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NATO AND TURKEY RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

The United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union battled together against Germany during the Second World War. These states during the Second World War started to design the post war world. After the triumph against Germany and with the finish of the Second World War the collaboration among the Allies finished. European states were enormously harmed in the Second World War and after the conflict the United States of America and the Soviet Union were superpower on the planet. The Soviet Union exploiting nonappearance of an ability to stop him in Europe laid out socialist systems in Eastern Europe nations that were involved by him during the conflict. In this way the Soviet Union held onto a significant piece of Europe. Even with danger presented by the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Western Europe states had to make a move. These states first and foremost carried out Marshall Plan for getting sorted out financial life. Later NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was laid out to arrange military force. The period after the Second World War rivalry and battle between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, was known as the Cold War. The Cold War was not restricted to Europe. It spread from one side of the planet to the other. Subsequently Turkey was affected by new world request. The requests of the USSR worried Turkey. Turkey tried to near with West especially the United States of America to ensure his safety. Turkey was pleased with emergence of NATO. Turkey showed intensive effort to become a member of NATO. Turkey initially benefited from the Truman Doctrine later was included in the Marshall Plan. Turkey sent troops to participate in the Korean War for becoming a member of NATO and eventually became a member of NATO. Despite the joint movements in the field of military alliance cooperation and foreign policy, there have been arisen on tension and crises from at times in relations.

Tensions escalated with Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. The US imposed embargo on Turkey because of this and so that the first fracture has occurred between the Alliance. After the removal of the embargo, relations between Turkey and NATO has been fixed but the

questions about NATO's membership has raised for Turkey. In the early long periods of the decision Justice and Development Party that came into power in 2002, it grew great relations with Western establishments through a Western-situated international strategy understanding. Showing dynamic investment on mediation in Afghanistan after the September 11 assaults, Turkey plays reinforced its part inside the partnership, acting along with NATO in this unique situation.

In the second term of the Justice and Development Party, the Western insight has started to change and international strategy discusses have started about moving pivot. In this specific situation, Rasmussen's designation to NATO's General Secretary prompted another emergency in relations. Turkey and NATO have encountered many emergencies as of late under the Middle East turns of events. Turkey's strategy through the playmaker state and driving country in the Middle East district have set off strains around here. Also, these advancements have prompted the scrutinizing of center Easternization and Western insights. Inside this system, the s-400 rocket intended to be bought from Russia raised pressures in relations and the inquiries regarding NATO have been expanded. Emergencies and clashes among NATO and Turkey has expanded by scrutinizing the coalition's future since Trump's Management came into power in the USA. The new improvements have been impeding to the partnership and thump trust relations out. In this review, emergencies experienced with the NATO union were assessed inside the structure of coalition connections and the most common way of settling these emergencies was analyzed. Furthermore, the emergency and collaboration influence among NATO and Turkey's relations has been addressed.

Key Words: NATO, AKP, FOREIGN POLICY, USSR, USA

1-THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AFTER WWII AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the most significant organizations which providing world security has been founded since 1949. However, today's NATO is a very different organization than when it was founded.¹ But to understand NATO and its reasons for its establishment, it is necessary to understand the Cold War. In order to understand the Cold War, it is necessary to examine the Second World War and to know what the great powers thought for the new world order at the end of the war. After the second world war, a very different world emerged. When the war ended, it was thought that a peaceful world order would be established in which peace and security would prevail. But the events that developed in parallel with the conditions of the period, it dragged the world into a new and completely different struggle, which we called the "Cold War".² The two superpowers that emerged at the end of the war, the USA and the USSR, became the two actors of this new world. On the other hand, with the end of the war in Asia and Europe, great gaps occurred in the balance of power in these continents. In the Second World War, both the victorious countries such as England and France and the defeated countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan emerged from the war largely worn out and damaged.³ In short, apart from the two superpowers, the rest of the world was dealing with serious problems both economically and socially. The destruction of the war was very high; infrastructures collapsed, cities-factories were destroyed, countries were stuck under the pressure of domestic and foreign debt. Therefore, a situation arose in need of these two superpowers to solve these problems.⁴

Socialism began to be a prominent ideology in the world. The USSR was leading this ideology to the world with its values of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, equality, fraternity, and independence. The USSR, besides being active in exporting the socialist system to the world, it also attempted to invade some countries.⁵ Due to these serious security concerns created by the USSR, the two great powers of Europe, England, and France, signed The Treaty

¹ Nejat Doğan, "NATO'nun Örgütsel Değişimi, 1946-1999:Kuzey Atlantik İttifakından Avrupa Atlantik Güvenlik Örgütü," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 60, no. 03 (March 1, 2005): 69–108, https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000001431.

² Türkkaya Ataöv, "Marshall Planından Nato'nun Kuruluşuna KADAR 'Soğuk Harb,'" *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 23, no. 03 (March 1, 1968), https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000001010.

³ Rifat Uçarol, *Siyasi tarih (1789-1999)*, vol. 5 (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1995).

⁴ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1989).

⁵ Fetullah Akin, "İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI SONRASI YENİDÜNYA DÜZENİ VE TÜRKİYE," *İş ve Hayat* 3, no. 5 (June 15, 2017): 119–35.

of Dunkirk in 1947 and took the first step in terms of alliance against "Soviet Russian Expansionism".⁶ However, it has been seen that even the alliances made by England, the greatest power of Europe, within Europe did not work against "Soviet Expansionism". The most important reason why the Soviet Union was so willing to expand after the Second World War was that there were no great powers in Europe to prevent it. It tried to expand towards the Middle East through Turkey, Greece, and Iran, and also increased its influence in Asia by taking advantage of Japan's absence as a major power after the war. Moreover, the new world order in Stalin's mind was strengthened by communist ideology. That is why, Especially the years 1945-1948 are extremely important for "Soviet Expansionism" into Europe.⁷ Eastern and Central Europe, with the exception of Western Europe, was either directly or indirectly influenced by the Soviets. Therefore, the USA had to do something against the USSR for its future. One-sixteenth of the world's population lived in the United States, and the survival of the United States in the 20th century depended on its alliance with at least half of the world's population. Otherwise, all countries could turn to communism, and this would not only leave the USA alone in the world, but also communism would be a threat to this country. Thus, the USA had no choice to fight against the danger of communism and save the countries exposed to the occupation of the USSR, to help them and to ally with them against the USSR. The Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948) are known as the most important events for this general purpose. United States' aid to Europe within the scope of the Marshall Plan has served many purposes and has not remained only on the axis of defense.⁸ While Europe's security was ensured with the Plan, its economic development also progressed in a similar way. With the effect of security concerns and economic conditions, European states were able to gather around America more easily. Thus, in a war that might break out with the Soviet Union, it would start with European countries as the front line, so that USA would suffer less damage in this conventional war that would be in an area close to Soviet territory and away from US territory.⁹ After the Western countries made alliances against itself, the Soviet Union made some agreements with these countries to keep the countries under its control as a bloc and to tighten the relations between them. In during that period, one of the important communist parties of Europe came together in Silesia to speed up the communist activities in the world. In the final

⁶ NATO; *The First Five Years, 1949-1954*, First Edition, First Printing (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1956).

⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

⁸ Alper Alpaslan Eker, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952)" (Kırıkkale, Kırıkkale University, 2007).

⁹ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, 31st ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2020).

declaration of this meeting, the Cominform was established on 5 October 1947. With this declaration, the world was officially divided into two blocks.¹⁰

In February 1948, known as the "Prague coup," when the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took over the administration of the country with a military coup with the support of the Soviet Union. With this Coup the security concerns in Western Europe have peaked and it has made it necessary to take a step in the field of security.¹¹ Therefore, The foreign ministers of England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, who met in Brussels after this coup and signed the "Brussels Treaty" on 17th March.¹² According to the 4th article of this treaty, if one of the parties was attacked with an armed attack in Europe, the other party states would assist the attacked state with all their means, including military force. Within the scope of this article, parties of the Brussels Treaty established the alliance they named "Western Union Defense Organization" in September 1948.¹³ Moreover, The Berlin Blockade and the Vandenberg Decision had a great impact on the process leading to the alliance between the Parties of the Brussels Treaty and the USA.¹⁴ The Soviets did not leave the lands which they liberated from German occupation in the Second World War. It did not give the nations in the said lands the right to self-determination. on the contrary, it made them part of the socialist system, namely the USSR. And by cutting off all communications between West Berlin and West Germany, USSR wanted to intimidate the allies and get them to give up West Berlin. Although the West Berlin blockade lost its meaning as a result of the USA's creation of "Berlin Air Bridge", the crisis went as far as the recognition of the division in Berlin with the holding of municipal elections on both sides of Berlin. At the same time, the Prague coup and the Berlin blockade are two significant turning points in terms of changing the traditional isolated foreign policy of the USA. And with the adoption of the resolution draft prepared by Senator Vandenberg by the US Senate on June 11, 1948, the way for the US to sign an alliance treaty with the European states was opened.¹⁵ As a result, in 1949 April 4th, the USA, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, England, Italy, Iceland, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal met in Washington DC to sign the North Atlantic Treaty against security and military

¹⁰ Uçarol, *Siyasi tarih (1789-1999)*.

¹¹ Cüneyt Akalın, *Soğuk Savaş ABD ve Türkiye 1 Olaylar-Belgeler 1945-1952* (Kaynak Yayınları, 2003), <https://www.kaynak yayinlari.com/soguk-savas-abd-ve-turkiye-1-p362328.html>.

¹² "The Brussels Treaty," Text, CVCE.EU by UNI.LU (CVCE.EU by UNI.LU, March 17, 1948), https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_brussels_treaty_17_march_1948-en-3467de5e-9802-4b65-8076-778bc7d164d3.html.

¹³ Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*.

¹⁴ Sander.

¹⁵ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1995)*, 12th ed. (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2017).

dangers in this new world.¹⁶ The NATO Treaty, which has a different importance with each article, consists of the following articles:

“Article 1: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

¹⁶ Alan K. Henrikson, “THE CREATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, 1948-1952,” *Naval War College Review* 33, no. 3 (1980): 1948–52.

Article 6: For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- *on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;*
- *on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.*

Article 7: This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8: Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9: The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10: The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11: This Treaty shall be ratified, and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which

will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12: After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13: After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14: This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.”¹⁷

Although some articles have been revised in time with the increase and expansion of the number of members in NATO. However, the transformation of NATO into an international organization and the determination of an alliance strategy in defense were due to the Korean War. The war that started with North Korea's attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950, reinforced the belief in the Western bloc that the Soviets posed not only a political but also a military threat to world and European security. The Soviet Union could directly invade Europe or support the East German "police force" to attack West Germany, just as it incited North Korean troops against South Korea. Thus, the USSR could directly or indirectly destabilize Europe. With the perception of the Soviet threat in this way, the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York decided to establish a military force in Europe. By this way, Supreme Allied Command Europe was established, and Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and Allied Forces Headquarters Europe opened in France

¹⁷ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, April 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

on April 2nd, 1951. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty was turned into a military-political organization. When we look at the previous military alliances, it is seen that these are agreements made against a certain enemy for a certain period, it called classical alliances in diplomacy, without their own bureaucratic and military organization. However, for the first time, an alliance agreement with NATO was made into an international organization with its own army, headquarters, and personnel.

1.2) TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR: ATTEMPTS TO JOIN NATO

Before the start of the Second World War, the Republic of Turkey had not even healed the wounds of the First World War yet. The recovery of the First World War which seemed to be partially achieved was not yet fully reflected in the society. The Second World War emerged at this very stage and affected Turkey even more negatively. Although Turkey did not enter the war, even so, it was almost equally affected by all the negative developments reflected in the world.¹⁸ These negative conditions showed themselves in every part of society. The war years showed themselves not only as social and economic negativity but also as health problems. Diseases have increased in epidemics and drug supply has become a major problem.¹⁹ In short, until the end of the war, Turkey was exposed to negative economic and social developments like a warring country.

Although the between 1945-1950 was called the period of healing the wounds of the war in Turkey, but the post-war negativity was so advanced that it was not easy to heal these wounds.²⁰ On the other hand, while it was expected that world peace would be achieved after the Second World War, the fact that there was a rose of blocking between the countries. This situation

¹⁸ Murat Metinsoy, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye: savaş ve gündelik yaşam (Turkey during World War II: War and Everyday Life)* (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2007).

¹⁹ The Republic Archive (BCA), "The CHP group conveyed its views to the Ministry of Health about the increase in malaria in the places they roamed and the difficulty in supplying malaria medicine and diesel.," 198 (Ankara: Presidency of The Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives, September 16, 1943), The Republic Archive (BCA), <https://katalog.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Sayfalar/eSatis/BelgeGoster.aspx?ItemId=163049&Hash=39A13FD1E1BB2D0639037DA8F749280FDD0F9FB2DC16EE279A234AA7F3B3B2B6&Mi=0>.

²⁰ The Republic Archive (BCA), "Republican People's Party Ağrı Deputy, Ahmet Alpaslan's report on social, cultural and economic issues in the constituency." (Ankara: Presidency of The Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives, September 3, 1947), The Republic Archive (BCA), <https://katalog.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Sayfalar/eSatis/BelgeGoster.aspx?ItemId=140774&Hash=BBDA08CEF567442B83BF72C7492D1A62C2A99720B733F2B75CBF672281A0894D&Mi=0>.

Turkey had also worried like other countries.²¹ As a result of the political conflict that emerged during the war between the USA and the Soviet Union, a bipolar world system has emerged under the leadership of the USA with the western bloc and the eastern bloc consisting of socialist states under the leadership of the USSR.²² The political conflicts of these two superpowers, of course, deeply affected Turkey. Because of the fact that, Turkey's geopolitical position was very valuable, so it was controversial in many ways between these two superpowers. In particularly the Turkish Straits crises, the conflict of the interests of these two states had a profound effect on Turkey both in domestic and foreign policy.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov summoned the Turkish Ambassador of Moscow Selim Sarper to his office on March 19, 1945, and gave a note. In this note, Molotov emphasized that the Non-Aggression Pact between Turkey and the Soviet Union would end on November 7, 1945, the conditions after the war had changed, and conditions were not the same as before, but they were ready to negotiate again with the new conditions and changes. The Soviet Union declared that the cities of Kars and Ardahan should be abandoned from Turkey and that Turkey was weak to maintain freedom of passage through the Straits that is why the Soviet Union should be given base in the Straits for the joint defense of the Straits. Turkey rejected the aggravated demands of the USSR, thus returned to the period of USSR proposals in 1939. Moreover, it is known that the USSR was on the side that won the war, so it had the support of the Allies this time. Between the years 1945-1946, Turkey-USSR relations were based on a given "notes" each other.²³ This ongoing "period of notes" situation has led to difficulty to repair in their relationships. This situation forced Turkey to keep combat formation its army, to be able to resist intense Soviet pressures and demands from 1946 which was accepted as the beginning of the Cold War. Because Turkey could not enact important policies to improve its economic situation.²⁴ While Turkey was aiming to return to normal life at the end of the Second World War, to establish its own national industry, and to continue its economic, social, and cultural moves, it faced the heavy economic burden and the political pressures created by the USSR. However, in that current situation, it did not seem possible for Turkey to find a solution to these problems alone.²⁵

²¹ Nevin Balta, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası 1950-1980 (Turkey's Foreign Policy 1950-1980)* (Ankara: Lazer Yayınları, 2005).

²² Kissinger, *Diplomacy*.

²³ Anthony R. De Luca, "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits," *Political Science Quarterly* 92, no. 3 (1977): 503–24, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2148505>.

²⁴ Yusuf Sarıncay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakı'na Yönelişi ve NATO'ya Girişi (1939–1952) (Turkey's Orientation to the Western Alliance and Entry to NATO (1939–1952))*, 1st ed. (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988).

²⁵ Eker, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952)."

These pressures of the USSR on Turkey would contain another important transformation in Turkish foreign policy. In response to this attitude, Turkey would begin to approach the UK again. As it is known, Turkey Before World War II, developed relations with Western states. It was signed the Tripartite Alliance Treaty between Britain, France, and Turkey in October 1939 right at the beginning of the Second World War. All the same, it had been in constant contact with England throughout the war.²⁶ However, Turkey could not rely on this. Because during the war, Turkey remained neutral despite the clear predicates of this agreement. In the face of a possible Soviet invasion, France and England might not have come to the help of Turkey by arguing this. On the other hand, even if France and the UK wanted to come to help, they were not in a position to defend themselves and Turkey without the support of the USA at that time. For this reason, Turkey attempted to include the USA in the Triple Alliance agreement signed with England and France in 1939, but it was unsuccessful. It can be stated that England was one of the most important allies of Turkey from the beginning of the war until 1947. With the conclusion of the war, Britain continued its support to Turkey. In 1947, it declared to the United States that it could no longer support Greece and Turkey. Because of UK's policy, the USA had to take action against the expansion of the Soviet Union. In this case, it opened the way to the Truman Doctrine.²⁷ All in all, Turkey naturally turned its face to the other bloc, namely the Western bloc which was led by the USA, in the face of the threat of Soviet Russia which increased its violence after the world war. During that period, the goals of Turkey were to get aid by approaching the USA, to revise its army with the aid it received, to get rid of the political loneliness which was emerged after the second world war, and to enter the international organizations formed by the Western states.²⁸

After the Second World War, the penetration of the USSR into Eastern European countries, the failure to reach an agreement for Japan among the Allies,²⁹ the Prague Coup, the Berlin Depression, and the Vandenberg Decision were raised security concerns in Western Europe. These developments necessitated a step in the field of security.³⁰ On March 17, the foreign ministers of England, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, met in Brussels and

²⁶ De Luca, "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits."

²⁷ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964* (Sevinç Matbaası, 1979).

²⁸ Abbas Balci, "Demokrat Parti ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dönemlerinde Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Giriş Denemeleri ve Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi 1945-1960 (Turkey's Attempts to Entrance to NATO in the Republican Peoples Party and Democratic party's eras and Turkey's Entry to NATO 1945-1960)," *DergiPark Akademik* 13, no. 251–276 (2019): 26.

²⁹ Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*.

³⁰ Sarinay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakı'na Yönelişi ve NATO'ya Girişi (1939–1952)* (*Turkey's Orientation to the Western Alliance and Entry to NATO (1939–1952)*).

they have signed the "Brussels Treaty" against the increasing Soviet expansionism in Europe and possible Soviet aggression.^{31 32} This idea of collective self-defense excited the Turkish authorities and made attempts to join this treaty. Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, who met with the British Foreign Minister three times in 11 months, could not achieve any results in this regard. Turkey did not join this collective self-defense in Western Europe, but when Turkey received the news that this collective self-defense would expand effectively with the participation of the USA and Canada, it started its initiatives during the establishment of NATO to participate in the new collective self-defense to be established.³³

The CHP government was waiting for an invitation to the NATO Treaty to be signed in April 1949, but it could not receive it. Turkey claims that the reason why Turkey did not receive the invitation is due to the fact that the Pact only includes the states that have a coast on the Atlantic Ocean, rather than the fact that Turkey is ignored by the states that established the Pact, or that Turkey sees Turkey as a liability rather than gain.³⁴ The founding negotiations of the North Atlantic Pact focused on the North Atlantic region in general. Both the Western European states and the United States wanted to create a security pact for the Atlantic region and were striving for it.³⁵ Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak went to Washington at that time, and he met the American Foreign Minister Acheson. During these meetings, Sadak expressed that he respects the founding purpose of the Atlantic Pact and that he would not insist on wanting to be a member of this pact if it was established with the aim of a union that covers limited geography. later, he mentioned his uneasiness caused by the Soviets.³⁶

One of the main problems for Turkey and Greece during the negotiations was the definition of the geographical area. The Ankara Government asked the United States and England about Turkey's position in the security pact agreement. Their response created a new problem for Turkey. Because it was clearly stated that Turkey could not be included in the new agreement. However, they assured Turkey that a new security pact agreement would be signed for the

³¹ "The Brussels Treaty."

³² Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982).

³³ Ayşe Erkmen, "Türkiye'nin NATO Üyeliği ve Üyeliğin TBMM'de Kabulü (Turkey's NATO Membership and Acceptance of Membership in TGNA)," *Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, October 20, 2020, 1024–49, <https://doi.org/10.33437/ksusbd.653737>.

³⁴ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (Palgrave, 2000), <http://www.palgrave.com/products/Catalogue.aspx?is=0333918185>.

³⁵ Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Volume V" (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977:1647), <https://search.library.wisc.edu/digital/AF6GZRLK7OUTOM87>.

³⁶ Nuri Karatas, *Türk-Amerikan Siyasi İlişkileri (1939-1952) (Turkish-American Political Relations (1939-1952))* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2013).

Mediterranean Region.³⁷ But at the same time, Italy was negotiating with the United States about joining NATO.³⁸ Turkish politicians were disappointed with this policy of the United States. In contrast, the American Foreign Minister Acheson mentioned the US aid which given to Turkey in the face of Soviet Russia's demands on Turkey since 1946 and the establishment of the Atlantic Pact, Turkey's exclusion from the pact, did not change the fact that Turkey's independence and territorial integrity were considered important by the USA for the President and himself.³⁹ For the time being, it did not seem possible for the USA to give Turkey a security guarantee based on an official commitment because, as Acheson expressed, it was dependent on the cyclical developments in the world. Such a cyclical development did not occur until the beginning of the Korean War. thus, Acheson did not want to sign an agreement with Turkey. In fact, the U.S. Government wanted to say to Turkey that it is satisfied with what we have given. The main reason for them to act like this is that they have already knew that Turkey had no other choice to act with Europe and the USA. In this case, the representatives of the Turkish Government had returned from the United States without gaining anything.⁴⁰

March 1949, one month before the signing of the Alliance Agreement, the CHP government tried to emphasize that this pact was not just an alliance, The pact is a North Atlantic alliance, an Alliance in which countries that have coastlines on the Atlantic Ocean are accepted as members. According to Necmettin Sadak, it is almost impossible for Turkey to claim a bond with this geography. Thus, the reason why Turkey was not included in the Alliance is geography. On the other hand, the visit of some ships bound to the Mediterranean Fleet of the USA to the ports of Izmir and Istanbul in March 1950 gave hope to Turkey again, but ultimately, according to the CHP government, "geography" is declared as the culprit for Turkey's not being accepted into the Alliance. "Geography" was blamed for a short time in Turkey's failure to enter the pact.⁴¹ The inclusion of Italy in the alliance is a turning point for this argument for Turkey. Italy's joining the alliance is a turning point for this argument that Turkey defends. Acceptance of Italy as a founding member of the Alliance, despite the promise to Turkey that Italy would not accept the alliance, refutes Turkey's argument that membership in the Alliance is limited to

³⁷ State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, (1949:164 8). The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Volume V."

³⁸ Henderson, *The Birth of NATO*.

³⁹ Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V" (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1978), United States Government Printing Office, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05>.

⁴⁰ Karataş, *Türk-Amerikan Siyasi İlişkileri (1939-1952) (Turkish-American Political Relations (1939-1952))*.

⁴¹ Balci, "Demokrat Parti ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dönemlerinde Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Giriş Denemeleri ve Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi 1945-1960 (Turkey's Attempts to Entrance to NATO in the Republican Peoples Party and Democratic party's eras and Turkey's Entry to NATO 1945-1960)."

countries that have coastlines on the Atlantic Ocean.⁴² this situation leads to serious criticism both in the Turkish government and the Turkish public opinion. Primarily the criticisms of Sadak and the Turkish public opinion were the inclusion of a country that is far from the region, such as Italy in this pact, which was created to protect the North Atlantic region. Rejecting Turkey due to its geographical location and including Italy in the pact, left the Turkish government in a difficult situation against the public and also caused uneasiness in the Turkish public opinion. Because in the current situation, Turkey was feeling the most deeply the threat of Soviet Russia among the European countries and the most vulnerable to the possibility of an attack on Soviet Russia, but Turkey believe that it has been abandoned and left out of the security plans of the Western states. Another concern in Turkey is the possibility that the USA would go even further after this policy, and it would cut aid by abandoning its policy of protecting Turkey which it implemented after 1946.⁴³

Despite the disappointment of not receiving an invitation, Turkey continued its efforts to become a member of NATO. It made its first application to NATO in May 1950. However, this application made by the Turkish government just before the meeting of the US, British and French Foreign Ministers did not yield any results. and as a result, this application was not accepted by the NATO Council of Ministers, especially the UK.⁴⁴ Thereupon, Turkey changed its policy regarding a new agreement and continued its work in the perspective of the Mediterranean Pact idea which was promised by the United States. Therefore, the Ankara Government's strategy this time was trying to establish the Mediterranean defense system by signing an agreement with Italy, a powerful NATO member state in the Mediterranean, and thus to draw the attention of Western countries to the Mediterranean area. For this purpose, Turkey-Italy signed” the Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement” on March 24, 1950.⁴⁵ Shortly before the signing of this agreement, Sadak reiterated the necessity of a Mediterranean Alliance that would bring the USA, France, England, and Turkey together.

Before leaving for London and Paris to attend the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) meeting, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak made a statement that if Turkey cannot join the Atlantic Treaty which was established to defend a certain geographical

⁴² Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War*.

⁴³ Balci, “Demokrat Parti ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dönemlerinde Türkiye’nin NATO’ya Giriş Denemeleri ve Türkiye’nin NATO’ya girişi 1945-1960 (Turkey’s Attempts to Entrance to NATO in the Republican Peoples Party and Democratic party’s eras and Turkey’s Entry to NATO 1945-1960).”

⁴⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd ed. (London and Newyork: Routledge, 2012).

⁴⁵ “ITALY, TURKEY SIGN FRIENDSHIP TREATY,” *The New York Times*, March 25, 1950, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1950/03/25/archives/italy-turkey-sign-friendship-treaty.html>.

area, he expressed the idea of establishing a Mediterranean Pact covering Greece, Italy, France, and England. Later, Sadak held a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of England and France, and in his evaluation after the meeting, he stated that the peace in Europe cannot be maintained only on the European continent therefore, the possibilities of completing the Atlantic defense system with a different defense system to be established in the Mediterranean should be investigated. However, this attempt of Turkey was also not successful and could not attract the attention of the USA and England.⁴⁶ The reason was that the United States was reluctant to form a regional agreement involving itself and Britain. The United States was unsure about the enlargement of NATO's space. Because the inclusion of Turkey and Greece would require a revision of the North Atlantic Treaty, at least in geographical terms. On the other hand, the formation of a new similar regional agreement, such as NATO, for the Eastern Mediterranean region was an option however Turkey's involvement was less of a challenge than the establishment of an entirely new organization.⁴⁷ however, Turkey achieved in this period was USA's guarantee against any USSR attack.⁴⁸ This guarantee did not satisfy Turkey.⁴⁹

1.2.1) TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE TERMS OF NATO MEMBERS: DIFFERENTIATION OF USA-UK-EU IN TURKEY'S ACCESSION PROCESS TO NATO

There were many reasons why NATO member states did not accept Turkey at that time. Initially, there was no consensus among member states about Turkey's membership. The biggest reason is that the countries had a conflict of interests about Turkey. The only country that supported Turkey's application was Italy. Canada and Western European countries did not favor Turkey's membership.⁵⁰ Feridun Cemal Erkin, who served as Turkey's Ambassador to the United States in 1949, expressed the reasons why Turkey was excluded when NATO was established, as follows: “1. *The Greek Civil War*, 2. *The secret efforts of some European States to exclude us from both the Marshall Plan and the European Union.*, 3. *The difficulties that Britain made at the last minute, despite previous promises, considering the opposition in*

⁴⁶ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964*.

⁴⁷ State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950:1306, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V.”

⁴⁸ State.

⁴⁹ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Eisenhower's Right Flank,” July 1951, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/1951-07-01/eisenhowers-right-flank>.

⁵⁰ A. Haluk Ülman, “Nato ve Türkiye,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 22, no. 04 (April 1, 1967), https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000000903.

Europe.”⁵¹ Initially, according to the American perspective, the authorities of the United States of America, who led to the Western Bloc, understood that they had to ensure the countries that will part of this bloc to get rid of the bad effects of the Second World War as soon as possible and to strengthen them. Because the economic difficulty of the European states facilitated the Soviet Union's communist propaganda. Communist parties started to be effective, especially in France and Italy.⁵²The USA thinks that the only way to prevent European states from the influence of the Soviet Union was to provide financial and equipment assistance. These aid policies also included Turkey.⁵³ The most crucial aids are the Truman Doctrine from 1947 and the Marshall Plan from 1948.⁵⁴ The decision of the USA to help Turkey and Greece led to the reaction of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union argued that this American aid was a threat to world peace and brought the issue to the UN Security Council but did not get any results.⁵⁵ With the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, a new era has begun in Turkish foreign policy. The expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union especially on Eastern Anatolia and the Turkish Straits were prevented.⁵⁶

In the early stages of NATO, the USA did not insist on the inclusion of Turkey in the NATO alliance because the USA was not sure about the public reaction about the idea of expanding the pact to the Eastern Mediterranean and it stated that the American public would not agree to this.⁵⁷ But on the other hand, American officials are aware that even during the Second World War, Turkey offered a critical location to gather military intelligence and it was an ideal base for various military operations. For instance, in 1943 Turkey's refusal to open the use of airports to the allies, the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the intelligence organization of that period, which would later be renamed the CIA, turned the summer house of the American

⁵¹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *TÜRKİYE VE NATO*, Türk Atlantik Andlaşması Derneği Yayınları : No 1 (Ankara, n.d.).

⁵² Eker, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952).”

⁵³ Sarinay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakı'na Yönelişi ve NATO'ya Girişi (1939–1952) (Turkey's Orientation to the Western Alliance and Entry to NATO (1939–1952).*

⁵⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,” *The Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (1985): 807–25, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1888505>.

⁵⁵ Scott D Parrish and Mikhail M Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports,” *Woodrom Wilson International Center For Scholars, Cold War International History Project*, 9 (March 1994): 58.

⁵⁶ Eker, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952).”

⁵⁷ Ülman, “Nato ve Türkiye.”

Ambassador in Adana into a secret intelligence base.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the USA's conviction about the necessity of the bases in Turkey for the defense of the Western alliance was not formed at the time. Because the USA relies on the atomic bomb superiority.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the reports of the American General Staff emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey's bases in this period and stated that it would be of vital importance, especially in a potential war with the Soviets.⁶⁰ Despite the geographical advantages Turkey offers in terms of army and military, this strategic value was not seen as vital in those days. this strategic value was not seen as vital in those days and was handled from a limited framework.

Beginning from 1948, Washington which wanted to benefit from the strategic opportunities offered by Turkey's geographical location, started to look for ways to achieve this.⁶¹ But the American political elite did not agree on exactly where Turkey should be located. For example, according to McGhee, Turkey was part of the Middle East, but according to Admiral Forrest Sherman, Turkey was partly in the Middle East and partly in the Balkans. according to Eisenhower, the head of NATO Forces, Turkey had to be considered in the Mediterranean and Turkey requires it to be able to withstand Soviet aggression.⁶² on the other hand American Air Force strategists, they emphasized Turkey's position as tactical airspace, also they believed that they should obtain these benefits without any additional commitment. they accepted Anatolia not only as a bloc against the Soviet expansion and it valuable for its potential strategic capacity as a platform to support American bombardment.⁶³ For this reason, the American authorities have also been hesitant for a long time and have repeatedly postponed

⁵⁸ Robert Cossaboom and Gary Leiser, "Adana Station 1943-45: Prelude to the Post-War American Military Presence in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 1 (1998): 73–86.

⁵⁹ Selin M. Bölme, "Soğuk Savaş'ta NATO-ABD-Türkiye Üçgeninde Askeri Üsler: Süreklilik ve Değişim(Military Bases in NATO-US-Turkey Triangle during the Cold War: Change and Continuity)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 9, no. 34 (2012): 51–71.

⁶⁰ Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII" (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1969), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/pg_858.

⁶¹ Selin M. Bölme, "Soğuk Savaş'ta NATO-ABD-Türkiye Üçgeninde Askeri Üsler: Süreklilik ve Değişim," Selin M. Bölme, "Soğuk Savaş'ta NATO-ABD-Türkiye Üçgeninde Askeri Üsler: Süreklilik ve Değişim(Military Bases in NATO-US-Turkey Triangle during the Cold War: Change and Continuity) *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 9, no. 34 (2012): 51–71.

⁶² Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey - Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO*, 1st Edition (London: Routledge, 1999), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203044629>.

⁶³ Craig Livingston, "'One Thousand Wings': The United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947–50," *Middle Eastern Studies* 30, no. 4 (1994): 778–825, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209408701024>.

Turkey's NATO membership. Another reason for the hesitation in Turkey's membership was that the US was afraid of angering the Soviets with such an attempt.⁶⁴

Soviet Union's successful detonation of the first atomic bomb in August 1949, caused All the military plans of the United States up to that time to be ruined and they began to look for other strategies.⁶⁵ According to the report of Senator Harry Cain, who mentioned the importance of Turkey's strategic position in September 1950, prepared as a result of the examination made in 16 countries on the defense situation of Europe, read in the American Senate; "For Turkey and Greece to control the right flank of the Mediterranean, they have to be taken into NATO or a similar security system. Just like Turkey needs America, America needs Turkey too. In addition to the high moral values of the Turkish nation and Turkey's important geography, it has a military force of 22 divisions. None of our allies in the pact have these moral and material opportunities. That's why Turkey should join NATO or should establish direct military and political agreements with the United States. As a result of not establishing such an agreement, if Turkey decides to remain neutral, both the United States and its allies will be in a very difficult situation, in the potential attack on Iran or Suez by Soviet attack."⁶⁶ Thus, Senator Harry Cain talked about Turkey's military power and geostrategic position and stated that in a possible intervention by the United States and other NATO countries needed in the Middle East, an ally that dominates the region like Turkey.⁶⁷ The statement made by Senator Harry Cain had a great impact on the thoughts of blocking Turkey's NATO membership. Thus, the United States felt the need to expand and strengthen its security measures against the Soviet Union. This situation changed Turkey's position about NATO.⁶⁸ The Soviet possession of nuclear power posed a danger to NATO's southeast flank. NATO needed new bases geopolitically close to strategic points of Soviet Russia during a Soviet attack.⁶⁹ Because the vast majority of American strategic bombers were medium-range aircraft, it needed bases in lands closer to the Soviet Union, for example in North Africa, the Middle East, and especially in Turkey. As a result, one of the most important reasons for the change in the USA's opinion

⁶⁴ Bölme, "Soğuk Savaş'ta NATO-ABD-Türkiye Üçgeninde Askeri Üsler."

