."[72] While describing the peculiarities, the author mentions that cultural sovietisation can be observed, for instance, in the process of the creation of a Soviet person identity.

The idea of a "Soviet person" comes from the broader term defining the "Soviet people" (Ukr. радянський народ). Roman Szporluk describes that even though Stalin was talking at some point about "peoples of the USSR" (Ukr. народи СРСР), by this idea he did not truly mean any kind of autonomous

[69] 'Sovietize'., Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary
[70] Yakovlev, 'Radyanizatsiya, Rusyfikatsiya Ta Deradyanizatsiya Yak Katehoriyi Politychnoyi Postkolonial′noyi Istoriyi Krayin Tsentral′no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy'., p.25
[71] Yakovlev., p.25
[72] Yakovlev., p.25

rights or self-determination for the nations. Therefore, the term developed into a new notion "Soviet people", which meant all citizens of the USSR. Szporluk says that "according to the official view, the peoples of the USSR formed an integrated whole, a single entity, in that they all shared allegiance to Marxism-Leninism as their world view and to the party and state that represented and realised that outlook in practice.[73]

While building communism, the Bolsheviks were not preoccupied with keeping the multinational diversity. Instead, the notion of "Soviet people" was intended to remove the ethnic factor and feelings from the political narrative.[74] A "Soviet person" or a "new person" became one of the most important constructs of the communist ideology.

Cultural attitudes acquired during Soviet times persisted also after 1991 among older generations in every post-Soviet country. Thus, researchers identify a present-day "Soviet person" as "controlled, dependent on the state, and culturally and politically unified."[75] Another author after exploring the "Soviet person" in Southern Ukraine mentions that this type of people is characterised by: "assessment of the Soviet system as order, discipline, and a "strong hand"; acceptance of political terror as a given, without which the country cannot exist; harsh negative assessments of democracy and freedom of speech; negative attitude to […]the Holodomor, World War II, and repressions; justification of the existence of privilege, careerism, and bureaucracy during the Soviet; clear paternalistic expectations from the state and leadership."[76]

The achievement of the needed state of communism looks connected to the need for the creation of the "Soviet people" through the sovietisation and spread of Soviet rituals, organisation of mass public events, demonstrations and parades, the invention or reinvention of common holidays, anti-religious cultural policy, etc.[77] According to McDowell, "[Soviet] ceremonies have been intended to strengthen Soviet authority, to undermine traditional religious systems, to serve as socialising agents in the incorporation of Soviet moral norms and the Soviet meaning system, and to more securely link the individual with the political system."[78]

The shift towards the usage of the term sovietisation in the political, public, and academic spheres instead of assimilation or russification is noticeable. Step by step this term absorbed the policies of the assimilation of different ethnicities in the USSR. For example, Zolotukhin mentions that "since the early 1930s, the term "assimilation" has been used in Soviet academic literature in a rather limited way."[79] Additionally citing the Soviet demographer Kozlov, Zolotukhin noted that "Many authors, analysing

[73] Szporluk, 'The Imperial Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem'., p.18
[74] Szporluk., p.20
[75] Kahanov, '«Radyans′ka lyudyna» v istoriohrafichnomu dyskursi: radyans′ka i dysydent·s′ka versiyi.', p.25
[76] Kahanov, 'Fenomen «radyans′koyi lyudyny» 1950–1980-kh rr. v suchasniy ukrayins′kiy istoriohrafiyi.', p.86
[77] Yakovlev, 'Radyanizatsiya, Rusyfikatsiya Ta Deradyanizatsiya Yak Katehoriyi Politychnoyi Postkolonial′noyi Istoriyi Krayin Tsentral′no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy'. p.265
[78] McDowell, 'Soviet Civil Ceremonies'., p.265
[79] Zolotukhin, 'Do Pytannya Nasyl′nyts′koyi Asymilyatsiyi Ukrayintsiv u Mynulomu i S′ohodni'., p.55

ethnic processes in the USSR, avoid using the term assimilation because they identify it with a violent assimilationist policy". [80] It shows that while there was an understanding of the violence used during the assimilation process itself, it was preferred not to mention it during research or use the neologism "Sovietisation" to describe the implementation of policies.

Additionally, specific attention deserves the fusion of the characteristics "Soviet" and "Russian". It can be witnessed through the narratives which spread in the public sphere, politics, international relations, media, academia, etc. Throughout the numerous books, articles, news, speeches etc. "the Soviet Union" is substituted by "Russia" as well as "Soviet" is often interchangeable with "Russian". Such examples could be found in various contexts: starting with an article about the Soviet Union in Britannica, where the note is made that the country is "also known as Russia"[81]; quotes of politicians such as Churchill, Reagan, Nixon, etc.; or names of the books such as McCauley, M. (2009). Russia, America and the Cold War: 1949-1991 or Jonathan Haslam, *Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (2011). All these examples tell us about the Soviet Union which became "Russia" and created the narrative that everything Soviet belonged and still belongs to Russia and its sphere of influence.

Interestingly, this phenomenon seems to be understudied as it is difficult to find articles or analyses of reasons for the creation of such interchangeability. I can only point out some factors that could be analysed in the future and seen as the reasons for the interchangeability of the terms. First of all, geographical dominance. Russia was one of the largest and most influential republics in the Soviet Union, both geographically and in terms of population. Therefore, the USSR was often referred to as "Russia" or "Soviet Russia" in popular discourse. Secondly, Soviet cultural influence, which includes Russification and Sovietisation. It is perceived that the dominant language and culture within the Soviet Union was Russian. Russian was widely spoken and served as the lingua franca among different ethnic groups within the union, willingly or not. Such linguistic and cultural influence might have contributed to the perception of "Soviet" as being synonymous with "Russian." And lastly, political power. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was in power of the Soviet Union, was often led by Russian politicians, or those representatives who had pro-Russian positions. This further reinforced the association between the Soviet Union and Russia in the minds of many people.

Current developments

Nowadays russification gained additional political context due to the aggressive politics of the Russian Federation. It can be connected to the lack of de-imperialisation processes, rising nationalism and chauvinism in Russia, as well as the revanchist politics of Vladimir Putin and his followers in Russia and neighbouring states. For instance, Savoyska determines current russification as "the language policy

[80] Zolotukhin., p.55
[81] Pipes, McCauley, and Dewdney, 'Soviet Union'.

of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, as well as the pro-Russian-minded power of modern independent Ukraine"[82] claiming that the inner pro-Russian forces in Ukraine also participated actively in the process of russification. She adds that "the pro-Russian ideology […] should be understood as an orientation to support the political system of Russia and the political regime of Vladimir Putin, belonging to the Russian people, […] culture, traditions, customs and values."[83] Such understanding of russification is tightly connected to the definitions of russification provided in the contexts of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the spread and superiority of the Russian culture, language, and worldview are now transferred into a specific political ideology of the "russkii mir".

Another interesting feature of russification nowadays is the use of modern tools for spreading – digital media in particular. Savoyska mentions the role of the internet and digitalisation in the process of russification of Ukrainians.[84] At the same time, Glasze et al. take a look at the general Russian influence on the neighbourhood using digital spatiality. They believe that "The power and leverage that Russia holds over post-Soviet countries through cyberspace has tended to increase with Russia's legislative inflation. Intermediation platforms, on the one hand, and Internet infrastructure and data routing, on the other, are two domains where the implications of the Russian drive for digital sovereignty are crucial for the post-Soviet space." The authors analyse the influence of Russian digital media platforms on the neighbouring countries and their role in the conflicts which led to the occupation of Crimea, Donbas, and Abkhazia.[85]

Contexts of russification

The research of russification is a complex and multidimensional process, requiring the adoption of various approaches and strategies to gain a comprehensive understanding. Within the scope of this thesis, my primary focus will be on russification in the context of forced Ukrainian mobilities. As a result, I will provide a chronological explanation that sheds light on Ukrainian migration to and from both the USSR and the Russian Federation and explain russification in the context of these mobilities. However, prior to going into the analysis of russification concerning these mobilities, it is important to establish a contextual framework within which the main aspects of russification evolved over the course of history. In the following section, I outline distinct contexts that are integral, and in my opinion play one of the most significant roles in the process of russification: language, education, religion, and identity. These aspects are tightly interconnected, each applying influence on the others in a way that might blur the lines of demarcation.

[82] Savoyska, 'Rusyfication, Russianize or Asymilation: To Define Concepts'., p.109
[83] Savoyska., p.109
[84] Savoyska., p.111
[85] Glasze et al., 'Contested Spatialities of Digital Sovereignty'., p.927

To start with, I will provide a brief overview of the russification practices within the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation as outlined by the defined contexts. Successively, in the forthcoming sections, I will elaborate upon and contextualise various aspects of russification in connection to the forced mobilities experienced by Ukrainians in their relationship with both the USSR and Russia. This approach will help gain a more profound insight into the details of russification in the specific historical context of Ukrainian migration and its implications.

Russification and language

As the name of the term alludes, russification is tightly connected to the process of making someone or something "Russian". Analysing the various historical developments of Russian statehood, an overview of the linguistic russification should be done with a special interest.

Among the practices, some empires are trying to establish a common language for their population which should serve as the lingua franca. The discussion continues about the strategies for the adoption of the lingua franca and its roles in the empires: be it a linguistic imposition as solely a bureaucratic tool or also as a spoken language for the population. In the case of the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation, linguistic assimilation plays one of the central roles in the discussion.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Russian Empire, which was a creator of russification policies realised an urgent need to demarcate its borders through culture and language. It is believed that a comprehensive nationwide policy of Russianisation can be traced back to the era of Catherine II. The implications of not just ideological attempts at assimilations are observed, but also the practical executions of the russification actions. Additionally, the intensification of this policy can be attributed to the imperial leadership's response to the "Spring of Nations" that raced through Europe.[86]

Due to the threat above the empires in Europe in general, and concrete hostilities on the Western border from the Polish side, the Russian emperor ordered to eradicate the Polish influence on the territories of the country, which had a direct impact on Ukrainians in particular. According to Weeks: "Fear of the threat posed by Polish influence – a fear which was pervasive and strong among Russian administrators and nationalists – was particularly acute in relation to two populations considered branches of the Russian nation: Belarusians and Ukrainians."[87] Apart from the mentioned Belarusians and Ukrainians, severe russification policies were adopted on the territories of modern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.[88] In the parallel, the Russian Empire applied much less effort to russification in regard to Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Weeks argues that slow assimilation was

[86] Mieliekiestsev and Temirova, 'The Policy of Russianization of Ukraine and Other European Territories of Russian Empire: Comparative Analysis'., p.43
[87] Weeks, 'Russification / Sovietization'., paragraph 10
[88] Weeks., paragraph 10-12

implemented by the Empire due to the belief that Asians and Muslims are "backward and doomed by history to eventually disappear."[89]

Consequently, linguistic russification is researched deeply in relation to the European territories of the Russian Empire and the various examples of russification there are broadly known. For instance, one of the attempts at russification was implemented through the conversion of the Baltic and Polish languages to the Cyrillic alphabet.[90] Additionally, the forbidding of the national languages, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Polish intellectuals began to import printed books illegally from Prussia and the United States in order to keep information and language circulating in the country regardless of the Russian imposition.[91]

At first glance, it seems more difficult to draw a similarity between the Baltic states and Ukraine in the context of linguistic assimilation. The issue with the Ukrainian language was the linguistic proximity of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and the mixed use of both languages in social interactions. Researchers are still debating to which extent the policies of the Russian Empire regarding linguistic russification were intended and aggressive, or whether they should be considered a natural assimilation and preferences of the society. However, the numerous policies aimed at forbidding and eradicating the Ukrainian language implemented by the Russian Empire argue for the targeted policy and political attempt to assimilate the Ukrainian population, at least starting from the second half of the 19th century. One of the most important measures were the Valuev's circular instruction of 1863 banning the publication of religious and instructional books in Ukrainian and the Ems edict of 1876 banning the import of Ukrainian books from abroad without special permission, publication of all original works or translations, stage performances and public lectures in Ukrainian.[92] Additionally, in the same way as the Baltic countries, Ukrainian intellectuals saved the Ukrainian language through the publishing of Ukrainian literature in Galicia which became the "Ukrainian Piedmont" (i.e. among the members of the Ukrainian national movement Galicia was seen as potentially playing the role that Piedmont had played in the creation of the Italian state).[93]

All these examples serve as arguments for the russification implemented by the Russian Empire, which till the end of its existence considered some of the national languages, especially Ukrainian, dangerous. Pavlenko summarises: "The [*Ukrainian*] language of instruction and even orthography became political questions for imperial law-makers". History will show though that not only for the imperial lawmakers, but for the Soviet and Russian as well.

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[89] Weeks., paragraph 13
[90] Mieliekiestsev and Temirova, 'The Policy of Russianization of Ukraine and Other European Territories of Russian Empire: Comparative Analysis'., p.51
[91] Mieliekiestsev and Temirova., p.52
[92] Pavlenko, 'Linguistic Russification in the Russian Empire'., p.340-341
[93] Mieliekiestsev and Temirova, 'The Policy of Russianization of Ukraine and Other European Territories of Russian Empire: Comparative Analysis'.

The attempts to russify the languages of the ethnic groups were implemented in the USSR as well after a short period of korenisatsiia in the 1920s[94]. Political attacks were directed at nations in varied geographic locations. For example, in the 1930s the central government created specific Cyrillic alphabets for Central Asian languages. This is a clear sign of linguistic russification which was used as a tool for the standardisation and unification of the nations under the Soviet Union rule.[95] Similar steps in russification took place in the Baltic countries through a similar attempt, following the one implemented by the Russian Empire, to write down the local languages in Cyrillic letters and use this alphabet as an official one.[96]

Less attention was paid to the attempts to russify the Ukrainian language in Soviet times for the same reasons: it is already a Slavic language written in the Cyrillic alphabet; however, researchers argue that the russification still took place. As an example, the "Kharkiv orthography" project implemented by the Soviet linguists as a part of the korenisatsiia policies ended up being banned for "attempts to emphasise a separate trajectory of the Ukrainian political and cultural development from the Russian one" and was "deemed anti-Soviet, as the one rejecting the slogans of the "united family of Soviet peoples", "fraternal friendship" or "proletarian internationalism"."[97] Consequently, the bourgeois orthography was rewritten by another linguist, who created the Ukrainian language "comfortable" for Moscow. Horbyk and Palko mention that "instead of 'bourgeois' Polish and Czech influences, the new orthography was to highlight the similarities between the Ukrainian and Russian languages, which would play into the hand of Moscow communist ideologists, who by the time had started to promote the image of 'fraternal peoples' and the historical unity of the Slavic people under the wise leadership of the Communist party".[98] And even though the russification of the Ukrainian language is not similar to the one implemented towards the Central Asian or Baltic nationalities, the implications of the forced assimilation of the language are visible through a different perspective.

Another issue with the research of linguistic russification of Ukrainians is connected to the fact that during the migration process often Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians were seen as one ethnicity and referred to as "Russians", thus not included in the statistics or observations as separate units. In this way, Ukrainians could be not only russified but also play the role of the russifiers. As an example, while talking of Russian immigrants and resettlers in Qazaqstan or Baltic states, it is not clear to which extent "Russian" meant Russians or in general Russian speakers, among which there could be already russified Ukrainians. For instance, Brazel describes in his report a high level of russification of the Baltic cities

[94] The policy of korenisatsiia will be described in detail in the chapter on the USSR times.
[95] Brazel, 'Russification Efforts in Central Asian and Baltic Regions'., p.14
[96] Brazel., p.20
[97] Horbyk and Palko, 'Righting the Writing. The Power Dynamic of Soviet Ukraine Language Policies and Reforms in the 1920s-1930s'., p.68
[98] Horbyk and Palko., p.78

through Russian-speaking migrants, which he admits are Russians but also Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Belarusians, and other Russian-speaking people from all over the Soviet Union.[99]

Following the dissolution of the USSR, the presence of linguistic russification has somewhat decreased. The Ukrainian government, upon gaining independence, took the issue of the Ukrainian language quite seriously. However, in subsequent years, the assertive foreign policies of the Russian Federation, combined with their practical implementation through pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine, particularly during Yanukovych's leadership, have contributed to the continuous russification of certain Ukrainian regions, the manipulation of language-related matters, and the eventual Russian-Ukrainian war.

Russification and education

Russification in education is tightly connected to linguistic assimilation. However, it is important to highlight the importance of this process specifically. In general, assimilation through education is commonly used as a tool in many empires all around the world. The influence through educational institutions is one of the most productive strategies with fast, direct, and long-term results.

Russification in educational institutions started to appear during the period of the Russian Empire. The examples of assimilation policies originate from various regions of the empire. In the Baltic states, the Russian language was enforced as a compulsory subject in all schools, and only Russians were eligible to hold positions within the education system.[100] Another example is a famous board of shame presented in the museum in Latvia. As it was forbidden for kids to speak their native language, those who were not obeying were punished by wearing a sign with the phrase "Today I spoke Latvian". (Appendix 1).

The russification through schooling was also implemented for Ukrainians. If in the first half of the 19th century a general movement of interest towards the culture and language of "Little Russia" was observed, after the Polish rebellion in the second half of the 19th century the government started being concerned about the possible separatist anti-imperial movements, therefore, the Ukrainophilia was aimed to be eradicated from the Western borders. According to Pavlenko: "What followed was a series of bans that aimed to prevent Ukrainophiles from establishing and using a Ukrainian-language education system to transmit a specifically Ukrainian consciousness and separatist ideas to the peasants".[101]

However, Pavlenko argues that even though the imperial bans on the Ukrainian language slowed down the linguistic standardisation and national consciousness formation, the Russian Empire failed to provide the schooling infrastructure and as a result, the russification through schooling did not influence

[99] Brazel, 'Russification Efforts in Central Asian and Baltic Regions'., p.19
[100] Brazel. p.339
[101] Pavlenko, 'Linguistic Russification in the Russian Empire'., p.339

Ukrainians as much as for example in the Baltic countries. According to the author, 94% of the population were peasants living in the countryside, in 1897 only 18.9% of Ukrainians above the age of 10 had literacy skills, and less than 1% continued studying beyond primary education.[102] Consequently, only a limited amount of people could be affected by the russification policies through schooling directly.

Later, during Soviet times, due to the different policies which were undertaken by the different party leaders and due to the different historical, social, and political contexts, the russification of education could be implemented more effectively. Linguistic russification through the education system is broadly analysed by Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver in their chapter "Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?". First of all, the authors propose to use a different periodisation for the analysis of the russification in education. It corresponds to the periodisation proposed earlier by Iunus D. Desheriev and divides the USSR period into three parts 1) 1917-1938; 2)1938-1959; 3) 1959-1985.[103]

In this periodisation, the first part of 1917-1938 is characterised as egalitarian. It consists of such processes as the construction of the new alphabets, the opening of non-Russian schools, limitation of the Russian language in non-Russian areas. All of this happened during the period of "nativisation" (korenizatsiia) during the 1920s, when the promotion of national peculiarities was encouraged, therefore the Russian language was studied as a subject but was not usually mandatory.[104]

The main reform of the second period, 1938-1959, was a decree which made the Russian language a mandatory subject of study in school. Historians characterise these years as the period of "differentiated bilingual education". Even though the Russian language became a compulsory subject in non-Russian schools, the "national school" model persisted with the non-Russian language as the primary medium of instruction. Simultaneously, attending Russian-language schools became socially acceptable for non-Russians during this period.[105]

The third period, 1959-1985, started with the education law that removed the Russian language from the obligatory to the voluntary with the rights of parents to choose the language of instruction for their children. This period is called by Anderson and Silver "highly differentiated bilingual education". According to them "in this period, the model non-Russian school diverged into two main types: (1) the traditional "national school," with a non-Russian language as the primary medium of instruction and Russian only as a subject of study; and (2) the school with Russian as the main language of instruction and the non-Russian language as a subject."[106]

[102] Pavlenko., p.346
[103] Anderson and Silver, 'Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?', p.64
[104] Anderson and Silver., p.64
[105] Anderson and Silver., p.64
[106] Anderson and Silver., p.65

Even though in the last period, the parents could choose their native language as the language of instruction, the process of russification already resulted in the shift of language usage in many areas. Therefore, for instance, according to Roman Solchanyk in the 1980s "out of 274 schools in Kyiv, 34 were Ukrainian-language institutions. At the same time, in 24 out of 25 Oblast centres, Russian-language schools accounted for 72% of the total, while the rest were Ukrainian and mixed Ukrainian-Russian schools."[107]

After the collapse of the USSR, the Ukrainian government attempted to use the educational system to reverse the russification process implemented under the Soviet regime. As a result, numerous legislations were implemented in order to influence the bilingual russified people while simultaneously trying to provide enough space for the minorities' languages. The success of these policies will be briefly observed in the last chapter of this thesis.

Russification and religion

Russification and religion, in particular the Russian Orthodox Church, are connected especially tightly. Religion was often used as a controlling tool in empires, and the Russian Empire was no exception.

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which is considered the main imperial religion, was using its influence in the area to support the russification of the population. According to Alexei Miller, in the Russian Empire, russification was a complex concept that depended on one's understanding of the "standard of Russianness" and its key components, including Orthodoxy, the Russian language, culture, and ethnicity. Depending on which component was emphasized, russification could range from language adoption to cultural influence.[108]

Ukrainian population, being Orthodox natively, was facing a separate way of being russified as they were considered "almost Russians" initially and according to the Empire needed a cultural, linguistic and religious boost and guidance to become truly "Russians". As a result, according to Weeks: "Russian administrators saw a clear choice between mainly peasant peoples being polonised and lost to the Russian nation or being "saved" through vigorous action to reinforce their Russian and Orthodox identity."[109] Additionally, through the spread of religious literature which was often printed in Russian or Old Slavonic (which has lots of similarities with Russian) and through the educational institutions which were founded under the control of the Church, the Russian language was gradually substituting or influencing the spoken language of Ukrainians eradicating the differences between the two.

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[107] Solchanyk, 'Ukraine, arusirussia, and Moldavia: Imperial Integration, Russification, and the Struggle for National Survival'., p.270
[108] Mieliekiestsev and Temirova, 'The Policy of Russianization of Ukraine and Other European Territories of Russian Empire: Comparative Analysis'., p.46
[109] Weeks, 'Russification / Sovietization'., paragraph 10

An additional strategy of the russification according to Mieliekiestsev and Temirova involved targeting local church leaders, particularly those of Polish descent or those of the Catholic and Uniat affiliation, who were seen as guardians of national identity and accused of promoting "anti-Russian sentiments." The prevailing belief was that for the Russian Empire to achieve true unity, it was essential for the "Slavic" identity to predominate over other ethnicities. This strategy essentially operated on the principle of "labelling everything as Slavic to assimilate it into the Russian identity."[110]

Later in the USSR, the Russian Orthodox Church was also used as a mechanism of control and influence. Even though the communist ideology was atheist in its nature, at later stages the USSR government had to find a balance appropriate for the social context.

Initially, the ideas of Lenin declared that any religious and ethnonational ties prevent the success of the creation of a "Soviet person". Therefore, for the further integration and development of the Soviet system, it is necessary to promote and impose atheism and internationalism in the understanding of dismissing belonging to any of the nations.[111]

Later, religious affiliations were limitedly allowed based on various factors such as historical ties, nationality amplification, self-identification of the ethnos, etc. Therefore, Bohdan Bociurkiw researching nationalities and religions in the USSR describes the following four patterns which are important for understanding the power balance and connections between the Soviet government and religions: 1) the historical ties between the main religion and its ethnocultural persistence and nation-building process; 2) the degree to which religions were used by the imperial regime as tools for Russification or integration and for the destruction of the peoples' distinctiveness from the Russian core; 3) the impact of Sovietisation on the traditional interdependence between religion and nationality; 4) the specific features of a given religion, including its attitude toward the state, the nature of its organisation, the locations, the adaptability to political and social change.[112]

A special place in the Soviet system was taken by the Russian Orthodox Church which is classified by Bociurkiw as the Imperial Church. Its main task was to consolidate all dangerous Christian beliefs which existed in the USSR and could potentially pose a danger. For example, all Orthodox non-Russians, such as Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Moldavians, the Turkic Chuvash and Gagauz, the Finnic Mordvinians, Mari, Udmurts, and Komi, were integrated within the dominant Russian Orthodox Church, around which the myths about a single and indivisible Christian Church was built.[113]

Christian Orthodoxy was in general a source of many nation-building myths which were spread by the Russian Empire and the USSR. One of the most important in the context of this thesis is the

[110] Mieliekiestsev and Temirova, 'The Policy of Russianization of Ukraine and Other European Territories of Russian Empire: Comparative Analysis'., p.50
[111] Bociurkiw, 'Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies'., p.215
[112] Bociurkiw., p.216-217
[113] Bociurkiw., p.218

trinity and destiny to be one nation for the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. This trinity became a base for the further and deeper assimilation of the Ukrainians and Belarusians to Russians.

Religion also played an important role in preserving national ideas and identities. Therefore, the restrictions for the local and national religions were often severe in the empires. In the Ukrainian context, Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Uniates were believed to be the nationalists and the core of separatism in the territory. For instance, after the Soviet occupation of Galicia in 1944, the Uniate Church representatives refused to join Russian Orthodoxy and to condemn the Ukrainian nationalist resistance. As a result, the Moscow government imprisoned and sent into exile the Church's entire hierarchy and several hundred clergymen of the Uniates.[114] For years, its representatives were considered traitors of the Soviet nation, bourgeois nationalists and Nazi collaborators. The Lithuanian Catholic Church was prosecuted for similar nationalist ideas and accused of "close interdependence of religion and nationalism in Lithuania and the continuing nation-integrating (and, conversely, empire-disintegrating) role".[115]

Today, the Russian Orthodox Church is still used as a russification tool and a useful base for the spread of propaganda and Russian imperial narratives. Therefore, in the following chapters a special attention will be paid to the russification in the context of religion, and religious institutions and initiatives.

Russification and identity

Another context of russification which is important for this thesis is the connection between russification and identity. First of all, all the above-mentioned peculiarities of russification were leading in one way or another to the issue of identity. As assimilation in general aims to substitute fully or partially the identity of a person, russification in its nature has a similar goal. The question of whether it was done voluntarily or involuntarily, structurally or based on historical, social, and economic contexts, efficiently enough or not due to the size of the colonised lands, requires first of all an acceptance that assimilation and russification in particular indeed happened to different ethnical groups residing on the territories of the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation.

The identities of the Ukrainian and Belarusian populations were targeted specifically hard, as their territories belonged to the Russian statehood in its various forms and borders for a long period of time. The role of linguistic, cultural, and religious similarities also cannot be underrated. For instance, Hajda and Beissinger comment: "For historic reasons – including religious, as the Russians interpreted them – the Ukrainians were viewed as a branch of the Russian nation. Precisely because they were thought to be

[114] Bociurkiw., p.224
[115] Bociurkiw., p.223

closer to the Russians than any other group (save the Belarusians), expression of Ukrainian distinctness was especially subject to persecution".[116]

Under the Tsars, the issue of self-identification had a different context than at the later stage of the development of the Russian statehood. Due to the fact that the peasants in general tended to identify themselves rather according to the region, village, language or religion,[117] it is usually difficult to follow the reidentification dynamic of those times. In general, it is observed that even though the issue of identity was not central for the peasants themselves, the government put effort into forbidding the self-distinguishing of the Ukrainians and Belarusians from the Russians. Hajda and Beissinger talk about "the Tsarist policy of denying the Ukrainians and Belarusians a distinct identity, including a separate identity in religious matters."[118]

Meanwhile, using data of the 1897 census, Pavlenko argues that the importance of the imposing of the Russian identity on the Ukrainians and Belarusinas was dictated by the need to keep Russians as a majority of the population in the Empire. Without Ukrainians who consisted 17.9% of the population and Belarusians (4.7%), the Russian population was only 44.3% and it was a minority in its own state.[119] Consequently, the Orthodox ethnic groups which were speaking a similar Slavic language were the easiest target group to get assimilated, russified and considered simply "Russians" in order to have a majority among the population.

The Soviet government continued the policy of unity of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians after a short period of the korenisatsiia policies. As Solchanyk is describing: "Soviet ideologists have increasingly come to view Ukrainians and Belarusians in terms of a special relationship with Russians, a link that is often characterised as "inviolable unity." Another important point, still relevant for the current days, brought by Solchanyk is the struggle of the Russian national idea to differentiate the limits of the Russian identity and the identities of the Ukrainian and Belarusian nations.[120]

Apart from that, the process of the creation of the "Soviet person" identity was ongoing and it required a constant assimilation of different linguistic, cultural, and religious groups. The importance of the Russian identity in the creation of the Soviet identity is unanimous. Russian language, literature, culture, and Orthodoxy were accepted as common and cross-nationally important. As Szporluk cited Trubetskoi: "The Russian nation is no longer the master of the household, but *only* the first among equals."[121] While the phrase refers to the principle of equality of all members, in reality, this concept was used by the Russian nation to create the narrative of its superiority covered by the illusion of equality in the Soviet Union.

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[116] Hajda and Beissinger, *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*., p.6
[117] Brazel, 'Russification Efforts in Central Asian and Baltic Regions'., p.7
[118] Hajda and Beissinger, *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*., p.13
[119] Pavlenko, 'Linguistic Russification in the Russian Empire'., p.340
[120] Solchanyk, 'Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia: Imperial Integration, Russification, and the Struggle for National Survival'., p.268
[121] Szporluk, 'The Imperial Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem'., p.14

Political manipulation around the Russian identity was also quite common. For example, Szporluk claims that the "official propaganda glorified the "great Russian people" and "Russia" in ways that were insulting to non-Russians and embarrassing to many Russians, but the Russian nation, culture, and history were manipulated in order to achieve specific political goals." He adds that a Soviet scholar Gavriil Popov pointed out that "the Russian nation's historical experiences and memories were selectively manipulated by Stalin in order to make the Russians a pliable instrument in his rule over the Soviet Union."[122]

A shadow of Russianness covered Ukrainians and Belarusians especially tightly. As it was mentioned, the so-called "trinity of the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians" as a single "Russian" nation is an identity phenomenon created by the years of Russian dominance on the territories of these nations. Even though the initial myth was created and spread in the Russian Empire mainly through religious institutions and the Russian Orthodox Church, it is important to mention it in the context of national identity formation. The belief in the "trinity" developed far beyond its religious connotations and overtook a lot of contexts in the historical memory which led to the distortion of the political situation and relations between the independent modern countries.

Current Russian imperialism and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are rooted in the same old idea of trinity and identity crisis. The occupation of Ukrainian lands is often accompanied by various russification policies the aim of which is the reidentification of Ukrainians back to Russians as these people supposedly are, according to the Russian worldview. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian diaspora, despite being one of the largest minority communities in Russia, remains invisible within the societal framework. This apparent lack of visibility can be attributed to the strained political relations between Russia and Ukraine since the early 21st century. Consequently, the Ukrainian diaspora's entitlement to rights related to language, culture, education, and identity appears to be disregarded or overlooked.

Russification and migration

Another political instrument which was used and became closely connected to the process of assimilation and russification was mobility. Numerous implementations of resettlements and deportations were effectively adopted by the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. This specific interconnection is at the core of this thesis and the following overview gives a glimpse into the complexity of the matter.

Mobilities had various outcomes, often favourable for the government, including consequent assimilation, russification, reidentification and unity of the state. According to Brazel: "Diversity, segregation and expansion that resulted from Russia's migration patterns in the late nineteenth and early

[122] Szporluk., p.25

twentieth centuries created a mixed and divided population with very little national identity." As a result, the formation of the national and political identity was comparatively slower for certain ethnic groups.

Interestingly Ukrainians often played a double role: being russified and russifying other nationalities. The idea of the Russian Empire was to colonise lands by settling Russians or at least close nationalities. As a result, according to Pavlenko: "Russian was also spread through the migration of Russian nobles (given estates in the newly incorporated territories), Russian officials, and Russian-speaking peasants colonising new territories."[123] Among the Russian-speaking peasants were also Ukrainians, a group which basically was considered by the Empire a variable of Russians. By creating a mixed space with people having various linguistic skills, the government boosted a need for a lingua franca for which the Russian language was the only choice. Consequently, people were naturally russified.

To support this argument, Pavlenko describes the situation of Ukrainians who were actively resettled to the Northern Caucasus, Qazaqstan, Siberia, etc. By 1897, in Siberia 9.4% of the population were Ukrainians, in the Northern Caucuses 33.6%, and in Kuban 47.4%. In total by 1917, it is believed there were around 2,500,000 Ukrainians living outside of the Ukrainian territories. Among them, many were unable to practice the Ukrainian language, culture, and religion in a traditional manner, apart from those who were settled in compact Ukrainian settlements, such as Zelenyi Klyn (Ukr. Зелений Клин), Siryi Klyn (Ukr. Сірий клин), etc. Nevertheless, the 1926 census reported that half of the Ukrainians in the Far East consider Russian as their native language,[124] indicating the ongoing process of russification and assimilation.

Additionally, Ukrainians were also actively russified on the territory of Ukraine. The linguistic assimilation was actively boosted by the industrialisation and urbanisation processes. In particular, during the Industrial Revolution, there was a notable influx of Russian workers into various regions of the Russian Empire, such as Ukraine, Belarus and Bessarabia. Factory owners preferred to bring in skilled Russian workers rather than relying on unskilled local labour. Meanwhile, local Ukrainian peasants tended to stay away from cities and towns. Consequently, Russian speakers became the majority in rapidly growing industrial cities, a tendency which remained visible throughout the Soviet times and is still observable today. For example, in 1897, Poltava was the only city in Ukraine with over 50,000 residents where Ukrainian speakers were the majority, the rest of the cities became Russian-speaking ones.[125]

The deportations of whole ethnic groups whose members were especially active in threatening the regime was another tool for the ongoing process of assimilation. The USSR was famous for its severe policies and deportation strategies. For example, Crimean Tatars who were accused of cooperating with Hitler's regime were deported wholly to Central Asia without an opportunity to come back to their homeland for more than forty years. During this time, they were denied their rights to receive education,

[123] Pavlenko, 'Linguistic Russification in the Russian Empire'., p.337
[124] Pavlenko., p.347
[125] Pavlenko., p.346-347

print any media or practice their culture in their native language. After the generations were raised in a dispersed community, often Crimean Tatars were assimilated and russified.

And even though Ukrainians were not targeted as a whole group, the population often suffered from various deportation policies such as dekurkulisation, resettlement of the frontier zones, etc. In this way, hundreds of thousands of people were victims of the forced migration policies of the Soviet Union. Additionally, intelligentsia representatives who are known to be main preservers of the Ukrainian language and culture, Ukrainian Orthodox, Uniat or Catholic religions, were often targeted by the regime and deported as "people's enemies" (Ukr. вороги народу). The victims of the regime were hundreds of politicians, writers, painters, historians, civil activists, vocal members of student groups, etc. By dismissing the most active and loud part of the intelligentsia, the government tried to reduce the separatist and nationalist mood among the population, clearing its way for further deeper assimilation and russification.

The programs of the resettlement of Russian workers and governors to the places of residency of the deported "bourgeois nationalist" elements were also commonly practised. For example, Burg writes that "Russians in the non-Russian territories […] represent a potentially powerful base of support for conservative opposition to any changes that might enhance the local autonomy of native elites".[126] Therefore, the presence of such groups in society on the territory which had a tendency for separatism was highly desirable.

After the collapse of the USSR, forced migration changed to voluntary mobility. However, the russification of the Ukrainians residing in Russia continued since the Ukrainian diaspora barely had any institutionalised rights for practising being Ukrainians. After the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, the diaspora of Ukrainians in Russia was enlarged through refugees and deported people.

All the implications of migration and assimilation will be described in detail in the next chapters of this thesis, focusing specifically on the Soviet era and the years after the collapse of the USSR. While exploring this topic, I anticipate finding the arguments for the nexus of displacement and russification in the contexts described above – language, education, religion, and identity.

[126] Burg, 'Nationality Elites and Political Change in the Soviet Union'., p.62

II. Soviet times

Displacement and assimilation of Ukrainians during the USSR times are each individually not new topics in academia. The last three decades were fruitful in the field of the history of migration and russification. However, in my perspective, it is time to connect the topic of mobility of Ukrainians with the subject of russification during Soviet times, as their nexus can help us understand the continuous tools and strategies applied by Moscow in the context of assimilation.

Before describing in detail the migration flows and their outcomes, it is important to mention the classification which will be used in this research. Since mobility is often categorised into two groups based on people's willingness to relocate, the majority of studies usually describe it as voluntary mobility and involuntary (forced) mobility.

At the same time, Pavel Polian describes a third type of migration which is specific to the USSR – the so-called voluntary-compulsory (*добровільно-примусовий*) migration which he includes in his forced migrations classification. Polian describes this type of migration as the mobility influenced by the "state-imposed circumstances and factors that influence individual decision taking regarding resettlement in such a way that it leads them to take the decisions preferred by the state."[127] In other words, it's a choice without a real choice. Within this type of mobility, the author mentions migration to remote and non-reclaimed territories; migration connected to military, industrial, power production-related and other types of construction work; resettlement of demobilised army service members and all types of displacements of the evacuees, refugees, voluntary repatriates.[128]

In this thesis, I will use Polian's classification of forced migrations as a framework (see Table 2). I will specifically concentrate on forced and voluntary-compulsory migrations while occasionally referring to voluntary mobilities that exhibit some degree of connection to involuntary movements.

A. REPRESSIVE MIGRATIONS (Deportations)		
I. ON SOCIAL GROUNDS		
	1. Decossackisation (1919–1920)	
	2. Dekulakisation (1930–1933)	
	3. Expulsion of nobility (1935)	
II. ON ETHNIC GROUNDS		
	1. "Political preparation of the theatre of war" and "border sweeps":	
		a) total,
		b) partial.
	2. Total deportations of "punished peoples":	
		a) preventive

[127] Polian, *Against Their Will.*, p.1
[128] Polian., p.45

		b) "retributive."
	3. Compensatory migrations	
	4. Imposed "Pale of settlement"	
III. ON CONFESSIONAL GROUNDS		
	1. Entire confessions (True Orthodox Christians, Jehovists and others)	
	2. Clerics from various confessions	
IV. ON POLITICAL GROUNDS		
	1. Members of banned organisations and parties	
	2. "People's enemies' " family members	
	3. "Socially unsafe" elements	
	4. The treaty repatriates	
	5. Foreign nationals	
V.PRISONERS OF WAR		
	1. POWs	
	2. Civilian internees	
VI. PRISONERS		
	1. Political (prisoners of conscience)	
	2. Criminals	
B. NON-REPRESSIVE ("Voluntary–Compulsory") MIGRATIONS		
VII. PLANNED RESETTLEMENTS AND RESETTLEMENTS "ON CALL"		
	1.To remote and non-reclaimed territories	
	2. From the mountains to the plain	
	3. As an effect of military, industrial, power production-related and other types of construction work	
	4. Resettlement of demobilised army service members	
VIII. EVACUEES (re-evacuees), REFUGEES, VOLUNTEER REPATRIATES		
	1. Displaced by war	
	2. Displaced as a result of genocide, ethnic or confessional conflicts	
	3. Displaced by natural disasters and environmental catastrophes	

Table 2. Classification of forced migrations in the USSR, Pavel Polian[129]

The next sections will be dedicated to the overview of the forced and voluntary-compulsory mobilities of Ukrainians in Soviet times. The visualisation of the mentioned movements is created in form of two tables according to the direction of the migration to or from the Ukrainian territory and is attached as the Appendix 2 and 3 of this thesis. The dates of the events, target groups and approximate

[129] Polian., p.44-45

number of the affected people are based on the work of Polian. After describing the Ukrainian migration in different decades of the 20th century, I will identify and discuss in a separate section the implications of russification taking into account the contexts of language, education, religion and identity formation.

Mobilities of the 1920s – 1930s: dekurkulisation, Great Terror, organised resettlements.

The fall of the Russian Empire, the Civil War, the communist revolution, and the creation of the Soviet Union are marked by a high amount of mobilities and migrations. The people's movements of the 1920s and 1930s are influenced by the processes of dekurkulisation, collectivisation, numerous forced organised and voluntarily non-organised resettlements to the remote territories, frontier resettlement, political arrests, and NKVD-guided resettlement of the non-reliable territories. The mobility of thousands of people from and to the territory of Ukraine is a significant event, which could not go unnoticed and has undoubtedly influenced the self-identification of the population.

