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THE 1974 REVOLUTION AND THE PORTUGUESE
DECOLONIZATION

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Abstract

This thesis aims at understanding the correlation between the 25th of April of 1974 revolution with the decolonization of the Portuguese Africa. Basing of the literature of this theme, primarily I will discuss the Estado Novo Regime that which affected both Portugal as well as the former Portuguese African colonies. After this, I also found important to have a better understanding of Portugal in the international context mainly due to the involvement and consequences it had from entering NATO and the UN. Lastly, I will analyze more in depth the specific cases of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. By analyzing these specific cases I will focus on the period of their fight for independence but also the period after the independence that led to severe instability in these countries and civil wars.

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List of abbreviations

AAPSO - Afro Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization

ANANGOLA - Associação dos Naturais de Angola

ANC - African National Congress

CDS – Centro Democrático Social

CEA - Center for African Studies

CEI- Casa de Estudante do Império

CEMGFA - Chefe de Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas (CEMGFA)

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CONCP - Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas

COREMO - Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique

DGS – Direção Geral de Segurança

ELNA - Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (ELNA)

FAA - Forças Armadas Angolanas

FAPLA - Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola

FNLA - Frente Nacional pela Libertação de Angola

FRELIMO - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

GA - General Assembly

GNR- Guarda Nacional Republicana

GPA - General Peace Agreement

JSN - Junta de Salvação Nacional

MCP - Malawi Congress Party

MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas

MINA - Movimento de Independência Nacional Angolano

MOU - Memorandum of Understanding

MPLA – Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OUA - Organização da Unidade Africana

PAIGC - Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde

PC – Partido Comunista

PCA - Partido Comunista Angolano

PCP – Partido Comunista Português

PDA - Partido Democrático Angolano

PIDE - Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado

PLUA - Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola

PPD - Partido Popular Democrático

PS - Partido Socialista

PVDE - Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado

RNM/RENAMO – Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

RUE - Renamo-União Eleitoral

SADF – South African Defense Force

UDENAMO - União Nacional Democrática de Mozambique

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNAMI - União Africana de Moçambique Independente

UNAR- União Nacional Africana de Rumbeszia

UNAVEM - United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNITA – União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola

UPA - União das Populações de Angola

USA – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ZAPU-Zimbabwe African People's Union

Introduction

The Portuguese colonization in Africa goes back to the time of the “*descobrimentos*” that took place in the XV century. Amid the colonization the Portuguese justified their occupation in this territory as “civilized mission” where they considered the population of these territories to be non-civilized. The Portuguese mission was to spread their values, language to these territories but mainly their Christianity values, which was of great importance for them. I chose to write my thesis on the subject of the carnation revolution and the Portuguese decolonization because it is a theme that I am already familiar with it but I wanted to deepen more my knowledge about the subject and understand how these two impacted each other. When I think my education in Portugal and the generalized view of the former Portuguese colonies I would always learn and read about the accomplishments of the Portuguese that sailed the world, that “conquered” a lot of territories, spread the Portuguese language and other great things they did. However, the purpose that made write this thesis is that the education we are taught and the view of a common Portuguese is that the Portuguese only did great things. I felt like the matter of the decolonization and even before, the brutalities that the Portuguese committed in their former colonies is not really mentioned or acknowledged enough in Portugal. Therefore, I chose this theme because I wanted to know more about the subject of how the Portuguese really treated and acted towards its former colonies. Firstly I will talk about the Estado Novo regime in Portugal that has a direct correlation for the colonial wars and the 25th of April of 1974 that finally ended the dictatorship in Portugal and led to the decolonization. Secondly, I will approach Portugal in the International system during the years of the Estado Novo regime. I found important to mention Portugal during this time in the international context during the Estado Novo regime particularly because it catches also the Cold war period. This period is very interesting to look at because there will be various actors involved in the “Portuguese Africa” during the period of the colonial wars but also after the decolonization. Thirdly I will discuss more in depth the cases of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau on their fight for independence but also during the civil wars.

Hence my research question that I chose to approach is how and what influence had the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal the decolonization in the “Portuguese Africa”. To understand more about this influence and correlation I used mainly literary sources such as articles, dissertations and books to obtain a better understanding of my question and overall research.

Chapter 1

Estado Novo Regime

1.1 Estado Novo

The period after the I World War in Portugal was marked by enormous political instability with serious problems of security and authority, with thousands of arrests and forced deportations to the African colonies, in addition to the massive flight of financial capital to the outside¹. The crisis of European democracies, combined with the people's disillusionment with the politicians and their clientelism, corruption and incompetence, influenced a growing sympathy by the authoritarian solutions advocated by the military, which would enable stability². Generalized disappointment culminated in a revolution led by the military on May 28th of 1926, which suspended the Portuguese Constitution, dissolved the parliament, and established a military dictatorship supported by a provisional constitutional structure³. The regime immediately attempted to highlight personalities deemed capable of integrating the new government, despite retaining the highest positions for the rebel military. António de Oliveira Salazar (1889-1970), a young university professor from Coimbra, was appointed to the Government and took over the Ministry of Finance⁴. The goal was to put the public finances in order, which he accomplished with success. He gradually rose in the power hierarchy and worked for a regenerative transformation as a way of national salvation capable of suppressing the country's anarchy and decadence while also representing a redeeming hope in the face of this “degeneration”⁵. After being enthroned as leader of the single party, the *União Nacional*, in 1930, Salazar continued his path of power consolidation. In 1933, a new political constitution was approved, ending the military dictatorship, and establishing another dictatorial political regime known as Estado Novo, which would last until the April 25th of 1974. Salazar was led to the position of President of the Council of

¹ Estado Novo Português Y Estado Novo Brasileño: Afinidades Y Divergencias EN L A S Relaciones Com, E. P. A.). (sem data). *ESTADO NOVO PORTUGUÊS E ESTADO NOVO BRASILEIRO: AFINIDADES E DIVERGÊNCIAS NAS RELAÇÕES COM O PATRIMÔNIO ARQUITETÔNICO (DÉCADAS DE 1930 E 19440)*. Ufba.br. Obtido 6 de março de 2023, de https://repositorio.ufba.br/bitstream/ri/20221/1/Acta__Estado-Novo_VersaoFinal.pdf

² Ibid

³ Ibid

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

Ministers, beginning to hold effective power, and initiating the ideological program that would define the Estado Novo until its demise⁶. The Portuguese Estado Novo was distinguished by its traditionalist, Catholic, nationalist and imperialist tendencies, not just during Salazar but this his successor (Marcello) continued this legacy.

1.1.1 The censorship

To comprehend the true political-institutional nature of the Estado Novo, we should not confine with studying the theory and doctrine of the constitutional enunciation that conformed its action, the regime's ideological discourse about itself. If the Estado Novo was ideologically limited by law and morality, constitutionally subordinated to citizens' rights, freedoms, fundamental guarantees, and intended to be controlled by a diversity of organs of sovereignty, not only did practice correspond to theory, but Salazarism became a police state and a constitutional dictatorship in the regime's administrative and governing practice ⁷. Over time, the constitutional and regime's legality gave way to administrative arbitrariness and the right to use force, which suppressed fundamental freedoms, particularly the rights of expression, assembly, and association. The pragmatism that characterized Salazar's Portuguese foreign policy encouraged a control and obstruction of Portuguese society's access to foreign-sourced information⁸. The censorship media was relentless and incisive, leading to very effective controls, given the Estado Novo's philosophies, prevent Portuguese citizens from accessing information that would undoubtedly alter public opinion. Therefore, the liberal state was the primary target of all of his criticisms, and the foundation of the entire new structural organization of the society was in the sense of overcoming it. Since liberalism is a parliamentary, individualistic system that purports to be democratic, it will contribute to the breakdown of national unity by superimposing private interests over those that are common and national, leading to anarchy and the degradation of society, which would

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO. Core.ac.uk. Retrieved March 6, 2023, from p.32

⁸ Campina, & Tenreiro Tomás . (n.d.). PORTUGAL, O ESTADO NOVO, ANTÓNIO DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR E A ONU: POSICIONAMENTO(S) E (I)LEGALIDADES NO PÓS II GUERRA MUNDIAL (1945-1970). p.84

then be reduced to nothing more than a collection of men and interests⁹. Mário Soares, an opponent of the regime, denounced that the two fundamental principles of Salazar's policy were always the police and censorship, which he personally directed¹⁰. Terror reigned, thanks to the political police, and he subdued his most obstinate opponents. Where he used censorship to keep information at his disposal and silence the entire nation¹¹. In the face of the growing predominance of the executive, the progressive erasure of the National Assembly as a body whose main functions were legislative and supervisory was carried out, first, by the annulment of its true representativeness of the voters, either by defining restrictive criteria for citizens' electoral capacity, or by the governmentalization of suffrage¹². According to the decree, only Portuguese male citizens of majority or emancipation, registered in the electoral census that followed extremely restrictive government-controlled rules, knowing how to read and write, and domiciled in the municipality where they had been for more than six months, had the right to vote¹³.

Also, the freedom of thought, which was already restricted in the constitutional text, was a primary target of a government that was always eager to control and manipulate public opinion¹⁴. To that end, three measures were devised to limit the “perversions” and excesses of free expression while also educating minds in good principles, namely preventive, repressive, and formative measures¹⁵. Prior censorship, which would last until the end of the regime, was the system's cornerstone, based on preventive repression, prohibiting writing, speaking, and showing¹⁶. A posteriori repression, though less common, served to correct the censors' inattention or incapacities, as well as to punish the malice and obstinacy of non-submissive and dangerous prevaricators¹⁷. The Censorship Commission, established in the name of defending public opinion and "imposing silence on some, assuring tranquility and security for all," as stated by

⁹ Grilo. (2011). *História e Ideologia no Estado Novo – A Revisão Integralista do Passado Nacional* p.196

¹⁰ Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). *ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO*. Core.ac.uk. p.33

¹¹ *Ibid*

¹² Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). *ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO*. Core.ac.uk. p.34

¹³ *Ibid*

¹⁴ Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). *ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO*. Core.ac.uk.p.38

¹⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁶ *Ibid*

¹⁷ *Ibid*

Oliveira Salazar himself, had the goal of preventing the press from being used against the national reconstruction program, republican institutions, and national well-being. As a result, its function was defensive¹⁸. In addition to prior censorship, the administrative control of periodicals themselves was used to limit freedom of expression, either through the requirement of prior authorization for the launch of new publications or through administrative repression and seizure¹⁹. From 1936 on, no publication could be found without the intellectual and moral suitability of those responsible being recognized, a recognition of the competence of the censorship²⁰. Furthermore, there was judicial repression of crimes against free expression, as well as the possibility of the Censorship services imposing fines and suspension measures, in addition to the seizure of previously published materials, such as books²¹. Salazar and later his successor, Marcello Caetano, controlled the media, the information they published to control the masses and let them think that the only viable option to govern Portugal was obviously his own government. To fight any opposition controlling the media was crucial to Salazar for the people to identify with his regime being the only one who could offer a sense of national unity with patriotic values. However, it was tricky for Salazar to try to conciliate asking favors to the media to speak highly about his regime and at the same time repressing this same media. The censorship was already quite heavy but increased even more with the beginning of the World War II with the pretext that there was military information's that should be hidden.

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). *ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO*. Core.ac.uk. p.39

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Ibid

1.1.2 The PVDE/PIDE

The process of the political police under the Salazar regime, which had as its central moment the creation by decree of 29 August 1933 *Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado* (PVDE), renamed in 1945 as the *Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE), can be seen as a gradual centralization of the functions of prevention and repression of political and social crimes in a single body, directly dependent on the Minister of the Interior and resulting fundamentally from the fusion and reorganization of two institutions forged during the Military Dictatorship: the Police for Political and Social Defense and the Portuguese International Police²².

After the World War II with the defeat of the Nazi Germany and the Italian fascism, Salazar decided to make some changes in the institutions, although this was just in a matter of a nomenclature. The former PVDE became PIDE, which had no real changes in its modus operandi but simply the nomenclature changed. The PIDE inherited from PVDE preparatory instruction for cases concerning social and political crimes and the ability to determine the arrests and regime of detention. With its own staff of officials and agents, the PIDE was competent in administrative matters relating to emigration, crossing land, sea borders, the regime of permanence and transit of foreigners in Portugal. The creation of PIDE was as stated before, only in nomenclature matter, so in this way Salazar could adapt to the new world order, after the World War II. The former PVDE continued in PIDE, and these elements became legislated and inserted in the Portuguese Law. In the case of the custody prison, it was unlimited and without a “deadline” until 1945, becoming almost a sentence with no ending in multiple cases. The PIDE was secret police with administrative powers and penal without barely any legal regulation. From 1945 the PIDE went from an autonomous organ of judiciary police with function theoretically equivalent to the judiciary police. Therefore, what PIDE used to do before in an aleatory and non-legislative way was now regulated in the Portuguese law.

The PVDE/PIDE, enjoying great autonomy, was in charge of preventing crimes of a political and social nature, surveillance of possible actions against state security, instruction of cases to be presented for trial by special military courts and

²² Ibid

superintendence of the fulfillment of sentences in special prisons in its custody, controlling, therefore, in an integral way, all stages of the process of political justice²³.

By defining what was or was not tolerable in freedom in an entirely discretionary manner, the "free will" of the political police was almost legalized, which circumvented and evaded compliance with general legal norms, acquiring a margin of action that was all the wider as is the ever-extensive notion of defense of order. Simultaneously, the regime began its legitimizing discourse on the political police, always reinforcing the defense of order and harmony, always keeping an eye on the regime's and the Portuguese people's tranquility, acting in a pacifying manner ²⁴. Due to the rise of opposition in the 50's the PIDE was even more committed in the censorship. The PIDE was in charge of finding and persecuting the opposers to the regime, but it was also in charge of the censorship. The "lápiz azul"²⁵ was a famous process known due to articles, books, journals, and other media things were censored with a blue pencil before they were published. However, with these rises of opposers this just proved how unqualified PIDE really was to apply the censorship needed according to Salazar standards. The people that oversaw the censorships of books, journals, magazines and so on, did not had enough qualifications to do this. There was a generalized lack of culture amongst these people, which the lack of capacities to enforce this role allowed for opposition ideas that should be censored ending up passing and being published. Therefore, potentially harming the regime with the spread of the ideas that could undermine the regime. Even though Salazar had as a priority to prevent the spreading of ideas that were opposed to his regime, he did not have enough "resources" to have a censorship that would 100% prevent the dissemination of these ideas, since the people in charge as previously stated, were severely unqualified for their role.

The PVDE/PIDE used a variety of investigative methods as part of its competencies, was supported by a large network of informants, and was endowed with funds that were

²³ Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). *ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO*. Core.ac.uk. p.40

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ The "lápiz azul" was the symbol of censorship and the time of the Portuguese dictatorship in the 20th century. The censors of the Estado Novo used a blue colored pencil in the cuts of any text, image or drawing to be published in the press. To protect the dictatorship, cuts were justified as a means of preventing and limiting attempts at subversion and defamation.

not subject to public oversight²⁶. The methods evolved into a wide range of forms of action, including encouraging denunciation, wiretapping, violation of correspondence, searches and seizure of various material thought to guarantee incrimination. Also surveillance and infiltration of agents and informants to obtain information that would serve as the basis for the PVDE's political files and the PVDE's lawsuits²⁷. The use of a wide physical and psychological violence and torture against detainees as a means of extorting "confessions or simply to intimidate them" was systematically adopted by the PVDE/PIDE. The most frequently used were violent beatings on any part of the body, with a kick, irons, or the butt of a gun, leaving visible marks on the prisoner, thereby extending their detention²⁸. Electric shocks and burns were also frequently used, and the isolation of the prisoner, as a form of psychological torture, was combined with the harshness of prison treatment through a poorly prepared and insufficient diet, often salted, and then the distribution of water was reduced. The most basic physiological needs of the human being were ignored and despised²⁹. After the start of the "collaboration" with the Gestapo and the Italian police, the forms of torture began to be "perfected," and the PVDE began to use "scientific" and more subtle methods of torture, which eliminated or at least reduced the visible marks of their use on the prisoners. Such as "sleep torture" or the so-called "statue," in which the prisoner was forced to stand for long hours without moving, sometimes with their arms raised³⁰. In addition to these forms of torture, among the special prisons of the PVDE there would be the harsh living conditions of the Aljube, Angra, Caxias, and Peniche, penal colonies overseas that would become notorious for their difficult conditions of survival³¹. The first, created in southern Angola, would receive as its first prisoners the insurrectionists of January 18, 1934. The second, and the most famous, created in Tarrafal, on the island of São Tiago in Cape Verde, would receive the first 157 prisoners in October 1936³². Implanted in inhospitable places, with a particularly difficult climate, some of the prisoners would end up succumbing to the dramatic conditions of health and nutrition,

²⁶ Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). *ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO*. Core.ac.uk. Retrieved March 6, 2023, p.41

²⁷ *Ibid*

²⁸ Pinto, D. M. G. (n.d.). *ENSAIO SOBRE A EVOLUÇÃO POLÍTICA DO ESTADO NOVO*. Core.ac.uk. p.42

²⁹ *Ibid*

³⁰ *Ibid*

³¹ *Ibid*

³² *Ibid*

combined with physical mistreatment³³. The PVDE/PIDE besides having a section that dealt with the problems within the country like problems of political and social spectrum they also had an international section that dealt with people coming in and out of the country either Portuguese or foreigners. The PVDE would check their documentation if they were legal, and if this people could be a threat to the regime. The people that were considered as opposition to the regime and were viewed as a threat to the regime, consequently, they would be arrested by PVDE with no trial, and could stay in prison up to one year and six months since this was legally allowed.

In relation to the targets of PIDE involving social classes, PIDE did not target specifically people from a higher or lower social class, anyone could be arrested regardless of their social position. However, a lot of social and political figures that could be a part of the leftist ideological spectrum suffered a bigger persecution. Due to this one of the main targets of PIDE was people that could have any relation to the communist party.

However due to the amount of repression PIDE did, when Marcello Caetano replaced Salazar, he knew the Portuguese population had a very negative view of PIDE, so to tackle this he replaced PIDE with DGS (*Direcção Geral de Segurança*) that had the same powers as PIDE. The powers didn't change much, but he was hoping that with this change the people would not be so opposed to these political police. Again, this was also only a nomenclature question.

Salazar then continued his path as "educator of souls" through the Ministry of National Education, directed in 1936 by Carneiro Pacheco, designed to mold young people into the values of nationalism, namely through the *Mocidade Portuguesa*³⁴. The *Mocidade Portuguesa*, established on March 19, 1936, included all youth, school-age or not, and was intended to stimulate the integral development of their physical capacity, character formation, and devotion to the Homeland, in the sense of order, the taste for discipline, and the cult of military duty³⁵. The project of turning the educational system into an instrument to root the new mentality around the consensus of the trilogy "*Deus, Pátria e Família*" was made possible by three determining factors: first, the political and

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Pinto, D. M. G. ensaio sobre a evolução política do estado novo. p 48

³⁵ Ibid

institutional consolidation of the New State; second, the context of growing political and military tensions in Europe; and third, the context of growing political and military tensions in Europe. and finally, the influence of outside models, namely Hitler's youth and the youth organizations of Italian fascism³⁶.

1.1.3 The Political death of Salazar

In 1968 Salazar suffered an accident that would end his rule and political career in the Estado Novo regime. To replace him after this accident that made him unable to govern anymore, Marcello Caetano was the man appointed to replace Salazar. Marcello Caetano previously graduated in law, brought great expectations between the more progressive currents of the *União Nacional*. However, these expectations would be quickly shattered after Marcello Caetano progressively saw his support falling from both the progressists of the regime as the traditionalists. In addition to this, Marcelo Caetano was overall seen by the military and the Portuguese population as a “softer” leader when compared to Salazar. While in power, he maintained the Estado Novo regime as well as the censorship and repression, that characterized the regime created by Salazar. Politically, Marcello Caetano wanted to continue the path created by Salazar but only with some upgrades, and to this he called “*renovação na continuidade*” where it aimed at maintaining the same principles but with a modernization of the Portuguese economy and industry. The 1969 elections were a watershed moment in the *Marcelista* political spring, signaling both hope and frustration. On one hand, the election campaign was relatively competitive³⁷. On the other hand, the results were the same as in previous elections, denying opposition members effective political participation³⁸. In this context, Marcello's missed the political opportunity to allow the politicians to form political parties, which is a necessary condition for a democratic transition³⁹.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. Revista Tempo e Argumento, p.4

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Ibid

1.1.4 The Marcelismo

It is also worth noting that the communist opposition was stronger than the moderate republican opposition⁴⁰. What solidified Marcello's perception of the communist threat and the non-communist opposition's political ineffectiveness contributed to the opening of initial policy retreats with the argument that building bridges with the revolutionary opposition is impossible⁴¹. For Marcello, the real threat to Portugal's social and political order was communist ideology.

Marcello, though no longer as animated, remained convinced that, following the 1969 elections, a reorganization of the political system is required⁴². To that end, he will form a new government, try to work with the new National Assembly deputies, and re-found the regime's old party⁴³. The situation with the National Assembly turned out to be complicated. Despite the formal renovation, a sizable majority of deputies maintained direct and indirect ties with the previous *Estado Novo* regime⁴⁴. However, despite differences in sensibilities, the parliament remained overwhelmingly conservative and undemocratic⁴⁵. The Liberal Wing, the newly elected independent deputies, were an exception. These deputies accepted Marcello Caetano's invitation to run on the *União Nacional* lists, but they were unaffiliated with the *Estado Novo's* apparatus policy⁴⁶. Young and politically inexperienced, they believed in the regime's internal evolution⁴⁷.

They recognized the anachronism of the *Estado Novo's* corporative authoritarianism and the need to overcome the regime's rigidity through liberalization that would facilitate a democratic transition⁴⁸. Melo e Castro had originally animated the Liberal Wing, which was part of Marcello's project of controlled liberalization⁴⁹. This means that there was initially a visible political convergence between the Liberal Wing and Marcello Caetano. However, after the start of the legislative session, it became clear that

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*, p.5

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Ibid

Marcello's controlled liberalization project and the Liberal Wing deputies' democratic liberalization project were incompatible⁵⁰. Liberal wing deputies wanted political reforms and advances rapid liberalization. Marcello wanted a controlled liberalization and with limits⁵¹. As time went on, these divergences were increasing and determined a relationship of disenchantment and frustration between Marcello and the Liberal Wing⁵².

1.1.5 The Colonial issue

There were two reasons for his persistent fear of exposing the regime, one structural and the other conjunctive⁵³. The first was his undemocratic personality and political culture, as well as his belief that Portugal was not ready to become a democracy⁵⁴. The second concern was with the overseas issue, specifically the increasing difficulty of internally and internationally legitimizing the continuation of the colonial war⁵⁵. Despite the difficulties, Portugal went to war in a context domestic and external, relatively favorable, either from a point of view of normative legitimation or from a strategic-military point of view⁵⁶. However, ten years after this context had changed radically. At internationally and domestically level, the three fronts of the war in Africa had less and less support⁵⁷. From an economic point of view, the war effort represented close to 40% of the general state budget⁵⁸. Even the military leaders began to be aware that the war had no solution military. This idea was more present in Guinea, where, in 1972, the military situation kept deteriorating⁵⁹.

Aware of the difficulties, Guinea's Governor, and Commander-in-Chief, António Spínola, proposes initiating political talks with the leader of the PAIGC, Amílcar Cabral,

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Ibid

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*, . p.11

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Ibid

through the mediation of Senegal's President, Leopold Senghor⁶⁰. Spínola travels to Lisbon on the 26th of May after meeting with Senghor in Senegal to present his idea for a political solution to Marcello and the minister of overseas affairs. Marcello quickly disagreed with Spínola on the importance of continuing the talks⁶¹. According to his political vision, Portugal could not negotiate with Amílcar Cabral because that would be recognizing the PAIGC as a “belligerent force” possessing “important territorial domain” which would amount to destroying all Portugal's juridical-political arguments on the defense of overseas territories ⁶².

Its most infamous shortcoming was his inability to deal with political movements that were not integrated or revised into the Estado Novo⁶³. Marcello was never able to engage in political dialogue with those who opposed to the continuation of the authoritarian regime⁶⁴.

Struggle Committees in universities began to spread Anticolonial linked to groups of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist inspiration. After the Ministry of National Education established the status exception in universities in 1971, the year 1972 is particularly significant⁶⁵. The causes of the unrest are rooted in the increased activism against the colonial war and the announced education reform⁶⁶. Several faculties at the Universities of Lisbon and Coimbra organize protests and boycott exam administration⁶⁷. In response to the challenge, the government imposes the use of force, police incursions ensue, and dozens of students are arrested or coercively incorporated into Armed forces⁶⁸.

Also, in the Catholic world, it was noted a growing opposition to the war, particularly in progressive catholic churches⁶⁹. Even the new hierarchy of the Church, led by Cardenal-

⁶⁰ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*, . p.12

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*, 12(29), e0205. p.14

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento* p.15

Patriarch D. António Ribeiro, begins to adopt a distance from the government's colonial policy. The execution of the "Vigil for peace" in the *Capela do Rato* is an example of this anti-war environment that was being established in Portugal⁷⁰. This Vigil and especially the government's reaction, had a significant political impact⁷¹.