⁶⁵ Robert E Osgood, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁶⁶ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl, Washington Büyükelçiliği*, vol. 2. Cilt (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992).

⁶⁷ Eker, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952)."

⁶⁸ Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*.

⁶⁹ Prof. Rıfki Salim Burçak, *Moskova Görüşmeleri (26 Eylül 1939 - 16 Ekim 1939) ve Dış Politikamız üzerindeki Tesirleri* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1983).

about Turkey's NATO membership was Turkey's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union. The United States of America could not see a solution other than the inclusion of Turkey in NATO to be able to use the bases in Turkey.⁷⁰

As it can be understood in the early stages of NATO, although the USA did not directly object to Turkey's membership request however some of the smaller states of NATO and especially the UK opposed this request. Furthermore, Norway and Denmark feared that, as a result of Turkey's joining NATO, which was most and most severely threatened by the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would certainly oppose it and could cause a war.⁷¹ And they did not want to go to war for the protection of the Mediterranean region, which was beyond their own interests, if the scope of the Treaty was expanded. These states also opposed the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in the pact, because of the fact that they are arguing that NATO is beyond the defense alliance, in addition, it was the unification of countries that are similar in terms of political, cultural, and social. They were opposed to the membership of Turkey and Greece in the Pact because they did not have these characteristics.⁷² In addition, according to the press conference held by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Scandinavian countries expressed their negative approach to Turkey's membership. The most important reason for the negative approach of these two countries was that they state that Turkey's membership will affect the terms of their military aid, so it would decrease if Turkey became a member. The British Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not use a definite statement in response to the Turkish authorities' questions about whether the approach of these two states is correct or not.⁷³

Moreover, according to the British perspective, Britain had close relations with Turkey from the beginning of the war until 1947 and then began to make significant changes in the policies it followed during the war. These changes in its foreign policy have also deeply affected Turkey, as mentioned above.⁷⁴ Britain started to lose its power and influence in Europe over time, and the USA became the new leader of Europe. As a result, UK's new policy point shifted to the "Middle East". And Egypt has determined the center point of its interests in the Middle

⁷⁰ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964*.

⁷¹ Eker, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952)."

⁷² Oran Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980 Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, 1 (İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

⁷³ The Republic Archive (BCA), "At the press conference held at the British Foreign Office, Turkey's attempt to enter the Atlantic Pact was discussed." (Ankara: Presidency of The Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives, August 22, 1950), 235 - 590 - 40.

⁷⁴ Mahmut Dikerdem, *Orta Doğu'da Devrim Yılları (Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları)*, 1 (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1977).

East region. Its bases in the region and its privileges in the Suez Canal have become indispensable for the UK. But on the other hand, a wave of "Arab Nationalism", started to develop in Egypt and took the region under its influence, and was spreading rapidly.⁷⁵ At the same time, Egypt wanted the abolition of the 1936 Treaty, which gave Britain the right to Suez base. That is why England had a fierce conflict with Egypt regarding the Suez Canal. In response to this newly formed situation, the UK's plans were gradually changing negatively. The new orientation in Egypt caused England to worry. England has been in search solution to this situation and turning it into an opportunity The opportunity UK has been waiting for has emerged in the process of Turkey's membership in NATO.⁷⁶

England advocated a different policy against the USA's policy of not excluding Turkey. The period when Turkey applied to NATO when Britain was now forced to withdraw from the Middle East and was looking for a solution to protect its interests in the Suez Canal.⁷⁷ Britain, whose relations with Egypt came to the breaking point due to the Suez Canal, was planning to create a security system in the Middle East by combining Turkey's security concerns with its interests in Suez and establishing a Middle East Command in the Middle East, in which Egypt would also participate. Therefore, the UK made pressured the USA at this point, and it insisted that Turkey be included in the Middle East equation, not in European geopolitics. The defense model proposed by Britain was a similar system with NATO which was called "the Middle East Defense Pact" that Turkey will lead.⁷⁸ Britain advocated that Turkey should take part in an organization to be established for the defense of the Middle East and act in harmony with the British troops in this region. Because, according to the British, the Turkish army was an important force that could be used to protect Britain's interests in the Middle East. they wanted Turkish troops to form an alliance with them in the Middle East, rather than to be under the command of a Mediterranean Command within the scope of NATO. The plan aimed to stay in Suez by making use of Turkey's military power. In this way, they wanted to prevent the reactions that would occur in this region where Muslim countries are the majority. When the UK was considering the influence of Egypt on the Arab League, which holds the Suez Canal also, the UK stated that Egypt was the key to the Middle East, and it was crucial to gain this

⁷⁵ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964*.

⁷⁶ J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II a Documentary Record 1914-1956*, First Edition, vol. II (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956).

⁷⁷ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964*.

⁷⁸ Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO, 1950-52," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (1999): 70-102.

country for this project to be realized. However, this British plan could be foiled because of the inclusion of Turkey in NATO. That's why Britain opposed Turkey's entry into NATO to protect its interests.⁷⁹ ⁸⁰That's why the UK didn't want to lose its influence on Turkey and Greece, and they wanted to keep Turkey within the defense system they wanted to create in the Middle East.⁸¹

Turkey, on the other hand, stated that NATO is an indispensable condition for itself. Moreover, Turkey emphasized that there could not be a military-oriented Middle East Pact with NATO and that the most possible thing would be agreements that include cooperation on cultural and social points.⁸² Because Turkey knew that Arab states such as Egypt would not participate in the pact planned by Britain in the Middle East.⁸³ After all, Turkey knew that without the support of the United States, it would not make sense British-Turkish cooperation in the Middle East. Because the only power that could support Turkey in the region against the Soviet threats was the United States of America. At the same time, Turkey was heavily dependent on the United States in terms of military equipment and weapons technology and there were many American military advisers in the country. Also, as mentioned above, Considering the problems that Britain had in Egypt and Iran, its influence in the Middle East began to diminish gradually. It was clear that Britain needed the support of the United States to maintain this influence.⁸⁴

Finally, on 11 May 1950, the last days of the CHP government applied for membership to NATO. but the application was not concluded because there was no support for this initiative, except in Italy. The USA did not directly give a negative answer to this application, they declared that it could arrange a meeting within the scope of "the defense of the Mediterranean Basin". this request did not generate a very positive situation in Turkey, Although it was accepted and the negotiation phase was started. In addition to this attitude of the USA and also

⁷⁹ Eker, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952)."

⁸⁰ Yeşilbursa, "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO, 1950-52."

⁸¹ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964*.

⁸² Metin İlhan, "Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi ve savunma politikaları / Turkey's accession to the NATO and defense policies" (İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi / Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü / Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı, 2015),

https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=7wbO5xHSS7FGqBDFpjCM8A&no=CdxmaYvzsy_Pqfw4_D5bUA.

⁸³ Erkmen, "Türkiye'nin NATO Üyeliği ve Üyeliğin TBMM'de Kabulü (Turkey's NATO Membership and Acceptance of Membership in TGNA)."

⁸⁴ Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*.

the UK showed hesitant behavior in making a clear statement on Turkey's membership in August.⁸⁵

1.2.2) REASONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR TURKEY

During the Cold War, Turkey continued to position itself within NATO and to see NATO membership as the most important element of its foreign policy. There were several reasons. Initially, The close relations with the west, which started in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, increased even more with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. From this point of view, according to Turkish politicians, being a member of NATO was seen as a requirement of the foreign policy towards the West.⁸⁶ Thanks to NATO membership, Turkish politicians believed that it would be an effective factor in the support of European identity.⁸⁷

However, the most important difference here is it was the change of the most powerful state in the West. England and France were understood as when the "West" was mentioned before the Second World War and the USA that comes to mind when the "West" is mentioned, with the USA being the dominant power after the Second World War.⁸⁸ The negative atmosphere created by the USSR, which started after the Second World War and continued since the beginning of 1940, deeply affected Turkey's foreign policy at that time. Therefore, Turkey naturally turned its face towards the west, namely America, against the threat from the east.⁸⁹ With the help of the USA, especially the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Turkey provided close cooperation with the United States, but as mentioned above, these were a temporary solution to the USSR threat and did not eliminate the danger posed by the Soviets.⁹⁰

Another reason, Turkey's view of NATO membership as the most important element of its foreign policy was that It was important to institutionalize the alliance between Turkey and

⁸⁵ The Republic Archive (BCA), "At the press conference held at the British Foreign Office, Turkey's attempt to enter the Atlantic Pact was discussed."

⁸⁶ Pinar Bilgin, "Securing Turkey through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (Spring 2009): 103–23, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005239>.

⁸⁷ Barın Kayaoğlu, "Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945–52," *Cold War History* 9, no. 3 (Ağustos 2009): 321–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740902981403>.

⁸⁸ Lerna K. YANIK, "Atlantik Pakti'ndan NATO'ya: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde Türkiye'nin Konumu ve Uluslararası Rolü Tartışmalarından Bir Kesit (From the Atlantic Pact to NATO: Debating Turkey's Location and Function in the Turkish Grand National Assembly)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi İktisadi İşletmesi* 9, no. 34 (2012): 29–50.

⁸⁹ Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War."

⁹⁰ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey and NATO," *Adam Academy Journal of Social Sciences* 3, no. 1 (June 1, 2013).

the USA by becoming a member of NATO, especially in the term of the military.⁹¹ ⁹²It was observed that during the CHP period, even before NATO's establishment, Turkey was aimed to join the USA, naturally, to the Western Bloc through an official alliance. Necmettin Sadak, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Hasan Saka government, stated during the US Naval Fleet's trip to Istanbul in 1948 that the Turkish government already wanted to embody these relations more effectively and officially with an alliance if it was legally possible for the USA. Despite Necmettin Sadak's offer, US Secretary of State Marshall did not approve of this offer, stating that the US had already helped Turkey, but that a formal alliance would lead to a review of the US's entire foreign policy and relations with all other countries.⁹³ Turkey planned to stabilize the flow of military and economic aid to Turkey, which had begun to be made with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, thanks to the alliance to be made with the United States. On the other hand, joining NATO was an opportunity not to be missed for Turkey to secure its territory and modernize its armed forces.⁹⁴ On the other hand, Turkish public opinion supported the government for NATO membership. In addition, Turkey, worried that American economic and military aid would decrease if NATO membership is not accepted, also they wanted to benefit from both the ongoing American aid and the new aid planned by NATO.⁹⁵ As it can be understood, Turkey believed that its foreign policy and, related to this, the innovation process in the economic, social, and military fields depended on NATO.⁹⁶

The Turkish public opinion also supported the government for NATO membership. However, the fact that Turkey was not included in the Council of Europe, which was established on May 5, 1949, and which was not even of a military nature, caused new reactions in Turkey. As a result of these reactions, the Committee of Ministers invited Turkey to join the Council of Europe on 8 August. Turkey continued its desire to join NATO after being included in the Council of Europe. For this, Turkey asked the USA to be included in NATO in December 1949, but it could not get any results. As mentioned below, the CHP government, which was waiting for an invitation before the Treaty to be signed in April 1949 and could not receive it, was

⁹¹ Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (2012): 481–95, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.741844>.

⁹² Furkan Arda, "1950-1960 döneminde Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin incelenmesi (Analysis of Turkey-US Relations in 1950-1960)" (Edirne, Trakya University, 2018).

⁹³ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964*.

⁹⁴ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

⁹⁵ Baskın et al.

⁹⁶ Eker, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952)."

greatly disappointed.⁹⁷ According to Celal Bayar, the President of the time, there could be two reasons why Turkey was not included in NATO. These could either be that the efforts of the statesmen representing Turkey were not sufficient and they could not perceive some developments well, or that the members of NATO wanted to use Turkey as a buffer state.⁹⁸

The views of NATO members about Turkey change rapidly after some developments in international relations. Furthermore, the persistence of Turkish politicians and they are imposing a certain "geopolitical vision" about Turkey was led to open the door of NATO for Turkey.⁹⁹ The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the time, Köprülü, stated that the pact could not be completed unless Turkey and Greece were included in NATO and that a crucial region like the Eastern Mediterranean region could not be left out of the common defense system. At the same time, while he said that the security of the world cannot be ensured without the security of Turkey, also the Middle East was added to this list as the region that needs to be secured together with Turkey and its emphasis becomes more frequent. According to Turkish political elites, only Turkey could provide security in the Middle East as well as world security. In this way, In July 1951, the Middle East entered the security equation in the discourse of the Turkish elite.¹⁰⁰ The fact that Turkish politicians' statements about the Middle East did not immediately make an influence the NATO front because until the early 1950s as we know, there was no consensus on the future of the Middle East between NATO's main allies, namely the United States and Britain. More precisely, the Middle East has not yet entered the radar of the United States, which emerged as the dominant power after the Second World War, due to the focus on the communist danger in the Far East. The Middle East was important to Britain mainly because of its interests in the Suez Canal.¹⁰¹

As a result, by the 1950s, the paths to NATO opened for Turkey, despite the opposition of the smaller NATO countries. The establishment of NATO and the possible membership of Turkey are shown as medicine that will cure all of Turkey's problems. moreover, ultimately,

⁹⁷ Erkmen, "Türkiye'nin NATO Üyeliği ve Üyeliğin TBMM'de Kabulü (Turkey's NATO Membership and Acceptance of Membership in TGNA)."

⁹⁸ Özel Şahingiray, *Celal Bayar'ın söylev ve demeçleri, 1933-1955 : dış politika* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları kitaplar, 1956).

⁹⁹ YANIK, "Atlantik Paktr'ndan NATO'ya."

¹⁰⁰ Fuat Köprülü, "TBMM Tutanak Dergisi" (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, July 20, 1951).

¹⁰¹ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey - Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952*.

Turkey's acceptance into NATO membership would enable Turkey to be considered as an important actor in international relations.¹⁰²

1.2.3) TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO NATO (1950-2):

Turkey's accession into NATO is not actually due to Turkey's insistence, but due to the changing international dynamics and the uneasiness and changes created by these dynamics.¹⁰³ Two developments in this period will affect all the political plans of that period. Moreover, with Athanassopoulou's own words the year 1949 was of a year of "disappointments" for Turkey, on the other hand, the year 1950 became the year of "events".¹⁰⁴ At the beginning of these concerns is the success of the USSR atomic bomb in the late 40s and the Korean war that broke out in the early 50s. First of all, this atomic bomb success of the USSR brought the end of the military strategy of the USA up to that point. And Soviet Union's successful detonation of the first atomic bomb in August 1949 ended the US monopoly on atomic bombs.¹⁰⁵ Thus, the USSR and the USA became equal in the nuclear field. With this development, the USA was losing an important advantage it had. The NSC-68 report, which means that the USA lost its nuclear monopoly and deterrence, was used as a basic reference source in the formation of national military policy.¹⁰⁶ According to this report, the necessity of strengthening NATO's southern flank was brought to the agenda. There was a need to use Turkish airspace to destroy the strategic points of the USSR against a possible Soviet attack.¹⁰⁷ Another reason why it was necessary to strengthen the flank was the situation in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948 and it was under intense pressure from the USSR.¹⁰⁸ NATO Commander-in-Chief Eisenhower emphasized that to prevent the invasion of Yugoslavia by the USSR, this front had to be strengthened.¹⁰⁹ As can be seen from the report, it was one of the

¹⁰² Eylem Yılmaz and Pinar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's 'Western' Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft," *International Journal* 61, no. 1 (2005): 39–59, <https://doi.org/10.2307/40204128>.

¹⁰³ Doğan, "NATO'NUN ÖRGÜTSEL DEĞİŞİMİ, 1946-1999."

¹⁰⁴ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey - Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952*.

¹⁰⁵ Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I - Office of the Historian" (U.S. Government Printing Office, April 14, 1950), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>.

¹⁰⁶ Ken Young, "Revisiting NSC 68," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 1 (2013): 3–33.

¹⁰⁷ Selin M. Bölme, "The Politics of Incirlik Air Base," *Insight Turkey* 9, no. 3 (2007): 82–91.

¹⁰⁸ M. Hakan Özçelik, "Türk Basınında Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci: (1948-1952) Turkey's Entry to NATO in the Turkish Press: (1948-1952)" (İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2003).

¹⁰⁹ Abbas Balcı, "Türkiye'nin NATO'ya giriş süreci ve etkileri 1945-1960 / Turkey's introduction to NATO and their effects 1945-1960" (Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ağrı, Ağrı İbrahim Çeçen Üniversitesi, 2017).

signs that the conditions were going in Turkey's favor. According to the continuation of this report, the loss of every "free country" against Soviet expansionism, United States was considered a factor that would trigger subsequent more "free country" losses.¹¹⁰ The report also stated that the United States had lost its relative nuclear superiority against the Soviets and recommended that it should establish a base geographically close to the USSR. This implicitly pointed to Turkey.¹¹¹ In addition, on page 36 of the report, NATO countries, Greece and Turkey have been counted among the countries that will receive military aid and will continue to give them.¹¹² As a result, the NSC-68 Report was the first of the documents that indicated that the United States' view of Turkey had begun to change. In addition to this report, the appointment of George McGhee as the US Ambassador to Ankara and the weight around Turkey's membership in NATO would change the balance that had developed against Turkey in favor of Turkey.¹¹³

The Korean War, which broke out on June 26, 1950, revealed the possibility of a war with the Soviets, which had been discussed by the USA up to that point, as a concrete reality also the Korean War showed that conventional wars can be experienced even in the nuclear age.¹¹⁴ The issues in Korea were based on the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences between the Allies towards the task of removing Japan from Korea at the end of the Second World War when it was given to the United States and the Soviet Union. With the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the Soviets occupied the north of Korea and the Americans occupied the south, declaring the 38th parallel as the intermediate border. Thus began the Korean Question.¹¹⁵ The Korean question was discussed at the Moscow Conference held between 16-22 December 1945 to be resolved between the Allies. It was decided to establish a democratic government in Korea and to achieve this, it was decided to establish a "The Joint Commission " consisting of the American and the Soviet Union commanders. However, the " The Joint Commission " could not resolve the issue due to disagreements between the parties. The United States then took the

¹¹⁰ Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War*.

¹¹¹ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

¹¹² Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security'" (History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, US National Archives., April 14, 1950), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191.pdf>.

¹¹³ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*, 1990th edition (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990).

¹¹⁴ Ayşegül Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu, 1945-1958*, 1st ed., vol. 8 (İstanbul: Boyut Kitaplar, 1997).

¹¹⁵ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman, Vol. 1: Year of Decisions*, 1st edition (Doubleday, 1955).

issue to the United Nations. On September 17, 1947, the UN General Assembly addressed the question of "Korean independence" for the first time, and " United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) " was established. Under the supervision of this commission, there would be elections held in Korea on May 10, 1948, and a national Korean government would be established, moreover American and Soviet forces would leave the country within 90 days.¹¹⁶ ¹¹⁷ However, the Soviet Union reacted to this decision at the beginning and did not accept cooperation with the " United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) " which started its duty in Seoul on January 12, 1948. Furthermore, did not allow the commission to pass to the north of the 38th parallel. Against this attitude of the Soviet Union, the UN held an election in South Korea under its control. With this election, on July 17, 1948, the "Republic of Korea" was declared in the capital Seoul, and Syngman Rhee was appointed as the President¹¹⁸ The UN recognized the Republic of Korea as the legitimate state of the whole of Korea. However, on September 9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was declared in North Korea. This state was established under Soviet support, only the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia recognized it.¹¹⁹ As a result, in 1948, two independent states emerged whose nations were one. Under the leadership of the United States of America, it was established in the south of Korea under the auspices of the United Nations, on the other hand, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the north with the support of the Soviet Union. ¹²⁰

But day by day, the situation in Korea was getting worse. The establishment of their armies by North Korea in 1948 and by South Korea in 1949 made the situation even tenser. As a result, armed incidents began to take place along the 38th parallel in 1949.¹²¹ Two agreements on military aid and security were signed between the United States and the Republic of South Korea on December 31, 1948, and January 26, 1950. While these were happening on the southern front, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Union signed a ten-year aid agreement with the on March 20, 1949, with the USRR, and also signed a thirty-year treaty of

¹¹⁶ The Republic Archive (BCA), "Kasım Gülek's Representation of Our Government at the United Nations Korea Commission" (Ankara: Presidency of The Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives, December 16, 1949), <https://katalog.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Sayfalar/eSatis/BelgeGoster.aspx?ItemId=114164&Hash=8ABD417F639F52D3530DD6988D3FE2F99F37F81223E2715B14859873CD4AE560&Mi=0>.

¹¹⁷ Jongsoo Lee, *The Partition of Korea after World War II A Global History*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

¹¹⁸ Byung-Joon Ahn, "The Soviet Union and the Korean Peninsula," *Asian Affairs* 11, no. 4 (1985): 1–20.

¹¹⁹ İbrahim Artuç, *Kore Savaşlarında Mehmetçik* (Kastaş Yayınları, 1990).

¹²⁰ Uçarol, *Siyasi tarih (1789-1999)*.

¹²¹ Joel R. Campbell, "The Wrong War: The Soviets and the Korean War, 1945-1953," *International Social Science Review* 88, no. 3 (2014): 1–29.

friendship and mutual defense with the People's Republic of China on February 14, 1950.¹²² With these agreements; It has become clear that the United States supports and protects South Korea, while the Soviet Union and China supported and protected North Korea. Thus, it was formed that two big communist countries took a front against the capitalist world.¹²³ On June 5, 1950, North Korea launched an offensive, claiming that South Korean soldiers had violated the 38th parallel. Thus, the fuse of the war was ignited. The events that took place with the support of Soviet Russia, the leader of the Eastern Bloc, and the United States of America, the leader of the Western Bloc, were the war of two different ideologies, the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc, rather than the war of two peoples of the same nation.¹²⁴ Thanks to the Korean War, the deficiencies in American war policies began to be seen more clearly.¹²⁵ First of all, The United States revealed how to mistake it is to consider the security of Europe within the limited geography of Europe. Thus, it has revealed the important positions of Turkey and Greece in terms of European and even world security and enabled these two countries to join NATO.¹²⁶ As it can be understood, the idea that regional conflicts would not threaten world peace disappeared with the Korean War, which brought the two newly formed blocs against each other. It has been understood that war can break out at any time, anywhere in the world. The United States has also realized how important the control of strategically valuable regions can be for its own and the world's security.¹²⁷

Turkey experienced intense years in foreign policy, also there will be developments that will be considered as turning-point in domestic politics during these dates. As a matter of fact, the Democratic Party won the general elections held on 14 May 1950 and, the CHP administration, which has been ruling the country for 27 years, came to end and Turkey has stepped into a multi-party democratic life.¹²⁸ When the Democratic Party came to power, the public was curious about the foreign policy of this new government. As it is known, after the Second World War, the CHP government preferred the Western bloc, or because it thought that

¹²² Uçarol, *Siyasi tarih (1789-1999)*.

¹²³ Özçelik, "Türk Basınında Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci."

¹²⁴ B. S. Agarwal, "KOREA AS AN EPICENTRE OF NORTHEAST ASIAN POWER POLITICS : A Historical and Geopolitical Perspective," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 67, no. 2 (2006): 261–78.

¹²⁵ Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I - Office of the Historian."

¹²⁶ WALTER LAFEVER, "NATO and the Korean War: A Context," *Diplomatic History* 13, no. 4 (1989): 461–77.

¹²⁷ Eker, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952)."

¹²⁸ Mim Kemal Öke, *Kore, 1950-53 : "Unutulan Savaş"ın Kronolojisi*, 1st ed. (İstanbul: Boğaziçi yayınları, 1990).

there was no other alternative, it pursued this road and it had taken important steps in this direction. The question was whether the Democratic Party Government would continue this path. The Democratic Party, even when it was still in the opposition, showed that it supported the CHP administration which envisages cooperation with the United States in foreign policy issues by voting in favor of both the military aid agreement targeted with the Truman Doctrine and the Economic Cooperation Agreement within the framework of Marshall Plan.¹²⁹ When Democratic Party came to power, Turkey hoped again to enter NATO and intensified its work in this direction. The Democratic Party, which came to power with great public support and promised to change Turkey, knew that it could do this by joining NATO most shortly and effectively. In the meantime, the Democratic Party administrators wanted to take the advantage of the Korean War which was the request of the United States of America for help from the member states of the Council of Europe. They wanted to use this opportunity for themselves to join NATO and they immediately started contacts.¹³⁰ The Korean War gave an important trump card to Turkish administrators in entering NATO. If Turkey were to send troops to Korea, Turkey would be demonstrated Turkey's commitment to the Western libertarian ideas and the American Congress would be affected. Thus, it would be ensured that the United States put its weight on Turkey's entry into NATO.¹³¹ Another factor that influenced the Menderes Government to take this decision was the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, Senator Cain, a member of the US Armed Forces Commission, who paid an official visit to Turkey between 23-25 July 1950 to obtain on-the-spot information about the American military aid and economic cooperation delegation in Turkey, encouraged Turkey to send troops to Korea during his visit.¹³²¹³³ Senator Michael Cain stated that the purpose of this visit to Turkey is to obtain on-the-spot information as a representative of the United States Senate. Senator Cain made the press conference while leaving Turkey;¹³⁴

“... As an American senator and citizen, I hope that Turkey will send a Turkish military unit to join the peace force to be formed by the United Nations due to the communist attack in Korea... If the United States becomes weary as a result of this war and depletes most of its forces in

¹²⁹ Karataş, *Türk-Amerikan Siyasi İlişkileri (1939-1952) (Turkish-American Political Relations (1939-1952))*.

¹³⁰ Eker, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952).”

¹³¹ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, 1947-1964*.

¹³² “25 Temmuz 1950,” *Zafer Gazetesi*, July 25, 1950, <https://dspace.ankara.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/20.500.12575/4599>.

¹³³ State, “Foreign Relations of the United States,” 1978.

¹³⁴ Cameron S. Brown, “The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War,” *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2008): 89–108.

Korea, what will happen when there is a conflict or war in a similar part of the world? The reason why the United States of America wants ground forces from other states is that America does not wear out and to be able to deal with any other conflict... If Turkey becomes the first state to provide such assistance, Turkey's prestige in the international arena will increase... I think that a small military unit that Turkey will send to Korea will affect its inclusion in NATO. When there is an attack on Turkey, all independent states should also help it. However, the situation is reversed; Turkey should also help another free state in an attack... In my opinion, Turkey should be included in NATO... ”¹³⁵¹³⁶¹³⁷

This statement by Senator Michael Cain, a member of the United States Armed Forces Commission, can be interpreted as the United States' desire to see Turkey in the NATO ranks. However, an important point that should not be forgotten was the decision whether Turkey would send soldiers to the United Nations army led by the United States against the communist attack in Korea. Ultimately, the Ankara Government would consider it appropriate to send troops to Korea to achieve Turkey's aspiration to join NATO.¹³⁸

Parallel to this, articles were written in *Zafer Gazette*, which is the voice of the Democratic Party, to emphasize the rightness of the decision to participate in the Korean War. Making a connection between the decision to join the war and American economic aid, Defending the correctness of the decision against the public and especially the Republican People's Party (CHP), it was mentioned as follows:

*“The very important decision taken by the United States is as follows: The economic aid to the states that will not help the Korean War will be stopped immediately. President Truman has been given full authority in this regard.”*¹³⁹

According to Prime Minister Menderes, the only need in the process of joining NATO was to shape the public opinion in line with the decisions to be taken. In this context, Prime Minister Menderes said to journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman:

¹³⁵ “25 Temmuz 1950.”

¹³⁶ “26 Temmuz 1950,” *Zafer Gazetesi*, July 26, 1950, <https://dspace.ankara.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/20.500.12575/4598>.

¹³⁷ State, “Foreign Relations of the United States,” 1978.

¹³⁸ Eker, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasındaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Nato'ya Giriş Süreci(1945-1952) / Advances of the Turkish Foreign Policy After World War II and Entrance Process to NATO of Turkey(1945-1952).”

¹³⁹ Fenik Mümtaz Faik, “Dünya Çapında bir karar,” *Zafer Gazetesi*, August 3, 1950, <https://www.gastearsivi.com/gazete/zafer/1950-08-03/1>.

*“We have to make an important decision on behalf of the Turkish nation. America has a message to independent nations to stand on the same front against communist forces in Korea on behalf of the UN. This call is an indispensable opportunity for us in terms of carrying out a common understanding of security and raising our reputation in the international arena. It could also help us get accepted into NATO. If Britain and other nations ignore it, this opportunity is gone for us. That is why we want to give a positive answer to this call before other states and leave them in the face of a situation that has already happened.”*¹⁴⁰

According to the statement above, Prime Minister Menderes stated that Turkey must act quickly to resolve the security crisis and to prove itself among European countries. and emphasized that the Government should take a critical role here. Article 43 of the United Nations Security Council's agreement of 25 and 27 June 1950 made the UN member states obliged to "give the necessary military force to the Council's disposal, by a special agreement, for the maintenance of international peace and security."¹⁴¹ According to this article, after the United Nations Secretary-General sent the decisions taken to Turkey on 28 June 1950, Turkey responded on 29 June 1950 with the following reply ¹⁴²: *"Turkey declares that it is ready to fulfill its obligations as a member of the United Nations, within the scope of the relevant law and sincerely"*¹⁴³ With this answer, the Ankara Government accepted the offer of assistance and it was thought that it could be effective in the entry of NATO by creating an impact on the American Government. Thus, Turkey seemed to have taken an important step in the process of joining NATO. In his memoirs, Celal Bayar argued that the decision to send troops to the Korean War was taken not to join NATO, but to show that we were loyal to the UN. He said that although Turkey did not want to become a member of NATO, it would send soldiers to the Korean War. However, he also acknowledged that our participation in the Korean War may have affected our admission to NATO.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Yakin tarihte gördüklerim ve geçirdiklerim*, 1st ed., vol. 2 (İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1970).

¹⁴¹ the Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, "Charter of the United Nations Chapter VII — Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression- Article 43" (The United Nations, August 23, 2016), <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art43.shtml>.

¹⁴² A. Fuad Başgil, "Hakikatin Sesi," *Son Posta*, August 5, 1950, https://www.gastearsivi.com/gazete/son_posta/1950-08-05/1.

¹⁴³ The Republic Archive (BCA), "Telegrams approving the decisions of the Government of the Republic of Turkey regarding the Korean War" (Ankara: Presidency of The Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives, May 8, 1950), <https://katalog.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Sayfalar/eSatis/BelgeGoster.aspx?ItemId=267151&Hash=683C54897A99B20E763D77F98A7120C7137676E4FEFDDE913796A702CC9383DD&Mi=3>.

¹⁴⁴ Celal Bayar, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*, ed. İsmet Bozdağ (Truva Yayınları, 2010).

The Turkish Government decided to assist the Republic of South Korea within the framework of United Nations resolutions on the same day that Senator Michael Cain, a member of the American Armed Forces Commission, held a press conference.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, The Turkish Government announced to the World that they had decided to send a military force of 4,500 people to the United Nations Force here.¹⁴⁶ Thus, with the start of the Korean War, Turkey became the first country to send troops to Korea after the USA. In addition, the Turkish Armed Forces were sent abroad and to a foreign country for the first time since the First World War and participated in the war.¹⁴⁷ The Turkish Brigade fulfilled its mission (1950-1953) with great success in every phase of the war, within the framework of the orders given by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force Command in Korea. As planned by the Ankara Government, it successfully represented Turkey in the international conjuncture and raised its prestige.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, the reasons such as the fact that Turkey was the country that sent the most soldiers to the Korean War after the USA, that it was the first country to send soldiers after the USA, and that the Turkish soldiers showed their combat capability in this war were the reasons why US administrators as well as the many of the other NATO members had a positive effect on the changing their ideas about the Turkish military and caused developments in favor of Turkey in this regard. This allowed the Turkish government to be more persistent. The opinions of the US public for Turkey were also important. The outstanding success of the Turkish troops in the Korean War led to an opinion in the American public opinion that Turkey should not be left alone against the Soviet threat.¹⁴⁹

Turkey and Greece applied to join NATO on 1 August 1950.¹⁵⁰ Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, in his statement to *Milliyet Gazete*, about this application of Turkey; “*The entry of Turkey, whose military might is known, into the Atlantic Pact, in the current world conditions, constitutes a new element of strengthening for the security and defense system established by this pact.*”¹⁵¹ Since Turkey participated in the Korean War, public opinion has emerged that Turkey will now be included in NATO. *Son Telegraf Gazete* claimed that this application would not be rejected.¹⁵² Nevertheless, the NATO council of ministers refused this request on

¹⁴⁵ Zafer Gazetesi, “26 Temmuz 1950.”

¹⁴⁶ Gül Tuba Dağcı and Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu, “Turkish Foreign Policy During Adnan Menderes Period,” *Alternatives : Turkish Journal Of International Relations*, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.21599/ATJIR.54368>.

¹⁴⁷ Uçarol, *Siyasi tarih (1789-1999)*.

¹⁴⁸ Öke, *Kore, 1950-53 : “Unutulan Savaş”ın Kronolojisi*.