Forced migrations

The Russian Revolution was marked by various military actions between different armies that were fighting for different state-building ideas and processes. Such political instability caused profound mobility chaos on the territory of the former Russian Empire. After the Red Army and Bolsheviks emerged as victors, it was important for the winners to implement the policies which would cover not just the ideology of communism promised by the revolution, but also combine it with convincing the nations which were included in the new state (willingly or after the loss of the fight for their independency) that the policies will differ from those in the Russian Empire.

That's how the policy of the *korenisatsiia* [*коренізація*], or "indigenisation" in the 1920s started to be implemented by the newly established government in Moscow. The indigenisation itself was broadly studied by different researchers and from an overlook, the Soviet Union could be indeed perceived, as the historian Terry Martin has described, as the world's first "affirmative action empire".[130] However, after a few years of various initiatives aimed at the development of the minorities' cultures, languages, literatures, etc., the Soviet government noticed that even though they believed that such actions would bring the member-nations closer to Soviet Moscow as they would "recognise the progressive and positive nature of Soviet socialism"[131], the opposite happened: national elites were empowered and consequentially were empowering others by breeding "bourgeois nationalism" among population.

[130] Weeks, 'Russification / Sovietization'., p.20
[131] Weeks., p.22

Therefore, the policies of *korenisatsiia* were stopped and instead, numerous repressive actions, including executions and deportations, followed.

Even though the end of indigenisation was never proclaimed officially and people were not prosecuted in mass for being part of these policies, the process of dekurkulisation[132], which took place simultaneously, was used as a punishment action and applied to those groups which were openly anti-Soviet. It is difficult to separate the numbers of victims of the "real" economic dekurkulisation and the dekurkulisation which was used as a prosecution since these processes were tightly interconnected and could serve as the repression of different classes of people with a broad range of accusations.

In general, the process of dekulakisation/dekurkulisation was one of the biggest highlights of the 1920s-1930s in the context of migration. The term kulak (from *кулак* in Russian) or kurkul (from *куркуль* in Ukrainian)[133] didn't always have a political connotation. However, already at the end of the 1920s, the Communist party authorities and their official proclamations ideologically identified a particular social group among the peasants who did not align with the socialist way of life in terms of economic, organisational, and national characteristics. Such individuals were named kurkul or kulak.[134]

The researchers of the dekurkulisation are still debating the number of victims of the policy aimed at destroying the "kurkul" class. The main difficulties with the estimate numbers are connected to the high secrecy of the reporting documents, as well as the loose process of reporting in general. For instance, from the reports accessible, historians claim that between 1929 and 1936 around 500,000 people were deported from the Ukrainian SSR territory, excluding those "kurkuls" who were executed and those who were resettled within the republic's territory.[135]

Other historians name much higher numbers which are based on the Postyshev's report at the XII Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1934. In this report he mentioned 200,000 deported kurkul farms[136], which could mean around 1 million deported people, considering that the average family consisted of around 5 members. Such a high number looks exaggerated and could demonstrate the loose system of reporting in the 1930s, as well as signal the necessity for Postyshev to portray the dekurkulisation process in Ukraine as a significant success.

As for the individuals who were deported, they originated from diverse regions and their reasons for being forcibly relocated greatly varied. For example, residents of the frontier regions were accused of foreign espionage or resettled as non-reliable people, while the population of other Ukrainian regions were often defined as those passively opposing communism and avoiding collectivisation. Certain groups were indeed actively protesting against the communist authorities and were accused of being traitors and

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[132] *Translated from the Ukrainian "розкуркулення" (rozkurkulennia).*

[133] I will use the terms "kurkul" and "dekurkulization" due to the Ukrainian sources I am using as well as the Ukrainian history context I am putting it into.

[134] Maročko, 'Stalins′ka teoriya i praktyka "nastupu na kurkulya"'., ст.85

[135] Matvyeyev and Rybak, 'Deportatsiya Rozkurkulenykh Selyan Druhoyi Katehoriyi z Ukrayiny u 1930-1936 Rr.: Chysel′nist′, Kharakter, Heohrafiya Poselennya'., p. 64

[136] Maročko, 'Stalins′ka teoriya i praktyka "nastupu na kurkulya"'., p.88

counterrevolutionary. Romanets describes the deportations like this: "The eviction of kurkul families from the regions of Ukraine was carried out taking into account such criteria as the state of collectivisation, the registration of kurkul farms, the size of the eviction carried out in 1930, political features, the degree of activity of the kurkuls, etc. Thus, the socio-economic situation of peasants was only one of the indicators of belonging to the kurkul layer. Poor and middle-class peasants could easily be included in the kurkul lists by being qualified as former Petliurists [*supporters of Symon Petliura*], Hetmans [*supporters of Hetmanat*], rebels, etc. In the border regions, candidates for deportation were selected for mythical ties to Poland and Romania."[137]

The operations of deportations had different levels of preparation. For instance, the deportation of kurkuls between the 1st of June and the 15th of July 1931 was particularly planned to cover Ukrainian territory gradually: "according to the sequence determined by the ODPU: first, the most dangerous regions: the border zone and the Right Bank (the territory of the Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kyiv operators' sectors and the AMSSR[138]), then the steppe zone (strategically important grain regions), zones of continuous collectivisation (Odesa and Dnipro operators' sectors), followed by the industrial areas of Donbas and, finally, the Left Bank, which had the lowest level of collectivisation (Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv operators' sectors)."[139]

The resistance movement of the peasants started almost immediately after the coercion of obligatory collectivisation in the autumn and winter of 1929 and the first half of 1930. Grain procurements, confiscation of property, and deportations were not taken by the population quietly, and the protests all over Ukraine (but also in other Soviet Republics) were organised on both individual and group levels. Notably, not only the rural population was resisting, but part of the intelligentsia also supported the protests.[140] More importantly, Vasyliev describes that Ukraine was one of the most protesting areas of the Soviet Union and, therefore, targeted specifically hard: "Ukraine was one of the regions of the USSR where the resistance of the peasantry became widespread and often took the form of physical, armed struggle against the actions of the authorities. […] In 1930, the GPU recorded a total of 4,098 mass demonstrations in Ukraine, which is almost 30% of the total number of peasant demonstrations in the USSR. The Chekists estimated the average number of participants in one demonstration at 298 peasants. Estimates suggest that more than 1.2 million people in Ukraine participated in active forms of resistance to collectivisation."[141] The numbers suggest that the following dekurkulisation policies could be targeting around 1.2 million people in particular.

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[137] Romanets′, 'Deportatsiya Kurkuliv 1931 r.: Osoblyvosti Provedennya, Naslidky'., p.125

[138] *Autonomous Moldovan Socialist Soviet Republic was an autonomous republic of the Ukrainian SSR between 12 October 1924 and 2 August 1940.*

[139] Romanets′, 'Deportatsiya Kurkuliv 1931 r.: Osoblyvosti Provedennya, Naslidky'., p.124-125

[140] Maročko, 'Stalins′ka teoriya i praktyka "nastupu na kurkulya"'., p.93

[141] Vasyl′yev, 'Selyans′kyy Opir Kolektyvizatsiyi v Ukrayini (1930-Ti Rr.)'., p.142

The main destinations for the deportations included the sparsely populated, or at least perceived as under-settled by the Communist regime, lands of the Northern Territory, Siberia, the Urals, the special settlement of the Belomorsk-Baltic Combine, and Qazaqstan, particularly the Karaganda region.[142] As a result, some areas became quite overpopulated with Ukrainians. For instance, Matveev and Rybak present the data that in 1931 the proportion of Ukrainian families in the Northern Urals was 25.1% of the total number of deportees to the Ural region. And excluding the dekurkulised local peasants of the Ural, the proportion of Ukrainians increased to 38.5% of families, or 34.6% of people residing in the region.[143]

The conditions of the places to which people were deported were often described as highly unsuitable for human habitation. For example, Romanets presents the number that as of the 1st of December 1930, 21,213 people (16.8%) of the 126,095 deportees to the Northern Territory had died due to the severe conditions of life and work at the settlements.[144] Those surviving these conditions were regularly used as a cheap labour force: 96.2% worked in the forest industry.[145] With such life and work conditions, decent life quality was scarce.

Already after the beginning of the deportations, it became obvious that the system was not ready to manage a high number of deportees arriving in the faraway regions. Apart from the fact that the travel conditions were extremely difficult, people had to travel for weeks and sometimes over a month in cargo waggons which resulted in the cost of thousands of lives especially of the most vulnerable such as children and elderlies, it is reported that people were sometimes robbed or misled regarding what they could take with them or where they go. For instance, the report of Berman, Head of the Gulag of the NKVD, states: "According to the NKVD of the Karaganda region, the migrants were misled before their departure from Ukraine, that they were going to the south where they did not need warm clothes, that there is no salt in Qazaqstan and cattle do not acclimatise well, which caused them to sell warm clothes, cows and take with them large stocks of salt."[146]

Trying to create order in the chaos of the resettlements, the OGPU[147] issued in 1931 the regulation document called "Provisional Regulations of the OGPU on the Rights and Obligations of Special Resettlers and the functions of the settlement administration in the areas of settlement of special resettlers" ("Provisional Regulation" further on). Even though the "Provisional Regulation" was supposed to be temporal, it stayed valid for many years ahead, regardless of nominal "losing" its validity

[142] Matvyeyev and Rybak, 'Deportatsiya Rozkurkulenykh Selyan Druhoyi Katehoriyi z Ukrayiny u 1930-1936 Rr.: Chysel′nist′, Kharakter, Heohrafiya Poselennya'., p.61
[143] Matvyeyev and Rybak., p.61-62
[144] Romanets′, 'Represiyi Proty «kolyshnikh Kurkuliv»'., p.106
[145] Matvyeyev and Rybak, 'Deportatsiya Rozkurkulenykh Selyan Druhoyi Katehoriyi z Ukrayiny u 1930-1936 Rr.: Chysel′nist′, Kharakter, Heohrafiya Poselennya'., p.59
[146] Doneseniye nachal'nika GULAGa M.D. Bermana narkomu NKVD G.G. Yagode o meropriyatiyakh, svyazannykh s rasseleniyem semey s Ukrainy. 16 iyunya 1936 g. // GARF. F. R-9479. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 7-11. Zaverennaya kopiya.
[147] OGPU from Russian: Объединённое государственное политическое управление, translation to English: the Joint State Political Directorate.

after the approval of the Constitution in 1936. However, since the new regulation was not approved, the previous one was considered as the main instruction for actions.[148]

This regulation is interesting in the context of this thesis as it describes not only the obligations of the deportees but also their rights. It is important to consider that it was extremely difficult, and most probably impossible, to fight for the deportees' rights in case of their violations, but this regulation helps us to provide an overview of the rights granted on paper.

First of all, it is mentioned in paragraph 4 that: "Special resettlers and their family members have the right to admission to local schools, courses, etc. on the same terms as freemen." However, the Note also says: "If there are no or if there is an insufficient number of local schools for children in the settlement centres, an additional specialised school network is organised*." Under the asterisk, it's added that "Special resettlers and members of their families have the right to admission to local schools, courses, etc. on the same terms as freemen".[149]

In reality, it was reported that the 1931/1932 academic year was disrupted, and not even 10% of the children, in some settlements it's under 5%, visited schools. Berdinskih et al. mention that: "The number of school-age children only in the special settlements of the Urals, Eastern Siberia and the North Caucasus in 1931 exceeded 129 thousand, of which no more than 3% were enrolled in school. By the mid-1930s, this situation was largely rectified, and most children were enrolled in schools. The authorities attached special importance to this, as school education and training were seen as an important tool for "separating children from the influence of reactionary parents". In September 1938, there were 1,106 primary, 370 incomplete secondary and 136 secondary schools in labour settlements, as well as 230 vocational schools and 12 technical colleges; there were 8,280 teachers, of whom 1,104 were labour settlers. There were 217,454 children enrolled in all educational establishments in the labour settlements, and 22,029 young children in preschool establishments, guided by 2,749 educators."[150]

Apart from the numbers, Berdinskih et al. also comment that paragraph 4 was often ignored "firstly, because schools were not available in all special settlements, and the "local" settlements where schools were available were located at a considerable distance from the special settlements; secondly, many children of special settlers could not attend school for the simple reason that they lacked clothes, shoes, and elementary school supplies; thirdly, the access of "kurkul" children to institutions of vocational education was practically closed."[151]

Regarding the language of instruction, there are no signs of attempts to provide children with schooling in their native languages and based on the highly internationalised camps in general as well as

[148] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev, *Sistema spetsposeleniy v Sovetskom Soyuze 1930-1950kh godov*., p.168
[149] Vremennoye polozheniye OGPU o pravakh i obyazannostyakh spetspereselentsev i funktsiyakh poselkovoy administratsii v rayonakh rasseleniya spetspereselentsev. 25 oktyabrya 1931 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 40—43. Zaverennaya kopiya. Opubl.: Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoy Sibiri. Vesna 1931 — nachalo 1933 g. Novosibirsk, 1993., p. 68—76.
[150] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev, *Sistema spetsposeleniy v Sovetskom Soyuze 1930-1950kh godov*., p.160
[151] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev., p.160

the low agency of the deportees, it is fair to assume that the schooling was provided in general in Russian language. Some authors claim that the camps themselves could be seen as another tool for linguistic assimilation as well as the tool for the creation of reliable "Soviet person" characteristics, particularly among children who were raised under the control of the NKVD. For instance, in the memories of Nadiya Tutik, she compares her experience of being born into deportation with that of her cousin, who was 10 years old at the time of deportation and who always refused to integrate into Soviet life.[152] The resistance to assimilation will also be visible in the ways of creating cultural groups in the camps since the witnesses and survivors of the camps often mentioned cultural events which were organised in native languages by the deportees themselves.

Coming back to the "Provisional Regulation", paragraphs 6 and 7 mention the right of the deportees to organise groups and events: "6. Special settlers and their families have the right, with the prior approval of the commandant's office of the OGPU, to establish cultural and educational organisations within the settlements (self-education circles, circles of various arts and sanitary circles). 7. Special settlers and their families, with the prior permission of the commandant's office of the OGPU, have the right to meet on issues of cultural and educational nature, issues of competition and striking, and issues of social order in the settlements." Additional note to these paragraphs says: "All public meetings of special settlers are held by a representative of the commandant's office of the OGPU, and all decisions of these meetings are valid only after they have been approved by the commandant's office."[153]

Even though the illustrative examples of the implementation of such activities come from the 1950s and will be described in the last section of this chapter, it is possible to assume that the idea of such type of permission was the same: people could exercise their native languages in the families, practice some traditions and organise cultural events under the supervision of the OGPU and NKVD as long as these activities were reproducing simple folklore style actions, representing the underdeveloped almost tribal style of the activities and in general were not against the policies of the sovietisation.

In 1935 and 1936 two interesting documents for the research on migration and assimilation were adopted, which could influence the situation of the deportees, however, they brought very few changes. In 1935 the Decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on schools in labour camps was adopted. Paragraph 1 of this document states: "To oblige the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR, together with the NKVD, to develop within a month and submit for approval by the Schools Division of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks specific measures to expand and strengthen the school

[152] 'Staty radyans'koyu lyudynoyu?'
[153] Vremennoye polozheniye OGPU o pravakh i obyazannostyakh spetspereselentsev i funktsiyakh poselkovoy administratsii v rayonakh rasseleniya spetspereselentsev. 25 oktyabrya 1931 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 40—43. Zaverennaya kopiya. Opubl.: Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoy Sibiri. Vesna 1931 — nachalo 1933 g. Novosibirsk, 1993., p. 68—76.

network in labour settlements, ensuring that the children of labour settlers receive universal education on a general basis. The school construction plan for the next two or three years should include the construction of new school buildings (from primary to secondary schools) in the biggest labour villages at the expense of the local budget."[154] This paragraph illustrates a specific focus of the central government on the long-term need not just of schools, but of the well-established structure of camps and settlements, therefore, it signalises the willingness of the Soviet government to continue its policy of deportation and forced migration of thousands of people in the future. At the same time, the focus on schools can illustrate the deep understanding of the role of schooling on deported children in order to grow the next generation of reliable Soviet people loyal to the state.

One year later, in 1936, the Stalin Constitution was adopted. Without going into depth about the importance of this document, it is worth mentioning the variety of rights that were theoretically granted in the document such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and holding of mass meetings, freedom of street processions and demonstrations, equality for women, equality irrespective of nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, etc.[155] The ongoing debate on whether the document was simply a tool of propaganda or can be considered as an attempt to achieve the Communist ideal world is ongoing. However, it is difficult to ignore the fact that already in 1937 Stalin initiated the Great Purge which resulted in thousands of people being executed or deported, including some of the authors of this very constitution, regardless of the violations of their rights mentioned in the constitution of the Union.

As a result of the Great Terror in 1937-1938 hundreds of thousands of people were prosecuted, among whom many were Ukrainians. According to Snyder, out of 681,692 recorded death sentences during the Great Terror, 123,421 were carried out on the territory of Ukraine[156], while thousands of others were deported.

Additionally, on 2nd of July 1937 another "kurkul operation" was authorised by a directive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party. This directive defined the main contingents of the repression this time: "former kurkuls" and criminal offenders. Under the signature of Stalin, paragraph 94 ("On anti-Soviet elements") of the document states: "It has been noticed that most of the former kurkuls and criminals who were at one time expelled from various Oblasts to the northern and Siberian districts, and then after the expulsion period expired, returned to their Oblasts, are the main instigators of all sorts of anti-Soviet and subversive crimes, both in collective and state farms, in transport and some branches of industry. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes that all secretaries […] should take a record of all kurkuls and criminals who have returned to their

[154] Postanovlenye SNK SSSR y TSK VKP(b) o shkolakh v trudposelkakh. 15 dekabrya 1935 h. // HARF, f. R-9479, op. 1-s, d. 25, l. 18,19. Kopyya.
[155] Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (utverzhdena postanovleniyem Chrezvychaynogo VIII S"yezda Sovetov Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik ot 5 dekabrya 1936 g.)
[156] Snyder, *Bloodlands*., p.107

homeland so that the most hostile of them should be immediately arrested and shot in the order of administrative execution of their cases through troikas[157], while the remaining less active but still hostile elements should be enumerated and deported to the districts on the instructions of the NKVD. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) proposes to submit to the Central Committee within five days the composition of the troikas and the number of those to be shot, as well as the number of those to be expelled."[158]

The following reports of the NKVD illustrate the dynamics of the arrests per republic and Oblast, as well as per category. For example, in the NKVD report from the 1st of March 1938, it was reported that in total 606,240 people were arrested in the USSR, 270,656 as the 1st category (to be executed) and 341,816 as the 2nd category (to be imprisoned and/or deported). Among these, were arrested in the Ukrainian SSR 83,950: 36,150 as the 1st category and 47,800 as the 2nd category.[159] There are no publicly available later reports, however, from the summary of the 1st special department of the NKVD of the USSR "On the number of those arrested and convicted by the NKVD of the USSR for the period from the 1st of October 1936 to the 1st of July 1938" it is known that on the 1st of July 1938 already 253,051 citizens of the Ukrainian SSR were reported to be arrested, 111,675 of them within the NKVD Order No. 00447 specifically (others were arrested within the orders of the arrests of the Poles and Germans on the frontier territories).[160] Unfortunately, the report doesn't show information regarding how many Ukrainian SSR citizens specifically were classified as 1st category or as 2nd category, however, the report shows the overall number for the USSR. In total 1,420,711 people were arrested: 1,124,000 of them were convicted, 556,259 executed, and the rest were arrested and/or deported.[161]

Regarding the situation with the arrests in the Ukrainian SSR, Yezhov, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, wasn't satisfied with the process on the territory of the republic and in February he sent a draft order of the NKVD of the USSR on "shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of mass operations" in Ukraine. He mainly criticised the overwhelming focus of the operations on the peasants and the less "effective" work being done in the cities. He commented: "For the most part, the anti-Soviet activists on the surface were arrested (members of […] church activists, individual carriers of anti-Soviet and anti-kolkhoz sentiments, rank and file insurgent and White Guards, etc.), while the most conspiratorial and organised kurkuls and White Guards and espionage formations remained undiscovered. The lack of the necessary operational and political purposefulness in mass operations also

[157] A group consisting of three persons.
[158] Resheniye Politbyuro TSK VKP(b) № P51/94 ot 2 iyulya 1937 goda "Ob antisovetskikh elementakh"
[159] Svodka № 33 GUGB NKVD ob arestovannykh i osuzhdennykh na osnovanii prikaza NKVD SSSR № 00447 ot 30 iyulya 1937 g. Ne raneye 1 marta 1938 g. // TSA FSB RF. F. 3. Op. 5. D. 573. L. 131—133. Podlinnik.
[160] Iz svodki 1 spetsotdela NKVD SSSR «O kolichestve arestovannykh i osuzhdennykh organami NKVD SSSR za vremya s 1 oktyabrya 1936 g. po 1 iyulya 1938 g.». Ne raneye 1 iyulya 1938 g. // TSA FSB RF. F. 3. Op. 5. D. 572. L. 36—43, 46—48, 55, 69. Podlinnik.
[161] Iz svodki 1 spetsotdela NKVD SSSR «O kolichestve arestovannykh i osuzhdennykh organami NKVD SSSR za vremya s 1 oktyabrya 1936 g. po 1 iyulya 1938 g.». Ne raneye 1 iyulya 1938 g. // TSA FSB RF. F. 3. Op. 5. D. 572. L. 36—43, 46—48, 55, 69. Podlinnik.

led to the fact that little attention was paid to nationalist formations such as Makhnovist and Petliurovists, their links with foreign emigrant centres, and their entanglements with foreign intelligence services." He encouraged future operations to pay more attention to the leaders of the anti-Soviet formations and nationalist groups.[162] It is possible to assume that after the implementation of this specific order, the number of arrested people in the Ukrainian SSR started drastically increasing.

This operation is believed to be the final and biggest operation on the "cleansing of the Ukrainian villages". Romanets, for example, explains that one of the common things for this operation was the fact that in 1930-1933 these people already were prosecuted as "kurkuls" and during the Great Terror, they were again accused of "counter-revolutionary agitation" under Article 54-10 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, since the application of this article made it easier for NKVD investigators to falsify criminal cases. For instance, the "confession" of the accused and the "correct" testimony of witnesses were now sufficient for prosecution.[163] Later in the second half of the 1950s and first half of the 1960s, the so-called "additional verification" of archival and investigative files was carried out as part of Khrushchev's rehabilitation and a lot of falsifications were reported.[164]

Nevertheless, rehabilitation did not prevent people from spending years in labour camps, being deported to faraway lands, and deprived of their land, cultures, languages, and identities.

Voluntary-compulsory migrations

Apart from the forced migration during the 1920s and 1930s, there were also bright examples of voluntary-compulsory migrations, where the Ukrainian territory served as both the point of departure and the destination. The main reason for the voluntary-compulsory migration during this period was the economic need to provide lands for the peasants from the overpopulated Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian republics. The level of overpopulation in the 1920s was reported to be around 14,5 million people in the Russian SFSR, 7,2 million people in the Ukrainian SSR and 1,7 million people in the Belarusian SSR. In April 1925, the plenum of The Central Committee of the Communist Party recognised that it was necessary to reduce the acuteness of the issue of "overpopulation" in the countryside and expand publicly funded works primarily in areas with the largest number of available labourers. Additionally, on the 10th of April 1925, the All-Union Resettlement Committee under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR was established by a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. And already on the 7th of October 1926, a new state body at the national level was established: the All-Ukrainian Resettlement Committee. Its main functions were the formation of long-term and annual resettlement plans which had to be submitted to the Central

[162] Proyekt prikaza NKVD SSSR o «nedochetakh podgotovki i provedeniya massovykh operatsiy» na Ukraine. Fevral' 1938 g. // TSA FSB RF. F. 3. Op. 5. D. 4. L. 2-15. Kopiya.
[163] Romanets′, '«Kolyshni Kurkuli» Yak Tsil′ova Hrupa «kurkul′s′koyi Operatsiyi» 1937-1938 Rr.', C.35
[164] Romanets′., C.34

Resettlement Committee of the USSR. In this way, colonisation and resettlement activities were to be carried out based on the all-Union plan strictly managed and controlled by the central Soviet government.[165]

The numbers of the voluntary-compulsory resettled citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are hard to trace due to the political turmoil regarding the plan to resettle the peasants, as well as the change of the plans due to the fabricated famine in 1932-1933 in Ukraine. Additionally, the return of the resettlers to the places of origin was highly common, therefore, the estimated numbers are not precise. However, it is possible to imagine the scale of the migration volume due to some documents and research focused on different regions of Ukraine.

For example, Rozovyk while analysing the migration of the Ukrainians to the Qazaq ASSR in the 1920s-1930s mentions the number of 190-200,000 people being settled there. However, the author also mentions that based on his estimates around 250,000 Ukrainians probably died during the famine in Qazaqstan in 1931-33.[166] At the same time, Dolynska while analysing the plans of the All-Ukrainian Resettlement Committee describes the constant changes implemented by the authorities. For instance, she describes that first, the institution developed the 7-year Perspective Plan (1925-1932), which aimed at resettling 1,865,000 people and was tied to the all-Union development plan. Later in January 1927, new instructions were issued and in October a new plan was approved with a 10-year goal to resettle the "surplus" population in Ukraine of around 5,215,071 people by 1932-1933. The plan was suddenly interrupted probably by the grain procurement crisis of 1927, the collapse of the NEP, and the creation of the foundations of a socialist economy. A new 5-year plan was created according to which 700,000 people were to move from Ukraine to vacant lands.[167] All the changes are believed to benefit the economic and political interests of the state rather than the peasant ones, even though the reports provided by the government from time to time describe the requests of the peasants for resettlement to the new lands, numbers of which are difficult to verify.

As it was mentioned before, it is difficult to trace how many of those who actually resettled stayed and settled down in the places of destinations due to the hard political, economic, and weather conditions. Therefore, one of the ways to check the numbers of this type of migration is to observe reports with the number of resettled people, keeping in mind the big waves of return migration. For example, the Resettlement Department of the NKVD discusses the scale of planned resettlements in the USSR for the period 1933-1937 reporting the number of 221,465 people being resettled from the Ukrainian SSR.[168] Another way to analyse the number of resettled people is to work with the census of the total population and take a closer look at the increase or decrease of the population in general and of the specific

[165] Dolyns′ka, 'Ukrayins′ke Selyanstvo v Pereselens′kiy Polityts SRSR u 1920-Ti Roky'., C.77
[166] Rozovik, 'Pereselens′kyy Rukh Ukrayins′koho Naselennya v KASRR (1920-Ti-Pochatok 1930kh Rr.)'., C.85
[167] Dolyns′ka, 'Ukrayins′ke Selyanstvo v Pereselens′kiy Polityts SRSR u 1920-Ti Roky'., C.85
[168] Spravka Pereselencheskogo otdela NKVD SSSR o masshtabakh planovogo pereseleniya v SSSR za period 1933-1937 gg. Ne raneye nachala 1938 g. // RGAE. F. 5675. Op. 1. D. 185. L. 1. Mashinopisnaya kopiya togo vremeni.

nationalities on different territories. This approach is also believed to be not very precise due to the biases of the 1939 Soviet census.

Another type of voluntary-compulsory migration that influenced the identification and assimilation of the Ukrainians was the resettlement of other nationalities to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. The two main waves I will mention are the resettlements before and after Holodomor in 1932-1933 in Ukraine. This thesis will not cover the reasons and outcomes of the Holodomor itself, however, it is worth mentioning that the loss of 3,7 million lives undoubtfully contributed to the assimilation and the crisis of national self-identification.[169]

The organised resettlements to the free territories within the Ukrainian SSR began at the end of the 1920s after the creation of the All-Ukrainian body in 1925 which was managing this process. Dolynska describes that in 1928 about 43,887 households, which means around 250,000 people, moved on the territories of the Ukrainian intra-republican land funds.[170] In the upcoming years, after the loss of millions of people due to the Holodomor (1932-1933), the acute need for labourers created a demographic crisis for the Soviet government. As a result, the resettlement plan was created, and in 1933 and 1934 the Ukrainian SSR was considered already not as a sending territory, but a receiving one. According to the information from the Resettlement Department of the NKVD of the USSR on planned and actual resettlement in the USSR, in 1933 – 21,100 households were planned to be resettled to the Ukrainian SSR from the Belarusian SSR, Gorky Krai (RSFSR), Western Oblast (RSFSR), Ivanovo Oblast (RSFSR), and Central Chernozem Region (RSFSR); in fact 23,583 households were resettled. Additionally, the same document mentions that the next year, 1934, 20,300 households were planned to be resettled from the Ukrainian SSR itself, but also from the Western Oblast and Central Chernozem Region; as a result 20,443 were resettled.[171]

The more detailed document on the number of resettled peasant farms for the period 1933-1937 demonstrates specific numbers and information on the origin of the people to be resettled as well as their region of the destination. It is documented that, for instance, the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR) received 38,612 people from the Western Oblast (RSFSR) in 1933, and then later in 1934 – 953 persons more from the same Western Oblast, 2,141[172] from the Chernihiv Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR), and 9,232 people from the Kyiv Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR); the Odesa Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR) received 34,345 people from the Belarusian SSR and Gorky Krai (RSFSR) in 1933, and in 1934 – 13,065 from the Vinnytsia Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR) and 9,376 from the Kyiv region (the Ukrainian SSR); the

[169] Viktor Hudz in his monography Historiography of Holodomor 1932-1933 in Ukraine has an extensive coverage of the topic of the Ukrainian Holodomor. Additionally, researchers who are covering Holodomor as the tool to influence Ukrainian identity are Mariana Budjeryn, Stanislav Kulchytskyi, Volodymyr Panibudlaska, Vitaliy Ohienko, Tetiana Yevsieieva, Norman Naimark, and many others.

[170] Dolyns′ka, 'Ukrayins′ke Selyanstvo v Pereselens′kiy Polityts SRSR u 1920-Ti Roky'., C.166

[171] Spravka Pereselencheskogo otdela NKVD SSSR o planovom i faktycheskom pereselenii v SSSR s 1933 po 1937 gg. Ne pozdneye 25 yanvarya 1938 g. // RGAE. F. 5675. Op. 1. D. 185. L. 3-3 ob. Mashinopisnaya kopiya togo vremeni.

[172] This number looks odd, as it is reported that from Chernihiv 4,558 households were to be resettled, which cannot be equal to 2,141 people. I accept in my overview the smaller amount of people as it is mentioned in the source.

Donetsk region (the Ukrainian SSR) received 19,311 people from the Yaroslav Oblast (RSFSR) and Ivanovo Oblast (RSFSR) in 1933, and then later in 1934 – 21,931 people from the Chernihiv Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR); the Kharkiv Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR) received 26,180 people from the Kursk and Voronezh Oblasts (RSFSR), and then later in 1934 – another 18,179 people from Voronezh arrived and 8,951people were resettled from the Kyiv Oblast.[173]

Already in September 1934 Muralov, the Chairman of the All-Union Resettlement Committee under the USSR Council of People's Commissars, reported to Stalin, Kaganovich, Zhdanov and Molotov that "according to incomplete data as of the 1st of September 1934, out of 45,500 collective farms resettled in Ukraine, 10,282 farms, or 23.5%, returned, including 4,084 or 34% of those from Odesa Oblast [*the Ukrainian SSR*], 3,198 or 24% from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast [*the Ukrainian SSR*],, 1,677 or 21% from Donetsk Oblast [*the Ukrainian SSR*],, and 1,323 or 12.3% from Kharkiv Oblast [*the Ukrainian SSR*],."[174] Additionally, Muralov comments on the possible reasons for the settlers to come back to the places of their origin, such as lack of financial and material support and national conflicts. The further outcomes of this report are not clear, as there is no available data on the following resettlements to Ukraine after 1934.

At this point, it is also important to mention the common misconception that the resettlement after Holodomor influenced the ethnic composition of the East and South of Ukraine in a way which influences the current political and social, as well as linguistic, situation in Ukraine in these regions. However, the numbers show that this resettlement itself could not influence these Oblasts and their population that drastically. Therefore, it is necessary to add this resettlement policy to the common picture of the general trend of the migrations, deportations and parallel processes of russification which altogether definitely influenced certain Ukrainian regions in a more profound way than the others.

The 1940s-1950s: deportations of non-reliable elements, punishment of the nationalist groups, dekurkulisation, repopulation

In general, the events of the period between the 1940s and the 1960s cannot be summarised in a short way. The first decade is marked by World War II and its preparations and outcomes as well as numerous Soviet deportations of those social groups, and sometimes whole nations, who were seen as "traitors of the state". The victory in the war, occupation of new territories and control of the new Socialist republics boosted the need for the russification and sovietisation processes and consequently led to Russian nationalism and chauvinism rooted deeply in the Soviet culture and identity. After the

[173] Spravka Pereselencheskogo otdela NKVD SSSR o masshtabakh i napravlenii planovykh pereseleniy v SSSR v 1933-1937 gg. Ne raneye nachala 1938 g. // RGAE. F. 5675. Op. 1. D. 185. L. 2-2 ob. Mashinopisnyy podlinnik, podpis' - avtograf.
[174] Dokladnaya zapiska Pereselencheskogo komiteta pri SNK SSSR № 229/1s o vozvrashchenii pereselentsev. 15 sentyabrya 1934 g. // TSA FSB RF. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 619. L. 205—207. Zaverennaya kopiya.

death of Stalin, the situation changed to a certain extent, however, thousands of people continued being prisoners in labour camps and special settlements deprived of their lands, cultures, and identities.

Forced migrations

In the 1940s, new waves of deportations took place. In September 1939, after the Red Army occupied the eastern territories of Poland and the Soviet Union declared reunited Ukraine and Belarus, the operations of deportations and cleansings from non-reliable and dangerous elements began. Polian describes these deportations as the introduction to the "new form of nation building" implemented by the Soviets for "the Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish, and other "nationalists".[175]

The first category of people to be deported was "osadniki". Beriia in his letter to Stalin describes this group: "In December 1920, the former Polish government issued a decree on the establishment of so-called *osadniki* in the areas bordering the USSR. Osadniki were selected from former Polish soldiers, were given up to 25 hectares of land, received agricultural equipment and settled along the border of Soviet Belarus and Ukraine. Surrounded by attention and care, and placed in good material conditions, the osadniki were the backbone of the former Polish government and Polish intelligence." Beriia adds that according to the reports, there are 3,998 of such families in Western Belarus and 9,436 in Western Ukraine, in total around 13,434 families which are potentially dangerous to the Soviet establishment.[176]

Two days after this letter, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to support Beriia's proposal to deport osadniki[177]. On the 29th of December 1939 the preparations were ordered, and destinations were chosen: the Komi ASSR, Kirov (RSFSR), Perm (RSFSR), Vologda (RSFSR), Arkhangelsk (RSFSR), Ivanovo (RSFSR), Yaroslavl (RSFSR), Sverdlovsk (RSFSR) and Omsk Oblasts (RSFSR), and Altay (RSFSR) and Krasnoyarsk Krays (RSFSR).[178]

In the report of the operation on the 12th of February 1940, Beriia communicated to Stalin the numbers of deported people: 124,247 people (24,133 families) boarded trains. Among them, 85,362 people (16,388 families) were deported from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and 38,885 people (7,745 families) were deported from the territory of the Belarusian SSR.[179] Interestingly, already in March 1940 the Soviet government decided to follow the "strategy" of the Polish government and settle on the places of the Polish "osadniki" their own people. It was ordered to keep the housing of the deported people for

[175] Polian, *Against Their Will*., p.115
[176] Pis'mo L.P. Berii I.V. Stalinu s predlozheniyem arestovat' osadnikov, nakhodyashchikhsya na territorii Zapadnoy Ukrainy i Zapadnoy Belorussii. Moskva 2 dekabrya 1939 g. // RGASPI. F. 17. Op. Z.D. 1016. L. 115. Rukopis' na blanke NKVD.
[177] Postanovleniye SNK SSSR № 2122-617ss o deportatsii pol'skikh spetspereselentsev-osadnikov iz zapadnykh oblastey Ukrainy i Belorussii. 29 dekabrya 1939 g.
[178] Postanovleniye SNK SSSR № 2122-617ss o deportatsii pol'skikh spetspereselentsev-osadnikov iz zapadnykh oblastey Ukrainy i Belorussii. 29 dekabrya 1939 g.
[179] Spetssoobshcheniye L.P. Berii I.V. Stalinu o rezul'tatakh operatsii po vyseleniyu osadnikov i lesnoy strazhi iz zapadnykh oblastey Ukrainy i Belorussii. 12 fevralya 1940 g. // AP RF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 199. L. 50-51. Kopiya. Mashinopis'.

"the resettlement of Red Army servicemen, party and soviet workers sent to work in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus."[180]

Interestingly, after the collapse of the USSR and arisen opportunity to discuss the Soviet regime crimes and deportations, Russia issued in 1996 a Note on repressions against Poles and Polish citizens in the USSR, where the Russian authorities report that in February 1940 around 140,000 Polish citizens, mostly families of rural inhabitants of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus were deported and 60,000 more were deported later in April 1940. It is also reported that "the criterion of repression was formally specified not as nationality, but as a social group - "osadniki and forest guards" (together with their families), but in fact, among these special resettlers prevailed persons of Polish nationality, accounting for 83 per cent."[181] As it was cited, the main criteria for the deportation were specifically the social group, therefore, it is possible that those considered to be Polish by the Soviet government due to their language, religion, passport, etc., could be in part Ukrainian Catholics who were often misidentified as Polish.

In 1941 a new wave of deportations began: this time under the radar were the counter-revolutionists and various nationalist groups[182]. In April of that year People's Commissar of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Meshik, wrote to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR Khrushchev and described the situation with the nationalist group in the Ukrainian SSR: "It is known that in the conduct of war, the Germans practiced a treacherous manoeuvre: an explosion in the rear of the belligerent side ("fifth column" in Spain, the treason of the Croats in Yugoslavia). Materials obtained in the process of agent development and investigation on the cases of members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), including the organisation's proclamations and leaflets of the organisation show that during the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, the role of the "fifth column" was to be played by OUN. This "fifth column" could represent a serious force, as it is well-armed and replenishes its warehouses by transferring weapons from Germany. The so-called "revolutionary wire" OUN, led by Stepan Bandera, without waiting for the war, is already organising active opposition to the activities of the Soviet authorities".[183] As a result, Meshik proposed: "1. To extend the law on traitors of the motherland to the members of anti-Soviet organisations in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, Chernivtsi and Izmail regions of the Ukrainian SSR. 2. The families

[180] Resheniye Politbyuro TSK VKP(b) «Ob okhrane gosgranitsy v zapadnykh oblastyakh USSR i BSSR». Moskva, 2 marta 1940 g. // RTSKHIDNI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 27, ll. 48-49.
[181] Spravka o repressiyakh protiv polyakov i pol'skikh grazhdan v SSSR. 22 fevralya 1996 g. // Tekushchiy arkhiv Minnatsa Rossii.
[182] The discussion of the ideologies of these groups and their actions are out of the scope of this thesis. The historiohraphy of this period is described broadly in the article of Suhyi O.: Sukhyy O. Suchasna ukrayins′ka istoriohrafiya natsional′no-vyzvol′noho rukhu periodu Druhoyi svitovoyi viyny ta pislyavoyennoho chasu: viziyi, napryamy, shkoly / O. Sukhyy // Volyn′ i volynyany u Druhiy svitoviy viyni : zb. nauk. pr. za materialamy I Mizhnar. nauk.-prakt. konf., prysvyach. podiyam Druhoyi svitovoyi viyny na terytoriyi Volyn. obl. / uporyad. M. M. Kucherepa. – Luts′k, 2012. – p. 652-664.
[183] Dokladnaya zapiska narkoma NKGB USSR P.YA. Meshika sekretaryu TSK KP(b) USSR N.S. Khrushchevu s predlozheniyami po likvidatsii bazy OUN v zapadnykh oblastyakh Ukrainy. Ne raneye 15 aprelya 1941 g. // Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti... T. I. Kn. 2. 1995. S. 99-100. № 185.

of illegal immigrants, in accordance with this law, are to be repressed and their property is to be confiscated. 3. The families of the arrested Ounovtsy *[members of the OUN]* are to be deported to remote places in the Soviet Union. 4. Considering that the main base of the OUN is the kurkuls, evict the kurkuls to remote areas of the USSR, and their property to be transferred to collective farms."[184]

In the next 10 years, all these orders mentioned by Meshik will be implemented with profound severity. On the 14th of May 1941 the Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the seizure of counter-revolutionary organisations in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR" was issued. The decision describes the main measures to be applied to the deportees: "to be sent into exile for settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years with confiscation of property". Additionally, it established the main target group: "the family members of the participants in counter-revolutionary Ukrainian and Polish nationalist organisations".[185] Another document, while describing the details of the deportation process, also includes the information that all children should accompany their families to exile.[186] The members of the counter-revolutionary nationalist organisations themselves are to be executed.