1.1.6 The watershed of the Portuguese colonialism

The year 1973 was pivotal and marked the beginning of the end of the Portuguese colonialism. Aside from the growing agitation and radicalization of the opposition, Marcello would lose the support of liberals and technocrats, exacerbate the distrust of the *ultras*, and open a new front of conflict with the military, which will be fatal for him. The year of 1973 will be a pivotal year in political movements, with social and political forces showing publicly their opposition⁷². The classic opposition will hold its third congress in Aveiro between the 4th and 8th of April⁷³. This was the largest Democratic Opposition Congress, with hundreds of communications. In Aveiro, there has been a growing skewing of the opposition's political discourse, as well as a clear rift with the government⁷⁴.

Economic growth and social reforms were critical to Marcello's first-year administration. However, the continuation of the war obscured and undermined the regime's achievements. More than the difficulties of military strategy on the battlefield, the issue was the political strategy of war management⁷⁵. Regardless of how intertwined they were, the main source of contention was the bad political gesture of the military revindications⁷⁶.

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento* p.18

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento* p.22

⁷⁶ Ibid

During this period, the major issue was to resolve the military contestation led by intermediation officials⁷⁷. Marcello considered applying disciplinary procedures to the contestants, but quickly realized that doing so would be impossible with hundreds of officials⁷⁸. The captains' movement contacted General Costa Gomes, who wouldl speak directly with Marcello about the injustice that has been perpetrated against the officers of the permanent board ⁷⁹. Marcello did not approve of the *Chefe de Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas* (CEMGFA) resignation, particularly his role as defender and spokesperson for a military movement. In his opinion, a government, even if it is amid a war, cannot tolerate military insubordination and open contestation⁸⁰.

Marcello recognized that the radicalization of the opposition, both to the right and to the left, was spreading to society, but he failed in his rational solution of authoritarian control, which, contrary to expectations, increased the radical appeal⁸¹. In the beginning of March of 1973, several faculties at the University of Lisbon and Porto transformed into "revolutionary centers," and unprecedented strikes occurred in the workplace⁸². Economic and social conditions increasingly deteriorate. Nonetheless, Marcello insists that the main issue is military agitation. Despite this, Marcello eventually gives in to the press and, on December 24th, four diplomas are published with the intention of putting an end to the military conflict⁸³.

The 1974 political year begins with General Spínola's assumption of office in his new position, unquestionably a way for him to compromise with the government, limiting his options for an open contest⁸⁴. Despite everything, this did not happen due to the publication of his book *Portugal e o Futuro*⁸⁵. The book had a significant impact and sparked a minor political quake. The book argued for regime democratization, closer ties with the CEE, recognition of the principle of self-determination, the end of the war,

⁷⁷ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*. p.23

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Ibid

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*. p.26

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*.p.27

⁸⁵ Ibid

and a political (federalist) solution for the colonies to solve the conflict⁸⁶. The publication of the book was seen as a true manifesto against the government, and it represented a political front for the capitalist movement⁸⁷.

The *Partido Comunista Angolano* (PCA), which began as a cell of the Portuguese PC, played an important role in enhancing the sense of a unified struggle of the entire Empire against the Lisbon regime⁸⁸. The PCA, along with other less organized groups, eventually ended up joining the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), founded in 1956. In Angola, three organizations took the lead in the process of national liberation, FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA; these presented differences in terms of ideological orientation, but more importantly, these movements were divided by regional and ethnic differences⁸⁹. The situation in Mozambique was different, but it did not raise significant concerns for Portugal⁹⁰. With the formation of FRELIMO in June 1962, Mozambique became the last colony to organize a national independence movement⁹¹. In terms of ideological and structural cohesion, FRELIMO was the only movement of territorial liberation (previously, there were some movements, but more of regional and ethnic characteristics, as in the other colonies), that was weaker than the movements in Angola and Guinea⁹². When Caetano came to power, Mozambique was in turmoil⁹³. Despite Frelimo's efforts to expand the conflict to the south, the fighting remained confined to the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado four years after it began⁹⁴. If the conditions in Angola and Mozambique were not already a source of concern for Caetano, they became so in September⁹⁵.

By 1968, the situation in Guinea was undoubtedly difficult. Guinea lacked the economic potential of Angola or Mozambique, as well as a large colonial population⁹⁶. However, Portugal spent more in terms of military and human resources in this small colony, since

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Abadia, D. M. (2010). *O jornal combate e as lutas sociais autonomistas em Portugal durante a revolução dos cravos (1974 1978)*. p.19

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Ibid

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Abadia, D. M. (2010). *O jornal combate e as lutas sociais autonomistas em Portugal durante a revolução dos cravos (1974 1978)*. p.20

the war began in 1963, than on any other colony⁹⁷. The PAIGC pressure on Portugal was ruthless: its operations centered on the territory's south and east, where guerrilla tactics were used against the armed forces, attacking military transport convoys⁹⁸. However, the regime could still be maintained in Guinea, as the PAIGC, like the MPLA and Frelimo, had to deal with internal divisions and fissures within the movements⁹⁹. In early 1968, Guinea's administrator was the former Minister of Defense of Salazar, Arnaldo Schulz, who from the beginning had shown himself incapable of doing facing the challenge posed to him by the guerrillas¹⁰⁰. Hence, in May 1968, Salazar chose to replace him, in a decision that would change the course of Portuguese history, António de Spínola as governor and commander Guinea military¹⁰¹.

It was when Spínola had this role that he realized that the war could not be won military, and it will be also in Guinea that the soldiers would realize that the war that had been dragging for so long had no prospects of bringing any benefits to Portugal. The colonial conflict was approaching a tipping point¹⁰². By declaring that the armed forces could not be the 'praetorian guard of power,' Spínola revealed his strategy: to promote a 'palace coup,' which forced him to work from within the regime to force change from the start¹⁰³. Despite being a newcomer to the Captains Movement, António Spínola is a key figure in the process leading to the dictatorship's demise¹⁰⁴.

Marcello received a phone call from the Defense Minister informing him that something is going on in certain quarters and at the Military Academy¹⁰⁵. On the 16th of March, it was announced that there will be a mobilization of soldiers from the Infantry Regiment No. 5 in Caldas da Rainha¹⁰⁶. The coup attempt failed because it was not coordinated

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Ibid

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² Abadia, D. M. (2010). *O jornal combate e as lutas sociais autonomistas em Portugal durante a revolução dos cravos (1974 1978)*. p.21

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*. p.28

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

with a rigorous national operational plan, which was to take place on April 25th. However, it was a clear indication of the anxiety that existed in the barracks¹⁰⁷.

1.1.7 The fall of the dictatorship

On the 25 of April of 1974 a bit after midnight, the song *Grândola Vila Morena* by Zeca Afonso was played in Rádio Renascença. This song was chosen by the MFA as the green light to start the revolution. Hours later at 5 in the morning Marcello woke up with a phone call from the director of the DGS saying that the revolution was in the streets of Portugal¹⁰⁸.

In the *Quartel do Carmo* after realizing the gravity of the situation Marcello Caetano calls Andrade e Silva that was minister of the army to assess the situation in which he replied the situation was easily controllable¹⁰⁹. However, this couldn't be more far from the reality. Marcello tried to take control of the situation but there was nothing he could do. The revolution has started, and no one wanted to defend the regime¹¹⁰.

A military column with tanks, commanded by Captain Salgueiro Maia, left the Practical School of Cavalry, in Santarém, and marched towards Lisbon. In the capital, he took up positions with the ministries and then surrounded the GNR of the Quartel do Carmo barracks, where Marcello Caetano had taken refuge. Even though the MFA warned the population to stay inside, the population could not contain the excitement of the revolution and filled the Terreiro do Paço in Lisbon to show the support to the MFA. The *Movimento dos Capitães* arose as a result of the Portuguese army's inability to maintain military operations against guerrilla groups in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

¹⁰⁸ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento*. p.29

¹⁰⁹ Mendes, P. E. (2020). Os dilemas da renovação na continuidade e o legado de Marcello Caetano: do outono ao inverno. *Revista Tempo e Argumento* . p.30

¹¹⁰ Ibid



Figure 1: 25 of April in Praça da figueira in Lisbon. Source: <https://www.cd25a.uc.pt/pt/page/157>

The revolutionary process acquired socialist, communist and social-democratic inspiration¹¹¹. However, the Portuguese Revolution did not have its origin in Portugal. It was a direct result of the peoples' struggles in what is known as Portuguese Africa, as well as the suffering endured by the Portuguese army in the three theaters of war (Angola in 1961, Guinea Bissau in 1963, and Mozambique in 1964)¹¹². These battles were taking place in an international setting marked by the Bandung Conference (1955)¹¹³. But during that month of April 1974—and the months that followed—the world's attention was focused on Portugal¹¹⁴. At a time when the Cold War was resurfacing, the political process that was taking place in that nation caused anxiety in Washington and a certain amount of excitement in Moscow¹¹⁵. Following the initial shock, the US launched a number of initiatives to stop Portugal from becoming yet

¹¹¹ Secco, L. (2014). A Revolução dos Cravos: A dinâmica militar. *Projeto História : Revista Do Programa De Estudos Pós-Graduados De História*. p.369

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Freixo. (2010). Repercussões da Revolução dos Cravos. p.254

¹¹⁵ Ibid

another Russian ally and to ensure that the developments there wouldn't have an impact on neighboring Spain and lead to the overthrow of the Francoist dictatorship, which was nearly as old as the Salazarist one¹¹⁶. In any case, the presence of Spínola and other conservative elements in the *Junta de Salvação Nacional* and in the Provisional Government, to be established after the 25th of April, made most of the countries with which Portugal maintained diplomatic relations recognized, almost immediately, the new political power installed in the country¹¹⁷.

However, no one expected this vertiginous outcome of the oldest colonial empire. The most organized Party in Portugal at the time, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), advocated the overthrow of the dictatorship as an alliance between the “masses allied with the progressive military sectors”, to combat the 'backwardness' of the country¹¹⁸. However, the regime falls into the hands not of the 'masses' or the soldiers, but of a group of middle officers, gathered in the *Movimento dos capitães*, who no longer wanted to go to war, which they considered lost¹¹⁹. The dragging of the war over 13 years without a glimpse of any political solution within the framework of Marcello Caetano's regime and the imminence of defeat opened the crisis in the Armed Forces¹²⁰. The revolution is determined by the combination of the anti-colonial struggle with the outbreak of struggles in the metropolis and vice versa, the situation in the metropolis reinforced the legitimacy of the liberation movements in the colonies and precipitates their independence in a short period of time (in 19 months all former colonies become independent)¹²¹. It is rare for a right-wing government to be overthrown by its own Armed Forces but this took place on the 25th of April of 1974 in Portugal. On the streets, in cafes, on public transport, the environment was filled with happiness that the dictatorship had finally come to an end¹²². The normally sad countenance of the Portuguese shined with the prospects of freeing the country from the regime that had dominated it for a long time¹²³. The program of the MFA seems, in fact, to satisfy all or

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ Varela, R. (2012). “Um, dois, três MFA...”: o Movimento das Forças Armadas na Revolução dos Cravos - do prestígio à crise. p.404

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² 25 de abril. Uma aventura para a democracia. Textos literários p.137

¹²³ Ibid

almost all the aspirations of a people that for many years lived in growing development of a guardianship that results in a constant appeal to duties with a parallel denial of rights¹²⁴. There was a military pronouncement, masterfully conceived and executed, cavalierly conducted¹²⁵. The so-called *movimento dos capitães* demonstrated that it was not just another organization to diagnose and not act¹²⁶. It acted with extraordinary speed and simplicity, managed to dominate the country, there was almost no bloodshed, except for the the DGS that shot a few people. Power was handed over to the *Junta de Salvação Nacional* presided over by General António de Spínola, which was "required to commit, according to the general lines of the Program of the MFA, to make a commitment, in the shortest period of time the new structures, to promote general elections for a National Constituent Assembly, whose powers, by its representativeness and freedom in election, would allow the country to freely choose its form of social and political life¹²⁷.

The victory of democracy and freedom put an end to the *lápiz azul* and the prior approval of censorship¹²⁸. Left to hands with a short space of maneuver and forced to authentic kidney blows in defense of the truth of the facts, the media professionals where they too were the target of persecution and imprisonment¹²⁹. With the 25th of April, the doors of a new reality, where the plurality of thinking and acting were assumed in their fullness¹³⁰.

More than a corporate issue, the emergence of the *Movimento dos Capitães* bloomed out of divisions within the ruling classes of the Estado Novo, the prolongation of the war, in the context of an economic crisis whose depths had led to the end of the Bretton Woods system and the 1973 oil shock¹³¹. A combination of factors that lead to the April 25th : the MFA in the Carnation Revolution MFA, whose members were mostly from intermediate sectors of society, not very politicized and limited to the goal of ending the war, strike a coup d'état and formally hand over the direction of the country, through the

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ 25 de abril. Uma aventura para a democracia. Textos literários p.139

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Varela, R. (2012). "Um, dois, três MFA...": o Movimento das Forças Armadas na Revolução dos Cravos - do prestígio à crise. *Revista brasileira de historia* p.404-405

Junta de Salvação Nacional (JSN), to a sector of the Portuguese elites represented by António de Spínola, the general who a year earlier had published the famous *Portugal e o Futuro* in which he advised a political solution to the war¹³².

1.2 The divergences within the MFA and the political instability

António de Spínola was from the beginning connoted with a federalist-type solution for the colonies. After trying during the preparation of the coup to impose changes to the MFA program – and be forced to back down –, states, in the first communication to the country by the Junta de Salvação Nacional, after the coup, that the first political task of the JSN was “to guarantee the survival of the Nation as a sovereign Homeland in its pluricontinental whole”¹³³. The following year, the MFA Program is published and states that the overseas policy of the Provisional Government began by recognizing that the solution to wars overseas is political not military¹³⁴. In less than 24 hours, the country learned that there were disagreements on the issue that prompted the coup: how to end the war and find a solution for the colonies¹³⁵. Regardless of its members' lack of political experience, the MFA was opposed to the war, which motivated the middle officers to carry out the coup¹³⁶.

The First Provisional Government, which takes office on 16th of May of 1974, bringing together members of the PCP, the Partido Socialista (PS), and the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) in an unstable and fragile coalition, cannot withstand the intensification of social conflict in Lisbon and the colonies for more than two months¹³⁷. Its downfall was due to divisions within the government and the MFA and the National Salvation Board on the solution to the colonial war, in which General António de Spínola would represent the dragging of the solution to the colonies, in an attempt to prolong Portuguese rule in Africa, while the MFA, the PCP and the PS wanted the

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ Varela, R. (2012). “Um, dois, três MFA...”: o Movimento das Forças Armadas na Revolução dos Cravos - do prestígio à crise. *Revista brasileira de historia*. p.405

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Ibid

¹³⁶ Ibid

¹³⁷ Ibid

independence of the colonies¹³⁸. These divergences lead to the resignation of the prime minister close to Spínola, Palma Carlos, on 9 July 1974, and that of António de Spínola himself, on September 30, 1974¹³⁹.

The crises that pushed Portugal to the left also pushed Portuguese Africa to independence. They arose as a series of sometimes protracted conflicts in which tensions in Portuguese politics, events in Africa, and external pressures converged to cause serious clashes¹⁴⁰. The underlying causes of these crises were well known to most politicized Portuguese, even though the Portuguese press did not publicize them, and when it did, it did so vaguely¹⁴¹. It was clear that the political instability Portugal was experiencing in this period was deeply connected and affected the period of post-independence of the former colonies.

After this confrontation was resolved with the removal of General Spínola and the nomination of General Costa Gomes to the Presidency of the Republic, social unrest continued to rise, reaching a new peak on March 11, 1975¹⁴². The period of tension that followed became known as the "*Verão quente*," and culminated with the military movements of November 25, 1975, and the definitive victory of those who desired a political system based on democratic elections and popular will¹⁴³.

In this exceptional period of less than nine months, profound changes in Portuguese society occurred, to which few were immune¹⁴⁴. People and social groups had the opportunity to express their positions and demonstrate a growing awareness of the principles and values at stake, whether through spontaneous movements motivated by immediate problems related to the most diverse social needs, or through large demonstrations mobilized as a result of their union or party membership¹⁴⁵. And, if this growing participation must be highlighted as a new phenomenon in the daily lives of the Portuguese, it is especially important to recall, during this period, the most

¹³⁸ Ibid

¹³⁹ Varela, R. (2012). "Um, dois, três MFA...": o Movimento das Forças Armadas na Revolução dos Cravos - do prestígio à crise. *Revista brasileira de historia*, . p.406

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

¹⁴¹ Ibid

¹⁴² Do 25 de Abril de 74 ao 11 de Março de 75: Memórias da Revolução: RTP

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

extraordinary and conclusive manifestation of the Portuguese people — the Constituent Assembly's electoral act on April 25th of 1975¹⁴⁶. This electoral act is, at the same time, a point of arrival, as the maximum realization of the promises contained in the MFA Program, the culminating act of a democratic process continued despite all the vicissitudes, and a starting point of the most virulent polemics surrounding the assumed opposition between the democratic process and the revolutionary process¹⁴⁷. As a matter of fact, from March 11th, the forces intervening in the political process will position themselves more clearly in relation to those two processes: while the more radical leftist forces, including the PCP, make the importance of the revolutionary conquests prevail, taking as a program a continuous advance of the revolution, although evidently with different practical orientations, other forces, especially led by the PS and the PPD, defend, above all, the continuation of the democratic process and, therefore, the holding of elections and the adequacy of the model of society to election results¹⁴⁸.

The Constituent Assembly's work began on June 2nd of 1975, coinciding with one of the most troubled periods following the 25th of April. The months that followed saw an increase in political tension and violence¹⁴⁹. The supporters of the "revolutionary way" and the supporters of the "European model of democracy" were clashing¹⁵⁰. On November 12th of 1975, a demonstration surrounded the São Bento Palace, where the Constituent Assembly was meeting, and was mostly made up of construction workers fighting for the signing of the collective labor contract¹⁵¹. The victory of the moderate military in the far-left officers' uprising on November 25th of 1975, marks the defeat of the MFA's "revolutionary wing" and returns political parties to the center of political life¹⁵². On April 2nd of 1976, the Constituent Assembly approved the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, with only one political party, the CDS, voting against. The revolutionary spirit of the time was reflected in the constitutional text, which set as goals for the state the transition to socialism, the exercise of power by the working

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

¹⁴⁷ Ibid

¹⁴⁸ Ibid

¹⁴⁹ *A construção Da democracia (1974-1976)*. Parlamento.Pt.

¹⁵⁰ *A construção Da democracia (1974-1976)*. Parlamento.Pt.

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² Ibid

classes, and the collective ownership of the main means of production¹⁵³. The 1976 Constitution enshrines fundamental rights and duties such as the principle of equality, freedom of the press, religious freedom, labor, social and cultural rights. Adding to this, establishes the President of the Republic, the Council of the Revolution, the Assembly of the Republic, the Government and the Courts as sovereign bodies, integrates the local authorities and the administrative regions into the political organization of the State, and establishes the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira¹⁵⁴. On April 25th of 1976, the first elections to the Assembly of the Republic are held. The revolution and the process of establishing democracy were felt in all sectors: in the media, in education, in culture, at work, in society, in the economy and in mentalities, thus achieving, in 1976, two objectives proposed by the MFA program: the democratization of the country and decolonization¹⁵⁵.

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

Chapter 2

Portugal in the international context

2.1 Portuguese foreign policy during the Estado Novo regime

2.1.1 Portugal and NATO

In the beginning of the cold war there were two antagonist ideologies, from USSR and the USA. That in this sphere, each one wanted to attract and exert their influence on other countries, so they had their support¹⁵⁶. Therefore, to tackle the soviet threat, NATO was created on a basis of a military alliance that if a member country of NATO suffered any armed attack this would be considered an attack to all the member countries of NATO¹⁵⁷. This Atlantic alliance was created in 1949 with Portugal being one of the founding members. However, these rises important questions. To begin with, why the invite to Portugal? Portugal was an authoritarian regime, underdeveloped and had maintained a certain neutrality position during the World War II as well as a quite isolationist policy¹⁵⁸. So, what could Portugal offer to this alliance?

Portugal's invitation to be a founding member of the Atlantic Pact was inextricably linked to the geostrategic importance of the Azores. Since 1944, following the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of October 1943, the USA had access to bases in the Azores (initially in the island of Santa Maria, and from 1946 onwards in Lajes, Terceira)¹⁵⁹. In the early years of the Cold War, US–Portuguese relations reflected a constant tension between the government of the Portuguese dictator, Oliveira Salazar, and the Truman Administration¹⁶⁰. Though allowing for the US presence in the Azores, Salazar's regime showed great reluctance regarding the existence of an American base in its territory¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁶ Teixeira, N. S. Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1999. Retrieved March 6, 2023, from p.17

¹⁵⁷ Ibid

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

¹⁵⁹ Marcos, D. (2014). Between the Atlantic and the Empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese–American relations in early Cold War (1949–1957). *The Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. p.325

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

¹⁶¹ Ibid

On the eve of the Cold War, the USA regarded the Azores, along with Greenland and Iceland, as a 'primary base area'¹⁶².

The contribution of this archipelago to transatlantic security was therefore 'the most vital single spot in the world' in terms of bases for the staging of air transport and combat aircraft. In this sense, it was essential to put an end to what the USA considered an 'undefined status' in the Azores, since the presence of US forces was only assured through a bilateral agreement signed with the Portuguese Government, which established a short-term period for the presence of the North-American forces in Lajes.

Therefore, this was this the essential reason for the invitation to Portugal, to whose territory the islands of the Azores added strategic value. An important basis already in first war, would prove decisive in the second and crucial in the during the cold war.

"In the year that followed on April 11th of 1918, the United States established a naval base in the Azores. The New York Times announced that this naval base would serve "American submarines, destroyers, and other small craft with the consent of Portugal in order to protect Atlantic trade routes to southern Europe. American officers stationed on the Azores islands would continue to garner favor amongst locals. The Azoreans felt that Lisbon had abandoned the islands and valued the attention the Americans lavished upon the archipelago'¹⁶³."

During the World War II the allies had always concerns about the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula. During the World War II both Spain and Portugal were under authoritarian dictatorships, therefore the concern of the allies were two. One of them was that since they were dictatorships from a right wing maybe they could sympathize with Hitler and let him use the Iberian Peninsula to fight the allies. The second one was if just Hitler decided to invade Iberian Peninsula and use the strategic position of the Iberian Peninsula to have an advantage towards the allies. Either way, both the allies and the axis power knew how important the strategic Iberian Peninsula was, particularly Portugal.

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ Mak, Daniella "Colonial Discourse in the Cold War: Negotiations Between António de Oliveira Salazar and John F. Kennedy over Angolan Independence and the Azores Base from 1961 to 1963," p.7

Located on the edge of the continent, Portugal had a more careful neutrality than Franco's Spain. Lisbon was a center for wartime relief, efforts, refugees, and a source of information where Axis and Allied agents were able to operate freely. Yet, Portugal's value as a neutral was offset by its strategic value¹⁶⁴. Portuguese seaports and islands could extend German military power further into the Atlantic and help open the way to Gibraltar and coastal North Africa. It could also offer the allies easier operations on the continent. The British feared a German move against Gibraltar through Spain and Portugal, therefore the British and the US focused on the strategic significance of Portugal's Atlantic islands, especially the Azores¹⁶⁵. "On June 16, 1943, Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, the British Ambassador to Portugal, wrote to Salazar, petitioning him to lease the Azores to the United Kingdom(...)Sir Campbell implored Salazar to permit the United Kingdom use of facilities in the Azores for "the operation of aircraft and surface vessels [which] would be a decisive factor in the early defeat of the German submarine campaign in the Atlantic and, consequently, a vital contribution to an early victory of the United Nations¹⁶⁶."The Azorean islands of São Miguel and Terceira would be used to operate general reconnaissance aircraft, with unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at São Miguel or Fayal. In order to persuade Salazar to allow the British use of facilities in the Azores, Sir Campbell made this request of Salazar in the name of the Alliance which had existed between Portugal and Great Britain for six hundred centuries¹⁶⁷.

Included in the Pentagon's military defense system for the post-war period, the base in the Azores had already been the object of a bilateral agreement between Portugal and the United States in 1948¹⁶⁸. With NATO, the value will be strengthened in a multilateral framework and its role confirmed in the Alliance's strategic concept that in the event of an attack coming from the east, the so-called "rapid reinforcement of Europe" inevitably passed through the Azores¹⁶⁹.

¹⁶⁴ Stevens, D. (1992). Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Azores dilemma, 1941. *The Historian; a Journal of History*, p.643

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

¹⁶⁶ Mak, Daniella "Colonial Discourse in the Cold War: Negotiations Between António de Oliveira Salazar and John F. Kennedy over Angolan Independence and the Azores Base from 1961 to 1963," p.9-10

¹⁶⁷ Ibid

¹⁶⁸ Teixeira, N. S. Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1999., 2023, from p.18

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

Why did Portugal accept the invite?