¹⁴⁹ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

¹⁵⁰ Dağcı and Diyarbakırlıoğlu, “Turkish Foreign Policy During Adnan Menderes Period.”

¹⁵¹ “Başbakan Adnan Menderes’in Milliyet’e Çok Mühim Beyanâtı,” *Zafer Gazetesi*, August 7, 1950.

¹⁵² “Atlantik Paktı’na Alınma Teklifimiz Reddedilmeyecek,” *Son Telgraf Gazetesi*, August 4, 1950.

13 September 1950.¹⁵³ Because the United States Chief of Staff was still reluctant to expand NATO-guaranteed space in the Middle East until the United States went further in strengthening NATO's military strength.¹⁵⁴ What broke the US General Staff's insistence on convincing Turkey in a way other than NATO membership was that, George C. McGhee and William M. Rountree, office of Greek, Turkish, Iranian Affairs Department of State, states their concerns about Turkey which they are were worried that Turkey might be lost at the US Conference of Chiefs of Mission in the Near East. Two American diplomats, who know Turkey closely, wrote a statement at the end of the conference, for the USA to achieve its political and military goals in the Middle East, mutual security arrangements should be made with Turkey and Greece as soon as possible.¹⁵⁵ ¹⁵⁶ The point that draws attention in the statement is that Turkey may prefer neutrality if it is not exposed to a direct attack, in this case, it is stated that the use of the bases in Turkey may not be possible. On February 26, 1951, In the National Intelligence Assessment (NIE) released a report about "Turkey's Position in the West-East Struggle". In the evaluations, the above views were shared exactly. In the National Intelligence Assessment, "the commitment of Turkish troops or the acquisition of Turkish bases depends on a firm assurance of armed support by the United States in the event of a Soviet attack." It has been clearly stated that a base cannot be provided unless the USA was assured that it will support Turkey's defense.¹⁵⁷¹⁵⁸ Thus, it was decided that the full membership of Turkey and Greece in NATO is necessary for the security interests of the USA¹⁵⁹ the same time, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands agreed with the United States on Turkey's membership in NATO. Britain, on the other hand, still wanted Turkey to be assigned to the defense of the Middle East. The other members of NATO, on the other hand, were still undecided.¹⁶⁰ Despite all these, on May 15, 1951, the USA wrote a letter to other NATO member states and made recommendations regarding the membership of Turkey and Greece, and with these recommendations' obstacles have been removed.¹⁶¹

¹⁵³ Dağcı and Diyarbakırloğlu, "Turkish Foreign Policy During Adnan Menderes Period."

¹⁵⁴ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*.

¹⁵⁵ State, "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1978.

¹⁵⁶ Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1 - Office of the Historian" (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1981), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v03p1>.

¹⁵⁷ State, "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1978.

¹⁵⁸ Hakan Yılmaz, "American Perspectives on Turkey: An Evaluation of the Declassified U.S. Documents between 1947 and 1960," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 25 (2001): 77–101, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600003617>.

¹⁵⁹ Bölme, "Soğuk Savaş'ta NATO-ABD-Türkiye Üçgeninde Askeri Üsler."

¹⁶⁰ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

¹⁶¹ İlhan, "Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi ve savunma politikaları / Turkey's accession to the NATO and defense policies."

At the end of the meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers held in Ottawa on 16-20 September 1951, it was unanimously decided to invite Greece and Turkey as NATO members.¹⁶² Meanwhile, the hesitations of Denmark, Norway, and Belgium regarding enlargement continued. In addition, Britain proposed a package agreement in 1951 stating that it would support NATO membership of Turkey and Greece in return for the Middle East Command, and the UK was accepted Turkey to join NATO, in the condition that Turkey would take part in the said formation.¹⁶³ That's why Turkey's membership in NATO did not happen immediately. One of the reasons for this was that Ankara and London could not agree on which command to subordinate Turkey and Greece. While Turkey wanted to connect its forces directly to the NATO Commander-in-Chief, Britain, wanted to connect Turkey's and Greece's forces to a Middle East Command to be established, even under the umbrella of NATO.¹⁶⁴ The reason why Turkey wanted its forces to be connected directly to NATO, not to the Middle East Command during the negotiations, was worried that it could be included in NATO on paper, moreover being used by Western states in the Middle East.¹⁶⁵ In the end, The USA, England, France, and Turkey submitted a proposal to Egypt on the Middle East Command on October 12, 1951.¹⁶⁶ In this bill, they stated that if Egypt joined the command, those of the British forces in Egypt who were not included in the treaty would leave the country. However, Egypt did not welcome this offer.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, these negotiations were reflected in the Turkish press and it was written that Turkey could only enter NATO with full and equal rights and that if the issue of Middle East Command insisted, our membership application would be reviewed.¹⁶⁸ *Milliyet Gazete* announced that we gave a note to the Western states on this issue.¹⁶⁹ Following this incident, the press secretary of the British Foreign Office stated that Turkey would be admitted to NATO unconditionally moreover, Turkey will play an important role in NATO.¹⁷⁰ As a result, Law No. 5886 on Turkey's accession to NATO was accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on February 18, 1952. This law entered into force by being published in the *Resmi Gazete* numbered 8038 and dated 19 February 1952.¹⁷¹ Turkey's NATO membership led to the reaction of the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet Union itself that triggered both the

¹⁶² Yeşilbursa, "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO, 1950-52."

¹⁶³ Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 9th ed. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996).

¹⁶⁴ Gönlübol.

¹⁶⁵ Akalın, *Soğuk Savaş ABD ve Türkiye 1 Olaylar-Belgeler 1945-1952*.

¹⁶⁶ "'Mısır Ortadoğu Savunmasına İştirake Resmen Davet Edildi,'" *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, October 12, 1951.

¹⁶⁷ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

¹⁶⁸ "'Hükümetimiz Üç Büyük Batı Devletine Birer Mesaj Yolladı,'" *Hürriyet Gazetesi*, January 13, 1952.

¹⁶⁹ "Bir Londra Haberine Göre Batılı Üç Devlete Birer Nota Verdik," *Milliyet Gazetesi*, January 13, 1952.

¹⁷⁰ "'İngiltere Hariciye Nezareti Sözcüsünün Tavzihi,'" *Milliyet Gazetesi*, January 14, 1952.

¹⁷¹ Dağcı and Diyarbakırlıoğlu, "Turkish Foreign Policy During Adnan Menderes Period."

establishment of NATO, The European states worried about the enlargement of the Soviet Union in Europe and were blocked, and Turkey's entry into NATO.¹⁷²

2) THE FIRST CRISIS AND THE FIRST PROBLEM IN the RELATIONS: CYPRUS (1960- 70s)

2.1) Emerge of the Cyprus problem: origins of the problem

Until the 1960s, the unchanging feature of Turkey's foreign policy was cooperation with the West. Taking part in the Western system has been the most important goal of Turkey and this desire continued until the 1960s. Relations with the West were placed at the center of foreign policy, and as a result, relations with other states remained in the background and were not given much importance¹⁷³ Therefore, unlike the Greek Cypriot community and Greece, Turkey did not pay much attention to the Cyprus issue after 1945. Moreover, Turkey perceived the Cyprus issue as interfering in the internal affairs of England and did not show much interest. On 17 December 1949, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak stated that Britain would not withdraw from Cyprus and that Greece did not have an official initiative regarding Cyprus, so there was no cause for concern. Sadak replied to a journalist on January 23, 1950, "There is no such thing as the Cyprus issue. Because Cyprus is under the domination and administration of England today. Fuat Köprülü, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Party, repeated similar statements. Since Turkey supported Britain in the first year of the conflict, Greece was accused Turkey because of supporting colonialism. Until the end of 1951, for Turkey, entering NATO was the primary goal in foreign policy that is why it was afraid that the Cyprus issue would negatively affect the NATO membership process and did not pay much attention to Cyprus. Turkey's view of Cyprus has not changed after NATO membership. because Turkey did not deal with the Cyprus issue in order not to have problems with its NATO allies Britain and Greece.¹⁷⁴ At that time, the British policy on Cyprus was to maintain its dominance in Cyprus. Britain rejected Greek Cypriot and Greek "Enosis" requests after the Second World War. The British Minister for Colonies, Henry Hopkins, in his speech at the British Parliament on July 28, 1954, said the following about Cyprus: "There is no problem with the change of

¹⁷² Çağdaş Yüksel, "Nato ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasına Etkileri (1949-1974) -Nato And Its Effects On Turkey's Foreign Policy (1949-1974)" (Edirne, Trakya University, 2013).

¹⁷³ Melek M. Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1999).

¹⁷⁴ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi*, ed. Mustafa Bıyıklı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin Kıbrıs Politikası (1945'den Günümüze)", (Gökkubbe, 2008).

dominance in Cyprus. In order for Britain to fulfill its strategic obligations in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, there is no other option but to maintain British dominance on the island.

The Cyprus problem became an international problem when it was brought the United Nations General Assembly for the first time as a complaint by Greece on 16 August 1954. In this application, Greece requested the implementation of the principle of self-determination by the people of the Cyprus. With this complaint, Greece wanted to take advantage of the anti-colonialism wave that started after the Second World War.¹⁷⁵ Although the United Nations put the issue on the agenda, but it rejected Greece's request.¹⁷⁶ This decision greatly pleased Prime Minister Adnan Menderes that, in a statement on 18 December 1954, Menderes said, "Since this issue is completely closed, it is time to pay attention and care not to overshadow our friendship with our ally Greece."¹⁷⁷

As mentioned above, Turkey's perspective, which initially did not care much about the Cyprus issue because it did not want to have problems with its NATO allies however it changed after Greece took the issue to the UN.¹⁷⁸ The wishes of Greece on Cyprus emerged as an official policy and the problem took an international shape, moreover the possibility that Britain might give up its sovereignty over Cyprus, finally the Democratic Party started to take an interest in Cyprus.¹⁷⁹ The first move in this direction was the appointment of Fatih Rüştü Zorlu by the government to deal with the Cyprus problem.¹⁸⁰ After the UN could not find a solution to the Cyprus issue¹⁸¹ and the expected result could not be achieved in the UN, Georgios Grivas and Makarios, who advocated the necessity of armed struggle in Cyprus,¹⁸² started an organization called EOKA and started violent actions against the British administration.¹⁸³ Thereupon, England invited Turkey and Greece to convene in London in order to resolve the Cyprus issue between the three states that were parties.¹⁸⁴ The London Conference was held in London on

¹⁷⁵ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

¹⁷⁶ Uçarol, *Siyasi tarih (1789-1999)*.

¹⁷⁷ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1995)*.

¹⁷⁸ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

¹⁷⁹ Serdar Sakin and Sabit Dokuyan, *Kıbrıs ve 6-7 Eylül Olayları Menderes ve Zorlu'nun Tarihi Sınavı* (İq Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2013).

¹⁸⁰ Taşkın Tuna, *Adnan Menderes'in Günlüğü : Siyasete Karışan Kan*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, 2010).

¹⁸¹ Sönmezoglu, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi*.

¹⁸² Farid Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, Historical Dictionaries of Europe (United States of America: Scarecrow Press, 2010).

¹⁸³ Melek M. Fırat, "Kıbrıs Sorununun Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri (1955-1997)," in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç: Ankara, 15 - 17 Ekim 1997 Sempozyuma Sunulan Tebliğler*, by İsmail Soysal, 1st ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 800.

¹⁸⁴ Nihat Erim, *Bildiğim ve gördüğüm ölçüler içinde Kıbrıs* (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık Sanayi, 1975).

29 August 1955 with the participation of Turkey, England, and Greece. At the conference, Britain rejected the solution proposed by Greece. The UK also stated that an autonomous administration could be established in Cyprus. However, Turkish delegation opposed the idea. Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu stated that a change in Cyprus would be contrary to the Treaty of Lausanne, and in this case, Turkey would have some demands. Zorlu also said that "Greece has to choose either Turkish friendship or the Cyprus cause".¹⁸⁵ At the London Conference, which lasted until 7 September 1955, no consensus could be reached on the solution of the Cyprus problem.¹⁸⁶ In Greece and Cyprus, the actions against Turkey and the Turks created a reaction in the Turkish public opinion. Meanwhile, on the rumor that the Turkish Consulate General in Thessaloniki was bombed on September 6, 1955, caused demonstrations and looting against the Greeks were held in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir in September 6-7, 1955. Thereupon, the Turkish Government declared martial law.¹⁸⁷ In addition, Turkey has informed Greece that the damages of those injured in the events of 6-7 September will be compensated and similar events will be prevented. These annals created tension in Turkish-Greek relations and led to the failure of NATO joint maneuvers. Thus, Turkish-Greek tensions affected NATO for the first time. This situation disturbed the USA and demanded the improvement of relations between the two countries.¹⁸⁸

Upon the worsening of relations between Turkey and Greece, US Secretary of State Dulles sent a letter to the Prime Ministers of both parties advising restraint on 18 September 1955. In the letter, he was expressed that they regret the events in Istanbul and Izmir, and that Greece and Turkey should resolve their bilateral problems among themselves for the benefit of the wider interests of their NATO alliance and their relations with the United States. The use of equal diplomatic treat to Turks and Greeks in the letter and in the press release made by the US administration angered the Greek government. The Greek government offended by this approach of the USA. It stated that NATO and the USA sided with Turkey instead of standing by the aggrieved Greece. As result, it has withdrawn its forces from the ongoing NATO Exercise in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Ethnos Newspaper published in Greece, made news

¹⁸⁵ Ali Rıza İzgi, "Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı Sonrasında Türkiye'ye Uygulanan Silah Ambargosu ve Sonuçları" (Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Denizli, Pamukkale Üniversitesi, 2007).

¹⁸⁶ Sönmezoglu, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi*.

¹⁸⁷ GEORGE A. KOURVETARIS, "A REVIEW OF 'THE MECHANISM OF CATASTROPHE: THE TURKISH POGROM OF SEPTEMBER 6-7,1955, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GREEK COMMUNITY OF ISTANBUL' BY SPIROS VRYONIS (NEW YORK, GREEK WORKS COM, 2005)," ed. SPIROS VRYONIS, *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 34, no. 2 (2006): 375–87.

¹⁸⁸ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

about Dulles' letter. Ethnos Newspaper evaluated the letter as a blackmail letter warning Greece and announcing that the US aid would be cut if the disputes with Turkey were not resolved.¹⁸⁹

On September 21, 1955, a vote was taken in the UN Security Council to include the Cyprus problem on the agenda of the autumn session of the General Assembly. In the voting, 7 countries voted against the Greek proposal and 4 countries voted in favor of the Greek proposal. While countries such as the Soviet Union, Poland and Egypt voted in favor of Greece, the fact that the USA, England, France, Norway and Luxembourg, which are allies of Greece, voted against Greece's proposal, prompted Greece to question its NATO membership.¹⁹⁰ As it is understood, The efforts of the United States regarding Cyprus in the 1950s were directed towards remaining neutral in order to ensure the functioning of NATO's Southeast Flank. According to the United States, Cyprus was a British concern in the 1950s. For this reason, the USA preferred to remain passive on the Cyprus issue so that the Cyprus problem would not weaken NATO.¹⁹¹ In October 1955, one month after the events of 6-7 September known as *Istanbul Pogrom*, Karamanlis stated that the aid provided by the USA to Turkey was disproportionate. Greece expressed its constant discomfort with the financial and military aid provided by NATO and the USA to Turkey. While Greece initially received more aid from the United States due to the cessation of conflicts in Greece, Turkey began to receive more NATO and American aid than Greece, due to its strategic importance and in proportion to its larger armed forces.¹⁹² The failure of England in the Suez operation caused a change in British policy.¹⁹³ As of 19 December 1956, when England declared that the principle of self-determination could be applied in Cyprus Furthermore it states that the division of the island between the two communities emerged as an option, so Turkey started to defend the partition “*taksim*” thesis for Cyprus.¹⁹⁴

During this period, Greece wanted the problem to be resolved between the people of England and Cyprus. While it aimed to prevent Turkey from becoming a party to the problem.

¹⁸⁹ Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).

¹⁹⁰ Theodore A. Coulombis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and Nato Influences*, 1st Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

¹⁹¹ Theodora Kalaitzaki, “US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 106–24, <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-16-2-106>.

¹⁹² Ronald R. Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict,” *Cambridge University Press, International Organization*, 53, no. 2 (August 12, 2003): 343–77, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550904>.

¹⁹³ Baskin et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

¹⁹⁴ Michael B. Bishku, “TURKEY, GREECE AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT,” *Journal of Third World Studies* 8, no. 1 (1991): 165–79.

Britain began to emphasize Cyprus problem its international character. On the other hand, the United States explained that it can be resolved within the framework of NATO alliance.¹⁹⁵ The United Nations has not found a solution to the Cyprus problem. The United Nations recommended countries to solve the problem by negotiating among themselves.¹⁹⁶ After that, on March 20, 1957, NATO was made a statement in Paris. In a statement, the Secretary General sent a letter to the representatives of England, Turkey and Greece. Lord Ismay, NATO Secretary General, in his report to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn, May 1957, NATO suggested that Lord Ismay, the Secretary General of NATO should mediate the problem that arose between Greece, Turkey and England due to Cyprus. He stated that “*I deemed it my duty last March to offer my good offices to the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom for the settlement of the dispute over Cyprus. The Governments of Turkey and the United Kingdom accepted my proposal in principle, but the Government of Greece have so far felt unable to do so.*”¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, The Greek representative stated on 22 March 1957 that the reason for rejecting NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay's proposal was that negotiations should be held between the UK and the Cypriot people for the solution of the Cyprus problem.¹⁹⁸ In this case showed that Turkey's trust in NATO, Greece, on the other hand, puts its national interests first and looks at NATO with suspicion.¹⁹⁹

At the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1957, it was announced that the Cyprus issue was discussed between Turkish Prime Minister Menderes, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and British Foreign Minister Lloyd. However, solution to the Cyprus issue was not found in this meeting either. Menderes, in a statement he gave on 24 December 1957 in Ankara upon his return from the NATO meeting, he emphasized NATO solidarity and his views on Cyprus, “*Regarding the settlement of the Cyprus issue, our proposal for partition “taksim” constitutes the last limit of the sacrifice we can make, and it is our right to expect others to understand and believe that it has this meaning.*”²⁰⁰ Beginning from 1957, there was a

¹⁹⁵ Baskin et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

¹⁹⁶ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

¹⁹⁷ Lord Hasting Ismay, “NATO April 1952- April 1957- Report to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn,” (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 1957), https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/3/137336/0096_Lord_Ismay_Report_North_Atlantic_Council_1957_ENG.pdf.

¹⁹⁸ Çağdaş Yüksel, “Nato ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasına Etkileri (1949-1974) -Nato And Its Effects On Turkey's Foreign Policy (1949-1974)” (Edirne, Trakya University, 2013).

¹⁹⁹ Dinçer Bayer, “Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations” (International Relations, Ankara, Hacettepe University, 2013),

<http://openaccess.hacettepe.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/handle/11655/2505>.

²⁰⁰ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

significant softening in the British Cyprus policy. Furthermore, the fact that the USA started to closer relations with Greek Cypriots policy on the Cyprus issue, and Turkey raised concerns which bases its foreign policy on establishing good relations with the USA and NATO.²⁰¹

In the first months of 1958, UK side Sir Hugh Foot proposed a resolution plan by, also called the Foot Plan. The Foot Plan came to the fore which based on the idea of self-management. This plan envisaged the coexistence of the two communities, was rejected by Turkey.²⁰² In the summer of the same year, the Macmillan Plan was propounded which was closer to the idea of partition.²⁰³ However, this time Greece rejected this plan.²⁰⁴ Events in the Middle East in 1958 indirectly affected Turkey's Cyprus policy. The overthrow of the pro-Western regime in Iraq led to the landing American troops in Lebanon and the landing British troops in Jordan. Turkey which determines the basis of its foreign policy according to NATO and especially the USA, in this period, Turkey did not insist on its own thesis on Cyprus so that NATO would not be adversely affected, that is why it acted very understandingly to resolve the issue. In September and October 1958, NATO once again tried to mediate between the three parties to the Cyprus problem.²⁰⁵ In this mediation attempt, NATO was decided that some NATO members who were not party to the Cyprus problem, would also participate in the negotiations between England, Turkey and Greece. It was envisaged that the USA and Norway would participate in the negotiations. However, Greece stated that Turkey had lately approved Norway's accession and it led to the failure of this trial. Because Greece wanted the Cyprus problem to be resolved not through negotiations, wanted it to be resolved in the United Nations with the principle of self-determination.²⁰⁶ Moreover, Turkey and Greece continued contacts between each other through international meetings. and as a result, with the Zurich and London agreements, under the guarantor of Turkey, England and Greece decided to the establishment of an independent republic in Cyprus.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, according to these agreements the President elected has to be Greek, the fact that his deputy has to be Turkish, and they were

²⁰¹ Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi*.

²⁰² Sir Hugh Foot, *A Start in Freedom* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1964).

²⁰³ Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956-1959* (Macmillan, 1971).

²⁰⁴ Andrekos Varnava, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy, 1957-1960," *Cyprus Review* 22, no. 1 (2010): 79–106.

²⁰⁵ Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi*.

²⁰⁶ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

²⁰⁷ Cihat Göktepe, "The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations," *Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 3 (2005): 431–44.

chosen by their own society. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus was established in Cyprus on 16 August 1960, based on the Zurich and London Treaties.²⁰⁸

2.1.1) First damage in relation: Johnson letter

Pursuant to the London Agreement of February 19, 1959, The Turkish Community in Cyprus has the right to the Vice-President, having decision and veto power with its members in the Cyprus Parliament in areas such as foreign relations, defense, taxation, defense and taxation were disturbed the Greek Community, which claimed to be the dominant power in the Republic of Cyprus. The first president of Cyprus Makarios aimed to destroy these constitutional guarantees and take control. The Cypriot Greeks who turned towards this goal, attributed the status established with the 19 February 1959 London Agreement to being a crisis area with its activities to turn the status in their favor.²⁰⁹ Thus, it was revealed that the “1960 order” caused problems. In 1962, bombs exploded in some mosques, and this was seen as the actions of EOKA. The suggestions of Makarios who came to Turkey in 1962 increased the problems.²¹⁰

The conflict called "Bloody Christmas" (*in Turkish: Kanlı Noel*) that started between the two communities in Cyprus on December 21, 1963, there were intense acts of violence by the Greeks on the Turkish Community.²¹¹ Thereupon, Turkey and England sent a note to Greece, they suggested that to stop the conflicting parties together with the British, Greek and Turkish troops. Moreover, and stated that Turkey would intervene unilaterally if the conflicts could not be prevented. Turkey has also reported its concerns on this issue to NATO. As a result of the conference convened in London on January 15, 1964, with the invitation of England, it was accepted by Turkey, Greece and England that a NATO force of 10,000 people under the command of a British officer would ensure security and order on the island.²¹² Furthermore, the USA proposed to contribute to this NATO force with a unit of 1200 men. However, Cyprus President Makarios determined to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy that's why, Makarios did not accept the US Undersecretary of State George Ball's proposal for deploy NATO forces on the island.²¹³ Ball stated that at the end of the mediation negotiations, progress could not be

²⁰⁸ Suha Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (1993): 505–25.

²⁰⁹ Geoffrey Warner, "The United States and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974," *International Affairs* 85, no. 1 (Ocak 2009): 129–43, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00785.x>.

²¹⁰ Sönmezoglu, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi*.

²¹¹ Ulvi Keser, "Bloody Christmas Of 1963 in Cyprus In The Light Of American Documents," *Journal Of Modern Turkish History Studies* XIII, no. 26 (Spring 2013): 249–71.

²¹² Baskin et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

²¹³ Stearns, *Entangled Allies*.

made due to the unreasonable attitude of the Greek Cypriot side.²¹⁴ moreover, attempts by NATO Secretary General Dirk Stigger to mediate on behalf of NATO, was also unsuccessful because the North Atlantic Council couldn't reached any consensus.²¹⁵

On the continuation of violence against the Turkish Community in Cyprus and NATO's failure to intervene in the events, Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü gave an interview to *Time* magazine. The interview was published also in Turkey, in the headline of the *Milliyet Gazzette*, on April 16, 1964.²¹⁶ İsmet İnönü stated that “*If our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up.*” in the continuation of the interview “*a new kind of world will then come into being on a new pattern, and in this new world Turkey will find herself a place.*”²¹⁷ Furthermore, İnönü wanted the USA to approve the attitudes of Greece and the Greek Cypriots, which are against the law and humanity, as well as against the NATO alliance. He said that “*I believed in the leadership of America, which is responsible for the alliance, it means I am paying for it.*”²¹⁸ As a result, the Greek Cypriot attacks increased their violence even more, which worried Turkey even more. Thereupon, Turkey took the decision to intervene in the island. This decision was taken at the Council of Ministers meeting chaired by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin was assigned to inform the American Ambassador Hare.²¹⁹ When Turkey announced on June 4, 1964 that intervention plan to Cyprus through the United States Ambassador in Ankara, it received a severe reaction from the United States. President Johnson, June 5, 1964 He wrote a letter addressed to the Prime Minister İnönü. Also known as the *Johnson Letter*, this letter was written in a non-diplomatic style.²²⁰ In this letter mention that, Turkey could not used U.S.-issued weapons without U.S. permission. Moreover, in case of problem with the Soviets due to Turkey's intervention in

²¹⁴ Ivar-Andre Slengesol, “A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (2000): 96–129.

²¹⁵ Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 1998).

²¹⁶ Bayer, “Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations.”

²¹⁷ “Turkey Ready to Quit Alliance,” *The New York Times*, April 17, 1964, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/04/17/archives/turkey-ready-to-quit-alliance.html>.

²¹⁸ Bayer, “Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations.”

²¹⁹ Halil Akman, “ABD'nin Ortadoğu Politikaları ve Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri (1952-1964) / The Effects of United States of America on Middle-East Policies and Turkish Foreign Policy (1952-1964)” (Doctoral Thesis, İstanbul, İstanbul University, 2013), <https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=r19LZ4JjYsblP4FPvWLdGQ&no=ZEishDmXx7St75Xxux2HJg>.

²²⁰ Fiona B. Adamson, “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 2 (2001): 277–303, <https://doi.org/10.2307/798062>.

Cyprus, the USA and NATO countries were not under the obligation to defend Turkey in this intervention, which NATO did not approve.²²¹ As result, Turkey has given up the idea of intervention on this. In this way, the Johnson Letter served its purpose.²²²

The most important reason for sending such a harsh letter to Turkey, which has NATO's most important military power in the south and one of the most important allies of the USA in the Middle East, the possibility Turkey-Greece crisis due to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. A possible war between two key forces of NATO's southern flank it will benefit the Soviets, and this will move the communist danger into a higher gear in the Middle East.²²³ Therefore, the problem that arose in Cyprus should resolved through diplomatic channels. And Turkey's intervention was not in line with US interests at the time. According to American diplomats, *the Johnson Letter* was not a letter to Turkey to discourage intervention, but it was just a letter warning Turkey about the consequences of a possible war. Despite these explanations, the aim of the letter was to prevent Turkey from intervening.²²⁴ Another reason President Johnson had an attitude of ignoring the injustice suffered by the Turkish community and preferred to remain inactive in Cyprus in order not to lose the votes of three million organized Greek American citizens in the presidential elections to be held at the end of 1964.²²⁵ this letter caused fragility bewteen Turkish-American relations. According to Turkish government, The United States was not as reliable an ally as they think it is. They decided to reconsider their relations with NATO and the United States, as well as with the Soviet Union.²²⁶ On the other hand, US Under-Secretary of State George Ball described the letter as "the most hurtful diplomatic note he has ever seen". Johnson's letter was crucial turning point in Turkey's foreign policy.²²⁷ The letter of US President Johnson, which was sent to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey İnönü on June 5, 1964, was hidden from the Turkish public for a long time.²²⁸ After that, it was announced to the public only with the *Hürriyet Gazette* on January 13, 1966.²²⁹ The letter began

²²¹ Lyndon B. Johnson and Ismet Inonu, "President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu: Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, as Released by the White House, January 15, 1966," *Middle East Journal* 20, no. 3 (1966): 386–93.

²²² İlhan, "Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi ve savunma politikaları / Turkey's accession to the NATO and defense policies."

²²³ GÜRHAN Yelice, "20 Temmuz 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nı hazırlayan koşullar / The circumstances that gave rise to Turkey's peace operation to Cyprus in 20 July 1974" (History, İzmir, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, 2007).

²²⁴ Nasuh Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations, 1959-2003* (New York: Nova Publishers, 2003).

²²⁵ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

²²⁶ Kalaitzaki, "US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954."

²²⁷ Warner, "The United States and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974."

²²⁸ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

²²⁹ Cüneyt Arcayürek, "İşte Johnson Mektubu," *Hürriyet Gazetesi*, January 13, 1966.

to be discussed in public after this date. İnönü sent his answer which is much longer and more comprehensive than Johnson's letter, on 13 June 1964, to Washington via the US Ambassador Hare. The letter was written in a diplomatic manner, but it was reflecting Turkey's discomfort with the US's attitude and the rightness of the Turkish side. This letter was also hidden from the Turkish public and announced to the public by being published in *the Milliyet Gazette* on 14 January 1966.

Due to Johnson's letter, the US administration's detached approach to the problems between Ankara and Athens for the benefit of NATO did not bring both countries closer to NATO, on the contrary, it distanced them.²³⁰ Furthermore, Kissinger's comment to Johnson's letter was: "*The language in Johnson's letter had never been used against any NATO ally before and will not be used again. Because NATO protects its members not because they will fall victim to a possible aggressor, but because the security interests of all allies, including the United States, require it. This is valid for countries such as Turkey, which is in an indispensable geographical position. Johnson's letter makes the NATO guarantee a strategic necessity rather than being a tool of America's desires and goals.*"²³¹ Although Turkey did not have sufficient financial means to land in Cyprus in 1964, in Turkey; There is a perception that the USA is preventing the landing in Cyprus by taking sides in favor of Greece.²³² During the 1963-1964 crisis, there was a great reaction against the United States due to the fact that Washington appeared next to Athens in the Turkish public opinion, and many anti-American demonstrations were held in Turkey at intervals until the military intervention on March 12, 1971. the reactions were made not only in the social arena, but also in the public sphere, for example, the General Staff established a division independent of NATO to be used only for national interests.²³³ The first landing ships of the Turkish landing fleet were built with national resources after this event, and the Turkish Armed Forces was made capable of overseas operations.²³⁴ Turkey's foreign policy regarding Cyprus was limited by the Johnson letter by the United States. NATO, on the other hand, has not played an independent role in the special meetings of the North Atlantic Council, other than reinforcing the US pressure on Greece and Turkey.²³⁵

²³⁰ Stearns, *Entangled Allies*.

²³¹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 7th ed. (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999).

²³² Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

²³³ Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, trans. Yavuz Alogan (Kaynak Yayınları, 2015).

²³⁴ Bayer, "Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations."

²³⁵ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*.

The Cyprus problem has provided Turkey with the opportunity to learn how lonely the Western world left it when it had problems with Greece, the historical friend of Western civilization. For this reason, Turkey reconsidered its foreign policy in 1964-1965. First of all, the alliance with the West, relations with the USA and NATO were questioned by the Turkish public opinion, Turkish political parties and the Turkish government. Turkey realized that how dangerous is to tie its security only to NATO.²³⁶ That's why, for example, Turkey has started to approach cautiously about membership in the new military structures established within NATO under the leadership of the USA, that is why in 1965 Turkey refused to join the Multilateral Force (MLF) which initially supported.²³⁷

Turkey has shaped its relations with its neighbors by considering the Cyprus issue. First of all, relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union improved significantly in 1964-1965. At the end of 1964, Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin visited Moscow, then in May 1965, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Gromiko came to Turkey, and then in August 1965, Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü went to the Soviet Union. In 1967, two countries took the form of closer economic ties²³⁸ Furthermore, Turkey also tried to improve its relations with the Middle Eastern states and hoped to find support on the Cyprus issue. For instance, Turkey supported Arab states in the 1967 the Arab Israeli War.²³⁹ Turkey supported the UN Resolution 242, demanding that Israel immediately evacuate the occupied territories, which was welcomed by Egypt and Syria. While the Arab states stopped oil shipments to many Western states, including the USA and England, they kept Turkey out of this embargo.²⁴⁰ In summary, the event that pushed Turkey to change its policy was the attitude of the Western states on Cyprus and especially the Johnson Letter. Turkey began to think that the USA established NATO to use it when the Soviet Union threatened American interests. This pushed Turkey to reshape its foreign policy.²⁴¹

2.1.2) The turning point for the relation: 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation by Turkey

²³⁶ Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

²³⁷ Bayer, "Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations."

²³⁸ John Sakkas and Nataliya Zhukova, "The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967-1974," *Les Cahiers Irice* 10, no. 1 (December 10, 2013): 123-35.

²³⁹ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1995)*.

²⁴⁰ Baskın Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası (2001 - 2012) Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, İletişim Yayınları*, Cilt:3 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul, 2013).

²⁴¹ Yüksel, "Nato ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasına Etkileri (1949-1974) -Nato And Its Effects On Turkey's Foreign Policy (1949-1974)."