Already on the 22nd of May, the deportation operation was reported to be successfully finished: "A total of 3,110 families or 11,476 people were scheduled for removal from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. 3,073 families, or 11,329 people, were captured, and loaded into wagons."[187] It took the authorities 9 days to initiate and deport people: organisation of the process, concluding and locating of the target families, the announcement of the guilt, and departure of 11,000 people were done in around 200 hours.

Another similar deportation operation took place in June 1941 and this time almost 30,000 people were deported for counter-revolutionary activities from the Moldovan SSR, specifically from Ismail and Chernivtsi Oblasts. According to the Report of the Deputy Commissar of State Security Kobulov to Stalin, Molotov and Beria on the progress of eviction of families of members of counter-revolutionary organisations from the Moldavian ASSR, Chernivtsi and Ismail Regions of Ukraine, 7,595 people were detained in the Chernivtsi Oblast, 6,991 of which were deported, and 3,852 people were

[184] Dokladnaya zapiska narkoma NKGB USSR P.YA. Meshika sekretaryu TSK KP(b) USSR N.S. Khrushchevu s predlozheniyami po likvidatsii bazy OUN v zapadnykh oblastyakh Ukrainy. Ne raneye 15 aprelya 1941 g. // Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti... T. I. Kn. 2. 1995. S. 99-100. № 185.
[185] Resheniye Politbyuro TSK VKP(b) «Ob iz"yatii kontrrevolyutsionnykh organizatsiy v zapadnykh oblastyakh USSR». Moskva, 14 maya 1941 g. // AP RF. F. 93. Kollektsiya materialov. Katyn'. 1940-2000. Dokumenty. p. 676-677.
[186] Instruktsiya NKVD i NKGB «O poryadke ssylki v otdalennyye severnyye rayony Soyuza SSR chlenov semey lits, nakhodyashchikhsya na nelegal'nom polozhenii, i osuzhdennykh uchastnikov kontrrevolyutsionnykh organizatsiy ukrainskikh, belorusskikh i pol'skikh natsionalistov». 24 aprelya 1941 g. // GARF. F. R-9401. Op. 2. D.1. L. 284-288. Podlinnik; Katyn', 2001. S. 319-321. № 147; Istoriya stalinskogo GULAGa. T. 1. S. 391-392. № 105.
[187] Iz dokladnoy zapiski NKGB SSSR v TSK VKP(b) i SNK SSSR o vyselenii iz zapadnykh oblastey Ukrainy semey repressirovannykh ili nakhodyashchikhsya na nelegal'nom polozhenii uchastnikov natsionalisticheskikh organizatsiy. 23 maya 1941 g. // TSA FSB RF. Opublikovano: Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. -T. 1. - Kn. 2 (1 yanvarya - 21 iyunya 1941 g.). - M,, 1995. - p. 154-155.

detained in the Ismail region, 3,494 of which were deported.[188] In total 10,485 people, according to this document, were deported in 1941 from the southern territories of today's Ukraine.

Apart from the described episodes and documents, many more deportations took place: such as deportations of the non-reliable Polish and German people, resettlement of the frontier zone, during which around 100,000 people became victims of the voluntary-compulsory resettlement[189], etc. And even though these displacements did not target Ukrainians as an ethnic group specifically, Ukrainians were directly affected. The researchers dispute the number of people affected in total. Some believe that between 1939 and 1941 almost 550,000 people in total were deported from the former Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil, and Stanisławow Oblasts. In this way, it would mean that almost every tenth resident of Western Ukraine became a victim of forced relocation.[190] Other Ukrainian researchers, such as Hrynevych, Lysenko, and Shapoval, name a much bigger figure believing that in general, repressions in the former Polish lands covered about 1.2 million people. They also stress that most of the targeted people were Polish (about 550,000 people), but according to them around 500,000 Ukrainians could suffer from the repressive policies as well.[191]

After the invasion of the USSR by Hitler's army in June 1941 the mobility of people increased, however, this time the migration flow was split into two main destinations: migration of the forced and voluntary labourers, repatriation of the Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians to the West and resettlement of the Jewish and Polish refugees, migration of the Ukrainians avoiding Nazi occupation to the East into the depth of the USSR. It is believed that the total amount of population of the Ukrainian SSR reduced from 40 million 967 thousand in January 1941 to 27 million 383 thousand in January 1945.[192] Such a high loss of population undoubtedly influenced not just the ethnic composition of the territory, but also the dynamic of the national, cultural, and linguistic identifications.

Moreover, the deportations in the Ukrainian SSR started right after the liberation of the Ukrainian territories. The main reason for the deportations of specific social groups or even whole ethnic groups of that period was the accusation of collaboration with the Nazi army. Therefore, already in 1944 one of the biggest ethnic cleansing operations on the territory of Ukraine, the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, took place. Around 191,014 people of Tatar nationality were deported from Crimea to the Uzbek SSR, the Udmurt and Mari Autonomous Republics, and other regions of the RSFSR. Together with the Crimean Tatars other nationalities faced similar accusations and about 37,000 Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians were evicted from Crimea.[193]

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[188] Iz dokladnoy zapiski zam. narkoma gosbezopasnosti B.Z. Kobulova I.V. Stalinu, V.M. Molotovu i L.P. Berii o khode vyseleniya chlenov semey uchastnikov kontrrevolyutsionnykh organizatsiy iz Moldavskoy ASSR, Chernovitskoy i Izmailskoy oblastey Ukrainy. 14 iyunya 1941 g. // TSA FSB Rossii. F. 3os. Op. 8. d. 44. L. 602–604. Kopiya

[189] Lysenko, 'Demohrafichni Vtraty Ukrayiny u Roky Druhoyi Svitovoyi Viyny'., C.10

[190] Arkhiyereys'kyy et al., *Politychnyy Teror i Teroryzm v Ukrayini. XIX-XX Centuries: Istorychni Narysy*., C.585

[191] Hrynevych et al., *Radyans'kyy proekt dlya Ukrayiny, Tom 2*., C.161

[192] Lysenko, 'Demohrafichni Vtraty Ukrayiny u Roky Druhoyi Svitovoyi Viyny'., p.8

[193] Lysenko., C.27

Another group which was accused of cooperation with the Nazi regime was the OUN members and their families. In the Directive No. 122 of the USSR NKVD on the organisation of exile of family members of OUN and insurgents issued in March 1944, it says: "All adult family members of convicted OUN members, as well as active insurgents both arrested and killed during clashes - to be exiled to remote areas of Krasnoyarsk Krai, Omsk, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk Oblasts".[194] The deportations of this kind lasted in waves for the next 5 years.

One of the biggest operations had a code name "Operation Zakhid" (meaning Operation West). It was implemented in the autumn of 1947 and believed to have been initiated by the Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR, Lieutenant General S. Ogoltsov and the Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Lieutenant General S. Savchenko, who, in a joint letter to the Minister of State Security of the USSR, Colonel-General V. Abakumov, dated 24 May 1947, requested permission to continue the initially started deportation practice. Bazhan cites their letter with the reasoning for this type of operation as follows: "The eviction of OUN members' and bandits' families, as experience has shown, was a very effective means of combating the OUN underground and banditry, contributed significantly to the decay of the underground and gangs and caused a turnout of confessions, made it difficult for OUN leaders to recruit new members of the OUN and bandits, pushed those who confessed to active struggle against gangs, reduced the base of accomplices, as the local population, fearing such reprisals as the eviction of families, refused to provide material assistance to the bandits".[195]

Operation Zakhid was scheduled for the period from the 10th until the 20th of October 1947 and Order No. 00430 issued by the Minister of State Security of the USSR Abakumov on the 22nd of August 1947 asked for the secrecy of all preparatory activities. Additional instructions to the order "On the procedure for the eviction of families of active nationalists and bandits from the western regions of Ukraine", clarified the details of the operation, in particular who was to be evicted (family members of insurgents, both adults and minors), and explained in detail the functions of a special group of operatives who, with the support of the local authorities, had to implement the eviction.[196]

Regarding the number of deported people, according to Vynnychenko the Plan of Measures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for the Transfer of Special Settlers from the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR, approved on the 3rd of October, mentions the number of 25 000 families, 75,000 people, to be evicted, with a later increase to 100,000 people. On the 26th of October, the deportation campaign was completed. In total, 26,332 families, which consisted of 77,791 people, were evicted, including 3,767 families (11,347 people) from Rivne region, 2,711 families (9,050 people) from Volyn

[194] Direktiva NKVD SSSR № 122 ob organizatsii napravleniya v ssylku chlenov semey ounovtsev i povstantsev. 31 marta 1944 g. // GA RF. F. P-9401. Op. 12. D. 207. T. 2. 1944 g. L. 21—22. Tipografskiy ekz. Opubl.: Sbornik akonodatel'nykh i normativnykh aktov o repressiyakh i reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressiy. Kursk, 1999., p. 461—460.
[195] Bazhan, 'Operatsiya "Zakhid": Do 75-Richchya Deportatsiyi Naselennya Zakhidnoyi Ukrayiny u Viddaleni Rayony SRSR'., C.340-341
[196] Bazhan., C.341

region, 5,223 families (15,920 people) from Lviv region, 5,001 families (13,508 people) from Ternopil region, 4,512 families (11,883 people) from Stanislav region, 613 families (1,627 people) from Chernivtsi region, and 4,504 families (14,456 people) from Drohobych region.[197]

It is believed that in the second half of the 1940s around 175,000 people in total, who were considered close relatives of the OUN members or those who were supporting OUN members, were deported. Polian claims that around 100,000 people were deported in 1944 and more than 75,000 more were deported by mid-November 1947.[198] Other archival documents show the number of 192,543 family members of the OUN and UPA groups being deported between 1944 and 1952, including 70,215 people from Lviv and Drohobych regions, 37,070 from Ivano-Frankivsk, 33,975 from Rivne, and 27,172 from Ternopil, 20,605 from Volyn, and 3,506 from Chernivtsi.[199]

Regarding the length of the punishments for this category of people, the terms of deportations varied from 5, 8 to 10 years, however, most of the people were deported permanently. The Report from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Kruglov to the Council of Ministers of the USSR states that as of the 1st of January 1949, a total of 112,633 members of families of active OUN members were detained in the special settlements, of whom 24,730 were evicted in 1944 - 1946 for a period of 5 years; evicted in 1947-1949 for a period of 8-10 years and indefinite settlement – 87,903 people. The same document claims that due to the inexpediency of people's return to their former place of residence and in order to strengthen the regime in the places of settlement for members of the families of the OUN, the proposal is "to abolish the terms of the expulsion of family members of Ukrainian nationalists, bandits and bandit accomplices and to establish that they are permanently relocated to remote areas of the USSR and are not subject to return to their former places of residence".[200] This document, first of all, shows the clear approach towards the OUN families, but also highlights the strategy of the government to keep the people in exile with the reason "to strengthen the regime" in the minds and lives of the people who were believed to be one of the most unreliable groups in the USSR.

Meanwhile, the deportations of the other groups continued. 1948 is known as the year of the beginning of the fight with a specific category of peasants - "pointers" (*указники* – ukazniki, coming from the verb to "appoint" since these people could settle only in a place appointed for them by the government) or also known as "parasites" (*тунеядцы* – tuniejadcy since these people were believed to work badly). On the 21st of February 1948, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a Decree on Eviction from the Ukrainian SSR persons "maliciously evading labour activity in agriculture

[197] Vynnychenko, *Ukrayina 1920-1980-Kh: Deportatsiyi, Zaslannya, Vyslannya*., C.69
[198] Polian, *Against Their Will*., p.157, p.166
[199] Platonova, 'Zakonodavchi Ta Vidomchi Normatyvni Akty Shchodo Spetsposelentsiv z Ukrayiny, 20-Ti-60-Ti Roky XX St. (Za Dokumentamy Derzhavnoho Arkhivu MVS Ukrayiny)'., C.96
[200] Dokladnaya zapiska ministra vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglova v Sovet Ministrov SSSR ob otmene srokov vyseleniya chlenam semey ounovtsev i rasprostraneniya na nikh deystviya Ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 26 noyabrya 1948 g. ob ostavlenii na spetsposelenii navechno. 17 marta 1950 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 525. L. 5—8. Zaverennaya kopiya.

and leading anti-social, parasitic lifestyles"[201]. According to Berdinskich et al., the initiative came from Khrushchev himself, and after convincing Stalin of the necessity to have the same operations in the whole country, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the deportation to remote areas of persons maliciously evading labour activity and leading anti-social, parasitic lifestyles was issued in 1948.[202]

Both mentioned decrees are almost identical and proclaim that "in many collective farms there are individuals who, hiding behind their membership of the collective farms, taking advantage of the privileges established for collective farmers, maliciously evade honest labour, lead anti-social, parasitic lifestyles, undermine labour discipline in collective farms and thereby damage the collective farm and reduce the income of honestly working collective farmers." For the implementation of the decrees, it was given "the right to pass public sentences for the eviction persons who persistently refuse to work honestly" to the council of the peasants of the villages. After the final approval of the decisions by the regional council, "persons against whom public sentences of eviction have been passed are subject to removal from the territories of a region, krai or republic for a period of 8 years to remote areas, the list of which is established by the Council of Ministers of the USSR."[203] In this way as of the 20th of February 1952, 33,012 persons were repressed and deported, among which 9,441 were evicted from the Ukrainian SSR.[204]

Meanwhile, the process of dekurkulisation also continued, and this time the Western areas of the USSR were specifically targeted by the government. The process of "collectivisation" of agriculture carried out in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the "Pact zone" (in the Baltic States, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Right-Bank Moldova, and Northern Bukovina) was going on in parallel with the "dekurkulisation", a strategy which was already used in the 1930s for hiding the depth of the Soviet punishment machine. In this way, tens of thousands of peasants were deported to the Tyumen region, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Yakutia, and Qazaqstan. Berdinskih believes that most of the deportees were included in the composition of the categories which were broadly used in the respective countries of the origin, such as "OUN members" for the Ukrainians, "special settlers of Baltics and Moldavia" for the deportees from those territories.

However, the smaller part of the newcomers was occasionally registered to their own special categories according to the respective Decrees. For example, such citizens of the Ukrainian SSR were marked as "kurkuls from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR" according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of the 23rd January 1951.[205] The Decree states to "accept the initiative

[201] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev, *Sistema spetsposeleniy v Sovetskom Soyuze 1930-1950kh godov*., C.77-78
[202] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev., C.77-78
[203] Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR «O vyselenii v otdalennyye rayony lits, zlostno uklonyayushchikhsya ot trudovoy deyatel'nosti i vedushchikh antiobshchestvennyy, paraziticheskiy obraz zhizni». 2 iyunya 1948 g. // GA RF. F. P-7523. Op. 36. D. 379. L. 30—31. Podlinnik.
[204] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev, *Sistema spetsposeleniy v Sovetskom Soyuze 1930-1950kh godov*., C.78
[205] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev., C.79

of the Ukrainian SSR" to deport kurkuls with their families from the territories of Volyn, Drohobych, Lviv, Rivne, Stanislav, Ternopil, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya Oblasts (the Ukrainian SSR). The deportation is set to be implemented in March 1951 with the destination of Krasnoyarsk region (RSFSR).[206]

Regarding the number of people deported within this decree, as it was mentioned, it is difficult to talk about the exact number of victims. Berdinskih names the number of 5,588 people being deported within this category from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.[207] Another author claims that there were 12,135 people deported.[208]

Apart from the above-mentioned operations, there were implemented dozens of other deportations which are not described in this thesis. Commonly they were targeting different religious, social, and political groups of people. Consequently, between 1939 and 1953 "the prison of the nations", as the USSR was also often referred to in general, was steadily growing. According to the archival data, in 1939 there were 938,552 persons registered in the special settlements, in 1953 there were already 2,819,776 persons.[209]

After Stalin's death in March 1953, requests for the release of certain categories of people started arriving at the Central Party leadership. One of such requests is, for example, the letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Kruglov to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Malenkov with a proposal to consider the cancellation of permanent special settlements, reduction of the number of special settlements and adoption of special measures to streamline the supervisory work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies in the settlements. According to this letter, the main reason for the growth of the population in the special settlements is the registration of children who are turning 16. Additionally, the author of the letter mentions that: "The supervision carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs shows that the bulk of the special settlers have a positive attitude to the activities of the Soviet authorities, are firmly settled in the settlements, work honestly and take an active part in social and economic life."[210] This paragraph clearly shows that the idea of keeping the deportees at the places of their settlement was particularly important, and the implementation of integration and assimilation processes achieved the

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[206] Postanovleniye Soveta Ministrov SSSR № 189-88ss «O vyselenii kulakov s sem'yami s territorii Volynskoy, Drogobychskoy, L'vovskoy, Rovenskoy, Stanislavskoy, Ternopol'skoy, Chernovitskoy i Zakarpatskoy oblastey Ukrainskoy SSR». 23 yanvarya 1951 g. // Opublikovano: Istoriya stalinskogo GULAGa. Konets 1920-kh - pervaya polovina 1950-kh godov. - T. 1. - M,, 2004. - p. 541-542

[207] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev, *Sistema spetsposeleniy v Sovetskom Soyuze 1930-1950kh godov*., C.79

[208] Platonova, 'Zakonodavchi Ta Vidomchi Normatyvni Akty Shchodo Spetsposelentsiv z Ukrayiny, 20-Ti-60-Ti Roky XX St. (Za Dokumentamy Derzhavnoho Arkhivu MVS Ukrayiny)'., C.96

[209] Pis'mo ministra vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglova predsedatelyu Soveta Ministrov SSSR G.M.Malenkovu s predlozheniyem rassmotret' vopros ob otmene spetsposeleniya navechno, sokrashchenii spetsposeleniy i o merakh po uporyadocheniyu nadzornoy raboty organov MVD v mestakh poseleniy. Iyul' 1953 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 611. L. 6-13. Kopiya.

[210] Pis'mo ministra vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglova predsedatelyu Soveta Ministrov SSSR G.M.Malenkovu s predlozheniyem rassmotret' vopros ob otmene spetsposeleniya navechno, sokrashchenii spetsposeleniy i o merakh po uporyadocheniyu nadzornoy raboty organov MVD v mestakh poseleniy. Iyul' 1953 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 611. L. 6-13. Kopiya

desired outcome targeted by the Soviet government. Moreover, the Minister of Internal Affairs proposed specific categories of people to be let out: "It is proposed to temporarily keep 1,046,503 people on special resettlement. To return to the consideration of the issue of further detention in special settlement of the other categories in 1954."[211]

Among the groups that were advised to keep deported were: "Crimean Tatars and former collaborators of the Germans among Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians, evicted from Crimea in 1944 – 140,606 persons; Ukrainian nationalists (OUN members), bandits, bandits' accomplices and members of their families deported in 1944-1952 – 134,816 persons; family members of bandits, bandit accomplices and kurkuls with their families, evicted from the Baltic states, western regions of Ukraine and Belarus and from the Pskov Oblast (RSFSR) in 1945-1952 – 124,802 persons; family members of former landlords, factory workers, big traders, family members of the punitive bodies of the bourgeois governments of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as family members of nationalists and members of counter-revolutionary and insurgent organisations who were evicted in 1940-1941 from the Baltics, Moldavia, western regions of Ukraine and Belarus – 25,630 persons; Andersovites and their family members evicted from Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus in 1951 – 3,003 persons; Jehovists evicted from the Baltics, Moldavia, western regions of Ukraine and Belarus in 1951 – 6,579 persons."[212]

In the next 5 years, even these categories were gradually released. According to the statistical reports, as of the 1st of January 1957, there were in total 211,408 people in the special settlements, as of July 1957 – 178,363 people, as of the 1st of January 1958 – 147,741 people.[213]

Specifying the number of people deported from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR as of the 1st of January 1958, Platonova presents a number of over 40,000 people still being in special settlements, in particular: former landowners, traders, members of so-called bourgeois political parties and governments, anti-Soviet organisations, and members of their families (2,237 persons); former members of the OUN and UPA (4,478 persons); family members of OUN and UPA members (26,552 people); OUN supporters and members of their families (2,871 persons); former members of Anders' army and their families (496 persons); Jehovah's Witnesses and members of their families (4,113 persons).[214]

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[211] Pis'mo ministra vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglova predsedatelyu Soveta Ministrov SSSR G.M.Malenkovu s predlozheniyem rassmotret' vopros ob otmene spetsposeleniya navechno, sokrashchenii spetsposeleniy i o merakh po uporyadocheniyu nadzornoy raboty organov MVD v mestakh poseleniy. Iyul' 1953 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 611. L. 6-13. Kopiya.

[212] Pis'mo ministra vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglova predsedatelyu Soveta Ministrov SSSR G.M.Malenkovu s predlozheniyem rassmotret' vopros ob otmene spetsposeleniya navechno, sokrashchenii spetsposeleniy i o merakh po uporyadocheniyu nadzornoy raboty organov MVD v mestakh poseleniy. Iyul' 1953 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 611. L. 6-13. Kopiya

[213] Spravka o kolichestve spetsposelentsev. 1 aprelya 1958 g. // GARF. F. Kollektsiya dokumentov.

[214] Platonova, 'Zakonodavchi Ta Vidomchi Normatyvni Akty Shchodo Spetsposelentsiv z Ukrayiny, 20-Ti-60-Ti Roky XX St. (Za Dokumentamy Derzhavnoho Arkhivu MVS Ukrayiny)'., C.100-101

Voluntary-compulsory migrations

The voluntary-compulsory resettlements were another important part of mobilities in the USSR during the 1940s and 1950s. Very often such type of migration was implemented as a parallel process next to deportations, therefore, it can be difficult to track its nature, figures, or true goals. One such example is the resettlement from the frontier zones in 1940. As the Ukrainian SSR western borderlands were considered as one of the most unreliable regions, hence, the citizens of these territories were targeted specifically. According to the resolution "On resettlement" of the USSR Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, it was ordered to settle away the 800-meter zone of the western border of the Ukrainian SSR. The document describes the villages, regions and amount of people who had to leave their homes, in total the number reached 102,800 people.[215] The majority of them were ordered to be resettled to the Ismail Oblast (the Ukrainian SSR) or the depth of the USSR.[216]

After the German attack on the USSR, similar resettlements were organised for other groups, such as factory workers. The evacuation was implemented according to the prioritisation of the production war needs. Therefore, most of the evacuees were skilled workers, engineers, and technical staff. Not all the people wanted to be resettled due to personal reasons or the lack of understanding the imminent dangers of war, since the propaganda of a near Soviet victory was successful. Consequentially, in December 1941 the decree forbidding the unauthorised abandonment of an enterprise was issued. It described the importance of factories for the army and future victory, and additionally, it ordered to consider the workers of certain fields as mobilised persons, and as a result: "unauthorised departure of workers and employees from the enterprises of the above industries, including evacuated ones, shall be regarded as desertion and persons guilty of unauthorised departure (desertion) shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 5 to 8 years." Additionally, such cases should be judged by the tribunal. In this way, if the workplace was evacuated to the East, the workers did not have another choice but to leave together with the factory, otherwise they would be prosecuted[217]

The relocation of the population of the Ukrainian SSR is believed to be mostly completed by December 1941. Lysenko provides a number of 1,934,300 specialists and industrial workers to be evacuated, among which 1,819,600, or 94%, were from the eastern Ukrainian regions. Adding other categories of the evacuated people, in total, it is believed about 3.5 million people to be replaced from

[215] Postanovleniye SNK USSR i TSK KP(b)U «Ob otselenii i pereselenii zhiteley 800-metrovoy pogranpolosy v zapadnykh oblastyakh USSR i ochishcheniye etoy polosy ot stroyeniy». 3 aprelya 1940 g. // Deportatsíi.., 1996. S. 94-96. № 33; TSDAGOU. F. 1. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 170-174.
[216] Lysenko, 'Demohrafichni Vtraty Ukrayiny u Roky Druhoyi Svitovoyi Viyny'., C.11
[217] Ob otvetstvennosti rabochikh i sluzhashchikh predpriyatiy voyennoy promyshlennosti za samovol'nyy ukhod s predpriyatiy (Ukaz ot 26 dekabrya 1941 g.) // Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1942 g., № 2.

Ukraine, which is less than 10% of its population, most of whom were residents of industrial cities, workers and employees of Eastern Ukraine.[218]

It is also important to mention that this resettlement even if seen at the beginning as a temporal measure, often turned into a permanent settlement. Lysenko mentions that "The evacuation saved the lives of some Ukrainian citizens and spared them the horrors of Nazi slavery. Despite all the mistakes and miscalculations, it preserved something that cannot be measured or evaluated by any numbers - the scientific, technical, spiritual, and cultural potential of Ukraine. At the same time, it should be noted that a large part of the working population left Ukraine forever. Some of them died on the road or in their new homes, and many Ukrainian workers and specialists did not return home after the expulsion of the German occupiers and remained in Siberia, Central Asia, and Qazaqstan."[219] The same strategies were implemented not just by the evacuated people, but also by deported people, who were released in the 1950s and 1960s, however, it will be described in the later parts of this thesis.

After regaining of the territories of the Ukrainian SSR by the Soviet army, the resettlements lead by the Soviet government continued. The main reason for mobilities during after-war times was the balancing between underpopulated territories. According to data, the population of the Ukrainian SSR as of January 1941 was 40 million 967 thousand people. In 4 years, as of January 1945, it was reduced to 27 million 383 thousand people.[220] The losses of military and civilian people during the war, but also the numerous deportations and resettlements, had to be substituted with new working force.

The resettlement of the Crimean Peninsula can serve as an example of such a strategy. The population of Crimea reduced from 1 million 196 thousand people before the war to 351,000 after the peninsula was liberated from Nazi German occupation, therefore, the resettlement started already in 1944. According to Vynnychenko that year 13,966 families (around 50,000 people) were relocated to Crimea from various Russian regions and settled all around the peninsula. Even though in the period of 1944-1949 around 55% of people returned to their home places in Russian SFSR, the government kept relocating people. For example, in 1950-1953 it is reported that 10,739 families arrived, and 1,687 left the Crimean Peninsula.[221]

The initial substantial return movement can be attributed to the poor conditions in the Crimean settlements and the nature of this type of relocation, which is believed to have been not always voluntary and might have had a voluntary-compulsory aspect. For example, Silaeva, the Head of the Department of the Central State Archive of the RSFSR, in the article describes: "Immediately, a new "call" began in war-ravaged villages of central Russia, in hospitals and clinics - people were invited (and not everywhere voluntarily) to "take part in the restoration of Crimean health resorts"."[222]

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[218] Lysenko, 'Demohrafichni Vtraty Ukrayiny u Roky Druhoyi Svitovoyi Viyny'., C.23
[219] Lysenko., C.24
[220] Lysenko., C.8
[221] Vynnychenko, *Ukrayina 1920-1980-Kh: Deportatsiyi, Zaslannya, Vyslannya*., C.61-62
[222] Silayeva, 'Iz ASSR Nemtsev Povolzh'ya 1941 g. Vyvezeno 40 Tys. Semey. Iz Istorii Bez Viny Vinovatykh'.

Relocation of Ukrainians to the Crimean Peninsula also took place. For example, Polian claims that only in "September–October 1944, more than 17 thousand collective farm members arrived [to Crimea] primarily from Ukraine."[223] Thousands more will be relocated in the next 20 years. Seitova describes the whole history of populating of Crimea and comes to the conclusion that between 1944 and 1960 in total 229,617 people arrived and 18,833 returned to their place of origin, showing that with the development of Crimea, more and more people were willing to settle down on the peninsula. In the next years the resettling only grew and according to the author: "In total, by 1967, collective and state farms in Crimea had received about 117,000 IDP families. Of these, 45,000 arrived within 8 years (1959-1967). If we take into account that each family consisted of at least 4 people, this means that approximately 468,000 people moved to the peninsula in 23 years."[224]

At this point, it's also important to highlight that after the war the autonomy of Crimea was cancelled, and it became an Oblast in the Russian SFSR. In 1954 the Crimean Peninsula joined the Ukrainian SSR, however, till 1954 people were technically resettled to the area under Russian authority, therefore Ukrainian settlers were considered a minority, and all the spheres were under the control of Russian policies, which directly influenced the process of russification of those who were relocated.

Another important category of the relocation was the inner migration of Ukrainians, especially the relocation of people from Western Oblasts to Donbas. Since the 1920s state-funded controlled resettlements have been recognised as the most promising and reliable tool for the colonisation of unpopulated lands, as well as a tool to control the overall development of regions and industries. Therefore, the natural population growth and distribution were ignored, and the land fund was concentrated in the hands of the state. It is interesting that returning to one's place of origin was prohibited, and the lands left behind were often colonised by other groups. This strategy was firmly entrenched within the framework of the Soviet socialist state.[225]

Another wave of active resettlement started in 1949 according to the Resolution "On the resettlement of collective and individual farmers to collective and state farms of the southern regions of the Ukrainian SSR from other regions of Ukraine". The organisational and practical work included propaganda among the peasants, benefits for the relocators and an overview of the amount of available free lands. However, people remembering the events of the 1930s were concerned that they would be brought to Siberia instead of the promised resettlements to the South of Ukraine.[226]

[223] Polian, *Against Their Will*., p.162
[224] Seitova, 'Z Istoriyi Zaselennya Krymu (1944–1967 Rr.)'., C.79
[225] Kas'yanova, 'Polityka Pereselennya Shchodo Ukrayins′koho Selyanstva (1940–1960-Ti Rr.)'., C.165
[226] Kas'yanova., C.166

Migrations of the period between the 1960s and the 1980s: dissident movement, repressions, voluntary migration

It is commonly believed that from the 1960s onwards the situation regarding deportations and compulsory relocations changed. For example, Platonova mentions that the final release of the people in labour camps and special settlements happened in the period between 1958 and 1965.[227] Many political and ideological improvements are connected to the death of Stalin in 1953, the speech of Khrushchev in 1956 "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" and the general process of the de-Stalinisation. However, even though Khrushchev is known for his Thaw policies, historians also refer to his times of rule as "liberalised terror" and point to the recessions of communist repressions in the 1960s-1980s.

Forced migrations

In the 1960s, one common type of movement was return migration following deportation due to the releasing of people and closing of their criminal cases. However, it was also common for people to settle around or even remain in the places where they had been previously deported to. For instance, Vynnychenko in his book mentions that after the death of Stalin, not many things changed drastically. The author presents a document from 1955 which mentions: "[*Ukrainians*] while being on the special settlement in general settled well in their new places of residency, especially those in the rural areas. Many of them built new houses and got new professions and qualifications. There are cases when the persons who have a well-paid profession and good jobs, after being taken off the limits regarding their special settlement [*released*] because of the unreasonable deportation, they are not leaving anywhere from the new places of residency. Lately, many of the special settlers from the Western Ukrainian Oblasts applied to direct them to the development of virgin and fallow lands[…] While being on the special settlement part of the young people, deported as part of these families, got married to the local residents of Ural and Siberia[…] Among the children, who were taken off the lists [*released*], very few came back to their relatives in their previous places of residency. The majority is staying with the parents in the places of the special settlement."[228] Such a description can represent the success of the russification and sovietisation tools which were applied to the deported people.

Another category of people were those who decided to come back to their places of origin or previous residency after the deportation. Even though they were officially released, their lives could be gravely burdened by the consequences of the prosecution and deportation. For example, one of Holyk's family members commented that even though the family was able to return to Zarubyntsi, their place of

[227] Platonova, 'Zakonodavchi Ta Vidomchi Normatyvni Akty Shchodo Spetsposelentsiv z Ukrayiny, 20-Ti-60-Ti Roky XX St. (Za Dokumentamy Derzhavnoho Arkhivu MVS Ukrayiny)'., C.101
[228] Vynnychenko, *Ukrayina 1920-1980-Kh: Deportatsiyi, Zaslannya, Vyslannya*., C.85

origin, in 1959, they were not welcome there. The local authorities did not want to register the Holyk's family in their native village and for a whole year the police were pressuring the father to move back to the deportation place with his family.[229] Such difficulties were created on different levels of the lives of the ex-deportees and often served as a social reaction to state propaganda against state traitors, Banderites, OUN members, Crimean Tatars, etc.

The fear of returnees also existed on the governmental level. Already in the late 1950s, the Ukrainian Communist Party mentioned: "Party organisations do not always take into account the fact that a significant number of rehabilitated or sentenced prisoners have recently returned from prison. Among them are individuals, especially bourgeois nationalists, who have not disarmed themselves ideologically. The Central Committee of the CPSU demands that party and Soviet bodies and all-party organisations intensify work among persons who have returned from prison, study their political sentiments, strengthen educational work among them, and take decisive measures against those who are trying to resume their past anti-Soviet activities."[230]

Numerous legislative acts were implemented in order to prevent hostile activities from the dangerous "elements" who were coming back from deportation. Among such acts were the USSR Law of the 25th of December 1958 "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes", the introduction of the article on "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" (Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the USSR) into the criminal codes of the Union republics, numerous instructions and recommendations of the KGB, the USSR General Prosecutor's Office, the USSR Supreme Court, and their subordinate republican bodies. All these documents became a base for the following prosecution of the non-governmental organisations, youth and student clubs, intelligentsia, and, as a result, the creation of the so-called generation of "The Sixtiers" – *шістдесятники* [Shistdesiatnyky].

Many of the newly created movements in Ukraine were indeed anti-Soviet and their participants believed in Ukrainian independence – cultural and political, which was illegal and therefore punished by the government. However, some cases were fabricated, lacked proof, and were supported only by forcefully gained confessions. Among the underground anti-Soviet groups which were targeted by the Soviet regime were the Union of Patriots, the Union of Fighters for National Ukraine, the Ukrainian Nationalist Organisation named after S. Bandera, the Ukrainian National Party (UNP), the United, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (URSS), and the Platform of the United Revolutionary Front.

Additionally, religious institutions also became one of the main targets of the Soviet punishment system. For instance, Arkhiyereyskyi et al. describe: "The administrative establishment of atheism during the Khrushchev Thaw took place in complete disregard of Article 124 of the USSR Constitution, which guaranteed citizens freedom of religion and the free exercise of religious rites. Examples of dismissive attitudes to the religious feelings of believers with signs of "spiritual terror" from the side of authorities

[229] Sereda, "'Zabyraytes', Bo Znovu Represuyemo!". Istoriya Vyslanoyi Na Sybir Rodyny Holykiv'.
[230] Arkhiyereys'kyy et al., *Politychnyy Teror i Teroryzm v Ukrayini. XIX-XX Centuries: Istorychni Narysy*., C.781

were traced not only in unjustified closure of religious buildings but also in searches of churches and parishioners' apartments, refusal to priests to be registered at the place of their residence, dismissing citizens from their jobs because of their religious beliefs."[231] It is believed that the Ukrainian Uniates church was targeted especially hard and its numerous priests were exemplarily arrested and sent to the working camps.[232]

The second half of the 1960s led by Brezhnev only speeded up the turn of the Soviet Union to neo-Stalinist ideas. It became clear that russification and general sovietisation were still the prioritised strategies of the Soviet government. This realisation became the last drop for the groups of the intelligentsia who decided to fight for Ukrainisation, in cultural, political, and linguistic senses, through their professional activities. To name a few of the activists: Ivan Svitlychnyi, Opanas Zalyvakha, Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyni, Mykhailo Kosiv, Mykhailo Osadchyi, Anatoliy Shevchuk, Myroslava Zvarychevska. These people were supported by many others such as Ivan Drach, Lina Kostenko, Mykola Kholodnyi, Iryna Wilde, Rostyslav Bratun, Roman Ivanychuk, Volodymyr Hzhytskyi, Ivan Dziuba, journalist Viacheslav Chornovil, and many other representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia. Arkhiyereyskyi et al. believe that the freedom movements and youth organisations served as a catalyst for the emergence of opposition sentiments within the Ukrainian intelligentsia and various layers of the population. The prosecution of these initiatives demonstrated the ruling Soviet regime's stance on the cultural and national revival efforts of the 1960s and exposed its inhumane nature, which wasn't planning to support national autonomies or independencies.[233]

The Brezhnev period is known for the different means of fighting with the "traitors" of the Soviet state. This time the fight was specifically targeting the leaders and public figures of the freedom movements in order to make other anti-Soviet elements scared and intimidate them by the possible use of harsh measures, including criminal liability clearly demonstrated by the state security agencies. Between 1967 and June 1971, the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR implemented such measures against more than 6,000 citizens.[234]

Starting from the 1970s, the wave of arrests reached lawyers and human rights defenders. One of the most important cases to mention was the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG). More than 20 members of the UHG were imprisoned between 1978 and 1981. In July 1978, one of the UHG leaders, Levko Lukyanenko, was sentenced to ten years in a penal colony and five years in exile. Other prosecuted activists to be mentioned are Myroslav Marynovych, Mykola Matusevych, Vasyl Ovsiyenko, Oleksandr Berdnyk, Yosyf Zisels, Petro and Vasyl Sichko, Vasyl Striltsiv, Yurii Lytvyn, Olha Heiko-Matusevych,

[231] Arkhiyereys′kyy et al., C.788
[232] Bazhan, 'Retsydyvy Teroru v Khrushchovs′ku Vidlyhu'., C.35
[233] Arkhiyereys′kyy et al., *Politychnyy Teror i Teroryzm v Ukrayini. XIX-XX Centuries: Istorychni Narysy*., C.804
[234] Arkhiyereys′kyy et al., C.812

Mykola Horbal, Vitalii Kalynichenko, Petro Rozumnyi, Vasyl Stus, Oksana Meshko, Ivan Kandyba, Yaroslav Lesiv, Ivan Sokulsky, and others.

In general, Solchanyk mentions that in the 1970s there was reported a significant influx of Ukrainians arriving at the Gulag system. According to human rights activist Yurii Orlov by the end of the 1970s 30-40% of political prisoners in the Mordvinian and Ural camps were Ukrainians.[235] All of those people were imprisoned, exiled, and tortured for representing Ukrainian ideas in certain ways or forms. Simultaneously, they served as symbols to other dissidents, their supporters, and the families of dissidents, illustrating the consequences they might face if they opposed Soviet ideology.

Voluntary migrations

The voluntary-compulsory migrations were not practised as broadly in the 1960s-1980s. However, the encouraged voluntary migration gradually substituted the voluntary-compulsory relocations. During these times researchers talk about high mobility not just from Ukraine but also into the Ukrainian SSR. According to Yankovska's calculations around 2.5 million people left Ukraine in the first half of the 1960s. Among them, around 500,000 were resettled as part of the organised recruitment, such as organised economic resettlement of specialists and appointment of graduates of different educational institutions.[236] This type of migration is hard to identify strictly as voluntary or voluntary-compulsory because certain groups, such as young specialists or students, struggled to refuse the resettlement as they had no other chances to find work, or as in the case of graduates, they were even obliged to work for a certain amount of years in a place chosen by authorities. Therefore, in my opinion, such mobilities could be also perceived as ones practised under coercion.