Salazar was aware of the Soviet threat. therefore, the Atlantic Alliance was the only way out to assure Western security. The geostrategic situation of Portuguese territory and the particularly situation of the cold war imposed on Portugal an adherence to the Alliance, and not simply a bilateral agreement with the United States¹⁷⁰ . Salazar was also concerned about the victory of democracies over totalitarian governments simultaneously created some political issues for the Estado Novo (New State)¹⁷¹. Furthermore, the spread of liberalism and democracy throughout Western Europe appeared to cause issues for the authoritarian governments in Iberia¹⁷². to uphold its long-standing principles of foreign policy, Portugal needed to strengthen its ties with the USA, the new Atlantic power¹⁷³. Portugal had experienced an unstable geopolitical balance between Europe and the Atlantic¹⁷⁴. With a larger and more powerful Spanish neighbor and a peripheral position in relation to the rest of Europe, Portugal had always viewed itself as primarily an Atlantic state committed to maintaining its colonial empire¹⁷⁵. Also, it regarded the Atlantic and the alliance with other western actors as a balancing factor for preventing the country's isolation. Therefore, Portugal's international status needed to be revised, so that was what was at stake¹⁷⁶.

Also of big importance, the traditional relationship with the UK, an element of continuity throughout the different political regimes that ruled Portugal, was essential for the international survival of the country, particularly in assuring its Atlantic vector¹⁷⁷. Consequently, the Portuguese Government saw in the ancient Alliance with Great Britain the main stronghold of its foreign policy¹⁷⁸. After Second World War, the international position of Salazar's regime was weakened¹⁷⁹. The allies' victory and the

¹⁷⁰ Teixeira, N. S. . Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1999. Retrieved March 6, 2023, from p18-19

¹⁷¹ Marcos, D. (2014). Between the Atlantic and the Empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese–American relations in early Cold War (1949–1957). *The Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. p.326

¹⁷² Ibid

¹⁷³ Ibid

¹⁷⁴ Ibid

¹⁷⁵ Ibid

¹⁷⁶ Ibid

¹⁷⁷ Ibid

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ Ibid

emergence of the USA as the main Atlantic power gradually, though not entirely, diminished the relevance of the long-lasting Alliance with the UK¹⁸⁰.

It was already obvious to Portugal that the United States should be part of the European defensive zone as "a crucial prerequisite to success" due to US power in Europe¹⁸¹. But to maintain the geographical and strategic unity of Europe and the Iberian Peninsula, it should also include Franco's Spain¹⁸². Furthermore, Portugal believed that the Pact should be expanded into all the European colonial possessions in order to guarantee the defense of the Portuguese colonies¹⁸³. The Pact should not, however, be used as a tool to guarantee the USA's long-term presence in the Azores, in more in more favorable conditions. Finally, the Alliance should reinforce the intergovernmental cooperation, avoiding any type of supranational integration¹⁸⁴.

2.1.2 Critics to the accession of Portugal

Some nations criticized the authoritarian traits of the Portuguese government and highlighted how it was damaging for Portugal to be a member of an alliance that aimed to uphold liberal institutions and the democratic spirit¹⁸⁵. However, from the US perspective, Portugal's neutrality, and proximity to the allies during the Second World War's closing stages, as well as the Estado Novo's fervent anti-communist nature, were sufficient grounds for extending an invitation¹⁸⁶. In October 1948, Portugal was first approached about the possibility of joining the future Alliance thanks to British support for the USA's position¹⁸⁷. The Portuguese government recognized the importance of forging a transatlantic alliance, particularly in the area of defense, to counter the Soviet threat in Europe. Despite the fact that Salazar didn't sympathize with the western democracies. In a scenario of global bipolarization and the worsening of the Cold War, a Portuguese refusal, with all its consequences, represented a responsibility that was too

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹⁸¹ Marcos, D. (2014). Between the Atlantic and the Empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese–American relations in early Cold War (1949–1957). *The Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, p.327

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ Ibid

¹⁸⁴ Ibid

¹⁸⁵ Marcos, D. (2014). Between the Atlantic and the Empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese–American relations in early Cold War (1949–1957). *The Journal of Transatlantic Studies*.p.326

¹⁸⁶ Ibid

¹⁸⁷ Ibid

much for Salazar in the eyes of political leaders and Western public opinion¹⁸⁸. Furthermore, a Portuguese refusal could still be interpreted as a sign of weakness and yielding to Franco Spain¹⁸⁹.

Despite the reluctance demonstrated by Lisbon, it is undeniable that the participation in the Atlantic Pact was crucial for the legitimization of the Portuguese authoritarian regime international position, highly diminishing the risk of its isolation¹⁹⁰. Also, in terms of ideology it was crucial for Salazar to be apart in this “crusade” against the soviet communism and defend and maintain the Christian values¹⁹¹. Added to this, the invitation to Portugal was a unique opportunity to reinforce the country’s significance in the international system, bringing it closer to the Western powers and clearly setting it apart from Franco’s regime in Spain. This inclusion of Portugal and the exclusion of Spain in the Alliance gave Portuguese foreign policy a preponderant place in the peninsular framework and a privileged interlocutor in the extra-peninsular framework¹⁹². In a period of intense international adjustment, with the beginning of the Cold War, Portugal had to adapt its own foreign policy, becoming closer to the USA while also maintaining a stable relationship with the UK.

2.2 Portugal and the United Nations

In May of 1945, Salazar declared his interest on the new international organization that was being created¹⁹³. Portugal applied to the UN in 1945 and was finally accepted in 1955¹⁹⁴. Portugal was accepted as member of the UN by a special session of the general assembly in 14 of December of 1955¹⁹⁵. Later, the declaration of acceptance for Portugal about the constant obligations of the charter¹⁹⁶. Was submitted to the general

¹⁸⁸ Teixeira, N. S. Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1999. p.21

¹⁸⁹ Ibid

¹⁹⁰ Teixeira, N. S. Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1999. p 19

¹⁹¹ Ibid

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). Portal Diplomático.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Ibid

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

secretary in 21 of February of 1956 which marks the date that went into force for Portugal¹⁹⁷

But why did Salazar wanted to be a part of the United Nations? Well, being accepted in the United Nations would concede a sort of legitimacy to Salazar regime since being accepted in this organization meant that the Portuguese regime would be “approved” by some important western countries. In 1949 they were founding members of NATO, and this would briefly fulfil the Salazar desire of being accepted in the international community. However, when comparing to NATO, Salazar would face much bigger problems in the UN. Apart from the anti-colonialist wave Portugal would face in the UN, when applying to the organization the USSR was also an obstacle for its entry. “The power given to the permanent members of the Security Council meant that the USSR was able to veto Portuguese admittance for a decade. Also, starting as early as 1946, the General Assembly became a major forum for anti-colonialism. Salazar was not alone in failing to predict how quickly the UN — boosted by the strategic and ideological disputes of an emerging Cold War — would take on this role¹⁹⁸”. Salazar was trying to maintain its authoritarian regime and its colonies while the rest of the international community had strong ideologies of democracy and a growing support for the auto determination of the colonies still existing¹⁹⁹. In the view of Salazar, it was worth to abandon this position of isolationism and have cooperation with other countries if that meant the preservation of the Portuguese colonies²⁰⁰. “Failure to get into the UN was being used by its political opponents as evidence that Salazar’s authoritarianism²⁰¹.” Since United Nations were composed predominantly of democracies and for a state that wanted to enter the United Nations, this state had to be considered a “peaceful state”²⁰². Even though controversies were presented about Portugal entering the UN, from a perspective of a state being peaceful, Portugal was indeed fulfilling this requirement²⁰³.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

¹⁹⁸ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). p.254

¹⁹⁹ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). p.255

²⁰⁰ Ibid

²⁰¹ Ibid

²⁰² Ibid

²⁰³ Ibid

Salazar facing this anti colonialist majority in the general assembly had to come up with something that would make his regime not seem authoritarian and anti-colonialist. But of course, the international community and the UN knew Portugal had colonies just as Belgium and Great Britain. So, to counter this, before accessing the UN Portugal did a new constitution that the Portuguese colonies would stop being addressed as colonies but as a part of Portugal territory, but simply it was overseas territories. “In 1952 the Portuguese Constitution was amended to state that Portugal no longer had colonies; the territories concerned were now to be designated *províncias ultramarinas* [overseas provinces] and to be regarded as integral parts of a unitary pluricontinental state²⁰⁴.”

After this constitution Salazar was hoping the critics about his regime would diminish but this was not the case, because the other countries were completely aware that this new designation wouldn't change anything, these colonies were still under rule of Portuguese domination²⁰⁵. But still, Salazar wouldn't mind facing this criticism if that meant that this new constitution would be enough for Portugal to enter the United Nations.

Furthermore, domestic politics made Portuguese admission to the UN desirable for the Estado Novo. Failure to get into the UN was being used by its political opponents as evidence that Salazar's authoritarianism had led to international isolation after 1945²⁰⁶. The Portuguese membership in NATO had already made that argument more difficult to sustain. However, the fact that Portugal was finally admitted to the UN on 14 December 1955, and its continued membership after that date, meant that the Portuguese state was recognized as a full member of the post-1945 international system, regardless of the nature of the regime or the international criticism that it might attract²⁰⁷.

In the short term, and for a few years, this strategy appeared to result in some diplomatic success for Portugal²⁰⁸. The diplomats were also able to make tactically clever use of UN procedural rules, such as the requirement for a two-thirds majority for votes on important issues - and the anti-colonial bloc had conceded this was such an

²⁰⁴ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). p.256

²⁰⁵ Ibid

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ Ibid

²⁰⁸ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). p.257

issue by repeatedly claiming that Portuguese denial of colonialism represented a vital threat to global order. This ensured that any decision against Portugal would be delayed due to a lack of a sufficient anti-colonial majority in the General Assembly prior to 1960²⁰⁹.

Since the first year of Portugal in the UN they faced a prolonged fight in the United Nations but also outside, due to its lingering colonialism²¹⁰. Portugal was able to maintain its colonies until 1974 despite all the criticism and opposition it faced, this was mainly due to the arguments of historic juridic nature it used²¹¹. These arguments were used to defend the legitimacy of Portugal's positions when it came to the *Ultramar*. However, the entry of the newly independent states in 1959, a special committee called the committee of the 6 was nominated to deliberate the competences of the un to deal with colonial problems would cause problems to the defense argument used by the Portuguese regime²¹².

The conclusions of the report that was produced and presented in 1960, conceded the anti-colonialist movement an even bigger legitimacy not just in the UN but also in the international political life²¹³. In this report we should add also the resolutions of the GA n° 1514 (relative to the concession of independence of the countries and *povos coloniais*), 1541 (incorporates the report of the committee of the six about the status of non-autonomous territories) and 1542 (relating to the non-autonomous Portuguese territories)²¹⁴. These resolutions made in 1960 would mark the beginning of the end historic juridic defense that Portugal had been using as an argument²¹⁵.

When Portugal was accepted into the UN it was asked if Portugal administrate any territory that could be applied to the article 73° of the charter²¹⁶. In which the Portuguese response was that they didn't possess any territories that were applied to the

²⁰⁹ Ibid

²¹⁰ Martins, F. (1997). A política externa do Estado Novo, o Ultramar e a ONU: uma doutrina histórico-jurídica (1955-68). p.189

²¹¹ Ibid

²¹² Martins, F. (1997). A política externa do Estado Novo, o Ultramar e a ONU: uma doutrina histórico-jurídica (1955-68) p.190

²¹³ Ibid

²¹⁴ Ibid

²¹⁵ Ibid

²¹⁶ Martins, F. (1997). A política externa do Estado Novo, o Ultramar e a ONU: uma doutrina histórico-jurídica (1955-68) p.191

referred article²¹⁷. Portugal despite clearly being a colonial power, in the view of the Portuguese state it was up to them to define the exclusive right to interpret and apply their constitutional order²¹⁸. However, the UN considered that for the fact that Portugal was admitted in the UN as sovereign state and not as a territory that could not be any doubt about their territorial extension and its political structure²¹⁹. Therefore, the Portuguese government responded that by the legislation produced under the *Filipino* rule, it was mentioned that Portugal and its non-European provinces are not distinct or separate of the kingdom²²⁰. So, the Portuguese would use this defense of a preexistent reality with historical meaning to justify their colonies²²¹. Under the point of view of the Portuguese state a person born in Angola was just as Portuguese as one person that was born in Lisbon²²². This doctrine emphasized the unitary structure of the Portuguese state attributing this equality to everyone who was born in its territory²²³.

From 1959 due to the increase of the number of afro Asian countries in the assembly, the un became even more anti colonialist and it was approved a constitution of a committee that could determine if certain territories could be declared or not as autonomous²²⁴. This did not help the Portuguese cause since this committee stated that non autonomous territories were those geographically separated and ethnically/culturally different²²⁵. Analyzing the Portuguese case the committee declared that the existence of the institution of “indigenous” it was a proof (under a juridic point of view) that the populations in the “*provincias ultramarinas*” were not in the same step of equality as the population in the metropole²²⁶. Since the enforcement of laws varied amongst the metropole and the *provincias ultramarinas* these last one were placed in a position of inferiority²²⁷. The UN deliberated also, the metropole was much more developed than the “*provincias ultramarinas*” and the legitimacy of the Portuguese historical presence was considered irrelevant since it was based in war and through

²¹⁷ Ibid

²¹⁸ Ibid

²¹⁹ Ibid

²²⁰ Ibid

²²¹ Ibid

²²² Ibid

²²³ Ibid

²²⁴ Martins, F. (1997). A política externa do Estado Novo, o Ultramar e a ONU: uma doutrina histórico-jurídica (1955-68) p.197

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ Ibid

²²⁷ Ibid

military conquest²²⁸. Until the Portuguese constitution of 1951 the *provincias ultramarinas* were in fact colonies since they also didn't have their own government²²⁹. And regardless of the nomenclature the Portuguese wanted to use there was also never done a democratic consultation to these people about their will²³⁰. So, the conclusion from the UN and the principles contained in the "report of the six" is that Portugal was not in line with the article 73^o ²³¹. Portugal's response was that according to its constitution they did administer any non-autonomous territories, constitutionally Portugal was a nation politically unitary and since it was the government role to interpret and apply their own constitutions Portugal considered the United Nations incompetent to deal with this subject²³². Adding to this the admission of Portugal in the UN also meant that they recognized the legitimacy of its constitution. The anti-colonial offensive against the Portuguese regime was portrayed as a violation of key UN Charter norms, specifically Article 2 on sovereign equality and non-interference²³³. The Portuguese case went even further, accusing the General Assembly of violating the very universality of the rights and norms it claimed to be defending in arguing for the abolition of colonialism by using ethnicity and territorial discontinuity as a criterion for determining the absence of self-determination²³⁴.

As previously stated, the rise of newly independent African countries contributed to a shift in power in the United Nations, most notably in 1960, where these new states brought a change of perspective and a majority of an anti-colonialist sentiment²³⁵. Belgium, France, and Portugal had been collaborating throughout their years of participation in the United Nations because these countries were colonial powers with similar interests in preserving their colonies²³⁶. Until 1959, governments in Paris,

²²⁸ Martins, F. (1997). A política externa do Estado Novo, o Ultramar e a ONU: uma doutrina histórico-jurídica (1955-68) P.197-198

²²⁹ Martins, F. (1997). A política externa do Estado Novo, o Ultramar e a ONU: uma doutrina histórico-jurídica (1955-68) P.198

²³⁰ Ibid

²³¹ Ibid

²³² Martins, F. (1997). A política externa do Estado Novo, o Ultramar e a ONU: uma doutrina histórico-jurídica (1955-68) p.199

²³³ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). p.259

²³⁴ Ibid

²³⁵ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). p.260

²³⁶ Ibid

Brussels, and Lisbon had converged in a determination to resist decolonization in the name of a shared belief in a necessarily slow pace for real overseas development, and a cultural and strategic preference for some kind of integration into a unitary state over full independence²³⁷.

Due to this the Portuguese shared interests with the other colonial powers, Salazar was relying on the support of the western countries to support the Portuguese perpetuation of colonialism²³⁸. However, this new wave of anti-colonialism did affect and brought changes to the colonial powers, they gave in to the pressure and started their decolonization process. The sudden change of direction towards rapid decolonization by France and Belgium was even more unexpected because Portugal had been engaged, since 1957, in regular diplomatic quadripartite consultations with Belgium, Britain and France, with a strong focus on the UN²³⁹.

The situation also aggravated even more to Portugal when the first uprising which marked the beginning of the Portuguese colonial war took place in Angola in 1961. This armed uprising and the ones who followed next being in Angola but also in Mozambique and Guinea were a proof that designated *provincias ultramarinas* designated by Salazar, were indeed colonies. The beginning of the colonial proved the denial of the Portuguese colonialism and gave reason to the countries in the UN that claimed that these were colonies and were not under rule by the Portuguese by choice. When Belgium proceeded to decolonization in the 1960 as well as France this did not cooperate in Portugal favor, since Portugal used to cooperate and share interests with Belgium and France. Consequently, this had a negative impact for the Portuguese cause since Portugal was being left more alone and losing support from the western powers, and this made the Portuguese insistent argument on defending its cause even harder.

While British officials seriously considered leaving the UN Committee on Decolonization, which they eventually did in 1971, the British government never seriously considered resisting the trend toward relatively rapid decolonization²⁴⁰. Yet this is precisely what Portugal, a much smaller state, did: it retained all its overseas

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ Ibid

²³⁹ Ibid

²⁴⁰ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974).p.261

territories while making no moves toward independence and remaining a member of the UN²⁴¹. As a result of tensions with the Afro-Asian or Non-Aligned Bloc, Portugal became increasingly a rogue state, as did some of its Western allies, particularly the United States, the Nordic countries, and even Britain and the Netherlands²⁴².

Why Portugal facing all this hostility, why didn't they leave the UN at this point? The justification for this is that Portugal believed it had every right to be a part of the UN and abandoning the UN would mean a lack of courage and arguments to defend the Portuguese regime. In fact, Portugal had no reason to abandon the UN, the Portuguese regime had nothing to lose, besides simply facing critics on their colonialist perpetuating behavior. Even with anti-colonialist states in the UN challenging Portugal, the is that Portugal was still a part of the UN, and indeed it was accepted and seen as state that fulfilled the requirements to be a part of this organization²⁴³. Salazar achieved what he wanted, that was to be in the UN so Portugal would be accepted in the new world order and be seen as a legitimate and peaceful state. Therefore, Portugal didn't abandon the UN because it would not bring any benefit for the Estado Novo regime.

In 1973, there was more evidence that Portugal was becoming a pariah state for the majority of the United Nations²⁴⁴. Guinea Bissau independence was declared unilaterally by the PAIGC in September. This was a significant departure from previous decolonization precedent, but it was recognized by the majority of states. Portugal suffered significant embarrassment as a result of its call for UN membership, because even Western Cold War allies like Britain and the Netherlands were hesitant to appear too close to Portugal and its colonialism in denial²⁴⁵. Portugal that refused to give in to the pressure of decolonization even with all the criticism and lost support. This made Portugal the longest empire to exist in history while it only proceeded to the decolonization after the carnation revolution, when the Estado Novo regime finally ended.

²⁴¹ Ibid

²⁴² Ibid

²⁴³ Ibid

²⁴⁴ Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). p.267

²⁴⁵ Ibid

Chapter 3

Angola

3.1 The origins of the Angolan nationalism

Even though the main uprising against the metropole that would lead to a fight for independence took place in 1961, that were previous episodes of contestation against the Portuguese colonialism. This roots back years, even centuries before the Angolan uprising of 1961. The Portuguese discovered Angola in the xv century and from the colonization period until the Angolan independence, the country would experience many changes, not just by the Portuguese administration but also by other international actors²⁴⁶. Several historical, regional, and international helped shaping this change, such as the Brazilian independence, the ending of the traffic of slaves, the conference of Berlin, conference of Brussels, alliances and contracts between the colonial powers in Europe²⁴⁷. The consequence of this led to the mixing of diverse people of varies kingdoms that had as well diverse beliefs of cultural values and ethnolinguistic diversities²⁴⁸.

As mentioned before, the dissatisfaction against the Portuguese colonialism was already verified in years before, even before the 20th century. These origins of the Angolan nationalism could be placed throughout the course of the centuries and also through regions. We can emphasize the resistance of Ngola Kiluanje of the queen N'ginga, Cordeiro da Matta and Mutu ia Kevela²⁴⁹. Also the first Luso Ovibumdu war and the second Luso Ovibumdu war are significant marks of insurrection against Portugal²⁵⁰. They all showed their dissatisfaction against the portuguese colonialism and contributed for the rise of the Angolan nationalism²⁵¹.

²⁴⁶ A FORMAÇÃO DE ANGOLA E AS RESISTÊNCIAS AFRICANAS. Encontro Estadual de História, 2016. P.3

²⁴⁷ Ibid

²⁴⁸ Ibid

²⁴⁹ A FORMAÇÃO DE ANGOLA E AS RESISTÊNCIAS AFRICANAS. Encontro Estadual de História, 2016. P.4

²⁵⁰ Ibid

²⁵¹ Ibid

In 1933 when the dictatorial regime of Salazar was consolidated, his plans for the colonies included the incentive of the occupation of the colonies by the Portuguese²⁵². This resulted in a big increase of the white population in Angola, which consequently lead to the weakening of the creole bourgeoisie and increased the feeling of antagonism between the Angolans and Portuguese²⁵³. This antagonism was also a result of the white populations or the crioulos who (traditionally) possessed lands and would enforce labor to the indigenous population²⁵⁴.

Also, the church had a significant role in the spreading of the nationalist feeling. The church had affinity with other churches of foreign countries, in which they would support them in many ways, mostly in health and education²⁵⁵. With this support the church would show openly their dissatisfaction against the Portuguese colonialism and the Portuguese troops ²⁵⁶.

The national league that then later became ANANGOLA (Associação dos Naturais de Angola) was the first nationalist organization to exist in Angola²⁵⁷. The ANANGOLA had a revolutionary tendency and had to operate in a “clandestine way” due to the heavy repressions made by the authoritarian regime of the metropole ²⁵⁸. As we will discuss later, most of the movements of liberations of the Portuguese African colonies could not operate inside the country do the sanctions and persecution made the PIDE²⁵⁹.

Due to the rising of the nationalist movements the Portuguese government implemented the PIDE to repress the nationalists²⁶⁰. The mass imprisonments began in 1959, having the main leaders being the most persecuted, hence why the liberation movements had to go out of the country so they could develop ²⁶¹.

²⁵² Ibid

²⁵³ Ibid

²⁵⁴ Ibid

²⁵⁵ A FORMAÇÃO DE ANGOLA E AS RESISTÊNCIAS AFRICANAS. Encontro Estadual de História, 2016. P.5

²⁵⁶ Ibid

²⁵⁷ Ibid

²⁵⁸ Ibid

²⁵⁹ Ibid

²⁶⁰ Ibid

²⁶¹ Ibid

3.2 The PIDE in Angola

The PIDE of Angola had a hierarchical structure consisting of the main delegation and several Sub-delegations and posts²⁶². The Delegation was the central body, which maintained links with the headquarters in Lisbon and the other sub-delegations which, aimed at the effectiveness of research, collection, compilation a of information²⁶³. With a certain amount of autonomy, they activated the Posts under their jurisdiction, enabling an exchange of information, always centralized in the Delegation²⁶⁴. The Angolan delegation carried out administrative, criminal prevention and repression functions identical to those exercised by similar services in the metropolis²⁶⁵. This PIDE was created in 1954, based in Luanda. Although the formation of the special staff of PIDE personnel in service overseas dates from 1956, the services of the Angolan Delegation only began to function in 1957 at the Border Posts, installed at the airport and port of Luanda²⁶⁶. That same year, personnel from the Angolan Public Security Police were transferred to the special staff overseas and in 1961 the PIDE that worked in service for the metropole and in the colonies was gathered in a single personal board²⁶⁷. With the cold war the PIDE would do surveillance in all the areas in Angola due to the fear of activities that could be considered “subversive” in the African territories²⁶⁸. Salazar wanted to keep external actors from exerting their influence in the colonies particularly when it came to something of communist “intent”²⁶⁹.

The fear of PIDE when it came down to this subversive propaganda was that the communist was growing around the world, so the concern was this could originate the creation of revolutionary groups in Angola²⁷⁰. P 307. In 1960 it arrived in Angola pamphlets and manifests of the “*Terceira Internacional Comunista*” that was initiated after the Russian revolution. With this it began the circulation of the subversive propaganda in Angola²⁷¹.

²⁶² Mendonça, A. G. (2018). O salazarismo e a PIDE. Faces da História, p.305

²⁶³ Ibid

²⁶⁴ Ibid

²⁶⁵ Ibid

²⁶⁶ Ibid

²⁶⁷ Ibid

²⁶⁸ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). O salazarismo e a PIDE. Faces da História, p.307

²⁶⁹ Ibid

²⁷⁰ Ibid

²⁷¹ Ibid

Other documents, that were circulating in the Portuguese colonies, were seized by the PIDE and sent to the Ministry of the Interior of Portugal. In the eyes of PIDE the content of the documents served to stimulate a revolution²⁷². These documents would mention insurrection was necessary to reach the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and end the problems of capitalism throughout the 19th and 20th centuries²⁷³. They also contained information about the earlier international conferences and on the philosophy of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the field social and economic²⁷⁴. This communist thinking was PIDE's greatest fear because it could lead to a rebellion and thus lost its possessions in Africa²⁷⁵. However, although the PIDE tried to censor these documents, there were some people who had contact with this Marxist literature inside and also outside Africa²⁷⁶.