To resolve the 1963-1964 crisis in Cyprus, on July 9, 1964, under the UN mediator Sakari Tuomioja and under the mediation of former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Britain, Greece and Turkey started Geneva negotiations. During these negotiations on 14 July, Acheson presented a resolution plan. The plan aimed to answer both Turkey's partition "*taksim*" and Greece's "*enosis*" argument, to address Turkey's security concerns, and to make the Eastern Mediterranean safe for the interests of the West.²⁴² This plan was planned to be presented as "*enosis*" to the Greeks and as partition "*taksim*" to the Turks, thus bringing Cyprus into NATO's sphere of influence. The USA thought that it could solve the problem within NATO, but the attempt failed because USA did not consider the Makarios factor.²⁴³ When the Geneva talks resumed on 20 July, Greece rejected this plan and returned to the proposal to start negotiations on the basis of the 1959 agreements.²⁴⁴

In November 1967, pro-enosis Greeks attacked 2 Turkish villages, and due to the subsequent events, the possibility of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus came to the fore. Upon the events, NATO appointed the Secretary General Broiso, and the USA assigned the former Deputy Defense Minister Cyrus Vance to act as mediator between Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.²⁴⁵ with the mediation of NATO, Greek General Grivas who organized the EOKA movements left Cyprus. NATO ensured 1200 Greek soldiers stationed withdrawal from on Cyprus. Thus, the tension in Cyprus was relieved however, due to Greece wants to bring the problems related to Cyprus to the international arena, no concrete results could be obtained from Vance's mediation attempts. The statement of Makarios that he no longer found the "*enosis*" plan realistic for Cyprus. This statement disturbed the military junta in power in Greece. As result, The military junta and supporters of Grivas began to see Makarios as an obstacle on the way to "*enosis*" that needed to be removed. In January 1970 and February 1972, two assassination attempt to Makarios which were the support by the junta regime in Greece were prevented by the CIA.²⁴⁶ Like Turkey, Greece started to have problems with the Makarios administration. Upon this development US Chief of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer said to Kissinger, "For the first time, Greece and Turkey are working together and we are not satisfied with this development."²⁴⁷ The USA preferred to stay out of all developments in this period.

²⁴² Onur Öymen, *Silahsız Savaş / Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi* (Remzi Kitabevi, 2011).

²⁴³ Kalaitzaki, "US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954."

²⁴⁴ Latif Ahmed Sherwani, "CYPRUS AND ITS TURKISH MINORITY," *Pakistan Horizon* 26, no. 2 (1973): 30–39.

²⁴⁵ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*.

²⁴⁶ Slengesol, "A Bad Show?"

²⁴⁷ Warner, "The United States and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974."

Kissinger evaluated that if the USA got involved in the Cyprus events, they would get the reaction of Greece and Turkey, and they would also anger Cyprus and the Soviet Union.²⁴⁸

On July 15, 1974, Coup Detat was took place against Makarios in Cyprus by Greek officers under the control of the Greek junta.²⁴⁹ The coup in Cyprus on July 15, 1974 was planned by the Greek military administration under the leadership of the nationalist and extreme anti-communist junta.²⁵⁰ The coup in Cyprus was reactions from Turkey, England, the USA and the USSR, which has interested in the region.²⁵¹In the beginning, the Americans decided to avoid the emerging crisis being dragged into a Turkish-Greek conflict or turned it into an international problem with the intervention of the Soviet Union and aimed to maintain the status quo by applying silent diplomacy. For this purpose, the United States, Britain, NATO and other allies decided to apply diplomatic pressure on the Greek government and to implement a diplomacy in which Athens would consent to the establishment of a legal government in Cyprus that would be accepted by all parties, by imposing sanctions such as restricting the sale of arms if necessary. The main purpose of this application has been determined as preventing Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, Soviet intervention, and Turkish-Greek conflict.²⁵²

The Turkish government evaluated that the situation in Cyprus was serious enough to require a military intervention. After the Council of Ministers convened in Ankara, Prime Minister Ecevit who went to the General Staff, gave his written order to the army: "The Turkish military presence would come to the island in an effective and measured manner." Before the Turkish government used its right to intervene as the guarantor state of the Republic of Cyprus, Treaty of Guarantee in 1960, it made an attempt to act together with the authorities of another guarantor state, the UK. If Britain did not accept, Turkey decided to act alone. During the negotiations with the UK, it was decided that the Turkish Armed Forces should prepare.²⁵³ Prime Minister Ecevit made a statement after the Council of Ministers: "National Security and the Council of Ministers no one took a stand against the operation. Turkey's Guarantor State As a result, it was obligatory to keep its military force in Cyprus. Only such a military in the sense

²⁴⁸ Bayer, "Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations."

²⁴⁹ Slengesol, "A Bad Show?"

²⁵⁰ Sotiris Rizas, "Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the 1970s," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 51–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850802012172>.

²⁵¹ Bayer, "Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations."

²⁵² Slengesol, "A Bad Show?"

²⁵³ Yelice, "20 Temmuz 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nı hazırlayan koşullar / The circumstances that gave rise to Turkey's peace operation to Cyprus in 20 July 1974."

of security that existence will provide a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, the situation of the Turks on the island can be secured and “*enosis*” could have been avoided. We saw that the Regime in Greece would not be willing to solve the problem through negotiations between Turkey and Greece. they had rudely turned down all our benevolent approaches. Against a regime with this mentality, we could only protect our rights with force.”²⁵⁴

Britain agreed with Turkey that the current situation in Cyprus was a violation of the constitution. However, Britain was reluctant to launch a military operation on the island. According to the UK, tensions between its two key NATO allies should have been resolved through diplomatic means. In addition, England did not want to intervene jointly with Turkey, considering that intervening in Cyprus would adversely affect its relations with Greece. Despite all these clear statements of Ecevit, the British they did not think that Turkey would make a military intervention in Cyprus.²⁵⁵ In the face of this attitude of Greece, which is one of the three guarantor countries that have secured the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which violated the agreements, Turan Güneş, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, told Kozmopoulos, the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, on the morning of 20 July 1974 he made the following statement: “The Turkish Armed Forces have now intervened in Cyprus pursuant to the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey comes to the island to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus and the rights of both communities.”²⁵⁶

3.1 Relations after 1974:

NATO did not approach the Southeast Flank realistically and evaluated the problems between its two allies only in terms of the risks it could pose to NATO security. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has periodically given cursory attention to Turkish-Greek conflicts since 1964. While the political problems between Turkey and Greece continued, NATO Secretary General only touched upon the military issues of the alliance with his “Watching Brief” reports. NATO preferred to ignore the problems between the two countries.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ İbrahim Artuç, *Kıbrıs'ta Savaş ve Barış*, KASTAŞ YAYINLARI, 1989.

²⁵⁵ Yelice, “20 Temmuz 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nı hazırlayan koşullar / The circumstances that gave rise to Turkey's peace operation to Cyprus in 20 July 1974.”

²⁵⁶ Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün [Kıbrıs / Cyprus]*, 7th ed. (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayın A.Ş., 1984).

²⁵⁷ Stearns, *Entangled Allies*.

Karamanlis, who came to power by returning to Greece after the 20 July 1974 Cyprus operation. He claimed that after the Turkish forces started the operation to expand the areas occupied in Cyprus on 14 August 1974, moreover he claimed that the NATO allies did not prevent Ankara. As a reaction on 15 August 1974, Greece announced his withdrawal from the military wing of NATO.²⁵⁸ The reasons for this decision considered as, to appease the rising anti-American anger in the Greek public, attracting the attention of the allies about the strategic importance of Greece and regaining national control over the Greek Armed Forces.²⁵⁹

After Turkey's 1974 Cyprus Operation, while the US Congress was discussing the issue of placing an arms embargo on Turkey, the US administration opposed the embargo. Politicians under the influence of the Greek lobby, who advocated the embargo, argued that Turkey's use of American weapons in Cyprus was against American laws and bilateral agreements. Although Israel used American weapons to fight against the Arabs in 1967 and 1973 however no sanctions were imposed against Israel. While there are the same reasons, it has been evaluated that not applying sanctions to Israel and applying an arms embargo to NATO ally Turkey will cause double standards and inconsistency in foreign policy, and therefore the US administration has taken a stance against the embargo. However, as result, in the US Senate, on December 17, 1974, with a vote of 43 to 49, and in the House of Representatives on December 18, 1974, by 209 votes to 189, for the "US to initiate an arms embargo on Turkey until February 5, 1975". President Ford approved and enacted these resolutions on December 30, 1974. The sale of arms to Turkey by the USA was stopped on February 5, 1975, and the \$200 million aid that was expected to be given was also suspended.²⁶⁰

The arms embargo on Turkey was taken as a result of the pressure of the Greek lobby in the USA, and the US administration despite its resistance the congress decisions due to the awareness of Turkey's strategic importance. Still the US administration could not do anything against.

In Kissinger's words, "Turkey was an indispensable ally for the United States. The United States was monitoring Soviet missile and nuclear weapons tests from 26 facilities in Turkey. Nothing like this has ever happened in NATO's history. This decision was against the interests of both NATO and the United States."²⁶¹ On the other hand, while sanctions were imposed on

²⁵⁸ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

²⁵⁹ Rizas, "Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the 1970s."

²⁶⁰ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

²⁶¹ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*.

Turkey after the Cyprus intervention in 1974, no sanctions were imposed on Greece due to the 1964 and 1967 interventions.²⁶² Turkey's intervention in Cyprus was entirely due to the July 15, 1974 Coup with the support of the Greek government. Instead of Greece, Turkey, which uses its guarantor right arising from international law, has been addressed.²⁶³ In the following period, the Westerners point of view of Cyprus was also shaped within the framework of this logic, and Turkey was constantly accused of being an occupying country because the Cyprus problem could not be resolved. On the other hand, The US administration, in Helsinki, told the Western European Leaders: "We wanted to provide arms aid to Turkey, to make every effort to keep Turkey in NATO, to support the Cyprus talks to be held in Vienna and to prevent the internationalization of the Cyprus negotiations. Moreover, USA administration made suggestions such as encouraging Greece to return to the military wing of NATO. When the U.S. Congress decided to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, the U.S. administration made sure that the Southeast Flank of NATO was affected in the least possible way, The US administration made attempts to orders for Germany and France to provide military aid to Turkey and Greece, primarily to Turkey. the U.S. administration coordinated Germany aid for Turkey."²⁶⁴

The government of the Republic of Turkey notified the US administration on February 9, 1975, that the US bases in Turkey could be closed in the new situation that arose due to the cessation of the US aid to Turkey. Turkey said that has given the message that they will continue to maintain a harmonious ally. If America removes the arms embargo, Turkey does not want to harm its friendly relations with the United States.²⁶⁵ US Secretary of State Kissinger came to Ankara on May 21, 1975 and requested Prime Minister Demirel not to close the bases. However, as the embargo continued and the USA did not comply with its commitments, Turkey unilaterally terminated the "Joint Defense and Union Agreement" between the USA and Turkey on 25 July 1975 and stopped the activities of the American bases in Turkey. All facilities whose operations were stopped, were transferred to the full control and supervision of the Turkish Armed Forces.²⁶⁶ On the other hand, while the USA was imposing an arms embargo on Turkey, continue to increase Greece's fighting capability by transferring A-7 bombers to Greece. This situation has offended Turkey. Thereupon, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Erbakan said, "If

²⁶² Stearns, *Entangled Allies*.

²⁶³ Bayer, "Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations."

²⁶⁴ U.S. Secretary of State., "Message to the American Embassy of Bonn," March 1975, 251402 Z Mar 75, E.O. 11652; <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR43>.,

²⁶⁵ The Amembassy Ankara, "Message to the U.S. Secretary of State.," April 1975, 220430 Z APR 75, E.O. 11652: N/A., <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR43>.,

²⁶⁶ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

the American embargo continues and the US's attitude does not change, Turkey can change the balance of power in the world and buy weapons from other sources, including the Soviet Union."²⁶⁷ Meanwhile, Turkey; have implemented an obstructive attitude and policy towards the efforts of Greece to return to the military wing of NATO. Furthermore, tolerating the Khomeini regime in Iran, it did not allow NATO's Rapid Deployment Force to be deployed on its territory and to fly U-2 spy planes in its airspace.²⁶⁸

Since the mid-1970s, when the USSR's influence in the Mediterranean increased, and especially on the developments in Iran and Afghanistan, Western countries began to worry about Greece being excluded from the NATO military wing. Commander-in-Chief of NATO European Forces (SACEUR) Gen. Alexander Haig and the next commander, Gen. Bernard Rogers, attempted to facilitate Greece's return to NATO's military wing during the governments of both Demirel and Ecevit, but they were unsuccessful.²⁶⁹ Greece applied to NATO in 1977 and wanted to re-establish ties with the military wing of the alliance, because of Turkish threat. According to the Greek proposal, it was foreseen that the Greek officers would not return to the NATO headquarters in Izmir and that a separate NATO headquarters would be established in Larissa, northern Greece, under the command of a Greek officer. Thus, Greece aimed to give the control responsibility in the Aegean Sea to Greece, as it was before 1974. At the end of the negotiations between NATO Commander-in-Chief Haig and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in Davos, an agreement, which was close to Greek views, was signed in February 1978 and this agreement was accepted by other NATO members. On the other hand, Turkey vetoed both the return of Greece to NATO and the agreement. Turkey argued that in this case, the conditions changed, and Greece could not return under the previous conditions, and that the command-control responsibilities should be re-determined according to Turkey's wishes. Lastly, Turkey vetoed the return of Greece to NATO's military wing from 1977 until the 1980 military coup.

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The US arms embargo, which was implemented on the grounds that Turkey used US weapons in violation of the agreements, continued to work not only against Turkey, but also against both

²⁶⁷ The Amembassy Ankara. "Message to the U.S. Secretary of State," August 1975. 251115 Z AUG 75, E.O. 11652: N/A. <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR43>.

²⁶⁸ Omer Goksel Isyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 32.

²⁶⁹ Adnan Önder, "Türk Yunan İlişkileri (Kıta Sahaneliği Meselesi)" (Master Degree Thesis, Edirne, Trakya University, 2008).

²⁷⁰ Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism."

NATO and the US with Turkey's countersanctions. NATO became sensitive to the Soviet Union on NATO's Southeast Flank because of due to the inability to use the bases in Turkey, and the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO, and the possible weakness of the Turkish Armed Forces, which may be caused by the US arms embargo. However, Turkey took the necessary measures to develop the national military industry in order to eliminate the weakness that the US embargo might create on the Turkish Armed Forces. That is why, Greece could not get the desired benefit from the embargo and the Greek Armed Forces could not make any progress in its position and relative military comparison compared to the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, it is considered that the most important the weakening of the southern flank of NATO may have occurred due to the US arms embargo against Turkey and in the same period Greece's departure from NATO's military wing in this period.²⁷¹

While discussing the risk of facing a weakness in NATO's southern flank against the Soviet Union, as a result of Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military structure; Turkey has assured NATO that this weakness will be covered by Turkey. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in April 1980 increased Turkey's regional importance, thus reviving the financial support to Turkey from the west. In return, Turkey was asked to allow Greece to return to NATO's military wing. However, Demirel who was responsible to an elected assembly, could not make such a concession.²⁷² After the September 12, 1980 coup in Turkey, on October 6, USA Ambassador Spain met with Evren and conveyed a message that President Carter's concerns about NATO's Southeast Flank being divided would be a tragedy for all parties. Furthermore, NATO Commander-in-Chief, General Rogers arrived in Ankara in October 1980. He told Evren Chief of General Staff, that the elections in Greece will held within 6 months and that if the socialists came to power, this country could be completely lost as an ally. Finally, Rogers convinced Evren, went to Brussels. Upon his return, NATO officials urgently called on NATO Defense Planning on October 20, 1980. Council approved and supported the return of Greece into the military wing of NATO. The Rogers Plan which known as the temporary arrangement for NATO command and control in the Aegean and consisting of 4 items, was made up of extremely complex provisions. Hence, the main issue for NATO and the USA which was Greece's return to NATO military flank was dealt with between the two commanders.²⁷³ 12

²⁷¹ Bayer, "Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations."

²⁷² Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*.

²⁷³ Oran, Baskın. *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. Cilt 2. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013.

September 1980 military coup, it weakened Turkey's hand in NATO and the European Union. Turkey was relying on the word of General Rogers and allowed return to Greece's NATO military thus Turkey lost only one trump card against Greece.²⁷⁴ According to a report by *Günaydın newspaper* on 01 November 1978, NATO Commander-in-Chief, General Haig made an interview with a defense magazine called *MS*, “The embargo caused a major decrease in the effectiveness and capabilities of the Turkish Armed Forces, which negatively affected NATO's defense power in the Southeast Flank.”²⁷⁵ From this expression, it was evaluated that the lifting of the embargo was due to the concern of NATO's weakening against the Soviets, rather than the concern of meeting Turkey's needs.²⁷⁶ Following the lifting of the embargo, the US Congress approved roughly equal military aid to Greece and Turkey. However, while aid to Turkey is in debt status, for Greece was noted that some of the aid provided was a grant.²⁷⁷

5- POST- THE COLD WAR PERIOD: (the 1990s)

3.4 The collapse of the USSR: Effects on the relation between NATO and Turkey

When we look at the systematic developments after the end of the Cold War period, how this alliance adapted to this transformation and how this adaptation process resulted, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disintegrated after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Eastern and Central European countries got rid of the influence of the Soviet Union, as a result of this situation, West and East Germany came together, and as a result, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. The old world order, which manifested itself in the form of East-West confrontation, has been abolished, and a new world order has started in its place. However, there are political structures that have not yet settled and found their place in this new world order: the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the nations in the former Yugoslavia have not yet fully stabilized. Imbalances and authority vacuum in the surrounding regions of Central Asia, and various interest expectations on these regions, the eternal conflicts between India and Pakistan, and the constant threat environment, and many more problems and uncertainties, all of these regions are either the border with Turkey. , or within Turkey's sphere of interest and influence. On the other hand, the structuring, which was formed as a

²⁷⁴ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

²⁷⁵ M. Emin Değer, *Oltadaki Balık Türkiye Emperyalizmin Tuzaklarındaki Ülke* (Kilit Yayınları, 2018).

²⁷⁶ Bayer, “Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde NATO'nun tutumu ve bunun Türkiye-NATO ilişkilerine yansımaları / NATO's stance toward Turkish-Greek relations and its reflections on Turkish-NATO relations.”

²⁷⁷ Ellen B. Laipson, *A Congressional Tradition: 7/10 Ratio in Military Aid to Greece and Turkey*, microform (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1983).

purely economic union (EEC) in Europe, has begun to transform into a political union under the name of the European Union and to create its own common defense force.²⁷⁸ The post-Cold War order is faced with three problems because of NATO: Internal relations in the traditional alliance structure; The relations of the Atlantic states with the satellite states of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and finally, the relations of the states that replaced the Soviet Union, especially the Russian Federation, with the North Atlantic and Eastern European countries may be the most important development in the last century. that the cold war is over.²⁷⁹ The most important reason for making such a judgment is that the tense and tense structuring in the world order based on East-West polarization since 1945 ended peacefully and unexpectedly.²⁸⁰ Indeed, since this development took place at a very sudden and unexpected time, Turkey, like some other states, caught it off guard. One of the important consequences of the end of the cold war period is the fact that the USA remains the sole superpower in the international system. Therefore, it can be said that the cold war period resulted in the victory of the West in general and the USA in particular.²⁸¹

With the end of the Cold War, critical approaches have also begun to show themselves in the scope of security. The ineffectiveness of the Eastern Bloc and its political, economic and military power in the international system has brought uncertainty about the future of NATO. Since the Warsaw Pact abolished itself, there was no competition, and there were those who claimed that there was no longer any need for NATO.²⁸² In the face of this claim, countries and neo-liberal views, which claim that NATO's existence is vital for the future of the West, especially England, have made an effort to keep the organization from losing its presence. Ultimately, NATO within the neo-liberal theory; It maintained its legitimacy on the grounds that it facilitated the cooperation of states and international organizations in security and other topics, and intervened in crises and conflicts with the principle of humanitarian responsibility, and thus, it took itself outside the field and gained the status of "world police".²⁸³ In the light of the end of the Cold War and the developments

²⁷⁸ Naci Doğan, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni Bağlamında Uluslararası Sistem, NATO'nun Rolü ve Türkiye'nin Stratejik Konumu" 5, no. 1 (2004): 21–45.

²⁷⁹ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*.

²⁸⁰ Abdulkadir BAHARÇİÇEK, "Uluslararası Sistemdeki Yeni Yapılanmaların Türkiye Açısından Yarattığı Bazı Önemli Sonuçlar Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," *Yeni Türkiye Dergisi* 21. Yy. Özel Sayı, no. 2 (1998).

²⁸¹ Richard G. Lugar, "American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (1994): 15–27.

²⁸² Jennifer Medcalf, *NATO: A Beginner's Guide* (Oneworld Publications, 2005).

²⁸³ Güngör Şahin, "Küresel Güvenliğin Dönüşümü; NATO Bağlamında Kavramsal, Tarihsel ve Teorik Bir Analiz," *Savunma Bilimleri Dergisi The Journal of Defense Sciences*, March 14, 2018, 59–81, <https://doi.org/10.17134/khosbd.405678>.

that took place, NATO shaped its new strategy at the summit held in Rome in 1991 and adopted the new policies that are vital for Turkey and listed below: ²⁸⁴ New and close relations with Central and Eastern European countries will be developed, the Soviet Union (Russian Federation) is no longer an enemy, new threats to the NATO alliance are risks in Central and Eastern Europe and potential military threats from North Africa and the Middle East, Nuclear, chemical and the proliferation of biological weapons is another threat, NATO will give more importance to political and economic means rather than military power in the fight against new threats, NATO will be equipped with more mobile, faster and advanced technology military force, In addition, NATO's new peacekeeping role It has been accepted that the alliance can undertake operations outside the protected area. ²⁸⁵ NATO'nun kabul ettiđi bu yeni strateji, Türkiye'yi çok yakından ilgilendiren özellikler içermektedir. Özellikle yeni askeri tehditlerin İslâm Ülkeleri'nden geleceđini belirtmesi ve Ortadođu ile Kuzey Afrika bölgelerinin NATO için yeni tehdit alanları oluşturacađının vurgulanıp kabul edilmesi, son derece köklü strateji deđişikliđini ifade etmektedir. It is difficult to say that the possible threats to Turkey in the new world order that is being established are less in terms of quality and quantity than before. In fact, Turkey is once again gaining an important position within NATO's new strategy, for reasons different from those in the Cold War era. The Gulf War that took place after 1990, the bloody conflicts in Bosnia, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and some conflicts and crises created by this disintegration are important events that took place in the geographies surrounding Turkey. support was needed. For this reason, NATO's taking on an out-of-zone role will mean that it will be used in these sensitive geographies that surround Turkey, which have not yet attained a permanent and permanent stability, and which seem to be pregnant with the emergence of some new events and crises at any moment. Such a Turkey's active participation in the operation within the framework of the UN Peacekeeping Force as well as within the framework of NATO Forces will definitely be required, and more will be required. However, it could be argued that during the Cold War period, the interests of Turkey and the Western world, if not exactly the same, at least because of the situation and attitude of the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Union was a threat to both. However, it is not always possible to say that the interests of Turkey and the West intersect in the

²⁸⁴ BAHARÇİÇEK, "Uluslararası Sistemdeki Yeni Yapılanmaların Türkiye Açısından Yarattığı Bazı Önemli Sonuçlar Üzerine Bir Deđerlendirme."

²⁸⁵ Kori Schake, "NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative," *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 3 (1998): 379-407.

Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia. What this means is that with its new strategy, NATO may impose new missions on Turkey that are not in line with its interests and will even harm it. More importantly, it is the fact that Turkey may not be able to impose it in this context and will have to accept this mission bluntly.²⁸⁶

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era for Turkey, which has been giving strategic priority to meeting the Soviet threat for years. The peculiarity of the new era that started with this process is Turkey's flexibility to become a direct focus open to a number of multifaceted and sometimes ambiguous threats, or an indirect crossroads where these reconcile and collide or conflict.²⁸⁷ New strategies in the emerging new world order contain propositions that will enable Turkey to become the central front country of NATO. One of the reasons for this is that Russia, which holds the Soviet military power, now borders only Turkey, which is a NATO member in Europe, and this situation (still) poses a threat to Turkey. The second reason is the rise of nationalist tendencies in some former Soviet republics and especially in the Caucasus region, leading to new conflicts and their close concern to Turkey. The third reason is the continuation of the instability that has existed in the Middle East region for more than a century. Turkey was the only NATO country bordering these regions, where instability is seen as a key feature.²⁸⁸ Due to these developments and changes, Turkey has come to the position of being the center front country of the Alliance instead of Germany in the post-Cold War period.²⁸⁹

In the 1990s, we come across as the period when the debates on security were the most. For this period, the idea that security was not only assumed as a military threat and that the main purpose of the security policies created was not only to prevent wars began to become more evident. This, in turn, led to the rapid development of expanded security concepts. When viewed, the perception of security threat in traditional security studies is still tried to be explained only with military reasons. When we look at the newly formed understanding of security, it started to develop after the increase in threats targeting security. After this process, in addition to military threat perceptions, the disappearance of natural resources, smuggling, international migration, economic imbalances, ethnic conflicts, environmental

²⁸⁶ Doğan, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni Bağlamında Uluslararası Sistem, NATO'nun Rolu ve Türkiye'nin Stratejik Konumu."

²⁸⁷ Doğan.

²⁸⁸ BAHARÇIÇEK, "Uluslararası Sistemdeki Yeni Yapılanmaların Türkiye Açısından Yarattığı Bazı Önemli Sonuçlar Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme."

²⁸⁹ Doğan, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni Bağlamında Uluslararası Sistem, NATO'nun Rolu ve Türkiye'nin Stratejik Konumu."

pollution are also included in security threat perceptions. ²⁹⁰Within the scope of international organizations, security concepts such as energy security, health security, food security, livelihood security have started to become more used. With the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the troublesome problems against NATO, NATO fell into an identity crisis. The debate about the purpose of NATO's existence has become inevitable²⁹¹ In this alliance, it would either end like the Warsaw Pact or follow a policy of deepening or expansion by adopting different missions. Another important decision taken in the organization was enlargement. ²⁹². Genişleme ile amaçlananın, Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin NATO'ya alınmasıyla birlikte Avrupa'da mevcut istikrarsızlık kaynaklarının ortadan kaldırılması ve NATO'nun yirmi birinci yüzyılda da dünyanın güvenlik ihtiyacına cevap verebilmesi olduğu söylenebilir. ²⁹³ If we look at the enlargement policies from Turkey's point of view, it should be reminded that Turkey, which generally supports NATO's enlargement policies, came to this point with some discussions. NATO's first invitation to enlargement was made to the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary at the Madrid summit in July 1997. Before this summit, before the NATO foreign ministers meeting held in February 1997, Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller warned in a speech that they were not against the enlargement of the alliance in principle, but that they were not against the enlargement of the alliance in principle, but that NATO, Western European Union and the EU's enlargement processes should be progressing in conjunction with it in NATO documents. At this point, one of the most important reasons for Turkey's opposition to NATO enlargement in 1997 is the fear that this enlargement will impose a financial burden on Turkey and it will lose its strategic importance. This thought of Turkey remained only in discourse and as it is known, it unconditionally supported the expansion of NATO. ²⁹⁴

new concepts have been shaped on human rights, democracy, freedoms, humanitarian interventions and the actions of terrorist groups on a global scale. NATO's reshaped missions and current goals have cast doubt on the sustainability of Turkey's position, which it maintained throughout the Cold War. In this context, the testing of Turkey's position and duties in the new crises that have arisen has also been the determinant of its new place in

²⁹⁰ Örgen Uğurlu, "TÜRKİYE'DE ÇEVRESEL GÜVENLİK BAĞLAMINDA SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR ENERJİ POLİTİKALARI" (Doctoral Thesis, Ankara, Ankara University, 2006).

²⁹¹ Ali Güzel, "NATO'nun Yeni Misyonu : "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Güvenlik Algılamaları," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 12 (2009).

²⁹² E.B. Tepe, "Prag Zirvesi: Genişlemeye Devam Mı?," *Stratejik Analiz Dergisi.*, no. 31 (2002).

²⁹³ Şahin, "Küresel Güvenliğin Dönüşümü; NATO Bağlamında Kavramsal, Tarihsel ve Teorik Bir Analiz."

²⁹⁴ Arif Bağbaşıoğlu, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası NATO Politikaları ve Türkiye'nin Rolü," in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 2014, 159–76.

NATO.²⁹⁵ While there were threats emanating from the Soviet Union, the perception among NATO members that the alliance was essentially a European-military-defense organization was strong. With the 1990s, the European allies within NATO started to see Turkey more as a part of the Middle East security system and wanted to create their own security institutions independent of NATO/USA, which started to worry Turkey. While the disappearance of the Soviet Union decreased Turkey's need for security in NATO, the European Union member countries' questioning of Turkey's European identity and possible EU membership made it possible for Turkey to look at NATO from an identity perspective for a while.²⁹⁶ The important issue for Turkey was that NATO could remain European and regional on the one hand, and renew itself in line with the globalization process on the other. While the globalization of threats, both in terms of the geographical areas they originate from and their characteristics, pulled NATO out of the European area, Turkey cared that this process would not cause a serious erosion in NATO's European identity.²⁹⁷

3.5 INVASION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ:

3.2.1 EMERGE OF “OUT OF AREA” ISSUE AND DISCUSSION OF “USE/ACTIVATION OF ARTICLE 5

The concept of out of area is used in NATO terminology to refer to areas outside the Alliance's mandate. By mandate we mean not only geographical area, but also NATO goals and principles. The out-of-area problem was a problem that emerged in relation to the measures to be taken within the framework of NATO on developments in the regions that directly affected the interests of these countries, although they were outside the area NATO was responsible for defending. As it is clearly understood from the text of the Treaty (arts. 5 and 6) NATO's mandate is the countries of the member states and their islands, planes and ships in the Mediterranean and north of the Tropic of Cancer. On the other hand, this mandate is also limited to the principle of "legitimate defense", which is expressed in Article 51 of the UN Charter; because, according to Article 5, "(...) the parties will consider an arms rape that will take place in Europe or North America (...) against one or more of them" as an attack directed at all

²⁹⁵ Sinem Kocamaz, *Türk Dış Politikası; Aktörler, Tercihler, Krizler, Çözümler*, ed. Sertif Demir, Ayça Eminoğlu, and Poyraz Günsoy, 1st ed. (Ankara: Barış Kitabevi, 2017).

²⁹⁶ ALI L. KARAOSMANOĞLU, "NATO Enlargement and the South: A Turkish Perspective," *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 2 (1999): 213–24.

²⁹⁷ Tarık Oğuzlu, "NATO ve Türkiye: Dönüşen İttifakın Sorgulayan Üyesi," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 9, no. 34 (June 1, 2012): 99–124.

parties and that the UN treaty will 5 They shall exercise their individual or collective defense rights based on Article 1. In other words, NATO cannot engage in any military operation other than self-defense, and NATO facilities and facilities cannot be used for such a purpose. .²⁹⁸ While the legal situation is like this, the reason for the emergence of the problem of being out of the area in the organization is the NATO opportunities of some alliance members, especially the USA. He sought various solutions to overcome this problem. It was primarily the Gulf crisis that began with the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. After the end of this crisis, part of it is that they want to use it beyond an Emergency Response to be deployed in Turkey. In order to establish the legal basis for the establishment of the Intervention Force, in November 1991, the principle that military forces could be sent outside of the mandate was adopted in case of "vital interests" such as preventing the flow of "very basic resources", namely oil. ²⁹⁹

And it is observed that the deep differences between the European members of NATO and Turkey in their perspectives on the threats emanating from the Middle East region have not changed much during the quarter century since the end of the Cold War. The hesitancy of European governments to assist Turkey under the umbrella of NATO has also been a reflection of the ongoing debates in the public opinion of these countries. The reactions of the opposition, especially in Germany and Belgium, showed that the European public was not in agreement on this issue.³⁰⁰ In the months following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Turkey, taking into account the possibility of the spread and escalation of the developments in the nearby geography, towards its NATO allies, in December 1990, through the deployment of the Alliance's Emergency Response Corps on its territory. However, Western European members of the Alliance slowed down in fulfilling their commitments under Article 5, arguing that the Middle East remained "outside" NATO's area of operation. ³⁰¹ As it is known, the "Out of Area" problem of the Middle East for European Allies is a problem that has existed since Turkey's NATO membership. As part of the USA's "containment policy" of the Soviet Union, many Western European member states, especially France and England, opposed the inclusion of Turkey in the North Atlantic Alliance together with Greece. The main reason behind this opposition was the concern that if Turkey joined as a full member, it would bring the problems

²⁹⁸ Derya GONCA PEKSARI, "NATO'NUN DEĞİŞEN KONSEPTİ" (Master Degree Thesis, Kırıkkale, Kırıkkale University, 2006).

²⁹⁹ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

³⁰⁰ Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*.

³⁰¹ Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "TÜRKİYE-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ," *SETA / SİYASET, EKONOMİ VE TOPLUM ARAŞTIRMALARI VAKFI*, no. 195 (March 2017).

of the Middle East region, which it is right next to its neighbor, into the Alliance.³⁰² The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proved the concerns of the European members of NATO on this issue. Although with article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty defining intra-Alliance solidarity, “an armed attack against one or more of them in North America or Europe shall be considered an attack against all (...) individually and others together with the use of armed force, they will help the attacked party or parties by taking actions deemed necessary” and with Article 6, “The parties' territory in Europe or North America, France's Algerian Although it has been registered that an armed attack on the Turkish territory (...) forces, ships, or aircraft in this territory or in the airspace over these territories (...) will be considered an attack on all member states, Western When it comes to Turkey's security, the European allies only have the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact-member neighbor Bulgaria to the northwest. They conveyed to the Turkish side in unofficial environments that they would be able to fulfill their obligations towards Turkey in the event of a possible attack. In other words, Western European NATO member countries should be content with the nuclear security guarantees of the Alliance, which provides a deterrent against an attack from the Soviet Union, and the problems and problems arising with Turkey's neighbors in the Middle East are NATO's own. It is out of my area of responsibility. Because NATO's priority is the threat arising from the Warsaw Pact".³⁰³

3.2.2. TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE GULF WAR

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq, which became the country with the most important military power in the Middle East, started to experience significant problems in repaying the debts it took from the Gulf countries during the war. The drop in oil prices in 1990 made the economic situation in Iraq more difficult. Since mid-July 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein blamed the drop in oil prices, especially the oil policies of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and at the same time began to lay claim to some oil deposits in the Kuwaiti territory, in the border area with Kuwait. The negotiations between the two countries on the subject in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, could not yield any results, and Iraqi military units invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, led by Saddam Hussein, was met with astonishment all over the world.³⁰⁴

³⁰² Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*.