At the same time, immigration to Ukraine from other republics exceeded emigration from the republic and around 3 million people moved to Ukraine in those years. According to Yankovska, the balance of changes for Ukraine is as follows: natural increase - 3.5 million, emigration - 2.5 million, immigration - 3 million. Makarenko believes that the data indicates an unusual migration flow in Ukraine and, therefore can be an argument for the potential large-scale implementation of russification. The author argues that due to the fact that the vast majority of immigrants were Russians (around 75%), the number of Russian residents among the population of the Ukrainian SSR increased by 1.5 million people in 1959-1963. Later, the process of increasing the Russian population continued, though at a slower pace and often via different tools.[237]

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[235] Solchanyk, 'Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia: Imperial Integration, Russification, and the Struggle for National Survival'., p.278

[236] Makarenko, 'Napryam Derzhavnoyi Etnopolityky v Krymu u 1950-1980-Kh Rr.: Prychyny i Naslidky Etnosotsial′nykh Zmin'., C.265

[237] Makarenko., C.265

Apart from the increasing level of Russian-speaking immigration flow, the urbanisation tendency also played an important role in the russification process. For example, a regional researcher of Donbas talks about 90% share of urban population in Donbas in the late 1970s. The author argues that russification was accelerated by the need for rural migrants to adapt quickly in cities, as in this way they had better prospects for personal and career development. Other researchers compare the Southern and Eastern regions. For instance, there is a noticeable similar trend of urban growth based on the rural emigration in Odesa, Kherson, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Novorodovska using different sources argues that: "during the 1960s and 1970s, number [*of the Russian-speaking population*] increased by 213,800 people (55.1%). Over the same period, the number of Ukrainian-speaking people increased by 410,300 (16.45%). In the 1970s and 1980s, the growth rate of the Ukrainian-speaking population declined sharply. During this decade, the Ukrainian-speaking population increased by only 71.4 thousand people (2.46%), while the growth of the Russian-speaking population reached 208.1 thousand people (34.58%). In other words, in absolute terms, the growth rate of the Ukrainian-speaking population decreased by 3 times. The most active decline in the number of Ukrainian-speaking people was in Odesa and Zaporizhzhia. This was caused by the same factors as in Donbas, namely russification in education, migration, urbanisation, mixed marriages, etc."[238]

There were also attempts to russify, sovietise, and "denationalise" the Western regions of Ukraine. The instruments used by the Soviet government were the same: resettlement, cross-national marriages, education with reduced opportunities to study in Ukrainian, etc. The migration flows were focused on mixing the "nationalist" West with the already partially russified East and South of the Ukrainian SSR. Even though this process was not as successful as the russification of other parts of Ukraine, the changes were still noticeable. For instance, according to Novorodovska, during 1959-1969, the increase of Russian migration to the Western Ukrainian regions was 56.7% (plus 1,152,300 people). Additionally, if in the 1970s, a third of the population of Galicia spoke Russian, especially in the cities, by the end of the 1980s, this figure had risen to 70%. The author also claims that the process of the russification of the West was less successful due to the tighter connection of people to the cultural traditions of their ethnic groups.[239]

As a result of the inner voluntary/voluntary-compulsory relocations by authorities, it is believed that between 1949 and 1988 more than 270,000 families were resettled within the Ukrainian SSR.[240] Such a high level of movement influenced the linguistic and cultural practices as well as the regional, ethnic, and national identities of the people.

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[238] Novorodovs′ka, 'Rehional′ni Osoblyvosti Movnykh Protsesiv Na Terytoriyi URSR u 1960-Ti – 1980-Ti Rr.', C.167-168
[239] Novorodovs′ka., C.170-174
[240] Luk″yanets′, 'Orhanizovani Nabory Robitnykiv v URSR Ta Yikh Pereselennya (Druha Polovyna 1940-Kh – Seredyna 1980-Kh Rr.).', C.270-271

Russification during Soviet Times

Sovietisation in general and Russification in particular go hand in hand with the policies of deportations, resettlements, and voluntary-compulsory migrations. Throughout history, the Soviet government has aimed at the creation of the "Soviet person" with homogeneous and mainly Russian cultural, linguistic, and traditional characteristics. In this section, I will focus on those aspects of russification which were directly or indirectly caused or amplified by the migrations described in the previous sections. As guidance, I will take the contexts of russification which were described in the very first part of this thesis, specifically: language, education, religion, and identity. Such an approach will help structure the diverse implications of russification which took place over the 75 years of Soviet rule.

Russification and language

The policies regarding the national languages in the Soviet republics changed significantly, depending on the evolving decisions of Party leaders. For instance, the famous policy of *korenisatsiia* or indigenisation implemented in the 1920s was also a tool for the spread of socialism deep down to society, especially among the peasantries. In the Ukrainian context, it was especially important as the Ukrainian peasants were known for their rebellious nature, and the new Soviet government clearly understood the importance of the peasants' role in these territories. Frunze in his special report on the national issue said: "We cannot leave the big part of the peasants outside of proletarian ideology. […] next task is to learn the Ukrainian language by our party, prepare the comrades who can do propaganda in Ukrainian".[241] After all the arguments, even Stalin in March 1921 at the 10th congress of the Communist Party said: "recently it was mentioned that the Ukrainian republic and Ukrainian nationality is made up by the Germans. Meanwhile, it is obvious that the Ukrainian nationality exists, and the development of its culture is the responsibility of the communists. We cannot go against the history. It is understandable, that if so far the Russian elements were prevailing in the Ukrainian cities, with time these cities will be inevitably Ukrainised".[242] Such an optimistic attitude inspired many Ukrainian activists and politicians to work on numerous programmes and policies for the Ukrainisation of the population.

While korenisatsiia was developing, the dynamic between the process of Ukrainisation and its implementors, represented mainly by "nationalist intelligentsia", was unstable. Already in 1926, a special commission of the Politburo of the Communist Party voted for the recommendation "to take a course on the fighting the right groups among the Ukrainian intelligentsia"[243], indicating the rising tension between the Soviet government and Ukrainian-focused activists. Additionally, researchers argue that the

[241] Serhiychuk, *'Ukrayinizatsiya Rosiyi'. Politychne Oshukanstvo Ukrayintsiv Rosiys'koyu Bil'shovyts'koyu Vladoyu v 1923-1932 Rokakh*., C.5
[242] Serhiychuk., C.8
[243] Serhiychuk., C.29

policy of support of the self-identification of Soviet nations was simply a part of the external image of the Soviet empire. This image had to be implemented on a very limited scale. For instance, Serhiichuk brings an example of how Stalin in 1930 had to present to the world that there was no agenda in the USSR to assimilate all the nations into one because such a strategy would be against Leninism.[244] However, the later developments of the Soviet Union will show that such an approach has changed quite rapidly.

Already in 1932, the Party stopped Ukrainisation in the main regions of the settlements of Ukrainians outside of Ukraine. The order says: "to change immediately […] the documents of all Soviet and cooperative organs of the Ukrainian regions, as well as all existing newspapers and magazines from Ukrainian to Russian as a language more understandable […]". The order which was initially implemented in the Northern Caucuses spread to the Far East, Qazaq ASSR, and many other areas.[245] Starting from 1933 the fight against the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" became one of the main leitmotivs of the Soviet government in its policies towards the identities of the Ukrainians. The accusations of nationalism were one of the main arguments for the deportations of people in a direct or indirect way. And even if being Ukrainian or speaking Ukrainian was not forbidden directly, the way of practising being Ukrainian was closely observed and controlled, and the Ukrainian deportees in the special settlements felt this control and observation even more than others.

Taking into account that the Ukrainisation was stopped, education, media or other sources of public Ukrainian language usage were highly limited, especially in the deportation places, Ukrainian communities tried to keep the usage of their native language at least in everyday life. For example, Vronska describes one of the memories of the deportee: "In the village to which we were brought, there was a rumour that they were taking Banderites [*people accused of being Bandera followers*]. All the people came out to watch. And among us, there were only old people, women, and children. We heard people saying, "Are these the Banderites?" And surprisingly, we hear Ukrainian speech all around. It turned out that people living there were expelled from Ukraine during the earlier dekurkulisation and collectivisation process."[246]

Other occasions for using the native language were celebrations, holidays, and self-organised cultural events in the settlements. The historian Vronska writes: "In fact, the special settlers made great efforts to preserve their culture. They got together and sang Ukrainian songs and formed choirs and other creative groups. For example, plays were staged in Ukrainian."[247] Another deportee Myroslava

[244] Serhiychuk., C.32
[245] Serhiychuk., C.33-34
[246] Vrons′ka, 'Zhyttya Ta Pobut Rodyn Uchasnykiv Natsional′no-Vyzvol′noho Rukhu v Mistsyakh Spetsposelen′ (1944–1952 Rr.)'., C.214
[247] Yatsenko et al., 'Faith'.

Krynytska (Sakharevych) remembers herself as a child growing up in the settlement of the deportees where she learnt Ukrainian by singing Ukrainian songs with other children.[248]

As it is described before, culture played a big role in creating a safe harbour for Ukrainians to keep using their language. An important comment about it is made by the anthropologist Dostoleva: "All creative activities of special settlers were censored and strictly regulated. In other words, it is hard to set the line between cultural resistance and the desire to preserve one's identity and the centrally imposed vision of Ukrainian culture as purely ethnographic or flattened to a safe stereotype."[249]

The strategy to make culture "flattened to a safe stereotype" is not new for empires. Indigenous cultures are perceived as easier to manage if they are reduced to the belief of being undeveloped, unimportant, and almost tribal in their cores. The same strategy was implemented by the Soviet Union, where the Russian culture was believed to bring civilization to other nations and the cultures of other nations were seen as tribal practices or traditions in a simplified folklore style. One of the most popular visual representations of such a strategy is the posters of "Friendship of the peoples" (see Appendix 5), where only a Russian representative is wearing civil clothes and other nations are represented by flattened traditional clothes.

This phenomenon in the context of the Ukrainian culture got its own term – "sharovarshchyna". The exact definition of the term is still discussed, but Yermolaieva and Nikishchenko argue that "sharovarshchyna" is "an attempt to represent the Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian identity through the pseudo folklore peasant and/or Cossack clothes, [and] everyday elements."[250] The authors are also describing the provinciality of the cultures which were not Russian. Such a strategy was common for the Soviet regime and was described by various academics. For example, Danylenko said that "in the second part of the XX century the Ukrainian culture in the USSR kept heading towards the "little russianism". The national culture was oriented to the "low" genres and was limited by the functional styles".[251] Another researcher, Riznyk, believes that "The function of the façade of the folklore in the USSR was supplemented by its provincialisation function, which was reflecting the doctrine about the lack of the perspectives of any languages or cultures in the USSR, apart from the Russian. If the latter was allowed to become "generally human" in its topics and tools […], other cultures had to be "nationally coloured" which meant their conservation in the archaeal forms."[252]

Due to the common efforts of the political and social structures guided by the Soviet regime, the native Ukrainian language was losing its main function, among the children of the deportees especially fast. For instance, one of the victims, who was 7 y.o. during the deportation, says that after coming back to Ukraine from the camp he almost forgot Ukrainian, so when he was answering in school, all his

[248] Yatsenko et al.
[249] Yatsenko et al.
[250] Yermolayeva and Nikishchenko, 'Yavyshche "Sharovarshchyny": Poshuk Definitsiyi'., C.30
[251] Yermolayeva and Nikishchenko., C.29
[252] Yermolayeva and Nikishchenko., C.30

classmates were "dying laughing" making fun of the way he speaks Ukrainian.[253] Such an example can serve as an argument that the aspect of language as the means of education is indeed extremely important and worth taking a closer look into, as I do in the next section.

Russification and education

The process of the brief Ukrainisation in the 1930s and later gradual russification in the context of education was described by numerous researchers. Analysis and comparisons by regions, classes, age, and other factors are made with the help of statistics and documents available to historians. With the information and outcomes of these studies, the tendencies and strategies of the Soviet government for the unification of the various ethnic groups in different republics are observed. The situation in the Ukrainian SSR was no exception.

The description of russification of the Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR is out of the scope of this thesis, therefore at this point, I will focus on the schooling in the Ukrainian language outside of the Ukrainian SSR and in the places of the deportations specifically. In this way it is possible to see the clear lack of support of Ukrainian minorities and as a result their fast assimilation and russification.

Since the creation of the USSR, the Soviet government tried to position itself as the opposite to the Russian empire, therefore, the policy of korenisation and Ukrainisation, in the case of the Ukrainians, were extremely important. Already in 1925, it was reported in Moscow that there were around 6,5 million Ukrainians living outside of Ukraine. A lot of them lived in compact groups: such as in Kuban (70% of local population), Siberia (613,000 people), the Far East (656,000 people), Turkistan (600,000 people), Voronezh province (1,000,000 people), Kursk province (23% of local population), Homel province (100,000 people), etc.[254] It is important to note that the "compact living", since it indicates the need and possibility of organising the Ukrainian media, schooling, entertainment activities, etc.

During the period of Ukrainisation, various activities of supporting the Ukrainian minorities in different regions of the RSFSR took place. In 1923 at the party meeting, Skrypnyk reported that for around 7 million Ukrainians there are around 500 schools and 2 vocational training institutions.[255] The actions were taken in the direction to increase these numbers, even though the different regions were managing it differently. Some were opening majors at universities in order to have teachers in schools, others were inviting teachers from neighbouring Ukrainian provinces. The low level of success was connected mainly to the lack of investments, interest and motivation of both institutions and the population. According to the report for 1924-1925 academic year: "this academic year the work was done almost solely in Kuban region. The main reason of the indifference on the spots towards Ukrainian issue

[253] Sereda, "'Zabyraytes', Bo Znovu Represuyemo!". Istoriya Vyslanoyi Na Sybir Rodyny Holykiv'.
[254] Serhiychuk, *'Ukrayinizatsiya Rosiyi'. Politychne Oshukanstvo Ukrayintsiv Rosiys'koyu Bil'shovyts'koyu Vladoyu v 1923-1932 Rokakh*., C.14
[255] Serhiychuk., C.11

is the proximity of the Ukrainian language the Russian. From the spots they report in the following way usually: Ukrainian population is russified, Ukrainians are speaking the spoiled Russian language, and so on."[256]

After 1932 when the Ukrainisation was harshly criticised by Stalin and stopped, there could be no support of the Ukrainian minorities living outside the Ukrainian SSR. In just two decrees the Politburo abolished all the Ukrainian institutions throughout the RSFSR and set up the reverse trend of russification, not just of the Ukrainians but in general of all nations. According to Martin, there was a shift in the perception of ethnic diversity, accompanied by a positive reassessment of the role of Russian culture. Nurmakov suggested a greater emphasis on Russian knowledge and questioned the value of education in minority languages, stating, "We establish national schools not to enforce mandatory instruction in native languages but to provide education to national minorities." This viewpoint diverged from existing policy and raised questions about the overall approach to minority language education. Nonetheless, the Education Commissariat's representative agreed on prioritising Russian, emphasising the importance of adapting to the language associated with "higher culture".[257] In this way, Ukrainisation in the Russian SFSR was brought to a conclusion.

Regarding the schooling for the deportees in the places of special settlements, in general, it was organised with a lot of difficulties. For instance, in 1931 it was reported that the 1931/1932 academic year was disrupted, and not even 10% of the children, in some settlements it's under 5%, visited schools.[258]

Within the next twenty years, the situation slightly improved in the deportation places. For example, a report of Shiyan, Head of the OSP of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, to the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov on the schooling of children of special settler evictees, describes that as of the 1st of January 1950 460,032 school-age children of special settlers were registered in the places of settlement, of whom 368,089, or 80%, were enrolled in primary and secondary schools, and 91,943 were not attending schools.[259] According to the statistics of this report, even though there are no specific numbers by the nationalities, it is possible to assume that for the Ukrainians the percentage ratio was similar to the general one, as it is true for one of the biggest Ukrainians deportees categories – OUN members.

In the same document there is an argumentation of why among the deportees of certain nationalities, the level of non-visiting school children is higher than the average. For instance, the reporter mentions such reasons as a difficult financial situation and the need of children to work, but at the same

[256] Serhiychuk., C.13
[257] Martin, 'The Russification of the RSFSR'., p.107
[258] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev, *Sistema spetsposeleniy v Sovetskom Soyuze 1930-1950kh godov*., C.160
[259] Dokladnaya zapiska nachal'nika OSP MVD SSSR V.V.Shiyana ministru vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglovu o shkol'nom obuchenii detey vyselentsev—spetsposelentsev. 24 fevralya 1950 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 457. L. 202—205. Podlinnik.

time, he mentions the lack of knowledge of the Russian language by certain nationalities and the absence of classes in the native languages for such children. Special attention is paid to the nationalist mood among specific groups and therefore, according to the reporter, parents do not allow their children to study in the Russian language in the new schools.[260] There is no information regarding the Ukrainians in this context, but it is possible to assume that it was easier to deal with them in this context due to the bilingualism, proximity of the Russian and Ukrainian alphabets and languages in general.

The ideological role of schooling was always important for the Soviet government. Schooling of the children of the deportees was obviously also under strict supervision. In the previously analysed report, for instance, it is mentioned that: "The […] facts also show that the local bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs do little to address the issue of universal education for the children of special settler evictees, do not sufficiently raise this issue with local Soviet and Party bodies, do not study in the course of their work the national peculiarities of the contingents and do not take measures to eradicate ethnic vestiges, which in some cases are an obstacle to the education of the children of evictees."[261] Berdinskich et al. write that already in the mid-1930s "the authorities attached particular importance to this [*schooling*], as school education and training was seen as an important tool for detaching children from the influence of reactionary parents."[262] Vronska expresses a similar opinion about the role of schooling in the lives of the deportees: "The Soviet government formally demanded that the management of the special settlements involve all school-age children in the education process. The main goal was to oppose the Soviet ideological upbringing to the influence of the family and to accelerate the process of domestic and linguistic assimilation."[263]

It is difficult to say to which extent this strategy was successful. For instance, Bohdan Kostelny, who was deported in 1947 to the Kemerovo region remembers: "In 1952, I went to school. In 1953, Stalin died. I recall a teacher coming to a class, there was a book "The Native Speech." She opened the book, and it had a portrait of Stalin on the first page. And she was crying: "Look, children, our Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin died." And all the children were crying. And my brother said, "It's good that he died. Now we can go to Ukraine." This episode showcases that regardless of the deep indoctrination in school, children were still formed by the opinions of their parents or other representatives of their social environment. Another survivor's memories are described as follows: "Marta Vvedenskaya, who was 12 years old at the time of deportation, recalls how she and her classmates were locked in a school in the Tomsk region and forced to join the Pioneer Youth until their parents made a scene and took the children

[260] Dokladnaya zapiska nachal'nika OSP MVD SSSR V.V.Shiyana ministru vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglovu o shkol'nom obuchenii detey vyselentsev—spetsposelentsev. 24 fevralya 1950 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 457. L. 202—205. Podlinnik.
[261] Dokladnaya zapiska nachal'nika OSP MVD SSSR V.V.Shiyana ministru vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglovu o shkol'nom obuchenii detey vyselentsev—spetsposelentsev. 24 fevralya 1950 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 457. L. 202—205. Podlinnik.
[262] Berdinskih, Berdinskih, and Verem'yev, *Sistema spetsposeleniy v Sovetskom Soyuze 1930-1950kh godov*., C.160
[263] Yatsenko et al., 'Training'.

away."[264] All these examples demonstrate the importance of ideological and linguistic unification among the children of the deportees and the role of schools in this process.

Schooling after Stalin's death did not change much. Regardless of the so-called Khrushchev Thaw, the process of the russification of schools continued and even got stronger. In different times, different decrees were changing the status of the Russian language in schools from obligatory to voluntary, which was technically voluntary-compulsory in its nature. Simultaneously, national languages could be rejected as a subject in school if parents did not see such a skill necessary for their children.

The ratio of the languages learnt in schools and self-identification plays an important role and can be a sign of assimilation when the number of schools with a specific language of instruction does not correspond to the number of national self-identification. Solchanyk describes that in the Ukrainian SSR "in the mid-1960s the proportion of schoolchildren […] being taught in Ukrainian was 62%, […] a proportion significantly lower than the share of Ukrainians in the republic's population, by 1987 this figure had dropped to 50.5%. At the same time, instruction in Russian encompassed 48.7% of the schoolchildren, while two decades earlier it had accounted for 37.2%."[265] The author also adds: "If one considers that in practice the mixed schools were actually Russian-language schools […], then Russian-language schools accounted for 84% of the total, leaving 16% of the schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction in the republic's twenty-four major cities."[266] The russification inside the national republic can be considered as the culmination of the russification policy.

Russification and religion

It is by mistake believed that the Soviet Union was denying religion as a tool to spread its ideology. Indeed, atheism is propagated to be the option for a true communist society, however, the Soviet government was cooperating with different religions to reach its political goals. One of the most prominent examples is the Russian Orthodox Church.

Bociurkiw describes the advantages of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as "the practical advantages of utilising the state-controlled Moscow patriarchate as an instrument of imperial integration and Russification of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Moldavians. The increasing, if not exclusive, role assigned to Russian nationalism in domestic self-legitimation during the late Stalinist and post-Khrushchev periods offered special advantages to the Russian Orthodox Church as the only surviving institutional link to the imperial past and credible bearer of traditional Russian national values and legitimising myths."[267]

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[264] Yatsenko, 'Radyans′ki Masovi Deportatsiyi: Instruktsiya z Asymilyatsiyi Dlya Rosiys′koyi Vlady'.
[265] Solchanyk, 'Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia: Imperial Integration, Russification, and the Struggle for National Survival'., p.270
[266] Solchanyk., p.270
[267] Bociurkiw, 'Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies'., p.214-215

Additionally, Borciukiw describes the Russian Orthodox Church as an "imperial Church" the role of which is to integrate other Orthodox nations. According to Zamkova, the idea of reviving Orthodoxy and the idea of "Moscow being a Third Rome" came to Stalin after the success of World War II. The author claims that this thought was "the basis of the mythology about the exceptional historical mission of the Russian people" which was a kind of "sacralisation of the ethnic characteristics of the Russian people and giving them religious significance. This idea was characteristic of Slavophiles […] in the context of their rejection of the "West"."[268] Later we will witness the same idea in the politics of Putin in the modern development of the Russian Federation.

Coming back to the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR, numerous researchers talk about its specific role in russification. Already in 1957, Mydlowsky identified that: "From the point of view of Russian imperialistic policy a particularly important task of the Russian Orthodox Church consists in isolating the population of the U.S.S.R. and, above all, of Ukraine from the West spiritually, that is to say, to cut them off from the influence of Western ideas and culture and from the true conception of religious faith and of national and individual freedom."[269] Ellis also believed that "the Moscow Patriarchate served as a voluntary instrument of Russification, which, of course, caused a reaction of resistance and indignation".[270] Apart from that Sysyn describes the dynamics between the ROC and Russian language as follows: "the post-war period has repeated the processes of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when Ukrainians took commanding positions in the Russian Church. But unlike that period, when Ukrainian learning and ecclesiastical practices supplanted Muscovite ones, no such tendencies are apparent yet in Russia. The church in eastern Ukraine remains a bastion of russification, using Russian pronunciation of Church Slavonic and Russian as a language of preaching and administration […]".[271] Later the author also cites the editors of the journal *The Ukrainian Herald* criticising Metropolitan Filaret: "Why is there no religious literature published in the Ukrainian language? No, the Exarch will not answer these questions. We will do this for him. It is because there is no official Ukrainian Church in Ukraine. Moscow usurped the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in eastern Ukraine in the thirties and the Greek-Catholic Church in western Ukraine in the forties. Moscow's Orthodox Church is an instrument of russification."[272]

Apart from the russification role of the Russian Orthodox Churches, the Soviet regime made sure to destroy any possible oppositional religious actors, such as national local churches. According to Bociurkiw national churches, which were often perceived as dangerous ones, could bring nationalist ideas into people's minds. The author believes that: "they [*national Churches*] represent a unique symbiosis of

[268] Bociurkiw., p.215
[269] Mydlowsky, 'Bolshevist Persecution of Religion and Church in Ukraine, 1917–1957: Informative Outline.', p.25
[270] Laas, 'Anhlomovni Pratsi pro Stanovyshche Rosiys′koyi Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy v Ukrayini v Period Pizn′oho Stalinizmu Ta Perebuvannya Pry Vladi M. Khrushchova'., C.411
[271] Sysyn, *The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR*., p.252
[272] Sysyn., p.257

religious and national identities that sustain and reinforce each other. This symbiotic relationship between religion and ethnicity is expressed institutionally through an independent or autonomous ecclesiastical structure based in the nation's territorial homeland and integrating members of that nationality at home and in dispersion."[273] Also, the author stresses the importance of such religious groups for national identities: "In the absence of other autonomous ethnic institutions, a national Church becomes a haven for national traditions and culture: it legitimises the struggle for their preservation and, at least implicitly, for national liberation, and assumes the role of spokesman for the national interest."[274]

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church is one of such cases when the church served as a haven for Ukrainians. This church has supported Ukrainian independence since World War I and throughout the whole Soviet period of Ukraine. Later it was punished for spreading such ideas, and in 1945-46 Moscow imprisoned and deported Uniate's entire hierarchy and several hundred clergymen who refused to join the Russian Orthodox Church.[275]

Regarding the deported people, their beliefs and traditions gave them a feeling of home. Often religious celebrations were the occasions for the communities to gather, speak Ukrainian, and practice some traditions and rituals. Vronska describes: "Ukrainians also on the North were Ukrainians […]. In the barracks, embroidered curtains were gradually installed on the half-blind windows, and icons were placed over the bunks. Even in exile, believers kept their rituals, gathering together, organised prayer services, taught children to pray, and passed on traditions and customs."[276] The author also comments: "Greek Catholics were assisted in all […] by priests, [who were] also deported. Due to the ban on performing religious rites, they worked on an equal footing with everyone. In some areas, commandants first turned a blind eye to the fact that priests were, after all, conducting the service. Eventually, the indulgence ceased."[277]

Religious holidays were additional occasions for Ukrainians to gather. Bohdan Kostelny, who was deported in 1947, remembers his celebration of Christmas in the special settlement: "we went to our barracks and sang the carols (we didn't go to the Tatars to sing carols). They came to the school, and the teacher, Polzova was her name, [asked]: 'Well, did you go to praise God?' – 'Yes, we went to praise God.'"[278] Another survivor of the deportation, Dmytrash, describes his experience: "On Christmas holidays, we went carolling in the barracks. We went, we were not afraid. On Easter holidays, we always had holy things, a priest came to bless us. Those who were not at work would go out and play haivky[279].

[273] Bociurkiw, 'Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies'., p.220
[274] Bociurkiw., p.220-221
[275] Bociurkiw., p.224
[276] Vrons′ka, 'Zhyttya Ta Pobut Rodyn Uchasnykiv Natsional′no-Vyzvol′noho Rukhu v Mistsyakh Spetsposelen′ (1944–1952 Rr.)'., C.214
[277] Yatsenko et al., 'Faith'.
[278] Yatsenko et al., 'Holidays'.
[279] Traditional spring song and dance practiced inviting spring to come.

Everyone knew songs from their village, from home, and they would go in a circle. The Russians watched and wondered: "How? They are hungry but singing".”[280]

The anthropologist Voronska also comments that despite the absence of official recognition of religious holidays in the Soviet Union, deportees from Western Ukraine made efforts to uphold their traditions even in deportation. During Christmas, they would gather with family or neighbours in a barrack, singing carols and traditional songs. They took advantage of opportunities to prepare festive dishes and practice their Ukrainian identities. Following Stalin's death, these celebrations took on a different tone, with special settlers expressing optimism about returning home soon. Improved financial circumstances also meant the festivities were less harsh than before, with people dressing in their best clothes and decorating their homes with embroidered drapes and tablecloths.[281]

Weddings were also celebrated by Ukrainian deportees often in a traditional way which was tightly connected to the church. Vira Tsvyk (Borovets), who was deported in 1950, remembers: "There was a wedding. I also had a church ceremony. The churches were available. All Ukrainians had weddings and church ceremonies."[282]

It is noticeable that religion was indeed tightly connected to the identities, cultures, traditions, and languages. Even though the Sovietisation did not include any religious beliefs, russification aimed at guiding Christian believers towards Russian Orthodoxy. Those who refused such options, such as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, were punished and deported. At this point, religious communities were becoming safe spaces for deportees where people were able to keep their identity as well as fight russification and sovietisation.

Russification and identities

Russification, as a key goal, aimed to shape the identities of individuals within the Soviet framework. To understand the nature of these changes, the first step is to look at the statistics and the Soviet census. Many scholars have already examined these numbers.[283] Analysing these figures provides insights into how russification has impacted the identities of people in diverse ways. However, before discussing the Soviet census and statistics, it is important to stress that the numbers should be taken into consideration carefully as some of the numbers were manipulated due to territorial changes, social and political contexts, etc. Additionally, according to Anderson and Silver: "the measure of ethnic identity or nationality in Soviet censuses is subjective, with respondents not required to show their internal passports

[280] Pukivs′kyy, 'My Ne Plakaly. Navit′ Spivaly Partyzans′ki Pisni'.
[281] Yatsenko et al., 'Holidays'.
[282] Yatsenko et al., 'Wedding'.
[283] Savoyska mentions the following authors: Yaroslav Antoniuk, Volodymyr Baran, Yurii Boyko, Viktor Danilenko, Ivan Dzyuba, Stanislav Kulchytsky, Vasyl Lizanchuk, Larysa Masenko, Hryhoriy Pivtorak, Oleh Rafalsky, Volodymyr Sklyar, Ivan Terlyuk, and others. Among the foreign researchers were Robert Lewis, Richard Rowland, Ralph Clem and many others who have also argued that many Ukrainians were assimilated by Russians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

or other identification papers. Thus, a person's self-identified nationality can change between two censuses, even if his or her official nationality remains unchanged."[284]

According to the first census conducted in the USSR, in 1926 there were 147 million 27 thousand people living in the USSR, among which 31 million 194 thousand self-identified as Ukrainians. The same year there were a bit more than 29 million people residing in the Ukrainian SSR, among which 23 million 218 thousand were self-identifying as Ukrainians and 2 million 677 thousand as Russians, while 7 million 873 thousand Ukrainians more lived on the territory of the Russian SFSR.[285]

The upcoming 1920s-1930s are believed to be difficult years demographically (and not only) for Ukraine: while many Soviet republics were growing in population numbers, the Ukrainian SSR was losing its people.[286] Due to the famines in Ukraine and Qazaqstan, the Soviet government was rescheduling the implementation of the census since 1933. Consequentially, the implemented census in 1937 was announced as inaccurate and incomplete, as its results were different from the expected ones, and its authors were prosecuted as enemies of the USSR and traitors.

Another census was implemented in 1939. This time it was reported that there were almost 31 million people living in the Ukrainian SSR, which is more than in 1926,[287] however, among them 23 million 667 thousand people self-identified as Ukrainians and more than 4 million as Russians.[288] As a result, it looks like the population in the Ukrainian SSR was growing due to the increasing number of the Russian community residing in Ukraine. However, the general number of Ukrainians in the USSR was reducing: in 1939 there were 28 million Ukrainians compared to 31 million in 1926, among them there were 3 million 359 thousand residing in the Russian SFSR compared to almost 8 million in 1926.[289] Putting these numbers in ratio to the total population in the USSR, the number of Ukrainians reduced from 21.2% to 16.5%. In the next decades of the Soviet rule, the ratio of Ukrainians will never grow more than 17% anymore. Interestingly, while the ratio of Ukrainians was reducing in the Ukrainian SSR, both the absolute number and the share of the total population of Russians living in Ukraine were increasing. Comparing the 1926 and 1939 censuses, the number of Russian residents changed from 9.2% of the total population in the Ukrainian SSR to 13.5% respectively.

As a result, the process of russification of the Ukrainian SSR was apparent in statistical numbers. For instance, Kozlov believes that the slow pace of the population growth of Ukrainians between 1926 and 1939 was partially due to their assimilation by Russians.[290] Tarapon comments on the numbers of the

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[284] Anderson and Silver, 'Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?', p.167-168
[285] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda'.
[286] Tarapon, 'Demohrafichnyy, Natsional′nyy Ta Sotsial′nyy Sklad Naselennya USRR–URSR 1920–1930-Kh Rr. u Rozrizi Povsyakdennoho Zhyttya'., C.127
[287] Tarapon., C.127
[288] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1939 goda.'
[289] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1939 goda.'
[290] Anderson and Silver, 'Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?', p.167

census: "as the proportion of Ukrainians in the population of the Ukrainian SSR decreased, the use of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine also declined. In 1926, 76.6% of the Ukrainian population spoke Ukrainian as their native language. 1 million Ukrainians (4.3%) in the Ukrainian SSR refused to recognise Ukrainian as their mother tongue, preferring Russian. Thus, in the Ukrainian SSR in 1926, 95.7% of Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian as their mother tongue. In the 1930s, Russification processes became more intense, especially in cities. While in 1926, 75% of urban Ukrainians declared Ukrainian as their native language, in 1939, only 66.6% in the largest cities of the republic."[291]

After the war, the demographic situation was extremely difficult and according to some researchers, in 1945, Ukraine's population was around 33.5-34.0 million, and if there had been no war, Ukraine would have had around 43-43.5 million people in 1945.[292]

The next available census was conducted only in 1959. Since then, it has been possible to compare data a bit more precisely, even though many scholars stress that there were different manipulations applied by the Soviet government. Even with the expected manipulations, the increasing number of Russians living in the Ukrainian SSR is observed, as well as gradual russification and "disappearing" of Ukrainians on the territories of the RSFSR.

Just to mention some numbers, in 1959 there was the highest proportion of Ukrainians in the USSR after Holodomor – 17.8%. Since then, the numbers gradually went down to 16.8% in 1970, 16.2% in 1979, and 15.5% in 1989. A similar situation was with the proportion of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR: 76.8% Ukrainians in 1959, 74.9% in 1970, 73.5% in 1979, and 72.7% in 1989. On the other hand, the proportion of Russians in the Ukrainian SSR all this time was increasing: 16.9% in 1959, 19.3% in 1970, 21.1% in 1979, and 22.1% in 1989.[293]

Solchanyk mentions that "in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldavia registered some of the largest proportional increases in Russian population among the union republics. […] [B]etween 1959 and 1989, the number of Russians increased in Ukraine by 59.9%". He also adds: "Throughout the 1960s Ukraine registered net increases of population through migration which reached a peak in the latter half of the decade, and this trend continued in the first half of the 1970s, although on a smaller scale. In the period 1959-72, residents of the RSFSR accounted for 75% of the total migrants to Ukraine."[294]

With the influx through Russian migration, the russification of Ukrainians also took place, and the processes of urbanisation and migration were among the main accelerators. For example, Savoyska mentions Masenko who argues that "in the depths of the empire, the language barrier between the

[291] Tarapon, 'Demohrafichnyy, Natsional′nyy Ta Sotsial′nyy Sklad Naselennya USRR–URSR 1920–1930-Kh Rr. u Rozrizi Povsyakdennoho Zhyttya'., C.128
[292] Danylenko, 'Ukrayins′ka i Rosiys′ka Natsional′ni Spil′nosti v Konteksti Sotsial′no-Demohrafichnykh Zmin (50-80-i Rr. XX Century.)'., C.48
[293] The data are visualised in the table in the Appendix 7. The source is cited in the table.
[294] Solchanyk, 'Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia: Imperial Integration, Russification, and the Struggle for National Survival'., p.260-263

Ukrainian city and the countryside has transformed the city centres of the Russian Ukraine, with Kyiv inclusive, into the province of Moscow, distorting the feeling of national identity, which has weakened the sense of national dignity to a critical level and national solidarity in the Ukrainian society. The language barrier between the two cultures - the urban Russian and rural Ukrainians - was intensified by the Soviet authorities in order to discredit the Ukrainian language."[295]

Passportisation was another strategy undertaken by the Soviet Union which led to the speeding of the process of russification. In addition to the overall challenges associated with passports during the 1920s-1930s, where passports were utilised as a means to restrict mobility (peasants were forbidden to move without them) and the revocation of passports from deported citizens, the later phases of passportisation involved specifying the ethnic group in the document. According to Serhiychuk, this way thousands of Ukrainians on the territory of the RSFSR were permanently identified as Russians as this category could never be changed again.[296]

There are different arguments about the role of the identity in the USSR in general. Some scholars support the idea of Afanasiev about an existing "identity vacuum" in the Soviet Union,[297] which later would lead to chauvinism and radical nationalism in Russia (called "Russism" today). Other scholars focus on the newly created type of identity in the USSR – the identity of a Soviet person. This type of self-identification is harder to follow as it was not researched or surveyed publicly during Soviet times.

The notion of the "Soviet person" is confusing and was perceived differently even by pro-Soviet academics. Szporluk describes the confusion as follows: "The fact that […] two prominent defenders of the concept of the "Soviet people" understand quite different things by the term is additional proof of the present ideological confusion if not crisis. Bromlei calls it a metaethnic entity, Borovik calls it national." Bromlei indeed believes that the "Soviet people" is a real community which has similar socialist features and can be considered as a meta-ethnic community[298], an idea that was not supported by everyone.

Academia was also confused and sometimes naturally biased regarding this term. Wojnowski believes that: "the "Soviet people" was often tantamount to ethnic Russians and an idealised vision of a conservative Russian culture." The author also describes that many other researchers "saw "Soviet people" as a multi-ethnic community united by common political structures or socialist values". Even though this equality often meant unity grounded in familiarity with the Russian language and culture – an ambition that was not so much unattainable, frustrated though it was by day-to-day xenophobia, but

[295] Savoyska, 'Rusyfication, Russianize or Asymilation: To Define Concepts'., p.110
[296] Serhiychuk, *'Ukrayinizatsiya Rosiyi'. Politychne Oshukanstvo Ukrayintsiv Rosiys'koyu Bil'shovyts'koyu Vladoyu v 1923-1932 Rokakh*., C.324
[297] Szporluk, 'The Imperial Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem'., p.24
[298] Szporluk., p.24

ultimately unimaginable in a society where every citizen was assigned one ethnic identity ("Soviet" was not an option) in his or her internal passport".[299]

Nevertheless, the identity of "the Soviet person" did not just hold during the existence of the USSR, but even outlived it. In 2022 Chaisty and Whitefield commented on the tendency within Russia of an increasing desire of people to self-identify with the Soviet Union rather than with their existing state – the Russian Federation,[300] a phenomena which definitely requires deeper research.

Regarding the identities of the deportees, it is an under-researched field, therefore, it is only possible to make conclusions based on the memories of survivors or read about the self-identification of the victims in the general research on the places of deportation. First of all, it is important to mention the general tendency of the russification of those Ukrainians who lived outside of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR between 1959 and 1970.[301] This process definitely influenced the deportees as well. The main reason for the russification is lack of the places which could support the stability of the Ukrainian identity, such as kindergartens or groups for children where Ukrainian was practised, schools or classes, libraries, books, newspapers, media in the Ukrainian language, etc.

Another important point to be mentioned is the russification as a strategy of the deportees to build a better life for either themselves after the release from the deportation settlements, or at least for their children who were "freer" in their choices of where to live, study or work. For example, Kassymbekova and Chokobaeva make the following point regarding russification, hierarchies and strategies of the deportees: "Russification was uneven for Slavic vs. non-Slavic groups. Theoretically, a deported Ukrainian, Belarusian or Georgian (or, rather, their descendants) could become a recruited settler in the Baltics if they had become russified and educated in the city. A Tajik had fewer opportunities for moving to cities and, hence, for russification, but even so, their chances of becoming a russified settler in Tallinn were much lower, if they even existed at all. Groups that were neither russified nor urbanised could stay in the liminal position of neither settlers nor natives."[302] Therefore, it is possible to conclude that deportees could choose to get russified or encourage this process for their descendants in order to fit the established system and improve the conditions of their lives. As a result, russification simply became a survival strategy for the victims of the Soviet regime.