Secret meetings were held by students to discuss Marxist issues across Africa and the colonial emancipation after encountering this communist literature. The PIDE tried not to allow this and whenever it discovered the meetings and arrested everyone, sending the leaders to Portugal or Tarrafal²⁷⁷. There were cases also of Angolan students, who were in universities in the Metropolis, sent information to Angola and to students who were in the liberation movements²⁷⁸. The Students' Union from Angola and Mozambique scheduled meetings in other European countries, such as one that took place in Zurich, Switzerland²⁷⁹. At that meeting, the Angolan students agreed to with other students from across Europe and Africa to combine a network around the world, where they could exchange some information, because in their territories, they were prevented to circulate²⁸⁰. While the students sought to build a network, the PIDE surveilled everyone in their territories by exchanging information with their partners to be able to track everyone who left the country²⁸¹.

²⁷² Mendonça, A. G. (2018). O salazarismo e a PIDE. Faces da História, p.308

²⁷³ Ibid

²⁷⁴ Ibid

²⁷⁵ Ibid

²⁷⁶ Ibid

²⁷⁷ Ibid

²⁷⁸ Ibid

²⁷⁹ Ibid

²⁸⁰ Ibid

²⁸¹ Ibid

A factor they also gave rise to question the Portuguese colonialism according to PIDE was the fact that Portugal sent white Portuguese/white soldiers to the regions in Africa which made the African people questioning²⁸². Why were they still under Portuguese domination? Another factor that made the population rethink their situation was the independence of Congo²⁸³. The independence of Congo took place in 1960, and obviously when it came to this matter important themes like the imperialism, and the independence of Congo from also a European colonial power (Belgium) sparked discussions in Angola²⁸⁴. Furthermore, the Angolans did not have to worry about depending on the Portuguese rule since the country was considered wealthy in natural resources, had a costal area that would surely attract tourism and its raw materials could also be exported, which would leave Angola in a good position if they achieved their independence²⁸⁵. The Portuguese government was fully aware of what Angola could offer and that's why after the Brazilian independence, Angola became the African gem of the Portuguese empire²⁸⁶. This was also the reason why the Portuguese enforced a lot of work, efforts, and soldiers when the liberation war started in Angola.

3.3 The fight for independence

As we have discussed previously many factors were involved in the “plantation” of the sentiment of nationalism for the Angolans, as well as there were also several factors that contributed to the beginning of the uprising of the armed fight for the independence of Angola. Besides being influenced by the independence of their neighboring countries as well as other factors in 1961, the episode in Baixa do Cassange would be the “last drop” that would trigger their fight for the independence. In the 50's cotton was planted under colonial order in baixa do cassanje by the peasants in an intensive labor in the fields of Cotonang. After the independence of Congo, with new political entities, there was an increase in dissatisfaction which lead to a peasant revolt in January 1961²⁸⁷. This episode was the most relevant one about contestation of the working conditions

²⁸² Mendonça, A. G. (2018). O salazarismo e a PIDE. Faces da História, p.309

²⁸³ Ibid

²⁸⁴ Ibid

²⁸⁵ Ibid

²⁸⁶ Ibid

²⁸⁷ Freudenthal, P. A. (1995). A Baixa de Cassanje: algodão e revolta 1. Unicamp.Br. p.245

imposed under colonial rule²⁸⁸. There were factors that made this episode more important such as the population involved, the geographical area and the violence used²⁸⁹. However the Portuguese regime wanted to hide the origins of the revolt, mainly the motivations of the peasants, so it could come across that everything was normal in Angola²⁹⁰. This led to a big misinformation about what was happening due to the censorship made by the Portuguese, since they also banned foreign journalists²⁹¹. The only information available were the testimonies of some Africans and missionaries that reported the information outside of Angola and were able to break this informative interception done by the Portuguese authorities²⁹².

3.3.1 Baixa de Cassange

In the 1950's, forced cultivation of cotton in Baixa de Cassange swept away African farms and villages, subjecting the population to intensive work under the vigilance of Cotonang agents²⁹³. As the annual incomes of Africans fell, discontent grew. In 1961, before the nationalist uprisings of 4 February and 15 March, a revolt of rural populations in Baixa de Cassange took place which is almost completely unknown because it was deliberately hidden and harshly repressed by the colonial authorities, unpublished sources and inaccessible archives of Oliveira Salazar and the PIDE have made possible a chronological reconstruction of events in Baixa de Cassange between January and March 1961, besides enabling a deeper understanding of the internal factors which led to this rural movement²⁹⁴. This peasant movement was deeply rooted in rural suffering, seems to have had scarce relation with Angolan nationalist movements which in the same year started the war of liberation²⁹⁵.

In December of 1960 that were observed the first sign of resistance by the peasants where they refused to pay the tax and started to openly challenge the colonial authorities

²⁸⁸ Freudenthal, P. A. (1995). A Baixa de Cassanje: algodão e revolta 1. Unicamp.Br. p.250

²⁸⁹ Ibid

²⁹⁰ Ibid

²⁹¹ Freudenthal, P. A. (1995). A Baixa de Cassanje: algodão e revolta 1. Unicamp.Br. p.250-251

²⁹² Ibid

²⁹³ Freudenthal, P. A. (1995). A Baixa de Cassanje: algodão e revolta 1. Unicamp.Br. p.278

²⁹⁴ Ibid

²⁹⁵ Ibid

and the agents of Cotonang²⁹⁶. The military forces sent initiated the repression on the 3 of February, supported by the aviation they launched napalm bombs over the population²⁹⁷. This resulted in a massacre made not just by the bombings but also for the summary executions that the estimative of the dead varied, according to authors, from hundreds to 20.000 deaths²⁹⁸. Cotonang episode served as an incentive for the beginning of the armed struggle for the independence from the metropole.

3.4 Movements of National Liberation

3.4.1 MPLA

THE MPLA was created in 1956 after the unification of the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA) as well and the Movimento de Independência Nacional Angolano (MINA) and the partido comunista angolano pca. The ethicity mbundo (quibundos) were the biggest supporters, but it also counted with the support of other tribal groups²⁹⁹



²⁹⁶ Freudenthal, P. A. (1995). A Baixa de Cassanje: algodão e revolta 1. Unicamp.Br. p.252

²⁹⁷ Ibid

²⁹⁸ Freudenthal, P. A. (1995). A Baixa de Cassanje: algodão e revolta 1. Unicamp.Br. p.252-253

²⁹⁹ Agostinho, F. P. (2011). Guerra em Angola: As heranças da luta de libertação e a Guerra Civil. P.11

Figure 2: Portuguese supports towards the MPLA.
Source: <https://www.buala.org/pt/galeria/album-de-fotografias-da-guerra-colonial-angola>

The MPLA was guided by a Marxist Leninist ideology where its main leader was Agostinho Neto³⁰⁰. This movement began their armed struggle against Portugal in 1961 where several attacks occurred in prisons, police stations other important civil and military infrastructures³⁰¹. Although, the MPLA claims the attacks made on 4 of February there are disagreements on who really started these attacks³⁰². It varies from these attacks being influenced by the MPLA but some say that they did not have an important role in these attacks, stating that it was the act of various Angolans armed groups that started these attacks and the MPLA simply claimed them³⁰³. Either way, the MPLA as well as the other movements, wanted to be recognized as the ones who began the attack against the Portuguese colonial forces³⁰⁴. Another important date that set off this armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialism was the 15 of March, where it resulted in a massacre of civilians in predominantly rural zones made by several guerrillas. These attacks were claimed by the UPA (future FNLA) where in this massacre were killed and mutilated white, black, mixed people regardless of being men, women or even children. Like the February episodes, the March events are interpreted, not for what they meant in themselves and for what they politically intended to achieve in the immediate future, but as the first step of a strategy that wanted to provoke an insurgency war against the Portuguese colonial state³⁰⁵. In any case, the guerrilla actions launched on the 15th of March not only took place in a completely different environment from that in which the “4th of February” took place, but the protagonists, from a political, ideological, social, cultural, and ethnic point of view, were entirely different from those who, allegedly, would have thought and executed the episodes of urban violence that occurred in Luanda³⁰⁶

³⁰⁰ Martins, F. (2014, August 23). Angola, 1961: como os independentistas prepararam a guerra. Observador.

³⁰¹ Ibid

³⁰² Ibid

³⁰³ Ibid

³⁰⁴ Ibid

³⁰⁵ Ibid

³⁰⁶ Ibid

These two moments were considered to be the founders of the colonial war. But in this case the line between facts and propaganda is very thin³⁰⁷. The “4th of February” and the “15th of March” would have been politically rational and ethically legitimate events because they had been preceded by political proposals addressed to the Portuguese government and in which the immediate opening of negotiations was demanded, with the in order to prepare the transfer of power from the colonial State to the nationalist movements that called themselves the only legitimate representatives of the peoples who lived under Portuguese tutelage in Africa and the Indian Subcontinent³⁰⁸. The absence of a response, or the failure to obtain the desired response, from the Portuguese state legitimized the events of February and March 1961, as it legitimized statements made justifying the use of violence to put an end to Portuguese colonialism³⁰⁹.

In fact, it was the events of February and March that pushed the MPLA and UPA into armed struggle and not these two movements which, in a planned way, intended for a lasting armed insurgency to start immediately after or because of those events³¹⁰. In other words, given that the successes of February and March, although mainly the first ones, were conceived and implemented without the consent of the leadership of the two main Angolan nationalist movements, MPLA and UPA, it is obvious that they were not part of a strategy to initiate the systematic armed struggle against Portuguese sovereignty in Angola³¹¹. In February as in March 1961, MPLA and UPA were far from being prepared to wage an insurgency war against the Portuguese colonial state, ending up being forced into it as a result of episodes colonial violence whose conception, outbreak and development eluded them wholly or partially³¹².

The leaderships of those two movements realized that they could and should take advantage of events that, firstly, had achieved great and very favorable international repercussions, and, secondly, generated a response in which, above all, the disproportionate amount of violence, whether on the part of the settlers or the police and military forces³¹³. The violence of the colonial response, even if used with the argument

³⁰⁷ Ibid

³⁰⁸ Ibid

³⁰⁹ Ibid

³¹⁰ Ibid

³¹¹ Ibid

³¹² Ibid

³¹³ Ibid

of self-defense, did not allow for a proclamation, even an implicit one, about the end of the armed struggle³¹⁴ .

Also what happened in February and March transcended also the Angolan reality, since in april 1961 in the *Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas* (CONCP) that took place in Casablanca it showed the intentions of initiating the armed struggle against Portugal but also influenced and convince other movements like PAIGC to choose the path that an starting an armed struggle against the metropole would be the only way to achieve their independence³¹⁵.

3.4.2 UNITA

The creation of UNITA is closely linked to Jonas Malheiro Sidónio Savimbi, founder and first president of the party. In early 1966, Savimbi founded UNITA in Moxico, province of Angola, with offices in Lusaka³¹⁶. It operated mainly in the plateau and southern regions, alongside the Ovimbundu¹² ethnic group, which was the most populous in Angola at the time³¹⁷. UNITA emerges with much less ambitious goals compared to the other two parties that were already engaged in the colonial struggle³¹⁸. In addition to independence, it sought to attract the largest number of people to join the party as militants³¹⁹. To achieve this objective, it was necessary to compete with the other groups that had already started this fight long before³²⁰. Although the number of its cadres was always very small, UNITA managed to gain some audience abroad, especially in China and Egypt³²¹. Therefore, UNITA initially faced several difficulties, including opposition from both the MLPA and the GRAE, either of which had better structures and better groups³²². Thus, a new nationalist movement emerged in the struggle, although inferior to the others. The policy adopted by Savimbi put UNITA on

³¹⁴ Ibid

³¹⁵ Ibid

³¹⁶ Francisco, M. (2012). Angola paz total: Processo de pacificação, acordos e reintegração dos ex-militares. Academia Militar. Direção de Ensino. P.9

³¹⁷ Ibid

³¹⁸ Ibid

³¹⁹ Francisco, M. (2012). Angola paz total: Processo de pacificação, acordos e reintegração dos ex-militares. Academia Militar. Direção de Ensino. P.9-10

³²⁰ Ibid

³²¹ Ibid

³²² Ibid

the same footing as the movements that, after 1975, engaged in war with a group capable of standing up to the MPLA³²³.

Another important organization that had a significant role in the decolonization of Africa was the United Nations. As previously discussed, Portugal until 1974 faced a lot of backlash from the United Nations. In January of 1957 when the UN revised the article 73 of the UN Charter they concluded that Portugal had in fact colonies³²⁴. This conclusion was reached due to citizenship for the population of the colonies that were classified as indigenous³²⁵. The relationship between Portugal and the UN would gradually aggravate, in 1960 where the UN rejected any political or juridic architecture that would hide the non-complying with the article 73³²⁶. Thus, they stopped recognizing the Portuguese “*provincias ultramarinas*” and demanded that Portugal conceded the independence to its colonies³²⁷.

In the years of the cold war until the 90s the Portuguese colonies, Portugal itself and both the USA and the URSS would all be involved in this web that had various dimensions and goals. Amid the cold war, both the USSR and the USA wanted to have and attract as many supports they could to their ideology sphere. Thus, in this time when the second wave of decolonization began they saw an opportunity to try to influence these newly independent countries, help the ones fighting for their liberation but also to avoid that these countries would fall in the sphere of their “opponent”. Therefore amid this decolonization wave they saw Africa as perfect stage to work on their pretensions. This would generate tensions mainly between Portugal and the US due to their support to the Portuguese colonies, but also due to the Azores bases.

The MPLA was guided by a Marxist Leninist ideology where its main leader was Agostinho Neto and defined itself a popular movement that fought for the independence of Angola regardless of the origin and social class³²⁸. This movement was the more organized and better structured of the movements in Angola, having the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba, the movement also had a formation school for its members.

³²³ Ibid

³²⁴ Agostinho, F. P. (2011). Guerra em Angola: As heranças da luta de libertação e a Guerra Civil p.8

³²⁵ Ibid

³²⁶ Ibid

³²⁷ Ibid

³²⁸ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). p.109-110

Besides this they would also put work in the relations of the leaders and movements from other Portuguese colonies such as Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral³²⁹.

3.4.3 FNLA

The second front that formed itself in the Northeast and East districts was the *Frente Nacional pela Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), that came up in 1954 through the fusion of the *União das Populações de Angola* (UPA) and the *Partido Democrático Angolano* (PDA)³³⁰. The UPA was a cultural movement of defense and of mutual help for the Congolese exiled in Angola³³¹. which was led by Holden Roberto that at the time was exiled in Zaire and also this movement worked and organized itself in the exile³³². From this union then the FNLA rises and organizes itself in two fronts³³³. The first one with the formation of the *Governo Revolucionário de Angola* in the exile (GRAE), presided over also by Holden Roberto, Jonas Savimbi as minister of foreign relations³³⁴. And the second with the formation of the *Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola* (ELNA) supported by the government of the then Congo Republic³³⁵. The FNLA had a racial flag and was openly against white, Portuguese and communists³³⁶. When comparing to the MPLA they had little military training and its structure was also not as organized as MPLA³³⁷.

Also, the case of FNLA is complicated due to the positions the movement took through its existence³³⁸. Even though the FNLA had this characteristic of a “racial war” the idea of uniting Africa against the colonizer thrived in the organization³³⁹

³²⁹ Ibid

³³⁰ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos”: colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). p.110-111

³³¹ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos”: colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). p 111

³³² Ibid

³³³ Ibid

³³⁴ Ibid

³³⁵ Ibid

³³⁶ Ibid

³³⁷ Ibid

³³⁸ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos”: colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). p.125

³³⁹ Ibid

For the UPA/FNLA , in a first moment, they would require the elimination of demographic elements that were then considered the white presence in Africa, this was seen as “strange” since it did not corresponded to the original African “essence”³⁴⁰.. Thus hence the massacre of the white, mixed and even *negros assimilados* ³⁴¹on the attacks by UPA in 1961. Also the UPA/FNLA had this political aversion towards the MPLA since they considered it the party of the *mestiços*, sons of the *colonos de Luanda*³⁴².

Until 1963 Salazar regime was able to repress all the liberation movements, however 1964 marked a turn in the liberation war with the weakening of Portugal and the strengthening of Angola in multiple fields³⁴³. The MPLA tried to emancipate the country and aligned it with Comintern³⁴⁴. The first step taken by the MPLA was to establish relations with other parties/movements of other Portuguese colonies in Africa that also shared the same Marxist ideology³⁴⁵. Therefore from 1964 the revolutionary groups had a better allies whilst Portugal was losing his historical allies³⁴⁶. Therefore, this marks this turn.

The Portuguese communist party and some supporters of Humberto Delgado asked for the Portuguese armed forces to not enter combat³⁴⁷. The PCP even edited a clandestine journal where it asked for the auto determination of the colonies and establishment of peace. Since the early days of the Estado Novo the PCP always supported the colonies but only now in the 60’s with this weakening of Portugal is that they found space to help³⁴⁸. Also, another supporter from the metropole was the catholic church. Even though at first the catholic church was the base of support of the Estado Novo in the 1930 decade because they related obviously to the catholic values Salazar would also

³⁴⁰ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). p.126

³⁴¹ The assimilados were the individuals who managed to demonstrate to the Portuguese colonial administration that they had reached a level of social evolution that allowed them to move from the condition of “indigenous” to that of “civilized”, which guaranteed them access to citizenship, proven by the possession of a document, conferred by Portuguese public and private law.

³⁴² Ibid

³⁴³ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). P.140

³⁴⁴ Ibid

³⁴⁵ Ibid

³⁴⁶ Ibid

³⁴⁷ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). P.141

³⁴⁸ Ibid

preach about³⁴⁹. However, this support changed amid the Vatican council II (1962-1965) that had more critics to the colonialist regimes³⁵⁰.

On a opposite side most of the press was in favor of the Portuguese colonialism. Since the journals were controlled by the regime, they addressed the situation in Angola as subversive conflicts and product of the “international terrorism”³⁵¹. Portugal tries to avoid that the world would find out what was happening in Angola therefore they controlled what to put in the press and if any journal or mean of communication tried to speak badly about the regime it would be simply censored³⁵².

Besides this, the armed struggle in Angola also found difficulties besides the repression and surveillance apparatus, the PIDE would also contribute to the deepening of the conflicts between the movements³⁵³. The PIDE was aware of the ideological conflicts between the movements and many times they used this in their favor³⁵⁴. In an announcement addressed to the Angolans confiscated by PIDE the MPLA would talk about false” patriots” that were trying to deceive the Angolan population³⁵⁵.

The announcement also talked about how UPA would bring segregation between the Angolans and the Portuguese and considered overall the UPA/FNLA racist³⁵⁶. In this same announcement the MPLA mentioned that whoever wanted to participate in the movement they could, regardless of racial or ethnic differences³⁵⁷. This was stated due to fact that the UPA/FNLA believed that the armed struggle should be fought by Africans and not supported by international agents, particularly the soviet socialism³⁵⁸. On a edition of the *boletim militante* of the MPLA of 1964, militant journal of the movement, they exposed again the tactics of the Portuguese regime that they wanted to

³⁴⁹ Ibid

³⁵⁰ Ibid

³⁵¹ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). P.142

³⁵² Ibid

³⁵³ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). P.144

³⁵⁴ Ibid

³⁵⁵ Ibid

³⁵⁶ Ibid

³⁵⁷ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). P.145

³⁵⁸ Ibid

perpetuate the domination and not concede the independence to the its colonies³⁵⁹. Whilst adding to this they alter or censor information para the delude the public opinion³⁶⁰.

These *boletins* would serve on one hand to denounce the repressive practices of the Portuguese regime in Africa and also to make the Africans aware to be against the colonizers. During the colonial war the movements also turned to OUA to increase their support with the colonial struggle³⁶¹.

3.5 Organização da Unidade Africana (OUA)

The OUA was born in 1963 in the Adis Adeba conference as an organization capable of promoting the unification solidarity between the African states³⁶². As well as defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and elimination of all forms of colonialism in Africa³⁶³. The OUA therefore functioned as a voice for the liberation movements, important societal and political African figures to debate and focus to have an Africa free of colonialism³⁶⁴. The OUA also played a crucial role in the history of decolonization of Africa, as they worked as a pressure group of the international community but also for providing direct support to the liberation movements³⁶⁵.

In the beginning the UPA/FNLA was the representative of Angola in this organization³⁶⁶. However, with the rising of the Marxist-Leninist support in Africa, the MPLA criticized the fact that only one movement was represented and supported by the OUA³⁶⁷. Therefore, with the help of the PAIGC, the movement was able to enter and from then had a bigger representativity in the organization³⁶⁸. While already in the

³⁵⁹ Ibid

³⁶⁰ Ibid

³⁶¹ Ibid

³⁶² Agostinho, F. P. (2011). Guerra em Angola: As heranças da luta de libertação e a Guerra Civil p.7

³⁶³ Ibid

³⁶⁴ Ibid

³⁶⁵ Ibid

³⁶⁶ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). P.146

³⁶⁷ Ibid

³⁶⁸ Ibid

OUA, MPLA claimed that in case of a possible leaving of the colonizer they would be the ones entitled to have the legitimate govern of Angola³⁶⁹.

3.6 The war against Portuguese colonialism

During the liberation war the destiny of many Portuguese and Angolans was death³⁷⁰. If the Angolans were not killed by the Portuguese then they would die over ethnic and ideologic conflicts³⁷¹. Also, a particularity of this war was that the resistance would happen in the woods and places near the frontier³⁷². Firstly because it was easier to receive the equipment and secondary because the repression “machine” of the Portuguese regime was not big in this area ³⁷³. Also, a lot of Portuguese and Angolans that supported the decolonization however did not wanted to fight, they would opt to escape to neighboring countries so they would avoid death, torture or imprisonment³⁷⁴.

The war would only end after the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship on the 25 of April of 1974 by the coup lead by the MFA. It was due to what happened in the metropole that the liberation war would finally come an end. After the fall of the Estado Novo regime, Angola was waiting to know, as well as the people in the metropole, what would happen in the colonies. Both the (most) of the Portuguese population as well as the Angolans wanted the independence from Portugal, however it was up to the movement of the armed forces MFA to decide how to proceed. The problem was the MFA obviously men that had no previous political experience found themselves in a hard position to come up with a solid plan for the decolonization. Plus, the political conflicts characterized by ideological divisions between key actors of the MFA and the provisional government would make the situation worse. Even though Portugal was no longer under a dictatorship, in the period after the coup until 1976 Portugal experience a significant political instability with multiple provisory governments until 1976. The two significant divergences after the coup in the middle of the MFA was that on one hand

³⁶⁹ Ibid

³⁷⁰ Mendonça, A. G. (2018). “Patriotas Angolanos” : colonialismo, repressão, nacionalismo e guerra de libertação (1933-1977). P.147

³⁷¹ Ibid

³⁷² Ibid

³⁷³ Ibid

³⁷⁴ Ibid

the majority wanted to grant the immediate independence to the colonies, and on opposite side Spínola wanted to create a federalist solution of Lusophone states under Portugal supervision. Spínola was a key actor in the revolution and in the period after the revolution and he did believe in the auto determination of the colonies however in his point of view this would have to be conjugated with the Portuguese supervision. Spinola's view sparked a big disagreement in the heart of the MFA, that these men, also like Spinola, had fought in this colonial wars, simply just wanted to distance themselves and have disengage from any colonial activity.

3.7 The independence

Therefore, with the end of the Estado Novo, the Portuguese government claimed the right of the independence of Angola and initiated the negotiations that lead to the Alvor Accords in January 1975, with the MPLA, UNITA and FNLA ³⁷⁵

3.7.1 The independence process

In the *Acordo de Alvor* was established a transition government for Portugal and the three movements³⁷⁶. This government should remain in power until the official proclamation of independence that was established for 11 of November of 1975, however this was a failure due to the conflicts caused by the dispute of power³⁷⁷.

The framework for Angola's decolonization was contained in General Spínola's program unveiled in August 1974 that included: a) recognition of the three major liberation movements; b) establishment of a two-year provisional coalition government representing the three liberation movements and the white Angolan community; c) preparation by the provisional government for elections for a Constituent Assembly whose task would be to prepare a constitution for Angola; and d) a commitment by the

³⁷⁵ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). P.26

³⁷⁶ Ibid

³⁷⁷ Ibid

provisional government to invite the United Nations to monitor the elections³⁷⁸. In addition, the provisional government would take all the necessary steps to “safeguard the life and property of the residents of Angola, whatever their color or creed, in accordance with the program of the Movement of the Armed Forces.” Before the establishment of the provisional government, Admiral Coutinho asked all the three liberation movements to enter into a permanent ceasefire with the junta³⁷⁹

The inclusion of "white Angolans" in the government, according to the nationalist movements, would undermine the country's aspirations for independence and result in "chaos and secession³⁸⁰." When the MFA's left wing overthrew General Spínola in September 1974 and right-wing Angolan whites attempted an unsuccessful coup against the junta in August, the chances for an interim government further faded³⁸¹. These incidents occurred at the same time as the FNLA launched more military raids and attacks in northern Angola, ending the possibility of a multiracial government³⁸².