³⁰³ Kibaroglu, “TÜRKİYE-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ.”

³⁰⁴ Alptekin Molla, “SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI KÖRFEZ KRİZLERİ VE TÜRKİYE-ABD-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ,” *Journal of Management and Economics Research* 7, no. 11 (August 1, 2009): 29–45.

When Kuwait was invaded by Iraq, Turgut Özal was the president and Yıldırım Akbulut was the prime minister in Turkey. ³⁰⁵Turkey's initial approach to the Gulf crisis, which began with the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi armed forces, was rather cautious. In the statements made by the Turkish authorities right after the invasion, it was stated that the invasion made the solution of the problem in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict difficult, and Turkey's opinion on the peaceful solution of the problem was announced to the public. ³⁰⁶ Statements in this direction were evaluated as an effort by Turkey not to show a clear stance at the beginning of the crisis and not to appear as a party. However, high-level visits from both Iraq and the United States to Turkey at the beginning of the crisis in the Gulf region revealed the key role that Turkey will play in overcoming this crisis. During the visits, it was observed that the parties tried to influence Turkey in line with their own policies. While Turkey's role against the Soviet Union during the Cold War shifted to the Middle East region due to the crisis in the Gulf, the factors threatening Turkey's security began to come from the South, not from the North. The expectation that the softening in the East-West relations will remove the defense priority in Turkish-American relations has come to the fore again after the developments in the Gulf region. ³⁰⁷ The decisions taken at the NATO Council of Ministers, which convened right after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, created some firsts in the history of the organization. NATO, which entered into an important transformation process right after the Cold War, has provided an important consultation and decision-making ground in this new period, and signaled that its political activity will be at the forefront from now on as well as its field of military activity. The fact that NATO sent the air elements of the Rapid Deployment Force to the Southeastern region of Turkey to assist Turkey's air defense meant that for the first time, NATO assigned a military force subordinate to it in a crisis. ³⁰⁸ The assignment of the Rapid Deployment Force against an 'out-of-area' country other than the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was a first in the history of the alliance. The decisions taken by NATO during the Gulf crisis also provided guidance on how NATO, which comes to the fore from time to time and is defined as 'out of area', will approach the problems that may arise out of its main area of responsibility. ³⁰⁹ The fact that the members of the organization discussed and evaluated a problem that developed outside the

³⁰⁵ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt 2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013).

³⁰⁶ Molla, "SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI KÖRFEZ KRİZLERİ VE TÜRKİYE-ABD-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ."

³⁰⁷ Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1991-03-01/turkey-and-west>.

³⁰⁸ Alptekin Molla, "NATO SAVUNMA POLİTİKALARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİNİN ANALİZİ" (Doctoral Thesis, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2008).

³⁰⁹ Molla, "SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI KÖRFEZ KRİZLERİ VE TÜRKİYE-ABD-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ."

scope of NATO's responsibility in detail showed that NATO would have a political weight in such problems among similar problems that may arise from now on. However, the organization's statement that it did not support a joint operation and only supported the United States of America, which sent troops to the region, revealed that some European alliance members did not take kindly to the "out of area" approach and their hesitations on this issue continued. Despite this decision taken by NATO, many NATO member countries contributed more or less militarily to the multinational force led by the United States of America, which was dispatched to the Gulf region, and that they opened the air, land and naval bases in their countries to the use of this multinational force. Even if not, it was important in terms of revealing NATO's connection with the Gulf crisis.³¹⁰ Right after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States of America started to build up a military build-up for a possible operation in the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, under the name of '*Desert Shield*'.³¹¹ At the end of August, he conveyed his wishes to the NATO Secretariat to go beyond its own area. In his speech at the extraordinary NATO Council meeting in September, US Secretary of State James Baker stated that member countries should take more military, political and financial responsibilities, including sending troops in the Gulf crisis, and demanded that Turkey benefit more from intelligence.³¹²

Turkey's pro-Western policy in the first days of the Gulf Crisis developed in the form of a closer cooperation with the United States of America in the later stages. Especially with the war becoming inevitable, Turkey not only complied with the resolutions of the UN Security Council, but also displayed a more positive approach to the demands of the United States of America in an operation to be launched against Iraq, which included military issues as well as economic and political support.³¹³ And the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces was closely watched by NATO, and the special situation of Turkey, which has a land border with Iraq, played an important role in this. Immediately after the invasion, the NATO headquarters in Brussels condemned the military attack of Iraq against Kuwait, and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces located on the territory of Kuwait. In addition, it was stated that the invasion act of Iraq constituted a clear violation of the United Nations convention, and the Alliance was invited to solve the problems of Iraq through peaceful means.

³¹⁰ İsmet Giritli, *Körfez Bunalımının Boyutları* (İstanbul, 1992), https://www.kitantik.com/product/Korfez-Bunaliminin-Boyutlari_1br9qfyki5xvhj910h7.

³¹¹ "OPERATION DESERT SHIELD," *On Point* 16, no. 1 (2010): 4–5.

³¹² Uğur URHAN, "1 NCI KÖRFEZ KRİZİ VE TÜRKİYE" (Master Degree Thesis, Van, YÜZÜNCÜ YIL ÜNİVERSİTESİ, 2007).

³¹³ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey and the United States: The Impact of the War in Iraq," *International Journal* 61, no. 1 (2005): 61–81, <https://doi.org/10.2307/40204129>.

Regarding the crisis in the Gulf, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner's statements after the bilateral meetings with the United States President George Bush stated that there are roles suitable for NATO in the Gulf issue, that this region is completely ' *the opinion that it cannot be considered as 'out of the field of duty'* ' was reflected. ³¹⁴At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting held in Brussels on August 10, 1990, the four-point proposal package proposed by the United States was accepted by the member states, while President Bush's decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia was supported and absolute defense assurance was given to Turkey. ³¹⁵

Turkey has begun to consider the NATO military aid issue more seriously at this stage of the crisis, which had come to the fore before but did not take kindly to it because it expected positive results from Iraq's reaction and peace efforts. Upon the increase in the possibility of conflict in the Gulf, Turkey applied to NATO and demanded that the air elements of the Rapid Deployment Force, which was envisaged to reinforce the armies of the flank countries for the first time in NATO history, be sent to its own territory. ³¹⁶ The NATO Defense and Planning Committee, which met towards the end of December 1990, could not reach a complete decision on the sending of the requested air force elements. Belgium and Germany requested that delegations of experts be sent to Turkey for an on-site examination and a decision based on the report to be prepared. As a result of the evaluations made, the NATO Defense and Planning Committee, which convened again in early January 1991, responded positively to Turkey's request to deploy air units affiliated in Turkey. ³¹⁷ In the statement made by the Committee, it was stated that it was decided to send an air force consisting of German, Belgian and Italian planes affiliated to NATO Aggression Force to the Southeastern region of Turkey. It was also emphasized that the purpose of the resolution was to show that the alliance is in common solidarity and determination against a possible threat to the territorial integrity of an allied country, and thus to contribute to deterrence and defense. Within the framework of this decision, Germany decided to send 18 Alfa Jets and 300 German military personnel to Turkey.

³¹⁴ J. E. Peters and H. Deshong, *Out-of-Area or Out-of-Reach?: European Military Support for Operations in Southwest Asia*, 0 edition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995).

³¹⁵ Molla, "NATO SAVUNMA POLİTİKALARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİNİN ANALİZİ."

³¹⁶ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 2*.

³¹⁷ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," *Foreign Policy*, no. 98 (1995): 116–29, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148961>.

³¹⁸ Military personnel to be sent by Germany II. It was the first military unit sent abroad by this country since World War II. ³¹⁹

While the Turkish government expressed its satisfaction after this decision taken by NATO, the effective efforts of the United States of America played an important role in taking this decision. In particular, the convincing of the European allies to move NATO's role 'outside the area' was carried out by the United States rather than Turkey. The sincerity and wishes of some of the NATO members, who seemed to have been convinced to help Turkey during the Gulf crisis, started to be questioned again after a while, with the developments that emerged. While the statements of the German and Belgian governments that how their units in the Rapid Deployment Force would require a new evaluation and decision in a possible war situation and that their own governments would have a say in the decisions to be taken on this issue were met with concern in Ankara, while the statements in this direction tried to appease the public opinion of these countries. considered as explanations. In these countries, especially the Social Democrat opposition followed a very strong opposition to aid to Turkey and a possible war in the Gulf. While Denmark and Norway sent American-made Sidewinder missiles to Turkey to be used in F-16 warplanes, the Patriot missile defense systems requested by Turkey from member countries in order to strengthen air defense at the NATO Defense and Planning Committee meeting were met by the Netherlands and the United States. ³²⁰ Just before the start of the Gulf War, US Secretary of State James Baker visited Turkey. During this crisis, the USA asked Ankara for help on three issues. first, the use of bases in Turkey during air operations against Iraq; secondly, Turkey's deployment of troops to the Iraqi border in order for Saddam to reduce the number of troops on the Kuwaiti front; Third, Turkey sent troops to the allied forces gathered in Saudi Arabia. While Turkey responded positively to the first two of these, it did not comply with the third as a result of the opposition of the TAF despite Özal's insistence. ³²¹ In this direction, Turkey moved about 180,000 soldiers of the Second Army to the Iraqi border, enabling Iraq to hold 8 divisions in the north, and easing the burden on the allies in the

³¹⁸ Marc Fisher, "GERMANY RELUCTANT TO DEFEND TURKEY IF IRAQ RETALIATES," *Washington Post*, January 22, 1991, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/22/germany-reluctant-to-defend-turkey-if-iraq-retaliates/31670669-d8f5-4ff5-84b1-63dcc31ff44b/>.

³¹⁹ Molla, "SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI KÖRFEZ KRİZLERİ VE TÜRKİYE-ABD-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ."

³²⁰ Joseph Cirincione, "The Performance of the Patriot Missile in the Gulf War" (An Edited Draft of a Report prepared for the Government Operations Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1992), <https://web.archive.org/web/20031223120310/http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/georgetow n/PatriotPaper.pdf>.

³²¹ Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy* (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2000).

land war. Thus, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, left the mainland, having largely met the American demands. The most important convenience Turkey provided to the United States during the Gulf War was the opening of NATO bases to US planes. For this, the government issued the decision numbered 1226 from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on January 17, 1991, and a day later, US warplanes landed on Incirlik and started the bombardment. During the bombardment, allied planes were either taking off from Incirlik and bombing Iraq, or arriving from bases and aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean and landing at Incirlik base, dropping their bombs over Iraq. This development was tried to be hidden from the Turkish public. Turkey had participated in the war, albeit indirectly, when the Turkish government opened the Incirlik Air Base to American warplanes for the bombing of Iraq by using its war authority from the parliament. After the bases in Turkey were opened, the statement made by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Turkey would not intervene in Iraq unless there was an attack on Turkey from Iraq. However, the Turkish Government's opening of NATO bases in Turkey to US warplanes to be used in operations was evaluated by many circles as provoking Iraq to attack Turkey.³²²

The Gulf Crisis constituted an important turning point in terms of showing that Turkey's strategic importance continued in the post-Cold War period. During the escalating process with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Western European members of the alliance also announced that a tense crisis would escalate as the Middle East said that it was outside the NATO operation area and slowed things down. Despite the demands of the Western allies to take things slow, the USA in particular convinced the allies by saying that this region cannot be considered completely out of the area and that the occupation cannot be kept silent. In this context, the decisions taken during the Gulf Crisis created some firsts in the history of the organization.³²³ After the Cold War, NATO formed the basis for consultation and decision-making and showed that political activities will continue along with military activities. Apart from this, Denmark and Norway sent missiles to be used in F-16 warplanes, while the Netherlands and the USA met the Patriot missile defense systems requested in order to strengthen the Turkish air defense.³²⁴ The support given was not unilateral, and Turkey proved that it was with the allies during the crisis, with the decisions it took at every opportunity. Especially at the beginning of the war, with the opening of Incirlik Air Base to American

³²² Ümit Ayşe Atak, "Körfez krizinin Türk dış politikası üzerindeki etkileri (1990-1996)" (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 1997), <http://acikerisim.uludag.edu.tr/jspui/handle/11452/6086>.

³²³ Molla, "SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI KÖRFEZ KRİZLERİ VE TÜRKİYE-ABD-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ."

³²⁴ Christopher J. Castelli, "Patriot Missile Defense Systems Begin Arriving In Turkey," *Inside the Army* 24, no. 51 (2012): 11–11.

warplanes for the bombing of Iraq, he showed his determination and place to participate in the war. In addition to these, it supported the decision of the economic embargo against Iraq and occupied Kuwait with the resolution 661 of the UNSC,³²⁵ The assets of Kuwait and Iraq in Turkey were frozen, and the commercial relations with both countries were frozen. Turkey's stance on the side of the Western allies ensured that it was rewarded and received military aid at the end of the war.³²⁶ It has been observed that the public did not fully support the war, along with the opposition parties, who thought that Turkey suffered commercial and political losses due to the closure of pipelines and the implementation of embargo decisions during the Gulf War. However, the Özal government of the period especially supported Turkey's active role in this crisis in order to show its allies how important its place in the post-Cold War organization membership was. Despite the anti-war demonstrations inside, the support given to the Gulf War showed that the importance of Turkey's place in the Alliance is preserved and that it will be protected in the future with its proximity to new threat and conflict areas. In addition, the active role played by Turkey has ensured that it will continue in the Middle East policies in the future in the context of alliance relations.³²⁷ Concerns and hesitations about the decrease in the value of Turkey's strategic position after the Cold War came to an end with the Gulf crises that started a short time later.³²⁸ Turkey's strategic position in the Middle East has once again revealed the importance of Turkey in the practices of the USA in the region.³²⁹

In addition, Turkey's democratic rule of law, as a 'model country', has been important for the United States of America for the stability of the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia regions.³³⁰ In addition to these, Turkey's efforts to ensure peace and stability in the Balkans and the peacekeeping operations it actively participated in were the factors that highlighted the importance of Turkey for the United States.³³¹ In the period from the late 1990s to the Iraq War in 2003, the relations between Turkey and the United States of America entered a rapid development process, and the relations between the two countries reached their highest level

³²⁵ UN Security Council, "Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1990-15 June 1991" (UN, 1993), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/166673>.

³²⁶ Molla, "SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI KÖRFEZ KRİZLERİ VE TÜRKİYE-ABD-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ."

³²⁷ İdris Bal, *21. Yüzyıl Türk Dış Politikası* (Ankara: ANKARA GLOBAL ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ, 2006).

³²⁸ Michael Lake and Pat Cox, *The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone?* (London: Federal Trust, 2005).

³²⁹ Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War*, 1st edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).

³³⁰ Faruk Sömezöğlü, Hakan Güneş, and Keleşoğlu Erhan, *ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERE GİRİŞ*, 8th ed. (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, n.d.).

³³¹ Morton Abramowitz, ed., *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, 2nd edition (New York: The Century Foundation, 2003).

since the 1950s. The US President Bill Clinton, who visited Turkey in 1999, defined the relations between the two countries as a strategic partnership used by very few countries, and it was important in terms of showing the point reached by the relations.³³² In this period, it was observed that the interests and evaluations of the two countries overlapped, especially in the regional instability and armed conflicts that emerged in the geography where Turkey is located.

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3.6 THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA:

3.6.1 ROLE OF NATO AND TURKEY: OPERATIONS OF NATO

One of the most important problems encountered in the international arena at the end of the 20th century is undoubtedly the "Yugoslavia Issue". In the Yugoslavian Question, which emerged at the end of the bipolar structure in the international system, the parties exhibited an example of a longer and harder struggle than expected. Although the events in Yugoslavia in 1991 were described as "a civil war in the former Yugoslavia" by many authors, the events that took place showed that the dimensions of the problem were much more than a civil war. In addition to various states, international organizations such as the UN, the North Atlantic Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the European Security Organization (OSCE) intervened in the end of the Yugoslavian Snake and the wars, in the establishment and maintenance of peace.³³⁴ Following the transformations that took place in Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Cold War period and the new conditions that emerged, paved the way for important transformations in the field of international relations, and this transformation caused major changes in NATO as well.³³⁵ As a result of the important changes that have occurred in the world security environment, especially in Europe, since the 1990s, NATO may have a very different threat and affect the security of the alliance and member states than the problems it faced during the Cold War; faced with regional risk factors such as ethnic and religious conflicts and had to adapt to this situation. In an environment of

³³² Lake and Cox, *The EU and Turkey*.

³³³ Şahin, "Küresel Güvenliğin Dönüşümü; NATO Bağlamında Kavramsal, Tarihsel ve Teorik Bir Analiz."

³³⁴ Nesrin Kenar, *Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası Yugoslavya Yugoslavya Sorununun Ulusal ve Uluslararası Boyutu* (Palme Yayıncılık, 2005).

³³⁵ Muaz Kazaz, "NATO'NUN BALKANLAR ÜZERİNDEKİ ROLÜ," *Akademik Bakış Uluslararası Hakemli Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, no. 74 (October 29, 2019): 69–89.

uncertainty in the international environment, new risk factors have been determined, and it has led to efforts to establish a new European security system.³³⁶

With its support in the Gulf War and its participation in the military operations in the Balkans, Turkey both reinforced its membership and showed that its military power is undeniably great and important in the region. These operations, carried out by NATO outside the borders of its member countries, were actually the results of the new concepts that spread since the beginning of the 90s. If geographies that pose a threat to international peace and security or human rights are taking place, especially near the borders of the member states of the Alliance, the union has begun to consider the decision to intervene as inevitable.³³⁷ Turkey's relations with the Balkans, which had a close attitude to the Soviets during the Cold War, were limited in this context. However, since a common culture was shared in the historical past, the ties have never come to the point of breaking. With the end of the Cold War, a power vacuum has emerged in the region and the Balkan states have started to have problems with what to replace the collapsed communism and Soviet ideology. Conflicts in the countries of the region intensified with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Turkey did not want to be indifferent to the conflicts and felt the need to follow an active policy.³³⁸ As long as the regime changes in the Balkans in the early 1990s did not cause instability, Turkey was generally satisfied. One of the biggest reasons for this was that Turkey first hoped that the effectiveness of a power like the USSR would decrease in this region. Moreover, the elimination of ideological differences would have improved the possibilities of cooperation in the Balkans. There was a power vacuum in the Balkans due to both the economic and political difficulties that the countries in this region faced due to the regime change and the disintegration of the USSR, and Turkey thought that it could fill this power vacuum politically and economically.³³⁹ In addition, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which gained their independence during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, wanted to get closer with Turkey. Albania started to develop its relations with Turkey even more, and even Bulgaria made a sudden change in its policy and started to get closer to Turkey. However, in addition to the developments that emerged in the Balkans after the Cold War and which at first glance seemed to be in favor of Turkey, problems

³³⁶ Kenar, *Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası Yugoslavya Yugoslavya Sorununun Ulusal ve Uluslararası Boyutu*.

³³⁷ Aslıhan Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ: MÜTTEFİKLİK İLİŞKİSİNDE KRİZ VE DÖNÜŞÜM- NATO-TURKEY RELATIONS IN JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT'S PARTY'S ERA: CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION IN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP" (Under-Graduate Thesis, İzmir, Ege University, 2018).

³³⁸ Kocamaz, *Türk Dış Politikası; Aktörler, Tercihler, Krizler, Çözümler*.

³³⁹ Mehmet Gönlübol, et al., *OLAYLARLA TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI (1919-1995)*, 10th ed. (Ankara: Kolektif Siyasal Kitapevi, 2014).

such as ethnic conflict, political instability, the emergence and strengthening of organized crime groups and the PKK becoming active in the region began to be experienced. In other words, as the Cold War period came to an end in the 1990s in the Balkans, the war started and more instability came to the region.³⁴⁰

The instability that the disintegration of Yugoslavia could bring and the success of the separatism of certain ethnic groups were issues that worried Turkey both in terms of its domestic and foreign policy. That's why Turkey was defending the unity of this country at first, that is, at the time of the crisis in Yugoslavia. During the disintegration process, both the Federal Yugoslav administration and the leaders of the republics were trying to provide support by visiting Ankara. In his meeting with the Federal President in April 1991, Özal stated that he supports the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.³⁴¹ Then, on 9-11 July, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov³⁴² and on 15 July President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Aliya Izetbegovic came to Ankara and demanded that their independence be recognized. When the European Union first recognized Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992, and then Bulgaria, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with these two, the fragmentation became irreversible. In this case, Turkey, which did not want to stay out of the developments in the region, completed these four republics at the same time on 6 February 1992.³⁴³ The events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia were evaluated at the summit held in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, where NATO's transformation and the roles it could play after the Cold War were determined, and the alliance's out-of-area operation concept was put on the agenda. At the end of the meeting, it was announced that the peacekeeping missions to be entrusted to NATO by the UN could also be carried out within the scope of crisis management operations.³⁴⁴ However, NATO initially did not want to be directly involved in the crisis in Bosnia and left the solution to the UN Security Council. Upon the conflicts that started in the region, the Security Council (UNSC) decided to establish the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1992.³⁴⁵ However, the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the UN peacekeeping forces against the Serbian forces could not prevent the conflicts. In particular, the failure of the Dutch peacekeeping unit to

³⁴⁰ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 2*.

³⁴¹ Şaban Çaliş, "Turkey's Balkan Policy in the Early 1990s," *Turkish Studies 2*, no. 1 (Ocak 2001): 135–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2001.11009177>.

³⁴² Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Turkey and the Balkans: The View from Athens," *The International Spectator 29*, no. 4 (Ekim 1994): 55–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729408458069>.

³⁴³ Baskın et al., *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*.

³⁴⁴ Manfred Worner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," *NATO Review* ILIII, no. 2 (1995).

³⁴⁵ Roderick K. Von Lipsey, ed., *Breaking the Cycle: A Framework for Conflict Intervention*, 1st ed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

prevent the 1995 massacre by the Serbs in Srebrenica, which was declared a "safe zone" by the UN, has become a symbol of this failure. In this process, the emergence of situations such as the Serbian militia and soldiers abducting some of the UN peacekeeping soldiers and even handcuffing some of them to trees as human shields in order to prevent aerial bombardments have also been examples of the inadequacy of the UN.³⁴⁶ NATO forces, which actively participated in the naval blockade with the resolution 787 of the UNSC in 1992 and the no-fly zone with the decision no. 816, came into warm contact with the Serbian forces for the first time in Bosnia and shot down four Serbian jets on 28 February 1994. has dropped it.³⁴⁷ The Serbian forces, who initially resisted, had to accept the ceasefire and sign the Dayton Peace Treaty, as a result of the NATO air bombardments that continued a year later. Due to the sensitivity of the situation in the region, NATO decided to deploy a multinational force of 60,000 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to UNSC resolution 1031 (1995). brought under control (UNSC, Resolution 1031). As the situation started to improve over time, the operation initiative was transferred to the European Union, and the ALTHEA peace support operation, which was initiated with the support given by 18 EU member states and 5 non-EU states under the command of the European Union Force (EUFOR), which was established within this framework, is still continuing.³⁴⁸

Conflicts in the countries of the region intensified with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Turkey did not want to be indifferent to the conflicts that broke out and felt the need to follow an active policy. Particularly, the country's natural extension towards the Balkans, its geographical proximity and the cultural and religious elements it shares in its historical background have been the main reasons why it could not remain indifferent. In this context, in the process leading up to the intervention in both Bosnia and Kosovo, diplomatic decision mechanisms were contacted and attempts were made to find solutions to the problems in the international arena. When the decision to intervene was taken, he remained determined and took an active role in the operations by taking an active role in the Alliance militarily. Turkey has also supported the Alliance by participating in these interventions due to reasons such as its common past and cultural connections and geographical proximity. Ankara wanted NATO to be more active and interventionist in ending the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 4

³⁴⁶ Schake, "NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995."

³⁴⁷ Michael O. Beale, "Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina" (AIR UNIV MAXWELL AFB AL SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, June 1, 1996), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA391295>.

³⁴⁸ Haluk Karadag, "NATO, Balkanlar ve Türkiye," *Güvenlik Yazıları Serisi*, no. 49 (KASIM 2019), <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.27137.40804>.

August 1993, Turkey has been able to send a military element to the multinational task force UNPROFOR. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), which sent a mechanized regiment-level military unit to the region, increased its contribution to the multinational force, which was first established as IFOR and then SFOR, under the command of NATO, to the brigade level, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Treaty. Ankara's support for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, announced in 1994, allowed the opening of a training center in Turkey in 1998.³⁴⁹ Although he wanted to speed up the process by including international organizations in the solution of the problems in Bosnia, he had to bomb Serbian lands for the first time in its history. It has been in close contact with organizations to ensure stability in the region both during and after the intervention.

The most recent conflicts over the legacy of Tito's Yugoslavia took place in Kosovo at the end of the twentieth century. The idea of Serbia, which claims to be the heir of the former Yugoslavia, to include Kosovo, which has the status of an autonomous region and ethnically Albanian majority, has led to the emergence of a new crisis. This time, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), the majority of whom were Albanians, came up against the rising Serbian nationalism, but the militia force in question was insufficient against the regular Serbian Army.³⁵⁰ As the Kosovo Crisis became more and more stalemate, the attacks of the Serbs led by Milosevic against the Albanians increased in early 1999. In February 1999, the USA organized a negotiation process in Rambouillet, France, with the participation of diplomats of many countries, together with Milosevic, for the solution of the Kosovo problem. In these negotiations, Milosevic was asked to withdraw the Yugoslav armies from Kosovo, but Milosevic refused this. Milosevic's strict stance made NATO's intervention inevitable. On March 24, 1999, 13 NATO member countries started bombing Yugoslavia without the approval of the UN.³⁵¹

On March 24, 1999, after 88 years within NATO, with the NATO intervention that lasted for 78 days, the Turkish military set foot in this region again.³⁵² Thus, Serbia had to withdraw from Kosovo. The reality revealed by the timing, scope and method of the Kosovo Operation reveals that this operation is based on strategic calculations beyond the Kosovo and regional balances. The reason why the air strikes against Yugoslavia were not stopped is that

³⁴⁹ Oğuzlu, "NATO ve Türkiye."

³⁵⁰ Karadag, "NATO, Balkanlar ve Türkiye."

³⁵¹ Dinah Shelton, *Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, 1st edition (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004).

³⁵² Mehmet NİZAM, "1999 Kosova Krizi ve NATO Müdahalesi," *TUİÇ Akademi* (blog), March 26, 2015, <https://www.tuicakademi.org/mehmet-nizam-199-kosova-krizi-ve-nato-mudahalesi/>.

the Serbian army and paramilitary units did not put an end to their 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo. Despite the start of the ATO air campaign, since Milosevic's aggression did not end, NATO forces continued their air strikes against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which they carried out as part of Operation Allied Forces, throughout May. Until the end of May, despite many diplomatic negotiations and maneuvers, the bombardment continued as the Milosevic leadership did not accept NATO's basic demands.³⁵³ Realizing that he could not resist the increasing NATO attacks, Milosevic announced on 10 June 1999 that he would accept the draft containing NATO peace terms. After Milosevic's calls for a ceasefire, the UN adopted Resolution 1244. With this decision, the "United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo" (UNMIK) was established. UNMIK was tasked with creating the post-war conditions.³⁵⁴

"Kosovo Peace Force" (KFOR) was established under the umbrella of the UN to ensure security in Kosovo alongside UNMIK. It was decided that KFOR would be a multinational force of approximately 50,000 personnel under NATO's command. At the same time, it was agreed that the Russian Federation should also be in KFOR. In addition, more than 12 non-NATO countries have stated to support KFOR.³⁵⁵ UN Resolution 1244 was an important step towards ensuring peace and security in Kosovo. With this decision, a civilian administration was established in Kosovo, and the UN took over the administration in Kosovo until the status of the region was determined. In addition, Yugoslav soldiers in Kosovo withdrew completely from the region with this decision. However, despite all this, Kosovo remained a part of Yugoslavia for a while. However, this situation has led to new problems in terms of NATO's legitimacy to carry out such operations.³⁵⁶ In fact, NATO has exhibited unprecedented behavior in practice regarding its traditional role in the international system since establishing "Operation Sharp Guard" in 1992, forcing the UN to impose an embargo on the FRY. Later, with the bombardments carried out in 1995 with the "Operation Deliberate Force" in the BiH and the establishment of SFOR and IFOR in the BiH after the Dayton Agreement, these new missions of NATO gained legitimacy in the international arena. If we look at what the consequences will be for Kosovo, according to UN Security Council resolution 1244, Kosovo was considered a

³⁵³ Hüseyin Emiroğlu, *Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Kosova Sorunu* (Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2010).

³⁵⁴ James Ker-Lindsay, *Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans*, Reprint edition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

³⁵⁵ NATO, "NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo," NATO, July 15, 1999, <https://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>.

³⁵⁶ Tunahan Oduncu, "1999 Kosova Krizi ve NATO'nun Kosova Müdahalesi," *Bucak İşletme Fakültesi Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (May 8, 2019): 1–15.

part of FRY, not Serbia.³⁵⁷ The Kosovo issue constituted one of the most complex and difficult problems in the Balkans for Turkey. In all problems and conflicts such as the pressures against the Bulgarian Turks in the Balkans in the previous periods, the war in Bosnia, the Macedonian problem, Turkey was able to act without hesitation and from time to time exhibit an active attitude. The Kosovo issue, on the other hand, created some important problems for Turkey, as it included the demand of an ethnic and religious minority to separate against the central government and to unite with their relatives in neighboring countries. In addition, Turkey was trying to get closer with Yugoslavia, whose relations had reached the breaking point during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and trade had stopped.³⁵⁸ However, when the disturbance in Kosovo turned into an armed conflict in March 1998, Turkey stood against Yugoslavia for many reasons and supported the Kosovo Albanians.³⁵⁹ Turkey's first official contact with the Kosovo issue was in 1992, during the visit of Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosovar Armavuts, to Ankara. Rugova was received by a president for the first time and met with Turgut Özal and demanded the recognition of the "Republic of Kosovo" by Turkey. This demand was not accepted by Turkey, but political support was promised to the Kosovar Albanians.³⁶⁰ As in Bosnia, Turkey acted together with Western countries in general and the USA in particular, and supported the decision of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia in parallel with its active stance at the beginning of the problem. He also announced that he would participate in air maneuvers over Albania and Macedonia, which were to be held in the Adriatic but were delayed due to developments in Kosovo. After the negotiations between the US diplomats and the Yugoslav officials regarding the Kosovo issue did not yield any results, NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999 both deeply affected the course of the Kosovo issue and made Turkey's position more sensitive. As a NATO member, Turkey, although feeling uncomfortable, had approved the decision to bomb a sovereign country against international law because of its ill-treatment of its minorities. Initially began to conduct inspection flights. In fact, Turkish jets also participated in the bombardments in the later stages of the operation. Turkey also sent a warship to the Adriatic to monitor the embargo. When NATO wanted to take advantage of its bases in Turkey to increase the effectiveness of its operations against Yugoslavia throughout April 1999, Turkey responded positively to this request. On April 27,

³⁵⁷ Kenar, *Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası Yugoslavya Yugoslavya Sorununun Ulusal ve Uluslararası Boyutu*.

³⁵⁸ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 2*.

³⁵⁹ Edith Harxhi, "An Overview of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans: 1990-2016," *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 1 (2017): 1990–2016.

³⁶⁰ Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığı ve Türk Dış Politikası (1990-2008)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 7, no. 27 (September 1, 2010): 51–86.

1999, the Council of Ministers decided to open the airports in Balıkesir and Bandırma to NATO warplanes, and the airport in Çorlu to be used by tanker aircraft. ³⁶¹Thereupon, as of June 3, American planes and personnel began to arrive in these cities. However, as a result of an agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO in mid-June, American planes did not need to hit Yugoslavia from bases in Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey has decided to join the international force (KFOR) to be deployed to keep the peace in Kosovo with a 1,000-strong contingent. As a result of the negotiations with NATO officials, it was accepted that the Turkish contingent to be sent to Kosovo would be placed near Mamusa, Dragoş and Prizren, where Turks live. While international troops under NATO's umbrella were entering the region, Turkey was delayed in sending troops here as a result of the conflict between Bulgaria and NATO over the transition problem, and this union was only able to set out on 30 June 1999. This development, which caused criticism in the Turkish public opinion, led to evaluations that Turkey's influence in the Balkans decreased and that it lost its superiority against Russia and Greece, which had previously deployed troops. ³⁶²With its support to the operations, Turkey has clearly demonstrated its sensitivity to the situation in the region and the support it has given to the communities living here that it feels close to. After the tension in the region decreased over time and the situation returned to normal, the task of the NATO forces serving in the Balkans was transferred to the European Union Force (EUFOR) as of 2004, and the TAF contributed to this force, which was formed under the name of Operation ALTHEA, with a motorized infantry division and liaison/monitoring teams. ³⁶³ These interventions in the Balkans both heralded a transformation within NATO and caused Turkey's military power to be seen once again. It has been emphasized that this conflict in the Balkans has put the security of Europe under threat since the Second World War, emphasizing the humanitarian dimension of the interventions. It has been said that the reasons for these operations are not to protect or gain territory, but to protect the values on which the Alliance is built. ³⁶⁴ In the process until the Kosovo intervention, Turkey acted on the axis of the USA-NATO with a great deal of consensus. Concerns that future conflicts in Kosovo would create instability and spread to the entire Balkans were shared. ³⁶⁵ Prior to the intervention, a frigate to the naval task force in the Adriatic and the F-16 squadron for flights over the region were also allocated to NATO command. During the intervention, air

³⁶¹ Arif Bağbaşıoğlu, "NATO'nun Genişlemesi ve Balkanlar / NATO Enlargement and Balkans" (Master Degree Thesis, Ankara, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2011).