Interestingly, being Russian was helping not only outside of the camps but also inside. Russian deportees were in a more privileged state than the deportees of other nationalities. For instance, Clara Hartman, one of the survivors of the Gulag camps, remembers: "There was such violence among the prisoners! It was a mixed camp. The Russian women felt that they had the power on their side, that they were allowed to do anything, and they let the others know. If they wanted to take my bread, they didn't

[299] Wojnowski, 'The Soviet People'., p.3
[300] Whitefield and Chaisty, 'Putin's Russia: People Increasingly Identify with the Soviet Union – Here's What That Means'.
[301] Anderson and Silver, 'Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?', p.167
[302] Kassymbekova and Chokobaeva, 'Expropriation, Assimilation, Elimination: Understanding Soviet Settler Colonialism'.

say anything, they just took it, and that was it. And I couldn't say anything, because in that case, they would just beat me. That's how it was." Later in the interview she also adds: "There were a lot of Ukrainian women. They were friendly, patient, and loved to get to know each other, but they had nothing themselves. They were like everyone else. But the Russian women got everything they wanted. They would go to the kitchen and return with bowls filled to the brim. If the cook didn't want to give them anything, they would beat her. Everyone was afraid of them. They would fill large bowls with food, return to the barracks and eat to their hearts' content. They would also go to the place where they cut bread and bring as much bread as they wanted. There was a big difference."[303]

To sum up, all the factors mentioned above influenced directly or indirectly the identity of Ukrainians and boosted the assimilation which concluded in the russified and sovietised citizens. While such an outcome was considered a success by the Soviet government, it became an issue after the collapse of the USSR for an independent Ukraine. The created identity crisis was manipulated and used by the Russian Federation to achieve its imperialistic goals with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 and the occupation of Ukrainian territories, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

[303] Khartman, 'Rozpovidaye Klara Khartman'.

III. Independency times

The collapse of the USSR and the establishment of Ukrainian independency influenced the migration flows in a major way. With democracy such notions as "deportations" and "exile" disappeared from the Ukrainian governmental policies, and those groups which were not allowed to return to their lands of origin finally started coming back. The biggest example of such type of movement is the return migration of the Crimean Tatars from Central Asia. Repatriation became a popular type of mobility also among Ukrainians who overnight found themselves living abroad instead of simply residing in another republic within their country. Simultaneously, other national groups residing in Ukraine often decided to return to their places of origin and one of the biggest groups of such kind residing in Ukraine were Russians.

Even though in the period from 1991 until 2013 there was no forced migration per se, I will take a look into the repatriation of the various ethnic groups as their return migration is a direct outcome of forced migration policies implemented by the Soviet government in the previous decades. Additionally, voluntary-compulsory migration, often in the form of organised labour migration, also ceased to exist. However, the broadly spread migration routes, especially those to the industrial centres in Russia, often transformed into the main destination of voluntary economic migration. At the same time, cultural and geographical proximity, as well as knowledge of the Russian language, were making the Eastern neighbouring country one of the most attractive destinations for Ukrainian labour migration. As a result, the number of Ukrainians residing in the Russian Federation continued growing even after the dissolution of the USSR, with Ukrainians ranking highest among non-Russian residents in Russia.

The Russian-Ukrainian war, which started in 2014, added new types of mobilities to the migration flows: internal displacement, war refugees' migration, and deportations. The total number of Ukrainians who moved to Russia since 2014 is estimated around 2 million people. However, the all-Russian census of 2020 showed that only around 800,000 people in Russia self-identify as Ukrainians, which seems very low. Many demographers believe that the "disappearance" of Ukrainians in Russia could be a result of aggressive policies against Ukraine and ongoing russification and assimilation leading to the rapid decrease of the number of people identifying as Ukrainians.

Unfortunately, the machine of russification did not cease its existence after the collapse of the USSR. It continued working both inside Ukraine, in some regions especially visibly, and in Russia towards Ukrainians residing there. The Russian-Ukrainian war and its consequential occupation of Ukrainian territories multiplied the strategies adopted by the Russian government and produced one of the brightest examples of russification policies.

Migrations in the period of 1991-2014

Since independency, a lot of migratory patterns of Ukrainians changed due to the economic, social, and political situation. Different researchers are characterising this period differently, however, it is common to mention it as the 4th wave of Ukrainian migration, where the first wave is the migration of peasants in the last decades of the 19th century; the second wave is characterised by the interwar migration due to political instability; and the third wave is highlighted by the post-World War II migration and migration of the 1950s-1960s as a reaction to the dissidents.[304] However, it is important to understand that throughout these periods numerous events, and not just those mentioned, could cause migrations, both forced and voluntary. Therefore, the usual generalisation of the fourth wave of the Ukrainian migration, as well as counting the waves and reducing them to four, creates wrong narratives and understanding of the history of migration and diasporas.

Analysing post-1991 types of migration in Ukraine, different scholars group people's movements differently. Vollmer and Malynovska propose the following classification, where all mobilities are organised into three major groups: 1. Labour migration; 2. Irregular migration; 3. "Ethnic" migration and repatriation.[305] An additional group which should be added, and it is done by Malynovska in her other article, is a group of refugees within which certain groups immigrated to Ukraine due to the war in their countries of origin, for instances: Azeri, Armenians, Georgians, and Moldovans.[306]

Describing each of the groups, labour migration characterises those people who migrate with the aim of improving their financial situation. On the opposite of the Soviet restrictions on movement and employment, after independency, Ukraine adopted the "Law on Exit and Entry" (1994) and the "Law on Employment of the Population" which guaranteed the right of Ukrainian citizens to move and work abroad. Already in 2006, according to Malynovska, there were 2 to 3 million Ukrainians working abroad.[307] This type of migration will be described broader in the part on voluntary migration.

The second category mentioned in the classification of Vollmer and Malynovska is irregular migration. The authors bring all types of irregular movements to this group. Among the most common are transit migration of refugees or stateless people and human trafficking. According to Malynovska "between 1991 and 2003, about 100,000 illegal[308] migrants were detained at Ukraine's western border."[309] This group is out of the scope of this thesis, therefore, I will not be focusing on it.

The third category, according to Vollmer and Malynovska, describes all kinds of ethnic movements as well as repatriations. This type of migration will be of specific interest to this thesis as people who

[304] Fedyuk and Kindler, 'Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union'., p.2-3
[305] Vollmer and Malynovska, 'Ukrainian Migration Research Before and Since 1991'., p.26
[306] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.
[307] Malynovska.
[308] The term is used by the author of the citation. According to my beliefs there is no person illegal, and this type of migrations or migrants should be classified as irregular.
[309] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.

repatriated to Ukraine were more likely to be the direct victims or descendants of victims of the numerous deportations and resettlements implemented by the Soviet government. Repatriants are defined by the Geneva Regional Conference in 1996 as "persons, who for economic, social or personal reasons, have voluntarily resettled in the country of their citizenship or origin for the purpose of permanent residence." Additionally, it suggests that such type of people "need assistance to resettle in/return to their countries of citizenship or origin, as well as to integrate into their societies".[310] A special preoccupation with this category of people in particular, as well as other types of migrations after the collapse of the USSR in general, can be explained by the fear of possible cleansings and ethnic conflicts starting on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Repatriation

After the proclamation of independence, dozens of post-Soviet countries took different decisions on how to treat and manage the situation due to the thousands of repatriants who used to be resettled, deported, or sent into exile, as well as those people who were willing to return to the place of origin. Ukraine was one of the countries that did not just allow everyone who was residing at the moment of proclamation in Ukraine to get the Ukrainian citizenship but also voted in the law "On Citizenship" in 1991. This law actively encouraged the repatriation of those people who had historic roots in Ukraine regardless of their ethnic origin. In this way, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Armenians, Germans, Bulgarians, and others could come back to Ukraine and receive citizenship together with their families.[311]

Different researchers present different numbers while describing the migration flows of the beginning of the 21st century. For instance, Malynovska talks about 1 million immigrants arriving to Ukraine between 1991-1992, among which 984,000 moved from former Soviet Union countries, and 81,000 arrived from Central European countries where Soviet military personnel and their family members were stationed.[312] Shulga claims that the years 1992-1993, had the highest number of repatriants arriving in Ukraine. He argues that in these years 828,000 people arrived, 377,000 (45.5%) of whom self-identified as Ukrainians.[313] Other documents claim that 2,229,870 persons immigrated to Ukraine between 1991 and 2004, among which over 2 million headed from the post-Soviet countries and almost 164,000 from others.[314] After this period, the repatriation slowed down, and Malynovska comments that

[310] 'Regional Conference to Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary Displacement and Returnees in the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Relevant Neighbouring States'., article 30, annex 2.
[311] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.
[312] Malynovska.
[313] Shul'ga, *Velikoye Pereseleniye: Repatrianty, Bezhentsy, Trudovyye Migranty*.
[314] Popson and Woodrow Wilson, *Demography, Migration, and Tolerance*., p.19

in 2004 only 38,600 people immigrated to Ukraine, among whom 32,600 were from post-Soviet states and 6,000 from other countries.[315]

Among the total number of immigrants, it is usually difficult to determine the repatriants. However, it is reasonable to assume that a big flow of incoming migrants in the 1990s from the post-Soviet countries were more likely to be repatriants. I will briefly mention the total number of immigrations to Ukraine during this period, acknowledging that the reported figures often vary. The discrepancies might be connected to the variability of the understanding of the term "immigrants". While some statistics include all people who were born outside of Ukraine but reside in the Ukrainian territory, the Ukrainian Immigration Office calculates only those persons who crossed the border after the proclamation of the independency of Ukraine. In this way, the numbers of immigrants can differ from almost 7 million foreign-born persons living in Ukraine in 2001 according to the Global Migrant Database reports, to a bit smaller number of 5.5 million immigrants for the year 2000 and 5.3 million immigrants for the year 2010 according to the UN Population Division. In contrast, the Ukrainian government reported that there were between 150,000 – 170,000 foreigners residing in Ukraine in the period of 2006-2008. The biggest group of immigrants is reported to come from Russia.[316] In both cases – whether considering statistics for all foreign-born people or those based on border crossings – it is logical that Russians comprised the majority of foreign residents, given that the largest Ukrainian diaspora was reported to be on the territory of the modern Russian Federation. Other source countries for foreign-born repatriants include Belarus, Qazaqstan, Uzbekistan, and Moldova.

In the 2010s the immigration rate based on border-crossing was increasing and experiencing various fluctuations due to the fast-changing political and economic situation in Ukraine. However, regardless of the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, according to the data of the State Migration Service of Ukraine, immigration was still ongoing: 253,000 foreigners resided in Ukraine in 2014, 250,000 – in 2015, 252,000 – in 2016, 265,000 – in 2017. Immigrants were still mainly coming from former communist countries, such as Russia, which make up more than half of all immigrants with 55.4%, Moldova (6.6%), Azerbaijan (4.5%), Armenia (4.3%), Georgia (3.9%), Belarus (3.3%), Uzbekistan (0.9%). New countries joining the list recently were Turkey, Syria and China (together 0.9% of the total). Interestingly, the authors of the report stressed that in the period of 2014-2017, the level of Russian immigration decreased by 6.5 %, while the number of other groups increased.[317]

According to the IOM reports, there were 285,000 foreigners with permanent residence permits in 2019[318], and around 293,600 in 2021[319]: "The majority of immigrants (83% in 2020) are family members

[315] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.
[316] Hofmann and Reichel, 'Ukrainian Migration: An Analysis of Migration Movements to, through and from Ukraine'., p.15-17
[317] *Ukrayins'ke Suspil'stvo: Mihratsiynyy Vymir : Natsional'na Dopovid'*., C.119
[318] 'Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures 2019'., p.12
[319] 'Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures 2021'., p.18

of Ukrainian citizens, as well as people of Ukrainian origin and their descendants who are eligible for Ukrainian citizenship. These people receive immigration permits out of the immigration quota annually set by the Government. Among them, most nationals are from the Russian Federation (more than a half) and other post-Soviet countries."[320]

Apart from the repatriants from Russia, a specific interest should be turned to Ukrainian minorities coming back to Ukraine and resettling on the lands of their previous residency. For example, around 250,000 Crimean Tatars, who are indigenous people of Crimea, came back from the deportations during 1989-1995.[321] Shulga claims that in 2001 more than 260,000 Crimean Tatars were registered in Crimea. Apart from Crimean Tatars, about 12,000 Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Germans arrived on the Crimean Peninsula.[322] Additionally, there were around 2,000 Germans[323] and 5,000 Meskhetian Turks[324] repatriating to Ukraine.

The return of different ethnic groups naturally brought a lot of issues such as the need for financial assistance for the repatriants, the regulation of withdrawn belongings from the deported people including land, the lack of political initiative to return the rights of indigenous people, linguistic varieties of the regions which were becoming more visible with the growing number of arrived repatriants, raising social tensions, growing xenophobia, racism and discrimination, etc.

Additionally, it is important to briefly mention refugees who were statistically part of the foreigners residing in Ukraine. According to Malynovska, Ukraine hosted around 62,000 Moldovan refugees from Transnistria in 1992, characterised by the author as "the predominantly Russian-speaking part of Moldova where ethnic Ukrainians compose a large part of the population."[325] Later, the number of refugee applications was decreasing, for instance, around 2,700 applications were received in 1997, and a total of 457 applications were received in 2002. In the period between 2006 and 2009, the annual application number grew and was around 1,700 – 2,000 per year.[326] However, the countries of origin of the refugees varied throughout the years. While at the beginning of the 1990s, the biggest amount of people were coming from Transnistria Moldova, 3,000 war refugees arrived from Abkhazia Georgia, about 2,000 people from Chechnya, and 5,000 from Tajikistan.[327] In the upcoming years, it was reported that out of the 16,647 asylum applications from 2000 to 2009 around 20% were from Afghanistan, 12.3% from Pakistan, 10.7% from India, 9% from the Russian Federation, 6.1% from Bangladesh and 5.2% from Iraq. Already in 2009, 53% of the 2,334 asylum seekers arrived from Afghanistan.[328]

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[320] Ibid, p.18
[321] Popson and Woodrow Wilson, *Demography, Migration, and Tolerance*., p.19
[322] Shul'ga, *Velikoye Pereseleniye: Repatrianty, Bezhentsy, Trudovyye Migranty*., C.32
[323] Shul'ga., C.32
[324] Popson and Woodrow Wilson, *Demography, Migration, and Tolerance*., p.19
[325] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.
[326] Hofmann and Reichel, 'Ukrainian Migration: An Analysis of Migration Movements to, through and from Ukraine'., p.18
[327] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.
[328] Hofmann and Reichel, 'Ukrainian Migration: An Analysis of Migration Movements to, through and from Ukraine'., p.18-19

Apart from a high incoming flow of migrants to Ukraine, different ethnic groups were also leaving the territory of Ukraine. As is known, Ukraine has been home to a diverse group of peoples since the times of the Russian Empire, which invited peasants of various ethnic backgrounds to settle its lands. Since then, the variety of ethnic groups living on the territory of modern Ukraine includes Greeks near the Azov Sea, Bulgarians in the Odesa region, Hungarians, and Romanians in the Transcarpathia, Moldovans in Odesa and Chernivtsi regions, and Poles in Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi and Lviv regions.[329] The groups which need special attention are Russian and Jewish communities, which together are the majority of minorities residing in Ukraine. Moreover, the emigration of a large number of people influenced the national and linguistic structure of the Ukrainian society, therefore, this type of mobility should be duly taken into consideration.

According to Malynovska between 1991 and 2004 around 2,537,400 individuals in total emigrated from Ukraine, among whom 1,897,500 moved to other post-Soviet states, and 639,900 people moved to other countries.[330] This migration pattern can be seen as an exchange of population among the ex-USSR countries. Other sources estimate that there were about 3 to 5 million Ukrainian emigrants in the period between 1990 and 2006.[331]

The immigration and emigration of Russians significantly influenced the demographic pattern of the population in Ukraine. According to data, during the 1990s 818,800 ethnic Russians arrived in Ukraine and 968,200 left, giving a balance of emigration of 149,400 people, which is 1.3% of the total Russian population in Ukraine according to the 1989 census. This out-migration changed the general percentage of Russians living in Ukraine from 22.1% of the total population in 1989 to 17.3% in 2001. However, researchers stress that the decrease in the share of Russians recorded in the 2001 census is greater than the emigration itself, therefore, it's reasonable to assume that some people at later stages re-identified themselves as Ukrainians.[332] The flexibility of self-identification of people will be also discussed in the later section of this chapter.

Voluntary migration

The possibility to migrate voluntary after a long period of restrictions and limitations implemented by the USSR was guaranteed by law in Ukraine since the 1990s. In 1993 all restrictions on movement were lifted and later in February 1994 the "Law on the Order of Exit from Ukraine and Entrance to Ukraine for the Citizens of Ukraine" was adopted. Additional guarantees of free movement were implemented through the 2003 "Law on Freedom of Movement and Free Choice of Residence in

[329] Popson and Woodrow Wilson, *Demography, Migration, and Tolerance*., p.19
[330] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.
[331] Hofmann and Reichel, 'Ukrainian Migration: An Analysis of Migration Movements to, through and from Ukraine'., p.24
[332] Dnistryans'kyy, *Etnohrafiya Ukrayiny: Navchal'nyy posibnyk*., C.95, C.98

Ukraine." All these rights gave the freedom to people to move out and back to Ukraine free of ideological restrictions previously imposed by the Soviet regime.[333]

The changes in legislation and the absence of limits on movement significantly influenced the level of emigration among Ukrainians. The emigration wave at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century is commonly associated with economic or labour[334] migration. Deep research is conducted on this topic covering different aspects of this type of mobility, including reasons for migration, demographics, duration, direction, etc. It is out of the scope of this thesis to discuss all these aspects in detail, however, at this point, it is important to see the continuation of the voluntary-compulsory and organised work migration practised in the USSR changing into free economic emigration, as well as to make an overview of the destinations, and specifically pay attention to the emigration to the Russian Federation.

The increase in economic emigration is justified by the context of a newly established country with its challenges and crises. It is difficult to estimate the numbers of emigrants due to similar difficulties as with the estimates of immigrants. The collapse of the USSR brought confusion to the statistical data as numerous reports were calculating people based on their place of birth and the split of one country into dozens created a statistically big number of emigrants and immigrants without actually moving.

In the context of Ukrainian emigration, for instance, the Global Migrant Database talks about almost 5.9 million persons who were born in Ukraine and lived outside of the country of origin in the early 2000s. Among them, around 3.5 million lived in Russia. Other countries of residency were the USA, Poland, Qazaqstan, Moldova, Belarus, Israel, Germany, and others.[335] Different numbers are presented by the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian Ministry of Interior reported the emigration level between 30,000 and 40,000 persons per year for the period of 2005 to 2007. At the end of 2007 another ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported that around 565,000 Ukrainians in total are registered at Consular Divisions abroad, however, this number can gradually underrepresent the whole picture due to the voluntary nature of such registrations.[336] According to the UN Population Department in 2017 there were more than 7 million Ukrainian citizens living abroad.[337] Meanwhile, the authors of the national report on migration in 2018 informed that "given the number of taxpayers in Ukraine, the scale of unregistered employment and possible accounting errors, the most likely estimate of the number of Ukrainians working abroad at the same time is 3 million people."[338]

Regarding destinations, Ukrainian emigration is split into two big categories: East and West. In the period 2005-2008, 48.1% of the emigrants went to Russia, 13.4% to Italy, 11.9% to Czechia, 8% to

[333] Malynovska, 'Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy'.
[334] These terms will be used synonymously.
[335] Hofmann and Reichel, 'Ukrainian Migration: An Analysis of Migration Movements to, through and from Ukraine'., p.24
[336] Hofmann and Reichel., p.24
[337] *Ukrayins'ke Suspil'stvo: Mihratsiynyy Vymir : Natsional'na Dopovid'*., C.30
[338] *Ukrayins'ke Suspil'stvo: Mihratsiynyy Vymir : Natsional'na Dopovid'*., C.80

Poland, and 18.6% to other destinations.[339] Regarding the emigration to Russia, the mobility flow was slowly decreasing over the years, and if in 2008 48.1% of emigrants chose Russia as their destination, in 2012 – 43.2% emigrated there. After 2014, due to the start of the war, the political situation for Ukrainians worsened in Russia, and as a result, in 2017 26.3% of emigrants chose the Russian Federation as their emigration destination.[340]

Numerous studies are covering special features and factors of the economic emigration in Ukraine. As this aspect is out of the scope of this thesis, I will only briefly describe the most important characteristics which might be of interest in the context of assimilation and russification.

First, it is believed that the labour emigration of Ukrainians is mainly short-term in its nature. For example, the national report of 2018 states that among the migrants in 2015-2017 43.6% made one trip abroad, 46.1% made several trips per year, 5.9% travelled once or more times per month, and 4.4% travelled weekly. While stating their duration abroad, 50% of people comment that they stayed abroad for a period of 1 to 3 months, 20% - for 3 to 6 months, 10.8% stayed abroad for 6 to 12 months, and 10.1% - for more than 12 months.[341] Additionally, the report describes the dependency of the duration of the stay to the distance between the home and host countries. The authors believe that those migrants who move to the neighbouring countries, such as Russia, Belarus, Poland, Czechia, and Hungary, are more interested in periodic short trips with a return to Ukraine, while those going to Southern Europe, Germany, the USA and Israel usually reside in those countries for a longer time.[342] With such descriptions, it is possible to assume that assimilation is less likely to happen to people staying abroad only for a short term rather than to those who are residing outside of Ukraine for longer periods of time.

The case of the Russian Federation is very specific and has more peculiarities. First, many labour migrants from Ukraine work not in the closest regions of the Russian Federation to the Ukrainian border.[343] Second, previous knowledge of the Russian language not only helps in finding a job faster but also boosts integration and assimilation much faster than in other countries. The data from the 2002 all-Russian census showed that 2,943,471 citizens identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians[344], while in 2010 according to the all-Russian census 1,927,988 people in Russia identified as Ukrainians is also making an argument for russification. Such big changes in numbers within such a short period of time, as well as the "disappearing" of Ukrainians, could be evidence of ongoing russification.

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339 *Ukrayins'ke Suspil'stvo: Mihratsiynyy Vymir : Natsional'na Dopovid'*., C.84
340 'Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures 2019'., p.8
341 *Ukrayins'ke Suspil'stvo: Mihratsiynyy Vymir : Natsional'na Dopovid'*., C.87
342 *Ukrayins'ke Suspil'stvo: Mihratsiynyy Vymir : Natsional'na Dopovid'*., C.88
343 *Ukrayins'ke Suspil'stvo: Mihratsiynyy Vymir : Natsional'na Dopovid'*., C.86
344 Chindea et al., *Migration in Ukraine*., p.23, 29

Ethnic composition of the population of Ukraine

The high level of mobility in the period of the 1990s and early 2000s had a major impact on the demographic picture of Ukraine, including its ethnic and linguistic aspects. Unfortunately, the first and only census implemented by Ukraine was conducted in 2001. Therefore, the census data are available only from that year. All other data from the later years are based on the surveys implemented by the different sociological institutions and researchers.

In general, the total population of Ukraine in 1993 was 52 million people.[345] In 2021 according to the report of the IOM, the population in Ukraine was decreasing, and totalled 41.4 million people in 2021.[346] By comparing the census of 1989, the last one implemented by the USSR, and the census of 2001, already implemented by Ukraine, it is possible to analyse some of the demographic changes.

It is noticeable that the total number of Ukrainians, who identified as such, remained relatively stable: 37.4 million in 1989 and 37.5 million in 2001. In the same period, the number of Russians drastically decreased by 3 million people – from 11.3 million in 1989 to 8.3 million in 2001. According to Romaniuk and Gladun: "This was not […] the result of a mass exodus in response to the diminished post-independence status of the Russian minority; rather, at least three other factors were at work. First, the predominantly Russian-speaking Eastern industrial regions, Donetsk, and Lugansk, were characterised by particularly low fertility and high mortality. Second, as the economic situation in Ukraine deteriorated, there was a great deal of economic emigration (by Ukrainians as well as Russians). Third, in the process of ethnic re-identification, it is possible that many mixed Russian-Ukrainian families self-identified themselves as Ukrainian."[347] Such a change in the total ethnic demographic picture resulted in a decrease of the Russian share within the population in Ukraine from 22% in 1989 to 17.3% in 2001 and an increase of the Ukrainian share from 72% in 1989 to 77.8% in 2001.

The strengthening of the Ukrainian share in the population is also visible in various administrative Oblasts. According to the analysis of the Ukrainian census done by Dnistrianskyi: "Ethnic Ukrainians were the majority in all regions of Ukraine [*in 2001*]: over 90% in 13 regions (Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Poltava, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv Oblasts), from 80 to 90% - in four regions (Zakarpattia, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Kherson, and Kyiv Oblasts), from 70 to 80% - in four more regions (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi Oblasts), over 60% in Odesa region and from 50 to 60% in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The minority is only reported in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol".[348] This data represents Ukrainian majorities in all Ukrainian regions, apart from Crimea, while the effects of the Soviet policies

[345] 'Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures 2019'., p.4
[346] 'Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures 2021'., p.4
[347] Romaniuk and Gladun, 'Demographic Trends in Ukraine'., p.324-325
[348] Dnistryans'kyy, *Etnohrafiya Ukrayiny: Navchal'nyy posibnyk*., C.108

of russification implemented through the resettlement of the South of Ukraine and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts are also visible.

Regarding the minorities residing in Ukraine, many of them reduced in numbers between 1989 and 2001. According to Kotyhorenko: "In relation to the total number of people […] the Jewish community in Ukraine decreased by 382,735 people (78.7%) and moved from 3rd to 14th place in the ranking of nationalities living in Ukraine. At the end of 2001, the number of Jews in Ukraine decreased to 103,591 people. […] Due to emigration and other factors, the number of Belarusians in Ukraine decreased by 37.3%, Czechs by 35.1%, Poles by 34.2%, Moldovans by 20.3%, and Slovaks by 19.5%."[349] In total numbers, the difference looks as follows: Jews in 1989 – 486,000 (0.9% of the total population) compared to Jews in 2001 – 103,600 (0.2%); Belarusians in 1989 – 439,900 (0.8%) and Belarusians in 2001 – 275,800 (0.6%); Czechs and Slovaks in 1989 – 17,200 (0.1%) and in 2001 – 12,300 (close to 0%); Poles in 1989 – 218,900 (0.4%) and in 2001 – 144,100 (0.3%); Romanians in 1989 – 324,500 (0.6%) and in 2001 – 151,000 (0.3%).[350]

A few minority groups in Ukraine also grew in the period of 1989-2001. According to Kotyhorenko, the Crimean Tatar "community in Ukraine increased from 46,807 people (82% of whom resided in Crimea) in early 1989 to 248,193 at the end of 2001 (almost 99% of whom resided in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). The share of Crimean Tatars among the population of Ukraine in this period increased from 0.1 to 0.5 per cent (among Crimean residents it increased from 1.9 to 12.0 per cent). In the ranking of the number of nationalities living in Ukraine, Crimean Tatars rose from 14th to 5th place after Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, and Moldovans."[351] The increase of other minority groups in the statistics looks as follows: Moldovans in 1989 – 134,700 (0.3% of the total population) and in 2001 – 258,600 (0.5%); Armenians in 1989 60,000 (0.1%) and in 2001 – 99,900 (0.2%).[352]

The increased migration flows in the 1990s and early 2000s significantly changed the picture of the ethnic composition of the population in Ukraine, therefore, as a result, it created numerous issues in political and social spheres. One of them was the ongoing process of russification, due to the large number of already russified Ukrainians and ethnic minorities, as well as the remaining 17% of Russians residing in Ukraine.

[349] Kotyhorenko, 'Etnichnyy Sklad Ta Etnomovna Kompetentsiya Naselennya Ukrayiny Za Perepysamy Naselennya 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989, 2001 Ta Rezul′tatamy Sotsiolohichnykh Doslidzhen′ 1994 Ta 2001'.
[350] Romaniuk and Gladun, 'Demographic Trends in Ukraine'., p.325
[351] Kotyhorenko, 'Etnichnyy Sklad Ta Etnomovna Kompetentsiya Naselennya Ukrayiny Za Perepysamy Naselennya 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989, 2001 Ta Rezul′tatamy Sotsiolohichnykh Doslidzhen′ 1994 Ta 2001'.
[352] Romaniuk and Gladun, 'Demographic Trends in Ukraine'., p.325

Migrations in wartime: 2014-2023

Forced migration

The Russian-Ukrainian war started with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the attack on Donbas in 2014. Migrations were an inevitable part of the war such as internal displacement of people who resettled in their home regions but in safer towns or moved deeper inside Ukraine, mobility of war refugees who moved to Russia or Europe, deportations, filtrations through occupation, and many other types of movements. The mobility of Ukrainians to Russia in these times is covered by historians, sociologists, and journalists, however, it is still difficult to estimate the numbers of people who migrated and the outcomes of their mobilities. Additionally, the full-scale invasion in February 2022 only amplified these processes. In the following sections, I will explore the estimated numbers and outcomes of these mobilities.

Migration after the annexation of Crimea and attack on Donbas

One of the most common types of migration after the beginning of the war is internal displacement. According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised border."[353]

According to the Ukrainian Migration Office, as of 2015, there were already 1,012,791 IDPs living in Government-controlled areas of Ukraine, among which 992,091 people from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and 21,700 people from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.[354] In 5 years the amount of displaced people grew to a total of 1,459,131 IDPs originating from the temporarily occupied territories in 2020.[355]

Looking into the demographic of the IDPs, in the period of 2014-2021 56% of the displaced Ukrainians were women and 44% were men. In 2014, more than half of the IDPs (54.7%) were in the working age group of 18 to 59 years, and 26.4% were children and youth under the age of 18.[356] Later in

[353] Deng, 'Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Francis M. Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission [on Human Rights] Resolution 1997/39.', p.5
[354] 'Mihratsiynyy Profil' Ukrayiny 2011-2015'., p.31
[355] 'Mihratsiynyy Profil' Ukrayiny za 2020 rik'., p.50
[356] Novikova et al., 'The Nature and Peculiarities of the Internal Displacement of the Population of Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014-2022'., p.141

2017 the Ukrainian Migration Office reported that among the 1,161,852 internally displaced people, there were 194,014 children (16.6%) and 546,475 (47%) people with disabilities and elderlies.[357]

Regarding the locations of the IDPs residency, according to Novikova, in 2014 almost half of the registered IDPs permanently resided in the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and about a third in other regions of Ukraine.[358] In 2015 the Interagency coordination headquarters reported that: "the largest number of internally displaced persons is located in Luhansk (162 thousand people – 19.5%), Kharkiv (161 thousand people – 18.4%), Donetsk (106 thousand people – 12.7%), Dnipro (83 thousand people – 10%), Zaporizhzhia (61 thousand people – 7.3%) regions and the city of Kyiv (39 thousand people – 4.7%)."[359] Later in 2016 the Ministry of Social Policy reported that: "the largest number of internally displaced persons were registered in Donetsk (676,533), Luhansk (251,231), Kharkiv (212,557), Kyiv (127,026), Zaporizhzhia (118,878), Dnipro (76,457), and Kyiv (48,975) regions".[360] Additionally Nagorna claims that the tendency of the IDPs to settle close to their places of origin can indicate their intentions to return home as soon as the situation allows it. In the parallel, family ties with those relatives who could not move, concerns regarding the properties or business in the occupied area, or even "shuttle" migration between Ukrainian-controlled territory and occupied zones, including a new phenomenon of travelling for obtaining social benefits from both places (the so-called "pension tourism") could be among other reasons for a settlement in vicinity.[361]

While analysing the reasons for the migration of IDPs, different conclusions are made. For instance, Novikova et al. argue that: "In 2014, a significant number of internally displaced persons were motivated to leave eastern Ukraine by the desire to save their lives and health, jobs, and businesses, while the number of those who migrated for political reasons fluctuated around 36%."[362] Meanwhile, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a survey on IDPs in 2016 where they learnt that 56% of the IDPs would prefer to stay in their current place of residency. And around 36% of the internally displaced people were hoping to come back to their place of origin. Noticeably, 66% of the IDPs from Donbas were expecting the war to end, 35% awaited the opportunity to have a quiet and comfortable life at home, and 41% looked forward to their place of origin being again under the control of the Ukrainian authorities.[363]

A big migration flow of Ukrainians after the beginning of the war in the Donbas region is also reported in the Russian Federation. The exact numbers of people who migrated to Russia since the

[357] 'Mihratsiynyy Profil′ Ukrayiny za 2017 rik'., p.43
[358] Novikova et al., 'The Nature and Peculiarities of the Internal Displacement of the Population of Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014-2022'., p.141
[359] 'Mizhvidomchyy koordynatsiynyy shtab: Holovne zavdannya – harantuvaty sotsial′nyy zakhyst kozhnomu pereselentsyu zi Skhodu Ukrayiny'.
[360] Nahornyak, 'Sotsial′no-politychni chynnyky i naslidky mihratsiynykh protsesiv v Ukrayini 2014 – 2016 rr.', C.38
[361] Nahornyak., C.38
[362] Novikova et al., 'The Nature and Peculiarities of the Internal Displacement of the Population of Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014-2022'., p.142
[363] 'Zvit za rezul′tatamy vseukrayins′koho opytuvannya vnutrishn′o peremishchenykh osib ta meshkantsiv pryymayuchykh hromad'., p.5

beginning of the war are difficult to estimate due to the high unreliability of the provided information by the Russian government and media.

The UNHCR reported in 2016 that "according to government sources in receiving countries, the total number of Ukrainians seeking asylum or other forms of legal stay in neighbouring countries now stands at 1,481,377, with the majority going to the Russian Federation (1,154,212) and Belarus (148,549). In other neighbouring countries, 286 Ukrainians sought asylum in Moldova, 80 in Romania, 71 in Hungary and 26 in Slovakia. As of the 1st of September 2016, since the beginning of the crisis, in the top five receiving countries of the European Union, there were 7,967 applications for international protection in Germany, 7,267 in Italy, 5,423 in Poland, 3,176 in France and 2,742 in Sweden."[364] However, while the information is provided by the receiving countries, it is impossible to verify the provided data, especially in the case of the data communicated by Russia.

In other sources, various numbers have been reported over the years, detailing the influx of arriving people to Russia. Usually, this process is described by the government and media using different legal terms. These terms appear to be often confused or used interchangeably, which is often legally inappropriate. For example, in March 2014, an article stated: "In the first two months of this year [*2014*], 675,000 Ukrainian citizens arrived in Russia. […] According to the Federal Migration Service, 143,000 Ukrainian citizens applied for asylum in Russia in the last two weeks of February."[365] Later in 2015, RBC reports: "Only from June to September 2014, according to the Federal Migration Service, more than half a million Ukrainians entered Russia […] This year [*2015*], the flow has decreased, but still 500-600 people apply for asylum every day. According to the latest FMS [*Federal Migration Service*] data, from the beginning of 2014 to June 2015, the number of Ukrainian citizens in Russia increased by one million people. Most of them, the migration service notes, were migrants from the southeast."[366] As these quotes show, the number of border crossings is often presented to be equal to the number of people or to the number of Ukrainian refugees specifically, which is not the correct way to report migration flows.

It is not clear what legal status Ukrainians have in Russia, however, the FMS stated that there were 2,503,680 Ukrainians in Russia in June 2015.[367] Another media comment on this data mentions: "According to the Federal Migration Service, a total of 2,500,000 Ukrainian citizens are in Russia. Of these, 550,000 are hiding from hostilities. Another 970,000 arrived directly from south-eastern Ukraine after the outbreak of hostilities."[368]

Later the legal status of the Ukrainians in Russia was commented in media as follows: "Not everyone who fled from Ukraine to Russia can be called refugees. This is a special status, and as of the end of May,

[364] 'UNHCR Operational Update on the Ukraine Situation (11 June - 15 July 2016)'., p.2
[365] 'V Rossiyu v 2014 godu priyekhali pochti 700 tysyach bezhentsev iz Ukrainy'.
[366] Zholobova and Solopov, 'Issledovaniye RBK: skol'ko Rossiya tratit na ukrainskikh bezhentsev'.
[367] Later in 2020 the all-Russian census will report about 880,000 Ukrainians in the Russian Federation.
[368] Braterskiy, 'Rossiya stala zemley obetovannoy. Rossiya prinyala v dva raza bol'she bezhentsev, chem SSHA, sleduyet iz doklada OON'.

according to the FMS, only 6,000 Ukrainians had applied for it (only 292 received it). Most of the resettled - about 355,000 people - asked for temporary asylum. This is a simpler procedure. However, the validity of the temporary asylum certificate is only one year, and then they will have to go through the "re-examination" again (those who received refugee status have a limit of one and a half years). Another 209,000 Ukrainians, according to the FMS, applied for a temporary residence permit, 114,000 decided to participate in the state program of assistance to voluntary resettlement of compatriots, 43,600 - to obtain a residence permit and another 95,800 asked for Russian citizenship."[369] Such an issue with the legal statuses of Ukrainians, makes it extremely difficult to track the numbers and types of people arriving in the Russian Federation.

Later an additional legal procedure was implemented for Ukrainians: the Russian government initiated the passportisation of the Ukrainian citizens on the temporarily occupied and annexed territories. While giving an overview of "the Ukrainian crisis" in February 2022, RBC comments: "According to the Interior Ministry, more than 300,000 Ukrainian citizens received Russian passports between 2014 and 2019. In 2019, by presidential decree, Russia introduced a simplified procedure for residents of Donetsk and Lugansk [Luhansk] regions of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship."[370] Later this article also mentions: "As of the 1st of January 2021 (the latest available data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to which Rosstat refers), there were 18,300 people from Ukraine with the status of temporary asylum in Russia. 83 out of a total of 455 refugees are from Ukraine, 56 Ukrainians out of a total of 2,512 internally displaced persons."[371] This data showcases the strategy of the Russian government to provide a Russian passport to a person rather than keep a person with its nationality and the status of an asylum seeker or a refugee. This process directly leads to the assimilation of Ukrainian citizens and their "disappearing" in the total Russian population in the statistics.

Additionally, it seems that the number of passports acquired mentioned above does not include those Ukrainian citizens who resided in Crimea. In June 2014 (just a few months after the official annexation), the head of the Federal Migration Service commented that "more than half [*of the residents of Crimea received their passports*]. […] 1.25 million applications with the necessary documents have been accepted for passports. More than a million ready passports are already at the issuance points. Over 800,000 passports have been issued. We produce about 20,000 passports a day. We hope that by the end of June, the majority of Crimean residents will receive documents certifying their Russian citizenship. I remind you that all residents registered in Crimea before March 18 are recognised as Russian citizens. And we are obliged to issue them passports within three months."[372]

[369] Zholobova and Solopov, 'Issledovaniye RBK: skol'ko Rossiya tratit na ukrainskikh bezhentsev'.
[370] Ponomarenko, 'Kak Rossiya prinimala ukrainskikh bezhentsev v 2014 godu'.
[371] Ponomarenko.
[372] Falaleyev, 'Glava FMS: Kolichestvo ukraintsev, priyezzhayushchikh v RF, uvelichilos' v 5 raz'.

The Ukrainian side believes that in the end around 90% of those residents of the Crimean Peninsula who lived there before the occupation were forced to receive a Russian passport.[373] Those who refused to do so, according to the NGO "Crimea SOS", faced various obstacles and restrictions, as well as having their human rights violated. For instance, the NGO reports that in 2014 around 3,500 people refused to change their passports. This category of people is not allowed to vote, cannot register in their place of residency, has problems with getting any type of bank services, and cannot register their cars or receive medical insurance, therefore, they should pay for the medical services as foreigners. Additionally, the NGO claims that in 2016 the Crimean courts were issuing fines to the companies who were hiring Ukrainians who did not have work permission or Russian passports. In 2018 there were various cases of deportations of the Crimean Tatars who did not receive a Russian passport, and recently in 2020 Ukrainians without a Russian citizenship were forbidden to own 80% of the borderlands in Crimea.[374]

Regarding the destinations, in 2015 the Russian government presented information regarding the redistribution of the resettlers from the Eastern and Southern Ukraine. RBC identified that the main regions to host Ukrainians in 2015 were Novosibirsk, Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts. However, regardless of the prepared governmental plan, people settled often according to their own wishes or contacts they had. As a result, the FMS presented a report regarding the settlement of refugees and Ukrainian citizens who received temporal asylum. It is communicated that among 200,000 people, 117,953 settled in the Central region, 55,481 in the Privolzhie region, and 42,811 in the Southern region. More than 3,000 people resided in Crimea, where initially it was planned to have no refugees from Ukraine at all.[375]

The information above should be analysed carefully, taking into consideration that the source is the Russian government and the verification of it is impossible. It is, unfortunately, only resources available for the estimations of Ukrainian migration to Russia since the beginning of the war in 2014 until 2022. According to the Russian side, around 1 million people arrived in Russia from Ukraine after the beginning of the war activities in Donbas, which sums up to around 2.5 million Ukrainians residing in the Russian Federation in 2015.