Despite this, the junta made plans to hold a bilateral ceasefire negotiation with the three liberation movements in hopes this would calm the tensions between them³⁸³. An agreement was reached between the UNITA and the Angolan administration in September 1974³⁸⁴. However, Savimbi ended up signing a secret ceasefire agreement with the Portuguese to confine itself to the areas under its control³⁸⁵. Savimbi opted to do this, to reassure the integrity of UNITA since it lacked significant external support

In October 21st of 1974, the MPLA signed its ceasefire agreement with the junta in an effort to balance the FNLA's rising political legitimacy after resolving its leadership crisis. The agreement contained a provision acknowledging the MPLA armed forces right to unrestricted movement throughout Angola, even though it resembled those of the FNLA and UNITA. This supported the idea that the MPLA had gotten special

³⁷⁸ Khadiagala, G. M. (2005, January 1). Negotiating Angola's Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords. *International Negotiation*; p.298

³⁷⁹ Ibid

³⁸⁰ Ibid

³⁸¹ Ibid

³⁸² Ibid

³⁸³ Khadiagala, G. M. (2005, January 1). Negotiating Angola's Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords. *International Negotiation*; p.299

³⁸⁴ Ibid

³⁸⁵ Ibid

treatment from Portuguese negotiators due to its left-leaning views. Admiral Coutinho also made choices throughout the conflict that tipped Angola's domestic power balance in favor of the MPLA on orders from the MFA. In particular, he supported the MPLA's "popular power" urban mobilization strategy by allowing it to control Radio Luanda³⁸⁶.

3.7.2 The summit in Mombasa

The three movements were given legitimacy by the bilateral cease-fire agreements, which allowed them to engage in political activity, rally support, and increase their political influence. Although the agreements provided structure to a program of decolonization that would have otherwise been incoherent, they did not provide an answer to the issue of a shared political platform among the liberation movements³⁸⁷. Furthermore, the already fractious nationalist atmosphere in Angola appeared to gain a potentially unstable component from the junta's sympathies for the MPLA³⁸⁸. Despite these obstacles, the OAU and the junta encouraged the nationalist movements to step up their efforts to create a unified front prior to independence³⁸⁹. As a result, the three movements reached several bilateral agreements, which culminated in multilateral negotiations in Mombasa, Kenya³⁹⁰. A dead-lock was developed between the three movements as a result of this agreement because none of them agreed with the proposals for the distribution of ministerial portfolios in the future Government of Transition³⁹¹. However, there were some areas of agreement, such as the convergence of the Cabinda enclave in Angolan territory and the development of a shared negotiation platform with the Portuguese Government with the aim of forming the transitional Government that would establish the independence of Angola³⁹². The three movements prepared for the start of the independence and transitional government negotiations with Portugal, which would take place on the 10th of January in Portugal and in which the

³⁸⁶ Ibid

³⁸⁷ Khadiagala, G. M. (2005, January 1). Negotiating Angola's Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords. *International Negotiation*; p.300

³⁸⁸ Ibid

³⁸⁹ Ibid

³⁹⁰ Ibid

³⁹¹ Carvalho, T. (2015). O Conflito entre MPLA e UNITA/FNLA como Materialização do Confronto URSS/EUA: no contexto da Guerra Fria.

³⁹² Ibid

three movements should be represented, by beginning to establish cooperative relationships in the fields of decolonization, defense, territorial integrity, and national reconstruction³⁹³.

3.7.3 The Alvor Accord

“The accord, comprising sixty articles, had three key ingredients. First, they acknowledged the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA as the sole representatives of the Angolan people. Second, they provided a legal and administrative framework for Angola’s independence in 11th of November, 1975. Third, they established procedures by which this independence would be decided³⁹⁴”

The accord envisaged that the transitional government would prepare electoral laws that would elect a constituent assembly made up of the three movements within nine months after its inception³⁹⁵. The constituent assembly would then elect the first president of an independent Angola³⁹⁶

Regarding the ceasefire, the agreements established a general ceasefire that formalized the earlier bilateral agreements and required the three armies to "settle in their rightful regions and localities³⁹⁷." A National Defense Commission was established to oversee the gradual integration of 24,000 Portuguese and 8,000 soldiers from each of the liberation movements into a combined military force³⁹⁸. Between October 1975 and February 1976, the 24,000 Portuguese troops would be gradually withdrawn once a combined army made up of the three movements had been assembled³⁹⁹. The nationalists requested Portugal to keep troops in Angola for three months after independence out of concern that their rivalries might flare up again⁴⁰⁰

³⁹³ Ibid

³⁹⁴ Khadiagala, G. M. (2005, January 1). *Negotiating Angola’s Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords*. International Negotiation; Brill. p.301

³⁹⁵ Khadiagala, G. M. (2005, January 1). *Negotiating Angola’s Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords*. International Negotiation; Brill. p.302

³⁹⁶ Ibid

³⁹⁷ Ibid

³⁹⁸ Ibid

³⁹⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid

The Alvor Accords, which served as a constitution, were a reflection of the limitations of the hurried and disorganized decolonization process that Lisbon had started in April 1974⁴⁰¹. It was fabricated out of convenience and built on the principles of good faith between parties who had previously harbored mistrust for one another⁴⁰². The accords promised parity between the parties at all levels of the transitional institutions in order to avoid this contentious history, but this parity resulted in a stalemate in the administration of affairs⁴⁰³. The accords marginalized important voices in Angola that would have provided the necessary political balance among the liberation movements by granting exclusive legitimacy to the three movements as the "only true representatives of the Angolan people⁴⁰⁴." Alvor was a transitional constitution, in contrast to other independence constitutions⁴⁰⁵. After forging the common platform in Mombasa, the movements had engaged in tactical maneuvers with one simple objective: taking overpower unilaterally in November 1975⁴⁰⁶. In the *Acordo de Alvor* it was established a transition government for Portugal and the three movements⁴⁰⁷. This government should remain in power until the official proclamation of independence that was established for 11 of November of 1975, however this was a failure due to the conflicts caused by the dispute of power⁴⁰⁸. Even though these movements had previously shown in the independence war that they significant differences and disputes there were big hopes that finally with the independence Angola could finally experience. However, this was not the case. Just briefly after the Angolan independence the three movements would begin a civil war that would last until 2002. These movements had significant ethnic and social differences, ideological differences as well as by the lack of effort from Portugal to set bases for a string political consensus⁴⁰⁹.

The provisional government, established by Portugal, was not able to unify Angola, not only because of the foreign influence rooted in the movement's independence, but

⁴⁰¹ Ibid

⁴⁰² Ibid

⁴⁰³ Ibid

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid

⁴⁰⁷ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). P.26

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid

⁴⁰⁹ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). P.27

mainly because of the economic and power interests of these groups⁴¹⁰. During the transition, the intensification of disputes led to calls for more support to consolidate the leadership position over the other political opponents, which intensified the external intervention, intensifying the conflict, which plunged Angola into a civil war⁴¹¹. For all these reasons, the conflict has become more and more internationalized and external actors began to strengthen their interference, at the request of nationalist movements⁴¹². As the intervention of the powers increased, the need to achieve their own strategic objectives grew, escalating the crisis in the region, because of its policies establishment of areas of influence⁴¹³.

Thus, one can point out the most relevant historical factors of the process of independence and formation of national liberation movements: the different groups of different social, ethnic and ideological origins fought in a sparse way, mainly for cause of difference in supporters in the context of a bipolar world⁴¹⁴. the violent disputes marked the independence process by the Salazar regime's insistence on maintaining its colonies facing the world stage, after the end of World War II; with the abrupt rupture of power in Portugal and consequent change of posture in relation to its colonies, Angola was freed from the chains of imperialism, but totally divided internally⁴¹⁵.the small efforts of division of power, did not lead the State to a sustainable peace process; and external influences, increasingly in conflict over control of the Angolan territory, took root in the national liberation movements and financed its continuation, giving military power to the leaders of these groups⁴¹⁶.

Amid the cold war, various actors but particularly, the USA and the USSR had a significant role that would impact the Angolan civil war. With the involvement of these actors some shared values with the liberation movements that would influence their

⁴¹⁰ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). P.29

⁴¹¹ Ibid

⁴¹² Ibid

⁴¹³ Ibid

⁴¹⁴ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). P.27

⁴¹⁵ Ibid

⁴¹⁶ Ibid

support. The MPLA had the support of the USSR and Cuba⁴¹⁷. The FNLA was able to have the support of the USA, south Africa and Zaire⁴¹⁸. Lastly, UNITA received support from south Africa and the USA⁴¹⁹.

Even though it was due to the disagreement of the movements that the civil war started, the support the foreign countries were giving to these 3 movements contributed for a longer and bloodier war. While fighting for the independence of Angola these movements had very precarious equipment and lacked an organization. However, when the civil war began these small groups suddenly would operate tanks and bulletproof cars.

3.8 The civil war and the US intervention

For Salazar, the recent president of the United States, John F. Kennedy, sympathizing with Third World independence movements represented a true betrayal of anti-communist ideals, particularly in relation to Portugal⁴²⁰. When it became clear that the US president was going to develop a policy opposing the one that the Estado Novo had determined, diplomatic disagreements between the Portuguese capital and the American capital began to take shape⁴²¹. However, the President of the Council of Ministers attempted to balance Washington's position by negotiating authorization for the American power to use the Lajes air base⁴²².

It is worth noting that the United States provided significant assistance to UNITA and formed an alliance with South Africa⁴²³. This help was a way of combating Soviet aspirations in the region and protecting the US interests in the country, such as oil exploration⁴²⁴. It was thus in America's best interests to influence and participate in the

⁴¹⁷ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.29

⁴¹⁸ Ibid

⁴¹⁹ ibid

⁴²⁰ De Fraga, L. A. (2014). A guerra colonial: 1961-1974. p.14

⁴²¹ Ibid

⁴²² Ibid

⁴²³ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.75

⁴²⁴ Ibid

Angolan civil war, thereby discouraging any Soviet leadership in the region⁴²⁵. That active rivalry in the international system was brought to Angola, increasing tensions between liberation movements, and intensifying the ideological conflict⁴²⁶. After leaving the national sphere, the Angolan conflict became international as a result of external interventions, primarily from major power⁴²⁷

The US was not only interested in undermining the possibility of a communist government in the country, but also in broadening its sphere of influence, exploitation of Angola's resources, and increasingly opening the way for its interests in the region⁴²⁸. As a result, the intensity of the fight increased, and rival groups' threats became constant⁴²⁹. With the war scenario fully embedded in the bipolar dispute, UNITA, South Africa, and, indirectly, the United States, threatened the MPLA, resulting in a large transfer of Soviet armaments to Angola in the second half of 1980⁴³⁰. Meanwhile, Cuba maintained its army, which numbered around 50,000 men. South Africa's involvement alongside UNITA should also be highlighted, since the African country of the Apartheid regime has become a great American ally⁴³¹

Moscow reinforced its support for the MPLA and as a result, the US increased financial support and requested the intervention by South Africa and Zaire⁴³². A lot of equipment sent by the Americans arrived at the FNLA and UNITA, through the border of Zaire⁴³³. The former USSR, therefore, requested the Cuban intervention in Angola⁴³⁴. The Operation IA Feature was established, in which the US supported, through this intelligence agency, UNITA and the FNLA⁴³⁵. However, if by on the one hand, the program was not strong enough to be effective, on the other hand, also not enough to remain secret⁴³⁶. Despite Zaire already demonstrating the decision to support the FNLA

⁴²⁵ Ibid

⁴²⁶ Ibid

⁴²⁷ Ibid

⁴²⁸ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.76

⁴²⁹ Ibid

⁴³⁰ Ibid

⁴³¹ Ibid

⁴³² Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.31

⁴³³ Ibid

⁴³⁴ Ibid

⁴³⁵ Ibid

⁴³⁶ Ibid

since 1973, the intervention only officially began in 1975, after a request made by the USA⁴³⁷. From July 1975, Zaire provided the FNLA with several battalions of infantry and commandos, as well as armored and artillery units of the Zairean army⁴³⁸. In parallel, there was an advance of armored units of the Zairean army which joined the FNLA and UNITA⁴³⁹. However, all this intervention failed to secure military victory.

Despite being part of the US strategy, South Africa also had own interests, among them, the concern with the stability of the southern African portion and the possibility of the rise of a regime in Angola that would support the South-West Africa People 's Organization (SWAPO)⁴⁴⁰. During the transitional government, the escalation of the conflict began⁴⁴¹. Entry into definitive US supporter of the FNLA and UNITA generated the Soviet response of intensifying support for the MPLA⁴⁴². As a result, both parties intensified the assistance, with ever-increasing financing and supply of material, culminating with the attraction of other States to the conflict, through military actions in territory Angolan⁴⁴³

Because it could not obtain internal consensus, the South African government initially adopted a cautious stance, relying solely on military and financial support. However, South Africa increased its support for the MPLA through Operation Savannah in October 1975, with the entry of 2,500 soldiers and 600 vehicles⁴⁴⁴. This triggered its direct intervention in Angola, with the goal of capturing Luanda from the south and ensuring control of the territory⁴⁴⁵.

The Zairean government, as well as the South African leadership, were adamant about establishing a unified regime in Luanda. However, in 1978, Zaire signed a non-aggression pact with the MPLA, effectively ending the FNLA's involvement in the

⁴³⁷ Ibid

⁴³⁸ Ibid

⁴³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁴⁰ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.32

⁴⁴¹ Ibid

⁴⁴² Ibid

⁴⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴⁴ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.35

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid

conflict⁴⁴⁶. Under US and Cuban pressure, such an agreement was reached, granting UNITA full US support⁴⁴⁷. Throughout the civil war, UNITA began to explore diamonds in its regions as a means of financing itself, in addition to the external support⁴⁴⁸.

In 1979 the leader of MPLA, Agostinho Neto dies. To take over his role then José Eduardo dos Santos is chosen⁴⁴⁹. In the following year it seemed that UNITA was about to be defeated by the MPLA, however South Africa came to their aid⁴⁵⁰. Therefore in 1981 the operation Protea is launched in 1981 by South Africa doing a significant attack to Angola, allowing the spread of guerrilla units of UNITA⁴⁵¹. With this context the US wanted to negotiate the withdrawal from Cuba in exchange for the independence of Namibia, however only Pretoria accepted this. Thus, South Africa kept their occupation until 1985⁴⁵².

In 1981, the South African army invaded the Angolan provinces of Cunene and Cuando Cubango, carrying heavy artillery and sophisticated armaments⁴⁵³. The South African army was confronted by an unprepared FAPLA that was unable to fight the level of the SADF army and an invasion of approximately eleven thousand men⁴⁵⁴. Another major South African invasion occurred in Angola in 1983, in the province of Skunk⁴⁵⁵. The Apartheid army caused widespread devastation with its powerful air force, handing victory to UNITA, which later declared that the province had been destroyed⁴⁵⁶. After this scenario of war and destruction in the country, in 1984, South Africa signed a peace agreement with Angola⁴⁵⁷. However, some scholars say that this agreement disguised the real intentions of South Africans in territory Angola, as they wanted a greater supply of weapons and financial support⁴⁵⁸. The following year, FAPLA forces

⁴⁴⁶ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.36

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid

⁴⁵¹ Ibid

⁴⁵² Ibid

⁴⁵³ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.77

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid

began a race against the government South African⁴⁵⁹. The Apartheid army interfered in the fight against the Angolans, but the SADF was unable to withstand attacks by the United Democratic Front (United Democratic Front - UDF) and asked for support from the US, which supplied missiles to UNITA⁴⁶⁰.

In this time Ronald Reagan (1981-89) received Savimbi at the white house and gave financial support his movement⁴⁶¹. In the second mandate of Ronald Reagan, and with the support of also Margaret Thatcher provided SADF and UNITA,⁴⁶². It is noteworthy that many groups that fought for freedom were considered terrorists, especially if they did not act alongside the Americans⁴⁶³. While Savimbi was seen with a “good eyes” as a fighting for freedom in Angola, Nelson Mandela, who stood against the Apartheid regime, was identified as a terrorist by the US and South Africa⁴⁶⁴. With that, with the speech to combat terrorism, the US has reactivated its military base in, Zaire, to build a northern front in the war against Angola, and through UNITA, the CIA aided South Africa⁴⁶⁵. With this support coming from the US, South Africans felt more encouraged to prolong the war, despite a occurring a political shift in South Africa⁴⁶⁶. South already seems very close, due to the formation of the Congress of Unions of South African Trade Unions COSATU and the performance of the UDF, causing the government to face challenges in its policy: “The evolution of popular democratic struggles in South Africa has made the country become ungovernable and apartheid unworkable”⁴⁶⁷. From that time on, therefore, the apartheid regime was already coming to an end and South Africa was close to being defeated in Angola⁴⁶⁸. In the late 1980s, the SADF launched “Operation Modular” to dominate the province of Menongue, in Angola, with the aim of forming a government UNITA interim and increase Western support⁴⁶⁹. For this

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid

⁴⁶¹ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.78

⁴⁶² Ibid

⁴⁶³ Ibid

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid

⁴⁶⁸ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.78

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid

operation, South Africa Sul invested in heavy weapons and roads were built so that these were transported to the province⁴⁷⁰.”

Meanwhile the FAPLA launched an attack in the province of Jamba and the battle of Lomba river was the preamble for the battle of Cuito Cuanavale⁴⁷¹. In 1987 when SADF initiated surrounding their frontiers they departed with a big resistance from the Angolans⁴⁷². . In the same year the force of FALPA also launched a big attack in the Southeast of Angola against the UNITA forces, which made SADF realize of the success the FALPA forces⁴⁷³. To counter this success of the FAPLA the SADF intervened in the Southeast. Therefore, in the beginning of November the armed forces of south Africa had already taken some Angolan units in Cuito Cuanavale and were ready to destroy them⁴⁷⁴.

Cuba also showed its engagement in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale and sent planes, soldiers and arms to fight the SADF forces⁴⁷⁵. Cuba had just an overall superiority in the weapons, army and also air force⁴⁷⁶. This made it possible for the Cuban troops to defeat the south Africans when dominating Cuito Cuanavale⁴⁷⁷. In the beginning of 1988 the south African forces were defeated by the Cuban forces⁴⁷⁸. The battle of Cuito Cuanavale ended after SADF accepted their retrieval from Namibia and surrender. After this Namibia had their independence in 1990 and Nelson Mandela was released⁴⁷⁹. Therefore, south Africa executed 3 operations in Angola without success, these being: operation Modular, Hooper operation and Packer operation⁴⁸⁰.

In the decade of 1980, it appeared the first signs of a possible resolution of the Angolan conflict⁴⁸¹. With Angola, Cuba and south Africa signing the New York accords in 1988.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid

⁴⁷¹ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.79

⁴⁷² Ibid

⁴⁷³ Ibid

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid

⁴⁷⁹ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.80

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid

⁴⁸¹ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.81-82

In these accords Cuba promised to retrieve their troops from the country under the condition that south Africa would also take its army from the south of Angola⁴⁸². The implementation of this accords was monitored by Angola by a mission of the UN, the UNAVEM I⁴⁸³. this mission was finalized in 1991 with the retrieval from the Cuban troops and the independence of Namibia⁴⁸⁴. Also, during this period significant changes in the international system were occurring with the end of the soviet bloc, which lead the civil war in Angola to take different paths⁴⁸⁵.

Since the involvement of the USSR and the US contributed to deepen the animosities between the MPLA and Unita, and also, we can say the conflict escalated way more with the assistance of these actors, also others, in the civil war. It was expected that would the end of the cold war the civil war in Angola could also come to end. However, it did not turn in this way.

3.9 USSR and Angola

Foreign policy in the former Soviet Union was aimed at ensuring an international environment favorable to communist ideology, protecting its national interests, and consolidating socialism on a global scale⁴⁸⁶. This policy was aimed at defending its territory and Eastern Europe, as well as spreading this mode of production around the world and limiting Western states' access to essential raw materials⁴⁸⁷. Thus, in relation to African nationalist movements, Soviet foreign policy took the form of aid to peoples in their struggle for independence and was guided by national interests, particularly economic and geostrategic ones⁴⁸⁸. In Angola its geographic position would allow the establishment of lines of communication with the interior Africa's interior, so as to enable the former USSR to control the outflow of raw materials from the continent⁴⁸⁹. In late 1974, the Soviet Union escalated its intervention in Angola by sending the

⁴⁸² Ibid

⁴⁸³ Ibid

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid

⁴⁸⁶ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.32-33

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid

MPLA across the border into the territory of the People's Republic of Congo. However, the Congolese government backed down and rejected the proposal in July 1975. In the end, Moscow requested Cuba's intervention to serve as its intermediary. Fidel Castro expressed his support for the movement in August of that year⁴⁹⁰. Following this, a protocol was signed between the Soviets and Cubans to continue economic assistance to Havana, which was most likely related to funding for such an intervention⁴⁹¹.

Thus, it is evident that the Soviet intention was to cover up the tracks of its interference in Angola in order to limit the risks of a direct confrontation with the United States⁴⁹². Besides, a failure in the action would be assumed by Cuba, sparing the former USSR from a possible humiliation possible humiliation by the defeat⁴⁹³

The MPLA was able to raise the new Angolan flag in Luanda on September 11, 1975, thanks to Soviet weaponry and Cuban support⁴⁹⁴. The only results obtained by the US in this manner were the intensification of the former USSR's intervention and Cuba's entry into the dispute. Following independence, national liberation movements in Angola began to amass the fighting power required to turn the conflict into a civil war⁴⁹⁵. Cuba's support was critical to the MPLA's ability to maintain control of the capital, but it was insufficient to bring the conflict to an end⁴⁹⁶. expansionist policy of spreading communism, acted in Another former USSR, through its expansionist since its decolonization process, supporting the MPLA in the struggle against the colonizers, while the US remained more distant⁴⁹⁷. However, the US entry into the conflict forced the Soviets to intensify their Cuba's entry into the dispute and the establishment of the MPLA in Luanda⁴⁹⁸. With the end of the bipolar rivalry, this fight continued as well as the support to UNITA. With the US also using means of external policy to weaken the MPLA and its ideology in the region.

⁴⁹⁰ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.33

⁴⁹¹ Ibid

⁴⁹² Ibid

⁴⁹³ Ibid

⁴⁹⁴ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.34

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid

The US had no interest in Angolan troop movements because they were directly involved in the Vietnam War, which was politically, economically, socially, and in terms of lives lost, added to the cases of political scandals⁴⁹⁹. However, knowing that the former USSR was supporting one side of the conflict, Washington decided to launch an indirect intervention to support the other movement⁵⁰⁰. Similarly, the Soviets did not want to provide direct support to the MPLA because it would make it difficult for them to maintain their détente policy with the US and could have negative consequences among their African allies⁵⁰¹.

Furthermore, although the intervention was indirect, these interventions were carried out to maximize interests⁵⁰². According to some scholars the USSR attempted to conceal its involvement in the dispute⁵⁰³. By using Cuba the Soviet Union used legal and formal mechanisms to hide its indirect action, while also contributing to the Soviets' goals and objectives in the confrontation⁵⁰⁴.

It should be noted that, in the Angolan Civil War, the opposing forces did not have sufficient combat power to prolong the conflict in the way they were able to do, without taking in account the financial, material, and military support from the other actors involved⁵⁰⁵. As a result, since their inception, national liberation movements have placed a high value on the search for foreign support to sustain hostilities⁵⁰⁶. As discussed in previous sections, South Africa and Zaire, despite having their own interests in the conflict, resorted to direct intervention by the United States, which used these states as proxy forces⁵⁰⁷. Cuba, on the other hand, appears to have initiated military action to cover up Soviet action in Angola, despite having no clear interest in the country⁵⁰⁸. Thus, it is concluded that direct interventions in the Angolan Civil War

⁴⁹⁹ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.39

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid

⁵⁰¹ Ibid

⁵⁰² Ibid

⁵⁰³ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.39-40

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid

⁵⁰⁵ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.40

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid

during the Cold War period acted as proxy forces for global powers' strategic objectives⁵⁰⁹.

The United States and the former USSR intervened indirectly in the Angolan conflict, with the interest of manipulating its outcome, since both were external actors in the context of the Angolan Civil War and provided arms, money and training to the movements they supported. In addition, they sought to diminish risks and the risks and achieve their strategic objectives without engaging in direct intervention⁵¹⁰.

Angola was still experiencing the tensions between the MPLA and the UNITA particularly amid the making of the democratic and free elections in 1992⁵¹¹. Unita showed resistance to the signed agreements and also hostility towards UN which considered to be a threat for the peace in Angola as well as the African continent ⁵¹². Multiple appeals were made for the beginning of cease fire to UNITA after the 1992 elections⁵¹³. However, UNITA showed indifference to this, and its army continued to invade Angolan cities, Jonas Savimbi would threat the MPLA and would preach about more violence⁵¹⁴. Therefore, it was clear that with UNITA not compromising anything and continuing with a violent hostility there were no prospects of the war coming an end soon.