³⁶² Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 2*.

³⁶³ Karadağ, "NATO, Balkanlar ve Türkiye."

³⁶⁴ Molla, "NATO SAVUNMA POLİTİKALARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİNİN ANALİZİ."

³⁶⁵ Fırat Purta, "SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI NATO'NUN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ VE GENİŞLEMESİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRK AMERİKAN ASKERİ İLİŞKİLERİ," n.d., 25.

power was supported and the use of military bases and facilities was also allowed. After the intervention, Turkey supported the efforts to ensure stability in the region and acted together with NATO at every stage of the intervention. Along with the support it has given, Turkey has shown that it makes significant contributions to NATO by taking an active role at every stage.³⁶⁶ The operations against these conflicts in the Balkans have led to the emergence of new fields of work in terms of international relations. The concept of humanitarian intervention has started to be discussed and the feasibility and legitimacy of out-of-area operations has been paved for NATO as well.³⁶⁷

4- NEW NATO AND NEW TURKEY: (THE 2000S-...)

4.1 TRANSFORMATION OF BOTH SIDES:

4.1.1 THE NEW AIM OF NATO: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The great victory of liberalism over communist ideology at the beginning of the 90s enabled the liberal system and its tools to take place as a major founding actor in the international system. As the biggest innovation brought by the liberal system, globalization has increased rapidly.³⁶⁸ Due to the increase in globalization, it has caused negative concepts such as terrorism and human rights violations to affect states on a global scale. The global effects of terrorism have proven that even the most powerful countries in the world are not completely safe. In this context, the terrorist attack in the USA on September 11, 2001 was also a turning point in terms of international relations. Terrorism is no longer only a domestic issue of states, but it is a problem that needs to be accepted in the international arena.³⁶⁹ This attack on the USA has exceeded the borders of the state in terms of its effects. President of the period, Bush, in his "Address to the Nation" speech on September 11, 2001, targeted terrorism and announced that the name of the problem of the new age would be terrorism.³⁷⁰ Bush garnered the votes of the public with this speech and he started to the infrastructure of the thoughts that rogue states should be punished has also begun to form. At this stage, the support of the states considered

³⁶⁶ Serhat Güvenç, "NATO'nun Evrimi ve Türkiye'nin Transatlantik Güvenliğe Katkıları," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 12, no. 45 (July 1, 2015): 101–19, <https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.462674>.

³⁶⁷ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 2*.

³⁶⁸ Karl Moore and David Lewis, "Globalization and the Cold War: The Communist Dimension," *Management & Organizational History* 5 (Ocak 2010): 5–17, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1744935909342325>.

³⁶⁹ Meagan Smith and Sean M. Zeigler, "Terrorism before and after 9/11 – a More Dangerous World?," *Research & Politics* 4, no. 4 (Ekim 2017): 2053168017739757, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017739757>.

³⁷⁰ "Statement by the President George W. Bush in His Address to the Nation" (Department of Defense. Defense Information Systems Agency. White House Communications Agency., November 9, 2001), 6171390, The National Archives, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6171390>.

as allies in the fight against the rogue states has also emerged as a sought-after factor³⁷¹. The National Security Strategy, which is the document the USA announced its strategic vision to the world, was influenced by this attack in 2002 and added the fight against terrorism to its main policies. President Bush declared that he could intervene in the country where there is a possibility of attack before the attack under the title of "preventive strike", which replaced the deterrent and defensive policies carried out during the Cold War period. This intervention can be made against any part of the world. In this new strategy path, countries will either act together with America or stand against it. After this date, the USA announced that it would undertake tasks such as global terrorism, conveying democracy to other states, and building open societies, and invited its allies to take its side. USA invited its allies to join its.³⁷² Another important result of the September 11 attacks was the place the Middle East gained in international politics. After this date, the USA reshaped its policy towards this region. Policies such as ensuring security in the region, eliminating the possibility of another attack by detecting the locations of terrorist organizations and establishing the security of energy resources have come to the fore again and strategies have changed in this direction. The continuous increase in the need and consumption of oil, especially since the 1940s, necessitated the need to remove the barriers to the safe delivery of oil to the market. With the increasing interest of the USA and Western allies in the region and its proximity to the Middle East, Turkey has become an alliance member with an increasing importance due to its geostrategic value.³⁷³

The attacks also transformed NATO, result in more effective stances by the Alliance against terrorism with in new strategies. With the 'Defense Against Terrorism Concept' adopted at the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO's field of activity has not only reached the borders of its member countries but has reached a global dimension in the need of combating terrorism.³⁷⁴In order to provide protection at the global level, the NATO Response Force was established which was Military units that mobilize and react quickly were established. These changing policies were not limited to the Middle East only. In this context, the Active Endeavor initiative

³⁷¹ Hannah Hartig and Carroll Doherty, "Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11," *War & International Conflict* (Pew Research Center, September 2021), 11, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>.

³⁷² George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (The White House Washington, September 2002), Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2002.pdf?ver=oyVN99aEnrAWijAc_O5eiQ%3d%3d.

³⁷³ İlhan Uzgel, "ABD Hegemonyasının Yeniden İnşası, Orta Doğu ve NATO," *Mülkiye Dergisi* 28, no. 243 (March 5, 2014): 7–20.

³⁷⁴ NATO, "Prague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, Czech Republic" (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 21, 2002), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm.

was launched to combat terrorism in the Mediterranean region. With the changing strategies, NATO member countries had left the borders and turned into a global security organization. In this way, it became ready for its first out-of-area operational mission.³⁷⁵

4.1.2 RISE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY: AKP

4.1.2.1 THE FIRST TERM OF AK PARTY AND ITS RELATIONS WITH WESTERN INSTITUTIONS

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded in 2001, and it became come to power without the support of a coalition partner in November 2002 by incorporating an Islamic discourse by going into a formation that included the followers of parties such as the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) of the 1960s, and the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) of the 1970s.³⁷⁶ After the coalition governments of the 90s, the AKP was able to come to power without the support of a coalition partner. In the "Government Program" created when the AKP came to power, it stated that the defense-oriented cooperation with the USA would continue, and this cooperation would become widespread. It was also included in the program that the relations with NATO would continue in parallel with Turkey's contributions, as in the past, and it was stated that the activities of the armed forces within NATO would continue by making efforts to maintain and expand stability and peace both in the regional and global context, by providing all necessary precautions and deterrence.³⁷⁷

The traditionally ongoing westernization policy has taken its place primarily in Turkish politics with the AKP's coming to power. Turkey, which is accepted as a natural bridge between East and West, as in previous years' policies, It has been pursued as a target to take a role as a political bridge and to take the role of a political bridge in order to bring these two sides closer to each other and to bring them together. In addition, after the September 11th attack, it opposed the association of terrorism with Islamic values and increased its attempts to establish dialogue

³⁷⁵ Claudia Bernasconi, "NATO's Fight Against Terrorism Where Do We Stand?" (NATO Defense College, April 1, 2011), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10396>.

³⁷⁶ Sebnem Gumuscu and Deniz Sert, "The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (Kasım 2009): 953–68, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200903268710>.

³⁷⁷ T.C. Resmi Gazete, "Başbakan Abdullah Gül Tarafından TBMM'ne Sunulan 58 inci Hükümet Programı" (Başbakanlık Mevzuatı Geliştirme ve Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, November 28, 2002), 24951, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2002/11/20021129.htm>.

with western institutions as a western Islamic country governed by democracy.³⁷⁸ In this context, its Western allies supported Turkey's attempts to become an exemplary country for other countries in the region. They expected a country with a long history with Western values to spread its open attitude to the West and values such as democracy, open market and liberal economy.³⁷⁹ However, a point that should be noted is that this bridge task has some features unlike previous years. The period when Turkey's duty to be a bridge was realized through the transfer of Western values to the East has changed with the AKP government. This bridge task no longer focuses on value transfer, but also on communication and collaboration. Westernism has ceased to be the only policy, Islamic values have been used extensively in foreign policy discourses, and it has sought to become a leading country as an example of successful democracy in Islamic geographies. Communication with other geographies such as the Caucasus, the Middle East and Asia has been tried to improve so that the Western identity does not overtake other identities. From this perspective, the idea was not shift away from NATO or EU institutions. The main idea was to take part in politics without staying away from these organizations and to manage the problematic tasks in their own region.³⁸⁰ In the first years when the AKP came to power, Turkey's role model for neighboring countries was a strategy supported by the USA and the Alliance. Countries where radical Islam is being fought and considered as the home of terrorist groups. Western allies would benefit from Turkey which were embrace liberal economy, embrace democracy and democratic values and follow open market and open door policies when home of terrorist groups, radical Islam countries follow Turkey. It has been frequently renewed in the speeches, especially in which Turkey were at the center of the policies towards the Middle East. In this period, the former ambassador to the USA (2003-2005) Eric Edelman announced that Turkey would be an exemplary state in the transformation of democracy and human rights in the Middle East, and that the situation was supported by the USA.³⁸¹ Being a NATO member, in cooperation and dialogue with Western institutions, Turkey in the EU membership process has been an important ally for the transformation of the countries in the region.³⁸²

³⁷⁸ Burcu Sunar, "ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ'NİN DIŞ POLİTİKA SÖYLEMİNDE TEMALAR: TÜRKİYE BÜLTENİ ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME," *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 18, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 431–54.

³⁷⁹ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

³⁸⁰ Ahmet Sozen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges," *Turkish Studies* 11 (March 1, 2010): 103–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683841003747062>.

³⁸¹ Muharrem Ekşi, "AK Parti Döneminde Ortadoğu'da Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Jeokültürel Eksenini: İslami Kimlik," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 9, no. 18 (December 15, 2016): 59–77, <https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.320807>.

³⁸² Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*.

With the strategic vision document agreed between the USA and Turkey in 2006, the relations were raised to the level of strategic partnership. In this framework, as clearly stated in the document, it has been renewed that the same values and ideals are shared in the context of regional and global goals, and it has been stated that joint action will be taken for the spread of democracy, peace and freedom. It has been listed under other headings such as the fight against terrorism, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the development of energy security, which this partnership will develop with NATO missions and duties.³⁸³ Analyzing the course of relations with the USA is an important factor in understanding the level of partnership between NATO and Turkey. Because the fact that the USA, which is NATO's largest material and human supporter in the military sense, affects the decisions and strategy of the Alliance is clear. When viewed from the perspective of view, the perspective towards NATO was also positive during the periods when good relations and strategies were carried out jointly with the USA, and the support given has been intense and high for both sides.³⁸⁴

In the first period when the AK Party came to power, it was observed that its relations with the West were close and in cooperation. Although there are names close to the *Milli Gorus* (National Outlook) perspective within itself, AKP separated itself from this movement and its predecessors with its pro-EU policies and activities aimed at improving relations with western institutions.³⁸⁵ AKP has also clearly stated in its party policies that it is in favor of cooperating with western institutions in order to spread western values such as democracy and human rights in global and international politics.³⁸⁶ Prime Minister of the time, Erdogan also emphasized the place of the west in the AK Party policies and said that his relations with western institutions were at the center of foreign policy. In this context, he stated that the steps taken regarding the EU will progress further and that they are making efforts to increase rapprochement with the organization.³⁸⁷ The policy of increasing rapprochement with the EU has been actively used especially to ensure political legitimacy before the international community and to facilitate

³⁸³ Armağan Emre Çakır, *The United States and Turkey's Path to Europe: Hands across the Table* (Routledge, 2015).

³⁸⁴ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

³⁸⁵ Ercüment Tezcan and İlhan Aras, "ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ'NDE EUROSEPTİZİZM*: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ DESTEĞİNİN ELEŞTİRİYE DÖNÜŞÜMÜ," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 11, no. 41 (2015): 1–35.

³⁸⁶ Hakan Koni, "Foreign Policy Vision of the Turkish Religious Right: From National View to Justice and Development Party," *International Journal of West Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (2011): 69–86.

³⁸⁷ "2003-07-31 Başbakan Erdoğan - Tim Genel Kurulu," Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı, July 31, 2003, <https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=30584>.

reforms in domestic politics.³⁸⁸ During the first period of his rule, relations with Western institutions were openly supported. The following evaluations about the EU were included in the 2002 election manifesto of the AK Party regarding this issue. “Our party sees the full membership of our country in the European Union as a natural result of our modernization process. The implementation of the economic and political provisions of the EU criteria is an important step towards our modernization as a state and society. It is inevitable to implement these criteria, even when considered independently of EU membership. However, we can convey our messages to humanity in the age and with awareness, and we can maintain our existence in the international arena by using the opportunities of the age. (...) Turkey, in its relations with the European Union, will ensure its commitments and the conditions that the Union wants the partner candidate countries to fulfill as soon as possible, and will try to prevent the agenda from being busy with artificial problems. (...) Full membership to the European Union is our primary goal in terms of economic and democratic development. On the other hand, the economic and democratic standards, legal and institutional arrangements presented by the EU will be supported regardless of the condition of full membership.”³⁸⁹ As it is clearly seen in the declaration, even if full membership does not occur in the future, it is aimed to support the making of legal arrangements for the standards of the EU. It is envisaged that all kinds of legal arrangements will be made and pro-EU policies will be made in order to ensure the conditions for the admission of new members of the Union.³⁹⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister in the first years of power, emphasized that Turkey's membership to the EU would contribute to the geocultural depth of the organization and stated that Turkey's membership would provide bilateral benefits. The policy of increasing relations with the EU has been clearly determined by the government and constitutional arrangements have been made on the way to membership with the discourses in domestic politics.³⁹¹ Constitutional arrangements aimed at deepening the relations with the EU were carried out rapidly between 2002-2005. In this framework, regulations have been made in areas such as the fight against torture, equal rights and freedoms, the expansion of individual freedom of thought and expression in the light of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the law on

³⁸⁸ Ali Balcı, “Türkiye’de Üç Tarz-ı AB Siyaseti: Post-Yapısalcı Bir Okuma,” *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 9, no. 35 (2013): 1–19.

³⁸⁹ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, “Seçim Beyannamesi : Herşey Türkiye İçin (2002)” (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Yayınları, 2002), TBMM Library, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/handle/11543/954?show=full>.

³⁹⁰ Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

³⁹¹ Eyup Ersoy, “Old Principles, New Practices: Explaining the AKP Foreign Policy,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (Winter 2009), <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/350/old-principles-new-practices-explaining-the-akp-foreign-policy-winter-2009>.

association activities, and the Law on Political Parties. Again, in this period, his membership of the General Staff in institutions such as the Council of Higher Education, Radio and Television Supreme Council was terminated. In addition, the death penalty was abolished and replaced with aggravated life imprisonment.³⁹²

All the constitutional arrangements made were welcomed by Western institutions as well. Manuel Barroso, who was the President of the European Commission in 2004, took an attitude supporting Turkey's EU membership. He stated openly in his speeches that Turkey's membership, which has realized the expected reforms and progress, is possible and that it will be a valuable member that will contribute to the union on this path. Saying that the rapprochement that started with the customs union must necessarily result in full membership, he continued his stance of supporting membership, saying that Turkey would contribute to the union with its economic dynamism and young population.³⁹³ The Negotiation Framework Document, which determined the procedures and principles for Turkey's full membership, was accepted at the intergovernmental conference held in Luxembourg on October 3, 2005, and EU accession negotiations started.³⁹⁴

4.1.2.2 AFGHANISTAN INTERVENTION AND ROLE OF TURKEY

The Afghanistan intervention is important in terms of transforming NATO and leading to new strategies, and therefore it was crucial to show Turkey's support for the Alliance. While Turkey was taking the decision to intervene in Afghanistan, although it was the first out-of-area mission, Turkey received support among the members of the Alliance and developed a new way of thinking within the scope of the fight against international terrorism.³⁹⁵ The conceptual

³⁹² "AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ UYUM YASA PAKETLERİ," 2007, <https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/abuyp.pdf>.

³⁹³ İlhan Aras and Muzaffer Akdoğan, "DISCOURSES OF PRESIDENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGARDING TURKEY-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS: BARROSO AND JUNCKER PERIODS," *Journal of Management and Economics Research* 15, no. 3 (September 30, 2017): 196–221, <https://doi.org/10.11611/yead.322758>.

³⁹⁴ "TÜRKİYE İÇİN MÜZAKERE ÇERÇEVE BELGESİ ve İlgili Diğer Belgeler" (AB Başkanlığı | T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı, October 2005), https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/AdaylikSureci/MuzakereCercevesi/Muzakere_Cercevesi_2005.pdf.

³⁹⁵ Ümit Çelik, "Soğuk Savaş'tan Libya Operasyonu'na NATO - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri NATO-EU Relations From the Cold War to Libya Operation," *History Studies, International Journal of History* 5, no. 5 (September 2013): 63–92.

and tactical preparations necessary for the out of area intervention were started to be made at the Prague Summit, and new decisions were taken to increase the chance of success and legitimacy of the intervention. Within this framework, it was decided to establish “the NATO Rapid Force” until September 2004. In this way, it has been tried to strengthen the troops in the operations carried out in different lands with a more flexible and fast deployable military force that can react quickly.³⁹⁶ After the September 11 attacks, the United Nations Security Council took the decisions numbered 1368 on September 12, 2001, and numbered 1373 on September 29, 2001, and started the process that will lead to a joint operation of the USA and England. Countries such as Russia and China have also supported the USA, on the other hand, there have been decisions condemning the attacks from the Islamic geography. With the start of Operation Enduring Freedom- Afghan targets were bombed and the first response took place. On the one hand, political negotiations were continued, and the interim Karzai government, which was established in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, started its duty on 22 December 2001 and tried to take political steps. Furthermore, with the Bonn Agreement, the command of ISAF forces, which was formed with the participation of eighteen states under the leadership of Britain on 19 December 2001, was transferred to NATO on 11 August 2003. After this date, Allied forces also participated in the operation.³⁹⁷ With the transfer of the intervention to NATO, a transformation began within the Alliance. It has also been one of the first indicators of out of area operations and the fight against international terrorism. In this context, the support of the Turkish forces to the operation is also important in terms of understanding the importance of its place in the Alliance.³⁹⁸

The presence of the Turkish Armed Forces in Afghanistan within the NATO mission has been an important and could not to underestimated. Turkey was welcomed by the Afghans more because of the historical bond with the Afghan people, and Turkey worked with the people of the region in more technical and educational fields, since Turkey said that the conflict forces would not take part in them.³⁹⁹ Turkey assumed the second term command of ISAF between June 2002 and February 2003 and continued its support in the military wing of the intervention. In the same period, Turkey also carried out the Kabul International Airport operation, which is

³⁹⁶ Sanem Özer, Ceren UYSAL Oğuz, and Senem Atvur, “NATO VE AB’NİN DEĞİŞEN GÜVENLİK STRATEJİLERİNİN AFGANİSTAN ÖRNEĞİNDE DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ,” *Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi* 10, no. 19 (May 1, 2010): 257–85.

³⁹⁷ Hilal Önal, “ABD’nin Afganistan Politikasının Açmazları: Bölgesel Bir Analiz,” *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, no. 23 (2010): 43–71.

³⁹⁸ Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

³⁹⁹ Özer, Oğuz, and Atvur, “NATO VE AB’NİN DEĞİŞEN GÜVENLİK STRATEJİLERİNİN AFGANİSTAN ÖRNEĞİNDE DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ.”

within the NATO command and control structure. Ensuring the security of the airport has been one of his most important contributions to the response. Turkey also actively participated in the training given by the Afghan national security forces to ensure the security of the country on their own, and trainings were given by Turkish soldiers at the Gazi Military Training Center opened in Kabul.⁴⁰⁰ Kabul Provincial Governor Dr. Zabibullah Mojadid said about Turkey in his interview was remarkable in terms of the presence of Turkish forces in Afghanistan and understanding their relations:” Unlike other international powers, the Turks do not march with their weapons ready to fire with their deputies. Afghans don't look at the Turks as a foreign power, they somehow see them as their own.”⁴⁰¹ Turkey, with the support of the Afghan people, has made great contributions to the stability and security building in Afghanistan, both within the framework of the UN and NATO, by using soft power. One of the important supports provided by Turkey was the training of the Afghan Police force in its own territory. This training provided a significant contribution to the modernization and specialization of the police in Afghanistan.⁴⁰² Turkey still continues its education on this subject and continues its support to the region. Training of police and national forces is an important detail for the success of the intervention. Because, in order to prevent terrorist groups from nesting and reaching the power to carry out their actions, a stable state should be organized in Afghanistan and security forces should provide its own security. The training of these forces by Turkey can be considered as one of the clearest contributions it has made to NATO.⁴⁰³ Wardak and Jawzjann states were among the most important contributions of Turkey. Aid to these provinces, which are among the poorest provinces in Afghanistan, was realized with the joint work of Turkish International Cooperation and Provincial Reconstruction Team (RPT). It is aimed to contribute to the education of the Afghan people, to improve their health and infrastructure, and to increase their quality of life, by carrying out more than 200 projects for the regions with more than 130 employees. For this purpose, hospitals, mosques, schools were rebuilt and health checks were carried out for people living in remote areas. In addition, Afghan women are trained to work in the military and police forces, healthcare and other similar services. In addition to all these, roads, bridges and water wells were built and infrastructure works were accelerated. More than

⁴⁰⁰ “Türk askerinin Afganistan misyonu,” Newspaper, NTV, March 16, 2012,

<https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/turk-askerinin-afganistan-misyonu,INGQQ4x1RUqbyfEg1FQeQ>.

⁴⁰¹ Karen Kaya, “Turkey’s Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization,” *MILITARY REVIEW*, August 2013.

⁴⁰² UNDP, “Afghan National Police Cadets Return Home from Training in Turkey,” UNDP, UNDP in Afghanistan, 2013, <https://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2013/02/17/afghan-national-police-cadets-return-home-from-training-in-turkey.html>.

⁴⁰³ Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

\$2 billion has been invested in these projects since 2002, financed by the Turkish government and private Turkish entrepreneurs.⁴⁰⁴

Despite the good relations and mutual support established by the Afghan people with Turkey, it is not possible to say this view for NATO as a whole. Many problems have been encountered, especially due to the increase in civilian casualties over time, the difficulty in the fight against terrorist groups throughout the country, the decrease in the support of the Afghan people and the distrust of the people towards the political structure. In addition, the ineffective use of financial transfer greatly affected the success of the operation. The absence of state institutions hindered the transfer of funds and there were great difficulties in ensuring stability in the region.⁴⁰⁵

4.2 THE SECOND TERM OF AK PARTY GOVERNMENT AND THE CHANGING PERCEPTION ABOUT THE WEST

In the General Elections held on July 22, 2007, the AK Party won 46.47% of the votes and emerged as the first party again. As a result of the elections, it reached the number of 341 deputies in the parliament and maintained its parliamentary majority since 2002. In the process leading up to the elections, large-scale rallies were held against the AK Party with the discourse that it was on an anti-secular axis, and the elections were held under these tensions. These rallies, called the Republic rallies, started on April 14, 2007 in Ankara, and were then held in Istanbul on April 29, in Izmir on May 13, and spread to other provinces.⁴⁰⁶ The AK Party, which is on the Islamic line and supports this view with its actions and attitudes, faced protests throughout the country on the grounds that it stayed away from the Anti-Secular and Kemalist lines in these years. These demonstrations, led by leftist groups, continued with the fears that Turkey's policies would move away from Western values and shift towards the Middle East axis.⁴⁰⁷ The reason for these uprisings has also been shown as Turkey's convergence to the Islamic line due to the lack of EU membership. At this point, criticism continued on the grounds

⁴⁰⁴ Kaya, "Turkey's Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization."

⁴⁰⁵ Paul Gallis and Vincent Morelli, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," *Connections* 6, no. 3 (2007): 10–32.

⁴⁰⁶ Erol Tuncer, "22 Temmuz 2007 Seçimleri: Genel Bir Değerlendirme," *Toplum ve Demokrasi Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (July 25, 2016): 135–46.

⁴⁰⁷ Gökçe Kabakci, "NEO-KEMALİST BİR HAREKET: CUMHURİYET MİTİNGLERİ," *Selçuk İletişim* 7, no. 1 (November 19, 2013): 96–112, <https://doi.org/10.18094/si.73872>.

that Western models did not guide Turkey, which had difficulties in balancing liberal democracy, Islam and secularism, and started to leave it alone.⁴⁰⁸

The thought that the AK Party was in activities contrary to secularism, starting from these rallies and the unrest among the people, eventually went to the judiciary and resulted in the filing of the lawsuit against the AK Party in the Constitutional Court. The opening of the case caused unrest, especially within the European allies and EU institutions.⁴⁰⁹ The date when Barraso, who will make his first visit to Turkey in April 2008 while the closure case continues, coincided with a very critical period. The Chairman of the Commission, who tried to avoid commenting on the closure case, still could not refrain from giving a message on the subject. “We support all parties working for reforms in Turkey. It should not be concluded from the messages given from Brussels that we support any party in Turkey.”⁴¹⁰ With this message, it is clear that Barraso wants to convey that the EU is impartial regarding the case. It has been pointed out that even if the AK Party is closed, this decision will be respected and the course of relations with the newly incoming ruling party will be tried to continue.⁴¹¹ Although the developments related to the closure case occupied this visit, hopeful discourses for the continuation of positive relations between Turkey and the EU were important. Barraso revealed that his support for Turkey on this issue continues with the following words: “I believe that Turkey and the EU will always remain focused on their common interests. 50 years ago, people with vision and leadership talent came together and formed this union to overcome centuries of war, hatred, and prejudices among the nations and peoples of Europe. In the multipolar 21st century, in a world where the world has become more complex and competitive and this is increasing day by day, this vision will bring both Turkey and the EU together in peace and solidarity. and together we will stand up against the challenges of the future.”⁴¹² Barraso's visit at a time when Turkey was dealing with domestic political problems was important as a sign of efforts to maintain relations with the EU.

These anti-secular-oriented problems faced by the AK Party during its second ruling period brought to mind the question of whether it was moving away from the West and caused

⁴⁰⁸ Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkey’s Parliament Lifts Scarf Ban,” *The New York Times*, February 10, 2008, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/world/europe/10turkey.html>.

⁴⁰⁹ Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

⁴¹⁰ “Barroso: Herhangi Bir Partiyi Desteklemiyoruz,” newspaper, *Hürriyet*, April 11, 2008, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/barroso-herhangi-bir-partiyi-desteklemiyoruz-8681700>.

⁴¹¹ Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

⁴¹² “AB Komisyonu Başkanı Barroso’nun Ankara Ziyareti,” AB Başkanlığı | T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı, April 10, 2008, <https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=41607>.

discussions. The Islamic-centered discourses and the increasing interest in the Middle East had started a new debate on shift in Turkish foreign policy.⁴¹³ It is important to discuss the axis shift for Turkey, which has seen the westernization policy as its main foreign policy target since its establishment. Because not only relations with Western institutions but also Western values are included in this policy. When Turkey wants to change its relationship with these institutions and replace it with a new one, it will have to change Western values as well.⁴¹⁴ Some scholars who argue that the concept of Middle Easternization does not cause a shift in axis, argued that this negative connotation is misinterpreted. According to Oğuzlu, he stated that Turkey's situation is axis enlargement, not axis shift. According to Oğuzlu, it is true that foreign policy has become Middle Eastern, but this cannot result in a break with the West. The increase in Turkey's interest in the Middle East has resulted in the Middle East becoming more prominent in relations with the West.⁴¹⁵ From this perspective, the increase in policies towards the Middle East essentially ensures the continuation of relations with the West, not ending. The point to be noted here is how much these policies overlap with the policies of Western states. The tensions and problems experienced show that these policies do not overlap always.⁴¹⁶ The points underlined by President Abdullah Gul on this issue were noteworthy: "What I want to underline once again is that some of them, especially in the last period, 'Where is Turkey going', Turkey is perceived as a country drifting in the middle of the sea according to the waves. It's not like that at all. Let me be very clear. It is very clear what Turkey is doing. Turkey, of course, goes both east and west, north and south, in all directions.(...)"⁴¹⁷ Although government representatives say that the axis shift debates are malicious rhetoric aimed at wearing down the country and destabilizing the country,⁴¹⁸ it would not be correct to claim that there have been no changes in foreign policy and that Turkey does not want to play a role as a rising power and model country in its policies regarding the Middle East. Contrary to government officials and writers who think otherwise, Turkey has clearly signaled that it does not stay in line with its

⁴¹³ Cengiz Çandar, "Türk Dış Politikasında Eksen Tartışmaları: Çok Kutuplu Dünya için Yeni Bir Vizyon," *SETA-Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı*, January 8, 2010, <https://www.setav.org/turk-dis-politikasinda-eksen-tartismalari-cok-kutuplu-dunya-icin-yeni-bir-vizyon/>.

⁴¹⁴ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴¹⁵ Tarik Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?," *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 3–20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840701813960>.

⁴¹⁶ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴¹⁷ MUAMMER TAN, "Gül: Türkiye, Her Tarafa Gitmektedir," *İhlas Haber Ajansı*, November 4, 2009, <https://www.ihha.com.tr/haber-gul-turkiye-her-tarafa-gitmektedir-94968/>.

⁴¹⁸ ""Erdoğan: 'Eksen Kayması Söz Konusu Değil,'" Newspaper, CNN Türk, December 6, 2010, <https://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/06/12/erdogan.eksen.kaymasi.soz.konusu.degil/579875.0/index.html>.

foreign policy priorities and ideas that diverge with the West. Turkey even faced with his allies from time to time because of these policies.⁴¹⁹

While these problems continued, Turkey would have another problem with its Western allies. The South Ossetia Crisis, which will result in Russia's intervention in an independent state for the first time after the Cold War years, has created a problem between Turkey and Western institutions, as well as a test for Western organizations. During the intervention process, which started with the discussion of Georgia and Ukraine's membership possibilities to NATO, Russia, for the first time, gave the signals that it would return to its former strong days by finding the opportunity to test its military and political stance. Unable to respond adequately to the intervention, NATO not only condemned the attack, but also opened the door for its policies to be questioned. With this intervention, NATO-Russia relations which have long been trying to maintain a well-managed network of relations, dialogue and cooperation, faced a shocking result and led to the failure of the NATO-Russia Council to convene. The Alliance's failure to respond adequately is actually an expected result, considering the roles of EU member states in NATO and their trade relations with Russia, including the energy network. In addition, the fact that the invader and intervening states were not members of the Alliance therefore, situation did not allow any conflict to be entered into legally. The war that started with Georgia's initiation of an operation against the Russians who entered South Ossetia on 7-8 August also affected Turkey. It has threatened both its commercial and regional policies in the region and has been affected by the tension between NATO and Russia.⁴²⁰ Although Turkey tried to fulfill the requirements of being an ally in this crisis with policies in favor of the USA and the Alliance, it was stuck politically due to the Alliance's inability to take an effective decision, the problems of cooperation among the members, and the absence of any resolution from the UNSC. The growing trade network with Russia, being the largest supplier of natural gas, and its contribution to tourism were among the biggest reasons for the political congestion. Turkey proposed the establishment of the "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" in order to end the war quickly and find a solution at the regional level. However, although this proposal was sent to all countries as an official offer, no institutionalization could be realized for this platform due to the effect of the Arab Spring. Due to the inability to allocate an

⁴¹⁹ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴²⁰ Süleyman Erkan, "2008 RUSYA-GÜRCİSTAN SAVAŞI VE ULUSLARARASI TOPLUM," *International Journal of Economic and Administrative Studies* 17, no. 41 (n.d.): 20.04.2016, <https://doi.org/10.18092/ijeas.48565>.

environment of mutual trust and peace in the negotiations between the parties with Turkey's initiatives, the platform was prevented from being implemented.⁴²¹

4.2.2 CRISIS OF ELECTION OF GENERAL SECRETARY OF NATO IN 2009

The elections for NATO Secretary General, which came to the agenda with the expiry of the Dutch Jaap De Hoop Scheffer term in 2009, caused controversial days for Turkey. The Turkish side who objected to the election of the Secretary General of the former Prime Minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, especially with the intervention of US President Obama overcame this process and finally accepted and approved Rasmussen's candidacy.⁴²² The NATO Secretary General is at a key point in that she/he is the Alliance's highest civilian administrative officer and, as such, represents NATO in international organizations. It is important for the spirit of the union and the stability of policies that the person who will come to this position is accepted and cooperated by the members of the Alliance. Rasmussen, who will be appointed as a Danish name for the first time, was met with a reaction by Turkey at first, and it was an important development in this context and has the potential to lead to a crisis in relations.⁴²³

Turkey, which objected to the election of Rasmussen, had three major problems. The first of these was Rasmussen's statements in 2003 that Turkey, which was advancing towards the EU, never had the possibility of becoming a full member in the future. The inability to produce the necessary internal security policies in order to reach the full member capacity of the EU, especially the failure of the fight against the PKK and the failure to reach a solution in the Cyprus problem, have been shown as the biggest obstacles on the way to full membership. The second problem is that Roj TV, the PKK's media organ, broadcasts freely in Denmark and the Danish government does not take any legal steps on the grounds of freedom of broadcasting. Third and lastly, there were relations that deteriorated with the rejection of the solution proposal brought to Rasmussen during the crisis that broke out with the publication of cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers.⁴²⁴ The cartoon crisis had wide repercussions in Muslim geographies and escalated the tension with the start of uprisings and attacks against

⁴²¹ Mitat Çelikpala, "Türkiye ve Kafkasya: Reaksiyoner Dış Politikadan Proaktif Ritmik Diplomasiye Geçiş," *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 7, no. 25 (Spring 2010): 93–126.