Migration after 24.02.2022 full-scale phase

Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022, migration flows from Ukraine drastically increased. While after the 2014 invasion IDPs originated mainly from the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and Crimea, since 2022 people from all Ukrainian regions were affected by the war. Due to the complexity of these migration flows, it is difficult to have exact numbers, however,

[373] Hlyan'ko, 'Pasportyzatsiya RF torknulas' 90% naselennya okupovanykh Krymu ta Donbasu - Reznikov'.
[374] '«Predlozheniye, ot kotorogo trudno otkazat'sya» – o prinuditel'noy pasportizatsii v okkupirovannom Krymu'.
[375] Zholobova and Solopov, 'Issledovaniye RBK: skol'ko Rossiya tratit na ukrainskikh bezhentsev'.

as of September 2023 the UNHCR reports 6,197,200 Ukrainian refugees registered globally. Among them, 5,828,000 are located in Europe, and 369,200 people are in other parts of the world.[376]

Apart from the registered Ukrainians abroad, the number of internally displaced people also increased. The best tracking of this category of people is provided by the IOM which regularly provides numbers, dynamics, and reports on this matter. The highest number of IDPs since February 2022 was recorded in May 2022 with more than 8 million Ukrainians being displaced. As of August 2023, there were 3,516,765 registered IDPs. The demographic characteristics show that among the total number of IDPs, 61% are women and 39% are male; age-wise 28% of IDPs are under 18 years, 54% are 18-59 y.o., and 18% are 60 years and older. Among all the registered IDPs, 6% have a state-recognised disability status. Additionally, regarding the locations, Dnipro (390,420 people), Kharkiv (337,443 people), and Kyiv (334,354 people) have the highest number of officially registered IDPs. Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi Oblasts have the highest share of registered IDPs aged 18 and under (36% and 35% respectively), while Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts have the highest share of registered IDPs aged 60 and over (29% and 28% respectively). Moreover, the proportion of female IDPs in all western Oblasts is significantly higher than in the rest of the country, with Ivano-Frankivsk (68%) and Zakarpattia (65%) having the highest share. Conversely, in Oblasts at the frontline, the proportion of male IDPs is higher than in the rest of the country, peaking in Kherson Oblast (47%).[377]

The migration flow of Ukrainians to the Russian Federation has also increased. Same as in the previous section of this chapter, the numbers provided here are reported by the Russian government and media and, therefore, must be acknowledged with a grain of salt and cannot be verified, however, it is one of very few sources of information on Ukrainian citizens and their movements in that direction. Additionally, it is important to mention that even a supposedly voluntary evacuation to Russia, or to the territories occupied by it, should be considered as forced migration because Russia created conditions as aggressor under which Ukrainians were often left with no choice but to migrate to or through Russia or in the words of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets: "Creating conditions where civilians experience fear of violence or the threat of detention or abuse of power, or other forms of psychological violence, constitutes coercion for deportation or forced displacement".[378]

According to the UNHCR, as of September 2023, there were 2,852,395 border crossings from Ukraine to Russia, and 1,307,750 registered Ukrainian refugees in the Russian Federation, among whom 65,400 persons were granted refugee or temporary asylum status.[379] At the same time, information from the Russian government varies. TASS, the Federal Information Agency, reported that in April 2022

[376] 'Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation'.
[377] 'Ukraine — Area Baseline Report (Raion Level) — Round 27 (August 2023)'., p.1, 3
[378] Sokolova, 'Na "otdykh" ili v "evakuatsiyu". RF vyvozit detey iz Ukrainy'.
[379] 'Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation'.

already more than 1 million Ukrainian refugees in Russia, among whom 182,000 were children[380]; in June 2022 they reported that more than 2.1 million refugees, including 340,000 children, have crossed the border with Russia[381], even the border crossings does not reflect itself in the number of refugee status receivers. In August 2022 TASS reported that 3.1 million people arrived in Russia, including 494,000 children; half of these people are claimed to be citizens of the so-called unrecognised "DNR" and "LNR".[382] In September 2022, more than 4 million refugees, including 628,000 children, are claimed to have crossed the Russian border according to undisclosed sources of TASS. The latest available information, as of February 2023, is reporting that 5.3 million people, among whom 738,000 children, arrived in the Russian Federation.[383]

The number communicated by TASS seems to be overstated. The NGO "Civic Assistance" created a detailed report with the arguments why the numbers provided by TASS do not look believable. Firstly, the authors of the report highlight that: "Russian media use the following overlapping and sometimes mutually exclusive terms to describe the figures: "arrived", "refugees", "crossed the border", "in the Russian Federation", "people accepted by the Russian Federation", "evacuated", "were being evacuated", "forced migrants"."[384] All of these terms are indeed different in their meanings and therefore do not provide an understanding of the real number of Ukrainian citizens residing in Russia. Secondly, the authors conclude that "it is impossible to estimate exactly how many refugees from Ukraine there are in Russia, in the situation of the destroyed institution of asylum. What we can say with certainty is that TASS manipulates statistics and misleads by passing off data on the number of border crossings as the real number of people from Ukraine who were forced to come to Russia."[385] Additionally, it is important to mention that the mentioned "crossings of the border" could include mobility of the "voluntary" migrants, registered refugees, deported people, and forcefully kidnapped Ukrainians. As the information on further movements of these people is not reported many people might have used Russian territory as a transit for travelling to further destinations, or they might have travelled back and forth from and to the occupied territories. As a result, it is impossible to make valid assumptions based on the numbers provided by TASS.

The most believable numbers so far are provided by the UNHCR speaking of 1.2-1.3 million Ukrainians crossing the border to Russia. Additionally, these numbers are also mentioned in the reports of issued residency permits by the Internal Police of Russia.[386] It is important to include those Ukrainians

[380] 'Chislo pribyvshikh v Rossiyu s Ukrainy i iz Donbassa prevysilo 1 mln'.
[381] 'V Rossiyu s Ukrainy i iz Donbassa pribyli boleye 2,1 mln bezhentsev'.
[382] 'V Rossiyu pribyli 3,1 mln bezhentsev s territorii Ukrainy i Donbassa'.
[383] 'Za god s Ukrainy i iz Donbassa na territoriyu RF pribylo 5,3 mln bezhentsev'.
[384] Troitskiy, 'Skol'ko bezhentsev iz Ukrainy nakhoditsya v Rossiyskoy Federatsii?', p.4
[385] Troitskiy., p.37
[386] Karyakina and Zinder, 'V Rossii nakhoditsya bol'she 5 millionov bezhentsev iz Ukrainy – po krayney mere, tak govoryat rossiyskiye vlasti. Skoreye vsego, eta tsifra zavyshena v neskol'ko raz'.

in the picture who preferred to receive Russian citizenship rather than refugee status. According to the Russian internal police data, there were around 303,000 Ukrainians of such category in 2022.[387]

Imprisoned Ukrainians are another category of people who were probably not included in the number of Ukrainians staying officially in Russia. It is extremely difficult to calculate or to assume how many Ukrainians were imprisoned by the Russian government as a result of the occupations, war activities, or filtrations. However, the independent sources from the Russian side claim that there are at least 4,000 civilians held in Russian prisons on its territory and at least as many were spread around the occupied territories. The Ukrainian government believes in a number of around 10,000 civilians who could be detained, based on reports from families and interviews with released civilians from Russian prisons.[388]

A separate calculation is done for one of the most sensitive groups of deportees: children from the occupied Ukrainian territories. Special attention is paid to this category of migration since the act of "forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" is considered an act of genocide under Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[389]

The assumed numbers of deported children highly vary. For example, in February 2023, the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health mentioned in its report that they have information about 6,000 children being held in different types of re-education institutions, however, they highlight that the final number is much higher. The authors classify all deported children in the following categories: 1. Children who have parents or clear familial guardianship; 2. Children deemed to be orphans by Russia; 3. Children who were under the care of Ukrainian state institutions prior to the February 2022 invasion (often due to severe physical or mental disabilities); 4. Children whose custody is unclear or uncertain due to wartime circumstances caused by the February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia.[390]

The Ukrainian government and the National Informational Bureau report with certainty of 19,546 deported children as of September 2023. This number is based on individual cases which are created together with the respective families, relatives, friends, or witnesses of the children, however, even this number is not final and is believed to be underreported.[391] The webpage of the Ukrainian government also mentions a number of 744,000 children. This figure is based on the information provided by the Russian side, and it is believed to be exaggerated in the same way as data about Ukrainian refugees residing in Russia.

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[387] Karyakina and Zinder.
[388] Arhipova, Stepanenko, and Hinnant, 'Thousands of Ukraine Civilians Are Being Held in Russian Prisons. Russia Plans to Build Many More'.
[389] 'Genocide'.
[390] Khoshnood, Raymond, and Howarth, 'Russia's Systematic Program for the Re-Education and Adoption of Ukraine's Children.', p.4
[391] 'Dity viyny'. https://childrenofwar.gov.ua/

Independent journalists also make attempts to identify the number of children who were deported to Russia, as well as report on their locations. One of such media has studied open sources and data from the Russian Ministry of Education to find out to which regions children taken from Ukraine are usually sent to. The whereabouts of 290 children from Ukraine in 23 regions of Russia were found. 47 children are in the Novosibirsk region, 30 children ended up in families in the Moscow region, 25 in the Kaluga region, 24 in the Nizhny Novgorod region, 21 deported children live in families in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, 20 in the Leningrad Region.[392] Also, Lvova-Belova, Children's Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation, commented that there are 380 Ukrainian children adopted and located in 19 regions of the Russian Federation.[393]

The locations of the deported children are important to report due to the fact that by international humanitarian rules, people can be indeed evacuated for their own safety. However, the aggressor side – Russia in this case – has no right to bring people far away from the border of the place of origin of the person, and moreover cannot keep the person against their will or the will of their caretaker. Russia on the contrary often tries to send people to places distant from the Ukrainian border, which is a clear sign of such violations.[394]

Another violation of international rules, which makes the estimations of the number of deported children extremely difficult, is the mass passportisation of orphans. In summer 2022, Putin ordered to simplify the procedure of getting Russian passports for orphans from "the new regions". Maria Lvova-Belova has also mentioned that Russian citizenship is necessary for orphans to obtain all the benefits and access to state medicine. Ukraine believes that Russia openly institutionalised deportation by making sure that these children won't be able to come back to Ukraine since they become citizens of another country.[395]

On the 17th of March 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court II issued arrest warrants for both the Russian President Vladimir Putin and Lvova-Belova for allegedly committing a war crime, namely the illegal deportation and transfer of children from the occupied regions of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, which has been taking place since at least the 24th of February 2022. Even though this formal step seems to slow down the process of adoptions of Ukrainian children in Russia (at least the publicity of it), it is still unknown how many deported children and adults remain in the Russian Federation against their will.

[392] Bonch-Osmolovskaya, 'Rossiyskiye vlasti peredali pod «predvaritel'nuyu opeku» boleye tysyachi detey iz Ukrainy'.
[393] 'L'vova-Belova: v sem'i Rossii ustroyeny 380 detey-sirot, evakuirovannykh iz novykh regionov'.
[394] Nazarova, 'Vyvoz detey iz Ukrainy v Rossiyu: otvechayem na vse glavnyye voprosy'.
[395] Nazarova.

Resettlement practices

Resettlement practices are another type of mobility which takes place in the occupied territories. The resettlement tool for moving Ukrainian citizens outside of their places of residency is implemented through amendments made to the Russian Martial Law which allows the Russian authorities "on the basis of presidential decrees, […] to apply forced and controlled displacement of citizens from the territory where martial law has been introduced to the territories where martial law has not been introduced".[396] Such changes can be used in order to deport unreliable people deeper into the territory of the Russian Federation, further away from the war zones so these people were not a threat to the occupational regime and didn't serve as partisans to the Ukrainian army.

Russia especially focuses on resettling "reliable people" supporting the Russian authorities to unpopulated occupied cities. The Ukrainian government claims that in July 2023 there were already 40,000 new residents from Russia settling in Mariupol alone, additionally assuming that in a year this number will grow to up to 120,000 people. Apart from that, the Centre of National Resistance states that according to their sources in occupation, until 2035 Russian authorities plan to resettle around 300,000 people from Russia to Mariupol.[397] The Ukrainian side believes that there are around 80,000 Ukrainian residents staying in the city of Mariupol,[398] which concludes the possibility that Ukrainians will soon be a minority in the occupied territories, and as a result, the politics of russification will be implemented even more rapidly.

A similar opinion is shared by one of the Deputies of the Ukrainian Minister of Defence. Maliar states: "The Russian Federation has initiated a large-scale resettlement of a significant number of people of different nationalities, mostly from low-income groups, from remote regions of Russia." She believes that in this way the Russian government tries to destroy Ukrainian self-identification of the society.[399] To encourage Russian citizens to resettle in the occupied territories, a programme of preferential mortgage loans has been created. The hope is that Russians will take out favourable loans and invest them in the construction of new houses on the territory destroyed by the Russian invasion.[400] According to the Centre of National Resistance such practices are aimed at the substitution of the demographic and ethnic change in the occupied territories.[401]

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396 Mukhametshina, 'Grazhdan prinuditel'no smogut peremeshchat' iz regionov s voyennym polozheniyem'.
397 'Okupanty planuyut′ zaselyty 300 tysyach rosiyan u tymchasovo okupovanyy Mariupol′'.
398 Beshley and Romaliyskaya, '"Uzhe bol'she 40 tysyach chelovek". Zachem rossiyane yedut v Mariupol' i pokupayut tam nedvizhimost' – ob"yasnyayet sovetnik mera okkupirovannogo goroda'.
399 Mazurenko, 'Okupanty zvozyat′ v okupatsiyu menshyny z viddalenykh kutochkiv Rosiyi, shchob vytisnyty ukrayintsiv – Malyar'.
400 Marchenko, 'V Kremle razrabotali plan zaseleniya ukrainskikh gorodov priyezzhimi rossiyanami'.
401 'Okupanty namahayut′sya zaselyty TOT rosiyanamy zavdyaky deshevym kredytam na zhytlo'.

While it is difficult to verify the mentioned numbers, it is noticeable that the reconstruction and building of new residential areas are indeed actively ongoing. The advertisements of selling and offers to buy accommodation in Mariupol, as well as other occupied areas, are published on various internet platforms. Among the main reasons for Russians to buy housing in the "new regions" people name better ecology and climate, seaside, cheap accommodation, hope for a fast reconstruction of the regions by Russia, better salaries for certain professions than in their current places of residency, etc.[402] At the same time, Ukrainian citizens meet a lot of obstacles when trying to claim their accommodation or trying to get a substitution for the accommodation which was destroyed due to the war activities. Some people believe that the Russian government is selectively providing new apartments to those Ukrainians who are "clearly of pro-Russian views", probably as a benefit for supporting the occupational government.[403]

Russification of Ukrainians after 1991

The implications of russification of Ukrainians in the context of forced migration can be observed through different times. The unwillingness of the Russian government to provide a 2 million members diaspora of Ukrainians residing in Russia with adequate institutionalised support in the forms of schooling, creation of the media, TV channels and radio in Ukrainian, can serve already as a sign of the attempts of the Russian government to continue supporting the assimilation practices in place. Additionally, the later shift of Russian politics towards isolationism, imperial revanchism, and rise of the chauvinism and nationalism radicalised the society and rebooted the ideology of Russian superiority, which is based among other aspects on the assimilation or colonisation of various minorities. With the worsening of the Russian-Ukrainian relations, Ukrainians and their culture, language, and literature became the subject of increased attention of the Russian government.

In this section, I will describe the russification policies according to the contexts which were discussed in the previous parts: language, education, religion, and identity. Some of them were applied especially hard during the beginning of the 21st century, others were implemented already after the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 or even after the full-scale invasion in 2022 and targeted Ukrainian refugees and deported children specifically. By describing the various cases, I will try to make an argument that current russification policies have similar tools to those applied in the Soviet Union and have common strategies and goals at their core.

Additionally, even though the Ukrainian territories under occupation are not in the scope of this thesis, I anticipate that a certain amount of the forcefully relocated people as well as abducted children are located in those territories, which makes the policies applied there relevant for their experiences.

[402] Robinson, Rivault, and Robinson, 'The Russians hunting for cheap flats in occupied Mariupol'.
[403] Robinson, Rivault, and Robinson.

However, since this is uncertain, the russification of the occupied zones will be mentioned only shortly at the end of the sections giving an overview and general context to the reader.

Lastly, the russification of the Ukrainians in Ukraine is another big part of the discussion of the assimilation policies implemented by the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation. Regardless of Ukraine and Russia being two different independent states, Moscow implemented aggressive external politics towards its neighbours and justified its actions by the "sphere of interests". Apart from the natural ongoing process of the russification of certain Ukrainian territories due to relocated Russians and other russified people during the Soviet rule, Ukraine was additionally russified indirectly through pro-Russian political elites such as ex-president Yanukovych and his party "Party of the Regions". These events will be described in more detail as an example of the successful russification process implemented through the last century and fueled by the Russian Federation after 1991.

Russification and language

The linguistic assimilation of Ukrainians on the territory of the Russian Federation is one of the most observable signs of the ongoing russification. Quantitative data is available due to the Russian censuses of 2002, 2010 and 2020. One of the questions posed in the surveys which help observe the dynamics of the issue of the Ukrainian language in Russia is about the Ukrainian linguistic skills. The data which I'm going to discuss are visualised in the table in Appendix 6.

According to the census, in 2002 there were more than 1.2 million Ukrainians and more than 483,000 Russians who reported that they speak the Ukrainian language.[404] In 2010, these numbers reduced to around 669,000 and 412,000 respectively[405]; and in 2020 there were around 277,000 Ukrainians and 307,000 Russians who could speak Ukrainian.[406] It is important to stress that it seems that in 20 years the number of Ukrainians knowing the Ukrainian language reduced six times without any observable mass emigration from Russia. It is highly unlikely that in a period of 20 years, people lose their language skills in such high numbers. Especially considering that the reduction of Russians knowing the Ukrainian language does not reduce as rapidly as in the case of Ukrainians. The linguistic situation developed in a way that in 2020 the number of Russians knowing the Ukrainian language outweighed the number of Ukrainians. It is possible that the reidentification of Ukrainians took place and people either assimilated and self-identified themselves as Russians or the political situation did not give these people an opportunity to claim their identity openly. Consequently, Ukrainians decided to start identifying themselves as Russians knowing the Ukrainian language. In any of these scenarios, the numbers suggest

[404] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2002 goda'.
[405] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2010 goda'.
[406] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2020 goda'.

that the linguistic assimilation and russification of the population indeed took place actively in the last 20 years.

Additionally, in 2010 a new category of questions was added to the census – native languages. It became possible to observe the balance between the people's self-identification and language practices. According to the data, in 2010 almost 500,000 people chose the Ukrainian language as their native, among whom more than 466,000 Ukrainians and around 23,000 Russians.[407] In 2020, the number of Russians who considered Ukrainian their native language grew to 27,000, however, the number of Ukrainians dropped to around 250,00 people.[408] It is difficult to imagine that almost half of the Ukrainians who considered the Ukrainian language as their mother tongue forgot their native language.

Another factor which should be considered in the quantitative analyses is the events of 2014. Due to the significant influx of Ukrainians migrating to Russia following the beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014, there is an expectation that the number of Ukrainians in Russia, who at least have knowledge of the Ukrainian language, if not considering it their native language, should increase. However, the data represent no sign of growth.

Additional growth should have been expected due to the annexation of Crimea and the acknowledgement of it as a "Russian region" in the 2020 census. According to available data, more than 176,000 people reported that they know the Ukrainian language in Crimea, among whom more than 100,000 self-identified as Russians, almost 60,000 as Ukrainians, and more than 7,000 as Crimean Tatars. Among the respondents, in the category of the native language, around 50,000 people residing in Crimea claimed Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Consequently, leaving out the residents of the Crimean Peninsula from the 2020 census, as they are essentially new participants, the noticeable disparities between the 2010 and 2020 data become even more concerning and raise questions.

Different Russian researchers provide overviews of the linguistic situation of minorities residing in Russia, and the Ukrainian minority in particular. For instance, Zavialov analyses the 2010 census and identifies the regions with the highest proportion of Ukrainian speakers. According to him, the highest concentration of Ukrainian speakers in 2010 was found in Moscow with 106,033 individuals, followed by the Moscow region with 82,386, and St. Petersburg with 49,667. When considering the proportion of Ukrainian speakers within Russian regions, the most significant percentages were observed in the following areas: Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, where 5.72% of the region's population spoke Ukrainian, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug with 4.56%, Magadan region at 4.23%, Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug with 3.70%, and the Murmansk region at 3.52%. Focusing on Ukrainians residing in Russia, the following regions had the highest ratio of Ukrainians who speak the Ukrainian language: Dagestan with 59.10%, the Vladimir region with 57.15%, the Murmansk region with 49.47%, and the Vologda region with 49.04%. Conversely, some of the lowest percentages of Ukrainians who speak

[407] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2010 goda'.
[408] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2020 goda'.

Ukrainian were found in regions traditionally settled by Ukrainians and commonly referred to as "klyns" where Ukrainian communities were formed back in the 19th century due to the resettlements. For instance, in the Omsk Oblast only 14.42% of Ukrainians speak Ukrainian, in the Orenburg Oblast 15.86%, and in the Voronezh Oblast 17.47%. Similarly, the Altai Krai has 17.54% of Ukrainians, among whom the preservation of Ukrainian identity is notable, even though the Ukrainian language has significantly declined.[409]

Comparing these numbers with the results of the 2020 Census it is possible to observe the dynamics of the situation over the years, the visualisation of which is done in the table in the Appendix 8. In general, there is a reduction tendency in all categories: in the absolute number of Ukrainian speakers in Moscow, Moscow region and St. Petersburg; in the ratio of Ukrainian speakers in comparison to the general population in regions previously mentioned in Zavialov's overview and in the Ukrainian population who can speak the Ukrainian language (apart from the Voronezh Oblast). If in 2010 in Moscow there were 100,000 Ukrainian speakers residing, there were only 41,955 of such people in 2020. Additionally, those regions which used to have 3-5% of Ukrainian-speaking people residing in 2010, had around 1.1-1.8% of such people in 2020.[410] This suggests that the trend in these particular regions and categories mirrors the overall situation in the Russian Federation.

Another important aspect to mention is bilingualism and the phenomenon of the merging of the Ukrainian and Russian languages – *surzhyk*. Melnyk explains surzhyk in the following way: "It is a post-colonial phenomenon of the Ukrainian language space, formed as a result of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism and long and intense Ukrainian-Russian linguistic interference. Linguists borrowed the word "surzhyk" from peasant life. It refers to a mixture of wheat and rye, rye and barley, low-quality grain. As for the language, this term refers to the combination of elements of two languages without observing the norms of the literary language. A part of the population of Ukraine speaks Surzhyk as their native language and uses this language variant (i.e. not Ukrainian or Russian) in most areas of communication."[411] In my opinion, the presence of this option in the surveys and censuses could significantly influence the results, as people who indeed speak this variant of the language will tend to choose Ukrainian or Russian as an alternative option in unpredictable ways, probably depending on subjective irrational factors.

According to the research done by Bublikov and Svidovskaya, such phenomena exist not only in the territory of Ukraine but also in the Ukrainian communities residing in the territory of the Russian Federation. The authors argue that in reality, the surzhyk or "Khokhlyatsky" language in Russia has a strong basis in Ukrainian. This means that this language variant shares a closer connection, both in terms of pronunciation and vocabulary, to the Ukrainian language rather than to Russian. However, some

[409] Zav'yalov, 'Rol' ukrainskogo yazyka v konstruirovanii etnicheskoy identichnosti ukraintsev Rossii'., p.110-111
[410] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2020 goda'.
[411] Melnyk, *Etnichne ta movne rozmayittya Ukrayiny: analitychnyy ohlyad sytuatsiyi*., p.68-69

speakers of the "surzhyk" language in Russia tend to exaggerate their "ignorance" of Ukrainian and their "knowledge" of Russian, thinking that knowing some Ukrainian words and their Russian equivalents makes their language closer to Russian, but this isn't entirely accurate.[412]

Additionally, Bublikov and Svidovskaya research the perception of the "ancestral language" of the respondents in order to see the correlations between the language of the respondents themselves and their self-identification. According to the results, the older generation of the Russian-Ukrainian bi-ethnic respondents often consider their ancestral language to be Ukrainian (52%), followed closely by Russian (51%), and "Khokhlyatsky" (45%). On the other hand, younger people more commonly regard Russian as their ancestral language (75%), followed by Ukrainian (56%), and "Khokhlyatskiy" (41%). The authors believe that: "This indicates two facts. Firstly, about the increasing level of Russification in each new generation of bi-ethnors, and secondly, the lower use of the term "Khokhlyatsky" by young people."[413] In general, I believe surzhyk as a phenomenon deserves a separate space for discussion and research not just as a linguistic peculiarity but also as a tool which has been used in the contexts of russification and Ukrainisation.

Another important evidence of the ongoing linguistic russification in the context of migration is the policies and activities applied to the deported Ukrainian children since 2022. After the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 in general and the full-scale invasion in 2022 in particular, the category of forcefully relocated people was enlarged with deported Ukrainian children. Those minors who were returned to Ukraine to their families or caregivers share their experiences. For instance, one of the girls shared her experience of being forced to use the Russian language: "We were forced to write in Russian at school. I understood what they were saying, but I still wrote in Ukrainian. I don't know how to write in Russian. I thought that if I learned to write in Russian, then I would not be able to write in Ukrainian."[414]

Furthermore, the OSCE also gathered evidence of the russification of Ukrainian children. In its report published in May 2023, the organisation mentions: "The interference with the identity of the Ukrainian children has taken place in numerous different ways. The Mission has received credible and consistent testimony that children who have been either sent to the so-called recreation camps or separated from their parents at filtration and subsequently find themselves in social care institutions of the Russian Federation or in foster care arrangements are consistently required to speak Russian, to attend Russian language lessons and even taught that Ukrainian and Belarusian are mere dialects of Russian. This appears a blanket requirement irrespective of whether the child is Russian speaking or not. Moreover, although many of the Ukrainian children speak Russian as their mother tongue, there are important cultural differences that still prevail which appear to have been ignored entirely by the Russian

[412] Bublikov and Svidovskaya, 'Rodnoy yazyk i etnicheskaya identichnost' sredi russko-ukrainskikh bietnorov v Rossii'., p.109
[413] Bublikov and Svidovskaya., p.110
[414] Babinets, 'How Two Ukrainian Teenagers Escaped Russian Captivity'.

Federation."[415] The mentioned practices of the separation of children from their families and indoctrination with the state ideology, including linguistic and cultural assimilation and russification, resemble the policies adopted by the Soviet regime during the mass deportations of families.

Recreating the Ukrainian language

Apart from the reduction of Ukrainian language knowledge among the population in Russia, it is important to also mention the attempts of the Russian government and its followers on the occupied territories to adapt the Ukrainian language.[416] One of such tools is the reproduction of the language in schoolbooks often according to outdated linguistic norms implemented in the Soviet times.

First attempts to reissue the textbooks of the Ukrainian language were done by the so-called "L/DNR". In 2016 "the Scientific and Methodological Centre for Education Development (NMCED) of the LNR" presented drafts of the textbooks of Ukrainian language and literature. Oksana Kolesnikova, the head of this institution, commented the drafts: "We tried to fill these textbooks with the things that are close to us and our children, to make the textbooks not politicised, but really close to the study of beautiful Ukrainian language and literature".[417] By the end of 2017, it was planned to issue up to ten textbooks of Ukrainian language and literature in the occupied territories.

While describing the attempts to create the Ukrainian language convenient for the Russian Federation, representatives of the government often use a descriptions of the language as "pure Ukrainian", "beautiful Ukrainian", "classical Ukrainian", etc., creating a narrative that the Ukrainian language was changed, damaged, or corrupted by Ukraine, and only Russia can fix it and bring its "normality" back. By this, they often refer to the changes which the Ukrainian language went through during the independency of Ukraine, such as changes in orthography, returning to the rules and norms which were common before pre-Soviet standardisation of the language, restoring the usage of the typical Ukrainian letters " r " and " ї ", which do not exist in the Russian alphabet and hence became symbols of the fight against Russian oppression. Thus, the news from the occupied regions about the creation of different Ukrainian language textbooks, such as "a textbook on the "classical Ukrainian language" for pupils of 1st-4th grades",[418] was not surprising since similar tools were adapted in the Soviet Union. In April 2023 Bugaiev, First Deputy Minister of Education in Russia, commented: "We are preparing that textbook that will really reflect all the beauty, all the purity of that traditional Ukrainian language that was studied in the Soviet period in the best of our pedagogical traditions."[419]

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[415] Bilkova, Hellestveit, and Šteinerte, 'Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation'., p.55-56

[416] 'NMTSRO do kontsa goda planiruyet vypustit' yeshche 5 uchebnikov po ukrainskomu yazyku i literature'.

[417] 'Minobrazovaniya LNR razrabotalo makety novykh uchebnikov ukrainskogo yazyka i literatury'.

[418] Mayyer, 'Minprosveshcheniya razrabotalo uchebnoye posobiye po ukrainskomu yazyku sovetskogo obraztsa'.

[419] Mayyer.

As a result, the creation of an alternative Ukrainian language by Russia seems to be an adapted strategy of the Soviet de-nationalisation strategy regarding the Ukrainian language and its orthography implemented in the 1930s and can serve as another example of russification implemented by Russia.

Russification and education

Russification in the context of education is realised in its various formats: lack of institutional support for educational institutions with Ukrainian as language of instruction, absence of educational materials, literature, and accessible media, but also the targeted ban of non-governmental grassroots educational and cultural initiatives.

The issue of supporting the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia was raised by Ivan Drach already in 1993. He wrote a letter to the Ukrainian government where he described: "This applies primarily to those parts of the Ukrainian ethnos that originally lived or were the first settlers in the territory of the present-day Russian Voronezh, Starodubsk, Belgorod and Lipetsk regions, in the Kuban (Krasnodar Territory), Stavropol, the Urals, the Volga region, Siberia and the Far East. The deprivation of their rights to their native language, national education and culture, periodicals [...] initiated and expanded by the terrorist Bolshevik regime continues to this day". According to Drach already in 1993 there were 60 Ukrainian non-governmental organisations or groups in Russia, which needed governmental support for their development and spread.[420] Later the author suggested the steps which should be taken to help Ukrainians in Russia: "official recognition of Ukrainians as the most numerous national minority in the Russian Federation; opening a network of state and public educational and cultural centres in places of mass compact residence of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation; familiarisation of state and public official delegations from Ukraine with the situation of Ukrainians in different regions of Russia".[421]

Specific attention to the educational aspect in the context of assimilation is not new and was raised by Drach on governmental level for a good reason. Without proper educational support and methods of enlightenment, it is extremely difficult to support the stability of a national identification of the population.

The Ukrainian government, unfortunately, wasn't very active in supporting Ukrainians abroad due to financial reasons. However, among steps taken in that direction was the programme "Ukrainian Diaspora until 2000" which was described as "the first comprehensive document aimed at creating a system of constant information exchange between Ukraine and the diaspora, developing a system of measures to support the spiritual and cultural identity of Ukrainians abroad."[422] Within this program the openings of Ukrainian cultural centres in Moscow, Sochi and Omsk were achieved. In the following

[420] Bratsyun, 'Znachennya Kul′turnyts′kykh Oseredkiv Ukrayins′koyi Diaspory v Rosiys′kiy Federatsiyi v Zhytti Ukrayins′kykh Trudovykh Mihrantiv Pislya Zdobuttya Nezalezhnosti Ukrayiny'., C.91
[421] Bratsyun., p.91
[422] Bratsyun., p.91

years, similar programmes were supported by Ukraine, such as the National Programme "Ukrainians Abroad for the period up to 2005" and the "State Programme of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad" for the period up to 2010. According to Braciun: "[*such programmes*] aimed to meet the cultural, informational, linguistic and educational needs of Ukrainians living in the former Soviet Union".[423]

Additionally, the grassroots initiatives of local Ukrainians in Russia had greater success, even though this way was difficult to undergo as well. Among the most prominent initiatives were the National Cultural Centre of Ukraine in Moscow, the Slavutych Union of Ukrainians, the Kobzar Republican National Cultural Centre of Ukrainians in Bashkortostan, the Kalyna Society of Ukrainian Culture, the National Cultural Autonomy Ukrainian Kinship in Surgut.[424] In 2007 there were already 105 Ukrainian NGOs operating in the Russian Federation among which 59 were registered legal entities, 69 were members of the Association of Ukrainians of Russia, 17 - of the Federal National Cultural Autonomy "Ukrainians of Russia [*FNCAUR*]".[425]

At the same time, the measures adopted by the Russian Federation in the last 32 years can be used as evidence supporting the argument of the ongoing russification of all ethnic minority groups within its borders, with a particular emphasis on Ukrainians.

One of the most important arguments in this context, is the fact that there are no traces of information about the existence of at least one school with Ukrainian as language of instruction. As of 2002, there were only 10 schools with Ukrainian language as an academic subject in the whole Russian Federation.[426] In the next 5 years the situation did not improve, and according to Mazuka, in 2007 there were still no schools with Ukrainian as language of instruction. As an exception, certain initiatives and diaspora groups reported that in some regions there are Sunday Schools or rarely taught subjects of the Ukrainian language in schools. The author comments: "Taking into account the peculiarities of the process of development of national education in the Russian Federation (sporadic emergence of institutions with a Ukrainian studies bias, lack of centralised statistical and information and reference data), determine the exact number of students in existing Ukrainian classes and Sunday schools, it is not possible to determine the exact number of students in existing Ukrainian classes."[427] As a result, schooling in Ukrainian language was impossible for the two-million Ukrainian diaspora in Russia. Such an unfortunate situation undoubtedly influenced the russification of Ukrainians with exponential speed, and no wonder that between 2002 and 2020 Ukrainians who resided in Russia, identified themselves as such, and considered the Ukrainian language as native reduced greatly in number.

With the worsening of the Russian-Ukrainian relations, regardless of the attempts of different Ukrainian initiatives to emphasise their non-political activities, the Russian government politicised the

[423] Bratsyun., p.91-92
[424] Bratsyun., p.92
[425] Mazuka, 'Ukrayins′ka Diaspora v Rosiyi: Aktual′ni Problemy Zberezhennya Natsional′noyi Identychnosti'., p.96
[426] Mazuka., p.98
[427] Mazuka., p.100

Ukrainian language and culture step by step. As a result, while in the first decade of the 21st century the various non-governmental organisations and initiatives could create educational space with the usage of the Ukrainian language, unfortunately, in the following years the activities of such organisations were severely limited.

For example, the Federal National Cultural Autonomy "Ukrainians of Russia" (FNCAUR), which was established in 1997 and actively supported Ukrainians in Russia, was ordered by the Russian court to be liquidated in 2010. The organisation was accused of spreading Ukrainian nationalist ideas. Obushnyi mentions: "Analysis of the internal political events that took place in Russia during this period, gives reason to believe that the dissolution of the FNCAUR was based not on separatism or political activities of the of the All-Russian Organisation of Ukrainians of Russia, but the "hand" of V. Putin, who at that time was the Prime Minister of Russia and who in his speech at a meeting of the State Council of Russia (January 2010) said: "We must constantly think [...] - in no case to allow the Ukrainisation of the political life of Russia."[428] Additionally, the author highlights that Ukrainisation in Russia started getting associated with revolutions (because of the recent Orange Revolution and the choice of Ukraine to turn towards a European direction), people's disobedience, democratisation of society to a certain point, therefore, the Russian government put a lot of efforts into prevention of such scenario for their country. After the dissolution of the FNCAUR, an independent umbrella organisation, according to Obushnyi: "activists of the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia repeatedly attempted to register at least one all-Russian organisation of Ukrainians […] but were constantly denied. Under such conditions, certain functions of all-Russian Ukrainian organisations, including official appeals on behalf of the entire two-million Ukrainian diaspora, are carried out by the editorial board of the website Kobza - Ukrainians in Russia.".[429] As a result, the Russian side supported the creation of the Federal Ukrainian National and Cultural Autonomy (FUNCA), which according to the same author is "headed by the puppet Bezpalko, [who] is considered a Ukrainian-hater and provocateur".[430]

The situation concerning media in Ukrainian, which also plays as means to information and therefore plays educational role to a certain extent, was also difficult. As of 2007, there was no registered printed Ukrainian media in Russia. Apart from that, a direct connection to Ukrainian TV or radio channels was very limited due to the distances of the compact Ukrainian residency. Unfortunately, there were no signs of improvements on this matter and according to Mazuka access to Ukrainian media was of extreme importance for Ukrainian diaspora members in Russia.[431]

The Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 turned out to be the last drop in the fears of Russia, and soon the invasion of Crimea and Donbas made any Ukrainisation processes impossible. Braciun in 2013

[428] Obushnyi, 'Features of ethnocultural activity of the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia in the age of putinism'., C.82
[429] Obushnyi., C.82
[430] Obushnyi., C.82
[431] Mazuka, 'Ukrayins′ka Diaspora v Rosiyi: Aktual′ni Problemy Zberezhennya Natsional′noyi Identychnosti'., C.101

described the situation concerning the numerous Ukrainian initiatives as follows: "The library of Ukrainian literature in Moscow was persecuted and then closed, the Ukrainian educational centre at secondary school No. 124 in Moscow was liquidated, the Federal National Cultural Autonomy "Ukrainians of Russia" and the Association of Ukrainians of Russia were prosecuted, which ended in their liquidation, and the centres of the Ukrainian diaspora in St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Surgut, and Ufa were harassed. In this situation, the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia needs urgent assistance from the Ukrainian government in defending its interests. Otherwise, both labour migrants temporarily staying in Russia and permanent Ukrainian citizens of Russia risk losing their national authenticity."[432]

After 2014, independent Ukrainian organisations were prosecuted or manipulated to close due to the political situation. In the beginning, the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians in Russia and the Association of Ukrainians in Russia were liquidated, later other regional organisations were targeted, such as the Ukrainian Community "Krynytsia" of the Khabarovsk Territory (Khabarovsk) and the Siberian Centre of Ukrainian Culture "Siryi Klyn" (Omsk).[433] In 2016, a violent attack on a Ukrainian culture centre took place, which was one of many other smaller disruptions of the work of the Ukrainian institutions in Moscow. According to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry: "These events around the Ukrainian institutions, which carry out exclusively peaceful and educational activities, are regarded in Ukraine as a blatant provocation aimed at inciting interethnic discord and artificially imposing anti-Ukrainian aggression on the Russian society."[434]

Meanwhile, instead of finding the attackers, the Russian government continued prosecuting people who were supporting Ukrainian culture. For instance, in 2017 a Moscow court found the former director of the Library of Ukrainian Literature in Moscow, Natalia Sharina, guilty of distributing extremist materials and embezzlement. As a result of her case, the only library of Ukrainian literature in Moscow was restructured and closed, its books were placed as materials for the Centre of the Slavic Cultures.[435] Later in 2019, the largest public organisation of Ukrainians living abroad, the World Congress of Ukrainians, was recognised in Russia as an "undesirable organisation", and its activities were banned in the country. In 2021 the Russian authorities liquidated the Far Eastern Ukrainian Spiritual Cultural and Educational Centre "Prosvita" (Vladivostok),[436] on the 27th of February 2023 the organisation "Kuban-Ukraine Commonwealth" was closed.[437]

In the parallel, many of those Ukrainian organisations which weren't closed decided to position themselves as "Ukrainian pro-Russian organisations". As a result, these groups and their members

[432] Bratsyun, 'Znachennya Kul′turnyts′kykh Oseredkiv Ukrayins′koyi Diaspory v Rosiys′kiy Federatsiyi v Zhytti Ukrayins′kykh Trudovykh Mihrantiv Pislya Zdobuttya Nezalezhnosti Ukrayiny'., C.93

[433] Hirzhov, 'Zakony RF pro «nebazhani orhanizatsiyi» – novyy krok do obmezhennya lyuds′kykh ta hromadyans′kykh prav ukrayintsiv Rosiyi'.