The civil war ended in 2002, with the assassination of UNITA's leader, leaving a large part of the country destroyed, a high number of deaths, a high rate of diseases and malnutrition, and a lack of a government institutional apparatus and organization, because the country was completely prevented from projecting its industrialization, economy, social projects, and institutions govern⁵¹⁵. The number of internal and external refugees also left the country with a shortage of qualified people to lead this

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid

⁵¹⁰ Nunes, F. J. M. (2020). A guerra civil angolana no contexto da Guerra Fria: da Independência à Guerra por Procuração. Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN). p.40-41

⁵¹¹ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.83

⁵¹² Ibid

⁵¹³ Ibid

⁵¹⁴ Ibid

⁵¹⁵ Persici, R. (2010). GUERRA E PAZ EM ANGOLA: Um Estudo sobre o Papel da ONU e das Grandes Potências. p.84

development and the greater part of the population lived deprived of their natural rights, such as the right to food, health, housing and other essentials for their survival⁵¹⁶

3.10 The 1992 elections

For the first time, Angolans were asked to vote separately for the president of the republic and parliamentary members in 1992⁵¹⁷. This was the starting point for the subsequent electoral crisis. While the MPLA gained a majority in parliament, incumbent MPLA presidential candidate José Eduardo dos Santos was defeated in the first round by Jonas Savimbi. A second round was planned for a few weeks later, but it never happened⁵¹⁸. Savimbi had already left Luanda, reassembled his troops, which had never been fully demobilized, and began to take over cities and small towns⁵¹⁹. The post-election crisis not only killed thousands of Angolans, but also plunged the country into ten years of civil war⁵²⁰.

The first attempt to solve the conflict happened almost in the end of the cold war. A negotiation that involved the main parties in the dispute: Angola, Cuba, Africa of the South and Namibia with the observation of the USA and the USSR, whose results originated the proposal of resolution of the conflict, expressed in the New York Accords, signed at United Nations ⁵²¹. Headquarters between Angola, Cuba and South Africa on December 22, 1988, and bilaterally between Angola and Cuba, which provided for the simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola⁵²². The UNAVEM I (United Nations Verification Mission in Angola) was born from these Agreements, under the proposal of the Secretary-General of the UN to oversee the withdrawal of Cubans⁵²³. UNAVEM I was the successful peacekeeping mission, expressed in the speed with which the New York Accords were fulfilled⁵²⁴. On May 31, 1991, after many months of negotiation between representatives of the

⁵¹⁶ Ibid

⁵¹⁷ António, T. A brief history of five elections in Angola.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid

⁵¹⁹ Ibid

⁵²⁰ Ibid

⁵²¹ Jose, J. (2008, January 1). Angola: independência, conflito e normalização. p.169

⁵²² Ibid

⁵²³ Ibid

⁵²⁴ Ibid

Angolan government – MPLA and UNITA – under the mediation of the Troika of observers, the Bicesse Accords are signed in Portugal, and the UN is invited to supervise the Accords with the creation of UNAVEM II⁵²⁵.

3.11 The Bicesse agreements

The *Acordos de Bicesse* were signed in Estoril was signed by Eduardo dos santos and Jonas Savimbi⁵²⁶. The Bicesse agreements had the goal to establish a ceasefire, the unification of UNITA and government troops into a single army and the holding of general elections. The UNITA and the FNLA also registered themselves as parties⁵²⁷. However, even though both leaders from the rival parties signed this document it was not enough to end the war.

After it was revealed that it was likely for Eduardo dos santos to win, by the national electoral council, Jonas Savimbi unhappy with these results accused the MPLA of having forged the results and other accusations⁵²⁸. Eduardo dos Santos had more votes on the first round even though it was not enough to not have a 2 round and end up also winning the second round⁵²⁹.

At the time it was speculate that, Eduardo dos santos won the first round, but to avoid tensions and violent conflicts to happen they did the second round to avoid this, although without success⁵³⁰

Eduardo dos Santos, a candidate for the (MPLA), won with 49.57% of the vote, while Jonas Savimbi, a candidate for the (UNITA), received 40.7%⁵³¹. According to that result, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won 54% of the legislative seats, while (UNITA) received 34%, giving (MPLA) 129 seats in parliament out of 223 seats, compared to 70 seats for (UNITA)⁵³². The remaining seats were distributed among the ten parties that ran in the elections, including the (FINLA) party

⁵²⁵ Ibid

⁵²⁶ Os Acordos de Bicesse - RTP Ensina. (2022, September 13)

⁵²⁷ Ibid

⁵²⁸ Bittencourt, M. I. (2016). As eleições angolanas de 1992. Revista Tempo, Espaço E Linguagem. p.190

⁵²⁹ Ibid

⁵³⁰ Ibid

⁵³¹ Hamood, K. O. (2020, December 29). ANGOLAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1992. p.2612

⁵³² Ibid

led by Holden Roberto. Participation in the elections was 91% of the registered voters, totaling 4.4 million voters⁵³³. According to Angolan law, the failure of the presidential candidate to receive more than 50% of the vote necessitates a second round of elections, but this did not occur due to Jonas Savimbi's withdrawal and rejection of election results on 5 October, accusing the government of fraud and threatening to declare civil war and withdraw (UNITA) forces from the joint armies⁵³⁴.

On the 6 of October Jonas Savimbi left the capital and went to the city of Huambo known for having a big UNITA support⁵³⁵.

3.12 Acordo de Lusaka 1994

The Lusaka Protocol (Acordo de Lusaka) was a peace treaty negotiated in the capital of Zambia, following the failure of the Bicesse Agreement, signed in Portugal in May 1991 by the Angolan government and UNITA, and which made it possible to hold general elections in Angola⁵³⁶. The elections, held on September 29 and 30, 1992, were won by the MPLA with 54 percent against 34 percent of the votes, while the then President of the Republic, José Eduardo dos Santos, obtained 49.7 percent of the votes and Jonas Savimbi 40.7 percent, with the need for a second round between the two⁵³⁷. However, the then leader of UNITA refused to participate in the second round, and that same year returned to war, after mobilizing his forces, which were supposed to be demobilized, some elements composing the Single Army - *Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA)* - together with personnel from the government forces - and others integrated into the National Police⁵³⁸. With the war spreading bloodily across the national territory, frustrating the population's hopes for peace, the belligerents began a rapprochement, aided by the international community, primarily through mediation (UN) and the troika of observers (the United States of America, Portugal, and Russia), with meetings in the

⁵³³ Ibid

⁵³⁴ Ibid

⁵³⁵ Bittencourt, M. I. (2016). As eleições angolanas de 1992. Revista Tempo, Espaço E Linguagem. p.189 ⁵³⁶ Embaixada da República de Angola em Portugal - Protocolo de Lusaka foi assinado há 25 anos. (2019, November 20). Embaixada Da República De Angola Em Portugal.

⁵³⁷ Ibid

⁵³⁸ Ibid

Angolan province of Namibe, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)⁵³⁹. Among these meetings, which were mediated by Margaret Anstee, the first Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Angola (she arrived in the country in 1991), the one in Abidjan, in mid-1993, lasted the longest, 45 days, but failed due to significant differences between the parties in conflict⁵⁴⁰. In October 1993, in the heat of violent military confrontations and numerous deaths, UNITA agreed to resume talks with the Government, and in November of the same year, in Lusaka, after an exploratory meeting of about a week, negotiations began, under the mediation of the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Alioune Blondin Beye, and the observation of the United States of America, Portugal and Russia⁵⁴¹.

The negotiations culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on November 20, 1994, in the Zambian capital⁵⁴². Signatories of the document were the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Venâncio de Moura, and the former Secretary-General of UNITA, Eugénio Ngolo Manuvakola⁵⁴³. The treaty, among other things, established a ceasefire, the formation of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) with all political forces with parliamentary seats based on the results of the 1992 elections, the installation of UNITA deputies in the National Assembly, the demilitarization of this organization, and the holding of the second round of presidential elections⁵⁴⁴. The protocol only lasted about four years⁵⁴⁵. Systematic protocol violations fueled distrust among the signatories, confirming fears that Jonas Savimbi's refusal to attend the signing ceremony foreshadowed a dramatic end to the agreement⁵⁴⁶. In fact, Jonas Savimbi's absence from the signing ceremony was a surprise, considering that his presence was expected alongside the former Angolan President, José Eduardo dos Santos, to confer greater reliability, credibility and, above all, political engagement at the highest level⁵⁴⁷. The skepticism with which the signing of the Lusaka Protocol was viewed, as a result of the contempt in which it was held by Jonas Savimbi, had its

⁵³⁹ Ibid

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid

⁵⁴¹ Ibid

⁵⁴² Ibid

⁵⁴³ Ibid

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid

reasons revealed, when in 1998, after a fragile peace of four years, UNITA reignited the war⁵⁴⁸. The intensification of the armed conflict forced the government forces to launch a military offensive in December 1998, which culminated in the conquest of several UNITA strongholds⁵⁴⁹.

3.13 Consequences of the civil war

The end of the military missions by the UN in Angola led for the civil war to continue from 1992 to 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. To begin with, Angola had very weak foundations as a country. With the Portuguese colonialism the Angolans never had a fair access to education, proper healthcare, education infrastructures, since it was mostly the white population that had this, and a very narrow percentage of the black population that had access to this. In the liberation war, in the regions that were controlled by the liberation movements provided a better access to this to the Angolan population, however not enough to set good foundations for the country. Furthermore, after the white Portuguese population left Angola after the 25 of April, they took with them useful knowledge about commerce, destroyed the infrastructures they owned, so this aggravated the situation even more. After the independence any hopes the Angolans could finally “build their country” came crashing down with the beginning of the civil war in 1975 that would last until 2002. The death of Jonas Savimbi would finally end the war, the Angolan government did not declare a victory for the MPLA or the Angolan government but took advantage of the circumstances to establish an agreement between the belligerent parties, to mutual advantage, whether for the government, with the pacification of the territory, whether for UNITA⁵⁵⁰. This measure was taken with extreme care so it avoids the war to continue and thus definitive peace was finally achieved⁵⁵¹. Following these events, the government of Angola unilaterally declared a ceasefire and initiated a series of contacts with UNITA leaders, which evolved into effective peace negotiations, culminating in the signing of the Luena Memorandum of

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁵⁰ Jose, J. (2008, January 1). Angola: independência, conflito e normalização. p.174

⁵⁵¹ Ibid

Understanding on April 4, 2002⁵⁵². With the end of the Angolan civil war, UNITA reunified (in moment of the crisis and under the effect of the sanctions imposed by the UN after the Lusaka Accords, dissidence arose from many members who founded the so-called UNITA-Renovada, recognized by the UN and the government of Angola) as a political party and rehabilitated itself, participating in the political life of Angola⁵⁵³

The civil war in Angola not only substantial losses in terms of physical (equipment, infrastructure, housing) and human capital, but also determine effects that combine with each other in the sense of a reduction in the well-being of the majority of Angolans. Most of these effects are directly related to poverty and the living conditions of the population: compulsive displacement, insecurity, food insecurity, malnutrition, serious difficulties in accessing health and education.

We can conclude that the civil war in Angola had two crucial reasons that lead to this event. The European colonialism that with the Berlin treaty of 1878 divided the African territory between the European powers, without considering ethnic and religious characteristics⁵⁵⁴. In this way, peoples of the same ethnicity and religion saw themselves separated and people's rivals were placed side by side in the same territory, this being one of the main reasons for civil wars and genocides in the African continent⁵⁵⁵. Lastly, also a result of an unorganized Portuguese decolonization.

⁵⁵² Ibid

⁵⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁵⁴ Silva, A. (2018). Angola: história, luta de libertação, independência, guerra civil e suas consequências.p.13

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid

Chapter 4

Mozambique

4.1 The Mueda massacre

Inspired by the other Portuguese colonies that started their armed struggle against the metropole Angola 1961 and Guinea Bissau 1963 and for the massacre of Mueda that occurred in 1960⁵⁵⁶. The Mueda massacre will be used in the future by FRELIMO in speeches for their armed struggle⁵⁵⁷. This massacre marked a turning point for Mozambique but also an inspiration. The Mueda massacre came to show how the peaceful strategies did not work with the repressive colonial state of Portugal and therefore the armed struggle would be the only solution⁵⁵⁸. Therefore, the only solution would be the armed struggle.



Figure 3: 16th of June of 1960. Massacre de Mueda, Mozambique.

Source:<https://www.esquerda.net/dossier/16-de-junho-de-1960-massacre-de-mueda-mocambique/63607>

⁵⁵⁶ De Oliveira, C. M. (2019). O Massacre de Mueda (1960) e a constituição das narrativas nacionais em Moçambique (1962-1986). p.68

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid

This massacre that took place in 16 of June of 1960 after a meeting was arranged between the people of Mueda and the Portuguese administration to demand better life conditions particularly for the peasants⁵⁵⁹. The reports about what really happened in this day and the accurate number of dead people that resulted in are multiple⁵⁶⁰.

“I went to Mueda to watch talks between the colonial government and the Faustino [Vanomba](...) On the 16th I arrived at Mueda. When I got there people were already concentrated. There were men, women and some children. Many people were well dressed. there were people of different races: Indians, whites and blacks. Moments later the colonialists hoisted four flags. Mueda's Administrator asked the population to participate in the hoisting of flags. But population refused to raise [the flag] saying that they had gone there to listen to the words of Faustino [Vanomba] and Kibiriti [Divane]. (...) the governor ordered one of the priests to bless the group of Faustino while intending to kill him! A soldier came out out and explained to the people that the Kibiriti would be killed because made a mistake. Afterwards, the governor called them individually there to inside. However, they were unable to kill him [the Kibiriti] and then they called Faustino Vanomba and everything was repeated because he didn't he died. The two of them left tied to the car and we took the car and we said "this car will not move forward. They did this with the from the first group, from Modesta, but today that won't happen”. At this moment that the population complained, starting to shoot stones. So the governor ordered to open fire⁵⁶¹.”

After this massacre Frelimo started to use the massacre of Mueda as a motivation and reason for the revolt against the colonial metropole⁵⁶². Frelimo justified the armed struggle using this day as an example of the colonial repression that responded with violence to the appeals of the Mozambicans⁵⁶³. FRELIMO when appealing to the armed

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid

⁵⁶¹ A., Adam, Y., & Dyuti, H. A. O MASSACRE DE MUEDA: FALAM TESTEMUNHAS. Mozambiquehistory.net. Retrieved March 7, 2023, from p.118-119

⁵⁶² De Oliveira, C. M. (2019). O Massacre de Mueda (1960) e a constituição das narrativas nacionais em Moçambique (1962-1986). p.69-70

⁵⁶³ Ibid

struggle they would also stress in their speeches how important it was to have the support of the people and for them to fight for the independence of their country⁵⁶⁴.

4.2 FRELIMO

The national movement that fought for the independence of Mozambique was FRELIMO. FRELIMO initiated their armed struggle after the revolt that happened in 1961 in Angola against the Portuguese colonialism⁵⁶⁵

The FRELIMO Party was formed on 25 June 1962 in the Tanganyikan capital Dar es Salaam, following the earlier repression of political activity within Mozambique and the beginning of revolt in the Portuguese colony of Angola in 1961⁵⁶⁶. Its membership was drawn from a diverse range of existing organizations, primarily the Rhodesian-based *União Nacional Democratica de Mozambique* (UDENAMO), the Tanganyika-based Mozambique African National Union (MANU), and the *União Africana de Moçambique Independente* (UNAMI), which had a safe haven in Malawi and was close to the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP)⁵⁶⁷. By 1964, Frelimo's influence was still challenged by a number of other organizations, each vying for official support from communist powers and the resources that came with it. In June 1964, Lucas Fernandes infiltrated 150 members of the MANU Youth League into Mozambique to plan military operations in the hope of attracting Soviet sponsorship⁵⁶⁸. Ever since the first armed attack against the Portuguese, Frelimo had to deal with the Portuguese but also had significant internal struggles. Frelimo expelled some members of the party, with two of them being Amós Sumane and Joseph Chitenie who after formed an organization named MORECO⁵⁶⁹. As Frelimo's influence grew their rivals decided to unify the non-Frelimo anti-colonial forces and thus, according to a letter sent to the Afro Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the groups UDENAMO-Moçambique, MANC

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid

⁵⁶⁵ Robinson, D. (2006). *Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war*. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.74

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid

⁵⁶⁸ Robinson, D. (2006). *Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war*. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.78

⁵⁶⁹ Robinson, D. (2006). *Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war*. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.78-79

(Mozambique African National Congress), UDENAMO-Monomotapa, UNAMI and MANU merged in Lusaka, from 24-31 March 1965, to form the *Comitè Revolucionário de continuação- Moçambique* (COREMO)⁵⁷⁰. COREMO's leadership included Gwambe as President, Gumane as Secretary-General, and Mahluza as Chief of Defence⁵⁷¹

COREMO did launch few minor military operations in tete province, however, according to a CIA report, COREMO did not have enough capacity and means to threaten Frelimo⁵⁷². Meanwhile Frelimo was making military progress, having increased guerrilla fighters which managed to continue their insurgency against the Portuguese government. However, they were quite factionalized⁵⁷³.

Since 1965, a faction within Frelimo known as the Mozambique Revolutionary United People's Party (MRUPP) led by Uria Simango and comprised Frelimo's Defence and Security Chief Filipe Magaia and Lázaro N'Kavandame⁵⁷⁴. This faction was ethnically Makonde, and they held differing political views on issues pertaining to the party's military and political sections, as well as the type of economy that should be developed in the liberated areas⁵⁷⁵. and "whether a class or race-based ideology would guide Frelimo's program, and whether liberated Mozambique would retain traditional social structures or create new social relations⁵⁷⁶. Samora Machel sought to "combine the modern form of a non-racial, national state with non-capitalist economic development" whereas the Makonde faction advocated for a "ethnically-based system of petty bourgeois capitalism⁵⁷⁷."

However convinced that Frelimo was plotting something against them, a group of Makonde guerrillas headed to the headquarters of Frelimo in Dar es Salaam with the intention of killing the main leaders including the Frelimo president, Eduardo

⁵⁷⁰ Robinson, D. (2006). Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.78-79

⁵⁷¹ Ibid

⁵⁷² Robinson, D. (2006). Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.79

⁵⁷³ Ibid

⁵⁷⁴ Robinson, D. (2006). Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.80

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid

Mondlane. P81. This attempt that ended up not being successful took place on 9 May of 1968⁵⁷⁸. Frelimo was warned of this attack and most people in the headquarters escaped unharmed⁵⁷⁹.

In July 1968, Frelimo held their second congress in Mozambique's Niassa province since it was a liberated zone⁵⁸⁰. It was in the liberated zones that the Mozambicans had basic educational, social, administrative and health infrastructures⁵⁸¹. In detriment, the areas that were still occupied by the Portuguese these basic things like education and other important services and infrastructures were denied to Mozambicans or provided with a very low quality⁵⁸². Thus, since these liberated zones were able to provide this they were "secure enough for this meeting of the entire Frelimo leadership, delegates from all over Mozambique, and representatives from the *African National Congress* (ANC), the *Movimento Popular Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), and the *Zimbabwe African People's Union* (ZAPU)⁵⁸³."

However, this decision of holding the second conference in Mozambique showed how alive the factional struggles really were in Frelimo⁵⁸⁴. "N'Kavandame wanted [the congress] to be held in Tanzania where he felt he had the strongest support for his bid for the presidency⁵⁸⁵. The Makonde faction subsequently claimed that the holding of the Congress in Niassa was a tactic to rob them of support⁵⁸⁶. Later on the vice president Amós Sumane supported by Artur Vilankulu and others attempted to "oust" the president Gumane, which was not successful. This also showed how COREMO also had internal factionalism which would lead to the decline of COREMO⁵⁸⁷. Consequently, the discovery of this attempt led to the expulsion of Sumane, and he ended up creating the *União Nacional Africana de Rumbezia* (UNAR)⁵⁸⁸. UNAR claimed to be following the footsteps of Mondlane, Gumane and Gwambe, while being opposed to both Frelimo

⁵⁷⁸ Robinson, D. (2006). *Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war*. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.81

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid

⁵⁸¹ Ibid

⁵⁸² Ibid

⁵⁸³ Ibid

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid

and COREMO, and both western and communist imperialism. Based in Malawi, UNAR brought together dissidents from Frelimo and COREMO⁵⁸⁹.

Based in Malawi, UNAR brought together dissidents from Frelimo and COREMO, including former Frelimo representative in Lilongwe Calisto Trindade as UNAR Information Secretary; former UDENAMO and then Frelimo member José Massamba as the Secretary of the UNAR; and former COREMO militant Domingos Zacarias⁵⁹⁰. However, it is very unlikely that UNAR had financial and ideological independence⁵⁹¹. While they operated in the Milange region near Mozambique's border, their headquarters was housed in the Malawi Congress Party building in Malawi's capital, Lilongwe. UNAR's desire to create the state of Rumbezia closely paralleled Banda's own desire for a greater Malawi, and the group was obviously sponsored by the Malawian government⁵⁹². Jorge Jardim's close links to Banda, including his involvement in training the Malawi Young Pioneers, have led some to suggest he may also have been one of UNAR's sponsors⁵⁹³. Though UNAR never grew large enough to have much influence in Mozambique, a reincarnation of the organization would arise in the late 1970s and eventually unite with RENAMO in the early 1980s⁵⁹⁴.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese armed forces' inability to combat Frelimo's campaign led them to drastic measures. In the north-east the Portuguese had attempted to stem Frelimo's influence by forcing up to a million people into fortified villages, predominantly in the province of Cabo Delgado⁵⁹⁵. At the same time in the northwest Portuguese forces targeted innocent villagers in a series of massacres⁵⁹⁶. The worst of these incident occurred on 16 December 1972 at Wiriyamu, Chawola and Juwan, a group of villages south of Tete⁵⁹⁷. On 15th December Chico Cachari, an African security official, visited the villages asking about Frelimo activity⁵⁹⁸. When villagers denied

⁵⁸⁹ Robinson, D. (2006). *Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war*. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.82

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid

⁵⁹¹ Ibid

⁵⁹² Ibid

⁵⁹³ Ibid

⁵⁹⁴ Ibis

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid

⁵⁹⁶ Robinson, D. (2006). *Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war*. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.88

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid

knowledge of any activity, Portuguese forces returned the following day and killed the inhabitants⁵⁹⁹.

After many years of fighting the war comes to an end in 1974. Not due to the FRELIMOs resistance but due to the overthrow of the dictatorship that happened in the metropole on the 25th of April of 1974. Since the MFA lead the overthrow and was managing at the time the significant steps to take. The main focus of the MFA was to proceed immediately was giving the independence to the African colonies and proceed to an immediate decolonization.

The confusion coming from Lisbon reflected in Mozambique, which experienced political instability and army desertions⁶⁰⁰. Thus, Portugal's new *Junta de Salvação Nacional* began talks with Frelimo for Mozambican independence and the transfer of power, while Frelimo used the threat of renewed warfare as a political bargaining method⁶⁰¹.

4.3 The independence

With the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal the Mozambicans were expecting the same liberation for Mozambique, since now Portugal was free from the dictatorship they also wanted Portugal to concede finally their independence⁶⁰². However, in Mozambique they were worries of the route Portugal was going to take⁶⁰³. Spínola was in power and his view on the decolonization from previous statements he made in his controversial book “*Portugal e o Futuro*” that he had a federalist proposal to deal with the Portuguese colonies. his federalist view worried Mozambique⁶⁰⁴.

However, the disagreements in the metropole came in favor of Mozambique and they finally had their independence.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰⁰ Robinson, D. (2006). Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war. The UWA Profiles and Research Repository. p.92

⁶⁰¹ Ibid

⁶⁰² MacQueen, N. (1997). The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa. p.127

⁶⁰³ Ibid

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid

4.3.1 Acordo de Lusaka

The Lusaka accord was signed on the 7th of September of 1974 in Lusaka Between the Portuguese state and the Frente de libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) ⁶⁰⁵. With *the Acordo de Lusaka* the Portuguese state recognized formally the independence of Mozambique as well as the right to auto determination of the Mozambican people Since the Frelimo was the nationalist movement that fought for the liberation of Mozambique the Portuguese state thought the transfer of sovereignty should be made to Frelimo⁶⁰⁶. Furthermore it was established in these agreements that the complete Mozambican independence would be proclaimed on 25th of June of 1975, date that also matched with the anniversary of the foundation of Frelimo⁶⁰⁷. Due to its leadership in the struggle against the Portuguese, FRELIMO had a significant advantage in politics⁶⁰⁸. This benefit, coupled with the near absence of other political forces (those that did exist did not stand in the way of FRELIMO's ambitions), and the vulnerability of the Portuguese as a result of the events in the Metropolis, strengthened its positions⁶⁰⁹. Considering this, the movement heads to the Lusaka talks in a strong position. Therefore, FRELIMO regarded itself as the sole representative of the Mozambican people as a whole, despite the fact that Lusaka made no explicit mention of the political system to be put in place in the nation⁶¹⁰. Removing with this any possibility of sharing power or any electoral maneuver or referendum and paving the way for a one-party and monolithic regime⁶¹¹.

When Mozambique finally had their independence and the Portuguese abandoned the authority they had on the country, Mozambique was left in a very precarious state. After their independence the majority of the white Portuguese population abandoned the country, which them being the majority of the instructed people with an education left a gap in the country in this area. With the leaving of the majority white Portuguese population because they had the fear now with their independence being the black Mozambicans running the country, stores of commerce) disappeared in Mozambique

⁶⁰⁵ MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*. p.147

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid

⁶⁰⁷ Peralta, E. (2019, June 1). A integração dos “retornados” na sociedade portuguesa: identidade, desidentificação e ocultação. *Análise Social*; Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa. p.315

⁶⁰⁸ Shikhani, R. (n.d.). *Uma Interpretação das Origens da Guerra Civil*. p.22

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid

⁶¹⁰ Ibid

⁶¹¹ Ibid

since it was the Portuguese population that managed them. This caused severe difficulties for trade in Mozambique since these little stores were very important for the agriculture trade and commercialization. There were no infrastructures, factories were destroyed by the Portuguese who abandoned the country and the educational level of Mozambicans was very low due to the Portuguese “*colonos*” not allowing for the Mozambicans to have a proper education. The heritage left by the colonization was too big and influential to be erased by the independence, but still, the Mozambicans were happy that finally they could build and govern their own country. Adding to this, the Portuguese authorities trusted the Frelimo to take over the country post-independence they did not take in account the racial differences and ideologies that existed in Mozambique.