⁴²² "Türkiye'nin Rasmussen'e İtirazı ABD İçin Sorun," Newspaper, Cumhuriyet, March 11, 2009, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiyenin-rasmussene-itirazi-abd-icin-sorun-47930>.

⁴²³ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴²⁴ Sedat Laçiner, "A 'Terrorism Supporter' to Be the Secretary General of NATO?," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, March 28, 2009.

Danish embassies. However, when Rasmussen refused to apologize on this issue and stated that freedom of expression could not be interrupted for any reason, that is why he faced a reaction in the Islamic world.⁴²⁵ With the cartoon crisis, the increasing anti-Islamism in Europe has actually started to make itself felt better. This situation will have consequences that will also affect Turkey's EU membership. The crisis spread to Europe with the publication of the cartoons in newspapers in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands apart from Denmark.⁴²⁶ When evaluated within the framework of these problems, Rasmussen's candidacy increased Turkey's concerns. However, the problems were overcome and Rasmussen was elected as the General Secretary.⁴²⁷

After Rasmussen was elected as the Secretary General, a period of improvement began in relations. Rasmussen, who participated in the 2nd Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations held in Istanbul, said the following in his speech both to clear up the question marks and to show that he did not have a negative attitude towards Turkey. "I want to come directly to the topic of cartoons in Denmark. My position there was very clear. It was clear before the crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis. I am not in favor of blaming people for their religious ethnic background.(...)As NATO's general secretary, religious and cultural I will pay particular attention to sensitivities. Here I will always maintain my respect for these diverse societies in an increasingly pluralistic and globalized world. (...) One of my priorities will be to increase and intensify our dialogue and relations with the Muslim world. "I believe in freedom of expression. I also believe in respecting personal and religious feelings. This is exactly the balance we believe in."⁴²⁸ Although Rasmussen's election as the General Secretary, Roj TV and the cartoon crisis and Turkey-Denmark relations went through difficult times, but relations started to improve as of 2010. In fact, trade between the two countries increased by 8.9 percent in 2010, achieved a record growth. In addition, in September 2013, the Economic and Commercial Partnership Committee was convened between Denmark and Turkey in Ankara and signed a protocol between two countries.⁴²⁹ Political negotiations have a great role in the positive economic relations and political cooperation. The United States intervened so that

⁴²⁵ Ian Traynor, "Bitter Turkey Finally Lifts Veto on Danish PM as Nato Chief," *The Observer*, April 4, 2009, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/05/nato-eu-denmark-turkey>.

⁴²⁶ Veysel Uysal and Ali Ayten, "Karikatür Krizi Bağlamında Yerel-Evrensel Tutumlar ve Dindarlık," *Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 29 (January 29, 2014): 27–40, <https://doi.org/10.15370/muifd.30344>.

⁴²⁷ Oğuzlu, "NATO ve Türkiye."

⁴²⁸ "Rasmussen: Dini Hassasiyetlere Dikkat Edeceğim," Newspaper, *Hürriyet*, April 6, 2009, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/rasmussen-dini-hassasiyetlere-dikkat-edecem-11374670>.

⁴²⁹ Ankara Sanayi Odası, "Danimarka Ülke Notu" (Ankara: Araştırma ve Yönlendirme Müdürlüğü, September 23, 2016).

Turkey would not object to Rasmussen's election, and Obama kept the channels of dialogue open, giving Turkey a kind of assurance. For Confirming this, Prime Minister of the time Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a statement: "US President Barack Obama cleared our reservations." After his election, Rasmussen stated that he was aware of these reservations in his comments: "I fully understand Turkey's concerns. I will be in close cooperation with Turkey. I will establish good relations with the Muslim world"⁴³⁰ It was important that give word about the Deputy Secretary General of NATO to be elected Turkish for Rasmussen's support of the Candidacy. Accepting this condition, NATO brought Hüseyin Diriöz to Defense Policy and Planning, one of the most critical areas in NATO.⁴³¹ Furthermore, In 2010, there was a surprising development between these two countries. Copenhagen City Court filed a closure case against Roj Tv on allegations that the channels were financed by the PKK and that they were making terrorist propaganda. The case, which started to be heard in August 2011, was concluded in 2012 and a high fine was imposed, and the channel was closed due to the license cancellation decision.⁴³² In an interview he gave in Turkey in 2010, Rasmussen emphasized the importance of Turkey's role in NATO and drew attention to its contribution to the alliance: "Turkey is an important bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. I have very good relations with the Turkish government. I'm not worried about security and defense cooperation. On the contrary, Turkey can play a very important role due to its strong cooperation and past relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan."⁴³³

4.2.3 LISBON SUMMIT (2010) AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS:

Turkey's questioning attitude towards the alliance started with the election of Rasmussen and continued with the decisions taken at the Lisbon Summit. These negative confrontations and crises against the spirit of the alliance led to the questioning of the Turkey-NATO alliance relationship and rekindled the discussions about the axis shift in foreign policy.⁴³⁴ Although missile defense systems came to the agenda at the Lisbon Summit and started to occupy Turkey's agenda, In fact, the idea of establishing this system dates back to the first years of the Cold War. In particular, the national security strategies of the USA have been

⁴³⁰ "Rasmussen NATO'nun Yeni Genel Sekreteri," Newspaper, CNN Türk, April 4, 2009, <https://www.cnnturk.com/2009/dunya/04/04/rasmussen.natonun.yeni.genel.sekreteri/520945.0/index.html>.

⁴³¹ Uğur Ergan, "NATO'ya 31 Yıl Sonra Türk Genel Sekreter Yardımcısı," Newspaper, Hürriyet, September 27, 2010, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/nato-ya-31-yil-sonra-turk-genel-sekreter-yardimcisi-15874044>.

⁴³² Engin Esen, "Roj TV ve Nûçe TV Niçin Şimdi Kapandı?," Newspaper, BBC News Türkçe, August 20, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/08/130820_nuce_tv_kapandi.

⁴³³ Batuhan Yaşar, "Rasmussen, TGRT Haber'e Konuştu," Newspaper, İhlas Haber Ajansı, October 7, 2010, <https://www.ihha.com.tr/haber-rasmussen-tgrt-habere-konustu-140825/>.

⁴³⁴ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

shaped after this date in order not to fill the power gaps that may arise against their own interests. In this framework, the missile defense system, which was partially included under the title of missile defense in the 1998 strategy, was deepened by taking its main lines in the 1999 strategy. In this strategy, it was emphasized that the threat was perceived from the states developing long-range weapons of mass destruction and the need for a defense system against the possibility of intercontinental ballistic missile attack against these rogue states was mentioned. However, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty of 1972, signed bilaterally by the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, had promised not to establish any air defense system on the territory of the country, with the exceptions allowed. In addition, nuclear armament was also brought under control with the START 1 and START 2 Agreements signed afterwards. The existence of these agreements prevented the US attempt to establish any system for a long time. Saying that it would attempt to soften the provisions of the agreement to establish this system, the USA later abandoned this idea and announced that they would withdraw from the Agreement in 2001 while George W. Bush was in the Presidency. and subsequently in June 2002 unilaterally terminated the Agreement.⁴³⁵

The withdrawal of the USA from the agreement unilaterally caused great reactions from Russia. Russia, which predicted that the superiority would develop in favor of the USA, due to the gradual development of the missile defense system and the increase in the arms race, opposed the regulation of this system. Russia, which realized that such a system that can be established near its territory can be equipped with espionage activities in the future, so Russia withdrew from “*Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe – CFE*” as a counterattack.⁴³⁶ The project, whose realization was suspended during the Bush era, was revised during the Obama era and started to be discussed again under the title of "phased adaptive approach". As the Obama administration approached the problem, Iran did not currently have long-range missiles, so it aimed to deploy medium and short-range missiles instead of long-range missiles to protect Europe.⁴³⁷

With the outlines of the missile system becoming clear, the missile defense system began to be discussed within the framework of the "New Strategic Concept" at the 2010 Lisbon

⁴³⁵ Selin M. Bölme, “NATO Zirvesi ve Füze Kalkanı Projesi,” *SETA- Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı*, December 15, 2010.

⁴³⁶ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Putin Surprises Bush With Plan on Missile Shield,” *The New York Times*, June 8, 2007, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/08/world/europe/08prexy.html>.

⁴³⁷ Jaganath Sankaran, “The United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System: Defending Against Iranian Missile Threats Without Diluting the Russian Deterrent” (RAND Corporation, February 13, 2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR957.html.

Summit.⁴³⁸ Because of its geographical proximity to Iran, Turkey was determined as the most suitable candidate for the deployment of these missiles, as result it increased pressures on Turkey.⁴³⁹ The increasing pressure on the AKP government has also caused controversy among NATO and alliance members. First of all, it was a problem for Turkey that the missile system was installed against Iran caused perceived Turkey as a threat. Because, according to the “Zero Problems with Neighbors” policy pointed out by Davutoğlu, there should be no conflict between Iran and Turkey.⁴⁴⁰ In addition, Turkey, arguing that Iran has not developed nuclear weapons, that is why also voted "no", opposing the UNSC's decision to impose sanctions on Iran.⁴⁴¹ The comments of Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, Turkey Director of the German Marshall Fund on this subject, are remarkable: “*In the transatlantic community, including Turkey, all countries except Turkey agree that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Iran is about to develop a nuclear weapon system. Not Turkey. There is also an alliance on the implementation of sanctions. There is also an alliance on the implementation of sanctions. Here, Turkey remains outside the subject of this alliance.*”⁴⁴² Both the desire to establish good and friendly relations with Iran in accordance with the foreign policy of the AK Party and the belief that Iran would not develop its nuclear programs would in a way fail this policy if the missile defense system was to be installed on the soil. Because it was clear that the defense system perceived Iran as a threat and was against the actions that this country could take. Turkey disturbed by this situation and objected to Iran being explicitly mentioned as a threat in official documents. In order not to damage the periodic cooperation and trade partnerships with its neighbor, and not to accelerate the possible armament of Iran, which is shown as a source of threat, it conveyed this opposition to the USA.⁴⁴³ Although the name of Iran or another country was not used side by side with the concept of threat in legal texts, it was clear which countries the threat refers to.

⁴³⁸ NATO, “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” e Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Lisbon: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 19, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_68172.htm.

⁴³⁹ Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

⁴⁴⁰ Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (2006): 945–64.

⁴⁴¹ Burak Bilgehan Özpek, “En Uzun On Yıl: 11 Eylül Sonrası Ortadoğu,” *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 3, no. 2 (July 15, 2016): 183–216.

⁴⁴² Değer Akal, “İran Nükleer Krizinde Gözler Türkiye Üzerinde,” *Deutsche Welle Türkçe*, April 21, 2010, <https://www.dw.com/tr/iran-n%C3%BCkleer-krizinde-g%C3%B6zler-t%C3%BCrkiye-%C3%BCzerinde/a-5489382>.

⁴⁴³ Kocamaz, *Türk Dış Politikası; Aktörler, Tercihler, Krizler, Çözümler*.

Moreover, it is obvious that the defense system did not directly overlap with the foreign policy that was shaped by the understanding of "Zero Problems with Neighbors".⁴⁴⁴

The USA wanted to include Turkey in the system from the very beginning, especially because of its geographical location, and wanted Turkey to be included as an important actor in this project. The views of Jim Townsend, one of the names in charge of Europe and NATO in the US Department of Defense, reveal the expectation of the USA on this subject: *"When we look at where ballistic missile threats can come from, Turkey is very much on the front line in our opinion. So, Turkey could be a good place to host some parts of the system geographically."* Townsend also stated that he had two expectations from Turkey regarding the NATO Summit to be held in Lisbon, and he made it clear to Ankara that they should think about at least two issues: *"First, their vote for NATO to assume the missile defense system as an Alliance capability. The second is what kind of role Turkey wants to play. It is clear that due to its geographical location, Turkey is a good place to host some parts of the system. We are hopeful that Turkey and all its allies will come forward and agree to accept missile defense as NATO capability."*⁴⁴⁵ Apart from not mentioning the name of Iran or another country for the establishment of the missile defense system, one of the issues that Turkey discussed was the question of who would be in control of the system. Prime Minister Erdoğan openly expressed his concerns on this issue in an interview with Reuters with the following words: *"There are some technical issues that need to be clarified in the project. Points such as who will command the system and who will press the button should be clarified. When such matters become clear, we will make our final decision on this matter."*⁴⁴⁶ If the missile shield is on the territory of the country, Turkey's being a clear target and how the control mechanism would work in case of an operation were among the main concerns. The operability of the control mechanism actually stemmed from Turkey's concerns about Israel. Turkey asked for assurances so that the system would not be operated in the event of an attack on Israel, which is not a NATO member. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Allied countries gathered after the summit made assessments on such matters and it was ensured that the Missile Shield would be operated only to protect the lands of NATO member allies by providing full coverage in the territory of

⁴⁴⁴ Arif Bağbaşıoğlu, "Füze Savunma Sistemi ve Türkiye (Missile Defense System and Turkey)," *The Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM)* 3, no. 24 (October 2011), https://www.academia.edu/1474503/F%C3%BCze_Savunma_Sitemi_ve_T%C3%BCrkiye_Missile_Defense_System_and_Turkey_.

⁴⁴⁵ Güven Özalp, "ABD'DEN TÜRKİYE'YE FÜZE KALKANI BASKISI," *Milliyet Gazetesi*, October 14, 2010, <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/abd-den-turkiye-ye-fuze-kalkani-baskisi-1301250>.

⁴⁴⁶ Simon Cameron-Moore, "Turkey Weary of Wait at Europe's Gates," *Reuters*, November 9, 2010, sec. World News, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-52791320101109>.

Turkey.⁴⁴⁷ Finally, the deployment of the Missile Defense System started with the meeting of Turkey's demands. However, it was unexpected that Iran did not intensify its criticisms while talking about the project and reacted to the radar systems that were planned to be deployed in Malatya Kürecik, an important pillar of the Missile Shield project, in 2011. In fact, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmed Vahidi said that they would hit the facility in Kürecik if necessary.⁴⁴⁸ The acceptance of Turkey's demands on Missile Defense Systems and the establishment of the system in Turkey had supported the continuation of Turkey's alliance tradition. Considering the axis shift debates that Turkey has experienced, a period of relative softening has started with the decision to host the systems.⁴⁴⁹

4.3- THE FINAL TERM OF THE AK PARTY GOVERNMENT AND CURRENT CRISES:

4.3.1 TENSION RELATIONS WITH WEST

Turkey, which took steps to consolidate its position in the military wing of the alliance with the placement of missile defense systems in the country, still could not escape from being at the center of the axis shift discussions as a result of the foreign policy moves it implemented and followed.⁴⁵⁰ Policies towards the Middle East and North Africa geographies and the crises that will occur in these regions will also open the door to a period that will lead to the questioning of alliance membership and foreign policy.⁴⁵¹ In line with the concepts of "zero problems with neighbors" and strategic depth, which Davutoğlu specifically pointed out, Turkey wanted to position itself as the central country in its region. Turkey, which does not want to stay away from the crises and wants to become the country that has a voice while the region is reshaped, showed itself with the Arab Spring, the Syria Crisis and the Libyan Intervention, and started a period in which relations with the West and the USA were questioned and conflicts increased. Turkey's desire and necessity to be a central country for these geographies is clearly stated in Davutoğlu's words: *"Turkey has a big impression in the international arena. More importantly, there is a critical group of countries that carefully listen to Turkey's stance on regional and international issues.(...)Assuming this role is a historical*

⁴⁴⁷ Bölme, "Seta Analiz."

⁴⁴⁸ "İran: Türkiye'deki Füze Kalkanını Vururuz," Newspaper, Al Jazeera Turk, November 27, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/iran-turkiyedeki-fuze-kalkanini-vururuz>.

⁴⁴⁹ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴⁵⁰ Çandar, "Türk Dış Politikasında Eksen Tartışmaları."

⁴⁵¹ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

responsibility for Turkey."⁴⁵² It is clear from these speeches that Turkey has positioned its foreign policy line towards the concept of "strategic depth" in order to produce policies on its own in its region and to become a leading country. ⁴⁵³ Promising to maintain its goal of becoming a great power in its region in foreign policy, the AK Party has started to reinterpret its reform attack between 2002-2005 and its close cooperation with Western institutions with increasing skepticism since 2010. Especially since 2007, it has been seen that the emphasis on EU accession has decreased and more general expressions have been used in AKP policy.⁴⁵⁴ On the other hand, the discourses showing the move away from the traditional Western alliance policy, the crises with the Western institutions fueled the question marks about the change in foreign policy and the discourses towards moving away from the Western institutions intensified.⁴⁵⁵

In the dialogue process with the EU, the negotiation chapters could not be closed and the discussions created by the progress reports resulted in an increase in European skepticism since 2010. The words of Cemil Çiçek, Speaker of the Assembly at the time, also reveal this issue: *"Two kinds of clocks are used in terms of timing in Turkey-EU relations: Wrist watches are used when it comes to our obligations, and hourglasses are preferred in terms of EU's obligations. The EU turns the hourglass as it suits them, turns it like this and throws the ball into the crown. I mean, of course, after this time, I don't know what others will say, but as the Speaker of the Assembly, I believe that at this point, due to the attitude that has been put forward so far, the matter made it hard."* ⁴⁵⁶ Government officials also frequently expressed the problems experienced in the process of full membership with the EU, and serious problems began to be experienced with Western institutions. The problems experienced in the European Union membership in the first place increased the discussion ground with the Western states.

4.3.2 LIBYA INTERVENTION.

The protests, which started with the shooting of a young man named Muhammed Bouazizi in Tunisia and grew under the slogan "Let's give jasmine to the police", changed the power by

⁴⁵² Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, May 20, 2010, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/>.

⁴⁵³ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴⁵⁴ Ebru Oğurlu, and Esra Çayhan, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerine Siyasal Partilerin Bakışı: Son 10 Yılda Ne Değişti*, 1st ed. (İstanbul: Beta Yayınevi, 2014).

⁴⁵⁵ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴⁵⁶ "PARLAMENTOLARARASI DEĞİŞİM VE DİYALOG PROJESİ" (Delegation of European Union to Turkey, PARLAMENTOLARARASI DEĞİŞİM VE DİYALOG PROJESİ, TBMM Ankara, January 16, 2014), <http://pecs.tbmm.gov.tr>.

taking the name "Jasmine Revolution" and these developments spread to the Middle East and North African countries, creating a domino effect. The "Arab Spring", given the general name of the revolts, changed the regime in the countries where it spread and was the scene of large demonstrations, public protests and internal conflicts that would displace the governments.⁴⁵⁷ The effect of the Arab Spring increased as it spread to the countries in the region in a short time and Turkey was also affected by this situation as a result of its proximity to the geographies. In Libya, one of the examples where these popular uprisings were suppressed most violently, the rapid decisions of the international community once again revealed how important the policies towards the region are in the decision-making process. The geographical location of Libya and its richness in energy resources, the effect of the "Unity for the Mediterranean" policy, which is one of the projects initiated by Sarkozy and his desire to become a leader in the Mediterranean, were undoubtedly the major factors in the rapid decision to intervene.⁴⁵⁸

Gaddafi administration, which has been trying to avoid being isolated by establishing close relations with the Western world since the 2000s, started to cooperate with Western states in the field of trade, especially in the period between 2002 and 2005, with the lifting of the UN sanctions on the region, and foreign companies increased their investments in the region. Libya, which has a serious economic relationship network, was also at a very important point as it served as a buffer zone on the migration routes to Europe. For such reasons, especially France, one of the European states, was at the forefront of the decision to intervene in the region and led the intervention in order to become the leading country in its policy towards the Mediterranean. For the USA, which did not make a sound about France's leadership, the Libyan intervention was also a testing ground for the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU, especially after the Lisbon Summit. In addition, the material and moral devastation caused by the operations carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan made it difficult for him to add a new one to his operations that started to be questioned. However, the lack of military equipment, the no-fly zone practices and the attacks on the civilian population, which were faced during the operation, forced NATO to step in and witnessed the failure of the EU.⁴⁵⁹ The No-Fly Zone in Libya, which was declared with the aim of protecting the civilian population with the UN Resolution No. 1973, enabled the establishment of a military operation under the leadership of

⁴⁵⁷ Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011): 2–7.

⁴⁵⁸ Kocamaz, *Türk Dış Politikası; Aktörler, Tercihler, Krizler, Çözümler*.

⁴⁵⁹ Çelik, "Soğuk Savaş'tan Libya Operasyonu'na NATO - Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri NATO-EU Relations From the Cold War to Libya Operation."

France, the USA, Italy, Canada and England which participated in the operation. The idea of making the operation under the EU which was expressed by France and England, could not be realized due to the lack of consensus. Finally, when the shortcomings of the operation came to the agenda, the operation was transferred to the NATO alliance on 24 March 2011.⁴⁶⁰

The decision to launch an operation against Libya disturbed Turkey and caused harsh criticism. At a time when Turkey was trying to maintain its claims of being a strong and central country in its region, it did not want to be a spectator to the developments in Libya. However, Sarkozy's project to become the leading country in the Mediterranean, which he thought for France, conflicted with Turkey's interests in this context, causing him to question the operation.⁴⁶¹ Turkey was considering that France is trying to regain its former influence in North Africa, on the other hand, Turkey also tried to establish a dialogue between the parties before the decision to intervene, arguing that the great powers' interest in the region stemmed from Libya's oil presence.⁴⁶² Turkey also faced with the NATO alliance in the Libyan issue, causing tension in the relations between the allies. When the discourses about NATO's involvement in the operation emerged, Prime Minister Erdoğan openly opposed the transfer of the operation to NATO with the words he said on February 28: *“Should NATO intervene in Libya? Is that such nonsense? What is NATO doing in Libya? In case of any intervention in one of the countries that are members of NATO, such a thing can be brought to the agenda. How else can we intervene in Libya? Look, as Turkey, we are against this, such a thing cannot be talked about, such a thing cannot be thought of.”* Turkey, which openly opposes the transfer of the intervention to NATO, has experienced a great tension in its relations with the USA and NATO after this statement.⁴⁶³ Trying to continue its reconciliation efforts, Turkey continued to oppose the intervention, and then Prime Minister Erdoğan openly stated this in his speech in Istanbul on 14 March: *“Everyone should do their best to end the violence and end the sibling rivalry in Libya. However, the Libyan people should be allowed to draw their own direction and change should be allowed to flow in its natural course. (...) We consider a NATO intervention, a military operation in Libya or another country extremely useless, and we are*

⁴⁶⁰ Öner Akgül, “Libya’da İç Savaşa Dış Müdahale: Avrupa Birliği Devrimin Neresinde?,” *The Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM)* 3, no. 36 (December 2011), <https://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/libya-da-ic-savasa-dis-mudahale-avrupa-birligi-devrimin-neresinde-2/>.

⁴⁶¹ Jason W Davidson, “France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 2 (Haziran 2013): 310–29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.784573>.

⁴⁶² İsmail Numan Telci, “Turkey’s Libya Policy: Achievements and Challenges,” *Insight Turkey*, November 26, 2020, <https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/turkeys-libya-policy-achievements-and-challenges>.

⁴⁶³ Ümit Çetin, “NATO’nun Libya’da Ne İş Var,” *Hürriyet Gazetesi*, March 1, 2011, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/nato-nun-libya-da-ne-isi-var-17150261>.

concerned that it may have dangerous consequences beyond useless.”⁴⁶⁴ All these efforts of Turkey were inconclusive as the attacks carried out by the Gaddafi regime against its own people continued and other organizations in the region took a stance in favor of the intervention, and it had to approve the NATO intervention by demanding the acceptance of some conditions.⁴⁶⁵

The operation, which was handed over to NATO command, was a first for the alliance to intervene directly in a Middle Eastern country. Turkey, on the other hand, did not participate in this operation as a warring party, but showed its support mostly in technical and humanitarian fields. With the start of the aerial bombardment, it contributed by concentrating its efforts on humanitarian aid, evacuations and logistical support, and control of the arms embargo. During the Libyan operation, it evacuated 25 thousand people, mostly Turkish citizens, from the region.⁴⁶⁶ The Libyan operation took place in the form of air strikes without a ground operation and took longer than expected. Only 8 out of 28 NATO members have participated in airstrikes and cooperated with other states and organizations in the region. In particular, the support of the Arab League and the participation of Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Morocco in the operation at various levels were aimed to contribute to the legitimacy of this intervention against the Gaddafi regime. The air patrols of Sweden, which is not a NATO member, were another contribution that was talked about. These contributions, as an interesting element in terms of seeing NATO's partnerships in the region, have signaled that dialogue and cooperation will develop in the future.⁴⁶⁷ Although the support of the countries in the region was tried to be obtained, the fact that the operation was carried out from the air and it was difficult to arm and control the opposition caused the operation to be prolonged. As the airborne intervention caused civilian casualties and the financial burden became a growing problem, the US administration demanded more serious support from Turkey, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany and Poland. The difficulties and hesitations experienced in the execution of the operation started to be overcome with the support of the British, French and Italian forces, weapons aid and the special

⁴⁶⁴ “Erdoğan: Libya’ya NATO Müdahalesi Faydasız,” Newspaper, Bloomberght, March 14, 2011, <https://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/867164-erdogan-libyaya-nato-mudahalesi-faydasiz>.

⁴⁶⁵ “Erdoğan: Operasyon İşgale Dönüşmemeli,” Newspaper, Cumhuriyet, March 21, 2011, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/erdogan-operasyon-isgale-donusmemeli-231692>.

⁴⁶⁶ Ali Oğuz Diriöz, “NATO’nun Ortadoğu’ya Yönelik Politikası ve Kurumsal Programları,” *The Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM)* 4, no. 40 (April 2014).

⁴⁶⁷ Madelene Lindström, “Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO” (Department of Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), October 2012).

forces' support to the operation, and the operation, which started in March, was ended in October after 7 months.⁴⁶⁸

4.3.3 SYRIAN CRISES AND TURKEY'S DOWNING OF RUSSIAN WARPLANE

Internal conflicts in Syria, emerging terrorist groups have started security problems by causing the intense migration of the Syrian people and have affected many surrounding countries, especially its close neighbor Turkey. As one of the country's most negatively affected by the effects of the Arab Spring, the conflicts in Syria, the emergence of new security threats and human rights violations, have had very important consequences in world politics. The new terrorist groups that emerged continued their deadly actions not only in the regions they were in but also in different geographies, affecting world security. With the exposure of the Syrian people to the migration caused by the crisis, the security of the countries that migrated and the struggle for the survival of the Syrian people have brought many problems. Turkey, one of its closest neighbors, has been affected by the many security problems it has experienced in this context and its relations with NATO and EU countries and other actor states in the region.⁴⁶⁹ However, as of March 2011, the harsh intervention of the Assad regime in the popular uprisings that took place under the influence of the Arab Spring, disrupted the relations between the two countries. In addition, Ankara's openly supporting the anti-regime movement in Damascus has also signaled those relations will not be the same as before. Moreover, the downing of the Turkish military intelligence plane on 22 June 2012 by the Syrian air defense elements while it was in the international airspace in the Eastern Mediterranean brought the two countries to the brink of a hot conflict.⁴⁷⁰

All these developments have reached a dimension that will affect the alliance between Turkey and NATO, and the decision to establish missile defense systems has been reached by NATO members on the borders of Turkey. The decision to install the missile defense system in Turkey is not a first in the history of the alliance.⁴⁷¹ Similarly, Patriot missile batteries were deployed to Turkey in 1991 and 2003. When the dimensions of the war in Syria continued to increase from their own region, the alliance members tried to remove any risk that may occur on Turkish soil by taking the decision to establish missile defense systems, which was a similar

⁴⁶⁸ Kocamaz, *Türk Dış Politikası; Aktörler, Tercihler, Krizler, Çözümler*.

⁴⁶⁹ Joëlle GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, "The War in Syria and Iraq: Humanitarian Aspects," GENERAL REPORT (France: NATO Parliamentary Assembly COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY, October 7, 2017), <https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-war-syria-and-iraq-garriaud-maylam-report-157-cds-17-e-bis>.

⁴⁷⁰ Kibaroglu, "TÜRKİYE-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ."

⁴⁷¹ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

decision. Despite the cautious approach of the European members to the problems of the Middle East, they eventually reached a consensus on the deployment of Patriot air defense systems developed by Germany, the Netherlands and the USA to protect their allies. Germany deployed batteries to Kahramanmaraş, Netherlands to Adana and USA to Gaziantep and these systems became operational as of November 2012. This decision is important in terms of repeating the spirit of solidarity and unity of the alliance.⁴⁷² The members of the alliance frequently expressed in their speeches that it is necessary for their allies to ensure the security of Turkey. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen: “*We know that Syria has missiles. We know that it also has chemical weapons, and for these reasons we must ensure that our ally Turkey is effectively defended and protected.*” He mentioned that they will fulfill their obligations for the protection of Turkey's borders. British Foreign Secretary William Hague, on the other hand, said, “*The placement of the Patriots is a demonstration of the spirit of solidarity to Turkey and also sends an important message to the Syrian regime.*” He expressed his support for the alliance.⁴⁷³ German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle stated that “*it is obvious that we need to act together to defend our partners*” and said “*supporting Turkey is absolute and imperative*”.⁴⁷⁴ However, the missile defense systems that came to Turkey were not as effective as expected and were insufficient to compensate for the deficiency in the air defense system.⁴⁷⁵ The Syrian missile, which fell in the Reyhanlı district of Hatay in 2015,⁴⁷⁶ revealed the necessity of Turkey to establish its own defense system effectively.

Another important issue in this regard was the downing of the Russian warplane by the Turkish Armed Forces on the grounds of “border violation” on November 24, 2015. This incident, which is said to have taken place due to the decision of Syria to shoot down the vehicle/elements that committed the violation in the face of a future violation, according to the rules of engagement that changed after Syria shot down the Turkish plane, also caused a serious tension in the relations between Russia and Turkey.⁴⁷⁷ It has been clearly understood that the

⁴⁷² NATO, “NATO Support to Turkey : Background and Timeline,” NATO, accessed March 6, 2022, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_92555.htm.

⁴⁷³ Bruno Waterfield, “Syria: Nato Agrees to Deploy Patriot Missiles in Turkey,” Newspaper, The Telegraph, December 4, 2012, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9722415/Syria-Nato-agrees-to-deploy-Patriot-missiles-in-Turkey.html>.

⁴⁷⁴ “Türkiye’ye Patriot füzeleri gönderiliyor,” Newspaper, BBC Turk (British Broadcasting Corporation, December 4, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2012/12/121204_nato_patriot_update3.

⁴⁷⁵ Kocamaz, *Türk Dış Politikası; Aktörler, Tercihler, Krizler, Çözümler*.

⁴⁷⁶ Alper Altuntaş, “Patriotlar neyi koruyor?,” Newspaper, Al Jazeera Turk, March 26, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/patriotlar-neyi-koruyor>.

⁴⁷⁷ Ahmet Keser and Ömer Ertuğrul Meral, “TÜRK HAVA SAHASINI İHLAL EDEN RUS UÇAĞININ DÜŞÜRÜLMESİ: ULUSLARARASI ANLAŞMALAR VE HUKUK ÇERÇEVESİNDE BİR İNCELEME,” *Türk Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (April 20, 2016): 27–42.

ongoing problems are getting bigger as the Syria problem could not be resolved, as it caused a major crisis between the parties. As can be seen in this example, the problems in the neighboring country caused Turkey to face security problems.⁴⁷⁸ After the plane was shot down by the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkey called the NATO members to an extraordinary meeting. In the meeting, a call was made to prevent the crisis between Turkey and Russia and to prevent it from growing any further. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, "We stand in solidarity with Turkey and support the territorial integrity of our NATO ally." By making a statement, he referred to the spirit of unity by emphasizing that they would stand by Turkey in the face of security threats.⁴⁷⁹ The downing of a Russian plane by a NATO country for the first time since the Second World War, with the thought that it could trigger a new NATO-Russia crisis, was met with concern by European states, causing restraint calls. In this process, NATO supported Turkey, but expressed its concerns and favored the problem not to grow. Turkey's NATO allies, led by America and Germany, underlined that the priority should be the fight against ISIS in Syria and stated that the continuation of the crisis with Russia would weaken this struggle. Although the Western allies conveyed their messages of support to Turkey, it was understood that they did not want to encourage Turkey in terms of the continuation of the problem.⁴⁸⁰

While all this is taking place, there is another problem that confronts the Western allies and Turkey in the Syrian war. The fact that the PYD is counted as a terrorist organization for Turkey, but that PYD is not recognized by its allies, has formed the building block of this problem. Turkey, which thinks that it is an issue that will return to itself as a security problem in the future, has criticized the USA, especially with the military equipment aid it has given to this organization. Turkey's policy towards Syria has been concerned about not arming the PYD, which it sees as an extension of the terrorist organization PKK, in the fight against DAESH. However, it has difficulties in reaching an agreement with the USA and its NATO allies on this issue. Erdoğan expressed this sensitivity in his speech in 2014: "The PYD is equal to the PKK for us. It is a terrorist organization. It would be wrong for it to stand up to a terrorist organization and expect the 'yes' statement and approach from us by openly saying the support of the United States, which we are within NATO, which is a friend to us."⁴⁸¹ For Turkey, which predicts that

⁴⁷⁸ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴⁷⁹ "NATO'dan Türkiye açıklaması: Destekliyoruz," Newspaper, Cumhuriyet, November 30, 2015, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/natodan-turkiye-aciklamasi-destekliyoruz-437057>.