[434] 'V Moskve napali na Kul'turnyy tsentr Ukrainy i sozhgli flag: MID trebuyet rassledovaniya'.

[435] Vashchenko, '«Etot protsess budut vspominat' kak «Delo vrachey»'.

[436] Hirzhov, 'Zakony RF pro «nebazhani orhanizatsiyi» – novyy krok do obmezhennya lyuds′kykh ta hromadyans′kykh prav ukrayintsiv Rosiyi'.

[437] Hirzhov.

publicly supported the Russian invasion and occupation and celebrated the "fraternal unity" with Russia. Such change of political orientation can serve as an example of assimilation and russification in its final stage and Ukrainians, who supposedly should have protected the independency of their country and their rights to self-identification, chose to follow the imperialistic narratives of the Russian propaganda.

A former deputy chairman of the Association of Ukrainians of Russia, Girzhov, comments on such shifts as follows: "There are almost no associations of Ukrainians left in Russia. Formally, such organisations exist, but they live on the [*Russian*] government's money and presidential grants, and the authorities arrange what I call 'sharovarshchyna'[438]: these organisations participate in city holidays and festivals, dance and sing, but no politics, no social activity, no rights of Ukrainians. These are the kind of Ukrainians the Russian authorities are happy with. And as long as you start supporting Ukraine, not even Maidan, but just independence, culture, language - that's the end."[439] Another person, a former leader of a Ukrainian association in the North of the Russian Federation, expressed a similar thought: "They [*the Russian government*] want not so much to destroy the Ukrainian movement as to take control of it and make it loyal."[440]

One of such "comfortable Ukrainian organisations" is the Ukrainian Historical and Cultural Centre in Bashkortostan, Russia. Regardless of being Ukrainian, its social media page shows the members' support of the Russian army by posing on pictures with people in Russian military uniform with the letter "Z"[441].[442] Additionally, the organisation prepared "an information hour" on the topic of "The Day of LNR and DNR joining Russia" for high school students in the region.[443] Another Ukrainian organisation "Kalyna" also did not criticise the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and instead published on their social media page information about "national friendship" using the common propaganda phrase: "We are together, strength in unity". Additionally, one of the members commented the war in Ukraine as follows: "We didn't discuss this issue with the manager, everyone has their own opinion, why should I discuss it? Denazification would have happened sooner or later anyway. Western Ukraine has them, the Nazis. I believe that Russian troops are only attacking military targets. As for the destruction... I don't ask myself where it came from. I won't even answer it. My husband and I have relatives in Ukraine, and we don't quite agree with their point of view. We live in Russia, we are happy with everything, we support Russia's policy. And the fact that they are fighting there - it is not people who are fighting, it is governments who are fighting".[444]

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[438] I discussed this term in the section of the russification during the Soviet times.
[439] Savina, 'Pochemu pri Putine sokrashchayetsya ukrainskoye naseleniye'.
[440] Shapoval, 'Nezhelatel'naya natsiya. Kak Rossiya vyzhimayet iz svoikh grazhdan ukrainskuyu identichnost".
[441] Latin letter "Z" became a common symbol of the Russian army. There are a lot theories and speculations regarding the reasons of usage of this letter, as well as some others such as "O", "V" and rarely "A".
[442] Kapralova, *Photo of Natalia Kapralova*.
[443] 'Glavnyy Spetsialist Ukrainskogo IKTS Ibatullina T.YU. Podgotovila Informatsionnyy Chas Na Temu «Den' Prisoyedineniya LNR i DNR k Rossii» Dlya Uchashchikhsya 10-11 Klassa.'
[444] "'YA veryu v televizor". Pochemu zhivushchiye v Rossii ukraintsy podderzhivayut voynu'.

One more example of such an organisation is the Ukrainian singing club "Mriia", which is also not disturbed by the war in Ukraine. Its leader, Yershova, commented: "I follow the news all the time. For eight years they [*Ukrainians*] have been bombing Donbas. Maybe I even experienced some feeling of joy that finally this fascist scum has been crushed. My choir colleagues are mostly of the same opinion. We somehow try not to discuss these issues. We support them [*Russians*] in our hearts, but we have not gone to any rallies. But if someone had called us to a rally in support of the special operation, maybe we would have gone." Additionally, she mentioned: "They [*Ukrainians*] say all sorts of rubbish about Russia. My sister and I try not to talk about these topics, only personal ones. Naturally, they [*Ukrainians*] don't understand us. I believe in television, but my relatives [*in Ukraine*] - what can they know? Krivoy Rog has not been touched yet. Ours won't touch it, Russians. But it's hard to say what these Banderites have in mind. They are bombing civilians in Ukraine, and they say it's ours [*Russians*] doing it. I'll never believe it! Ours only bomb military targets. I'd like to believe that. We [*here*] are different Ukrainians, we are Soviet Ukrainians."[445]

There are still some Ukrainian organisations in Russia which support Ukraine and criticise the Russian government. However, such organisations often work without registration and go into underground activities. For example, one of such organisations is led by Semenenko. He heads a public association of Ukrainians of Russia, which operates without legal registration and comments on their activities: "Now the Ukrainians of Russia are sitting in the underground. In fact, there is no public activity - it's dangerous... We know Russian law: we can only write about the pain and suffering of Ukrainians, but we can't write about military actions and even less discuss the [Russian] army. But we can help: people are fleeing from shells, from bombs, we help them get to the border. But even this help is not welcomed in Russia actually." Additionally, he comments on the Russian government: "This is a general tendency to deny Ukrainian identity. Now they [the authorities and propagandists] are openly saying that there are no Ukrainians and there never were, and that the Ukrainian language never existed, and that all this is an invention."[446] Another Ukrainian woman, who is a participant in an underground Ukrainian organisation, commented: "We used to be engaged in cultural and educational activities, and we saw many Russians who helped us, who were with us on our [Ukrainian] public holidays. Now we can't do anything: we just worry, we help our refugees. But you know how the authorities feel, even if you help, you have to be careful."[447] Another organisation leader, the Union of Ukrainian Women in Russia, Lyudmila Melnyk commented on her experience: "Many of our acquaintances in Ukraine, even knowing my position, do not communicate with us because we are in Russia. I also feel guilty that I can't do anything to help. Go to a rally? We went out! We saw how the police were dragging girls by their hair. And we decided there was just no point. It's all very hard, I don't know how to live with it."[448]

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[445] "'YA veryu v televizor". Pochemu zhivushchiye v Rossii ukraintsy podderzhivayut voynu'.
[446] Savina, 'Pochemu pri Putine sokrashchayetsya ukrainskoye naseleniye'.
[447] Savina.
[448] "'YA veryu v televizor". Pochemu zhivushchiye v Rossii ukraintsy podderzhivayut voynu'.

Such intense attention to grassroots organisations of the Ukrainian diaspora is paid by the Russian government for various reasons. Mikhail Savva, Head of the Ukrainian expert group Sova, explains: "The Russian security services are convinced that there can be no resistance on the part of people if there are no bright leaders around whom they can unite. Because of this theory, any structure around which people dissatisfied with the authorities can unite is eliminated. It can be a national-cultural society, a library, a non-profit organisation, or even a dog breeders' society. Today they study the Ukrainian language, and tomorrow they will go to the barricades with this organised group."[449] Additionally, it seems that the targeted eliminations of linguistic, cultural, and national identifications are aimed not just at Ukrainian people, but also at numerous other minorities in Russia. However, the scale of the attacks on Ukrainian organisations is connected to the ongoing war, the main ideology of which is to prove that Ukraine is a failed state, Ukrainian identity is simply a part of the Russian one, and the Ukrainian language does not exist as a properly functioning language.

Russification and education in occupation

Even though the russification policies implemented on the occupied territories of Ukraine are out of the scope of this thesis, I will shortly mention the most prominent aspects of this process. In my opinion, it is important to include it briefly because those people who migrated or were deported, including abducted children, could find themselves on these territories and russification policies which are implemented there possibly influence forcefully migrated people.

The russification in Crimea after its occupation in 2014 was implemented extremely rapidly due to the minority of Ukrainians residing in Crimea even before the occupation, therefore, the population there was already more open to the russification processes. Additionally, a rapid annexation and adjoining of the peninsula to the Russian state structure with the consequential implementation of all laws and rules of the Russian Federation on the territory of Crimea boosted all the processes.

The comparison of the dynamic of Ukrainian schooling in Crimea was done in 2016 by the Crimean Human Rights Group. According to the data presented by this organisation, since 2013, the number of pupils whose education is provided in Ukrainian language has decreased 36 times. The organisation demonstrated that in 2013 "despite the fact that Russian was not the state language of Ukraine, 90.7% of pupils in Crimea received education in Russian and 99.2% studied Russian as a discipline",[450] and therefore, the claims of the prosecution and pressure of the Russian language in Crimea were not true. However, the situation concerning the Ukrainian language in Crimea drastically changed

[449] Hirzhov, 'Zakony RF pro «nebazhani orhanizatsiyi» – novyy krok do obmezhennya lyuds′kykh ta hromadyans′kykh prav ukrayintsiv Rosiyi'.
[450] 'Situatsiya s dostupom k obrazovaniyu na rodnom yazyke v Krymu'.

during the occupation. Already half a year after the occupation, in the 2014/2015 academic year, there was only one Ukrainian school left and 163 Ukrainian classes with 2,154 children studying there.[451]

Based on the statistics about the identification and native language in the ratio to the number of schools available in the Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, the Crimean Human Rights Group came to the conclusion, that in Crimea children who declared Russian as their native language were covered by schooling in their language for 111.3%, Crimean Tatars who declared the Crimean Tatar language as their native were covered for 33.9%, and Ukrainians who declared Ukrainian as their native language were covered for 15.5%. At the same time, the situation looks even worse in the case of calculating the ratio between the nationalities according to which children self-identified and the availability of schooling in the language of their nationality. In this way, 3.2% of Ukrainians have access to schooling in their national language, 25.2% of Crimean Tatars and 137.4% of Russians.[452] The hyper-accessibility of Russian-speaking schooling in Crimea proves the strategy of the targeted russification of children in Crimea, and Ukrainians seem to be hit especially hard.

The russification in the so-called "DNR" and "LNR"[453] was developing in a more gradual way compared to Crimea due to the lack of recognition of these territories by the Russian Federation. The russification strategies are important to be analysed, especially in the context of the following occupations in 2022-2023, as these specific practices implemented in the "L/DNR" were frequently repeated in the newly occupied territories of Ukraine after February 2022.

Since the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 the position of the Ukrainian language in the occupied territories of Donbas significantly deteriorated. Initially, the education system kept working as it used to do under Ukrainian control. However, in the upcoming years, the situation with schooling in the Ukrainian language drastically changed. In 2017, according to Aleksandr Zakharchenko, head of the self-proclaimed "DNR": "local educational institutions have completely switched from the Ukrainian language to Russian. […] The process started back in 2014. Back then, 50% of students were taught in Russian, in 2015 – 88%, and now [*June 2017*] this figure has reached 100%."[454] Additionally, Larisa Polyakova, the so-called "Minister of Education and Science of the DNR", commented on the reduction of the Ukrainian language in schools: "We have not cancelled the study of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian is studied in all schools. To study in any language is an individual matter for each person. It happens according to the parents' wishes. If last year we still had some percentage of training in Ukrainian at the request of parents, then in 2018 no one wished to be trained in Ukrainian. Donbas is part of the Russian world. We wish to speak Russian, to study the Russian language".[455]

[451] 'Situatsiya s dostupom k obrazovaniyu na rodnom yazyke v Krymu'.
[452] 'Situatsiya s dostupom k obrazovaniyu na rodnom yazyke v Krymu'.
[453] Often referred together as "L/DNR"
[454] Kovalenko and Rezchikov, 'Donbass i Krym zabyvayut ukrainskiy yazyk'.
[455] Kovalenko and Rezchikov.

2019 and 2020 are believed to be the years of the last stage of russification of education in the Donbas region. Step by step the full substitution of the textbooks was implemented, the classes of the Ukrainian language were reduced to the minimum or even fully cancelled, and as a final step – the republican constitution cancelled the official status of the Ukrainian language in the so-called "DNR". The representatives of the "DNR" reasoned such a decision with the argument that the Ukrainian language has not found its practical implementation in the region.[456] The fact of whether it did not find its implementation naturally or was simply marginalised, as well as perceived as the "language of the enemy", needs a deeper examination.

After the full-scale invasion and occupation of the new territories of Ukraine in 2022-2023, russification tools were applied in the same way as they were implemented on other occupied territories of Ukraine. The education systems in all the occupied regions officially became provided in Russian with the possibility to learn Ukrainian in the formats established in the regions according to their preferences.

Overall, the education system in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine faced criticism from the Russian government. The attempt was made to portray the Ukrainian education system as outdated, politicised, and neglectful of its territories and the children residing there. For example, Kravtsov, the Minister of Education of Russia, in April 2023 commented: "Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts are more difficult, there were obvious problems there. We measured them together with Rosobrnadzor in September last year. Children there were simply not taught. The textbooks they were taught with were developed with funds from foreign companies. Anti-Russian propaganda is not only in history textbooks, but also, for example, in geography textbooks. No fundamental knowledge. Children did not know biology or chemistry."[457] Similar comments about students from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia were made back in November 2022 by a Russian Parliament member who claimed that Kherson high school students who were "evacuated" to other Russian regions needed help to fill their knowledge gaps in the Russian language for normal socialisation. According to the Parliament representative, there was a language barrier that the children needed to overcome. The main reason of such barrier is apparently the fact that children were educated in Ukrainian language in schools in their homeland, so the Parliament member communicated a need to solve this "problem" at the state level.[458] Such comments directly illustrate the targeted russification of Ukrainian children by the Russian government and its perception of the Ukrainian-speaking children as "problematic".

Additionally, since the occupied regions lack school staff, cases of inviting young pedagogues from Russia to teach Russian language and history are reported by the media. For example, in Kherson, the project "Pedagogical paratroopers" has been launched by the party "United Russia". As a result, students from Russian universities were invited to teach in the schools in occupation on the territory of

[456] Isak, 'Otmena yazyka. V Donetske pomenyali "konstitutsiyu"'.
[457] '"My obyazany uchitelya zashchitit"': Ministr prosveshcheniya Sergey Kravtsov otvetil na samyye ostryye voprosy uchiteley, roditeley i zhurnalistov "RG"'.
[458] 'V Gosdume pomogut khersonskim shkol'nikam vospolnit' probel v obrazovanii'.

Ukraine in order to continue russifying Ukrainian children. For instance, one of such young pedagogues, who was teaching Ukrainian children the Russian language by giving the example sentence "I love Russia", commented on her work in Kherson: "We are learning to build sentences from the words, repeating the multiplication table, we are talking about history and nature of our great and powerful country. Children have capabilities, but they have lacked knowledge because the Nazi government did not care about them. No one was teaching them, and no one was enforcing the discipline. For me education […] is what changing the consciousness of the young children, so they could become proper citizens of our great Russia."[459] Additionally, the leader of the project comments on their goal: "We came here to show, first of all, to teachers what Russian discipline is, what education is in the academic teaching process."[460] The Centre of National Resistance concludes that the courses which are taught within such initiatives are deliberately chosen – Russian language and History – because in such way "Russians will be pursuing a policy of genocide here to destroy the consciousness of an entire generation of Ukrainians. The "teachers" are supposed to teach exactly those lessons where children will be told about their belonging to the Russian Federation and shift the responsibility for the war to Ukraine."[461] All these re-educational activities are directly targeting the identity of children for the specific political goal of the Russian Federation to create a detachment of the young generation residing on the occupied territories of Ukraine and create a loyal to Russia layer of society for the future.

Russification and religion

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) plays a special role in the process of russification throughout the history of the Russian statehood. The period after 1991 is no exception. Horkusha describes the role of the ROC in the russification process as follows: "The Russian authorities use the religious (Orthodox) identity, which is the breeding ground and disseminator of the ROC and its structural subdivisions, including the ROC in Ukraine (UOC-MP), as a unifying principle for the "Russian world" [*russkii mir*] and, with the prospect of future actualisation, for the entire "Orthodox" humanity. According to their instrumentalist approach to each property inherent in the "russkii mir" as an identifying feature of those who belong to it, by analogy with the "Russian language" (one of the arguments for the invasion of Ukraine was the protection of "Russian speakers"), we should expect "orthodoxy" to be the next argument for the Kremlin's expansionist policy."[462]

The above-mentioned argument is proved by various activities of the ROC and associated with its organisations and personalities. Various journalist investigations, as well as the open declarations of the Russian Orthodox Church, showcase the direct engagement of the Church in the process of

[459] 'V Khersonskoy oblasti startoval proyekt «Pedagogicheskiy desant MGER»'.
[460] '"Molodaya Gvardiya Yedinoy Rossii" zapustila v Khersonskoy oblasti proyekt "Pedagogicheskiy desant"'.
[461] 'Okupanty zvozyat′ z RF studentiv-pedahohiv dlya «roboty z dit′my» na tymchasovo zakhoplenykh terytoriyakh'.
[462] Horkusha, 'Terminological Front'., p.33

deportation and migration of Ukrainians since 2014. For instance, the main page of the official website of the ROC contains information "for the refugees and victims" without mentioning the reasons for the existence of such kind of groups of people and the direct connection between the Russian state and the reasons why these people are forced to flee their homes. Moreover, since 2014 various press releases informed about the humanitarian actions of the ROC. One of them states: "It was proposed to create warehouses of humanitarian aid for refugees at churches, dioceses were recommended to accept Ukrainian citizens in subordinate institutions (shelters and monasteries), and to provide jobs where possible." Adding later that: "more than 500 refugees have found shelter in church institutions in Priozersk, Kolomna, Kostroma, Rostov, Nizhny Novgorod, Voronezh regions, Udmurtia, as well as in Donetsk region in Ukraine and in Crimea."[463]

In another article, it was mentioned that in the autumn of 2014, the activities of the ROC were better organised and institutionalised in this context: "To provide centralised assistance to refugees from South-East Ukraine, an All-Church Headquarters for Refugee Assistance was formed under the Synodal Department for Church Charity and Social Service: it was opened in July and coordinates assistance to refugees in all dioceses. By autumn, the Russian Orthodox Church had accommodated about 500 people in its institutions and provided shelter in private homes and flats for over 1,000 refugees."[464] Additionally the press-release mentions that hundreds of refugees found shelter in twelve church institutions in Rostov, Voronezh, Samara, Moscow, Leningrad, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Kostroma, Yaroslavl regions, and in the Republic of Udmurtia.[465]

After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the actions of the Russian Orthodox Church were even more dynamic. One of the investigations demonstrated the role of the Church in filtration, deportation, and relocation of the Ukrainian population from the occupied territories, among which hundreds of children who are now considered abducted are suspected. According to the report, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia passed information about deportees to the church, after which church representatives centrally resettled people in churches and monasteries all over the territory of Russia. Additionally, the journalists identified the location of church institutions where forcibly deported Ukrainians may be staying. The maps prepared by the journalists with marked locations of the churches and monasteries which were actively engaged in the forced migration of people. One of the key activities of the Church was to manage refugees from Ukraine allocated to the institution: "In almost every region where Ukrainians are brought, there is a diocese that takes care of the issues of the displaced. They bring them food and hold "spiritual conversations"." Additionally, the journalists reported that "despite the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church conceals the ways in which Ukrainians are transported to its church institutions, the conditions of their detention, and […] information about

[463] 'V Tserkvi razrabotan plan kompleksnoy pomoshchi bezhentsam iz Ukrainy'.
[464] Mikhailova, 'Bezhentsy. Chto sdelala dlya nikh Tserkov'?'
[465] Mikhailova.

surveillance cameras for forcibly taken people, the church has launched a whole information campaign to spread information about its charity. Among the letters, [*the reporters*] found a media plan prepared by the churchmen to disseminate their messages with the involvement of Russian bloggers and news media."[466]

Furthermore, it's worth noting that non-governmental religious organisations in Russia are actively participating in projects that align with the russification efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian government. An illustrative example of such a project, which has received financial support from the Russian state directly, outlines the project's objectives:

1. To undertake a series of initiatives with beneficiaries that encompass spiritual and moral, cultural, historical, and military-patriotic themes. They seek to introduce dynamic forms of spiritual, moral, historical, and patriotic education among internally displaced persons (IDPs).
2. To engage project beneficiaries in exploring and popularising Russian history while fostering the cultivation of moral values through an understanding of the saints and celebrations within the Russian Orthodox Church.[467]

These activities are all directed towards the assimilation and russification of the population residing in the occupied territories and the Ukrainian refugees who have sought shelter in Russia due to the conflict. Undeniably, these strategies are boosting the processes of assimilation and reshaping of Ukrainian identity.

Russification and religion in occupation

Regarding the religious oppression in the occupied lands of Ukraine, the Crimean Peninsula faced russification and religious repression since 2014. It is reported that since the beginning of 2014 the Crimean Diocese of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), a church independent from the Moscow Orthodox church, had 45 parishes served by 14 clergy. By 2022, the Diocese had only 7 parishes and 4 priests left. Those priests who managed to arrive to the mainland controlled by Ukraine talk about attempts by FSB officers to recruit people to obtain information about the diocese, as well as report cases of people, who got a job in civil service after the occupation, and these people asked their parents not to go to the Ukrainian church because it could cause them problems at work. Additionally, on the 23rd of August 2021, Archimandrite Damian (Pavel Skokov) of the OCU was prosecuted for performing a liturgy as a so-called "illegal missionary activity". The representatives of the OCU comment: "Such a policy of pressure and prosecution, which has been going on for eight years, is absolutely unacceptable from the

[466] Korniyenko, 'Deportuy blyzhn′oho svoho: yak Rosiys′ka Pravoslavna Tserkva razom iz sylovykamy prymusovo pereselyayut′ ukrayintsiv do rosiyi'.
[467] 'Proyekt K istokam'.

point of view of human rights and international humanitarian law and is one of the levers and elements of the destruction of the Ukrainian identity of the population of the Crimean Peninsula."[468]

The situation in the "L/DNR" was also difficult for the various religious institutions. Because of the acknowledgement of the occupied territories of Ukraine by Moscow as their own, their federal laws became applicable to the new territories, including the implementation of the Yarovaya Law and other "anti-extremist" laws which are oppressing religious beliefs. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports that as a result: "Former Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Oleksandr Zakharchenko declared in May 2015 that Ukrainian Orthodox Church (OCU) members, Greek Catholics, and Evangelical Christians were "sectarians" within the DNR. Zakharchenko announced that occupation authorities would only recognise the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, Catholicism, Islam, and Judaism. Occupation authorities forced many religious groups to reregister under the Russian Yarovaya law, bureaucratically eradicating religions such as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Muslim group Hizb Ut Tahir. A Russian court ordered the only remaining Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Russia to be demolished at the expense of the Ukrainian diocese in 2019."[469]

Additionally, the authors of the ISW report presented evidence of systematic eradication of the OCU's functionality in the occupied territories. According to the report, 34% of the recorded incidents of prosecution were directed towards the OCU, making it the religious group most frequently subjected to prosecution. A notable percentage of prosecution incidents against the OCU can be seen as unsurprising, as it is the most widely practised denomination in Ukraine. Testimonies from witnesses suggest that Russian authorities appear to be singling out the OCU due to its Ukrainian identity. Even during the brief period of Russian occupation of the Kyiv Oblast early in the conflict, reports indicate that these targeted attacks against the OCU were deliberate actions within a broader strategy of the Russian invasion.[470]

Other religious groups, which are typical for Ukraine, are also targeted by the occupiers. The ISW report described the prosecution cases of Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests, and brutal cases of oppression of Ukrainian protestants, especially Baptists, apparently calling them "American spies," "sectarians," and "enemies of the Russian Orthodox people."[471] As a result the ISW authors believe that: "Russia's systematic religious persecution supports a larger Russian campaign of cultural genocide against Ukraine."[472]

Other institutions also analysed Russian activities on the occupied territories, and according to the OSCE report published in May 2023, the various violations of the rights to thought, conscience and religion took place on the occupied territories and these violations serve as evidence of russification:

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[468] 'Pislya okupatsiyi Krymu kil′kist′ parafiy PTSU na pivostrovi zmenshylasya z 45 do semy'.
[469] Barros and Stepanenko, 'Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment'., p.5
[470] Barros and Stepanenko., p.5
[471] Barros and Stepanenko., p.10
[472] Barros and Stepanenko., p.13

"Noting the split of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Moscow Patriarchate in May 2022, it is clear that the two churches are separate identities. Yet, for example, there are reports of children having "educational" conversations with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as part of their "patriotic" education. Moreover, given the dominant anti-Ukraine narrative in the Russian Federation, it is safe to conclude that the there are no opportunities for Ukrainian children to attend Ukrainian Orthodox churches or indeed meet with religious leaders of their church."[473]

Russification and identity

Prior to discussing how russification policies affect the self-identification of Ukrainians living in the Russian Federation, it's essential to provide a brief categorisation of these population groups.

In the process of the dissolution of the USSR, people had different reasons for mobility or immobility. For instance, some former deportees chose to stay close to the places of their deportation because their children could get an education there and integrated into the region. Mixed marriages became more common, and some people found housing and jobs in the areas where they had been relocated. For others, returning to Ukraine was not an option as they had lost all their belongings. Economic factors also played a role: with the growth of the oil industry and the demand for specialists people were attracted to stay in Russia after the USSR's dissolution. Determining the exact number of this group is difficult due to their scattered settlements.

Another group of Ukrainians in Russia is made of economic migrants. A nationwide survey of labour migration of Ukrainians abroad identified 710,300 people who worked in Russia in 2005-2008, however, the number is believed to be higher.[474] The difficulty concerning the precise calculation exists due to the practically borderless travelling between Ukraine and Russia, irregularity of the work offered to the migrants, and often "shuttle" or seasonal type of work migration. Interestingly, in the 2000s reports suggest that 90% of the Ukrainian labour migrants who worked in Russia were not considering settling there[475], therefore, it is possible to assume that these people preferred to avoid assimilation.

The last group of Ukrainians in Russia consists of people who are native to the borderlands or other territories settled by Ukrainians. For instance, due to the establishment of the borders between the newly created Ukrainian and Russian Soviet republics in the 1920s, a number of Ukrainians found themselves living beyond the borders of the Ukrainian SSR marked by the Soviet regime. According to Zubyk such territories as Kuban, Don, Voronezh, Kursk, Bryansk, Starodubshchyna (northern part of Chernihiv-Siversk land), Northern Slobozhanshchyna, Taganrog and Shakhtyn districts became parts of modern

[473] Bilkova, Hellestveit, and Šteinerte, 'Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation'., p.65
[474] Bratsyun, 'Znachennya Kul′turnyts′kykh Oseredkiv Ukrayins′koyi Diaspory v Rosiys′kiy Federatsiyi v Zhytti Ukrayins′kykh Trudovykh Mihrantiv Pislya Zdobuttya Nezalezhnosti Ukrayiny'., C.91
[475] Bratsyun., C.91

Russia even though the majority of population there were Ukrainians.[476] Ukrainians living there are not considered as a Ukrainian diaspora, since these people did not migrate to the lands where they are settled. However, they and their descendants could still identify themselves as Ukrainians in Soviet and Russian censuses and surveys. The issue of Ukrainians residing in those territories could be of specific interest as the highest level of russification is expected to be enforced on this group of Ukrainians due to their immobility and lack of minority-orienting policies in the USSR and Russia.

By virtue of the all-Russian censuses of 2002, 2010 and 2020 it is possible to compare the statistical dynamic of Ukrainians residing in Russia.[477] In total according to the 2002 all-Russian census, Ukrainians were the third most represented ethnic group in the country with 2,943,000 people residing in Russia, which results in 2% of the total Russian population.[478] 8 years later, there were 1,927,988 Ukrainians living in Russia: 1 million people less, which meant that in 2010 the Ukrainian minority resulted in 1.34% of the total Russian population.[479] As of the Russian census of 2020, there were already 884,007 people identifying themselves as Ukrainians in Russia.[480] Such a dynamic seems suspicious since apart from those Ukrainians who have been living in Russia for the last 30 years, there should be more than 1 million Ukrainians arriving as refugees from Donbas after 2014. Additionally, among more than 880,000 Ukrainians reported by the 2020 census, around 145,000 reside in Crimea specifically, therefore they are a newly added population.[481]

The number of the Ukrainian diaspora, as well as the level of Ukrainian language knowledge, were steadily lowering and the comparison of the 2002, 2010 and 2020 censuses clearly demonstrated this process. There are three main reasons explaining the decline in the number of Ukrainians residing in Russia: natural decline, migration outflows, and reidentification. Zubyk presents the arguments of Russian researchers who believe that "the first two factors led to a decrease in the Ukrainian population in the Russian Federation by no more than 250,000 people, and 1.2 million Ukrainians simply "disappeared" as a result of a change in national identity."[482] Consequently, russification and assimilation of Ukrainians seem to be the main reasons for the reduction of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation.

After the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 in Ukraine and the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, the lives of Ukrainians in Russia drastically changed. Being Ukrainian imposed real dangers. The demographers believe that apart from the possible statistical mistake and doubtful quality of the 2020 Russian census (most probably a big part of it was done administratively by rewriting data from the available to the government datasets), a large number of Ukrainians indeed preferred to

[476] Zubyk, 'Etnoheohrafichni Protsesy v Seredovyshchi Ukrayintsiv Rosiyi'., C.200
[477] The Appendix 6 presents the data in the table.
[478] Bratsyun, 'Znachennya Kul′turnyts′kykh Oseredkiv Ukrayins′koyi Diaspory v Rosiys′kiy Federatsiyi v Zhytti Ukrayins′kykh Trudovykh Mihrantiv Pislya Zdobuttya Nezalezhnosti Ukrayiny'., C.91
[479] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2010 goda'.
[480] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2020 goda'.
[481] 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2020 goda'.
[482] Zubyk, 'Etnoheohrafichni Protsesy v Seredovyshchi Ukrayintsiv Rosiyi'., C.202

self-identify as someone else but not Ukrainians. According to Florinskaya: "Some part probably preferred to be called Russians rather than Ukrainians, in 2021 the level of negativity [*towards Ukraine*] in society was already very strong".[483]

Ukrainians in Russia indeed describe their fear of identifying as such. For example, UNIAN special correspondent Roman Tsimbalyuk, who works in Moscow, comments: "It is dangerous to be a conscious Ukrainian in Russia. The ideology that declares Russians and Ukrainians to be "one people" provides no room for citizens who insist on their Ukrainian identity, seek to learn their language, and do not recognise the annexation of Crimea."[484] At the same time, Grizhov, former deputy chairman of the Association of Ukrainians of Russia, mentions: "People are afraid because now it is not safe to admit that you are Ukrainian. For example, the FSB summoned people from the register of readers of the Library of Ukrainian Literature for interviews. Older people have children and grandchildren, and they are worried. Younger people are afraid of losing their jobs. Whoever could, left before the war. Now it's difficult, so until the war is over, others try not to emphasise their 'Ukrainianness' - it's fraught."[485]

Another demographer, Oleksiy Raksha, mentions that the natural accelerated assimilation of Eastern Slavs is the main reason for such a big wave of reduction of Ukrainians. He believes that Eastern Slavs tend to stop identifying themselves with their ethnic groups and start identifying themselves as Russians much faster than representatives of other nationalities, mainly at the expense of young people.[486]

Additionally, social and political pressure can also boost the shift in self-identification. Examples of prosecutions, hate actions, prejudice and bullying are reported by the media and human rights organisations. For example, the Crimean Human Rights Group reports that: "The level of hate speech, along with other manifestations of discrimination against Ukrainians in Crimea, causes many Ukrainians to avoid openly expressing their ethnicity in order to avoid being persecuted by the authorities or becoming victims of hate crimes. […] [*Moreover,*] in a situation where Ukrainians are persistently labelled as "the enemy", Crimeans are wary of openly positioning their Ukrainian identity".[487] Such facts lead to the conclusion of targeted policies against the people who self-identify as Ukrainians in the occupied territories and showcase people's fear to be identified in this way.

Re-education activities are another russification tool of identity. In February 2023, the Conflict Observatory published a report based on an analysis conducted by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. The analysis covered the issues of abduction, deportation and systematic re-education programmes implemented in the Russian Federation. Researchers reported that they mapped a network of 42 facilities that stretched from one side of Russia to the other with the furthest camp in Magadan Oblast in Russia's Far East near the Pacific Ocean, more than 6,000 kilometres away from Ukraine's border with the Russian

[483] Savina, 'Pochemu pri Putine sokrashchayetsya ukrainskoye naseleniye'.
[484] Shapoval, 'Nezhelatel'naya natsiya. Kak Rossiya vyzhimayet iz svoikh grazhdan ukrainskuyu identichnost".
[485] Savina, 'Pochemu pri Putine sokrashchayetsya ukrainskoye naseleniye'.
[486] Savina.
[487] 'Situatsiya s dostupom k obrazovaniyu na rodnom yazyke v Krymu'.

Federation. According to the data of this report at least 32 of those facilities (78%) were engaged in "systematic re-education efforts that expose children from Ukraine to Russia-centric academic, cultural, patriotic, and/or military education. Multiple camps endorsed by the Russian Federation are advertised as "integration programs", with the apparent goal of integrating children from Ukraine into the Russian government's vision of national culture, history, and society."[488]

Additionally, witnesses and victims often provide comments on various re-education programmes which aim at the cultural and national identity of the children. For instance, a woman who adopted a Ukrainian boy gave an interview: "I am very happy that now they are going to introduce raising the flag every week and the Russian anthem will be learnt by heart by children. I'm very happy about that. And lectures on patriotism - I directly asked the administration [*about it*]".[489] With the return of the deported children from occupation, evidence of the survivors is reported in numerous interviews. One of the children told how they were forced to learn the Russian anthem: "We were forced to sing the Russian anthem, to hold the Russian flag, to raise it on the flagpole, but we did not want to do it. They gave us the text of the anthem and said: "Learn it, tomorrow you will retell it by heart"."[490] Another article described the experience of orphans from Ukraine who were put into children's homes in Russia. According to the article, children went through numerous propaganda activities, such as patriotic events, and meetings with Russian military representatives, who convinced the children of an "existing fascist regime" in Ukraine and advertised serving in the Russian army after graduation from school.[491]

Another influential re-identification and russification tool is passportisation. Since 2022 Putin ordered the implementation of a simplified procedure for the passportisation of abducted children from Ukrainian territories. This order is a direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits changing the nationality status of children during military conflicts and occupation. According to the UN Commission: "Measures to obtain citizenship and family placement that may have serious consequences for the child's identity violate the child's right to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations."[492] The Ukrainian children who managed to return to Ukraine shared their experience of how they were manipulated or forced into changing their citizenship and passports. There is evidence that educational institutions are regularly engaged in this process. For instance, there is an example of administrators telling all the Ukrainian children to apply for Russian passports, because they would have exams in the summer and could not pass them without Russian documents.[493]

Furthermore, on the 27th of April 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe voted in favour of recognising the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia as genocide.

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[488] Khoshnood, Raymond, and Howarth, 'Russia's Systematic Program for the Re-Education and Adoption of Ukraine's Children.', p.5
[489] Bonch-Osmolovskaya, '«Dopolnitel'nyye grazhdane Rossii»'.
[490] '«Bili zheleznoy palkoy, derzhali v podvale». Ukrainskiye deti rasskazali, kak ikh uderzhivali v rossiyskikh lageryakh'.
[491] Bonch-Osmolovskaya, '«Dopolnitel'nyye grazhdane Rossii»'.
[492] Nazarova, 'Vyvoz detey iz Ukrainy v Rossiyu: otvechayem na vse glavnyye voprosy'.
[493] Babinets, 'How Two Ukrainian Teenagers Escaped Russian Captivity'.

One of the arguments which brought the Assembly to such a conclusion is: "the practice of "re-education" of the children thus removed from their homes and families, both in residential facilities and in foster or adoptive families. This practice is called "russification", which implies a prohibition from speaking the Ukrainian language or expressing in any way their Ukrainian identity and culture, compulsory exposure to the Russian language and culture through classes, blanket exposure to the prevailing propaganda through the media, teaching of the Russian version of history, visits to "patriotic" sites, military training and denigration of the Ukrainian language, culture and history."[494] Additionally, the resolution of the Assembly comes to the conclusion that: "[*Russian*] crimes indicate an intention to destroy Ukraine and the Ukrainian identity as well as the cultural and linguistic characteristics of its people. The forcible transfers, unlawful deportations, and "re-education" of children, who are especially vulnerable and in need of protection, are abhorrent in their aim of annihilating the children's every link to and feature of their Ukrainian identity."[495]

Russification is implemented not just via governmental institutions, but also with the help of various non-governmental institutions and the governmental grant system. For instance, journalists reported about those projects which received financial support from the Russian Federation for propaganda, psychological counselling, and even for the training of children from the occupied regions of Ukraine to enter Russian military universities. In the descriptions, the authors of the projects describe their plans in detail. For instance, one mentions: "Some children from the liberated territories who have been placed in orphanages were raised in the Ukrainian paradigm and are now going through the difficult and traumatic psychological process of changing their homeland. They also need to be supported, both by reducing stress and by instilling traditions of patriotism and *russkii mir*".[496] Another project explains: "In order for the unity of the two nations to take place, we must focus the internally displaced people on knowing their historical roots and realising the uniqueness of our common Fatherland, its destiny, pride in belonging to the deeds of their ancestors, as well as historical responsibility for what is happening in the society and state in which they are forced to live and of which they aspire to become citizens." The same project later mentions: "The authors of the project are convinced that thanks to the work of a psychologist, lawyer, spiritual, moral and historical-patriotic activities, the level of social tension among internally displaced people will be reduced, they will focus for the duration of the project on the knowledge of historical roots, spiritual community of the two nations, will find for themselves examples of moral behaviour, will tune in to the course of increasing loyalty to the state policy of Russia (a well-

[494] 'Deportations and Forcible Transfers of Ukrainian Children and Other Civilians to the Russian Federation or to Temporarily Occupied Ukrainian Territories: Create Conditions for Their Safe Return, Stop These Crimes and Punish the Perpetrators'., p.2, paragraph 7.4
[495] 'Deportations and Forcible Transfers of Ukrainian Children and Other Civilians to the Russian Federation or to Temporarily Occupied Ukrainian Territories: Create Conditions for Their Safe Return, Stop These Crimes and Punish the Perpetrators'., p.2, paragraph 8
[496] 'Proyekt Pomoshch' detyam-sirotam Donbassa'.

coordinated team that has successfully implemented similar projects will work on the project…)".[497] The last words give an impression of the continuous work of the organisation in the field of Russian propaganda, reidentification and russification.

Apart from the traditional school education, children are also influenced by summer camp activities. For instance, a specific programme "Poslezavtra" was created with the patronage of Lvova-Belova[498]. In 2022, more than a thousand children from the "new regions" participated, and it was planned that around 2 thousand more would participate in 2023. On the website of Lvova-Belova, it was reported that there were: "727 trainings and other group activities, and 1,850 individual counselling. At the end of each shift, all participants receive personalised recommendations on development and self-regulation." Additionally, it was planned that: "further support for the participants in the format of trainings, master classes, webinars and psychological counselling sessions"[499] will be provided. In a later report it was mentioned that psychologists supported children: "They paid special attention to analysing the psychological characteristics of minors evacuated from war zones. According to the experts, many children are diagnosed with psychosomatic disorders, depression, and identity crises is characteristic of the older [*children*]."[500] The engagement of professional psychologists indicates the attempts of the Russian government to deeply influence Ukrainian minors.

Russification of the identity in occupation

Influencing the identity of Ukrainian children through re-education programmes is one of the most common and openly applied mechanisms used by the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war. Numerous political, media and non-governmental organisations and institutions report systematic cases of targeted russification of Ukrainian minors. Patriotic education is an important element of propaganda on the occupied territories. Therefore, special attention is paid to educational institutions of all levels, starting with kindergarten, and non-educational after-school activities, summer camps or private projects.