4.4 The civil war

Four stages of the civil war can be distinguished. In the first, RENAMO was established, maintained, and headquartered in Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe), gradually beginning to act militarily in Mozambique territory, and eventually becoming based in the nation at a time when the conflict was expanding⁶¹². When Zimbabwe gained its independence during the second phase, between 1980 and 1986, Rhodesia stopped supporting RENAMO, but it eventually came under the control and support of the Pretoria government⁶¹³. The third period, from 1986 to the 1990s, was then marked by a high level of hostility between the parties, particularly in the southern part of the nation⁶¹⁴. Finally, in the fourth period, between 1990 and 1992, negotiations were started for the creation of a new constitution in 1990 and for a peace agreement, which were finished on October 4, 1992⁶¹⁵. This coincided with South Africa's support being gradually decreased during this time⁶¹⁶.

⁶¹² Diaz, J. (2022). As relações internacionais da construção do Estado em Moçambique: pós-independência, guerra civil e transições políticas. p.11

⁶¹³ Ibid

⁶¹⁴ Ibid

⁶¹⁵ Ibid

⁶¹⁶ Ibid

4.4.1 RENAMO

The civil war culminated due to two currents of different ideologies, these two being Frelimo and RENAMO. Frelimo was the national liberation movement that the power was transferred to from the metropole, and which also had the majority of support from the Mozambican population. However, with the emergence of RENAMO having an ideology opposed to Frelimo this gave rise to disagreements and rivalries that were too great to overcome, thus starting the civil war. RENAMO was established to work toward the destabilization of FRELIMO and provide guides and interpreters for military operations against bases of Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas in Mozambique by the Rhodesians⁶¹⁷.

The RNM gathered support from different sources, who shared the same objectives, benefiting from the delicate situation in which Rhodesia found itself, where the colonists in rebellion against the British crown continued to have difficulties in seeing their State - unilaterally declared independent in 1965 - recognized by most nations⁶¹⁸. Instead, they faced UN economic sanctions, which Mozambique also imposed (namely, the closure of the border with Rhodesia in 1976) with vehemence, relying on the international community to help offset the severe financial consequences of such a decision⁶¹⁹. The Rhodesian government retaliated by supporting RENAMO and escalating the conflict with the Frelimo regime⁶²⁰

MNR initially focused on "*destabilização*" (destabilization), such as attacks on infrastructure and local residents⁶²¹. This was meant to put the Mozambican (FRELIMO) government on the defensive, as it had imposed economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia and openly supported the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA)⁶²². However, when the armed liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia began in 1978, the Southern Rhodesian army ordered MNR to attack ZANLA bases and

⁶¹⁷ Maseko, F. (2019). A GUERRA DOS 16 ANOS EM MOÇAMBIQUE: CAUSAS NACIONAIS OU INTERNACIONAIS? p.123

⁶¹⁸ Ferreira, M. E. (2009, July 1). O papel de um empreendimento privado agrícola no reassentamento de população deslocada de guerra: o caso de Chibonzane em Moçambique. p.51-52

⁶¹⁹ Ibid

⁶²⁰ Ibid

⁶²¹ Funada-Classen, S. (2013). The Origins of War in Mozambique: A History of Unity and Division p.7

⁶²² Ibid

villages that supported it⁶²³. The RNM, based in Southern Rhodesia, freely crossed borders and intensified attacks in the south-eastern part of the country and the central part of Mozambique⁶²⁴.

Following Mozambique's independence, the Frelimo government supported the liberation movement in Rhodesia; however, with the emergence of RENAMO, Rhodesia then provided military support to RENAMO to harm the Frelimo government⁶²⁵. When Rhodesia's war ended and it became the current Zimbabwe, South Africa took over Rhodesia's role in assisting RENAMO⁶²⁶. RNM, allegedly a "puppet" of the Southern Rhodesian army and intelligence, was expected to vanish when the white minority rule of Southern Rhodesia gave way to the black majority rule of Zimbabwe in 1980⁶²⁷. On the contrary, it increased its troop strength from around 1,000 to nearly 7,000 soldiers and expanded its operational area⁶²⁸. This because Southern Rhodesia, realizing the dawning of an independent Zimbabwe, negotiated with South Africa to take over its support of MNR⁶²⁹. A result of this was that by the time of Zimbabwe's independence, South Africa's support for MNR by far exceeded that of its predecessor⁶³⁰. The RNM relocated its military base from Southern Rhodesia to the Gorongosa National Park in central Mozambique, with South African support⁶³¹. The attacks' targets shifted from various facilities to villages⁶³². MNR attempted to sabotage the rural development policy that FRELIMO was promoting, as well as to secure food and recruits, by burning the *aldeia comunal* (communal villages) and killing FRELIMO supporters⁶³³. With the civil war, everything that Mozambicans tried to build and improve in the country after independence suffered a huge drop in all the effort invested. Education, health, and agricultural infrastructures were completely destroyed⁶³⁴. In addition to the war, there

⁶²³ Ibid

⁶²⁴ Ibid

⁶²⁵ Ibid

⁶²⁶ Ibid

⁶²⁷ Ibid

⁶²⁸ Ibid

⁶²⁹ Ibid

⁶³⁰ Ibid

⁶³¹ Ibid

⁶³² Ibid

⁶³³ Ibid

⁶³⁴ Claiborne, W. (1988, January 24). WAR PUSHES MOZAMBIQUE TOWARD FAMINE, COLLAPSE. Washington Post.

was a huge drought in the early 1980s, which led to a serious case of famine, and the deaths in Mozambique were caused by war and famine⁶³⁵

With the situation in Mozambique getting worse, more and more international aid then came to try to assist Mozambique with the crisis it was going through⁶³⁶. Aid was mostly from Western countries with the biggest financial aid coming from the USA, which also put pressure on the resolution of the conflict⁶³⁷. The Mozambican government began to initiate secret negotiations with the South African government, and they managed to reach the Nkomati Agreement in 1983⁶³⁸.

4.5 The Nkomati agreement

The Nkomati agreement was signed by Samora Machel and Pieter Botha, where they agreed that Mozambique would stop supporting the African National Congress militants, and the South African government would also stop supporting RENAMO⁶³⁹. At this time, South Africa was frowned upon by the international community due to the racial segregation present in the country, and although Mozambique did not exactly want to negotiate with the South African regime, it was important that they stay on good terms with the South African government⁶⁴⁰. RENAMO was supported by the South African government and the war between the Mozambican government and RENAMO was causing catastrophic effects for Mozambique, so they wanted a truce with the South African regime as soon as this would ease tensions⁶⁴¹.

These efforts proved ineffective. By 1982 the MNR had cost the Mozambican government an estimated \$3 8 billion dollars through direct damage and increases in defense expenditures.²⁷ According to official estimates, the MNR had destroyed 840 schools, 12 health clinics, 24 maternity clinics, 174 health posts, two centers for the handicapped and 900 shops while kidnapping 52 foreign technicians and killing 12.28

⁶³⁵ Ibid

⁶³⁶ Metz, S. (1986). The Mozambique national resistance and south African foreign policy. African Affairs. p.497

⁶³⁷ Ibid

⁶³⁸ Ibid

⁶³⁹ Ibid

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid

⁶⁴¹ Ibid

By 1983 it was clear that the only way to stop the MNR was through an agreement with South Africa. South Africa had continually denied support for the MNR, but solid evidence indicated otherwise⁶⁴².

4.5.1 The return to hostilities

It was to be expected that with the Nkomati agreement the hostilities would stop, and the Mozambican government would be able to recover from the war that was devastating the country, however that was not what happened⁶⁴³. After the signing of the Nkomati agreement, attacks continued to be frequent, and the Mozambican government was desperate about what to do to resolve the situation since the path of diplomatic resolution was also not appeasing the war⁶⁴⁴. Despite the South African government claiming that they were no longer supporting the RNM/RENAMO this turned out to be false⁶⁴⁵. The fact that RENAMO continued the attacks was proof that the South African government was still supporting RENAMO militarily⁶⁴⁶. However, other perspectives were heard that perhaps the possession of these weapons would be weapons already provided before the Nkomati agreement⁶⁴⁷. This second theory was disproved in 1985 when captured MNR papers were found which proved that during and after the agreement in the South African government continued to train and arm the rnm⁶⁴⁸. This proved that South Africa was not in fact fulfilling its part of the agreement not to further support the RNM, RENAMO⁶⁴⁹.

It's a known fact that South Africa has long supported the RNM/RENAMO, and although the South African government has been involved in attacks in Mozambique, they have always preferred to invest more in supporting the MNR to carry out these attacks⁶⁵⁰. The South African government wanted Mozambique to cut ties with the

⁶⁴² Ibid

⁶⁴³ Metz, S. (1986). The Mozambique national resistance and south African foreign policy. African Affairs, p.498

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid

⁶⁵⁰ Metz, S. (1986). The Mozambique national resistance and south African foreign policy. African Affairs, p.499

ANC- African National Congress in South Africa⁶⁵¹. The ANC carried out several attacks in South Africa which were mostly terrorist attacks carried out by small groups⁶⁵². The part that most worried the South African government about these attacks was that they were causing destabilization in the country and thus interfering with the long stability that South Africa had before it attracted foreign investment⁶⁵³. The second reason why South Africa supported the MNR was because it wanted to cause destabilization in Mozambique, with this destabilization in the South African government intended that Mozambique would become more economically dependent on South Africa⁶⁵⁴. After South Africa industrialized after World War II they tried to have an approach to be as autonomous as possible⁶⁵⁵. However, this proved to be neither politically nor economically feasible⁶⁵⁶. Due to this, if Mozambique became more dependent on South Africa this would be more beneficial for the South African government.

What was the reason for South Africa to choose the MNR to perpetuate attacks and not themselves? This is due to two reasons. Firstly, because the intervention that South Africa made in Angola turned out to be a failure⁶⁵⁷. And second and perhaps the most relevant that involves the foreign policy of South Africa is that choosing another actor to carry out the attack freed South Africa from the responsibility of the attack, the MNR was in a certain way for South Africa a scape goat ⁶⁵⁸. It was verified, for example, in the previously mentioned Nkomati agreement, which was a truce between South Africa and Mozambique, where South Africa committed to stop supporting RENAMO ⁶⁵⁹. However, later agreement evidence was found that South Africa continued to support the RENAMO militarily⁶⁶⁰. This aroused suspicion since RENAMO continued the attacks and that they clearly had weapons. This is merely an example of why South

⁶⁵¹ Ibid

⁶⁵² Ibid

⁶⁵³ Ibid

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid

⁶⁵⁷ Metz, S. (1986). The Mozambique national resistance and South African foreign policy. African Affairs, p.498

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid

Africa chose not to be directly involved in the attacks to avoid any responsibility in the GPA.

After Mozambique faced so many years of war in their fight for independence and as well after the independence the hostilities finally end in 1992 with the peace agreement⁶⁶¹. RENAMO had been fighting Frelimo since 1977 and with the shifting of some important events in the international context both FRELIMO and RENAMO decided they reached a point it was leading nowhere, most importantly, harming Mozambique⁶⁶². The death of Machel and the end of the Soviet Union were two big factors that made them reach this conclusion. With the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the bipolarization atmosphere that marked the international scene was finally over⁶⁶³. The cold war did emphasize the differences between RENAMO and FRELIMO, also the influence that the actors had in this area and the help they were providing to RENAMO and FRELIMO contributed also to deepen the rivalry⁶⁶⁴. Thus, shortly after the end of the cold war a round of peace talks began in Nairobi in 1990 that two years later would culminate in the general peace agreement⁶⁶⁵. In the peace agreement FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed on a ceasefire, the demobilization of their armies, to form a unified army and to multiparty election⁶⁶⁶.

4.6 The first elections

After the signing of the general peace agreement, two years later in 1994 the first multi-party elections were held in Mozambique⁶⁶⁷. The people were happy to also have a multi party democratic regime which motivated for a big number of voters⁶⁶⁸. Just coming out of the war a couple of years before the politicians running for the elections

⁶⁶¹ Rugumamu, S., & Gbla, O. (2003). STUDIES IN RECONSTRUCTION AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES IN AFRICA SOME LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM MOZAMBIQUE p.13

⁶⁶² Ibid

⁶⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶⁶ Mawson, A. (2014, July 11). Compromise and Trust-Building After Civil War: Elections Administration in Mozambique, 1994. Innovations for Successful Societies. p.2

⁶⁶⁷ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE. p.2

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid

were not making hate speeches about it other but were focusing more on a speech of maintaining the peace and agreeing to never go to the war path again⁶⁶⁹. Since the 1994 elections were the first multi partite elections of Mozambique, it was needed a effective voter education campaign to appeal people to register and vote⁶⁷⁰. It was mostly students and young people that the commission civic and voter education chose to oversee this and therefore travel to the rural areas⁶⁷¹. However, the commission realized that this was not working because these people did not have credibility in the communities, they visited⁶⁷². To solve this problem, they realized that it should be traditional leaders to enforce this role since they were more respected In the rural communities⁶⁷³.

It was much easier to implement the civic education program once the election commission began reaching out to traditional leaders and the youth educators had the leaders' approval to work in their communities⁶⁷⁴. The decision to work through traditional leaders was a contentious one within the election commission⁶⁷⁵. During the fight for independence and throughout the civil war, FRELIMO had marginalized traditional leaders, viewing them as anti-revolutionary figures who had collaborated too closely with the Portuguese⁶⁷⁶. RENAMO, on the other hand, had used traditional leaders to spread its message during the war⁶⁷⁷.

Since FRELIMO knew rename had this advantage with the “*régulos*” FRELIMO was hesitant in using the *régulos* for the election commissions work, but in the end they agreed⁶⁷⁸. The next step would be voter registration ⁶⁷⁹ Although registration was the second stage of the STAE Action Plan, the plan was scant on details⁶⁸⁰. Recognizing

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid

⁶⁷⁰ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE. p.5-6

⁶⁷¹ Ibid

⁶⁷² Ibid

⁶⁷³ Ibid

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid

⁶⁷⁸ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE.p 6

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid

that registration officials would need to travel around the country to reach a dispersed population, the commission worked closely with the parties to arrange an amendment to the electoral law that would allow mobile voter registration brigades to run the registration process⁶⁸¹.

After the voter registration process began the commission immediately saw some difficulties that had not anticipated due to political and logistical constraints⁶⁸². This process was difficult due to the state of the country's infrastructure where there was landmine threat, unseasonable rains in parts of the country and also a delay relating to the vehicles, since there were not enough vehicles⁶⁸³. To tackle this, they relied on the international help and decided the air transportation would be more effective⁶⁸⁴. "Air transportation proved essential for accessing remote areas that were cut off from urban centers by bad roads and landmines⁶⁸⁵. Even though the air transportation heavily increased the costs it revealed to be essential otherwise it would not have been possible to conclude the electoral timetable in time⁶⁸⁶. The air transportation saved the inconvenience of the country rainy season⁶⁸⁷.

The commission directed several brigades to travel further into rural areas on foot to better reach voters⁶⁸⁸. To improve food supplies to the brigades, the commission collaborated with the United Nations World Food Programme, which arranged for maize, beans, oil, and sugar to be distributed⁶⁸⁹. Finally, to ensure that logistical constraints early in the registration process did not have a negative impact on the number of voters registered, the commission continued to work closely with the parties to extend the registration deadline⁶⁹⁰. With the cooperation of the parties, the commission negotiated an amendment to the electoral law that extended the registration

⁶⁸¹ Ibid

⁶⁸² Ibid

⁶⁸³ Ibid

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid

⁶⁸⁶ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE. p.7

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid

period by two weeks, to September 2⁶⁹¹. By the final deadline, the commission had managed to register over 80% of the estimated total number of voters—which had been revised downward from 8.5 to 7.5 million⁶⁹².

Other problem that arises from this process was the fact that RENAMO was opposed to the use of computers to tally votes⁶⁹³. RENAMO had this distrust after finding out that the company who was to provide the computers and software was the same company had was involved in Angola's failed elections⁶⁹⁴. RENAMO did not trust the computer system to be reliable even though the selection had been made by the European union which was one of the actors that most helped Mozambique in their transition to democracy⁶⁹⁵. This problem ended up being solved after the European commission assured RENAMO that the system was reliable and there was no reason to believe it was not reliable⁶⁹⁶.

The commission then had to set up and staff the polling places. Votes were initially tallied in front of election observers and party representatives at the polling places⁶⁹⁷. Following the count, the public notice of results was signed by all party agents and polling station staff⁶⁹⁸. A copy was also displayed outside the polling place. Officials then sent the notice to the district level⁶⁹⁹. The results from the numerous polling places were collated at the district level, and officials were instructed to repeat the validation and transmittal procedures⁷⁰⁰. In order to determine the province results, authorities at the provincial level were required to enter data from the district level into a computer program⁷⁰¹. The provincial election officials after this, then were supposed to transmit

⁶⁹¹ Ibid

⁶⁹² Ibid

⁶⁹³ Ibid

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid

⁶⁹⁷ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p.7-8

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid

⁷⁰¹ Ibid

that information to Maputo, where the election commission would validate the final results⁷⁰².

Because it lacked the authority or resources to handle some of the issues that occurred in keeping political parties loyal to the process, the election commission frequently had to cooperate with the international community to maintain the electoral process⁷⁰³. When RENAMO's leader, Afonso Dhlakama, declared that his party would boycott the elections on the eve of the election in October 1994, the important role of the international community came into sharp relief⁷⁰⁴. According to Dhlakama, FRELIMO was preparing a significant electoral scam⁷⁰⁵. The diplomatic establishment worked nonstop to get RENAMO back⁷⁰⁶. On the morning of the second election day, RENAMO consented to return to the voting process⁷⁰⁷

The U.N.-led commission in charge of overseeing the peace process gave RENAMO an assurance that it would monitor the elections, and donors sweetened the deal by contributing an additional US\$1 million to the RENAMO Trust Fund⁷⁰⁸. The election commission added a third day of voting when RENAMO returned to the elections to make up for the day the party had lost due to its boycott⁷⁰⁹. However, the role of the international community was occasionally criticized after the fact to bribe RENAMO in 1994 to stay on course inspired the party in later elections to withdraw from the race at crucial points and make a variety of additional threats to get support and attention from abroad⁷¹⁰.

⁷⁰² Ibid

⁷⁰³ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p.8

⁷⁰⁴ ibid

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid

⁷⁰⁸ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p.8-9

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid

⁷¹⁰ Ibid

Both the international community and Mozambicans praised the 1994 elections as a success⁷¹¹. The last-minute boycott attempt by RENAMO was defeated, and the war did not erupt again as some had predicted⁷¹². The outcomes were eventually agreed upon by all stakeholders, including RENAMO⁷¹³. By the time the polls closed, 87% of the eligible electorate had voted⁷¹⁴. The EU's election observation team stated a few days after the election that Mozambican polling officials "exhibited a high degree of transparency, conscientiousness, and diligence during the counting operations at polling stations⁷¹⁵.

The election commission played an important role, managing its affairs and public efforts in a way that inspired trust in the voting process's underlying fairness⁷¹⁶. The commission's public communication strategy was effective⁷¹⁷. The requirement for consensus in decision making aided in the development of trust in a hostile environment⁷¹⁸.

4.7 The failure of the democracy

However, contrary to the elections of 1994 where FRELIMO and this was accepted quite well, the same did not happen in the 1998 elections⁷¹⁹. The first municipal elections of 1998 were characterized by boycott campaigns led by opposition parties, who claimed that the objective conditions for their holding had not been created⁷²⁰. As a result of this boycott there was an abstention of 85%⁷²¹. The results of the second presidential and legislative elections of 1999 were strongly contested by the *Renamo-*

⁷¹¹ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p.9

⁷¹² Ibid

⁷¹³ Ibid

⁷¹⁴ Ibid

⁷¹⁵ Ibid

⁷¹⁶ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p.10

⁷¹⁷ Ibid

⁷¹⁸ Ibid

⁷¹⁹ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p.3

⁷²⁰ Ibid

⁷²¹ Ibid

União Eleitoral (RUE), considered fraudulent, despite their revalidation by the Supreme Court ⁷²²The following year, the same Coalition organized general demonstrations across the country, which ended up causing clashes with the police in the cities of Beira (central part of the country) and Montepuez⁷²³. They resulted in more than a hundred deaths in the city of Montepuez, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. A climate of fear and instability was generated in that city and a certain political tension throughout the country.⁷²⁴”

In November 1999, the second general and multi-party elections were held⁷²⁵. Opposition political parties formed the *Renamo-União Eleitoral* Coalition (RUE)⁷²⁶. The electoral process was very disputed⁷²⁷. This year's electoral campaign was characterized by speeches of mutual attacks between Frelimo and *Renamo-União Eleitoral*⁷²⁸. The belligerent tone of the speeches was joined at times by acts of violence between sympathizers and members of the two major political parties⁷²⁹.

On 1999 the second multipartite general elections took place in which political parties of the opposition formed a colligation - *Coligação Renamo-União Eleitoral* (RUE)⁷³⁰. The electoral process of this year was very disputed where the speeches of FRELIMO and Renamo-União eleitoral consisted of mutual attacks, and also involved moments of violence with the people who supported these two biggest political parties⁷³¹. Since in these elections Frelimo won again there were big protests and contestations from the colligation *RENAMO Uniao Eleitoral* which turned the country again in a atmosphere of violence ⁷³²

⁷²² Ibid

⁷²³ Ibid

⁷²⁴ Ibid

⁷²⁵ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p.8

⁷²⁶ Ibid

⁷²⁷ Ibid

⁷²⁸ Ibid

⁷²⁹ Ibid

⁷³⁰ Mazula, B., & Mbilana, G. (2003). O PAPEL DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA PREVENÇÃO, GESTÃO E TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS: A EXPERIÊNCIA DE MOÇAMBIQUE p8-9

⁷³¹ Ibid

⁷³² Ibid

When comparing the period of the 1990's where people were eager to vote in a fair democracy the same cannot be said from the period of 2000/2010⁷³³. The elections in the 1990s were marked by a high rate of participation like in the general elections of 1994 and 1999, where there was also a significant number of political parties and candidates⁷³⁴.

Even though the election and the electoral campaigns were not free of problems, the problems and inconveniences that raised were able to be solved with a relatively peaceful atmosphere⁷³⁵. Furthermore, even though FRELIMO won the elections in 1994 RENAMO did not protest and accepted the win of FRELIMO⁷³⁶.

This peaceful atmosphere would change particularly in the period comprised of 2000-2010⁷³⁷. In this period the democratic euphoria vanished and from here the electoral processes were characterized by a high rate of abstention, violence and an overall environment of distrust⁷³⁸. "the participation rate went from 80% in the 1990's to 45% in the years 2000/2010"⁷³⁹. Besides this, there were significant errors and frauds in the process of the results and also mistakes in the voters registration which caused RENAMO to reject results and start boycotting the electoral processes due to fraud. Consequently, the violence increased between the Frelimo and RENAMO. In 2000, in a protest against the electoral results in Montepuez, nine people died⁷⁴⁰. After the civil war Mozambique was going on right path to have a successful democracy, so what when wrong in this process? just coming out of a civil war the political institutions were quite fragile which is not abnormal⁷⁴¹. However, RENAMO and FRELIMO after becoming political parties after the war, when examining this they had no real experience or competence. The politicians were unexperienced t they did not had enough resources, and the struggle to govern it was more driven by the power and not in maintaining a fair well working democracy⁷⁴².

⁷³³ Da Silva, C. R. (2016). As eleições e a democracia moçambicana.

⁷³⁴ Ibid

⁷³⁵ Ibid

⁷³⁶ Ibid

⁷³⁷ Ibid

⁷³⁸ Ibid

⁷³⁹ Ibid

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid

⁷⁴¹ Ibid

⁷⁴² Ibid

The obsession for power has a few factors that contribute to this. Living in a poor country where the wealth distribution is made in an unfair way, plus social inequality and social exclusion leads for people to see the power as the only way out of these precarious situations⁷⁴³.

Aside from the low motivation to participate, the act of voting is logistically difficult, if not impossible⁷⁴⁴. Sometimes the distances to the polling station are too big, or the polling days coincide with the rainy season, which isolates many villages.⁷⁴⁵ P34. Faced with the systemic challenges of Mozambican politics, the population regards the electoral act as futile and prefers not to participate⁷⁴⁶. They assume its pointless firstly because Frelimo will in and secondly nothing major will change in Mozambique's policies regardless of the result. The people know the politicians make promises in vain and concentrate the power in themselves, leaving a socioeconomic situation of inequality.