⁴⁸⁰ Hilal Köylü, "NATO'nun Türkiye hesapları," Newspaper, Deutsche Welle Türkçe, February 12, 2015, <https://www.dw.com/tr/natonun-t%C3%BCrkiye-hesaplar%C4%B1/a-18889651>.

⁴⁸¹ Emel Parlar Dal, "Impact of the Transnationalization of the Syrian Civil War on Turkey: Conflict Spillover Cases of ISIS and PYD-YPG/PKK," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (Ekim 2016): 1396–1420, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1256948>.

the problem of terrorism in its own territory will increase with the armed PYD groups, the aid provided to this group by the USA, an ally country, is unacceptable. The possibility that the conflicts in Syria will lead to sectarian separations in the region and that the armed PYD forces may pose a threat to Turkey's security in the future has been one of the main issues that worried Turkey.⁴⁸²

4.3.4 15TH JULY ATTEMPT OF COUP DETAT AND AFTER THE RELATIONS

The coup attempt that took place on July 15, 2016 has been an important distinction in the Turkey-NATO alliance relationship. For Turkey, which thought that it did not receive the support it expected from its allies, the reactions from the Western states to the coup attempt were not sufficient, and sufficient support messages were not given after the coup.⁴⁸³ "*Turkey's membership could be in jeopardy*" reported in the Washington Post after the coup attempt. The comments of the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, given the headline as the following, caused tension between the two countries and drew the reaction of Turkey.⁴⁸⁴ With the denial news from the US Embassy in Ankara, it was underlined that there was no sign that Turkey's NATO membership was in danger, and it was stated that such a speech was not included in the news. Then, Foreign Affairs Spokesman John Kirby said that NATO is watching Turkey carefully and said, "It is too early to say that Turkey's membership is at risk." has made comments⁴⁸⁵ However, for Turkey, who thought that this news could not get the support it was expected, the signals of questioning the alliance membership were given as developments that undermine trust and damage the alliance relationship. With the emergence of anti-NATO rhetoric, Turkey began to question the alliance's spirit of solidarity, and with these developments, it became an indicator of its isolation in the international arena.⁴⁸⁶ In addition to all these, the fact that Gülen was not extradited in line with Turkey's demands from the USA caused a serious breaking point in relations with the USA. On this issue, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu said, "We expect the necessary measures to be taken. (...) Our relations will be affected when the USA does not give it to us." he said, revealing the tension in relations.

⁴⁸² Lenore G. Martin, "Turkey and the USA in a Bipolarizing Middle East," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (Haziran 2013): 175–88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2013.775037>.

⁴⁸³ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁴⁸⁴ Carol Morello, "Kerry Urges Turkey to Maintain Democratic Principles after Coup Attempt," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2016, sec. World, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kerry-warns-turkey-nato-membership-potentially-at-stake-in-crackdown/2016/07/18/f427ba8a-4850-11e6-8dac-0c6e4acc5b1_story.html.

⁴⁸⁵ Zeynep Güranlı, "ABD ve AB'den Türkiye'ye Ortak Çağrı," *Sözcü*, July 18, 2016, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/dunya/son-dakika-kerry-turkiyenin-nato-uyeligi-tehlikede-olabilir-1320134/>.

⁴⁸⁶ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

However, the United States, which did not want to cooperate on extradition, reminded the crisis in the alliance relationship and caused the alliance membership to be questioned once again.⁴⁸⁷

The trial process initiated after the coup attempt also resulted in the beginning of a controversial period. The most remarkable and grave event in this process took place in the process that started with the arrest of US Consulate officer Metin Topuz. With the arrest of Topuz and the rise of tension between the two countries, the US missions in Turkey announced that they had stopped visa procedures. The mutually suspended visa problem has been a field of deep conflict for the two countries that have been allies for many years.⁴⁸⁸ The tension between the two countries resulted in the damage to the spirit of NATO. President Erdoğan said, “We are the state of the Republic of Turkey, you will accept this. Sorry if you don't accept this, we don't need you.” Their discourses revealed the effect of tension on the spirit of unity. Although the alliance relationship, which started to crumble, was tried to be overcome with the resolution of the visa crisis, it caused the number of question marks about the union to increase.⁴⁸⁹ While these problems were being experienced, the state of emergency declared in Turkey on 20 July 2016 increased the Western states' concerns about Turkey. Numerous arrests, detentions and expulsions during the State of Emergency have led to harsh criticism of Turkey.⁴⁹⁰ In particular, the EU pointed out the human rights violations committed in this period by stating that Turkey was moving away from democratic means. These concerns were also expressed in the “2018 Progress Report”, and it was criticized that one of the harshest reports in history, such as human rights, freedom of the press and independence of the judiciary, and personnel dismissed from the public sector, quickly moved away from EU standards.⁴⁹¹ Turkey reacted to these statements of the EU and started a mutual showdown process. All these developments have caused Turkey to reconsider its relations with the West, causing unrest within the NATO alliance.⁴⁹²

4.3.5 TRIDENT JAVELIN INITIAL EXERCISE (NORWAY CRISIS IN 2017)

⁴⁸⁷ “Gülen iade edilmezse ABD’yle ilişkiler etkilenir,” Newspaper, BBC News Türkçe, July 25, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/36882936>.

⁴⁸⁸ “ABD ile vize krizi çözüldü,” Newspaper, BloombergHT, December 28, 2017, <https://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/2082273-abd-ile-vize-krizi-cozuldu>.

⁴⁸⁹ “Erdoğan: ABD stratejik ortağını bir büyükelçiye feda etti,” Newspaper, Deutsche Welle Türkçe, December 10, 2017, <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan-abd-stratejik-orta%C4%9F%C4%B1n%C4%B1-bir-b%C3%BCy%C3%BCkel%C3%A7iye-feda-etti/a-40924234>.

⁴⁹⁰ Kocamaz, *Türk Dış Politikası; Aktörler, Tercihler, Krizler, Çözümler*.

⁴⁹¹ “AB’den Türkiye’ye en sert ilerleme raporu,” Newspaper, Euronews, April 15, 2018, <https://tr.euronews.com/2018/04/15/ab-den-turkiye-ye-en-sert-ilerleme-raporu>.

⁴⁹² Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

in the Trident Javelin-2017 Initial Exercise, organized by NATO in Norway, was added to the problems between Turkey and NATO and created tension with Turkey. As part of the Trident Javelin-2017 (TRJN17) exercise, using the Chatter application that simulates Twitter, in addition to the personnel of the Exercise Control Headquarters (EXCON) and the participating command press and public relations offices, all personnel authorized to access NATO confidential pages related to TRJN17 could access and open an account through the program. The posts made from the fake account named "RTerdogan", which was found to be opened through the Chatter program, were later noticed by the personnel in charge of the exercise. A major crisis began with the scandal, in which both Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were portrayed as "enemy" targets.⁴⁹³ Upon what happened, Erdoğan said, "*Such a union, such an alliance cannot be.*" His words revealed Turkey's anger and resentment. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg immediately issued a message of apology and said that these incidents were individual acts and did not reflect NATO's views. In addition, Stoltenberg said, "*Norwegian authorities will impose the necessary disciplinary action. (...) Turkey is a valuable NATO ally that makes significant contributions to the alliance.*" Norwegian Defense Minister Frank Bakke-Jensen said: "*These messages do not reflect Norway's views or policies, and I regret the content of this message.*"⁴⁹⁴ She emphasized the importance of Turkey.⁴⁹⁴ Turkey expressed its reaction to the events and withdrew its 40 soldiers who took part in the exercise.⁴⁹⁵ The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, gave its reaction to the incident in a written statement. "*It is regrettable that the photo of the great leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of our Republic, is shown among the leaders of the fictional rival countries within the scope of the exercise, and the attempt to create the impression that our country cooperates with the enemy countries through a fake address created using the name of our President in the closed-circuit communication system within the scope of the exercise. It is unethical and unacceptable.*"⁴⁹⁶ In addition, President Erdoğan's statement that "*NATO's*

⁴⁹³ "NATO ve Norveç Türkiye'den özür diledi," Newspaper, Deutsche Welle Türkçe, November 17, 2017, <https://www.dw.com/tr/nato-ve-norve%C3%A7-t%C3%BCrkiyeden-%C3%B6z%C3%BCcr-diledi/a-41429775>.

⁴⁹⁴ "Nato Apologises to Turkey after Erdogan and Ataturk Appear on 'Enemy Chart,'" Newspaper, The Guardian, November 18, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/18/nato-apologises-turkey-erdogan-ataturk-enemy-chart>.

⁴⁹⁵ "Turkey Pulls Troops out of NATO Exercise over 'enemy' List," Newspaper, Reuters, November 17, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-nato-norway-idUSKBN1DH1P7>.

⁴⁹⁶ The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "17 November 2017, Press Release Regarding the Targeting of Our Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Founder of Our Republic, and of Our President during a NATO Exercise in Norway" (The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 17, 2017), https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-353_-norvecteki-nato-tatbikati-esnasinda-cumhuriyetimizin-kurucusu-buyuk-onder-mustafa-kemal-ataturkun-ve-sayin-cumhurbaskanimizin-hedef-alinmasi-hk.tr.mfa.

credibility has come into question" has revealed the question marks in relations with NATO.⁴⁹⁷ This crisis in Norway has added a new dimension to the long-standing NATO discussions. In fact, in times of crisis, while Turkey questioned its place in the alliance, on the other hand, it complied with the decisions taken by the alliance and continued to contribute to NATO actions and support missions, as in the case of Libya, even if it initially opposed it. However, the rhetoric in domestic politics was kept harsher and messages of separation from the Western allies were given from time to time. With the Norwegian crisis, Turkey-NATO relations have passed another test. Even if the crisis is over, these discussions within the Alliance hurt the spirit of unity. This crisis in the Norwegian exercise has been one of the examples of the problematic period between Turkey and NATO. These examples showed that the separation between the parties with the tradition of alliance has become clear. While all these problems continued, with the Trump administration coming to power in the USA, the question marks regarding the future of the alliance caused the crisis between Turkey and NATO to increase. The developments experienced in recent years show that NATO-Turkey relations, which are in a period in which the alliance relationship has been hurt the most and the bond of trust has been damaged in the ongoing process since the Johnson Letter, is also going through a serious test.⁴⁹⁸

4.3.2 INQUIRY OF NATO ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP AND TURKEY'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY:

The Western reform attack and intense Western support in the first years of AKP's coming to power had gradually decreased over the years. The increasingly confused structure of the Middle East has greatly affected Turkey with its proximity to the region. The effect of the Arab Spring in the region in recent years has changed Turkey's role in the Middle East policies and it has wanted to be a playmaker in the region under the central country policy. However, the developments clearly show that Turkey does not take place as a political actor in the region alone. The power struggles in the region have affected the alliance relations, especially Turkey's security, and it has often been faced with crises. With the decision to suspend Turkey's negotiations with the EU, which became tense with the West and went through periods of crisis, in the European Parliament, the problems in relations were revealed

⁴⁹⁷ Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), "Erdoğan'dan NATO'ya tepki: Kuru bir özürle geçirilemez," Newspaper, Deutsche Welle Türkçe, November 18, 2017, <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fandan-natoya-tepki-kuru-bir-%C3%B6z%C3%BCrle-ge%C3%A7tirilemez/a-41436147>.

⁴⁹⁸ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

and concerns arose about the continuity of the pro-Western policies of the first years. These concerns have revealed the differences of opinion along with the emerging crises. The problems experienced within the framework of the operations carried out in Syria, the independence referendum of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government, the coup attempt, the fight against FETO, the visa crisis with the USA and the decision of the USA to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel have been some of these crises. With the conflicts, Turkey started to reconsider its relations with the West. In this context, messages such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Discourses, rapprochement with Russia and the demand for the deployment of S-400 missiles were tried to be sent against the Western alliance.⁴⁹⁹

4.3.2.1 S-400 MISSILE SYSTEMS

One of the most important reasons for the problems between NATO and Turkey was the S-400 Missile Systems, which Turkey was trying to negotiate with Russia. The developments since December 2017 have caused important question marks to arise within the union and have brought up the questions of Turkey's departure from NATO. Turkey's desire to develop its air defense desire has increased especially with the threat perception from the countries in the region.⁵⁰⁰ After the Science and Technology High Council meeting on 27 December 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan said, “*Our neighbor Iran has built missiles with a range of 2,000-2,220 kilometers.(...) It produces them independently of Europe. He does it despite the embargo.*” He said that by targeting the missiles developed by Iran, Turkey should develop equipment that can provide its own security in this direction.⁵⁰¹ The missile defense systems that are desired to be developed are due to the existence of threats from the surrounding countries. In this context, it is important to feel the threat that Syria threatened Turkey with ballistic missiles in 1998 and 2012-2013 and that ballistic missiles with chemical warheads started to be used in the internal conflicts. “*The Şahap-3*” and “*Sejil*” missiles, developed by Iran, with technical support from North Korea, was another country that is seen as a threat with its capacity to reach all of Turkey's lands. Especially since the deployment of the US ballistic

⁴⁹⁹ Karataş.

⁵⁰⁰ Levent Yiğittepe, “NATO VE RUSYA ARASINDA TÜRKİYE’NİN GÜVENLİK ALGILAMASI: S-400 KRİZİ ÖRNEĞİ,” *Journal of Management and Economics Research* 16, no. 1 (September 30, 2018): 276–89, <https://doi.org/10.11611/yead.458050>.

⁵⁰¹ Aydemir Bülent, “Türk Füzesi: Hedef Menzil 2500 Km,” *Habertürk*, December 29, 2011, sec. gundem, <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/701120-turk-fuzesi-hedef-menzil-2500-km>.

missile detection and identification radar in Malatya-Kürecik, Iran's threats confirm Turkey's concern.⁵⁰²

Turkey understood the necessity of creating its own air defense system, especially with the increase in the Syrian internal conflict with these threats. In this context, it wants to prevent a possible attack by closing the gaps in the air defense system with the S-400 missiles requested from Russia. S-400 missile systems, which are shown as one of the best air defense systems in use in the world, represent the fourth generation of the missile defense system that Russia started to develop during the Cold War. This system is capable of destroying both cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as any manned or unmanned aerial vehicle, and can hit 80 targets simultaneously by locking two missiles on each target. If the negotiations with Russia, which started with Turkey's long-standing demand to establish an air defense system of its own, are completed, it will be the first NATO member state to use the S-400, and the members are concerned about this decision. This situation also caused many problems in the alliance.⁵⁰³ In fact, Turkey's demands to establish its own missile defense system have come to the fore before. However, the long-range missile tender won by China in 2015 was later cancelled.⁵⁰⁴ Although Turkey later announced that it was considering developing its own missile system, the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia came to the fore and started a new discussion. NATO countries, which reacted to this decision of Turkey, were concerned about the possibility of information sharing, especially in technical and military terms. It is also a matter of concern what could happen if the missiles are integrated into NATO equipment.⁵⁰⁵ Minister of National Defense Fikri Işık said, "*We will not integrate it into the NATO system. We will use our own means. It will remain a weapon in Turkey's own inventory*", but this statement was not found satisfactory by the Western allies.⁵⁰⁶ In addition, the use of NATO means that it cannot use half of the air defense system. In this case, the possibility that the S-400 agreement can be used as a trump card in a serious policy change or negotiations is thought. The demand for the purchase of missiles and the increasing cooperation with Russia caused the uneasiness of NATO members

⁵⁰² Sıtkı Egeli, "Türkiye'nin Balistik Füze Programı-Turkey's Ballistic Missile Program," *The Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM)* 5, no. 58 (October 2013).

⁵⁰³ Yiğittepe, "NATO VE RUSYA ARASINDA TÜRKİYE'NİN GÜVENLİK ALGILAMASI."

⁵⁰⁴ "Milli Savunma Bakanı Işık: Rusya ile S-400 Konusunda Nihai Aşamaya Geldik," Newspaper, BBC News Türkçe, April 21, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-39665393>.

⁵⁰⁵ Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief," Report (Congressional Research Service Informing the legislative debate since 1914, June 6, 2018), Turkey, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1213139/>.

⁵⁰⁶ "Hükümetten Afrin açıklaması: Operasyon gerekirse Türkiye çekinmez," Newspaper, BBC News Türkçe, July 4, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-40493728>.

and brought to mind the question of whether Turkey is changing its strategy. In this context, due to the detention of some American citizens with the purchase of the S-400 air defense system and the deterioration of democracy in Turkey, some members of the US Congress made attempts to restrict the sale of the F-35 and more generally military equipment to Turkey.⁵⁰⁷ When it comes to military defense systems and defense mechanisms, Turkey, which has traditionally preferred its choice within the framework of the multilateral alliance ties offered by NATO, has given the impression that it is in search of changes in its defense strategies and new alliances with the demand for the purchase of S-400 missiles, which has come to the fore in recent years, from Russia. However, in the event that S-400 missiles are purchased from Russia, there are concerns that the military capacity developed within NATO will not be able to adapt.⁵⁰⁸ Turkey says that S-400 missiles will not be operated within NATO and with its equipment. However, the modern air defense concept envisages the operation of weapons and communication systems that are in communication, supporting and backing up with each other, in an integrated and coordinated manner, rather than basing air defense on a single place. In the absence of this work and cooperation, the enemy can plan an attack on the country from the slightest weakness it finds to attack. The official announcement that Turkey will be used as “stand-alone” means that the S-400s will not be able to benefit from some elements of the national command-control-communication network connected with NATO.⁵⁰⁹ This means that S-400s will only be able to launch missiles at targets detected by their own radars, but will not be able to engage targets other stimuli, such as airborne HIK aircraft or NATO early warning radars, but not the S-400's own radar. The fact that NATO's Link-16 system and Mod-5 friend-foe interrogation system, which enable target information sharing and allocation with aircraft in the air, cannot be integrated into the S-400s, may also create a serious "friendly fire" threat for airborne friendly elements.⁵¹⁰ Attempts to purchase the S-400 air defense system from Russia are of great importance in terms of relations with NATO, and the consequences will be serious. Whether the source codes of the system will be given or not, and how much Russia will be under its control are matters of great concern.⁵¹¹ It is also a matter of debate how much Turkey feels safe within NATO and how it views the alliance relationship.

⁵⁰⁷ Karataş, “AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:”

⁵⁰⁸ Sitki Egeli, “Füze Tehdidi ve NATO Füze Kalkanı: Türkiye Açısından Bir Değerlendirme,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, May 1, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.553369>.

⁵⁰⁹ Sitki Egeli, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round,” *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 8, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 69–92, <https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.470640>.

⁵¹⁰ Sitki Egeli, “S-400 Alımı, Hava Savunması, Füze Savunması, NATO: Mitler ve Gerçekler,” February 8, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.19015.32168>.

⁵¹¹ Yiğittepe, “NATO VE RUSYA ARASINDA TÜRKİYE’NİN GÜVENLİK ALGILAMASI,” 4.

Considering that the history of membership and the alliance relationship goes back many years, NATO has a great role in the establishment of military systems, and it is not clear how the security system to be established by an outside state will be integrated into the existing system.⁵¹²

4.3.2.2 DISCOURSES ON SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

Turkey has been experiencing disputes and conflicts with Western states, judicial processes arising from the State of Emergency, detentions, and human rights problems have distanced itself from the EU and brought relations to a standstill in recent years. In this process, the AK Party government, which tried to seek alternative ways for itself, started to voice that it could become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative to the EU.⁵¹³ Established on the basis of a regional security organization, the SCO was first established in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under the name "Shanghai Five". After Uzbekistan joined in 2001, it changed its name to Shanghai Cooperation Organization.⁵¹⁴ The SCO, which was established as an intergovernmental organization, was founded on issues such as the cooperation of China and Russia on Asian security, Islamist organizations in Central Asia and the prevention of drug trade. The organization, which is structurally and purposefully different from the EU, in many aspects. The EU has a binding *acquis*, which is enforced within a parliament and a court with legislative power, where member states are represented. Decisions taken on economy, politics, security and human rights are also binding for member states. In the SCO, there is no such *acquis* or common economic decisions, no understanding of human rights. While there is free movement of people, capital and products among EU member states, these are not available in the SCO. Besides, there is no free trade agreement even between SCO countries. Considering all these differences, actions such as intelligence sharing and extradition among SCO members confirm that they are similar to NATO, not the EU. In addition, the fact that SCO members carry out military exercises together

⁵¹² Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁵¹³ Emre Rifat Güpgüpoğlu, "Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Turkey Relations," *Resolusi: Jurnal Sosial Politik* 2, no. 1 (June 30, 2019): 45–54, <https://doi.org/10.32699/resolusi.v2i1.723>.

⁵¹⁴ Gülden Şensoy, "Ekonomik Entegrasyon Teorileri Çerçevesinde Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü ve Türkiye İlişkileri / Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Turkey Relations within the Framework of the Theory of Economic Integration" (Master Degree Thesis, Sakarya, Sakarya University, 2018), https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=-yajwjM-vDOJ0yaGHSySkg&no=UzKS2ki_GC3BwYrBBiffaQ.

shows that it has a military and security nature like NATO, rather than an economy-based one like the EU.⁵¹⁵

Participation in the SCO, which has been in discourse since 2013, is in Prime Minister Erdogan's discourse: "*I said to Mr. Putin, 'Take us into the Shanghai Five,' recently.*" came to the fore in the statement.⁵¹⁶ It is clear that the SCO cannot be shown as an alternative to the EU, considering its founding objectives and practices. However, these rhetoric in foreign policy and the harsh language used cast a shadow over Turkey's prestige and determination in the international arena. By voicing the possibility of SCO membership, which is more similar to a military and security-based organization like NATO, harms Turkey's relations with NATO.⁵¹⁷ After Turkey's rhetoric, it was stated by the SCO member states that there would be no possibility of Turkey's full membership. Sergey Markov, an adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, stated that NATO members cannot join the SCO with the following words: "*Erdogan said that Turkey can become a full member of the SCO in order to strengthen Turkey's hand against the EU. (...) Among the countries that are full members of the SCO, there is not a single country that is an ally of the USA. Turkey, on the other hand, is both a NATO member and a member of the SCO. It is one of the closest allies of the USA. It is not possible for SCO members to accept Turkey as a full member under these conditions.*"⁵¹⁸

The SCO does not appear to be an alternative organization to the EU, and it is clear that Turkey cannot be a rival in terms of trade rates with the EU. According to 2016 TUIK data, Turkey's exports to the EU in the January-September period are at the level of 50.5 billion dollars. When the data for December 2017 are analyzed, it is observed that the export share, which was 44.3% in December 2016, increased by 47.1% in 2017. From a trade point of view, it is clear that Turkey still exports half of its exports to EU countries, and in terms of market opportunities and trade volume, it is far from possible to form an alternative to the EU by making such a trade with SCO countries.⁵¹⁹ It is clear that the EU cannot be an alternative to

⁵¹⁵ Zahir Ahmad KHALEQI and Jamaluddin Sadruddin Oghli, "ŞANGAY İŞBİRLİĞİ ÖRGÜTÜ VE TÜRKİYE'NİN OLASI İLİŞKİLERİ-SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND TURKEY'S POSSIBLE RELATIONS," *Pearson Journal of Social Sciences - Humanities* 6, no. 12 (2021).

⁵¹⁶ "Şangay Beşlisi'ne alın AB'yi unutalım," Newspaper, *Hürriyet*, January 26, 2013, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/sangay-beslisine-alin-abyi-unutalim-22448548>.

⁵¹⁷ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

⁵¹⁸ Gökhan Telatar, "TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA AVRASYA SEÇENEĞİNİN YÜKSELİŞİ," *Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi* 15, no. 3 (December 31, 2019): 351–69.

⁵¹⁹ Ülker ÇAM Karakaş, Adem Karakaş, and Samet Topal, "Economic Growth Effects of Economic Integration: An Economic Analysis on Turkish Economy in the Context of the European Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization," *Alphanumeric Journal* 7, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 185–204, <https://doi.org/10.17093/alphanumeric.604525>.

each other, with its own unique integration process and structure, and the SCO's goals in the context of politics and security rather than economy. Turkey's search for an ally against the Western world creates distrust in its NATO membership and foreign policy, with the styles and discourses used.⁵²⁰

CONCLUSION

Towards the end of the Second World War At conferences between the Allies, Soviet Union's thoughts about Turkey, caused worried Turkey. Termination of Treaty of Non-Aggression, plans about Kars and Ardahan, demand on a base in the straits caused Turkey was compelled to seek support from Western states. The loss of power of England and France after the war,

⁵²⁰ Karataş, "AKP DÖNEMİ NATO-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ:"

Turkey tried to establish close relations with the United States to ensure its security. The failure of Germany caused an alliance between the West and the Soviet Union. The activities of the Soviet Union rekindled the historical Russian fear in Europe. That is why, Europe needed US support against the Soviet Union. This situation caused the USA to change its traditional policy. The USA's support of Europe against the enlargement of the Soviet Union caused the emergence of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO to stop the threat of the Soviet Union. These developments made Turkey happy. Because of the fact that, since Turkey thought that it could not protect its territorial integrity with its own power, it saw NATO as an opportunity to save itself from the threat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkey has made an effort to be included in this alliance since the date of NATO's establishment. Turkey has used all foreign policy tools to enter NATO. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Turkey joined the Korean War by giving soldiers to the UN in order to integrate with the West. Turkey's participation in the Korean War was received positively in the USA. However, the USA's support for Turkey's membership in NATO cannot be explained only by the Korean War. The most important reason for the USA to support Turkey's NATO membership was its national interests. The USA wanted to keep this region under its control in order to obtain the oil needed for its developing industry from the Middle East. The USA, which followed a policy of limitation against the Soviet Union, understood that Turkey was important for this policy. As Turkey's strategic importance for the USA increased, the USA's view of Turkey's NATO membership changed. Meanwhile, Turkey proved how potential good an ally it would be by participating in the Korean War. After that, the USA started to state that Turkey should be included in NATO. Despite the objections of some minor NATO members and the UK, Turkey became a member of NATO with the support of the USA. Thus, Turkey undertook the task of preventing the Soviet Union from spreading to the south. Turkey's NATO membership led to the reaction of the Soviet Union. In fact, the factor that triggered the establishment of NATO and Turkey's entry into NATO was the Soviet Union itself. As the Soviet Union progressed in Europe, the European states worried about it became blocked and NATO emerged. Again, as the Soviet Union put pressure on Turkey, Turkey got closer to the West and became a member of NATO. As Turkey had problems with the Soviet Union, it tried to get closer with the West, and as it tried to get closer with the West, it became the target of the reaction of the Soviet Union. NATO has influenced Turkey's domestic policy and economy as well as its foreign policy. Turkey's efforts to join NATO accelerated the transition to multi-party life and contributed to the democratic life. Although Turkey's transition to democracy was welcomed in the Western world, the main factor for NATO membership was the USA's need for Turkey.

Because the USA did not react to the coups in Turkey and was one of the first countries to recognize the administrations established after the coups. The most important effects of NATO have been in the field of foreign policy. NATO has not only affected Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. The most important effects of NATO have been in the field of foreign policy. NATO has not only affected Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, Turkey, which did not want to cause problems within NATO, did not take much action on the Cyprus issue. With the increase in the Cyprus crisis, the Johnson Letter that followed after Turkey's idea of intervening strained relations with NATO. With the questioning of Turkey's NATO membership and the rise of anti-Americanism, cracks in relations began to emerge. In 1974, the first major crisis in relations was experienced with Turkey's military operation against Cyprus. The US arms embargo against Turkey has revealed the tension in the alliance relationship. However, with the years following the lifting of the embargo, this crisis was overcome, and close relations continued. With the end of the Cold War, NATO faced a legitimacy problem. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, which led to its establishment, the need for a new way of seeking a new mission and the continuation of the alliance tradition of the organization emerged. The alliance, which turned this crisis into an opportunity, realized the transformation by explaining its stance against the new problems brought by globalization. NATO, which has taken on new duties in areas such as human rights, protection of democracy, international peace and security, transnational terrorism, and activities of terrorist groups, has overcome the legitimacy crisis. The end of the Cold War caused Turkey's role in NATO to be questioned again. In this study, it is underlined that Turkey's role in the alliance continues by being reinterpreted, and continues to take an active part in operations and missions while maintaining its importance. Turkey's role in the Gulf War, which is one of these tasks, has been rewarded by the alliance with the military equipment aid it received as a result of this role, by showing the support it gave to the alliance. Turkey's support for the Bosnia and Kosovo operations, which took place in the 90s, where NATO intervened outside its borders and demonstrated its missions for the protection of human rights, international peace and security, again revealed its importance and place in the alliance. These operations are important in terms of showing the common foreign policy understanding between NATO and Turkey. Common responses to international crises show the bonds of alliance relations. With the realization of the September 11 attacks, the transformation in international relations caused a change in NATO and threat perceptions. The problem of transboundary terrorism resulted in NATO's first out-of-area operation. It has now used Article 5 for the first time, showing that it can also intervene in areas outside the borders of the alliance. Acting on the principle of common defense, Turkey

supported NATO in this process. Continuing its support to the alliance, Turkey showed that it stands by its allies and actively participated in support missions such as construction, police training, road and hospital construction in Afghanistan. In this study, the foreign policy understanding and transformation of the AKP government from the first years of its coming to power until 2017 were examined within the framework of its relations with NATO. The reform attack he showed in the first years of his power and the good relations with Western institutions took place as the years when Turkey shaped its foreign policy together with its allies. These good and close relations began to be questioned by the increasing axis shift debates in the second term of the AKP government. The idea of shifting towards the Middle East axis in foreign policy, which marked the second term of the AKP government, emerged especially with the change in foreign policy practices. Turkey's formulations such as Zero Problem with Neighbors, Center Country, Being a Playmaker, and Geostrategic Depth have revealed its desire to take place as a leading actor in the Middle East. The close contacts that were attempted to be established with the Middle East and North African countries during this period should also be examined within this framework. Turkey's foreign policy understanding, which can make decisions alone in the region and try to act as a central country, has caused problems with its allies. In this context, primarily his opposition to the Libyan intervention, his attitudes that did not support the NATO operation, and his attempts to prevent the decision to take the operation were examined. However, the support given to the operation after the decision is taken is important in terms of showing the benefits of the alliance relationship. After the start of the intervention, Turkey participated in the operation and showed its support by taking part in the union. The Middle East crises, which started with the Arab Spring, caused the effects of the civil war in Syria to be seen until today. Due to the long borders it shares with Syria, Turkey has been one of the countries most affected by this crisis. The intense migration flows, border security problems and the downing of the Turkish plane naturally caused Turkey to want the war in Syria to be resolved in a short time. However, the USA's arming of militia forces in the region and the possibility that these forces pose a threat to Turkey's security in the future represent one of the problematic areas in relations. Turkey criticizes its ally on this issue, claiming that it does not act in accordance with the demands of the USA and harms relations. While the Syrian crisis continued, the coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 constituted an important point in terms of seeing the support of the alliance. At this point, Turkey stated that it could not get the support it expected from its allies and demanded the extradition of Gülen, whom it held responsible for the coup attempt, from the United States. However, the USA did not take any steps in this regard and, like other European states, did not want to send some of

the FETO members on its wanted list to the country within the framework of the extradition agreement. These problems have caused NATO's spirit of alliance to be questioned by government officials and within the country. Turkey's changing foreign policy understanding has opened the door of the process leading to harsher rhetoric against its allies and intense questioning of the alliance. In this context, the S-400 missiles requested from Russia escalated the tension in relations. This attempt by Turkey to strengthen its defense systems was met with harshness by the alliance and the USA, and the US Senate was opposed with the warning that the F-35 agreement would be canceled as a result of the purchase of missiles. The acquisition of S-400 missiles carries some messages for Turkey to develop a multilateral foreign policy understanding. Questions such as at what level the S-400s, which are claimed not to be integrated into NATO systems, will be used in this situation, how to prevent intelligence sharing, and how to distinguish between enemy targets and friendly targets if they are not integrated into NATO systems are examined within this framework. Along with the S-400 missiles planned to be purchased from Russia, the Turkish authorities' discourses on joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization also created a new discussion in relations and brought up the questions of leaving the alliance. However, it is clear that the possibility of this membership is remote in terms of the structure and purposes of the SCO. Such discourses damage the alliance structure and alliance tradition. In addition to all these, the crisis experienced in the Norway Exercise once again proved the tension in relations. The attacks against Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, and the then President Erdoğan represented a negative point in the perception towards NATO. As a result, there have been many problems between Turkey and NATO historically and the spirit of alliance has been hit from time to time. Turkey's policies have changed periodically in this context. While the foreign policy understanding, which was affected by international problems and the dynamics of the period, was realized with the establishment of good relations in the first years of the AKP government, the changing structure and conflicts of the Middle East caused Turkey to acquire new foreign policy targets. speed during this period. The questioning attitudes towards NATO, which won the war, continued to increase with the crises. Turkey's active participation in the operations that took place in times of crisis has been examined in the principle of collective security theory. Despite the crises and transformations, Turkey maintains its place in the alliance. With its participation in operations and its voice in the alliance, it continues to show its place in NATO membership, which is unique and unique.

This study, which completely rejects the prediction that Turkey and NATO relations will come to the breaking point and Turkey will leave NATO, is in the direction of the idea that the USA will continue its relations and close cooperation with a country like Turkey, which is still strong and located in a geography close to the problematic areas of the world. However, it should be noted that this change in the AKP government's rhetoric does not end the questioning of the NATO alliance and that the potential crises in the relations will continue. However, Turkey, with its deep-rooted membership history and tradition of alliance, has the potential to overcome the crises to be experienced and the motivation to cooperate in new areas. A security organization without a substitute cannot be replaced, and there is no other country that can take Turkey's place in the organization.

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