For example, children in the occupied Donbas regions learn the alphabet using the book "Alphabet of Donbas" where children can observe flags of Russia and "DNR", a man in a military uniform with a gun symbolised as "Donbas protector", as well as learn that "Donbas is a Russian land" and "our homeland is Russia".[501] The "DNR administration" claims that "the book is very non-political"

[497] 'Proyekt K istokam'.
[498] Children's Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation
[499] 'V 2023 godu proydet desyat' molodezhnykh smen «Poslezavtra»'.
[500] 'Rebyatam vazhno dat' chuvstvo opory i uverennosti v budushchem – Mariya L'vova-Belova o psikhologicheskoy pomoshchi detyam iz zon boyevykh deystviy'.
[501] '«DNR» podarit pervoklassnikam «Azbuku Donbassa». Tam Pushilin i «Rodina — Rossiya»'.

and was distributed to more than 3,000 children in August 2021 while 20,000 more copies were printed in October 2021.[502]

Special attention is paid to history classes where children discover their belonging to a specific cultural and historical place through a distorted version of historical events. In the case of the "DNR", it is done by specific history textbooks which focus on the history of the region through the Russian lens. Also, journalists discuss the programme of the course "Lessons of Citizenship and Spirituality in Donbas" targeted at 11-12 y.o. children. Journalists comment that the programme includes: "four major sections: "Donbas is my native land", "Spiritual and moral foundations of the people of Donbas", "Raise a citizen of the Donetsk People's Republic", and "Donbas and the Russian world". This is a rather voluminous document, which requires that a pupil of 11-12 years old, having studied, for example, the section on the Russian World, already understand the "fundamental foundations of the Russian World", gives examples of historical and cultural links that confirm the thesis "Donbas is part of the Russian World", and explains the meaning and significance of the "Immortal Regiment" action."[503] The topics are noticeably focused on anything related to the idea of belonging to Russia and propaganda of the *russkii mir* ideology, which is directly targeting children's identities.

Another part of patriotic education is seen in the military programmes organised in various camps and military youth organisations such as "Yunarmiia". The influence of military youth entities is out of the scope of the thesis; however, it is discussed in detail by Barbieri who analyses this and other types of educational programmes which target Ukrainian children on the occupied territories for re-education. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that there are three main objectives of re-education programmes: "The first objective has been indoctrinating youth to the political cause of the DNR/LNR as part of Russia's civilisational space while promulgating militaristic values and misrepresenting Ukrainian national identity as inherently hostile to the local population."[504] The second objective is explained by the need of Russia to reinvent the national myth which portrays Donbas as an integral part of the *russkii mir* cultural, linguistic, and historical space. The third objective is the recruitment to serve in the military and/or law enforcement agencies. Additionally, Barbieri mentions that: "Russia-sponsored patriotic education programmes in the DNR/LNR acted as catalysts for the consolidation of a distinct 'republican' identity culturally oriented towards Russia to fuel polarisation in Ukrainian society […] Patriotic education programmes turned into means of political control to root out and convert 'disloyal' citizens, laying the ideological groundwork for the incorporation of these (and other) territories into the Russian Federation."[505]

[502] Durnev, 'Urok na budushcheye. Kak v DNR uchat detey byt' patriotami — bez voinskoy podgotovki, urokov grazhdanstvennosti Donbassa i mongolo-tatarskogo iga'.
[503] Durnev.
[504] Barbieri, 'Raising Citizen-Soldiers in Donbas'., p.12
[505] Barbieri., p.12-13

In my opinion, russification and assimilation tools require deep research and analyses in order to develop a strategy for the re-identification and reintegration of such children back into Ukrainian society.

Russification in Ukraine

Various policies and laws were implemented by the Ukrainian government in order to reverse the russification process among the population. Specific attention was paid to the establishment of the Ukrainian language as an official national language, its gradual implementation as a language of instruction in all educational institutions, the adaptation of the Ukrainian language as the main one for public and business services, establishing quotas for the Ukrainian language in media, etc. Such policies were often debated democratically by politicians and among the population. However, one of the biggest shifts back towards russification happened during the rule of the pro-Russian president Yanukovych and his followers.

All these developments are closely linked to the consequences of past mobilities and assimilation policies, making it, in my view, crucial to provide a concise overview of them as instances of successful russification in Ukraine. However, it's equally essential to underscore the need for more in-depth research into these aspects.

Linguistic aspects of successful russification

The linguistic landscape of Ukraine has always consisted of various linguistic minorities. However, my primary emphasis will be on the context of how the Russian language is used in Ukraine. The Ukrainian censuses of 1989 and 2001 help us to see the tendencies of the usage of languages by the population in Ukraine. For instance, the General commentary of the Ukrainian National Statistics Committee states that: "The Ukrainian language was considered native by 67.5% of the population of Ukraine, which is 2.8% more than in the 1989 census. Russian was identified as a native language by 29.6% of the population, a decrease of 3.2% compared to the previous census. The share of other languages indicated as mother tongue increased by 0.4% over the inter-census period and amounted to 2.9%."[506]

At first glance it could mean a positive change for the speakers of ethnic languages, however, certain groups gained in numbers of speakers of their native language and others considerably lost despite the average percentage. Taking into account Ukrainian and Russian languages which are of specific interest in this thesis, there was a decrease between 1989 and 2001 in the number of speakers of Russian language - 98.39% versus 95.92% (-2.47%) - and among Ukrainians who consider their native language

[506] 'Vseukrayins'kyy perepys naselennya 2001'.

Ukrainian – 87.72% versus 85.16% (-2.56%).[507] Such changes could mean that the Ukrainian and Russian communities surveyed in 1989 and 2001 consist of different persons due to the high level of in and out mobility. Therefore, more russified Ukrainians arrived from Russia, some Ukrainians could be already considered officially Russian by citizenship, self-identify as Russians or repatriate with their Russian-speaking families and descendants.

Apart from this, in the context of russification, it is important to check whether Russian language is considered native among the ethnic groups living in Ukraine. According to the census 2001 the numbers were as follows: 14.77% Ukrainians considered Russian as their native language, 62.46% Belarusians, 17.63% Moldovans, 6.13% Crimean Tatars, 30.34% Bulgarians, 82.98% Jews, 43.15% Armenians, 88.47% Greeks, 58.74% Tatars, 37.56% Azeri, 54.36% Georgians, 64.71% Germans. In total around 13% of the population in Ukraine – 6,279,838 persons – considered Russian as their native language, even though not all of them identified as Russians. Only a few minority groups living in Ukraine consider Ukrainian as their native language. Among them Hungarians 3,43% (Ukrainian language) versus 0.97% (Russian language), Romanians 6.2% versus 1.52%, Polish 70.96% (even more than the Polish language) versus 15.61%, Romas 21.1% versus 13.4%, Slovaks 41.66% versus 5.24%.[508] Notably, almost all these groups (apart from the Romas) are the nations bordering Ukraine, therefore the linguistic mix is understandable.

Additionally, it is important to highlight the difference between such categories as "native language", "being fluent" in a certain language, identifying yourself with a specific nation, and using a specific language more often than another in different social situations. The in-depth description of all these differences is out of the scope of this thesis, however, it is important to mark certain peculiarities which are important for the analysis of russification of Ukrainians. According to the analysis of Kotyhorenko: "The share of the population of Ukraine fluent in the language of their nationality increased by 1.7% - from 93.5 to 95.2 per cent. In particular, for Ukrainians, these figures were, respectively, 94.7 and 96.8 per cent, and for Russians - 99.6 and 98.9 per cent."[509] These numbers show that 10% of Ukrainians who didn't consider Ukrainian language as their native language in 2001, were still fluent in it. Another argument of Kotyhorenko shows the difference between language usage, native language, and self-identification: "In 1994, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a study and obtained the following results. When asked about the "preferred language" in family communication, the answers "Ukrainian" were distributed by region: in the 5 eastern regions - 14.6%, despite the fact that 42.1% of respondents considered it their native language and 52.5% of respondents identified themselves as Ukrainians; in the south of Ukraine, the corresponding figures were 11.3%, 48%,

[507] Melnyk, *Etnichne ta movne rozmayittya Ukrayiny: analitychnyy ohlyad sytuatsiyi*., C.13
[508] Melnyk., C.13
[509] Kotyhorenko, 'Etnichnyy Sklad Ta Etnomovna Kompetentsiya Naselennya Ukrayiny Za Perepysamy Naselennya 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989, 2001 Ta Rezul′tatamy Sotsiolohichnykh Doslidzhen′ 1994 Ta 2001'.

52.5%; in the western regions - 91.6%, the share of ethnic Ukrainians among the respondents was 89.2%."[510] These numbers once more show that the language which is preferred in usage, the language which is considered to be native and the national identification can significantly vary and change over time.

Another factor which is worth noting is the comparison of the statistics regarding the usage of languages in everyday life, especially in families. However, it is important to include such linguistic phenomena as surzhyk as well. Based on the surveys of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology between 1991 and 2003, Khmelko describes the lingual picture of Ukraine based on the 5 main geographical areas. The author adds the category "speaking surzhyk" to the analyses and applies the national identification to the linguistic preferences which gives us additional information. The data is visualised in the table in the Appendix 9. According to it, almost 11% of the adult population chose the category of "surzhyk". Additionally, it shows a big regional difference in numbers of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians. While in the Western regions, the Russian-speaking Russians represent 1%-17% of the population, in the Eastern and Southern regions they were often in the majority in comparison to the Ukrainian-speaking part of the population.[511]

Additional peculiarities of the linguistic situation in Ukraine are the stability of the usage of language, meaning that due to bilingualism people are switching from Ukrainian to Russian and vice versa depending on the social situation. This phenomenon is described in the data of another survey which covers the period of 2002-2005. According to this survey, the option of speaking "only Ukrainian" was chosen by most of the respondents in the Western and North-Eastern regions, "only Russian" was chosen by most of the population from Donbas, other regions have similar figures of the option "only Russian" and "Ukrainian or Russian depending on the situation".[512] The data is visualised in the table attached in the Appendix 10.

While analysing the reasons and outcomes of linguistic flexibility and bilingualism, the researchers come to different conclusions. However, Melnyk mentions one important argument: "The massive nature of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism is also manifested in the fact that a significant number of Ukrainians have lost their linguistic stability among both Ukrainians and representatives of ethnic minorities (Belarusians, Jews Greeks, and Germans), there is a linguistic shift towards Russian language and linguistic assimilation."[513] This tendency can be seen in various Ukrainian regions, where Russian-speaking groups are influencing the Ukrainian-speaking people and gradually russify them.

Russification and Ukrainian education

[510] Kotyhorenko.
[511] Melnyk, *Etnichne ta movne rozmayittya Ukrayiny: analitychnyy ohlyad sytuatsiyi*., C.68
[512] Melnyk., C.72
[513] Melnyk., C.71

As it was discussed previously, schooling was one of the tools to amplify the process of assimilation and russification. The Ukrainian independence brought new legislation in the sphere of education which had a direct influence on these processes and attempted to reverse their direct outcomes.

Due to the legislation promoting Ukrainisation, the number of schools which were teaching in Ukrainian was gradually growing providing more and more pupils with education in Ukrainian language. According to the statistics provided by Melnyk in the 1989/1990 academic year 48% of pupils studied in Ukrainian and 51% studied in Russian, while even back then most of students were Ukrainians and considered Ukrainian as their native language. Such a disbalance can be a sign of the ongoing purposeful russification. In the following years, the number of students being schooled in Ukrainian grew and in 1995/1996 academic year (a.y.) 58% of children studied in Ukrainian and 41% in Russian, in 1998/1999 a.y. 65% in Ukrainian and 34% in Russian, in 2000/2001 a.y. 70% in Ukrainian and 29% in Russian, in 2005/2006 a.y. 78% in Ukrainian and 21% in Russian, in 2008/2009 a.y. 81% in Ukrainian and 18% in Russian.[514]

Even though the general statistics show us a positive development of the linguistic situation, not all the regions were de-russifying at the same pace. Melnyk mentions that: "According to the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, in the 2005/2006 academic year [in Crimea] there were 359 Russian schools and only 7 Ukrainian schools. The language situation is even worse in the peninsula's higher education institutions, where teaching is practically conducted exclusively in Russian. Similar situations are observed in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Thus, in these regions, it is not the Russian language that needs protection, but the Ukrainian language. Here, Ukrainian should function as the state language, but in fact, it is in the position of a minority language."[515]

It is interesting to compare the ratio between self-identification, native language, and language of schooling.

	Population which	**Ukrainian**	**Russian**	**Other**
1.	Considers its national identity	78%	17%	5%
2.	Considers its native language	68%	29%	3%
3.	Studying in this language 2001	70%	29%	1%
4.	Studying in this language in 2009	81%	18%	1%

Table 3. The population of Ukraine by nationality and mother tongue in relation to the distribution of students by language of instruction[516]

The table above shows that the number of students studying in Ukrainian was growing and in Russian was declining. While comparing the national identification with language of studying, the picture is a bit

[514] Melnyk., C.118
[515] Melnyk., C.118
[516] ibid

different. In 2001 there were fewer Ukrainians schooled in Ukrainian, and more people schooled in Russian than the number of those who identified themselves as Russians. Of course, more detailed data is needed to make conclusions on who are Ukrainised and keep being russified: minority groups, Ukrainians or Russians living in Ukraine.

Big changes occurred in 2010 after Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential election. His governing is connected to the big pro-Russian political changes in the country, including those in the language and education spheres. On the 3rd of July 2012, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new law "On the Principles of State Language Policy", which allowed the use of national minority languages in governmental and educational institutions in regions where the respective ethnic groups constituted at least 10% of the population. Given the ethnic picture of Ukraine and language preferences, this law supported the russified regions of Ukraine and pro-Russian visioners of Ukraine's future. As a result, several southern and eastern regions included the Russian language as the regional one.

Consequently, the Ukrainian and Russian languages had different governmental support in different regions of Ukraine. The regional linguistic issues seem to be problematic in specific regions. For instance, the 2011 letter on the implementation of the State Programme for the Development and Functioning of the Ukrainian Language states that: "in Donetsk Oblast, over the years of the programme's implementation as a result of the balanced, systematic work of the education authorities, the number of preschool educational institutions with the Ukrainian language has increased to 844 and accounts for 74.5% of the total number of general education institutions increased to 750, which is 69.4% of the total number. At the same time, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the number of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction has not increased, and in many districts there are no such educational institutions."[517] And even though the letter mentions an increase in numbers of Ukrainian educational institutions in the Donetsk Oblast, their number is still below the country average, while there is no development regarding Ukrainian schooling in Crimea at all. Additionally, while overall in Ukraine there were 82.3% of students getting an education in Ukrainian according to the data of a survey conducted in 2011[518], there weres only 48.5% in Luhansk Oblast, 46.7% in Donbas, 8.1% in Crimea and 2.9% in Sevastopol.[519] Regardless of the governmental efforts to improve the situation concerning the usage of Ukrainian language in Ukraine, it seems that not all regions were Ukrainising at the same pace. Unfortunately, the derussification process was harder for certain Eastern and Southern regions due to the bigger number of minorities and Russian-speaking Ukrainians residing there.

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[517] Ibid.

[518] The survey was conducted by "Research & Branding Group" which later was accused in biased cooperation with Yanukovitsch and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. The website with this data is not working anymore, therefore it is possible to cite only some media describing the results. Additionally, this sociological firm is doubtful, but it seems to be the only available data of this kind, and the general number which is mentioned in the governmental report correlates to the one presented by this firm. I make conclusion that the government was using the data from the same survey, therefore, I use it here as well.

[519] 'Monitorynh stanu ukrayins'koyi movy'.

Russification and its influence on identity

First, it is important to acknowledge a deformed understanding of identity that Ukrainians inherited from the USSR. Krasivskyy and Pidberezhnyk argue that the Soviet strategies to create a homogeneous Soviet identity which was based on the erasure of ethnic identities and assimilation led to the corruption of people's understanding of identity and loss of cultural and linguistic peculiarities of the Ukrainian identity specifically.[520] Additionally, the authors comment that: "Unfortunately, during the years of Ukraine's independence, the policy of levelling the main national integrating and identification features, in particular, Ukrainian national values, cultural features, the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language, and falsifying the history of Ukraine, continued by pro-Russian political and business circles. As a result, it led to the deepening of the spiritual crisis of Ukrainian society, the crisis of linguistic and cultural identity, predominance of regional identities over national, uncompleted formation of the Ukrainian civil nation; ignoring of Ukrainian national interests and national values, loss of values and regulatory guide marks; dominance of the Russian language in key areas of socio-political life of Ukraine; political speculation over language issues; growth of annexationist and separatist sentiments among the population of the Eastern regions of Ukraine, inspired by the Russian Federation; occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and Russian aggression against Ukraine in Donbas."[521]

Interestingly, in the quote above, the competition between national and regional identities is mentioned. However, apart from the mentioned two, it is also important to add the Soviet identity to the equation as often these three types of identities were competing. The peculiarity of the Soviet identity in independent Ukraine is that while the "being a Soviet person" identification transformed in Russia to "being a Russian", in Ukraine the "being a Soviet person" didn't transform either fully to "being a Ukrainian" or to "being a Russian".[522] Therefore, the assumption is that this category could partially drift to one or another national identity, as well as just freeze in its form of Soviet identification.

In practice, this assumption is represented in sociological research and surveying of people from certain regions. Stepyko describes in one of such surveys, that people from Donetsk and Lviv were asked to choose their national identity out of three possible options: Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet. As a result, in 1994, the Soviet identity in Donetsk prevailed over the Russian and Ukrainian identities (45.4%, 22.9%, and 25.9% respectively). Meanwhile, in Lviv, the Ukrainian identity was chosen by 78.5% of respondents, the Russian identity by 8.3%, and the Soviet identity by 4.9.[523]

The surveys in dynamics show that the number of people self-identifying with Ukraine, rather than with Russia or the Soviet Union steadily grew over the years of independence. In 2006-2007, according

[520] Krasivskyy and Pidberezhnyk, 'Cultural Security of Ukraine'., p.475
[521] Krasivskyy and Pidberezhnyk., p.475
[522] Stepyko, *Українська ідентичність*., C.332
[523] Stepyko., C.180

to a study conducted by the Razumkov Centre, the Ukrainian cultural tradition was chosen by 56.3% of respondents, the Soviet by 16,4%, the Russian by 11.3%, the pan-European by 6.6%, and 7.9% of respondents did not answer.[524] Already in 2010, when asked about identification, in Ukraine 70% in total answered that they self-identify as citizens of Ukraine, and 64,1% as Ukrainians. Interestingly, when having a choice between the types of identification (national, political, social, and religious), 74.4% of the residents in central Ukraine identified as Ukrainians, 84.5% in the West and 69.7% in the South as citizens of Ukraine, while 49.8% in the East identify as residents of their city. These numbers demonstrate that the identity in the East started transforming into a regional one, which can explain the successful influence of Russian propaganda and its misuse of the topic of the "Donbas people".[525]

After the Revolution of Dignity and the occupation of Crimea and Donbas by Russia, the sociological surveys about identity and language became even more important. Soviet identity stayed strong for a while in society before it got transformed. According to the 2014 Social Change Monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 13.9% of the population of Donbas consider themselves citizens of the USSR (the corresponding national figure is 5.5%).[526] The events of 2013-2014 influenced the Ukrainian identity of the population in general positively. The Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine regularly measures the dynamic of the Ukrainian identity (see Appendix 11) and states that in 2014 64.4% of the population self-identified as Ukrainian citizens. In the following years, this number was fluctuating between 56.9% and 62.6% in the period of 2015-2021. The highest consolidation of society happened after the full-scale invasion: in July 2022 84.6% of the population identified as Ukrainian citizens, and till December 2022 this number slightly fell to 79.0%. Simultaneously, the identification with the USSR constantly reduced: in 2021 2.8% of the population self-identified themselves as citizens of the ex-USSR, and in 2022 there were already 1.4% of such people. The self-identification as a resident of a certain region or town/village also reduced: 5.6% identified themselves with their region in 2021 and 1.7% in 2022, while 20.8% identified themselves with a town/village in 2021 and 7.9% did so in 2022.[527] The numbers show that more and more people identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine, while the identity of the "Soviet person" disappears step by step as a phenomenon in Ukraine. Sociologists believe that these numbers can serve as an indicator of the formation of a Ukrainian political nation and that its identity has not only stabilised but is positively developing.

[524] Kryvdyk, 'Identychnist′ radyans′koho natsionalista v suchasniy Ukrayini'.
[525] 'Bil′shist′ zhyteliv Ukrayiny identyfikuyut′ sebe yak ukrayintsiv'.
[526] Degterenko, 'Zahal′nonatsional′na Ta Rehional′na Identychnist′ Hromadyan Ukrayiny u Zv″yazku z Podiyamy Na Donbasi v 2014–2016 Rokakh».'
[527] Dembits′kyy, 'Sotsiolohichnyy monitorynh «Ukrayins′ke suspil′stvo» HROMADS′KA DUMKA V UKRAYINI PISLYA 10 MISYATSIV VIYNY'.

Conclusion

The interconnection of displacement and assimilation is a complex phenomenon which can be studied from various angles and within numerous contexts. This thesis provided an analysis of the mobility and russification of the Ukrainians within the period of the Soviet Union and the post-1991 era. The research was conducted within the framework of four main contexts that, in my perspective, play vital roles in the assimilation process: language, education, religion, and identity.

Foremost, this study provided a detailed description of the various forced and voluntary-compulsory migrations of Ukrainians during the different decades of the 20th century. Mobility in the USSR was mainly controlled by the central government and implemented in an organised way. In the scope of forced migration, deportation is one of the most common types of mobilities which was identified in the Soviet period. The deportations of Ukrainians were executed for various reasons, such as dekurkulisation, frontier zone repopulation, non-reliable people's resettlement, alleged cooperation or membership in the nationalist anti-Soviet groups, alleged collaboration with the Nazi occupation regime during World War II, punishment of dissidents and freedom fighters' groups, general political prosecution, etc. Russification and sovietisation implications targeted at deportees and their families, in particular children, were identified. After the analyses of various governmental orders and reports it was possible to detect a specific interest of the Soviet regime to influence the young generation. It was frequently implied that minors could be shaped and nurtured into becoming true Soviet citizens. Additionally, the absence of the Ukrainian language in social interactions, coupled with the proximity of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and cultures, frequently forced Ukrainian deportees to assimilate into the multinational surroundings where the Russian language served as a lingua franca.

Consequently, Ukrainian migrants often faced a choice between two primary strategies: preserving the Ukrainian language and culture within small underground communities or embracing the processes of russification and sovietisation in order to secure survival and offer their descendants a path to social upward mobility.

Regarding the post-1991 period, Russian-Ukrainian relations developed from being positively neutral to being hostile. Consequently, the strategies applied by the Russian Federation varied throughout the years. Initially, the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia was able to establish grassroots organisations and initiatives, whose role was to offer Ukrainians a space to practice their Ukrainian identity. Even though the institutionalised support from the side of the Russian government was extremely low, for instance, there were no schools with the Ukrainian language of instruction for the two-million diaspora, at least there were few limitations in people's initiatives in the early 2000s. Starting in 2007, Russian policies towards Ukrainians changed and became more aggressive. Ukrainian non-governmental organisations

and institutions were closed or prosecuted, and other "convenient" initiatives were created by pro-Russian representatives within the Ukrainian community. As a result, during the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, there was almost no protesting reaction from the large Ukrainian minority in the territory of Russia.

More importantly, the war triggered a surge in forced mobility among Ukrainians, including migration towards the Russian Federation. Estimates suggest that more than 1.5 million Ukrainians arrived in Russia after 2014, although numbers may vary. It is important to note that any mobility in times of military conflicts can be perceived as implemented under coercion. However, a particular emphasis should be directed to the cases of filtration, prosecutions, and deportations. The most concerning instances within such mobilities involve the deportation of Ukrainian children, an issue reported not only by Ukrainian and international institutions and organisations but also publicly acknowledged and proudly demonstrated by the Russian government.

Regarding assimilation and russification in the post-1991 period, the various examples and outcomes were discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. The exploration of Ukrainian experiences and Russian initiatives and programmes was organised within the previously established framework, specifically focusing on the contexts of language, education, religion, and identity. For instance, same as in the USSR, a special focus is dedicated to the re-education programmes and other formats of the influence of the young generation. As a result, different subjects in schools are reformed to support the Russian ideology, the usage of the Ukrainian language is either forbidden fully or limited to its possible minimum, various extracurricular activities are implemented to support children's "mental integration" into the Russian society, non-governmental organisations are funded by the government to implement diverse initiatives of religious and ideological nature, etc. During this analysis, observed the similarities between these practices and those employed in the Soviet Union are observed, indicating a continuity in the Russian assimilation of Ukrainians.

Additionally, in a separate section, I conducted an overview of the development and outcomes of russification policies in Ukraine. Even though Ukraine has been an independent state for the last thirty-two years, the indirect Russian influence on its politics can still be observed. For instance, regardless of the implemented Ukrainisation supported by the various legislations, slow results were provided, especially in the heavily russified regions, such as Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Moreover, this study applied a retrospective look at the evolution of national and linguistic self-identification to reveal its firm integration within the Ukrainian society, which in my opinion, can serve as an argument for a successful outcome of the russification implications. A deeper analysis of this aspect should be conducted, and its results should be taken into account for future policy development.

Regarding other limitations, it is important to highlight the importance to contextualise the nexus of voluntary migration of Ukrainians and russification in more detail. It is possible that the assimilation

of this category of people is different in its core and nature. As an additional approach, the connection between mobility and assimilation of Ukrainians can be compared in different social contexts in different countries, exploring how non-coercive russification differs from assimilation to the main cultural trains of countries in Europe and North America, which is a home of large Ukrainian communities that migrated there in different periods since the late nineteenth century.

A separate focus could be devoted to the implementation of the "Soviet person" identity and its further development and transformation in Ukraine in general and in deeply russified Ukrainian regions in particular. I anticipate that the russification of this particular group of people was especially rapid, and it serves in the future as a base for further Russian propaganda spread in Ukrainian regions. Furthermore, the contexts of russification implemented by the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation can be enlarged and analysed from other angles, such as political influence, scientific development, militarisation implications, etc. Experiences of different social groups can also be included, for instance, peculiarities of the experience of females, elderlies, religious and ethnic minorities, and so on.

Another need for research comes from the observation of the lack of studies on Ukrainian ethnic minorities residing in the borderlands of Russia and Ukraine. This type of people builds a group which is not commonly included in research on diaspora, and neither are they migrants to be included in migration studies. However, same as in the context of the Russian occupation, people residing in the bordering regions were Ukrainians who moved into the Russian legal and political system in the period of the establishment of the borders between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR without actively migrating themselves. I anticipate that the assimilation strategies applied towards these people are potentially similar to those applied towards people living in Ukrainian regions under Russian occupation nowadays.

Nevertheless, the multitude of potential further research directions highlights the extreme interest of the question of the connections between displacement and assimilation in Ukrainian history – a question that requires particular attention, especially given the current developments in the Russian-Ukrainian relations.

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Appendix

Appendix 1

Punishment sign "Я сегодня говорил по Латышски" ("I spoke Latvian today"). A board of shame for schoolchildren, late nineteenth century. From the exhibition of the Latvian National History Museum.[528]

[528] Shurkhalo, 'Istoriya movnykh konfliktiv. Nemaye natsional′noyi derzhavy, de ne bulo b svoho «obruseniya» – Mykhaylo Drahomanov'.

Appendix 2

Forced migration to the territory of Ukraine in the USSR

The main data are taken from Supplement 1 "Repressive forced migrations in the USSR" in the book of Pavel Polian (2004) Against Their Will. Separately cited data are added manually from the text of his book.

Year	Month	Day	Target group	Total (thousands persons)	Region of departure	Destination (to Ukrine)
1920	04	17	The Terek Cossacks	45	8 stanitsa settlements along the Terek river	Ukraine, the north of the European part of USSR
1931			Central Asia	6 (families) https://rg.ru/2014/06/11/romodanovskij.html	Central Asia	southern Ukraine and the North Caucasus
1933			resettlement campaign	16 (families)[529]	Ukraine	Ukraine
1933 - 1937			All-Union and NKVD Resettlement	221,5[530]	No data	Ukraine
1935	02-03		Poles and Germans (predominantly) from the Kiev and Vinnitsa Obl.	412	The Kiev and Vinnitsa Obl. Ukrainian SSR, frontier zone	Eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR

[529] Polian, *Against Their Will*., p.88

[530] Polian., p.89

1942	05-07		Kalmyks	26	Northern and eastern regions	The European part of the RSFSR (the Saratov,Voronezh Obls., Krasnodar Kray), the Ukrainian SSR

Appendix 3

Forced migration from the territory of Ukraine in the USSR

The main data are taken from Supplement 1 "Repressive forced migrations in the USSR" in the book of Pavel Polian (2004) Against Their Will. Separately cited data are added manually from the text of his book.

Year	Month	Day	Target group	Total (thousands persons)	Region of departure (from Ukraine)	Destination
1930			Socially dangerous elements from frontier zones of the UkSSR and BSSR	18	22 km zone along the western border of the USSR	West Siberia, and the Far East
1930	02-04		1st and 2nd-category kulaks	472	The blanket collectivisation regions	The North Kray, the Urals,West Siberia
1930	03-04; 08-10		3rd-category kulaks	250	Nizhny Novgorod Kray, Low Volga Kray, Central Volga Kray, North Caucasus Kray, Far East Kray, the Central-Chernozem Oblast, the West Obl. and other regions	Within the regions of previous residence
1930	05-12		1st and 2nd-category kulaks	30	The blanket collectivisation regions	Siberia, Qazaqstan The Stavropol and Salsk districts of

						North Caucasus Kray
1931	01-02		1st and 2nd-category kulaks	45	Kuban maritime, and forest and mountain regions	Siberia, Qazaqstan The Stavropol and Salsk districts of North Caucasus Kray
1931	03-04; 05-09		1st and 2nd-category kulaks	1,230	Ukraine, the North Caucasus and other blanket collectivisation regions	The Urals, the North Kray, Siberia, Qazaqstan
1935	02-03		Poles and Germans (predominantly) from the Kiev and Vinnitsa Obl.	412	The Kiev and Vinnitsa Obl. Ukrainian SSR, frontier zone	Eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR
1936	02		resettlers from Ukraine	10,6 (families planned)[531]	Ukraine	Republic of Qazaqstan, The economic objectives that were pursued by this project included the expansion of areas used for sugar-beet harvesting, and the development of the

[531] Polian., p.96

						sugar industry and tobacco-growing.
1936	05		Poles and Germans	45	Frontier zones of the Ukrainian SSR	The Karaganda and other Obl. of the Qazaq SSR
1937	08		Germans	53	Crimean ASSR	Ordzhonikidze Kray and the Rostov Obl.
1937	09-10	25.09–10.10	Germans	110	The Zaporozhye, Stalino,Voroshilovgrad Obls.	The Qazaq SSR, Astrakhan Obl.
1940	02	10	Poles	Around 140	Western parts of the UkSSR and BSSR	North of the European part of the USSR, the Urals, Siberia
1940	04	09, 13	Poles	61	Western parts of the UkSSR and BSSR	The Qazaq SSR, part of the Uzbek SSR
1940	06	29	Refugees from Poland	75	Western parts of the UkSSR and BSSR	North of the European part of the USSR, the Urals, Siberia
1941	05	22	Counter-revolutionaries and nationalists	11	Western Ukraine	The South-Qazaqstan Obl., Krasnoyarsk

						Kray, the Omsk and Novosibirsk Obl.
1941	06	12-13	Counter-revolutionaries and nationalists	30	The Moldavian SSR, Ismail and Chernovtsy Obl.	The Qazaq SSR, Komi ASSR, Krasnoyarsk Kray, the Omsk and Novosibirsk Obls.
1941	03		Germans	No data	The Kharkov, Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kalinin Obls.	No data
1941	04		Greeks, Romanians and others	No data	The Crimea, North Caucasus Krasnodar Kray	No data
1942	01	28-29	Italians	No data	The Kerch Peninsula, Crimea, Mariupol (presumably)	The Qazaq SSR Akmolinsk Obl.
1942	05-06		Crimea's peoples (Greeks, Bulgarians,	42	The Crimean ASSR	The Uzbek SSR
1942	07	27	Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks	Around 4	The Crimea	The Uzbek SSR
1942	08-09		Poles	Around 30	Urals, Siberia, the Qazaq SSR	The Ukrainian SSR, the European part of the RSFSR
1944	05	18	The Crimean Tatars	182	The Crimean ASSR	The Uzbek SSR

1944	06		Greek, "Dashnak" Armenians	58	The Black Sea coast region	The Qazaq SSR (the South-Qazaqstan and Dzhambul Obls.)
1944	09-10		reconstruction of the Crimean health resorts	17[532]	Ukraine	Crimea
1944	10		OUN members	100	Western Ukraine	No data
1947	08		Families of convicted and killed OUN members	No data	Western Ukraine	
1947	09		OUN members	75	Western Ukraine	
1951	10		Kulaks	35 (Western Ukraine and Western Belarus (5,588 persons))	The Baltic republics, Moldavia,Western Ukraine,Western Belarus	Krasnoyarsk Kray, the Yakut ASSR,Tyumen Obl., Qazaq SSR

[532] Polian., p.162

Appendix 4

The dynamics of the amount of the special settlers in the USSR 1939-1953 according to the Letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR S.N.Kruglov to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers G.M.Malenkov with a proposal to consider the cancellation of special settlements forever, reduction of special settlements and measures to streamline the supervisory work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies in the settlements. July 1953 // State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. P-9479. Op. 1. Д. 611. Л. 6-13. Copy.[533]

Year	Amount of people
1939	938 552
1940	997 513
1941	997 110
1942	1 682 659
1943	No data
1944	1 938 539
1945	2 094 562
1946	2 264 749
1947	2 280 542
1948	2 243 989
1949	2 309 898
1950	2 660 040
1951	2 683 046
1952	2 797 678
1953	2 819 776

[533] Pis'mo ministra vnutrennikh del SSSR S.N.Kruglova predsedatelyu Soveta Ministrov SSSR G.M.Malenkovu s predlozheniyem rassmotret' vopros ob otmene spetsposeleniya navechno, sokrashchenii spetsposeleniy i o merakh po uporyadocheniyu nadzornoy raboty organov MVD v mestakh poseleniy. Iyul' 1953 g. // GA RF. F. P-9479. Op. 1. D. 611. L. 6-13. Kopiya.

Appendix 5

The posters representing the friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

Appendix 6

The table is based on the all-Russian censuses of 2002, 2010 and 2020 in the Russian Federation. The data of 2020 is presented together with the occupied Crimea.

	2002[534]	**2010**[535]	**2020**[536]
Ukrainians in Russia	2,942,961	1,927,988	884,007 (including 145,852 Ukrainians in occupied Crimea)
% of Total Russian population	2%	1.34%	0.6%
People who know Ukrainian	1,815,210	1,129,838	627,106 (208,854 using it in everyday life)
Ukrainians who know Ukrainian	1,267,207	669,246	277,014
Russians who know Ukrainian	483,715	412,668	307,122
People who chose Ukrainian as a native language	-	499,466	294,952
Ukrainians who chose Ukrainian as a native language	-	466,548	254,528
Russians who chose Ukrainian as a native language	-	23,714	27,338
Median age	45,9 years	52,5 years	56,9 years

534 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2002 goda'.
535 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2010 goda'.
536 'Vserossiyskaya perepis' naseleniya 2020 goda'.

Appendix 7

Category	**1926**[537]	**1939**[538]	**1959**[539]	**1970**[540]	**1979**[541]	**1989**[542]
Total population in the USSR	147,027,915	170,557,093	208,826,650	241,720,134	262,084,654	285,742,511
Ukrainians in the USSR	31,194,976	28,111,007	37,252,930	40,753,246	42,347,387	44,186,006
Ratio	21.2%	16.4%	17.8%	16.8%	16.2%	15.5%
Total population in the Ukrainian SSR	29,018,187	30,946,218	41,869,046	47,126,517	49,609,333	51,452,034
Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR	23,218,860	23,667,509	32,158,493	35,283,857	36,488,951	37,419,053
Ratio	80.2%	76,5%	76.8%	74.9%	73.5%	72.7%
Russians in the Ukrainians SSR	2,677,166	4,175,299	7,090,813	9,126,331	10,471,602	11,355,582
Ratio	9.2%	13.5%	16.9%	19.3%	21.1%	22.1%
Ukrainians in the RSFSR	7,873,000	3,359,184	3,359,083	3,345,885	3,657,647	4,362,872

[537] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda'.
[538] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1939 goda.'
[539] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1959 goda.'
[540] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1970 goda.'
[541] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1979 goda.'
[542] 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989 goda.'

Appendix 8

The data of the 2010 is calculated by Zavialov in his article "The Ukrainian Language Role in the Construction of Ukrainians' Ethnic Identity in Russia".[543] While the data of the 2020 is calculated by me based on the data of the all-Russian Census 2020.

The absolute numbers:

Name of the region	**2010**	**2020**
Moscow	106,033	41,955
Moscow region	82,386	33,905
St. Petersburg	49,667	21,844

The regions with the highest ration comparing with the general population:

Name of the region	**2010**	**2020**
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	5.72%	1.83%
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	4.56%	1.80%
Magadan region	4.23%	1.38%
Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug	3.70%	1.11%
Murmansk region	3.52%	1.49%

The ratio of the Ukrainians speaking the Ukrainian language:

Name of the region	**2010 ratio**	**2020 ratio**
Dagestan	59.10%	(unknown)
Vladimir region	57.15%	32.59%
Murmansk region	49.47%	36.29%
Vologda region	49.04%	40.61%

[543] Zavialov in his article "The Ukrainian Language Role in the Construction of Ukrainians' Ethnic Identity in Russia", p.110-111

Omsk Oblast	14.42%	11.26%
Orenburg Oblast	15.86%	13.62%
Voronezh Oblast	17.47%	24.65%
Altai Krai	17.54%	11.55%

Appendix 9

Distribution of the adult population of Ukraine in 2003 by linguistic and ethnic groups by region (Khmelko based on KIIS). The regions are grouped in the following way: Western: Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions; West-Central: Khmelnytsky, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv regions and the city of Kyiv; East-Central: Dnipro, Poltava, Sumy and Chernihiv regions. South: Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea with Sevastopol; Eastern: Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[544]

Choice of the language	**Western region**	**West-Central region**	**East-Central region**	**Southern region**	**Eastern region**	**Adult population together**
Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians	91.7	59.3	30.8	5.3	3.6	38.5
Surzhyk speaking Ukrainians	1.5	13.0	20.6	11.3	8.3	10.7
Russian speaking Ukrainians	1.3	17.2	33.5	40.0	48.6	28.0
Russian speaking Russians	1.5	5.8	11.1	31.1	34.1	16.9
Others	4.0	4.7	2.0	12.2	5.4	6.0

[544] Melnyk, *Etnichne ta movne rozmayittya Ukrayiny: analitychnyy ohlyad sytuatsiyi*., p.68

Appendix 10

Language by the regions in 2002-2005. In the table the regions are grouped in this way: Western region - Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi; Central region - the cities of. Kyiv, Kyiv region, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytsky and Cherkasy; North-eastern - Zhytomyr region, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky and Chernihiv; South-eastern region - Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv; Donbas - Donetsk and Luhansk; Southern region - Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.[545]

Language preference	**Western region**	**Central region**	**North-Eastern region**	**South-Eastern region**	**Donbas**	**Southern region**
Only Ukrainian	87.3	45.1	62.3	13.1	2.4	20.5
Only Russian	3.4	31.3	9.8	44.5	79.6	40.7
Another language	1.9	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.1
Ukrainian or Russian depending on the situation	7.4	23.2	27.8	42.8	17.3	38.3

[545] Melnyk., p.72

Appendix 11

Presentation: Sociological Monitoring "Ukrainian Society" Thunderous Thought in Ukraine after 10 Months of War. The research toolkit was developed by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The data collection commissioned by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 2022 was carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.[546]

[546] Dembits′kyy, ‘Sotsiolohichnyy monitorynh «Ukrayins′ke suspil′stvo» HROMADS′KA DUMKA V UKRAYINI PISLYA 10 MISYATSIV VIYNY’.