Even though in the decade of 1990 both parties were able to sustain a situation of bipartidism and later RENAMO had an improvement regarding the votes in the general elections of 2014, RENAMO still can't win against Frelimo⁷⁴⁷. Besides obtaining most of the votes the government of FRELIMO was also very centralized⁷⁴⁸. The Mozambicans knew FRELIMO would always win not just because of the centralizing efforts of the party but also because they did not have high hopes for RENAMO⁷⁴⁹. RENAMO while compared to FRELIMO were more unexperienced, still used a lot of violence and they never really changed the way of operating and conduct serious political matters⁷⁵⁰. There was no change in RENAMO as a guerrilla and as a political party.

In the case of Afonso Dhlakama he always prioritized his wealth then managing RENAMO in a fair and democratic way⁷⁵¹. The resources provided to him from the

⁷⁴³ Ibid

⁷⁴⁴ Da Silva, C. R. (2016). As eleições e a democracia moçambicana. p.34

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid

⁷⁵¹ Da Silva, C. R. (2016). As eleições e a democracia moçambicana. p.35

international community were poorly spent, instead of focusing on having strong and competent allies in the party he would kick them out of the party⁷⁵². Two members that were expelled were Raul Domingos and Daviz Simango, because Dhlakama felt threatened by them⁷⁵³. Furthermore, rename every time it would find a situation unfair or had a disagreement, they would always opt for a strategy of violence to have things get played in their way⁷⁵⁴. RENAMO simply did not abandon the guerrilla mindset from the civil war, and that also why on issues that should be solved politically but they opt for violence, therefore RENAMO loses its credibility⁷⁵⁵.

4.8 A New Peace

When the peace was established, the country began to experience accelerated economic growth. However, the benefits of this growth were not felt by the majority, with more than half of the population remaining below the poverty. This contributed for RENAMO to deny the peace agreement, and in 2013, starting a low-level insurgency. In 2014, a new peace agreement was negotiated and signed shortly before the general elections. However, the election results were contested and the agreement turned out to be short-lived, with a resurgence of violence in 2015. The RENAMO insurgency did not stop with the agreement, tensions between Renamo and Frelimo came back again between 2014 and 2015, when a military political crisis erupted. The country, despite having signed peace, the situation in Mozambique was not what was initially imagined. After the 1992 peace agreement, already out of the civil war, Mozambique was experiencing good economic growth. However, this economic growth was not being reflected fairly in Mozambican society. Despite this economic growth there were serious problems of inequality due to a failure to share wealth and redistribute it. With these problems, the transparency of the Frelimo government began to be called into question and this would culminate in Frelimo's former opposition, RENAMO, rekindling tensions between these two.

⁷⁵² Ibid

⁷⁵³ Ibid

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid

With the increase in tensions between Frelimo and RENAMO, several actors in the international community decided to intervene to mediate the conflict. Among these, the European Union, ambassadors from South Africa, the former president of Tanzania and even the Catholic Church played an important role⁷⁵⁶. This mediation lasted about 5 months, however it did not lead to any positive result⁷⁵⁷. Having said that, President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi and President Afonso Dhlakama of rowing decided the best way to reaching an agreement that would benefit both would be to start negotiating directly⁷⁵⁸. The path they chose to negotiate directly was effective and culminated in a national peace process on March 1, 2017.

The main problems they had in mind to solve was decentralization, so for that they elaborated a proposal for a new decentralization framework⁷⁵⁹. And regarding the RENAMO fighters, the topic of the DDR would be dealt with by a military affairs commission⁷⁶⁰. Also, to ensure that the ceasefire would be adhered to, they also created a joint monitoring and verification team⁷⁶¹.

A Contact Group, chaired by the Swiss Ambassador to Mozambique, Mirko Manzoni, was formed to coordinate support from the international community. A Secretariat was also created in early 2017 to support the process⁷⁶². Significant advances were made, which resulted in a revision of the Constitution, which included amendments on decentralization reform, and which was unanimously approved by the Assembly of the Republic in May 2018, followed by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Military Affairs in August 2018⁷⁶³.

This Memorandum of Understanding outlined the road map for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)⁷⁶⁴. The unexpected death of RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama on 3 May 2018 hampered the process. With the appointment of Ossufo Momade as Interim RENAMO leader, he was quickly and thoroughly

⁷⁵⁶ Maputo Accord. <https://maputoaccord.org/>

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid

⁷⁶¹ Ibid

⁷⁶² Ibid

⁷⁶³ Ibid

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid

introduced to the process to ensure that it remained on track⁷⁶⁵. Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, both the government and RENAMO demonstrated their dedication to the central issue of DDR, with the process officially kicking off in October 2018⁷⁶⁶. The following organizations are involved: the Commission on Military Affairs, the DDR Joint Technical Group, the Integration Joint Technical Group, and the Monitoring and Verification Joint Technical Group⁷⁶⁷.

In 2019, before the signing of the final peace agreement, RENAMO officially started the DDR process with its government counterparts⁷⁶⁸. This action managed to create confidence and stability before the signing of the definitive cessation of military hostilities agreement and the Maputo peace and national reconciliation agreement, which took place in August 2019⁷⁶⁹. This agreement finally put an end to the tensions that reappeared in 2013, where RENAMO and Frelimo pledged to end all political and military hostilities and focus on a future of lasting peace⁷⁷⁰. – mention fully implementing the legislative package on decentralization.

After the Mozambican independence the power was simply transferred to FRELIMO with any elections. This gave rise to opposition that did not agree that Frelimo should have the legitimacy to govern the country, hence RENAMO is created in 1975 as opposition to Frelimo. The civil war did not happen as immediately as in Angola, but it began also shortly after in 1977. Such as Angola, the Mozambican civil war was a product of the sloppy Portuguese decolonization that caused devastating consequences to the country.

4.9 Relations between Portugal and Mozambique

Relations between Portugal and Mozambique were initially more difficult than those between Portugal and Angola, and they took much longer to improve⁷⁷¹. The difficulties with Maputo were quite different from those with Luanda, reflecting fundamental

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷⁷¹ MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa* p.227

differences in the two territories' conditions at independence⁷⁷². For starters, Mozambique's economic prospects were infinitely worse than those of Angola⁷⁷³. Second, Angola's civil war had resulted in a violent, traumatic, but ultimately total exodus of white settlers⁷⁷⁴. However, in the case of Mozambique even though there was a trigger in the outflow of settlers, the ones who stayed had a harsh treatment towards the Mozambicans which made the tensions between Lisbon and Maputo to worsen⁷⁷⁵.

The Frelimo regime in the first two years went ahead with a series of nationalizations that affected both financial and human resources⁷⁷⁶. There were also concerns of Portuguese citizens being held in prison without trial and the situation was further aggravated when Frelimo nationalized all the Portuguese banks⁷⁷⁷.

It is difficult to understand Frelimo's refusal to cooperate in improving relations with Portugal currently⁷⁷⁸. Despite a far-reaching east European-inspired development program adopted in early 1977, the economy showed few signs of improvement⁷⁷⁹. By 1978 the guerrilla war against the white regime in Rhodesia was almost daily spilling across the border into Mozambique⁷⁸⁰. Worryingly, the opposition movement that would eventually be known as RENAMO had begun a campaign of violence in border areas⁷⁸¹. Since Mozambique was in such situation it was expected to be wanting to have any kind of friendship extended to it⁷⁸². While some in the Frelimo leadership were probably thinking along those lines Machel's style and pronouncements became increasingly authoritarian, as if he was determined to assert Portugal's irrelevance, whether as a friend or foe to the new revolutionary state⁷⁸³.

The relationship improved slightly in the early 1980s as a result of Eanes' personal diplomacy. He and Machel met informally in Luanda during Agostinho Neto's funeral in September 1979, and a formal visit to Portugal by Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's

⁷⁷² Ibid

⁷⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷⁷ MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa* p.227-228

⁷⁷⁸ MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa* p.228

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid

⁷⁸¹ Ibid

⁷⁸² Ibid

⁷⁸³ Ibid

then-foreign minister and number two in the Frelimo hierarchy, followed in early 1981⁷⁸⁴. However, this improvement in bilateral relations was largely due to a broader shift in Mozambican foreign policy toward the west⁷⁸⁵. Several factors influenced the westward opening⁷⁸⁶. There was a realization that condemning the entire capitalist world as imperialism incarnate was not only politically incorrect, but also economically counter-productive⁷⁸⁷.

Portugal did not have a lot of interest in Mozambique except for Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme and carries over 805 of the debt burden associated with it⁷⁸⁸. Since from the Mozambican independence Portugal had agreed to maintain responsibility for this⁷⁸⁹. When the project was completed in July of 1977 it also coincided with anti-FRELIMO guerrilla movement that was occurring⁷⁹⁰. Therefore, assuring stability was economically important for Portugal because internal conflicts in Mozambique could get in the way of the chances of recouping its investment⁷⁹¹.

Portugal showed some initial optimism with Nkomati accord signed in 1984 later on it just proved that the accord failed and was unable to contain RENAMO⁷⁹². In the 1980s, the RENAMO issue became a major source of contention between Portugal and Mozambique⁷⁹³. The problem was similar to, but far more serious than, the one between Lisbon and Luanda over anti-MPLA activity in Portugal⁷⁹⁴. Mozambican hostility was centered on the fact that a significant portion of RENAMO's publicly identified leadership were Portuguese citizens who had refused to compromise with the Frelimo state by taking Mozambican nationality at independence⁷⁹⁵.

These interests allegedly wielded power at the highest levels of the centre-right PSD, which was in and out of power throughout the 1980s⁷⁹⁶. Relations were strained further

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸⁸ MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa* p.229

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid

⁷⁹¹ Ibid

⁷⁹² MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa* p.230

⁷⁹³ Ibid

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid

in 1988 by the kidnapping and murder of a leading figure in RENAMO , Evo Fernandes, near Lisbon, which resulted in the expulsion of a junior diplomat from the Mozambican embassy on suspicion of involvement⁷⁹⁷. Perhaps it was this underlying tension that prevented Portugal from playing the prominent role in efforts to resolve Mozambique's problems that it did in Angola⁷⁹⁸.

Portugal was not completely excluded from the peace process. Although not in a key position – the United Nations mission was led by an Italian – Portugal served on the Supervision and Control Commission, which oversaw demobilization and election preparations, and UNOMOZ included a Portuguese army contingent⁷⁹⁹. RENAMO performed better than expected in the October 1994 elections, but was easily defeated by Frelimo, which won an absolute majority in the national assembly and re-elected Chissano as president⁸⁰⁰. This could also be justified since in Angola there were oil and diamonds worth fighting for but this was not the case in Mozambique⁸⁰¹.

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹⁹ MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa* p.231

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid

⁸⁰¹ Ibid

Chapter 5

Guinea Bissau

Guinea has always been one of the most unwanted Portuguese colonies, with the Portuguese giving priority to Brazil, and when Brazil had its Independence, Angola became the most important Portuguese colony, being considered the Portuguese jewel of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. During the period of colonization and the Portuguese occupation, what the Portuguese most wanted to “take advantage of” from Guinea Bissau was the forced labor of Guineans. Throughout the period of Portuguese occupation inhuman acts were committed against the population where slavery was what Portuguese most focused on in Guinea, and not so much the extraction of natural resources. Even after slavery was banned, forced labor of Guineans remained but under other rules, for it to be legally and morally acceptable. This took place after the Berlin conference where the so-called “pacification campaigns” took place. The main objective of these campaigns was to force the Guineans to pay the hut tax. In order to be able to pay this tax, Guineans would have to work up to a certain amount and then to be sold by the settlers. Basically, *imposto de palhota* was “hidden” forced labor, in the sense that the Portuguese simply found another alternative and circumvented the legal situation in order to continue to enjoy the forced labor of Guineans.

Guinea then started its liberation war against Portugal after Angola and Mozambique already started there's. Such as it was in the case of Mozambique and Angola there was a particular moment of colonial repression that triggered them to start also their war.

5.1 The Pidjiguiti massacre

In 3rd of August of 1969 the workers of the port of Pidjiguiti organized a strike claiming a raise in the salaries⁸⁰². Particularly those who worked for the Gouveia house were violently repressed by the colonial employees, police, military as well as some civilians, where it resulted in the death of 50 people⁸⁰³. Although this was not the first workers

⁸⁰² Roque, S. (2019, July 29). 3 de Agosto de 1959, Massacre de Pidjiguiti, Bissau. Coimbra. p.33

⁸⁰³ Ibid

strike, having previously organized one in 6 of march of 1956 for the same reason⁸⁰⁴. However this strike had just a few detentions and not such an strong violence as the strike 1959⁸⁰⁵. According to the reports and testimonies of the survivors and other witnesses, since they refused to attend to the workers revindications the workers decided to go forth with the strike and gathered in the port stopping all activity⁸⁰⁶. Facing this the colonial authorities threatened them as the workers closed the gate that had access to the port⁸⁰⁷. This lead to the soldiers and police to knock down the gate and shoot at these workers indiscriminately.

After the repression, multiple strikers and sympathizers were detained, and some tortured and persecuted by PIDE as PIDE considered this strike impossible to be organized by indigenous analphabets⁸⁰⁸. the model of economic control in Guinea always based itself in the commercial exploration of the existent activity, from the traffic of slaves to the Agricola production.⁸⁰⁹ After the second world war the forced labor was replaced by the “*trabalho assalariado*”, that could be translated to very low wages and precarious conditions based in authoritarianism⁸¹⁰.

The Pidjiguiti repression happened in a time where the “*estatuto do indigenato*” was still employed but also, in a time where the nationalist movements in Guinea were starting to organize themselves with a higher intensity, also inspired by the international context being pro the “African independence”⁸¹¹. What happened in Pidjiguiti was a demonstration of the excessive use of violence against civilians without any possibility of defense. In this particular happening the goal was to completely shatter any resistance to colonialism through the fear of the indiscriminate use of violence⁸¹². P 35 this massacre was taken as an historical moment of the strong colonial repression that would foment the nationalist spirit of guinea but particularly of PAIGC to lead an armed fight for the liberation of Guinea ⁸¹³.

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid

⁸⁰⁸ Roque, S. (2019, July 29). 3 de Agosto de 1959, Massacre de Pidjiguiti, Bissau. Coimbra. p.34

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid

⁸¹⁰ Ibid

⁸¹¹ Ibid

⁸¹²Roque, S. (2019, July 29). 3 de Agosto de 1959, Massacre de Pidjiguiti, Bissau. Coimbra. p.35

⁸¹³ Ibid

Like in the case of Angola and Mozambique, the Pidjiguiti massacre just confirmed that for Guinea to have their independence the only solution would be to start an armed fight against the metropole.

5.2 The beginning of the armed fight

Despite extensive planning for the operations, it was decided to start the armed conflict despite the fact that there was a lack of supplies⁸¹⁴. On January 23, 1963, the first attack was made on Tite's barracks⁸¹⁵. This attack had a significant impact because, at the time, Tite was commanded by a captain known as "Captain Short," who rose to fame for the atrocities and brutalities he committed against prisoners brought there from other parts of the Province, militants and supporters of the cause of national independence, the ordinary population of that region of Quinara, and other targets⁸¹⁶.

In this way, the guerrillas, who were at the time still in their infancy, as well as the populations who endured those horrors, gained a great deal of courage from the attack on Tite's barracks⁸¹⁷. It quickly spread through oral tradition (word of mouth) and the events that started in Tite with that first action⁸¹⁸. After all, there was a chance of defeating the colonialists. Along with the attacks, numerous acts of sabotage were also committed, such as cutting down trees on trails and CTT phone lines to impede communication between the colonial authorities. Threatening notes to the Portuguese authorities were left at the scenes of the crimes⁸¹⁹.

In response to this attack, the colonial power became more violent and brutal toward our populations, but on the other hand, support for the cause of the liberation struggle also grew. Attacks by the PAIGC increased to some extent across the so-called Portuguese Guinea territory⁸²⁰. Parallel to these assaults, Amílcar Cabral quickly acquired new resources, including weapons and equipment.⁸²¹ The Cassaca Congress was critical to

⁸¹⁴ Início da Guerra na Guiné-Bissau 1963. Uma Visão Guineense. Portal Da Defesa.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid

⁸¹⁶ Ibid

⁸¹⁷ Ibid

⁸¹⁸ Ibid

⁸¹⁹ Ibid

⁸²⁰ Ibid

⁸²¹ Ibid

the success of the National Liberation Struggle⁸²². Despite the existence of organizational directives issued by the Party leadership in order to standardize procedures and follow a coordinated strategy, the guerrillas gradually organized themselves in the image of the leaders who led the various guerrilla groups⁸²³. Given the low level of preparation of some of the leaders, clear signs of unpreparedness on the part of the guerrilla leaders began to emerge⁸²⁴. A spirit of superstition and mistrust spread among all, undermining the armed struggle for a common goal⁸²⁵. At the same time, illnesses caused by poor personal hygiene and a lack of basic medical care exacerbated the situation⁸²⁶.

5.3 PAIGC

The PAIGC Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, was founded in 1956 in Bissau, and was the national liberation movement that led the Guinean war against Portuguese colonialism⁸²⁷. Priority was thus given to the mobilization of the peasant masses. Amílcar Cabral was the great leader of the PAIGC and of the armed struggle that followed and would lead to the independence of the country. Amílcar Cabral and five other comrades, including Aristides Pereira, Luis Cabral, Inácio Júlio Semedo, Fernando Fortes, and Elisée Turpin, secretly founded the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) on September 19, 1956, in Bissau⁸²⁸. It was a political organization that aimed to bring Guinea and Cape Verde together in order to overthrow the colonial regime. Founded with the name party, the PAIGC was nothing more than a revolutionary liberation movement from its inception until March 1972, when it was transformed into a party with the holding of a General Assembly in April of the same year⁸²⁹.

⁸²² Ibid

⁸²³ Ibid

⁸²⁴ Ibid

⁸²⁵ Ibid

⁸²⁶ Ibid

⁸²⁷ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990).). p.16

⁸²⁸ Ibid

⁸²⁹ Ibid

Amílcar Cabral first joined the *Casa de Estudante do Império (CEI)* in Portugal, an institution that helped students integrate into the new cultural reality⁸³⁰. Later, he founded the Center for African Studies (CEA) with other colleagues, where the group met to discuss, define strategies, and develop political actions to raise awareness not only of colleagues in the metropolis, but also to make their ideas reach the colonies. The goal was to make them understand the negative consequences of the colonial regime⁸³¹. The action was carried out primarily through literary and poetic manifestations, which were disseminated both within and outside of the metropolis via participation in magazines and collections⁸³². After finishing the study, he was sent as an agronomist to the colonial government to carry out agricultural mapping in Guinea, as he later stated⁸³³. Due to the demands of the job, Amílcar Cabral had the opportunity to travel throughout the country and meet people who he later relied on to create the PAIGC and spark the struggle for self-determination in the States of Guinea and Cape Verde⁸³⁴.

Influenced by the context of neighboring countries' independence processes, the PAIGC defined peaceful struggle as a priority of its strategy when it was formed, thus following the example set by former French and English colonies⁸³⁵. Before starting any armed actions against the colonial state, the PAIGC militants took about three years to investigate patiently the local conditions, focusing its efforts on local ethnic groups most likely to support and sustain the rebellion⁸³⁶. They gained their sympathy by developing a form of political propaganda that summarized, in fact, the reasons for people's complaint⁸³⁷.

However, three years after its formation, the events of August 3, 1959, at the Pidjiguiti Pier in Bissau - in which fifty dockers were killed and one hundred others were injured - changed its strategy, and it began to use the guerrilla technique to harass colonial

⁸³⁰ Ibid

⁸³¹ Ibid

⁸³² Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990).. p.16-17

⁸³³ Ibid

⁸³⁴ Ibid

⁸³⁵ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal. p.1134

⁸³⁶ Ibid

⁸³⁷ Ibid

commercial activity⁸³⁸. Thus, in 1961, he launched "Direct Action," a sabotage tactic based on the destruction of roads, bridges, electrical networks, and communication systems⁸³⁹. Apart from Guinea-Conakry, where the movement's central base was established, training of militants and party cadres began abroad in 1960 and 1962. Among the support received at that time, the People's Republic of China was the first to receive and train PAIGC militants, then other countries followed, among which the Kingdom of Morocco, Algeria, Eastern European Countries and Cuba also supported the training of political cadres and militants of the PAIGC⁸⁴⁰.

Many of the militants assembling in Conakry had previously served in the colonial army and had some familiarity with military instruction, therefore, instructors were appointed and basic training started for everyone who was present⁸⁴¹. After preparing them, they were dispatched to the various regions of the former Portuguese Province to spread awareness of the goals and causes of the National Liberation Struggle⁸⁴². By this time, I had already returned from People's China with the first group of Guinean militants sent there for guerrilla warfare training, which included many of the individuals who would go on to become famous commanders of the armed forces⁸⁴³.

The PAIGC's militant or political education had anti-colonial and Afro-centered goals, aiming to demolish the system and the prejudiced, hierarchical, and oppressive educational practices passed down from Portuguese colonial education⁸⁴⁴. It introduced new knowledge and experiences of social life into textbooks and school curricula, emphasizing learning about the concrete realities of the African people, the historical processes they were opposing at the time - colonialism - and the violent and structural relationships that resulted from their practices⁸⁴⁵.

⁸³⁸ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990).p.17

⁸³⁹ Ibid

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid

⁸⁴¹ Fati, S. (2021). INÍCIO DA LUTA DE LIBERTAÇÃO NACIONAL 1963: UMA VISÃO GUINEENSE

⁸⁴² Ibid

⁸⁴³ Ibid

⁸⁴⁴ A. (2022, September 13). A Educação Política para a Libertação na Guiné-Bissau entre 1963-1974. Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid

An important mark of PAIGC was the unity between Guinea and Cape Verde. In this time there was a relevant feeling of pan Africanism, Amílcar Cabral also influenced by this used this as an inspiration for the unity, using therefore the pan Africanism argument for to work together for the independence of both⁸⁴⁶.

Amílcar Cabral used this argument as a pretext to achieve his goal of granting independence to the two former colonies. He felt a part of Guinea and Cape Verde, and he wanted to fight for his rights, but the only way to do so was to unite the struggles⁸⁴⁷. One advantage is that they are geographically close regions, with interconnected pasts and cultural similarities in terms of language: Creole. When it was determined that the necessary conditions had been met, the PAIGC launched the armed struggle for national liberation in Guinea-south Bissau's on January 23th of 1963, with the participation of Guineans and Cape Verdeans⁸⁴⁸. The post-independence period was not successful, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, where political groups involved in the revolutionary process did not get along and engaged in a decade-long armed conflict⁸⁴⁹. Meanwhile, in Guinea-Bissau, there was growing uncertainty about how to build unity between two national groups⁸⁵⁰.

Besides having ideological differences another problem that the liberation movement also had to deal was the struggle to make the public machine work properly⁸⁵¹. As previously stated, in the case of Mozambique and Angola the development of infrastructure was quite precarious, and it was even more accentuated in Guinea⁸⁵². The Portuguese colonization had caused in the former colonies limited developments, social, economic and political disequilibrium that made an obstacle for these to have a proper development. In the Guinea case it was considered a “*colonia de tráfico*” unlike Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde that were “*colonias de povoamento*”⁸⁵³. This was due to Guinea, while comparing to Angola did not have significant natural resources

⁸⁴⁶ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990).p.17-18

⁸⁴⁷Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.18

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid

⁸⁵¹ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990).p.19

⁸⁵² Ibid

⁸⁵³ Ibid

worth exploring, therefore the Portuguese in Guinea only focused in the traffic of slaves and forced labor. Consequently, Guinea in detriment of the other Portuguese colonies had a even lower level of people with education and less working infrastructures. Furthermore, there was also a selective choosing for education, where the population was classified in two social categories⁸⁵⁴. The *assimilados* that technically had the same social rights as the Portuguese, that were about 1% of the population, meanwhile 99% were the indigenous that barely had any rights, education and healthcare⁸⁵⁵.

There was a greater vulnerability to colonial army land and air attacks on large encampments known as central bases or barracks⁸⁵⁶. When the Secretary General of the Party learned of the situation, which he considered serious and a threat to the liberation struggle, he decided to convene a meeting in the country's interior with all those responsible for the guerrilla movement⁸⁵⁷. This gathering was known as the Congress of Cassacá, after the town where it was held⁸⁵⁸. As previously stated, all guerrilla commanders, officials, and Party leaders were summoned to the meeting, and severe measures were taken against those who committed crimes and abuses against civilian and, in some cases, military populations for several days after testifying witnesses and victims of the misdemeanors and crimes committed⁸⁵⁹.

The party was forced to confront two fundamental aspects of its purpose as soon as the struggle began in 1964: first, it was an Armed Action - perpetrated by the Battle of Komo, which lasted seventy-five days and nights of bombing and displaced the General Staff to closely monitor operations⁸⁶⁰. The second, the Political Action - the 1st Congress of the PAIGC, which took place from February 13th to 17th in Cassacá, was taking place fifteen kilometers from the Island of Komo⁸⁶¹. Congress was called together in an emergency to correct errors that were occurring and could jeopardize the struggle. Errors included deviations from guidelines, assassinations of populations whose support was critical to the success of the movement's struggle, and abuse of

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid

⁸⁵⁶ Início da Guerra na Guiné-Bissau 1963. Uma Visão Guineense. Portal Da Defesa.

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid

⁸⁶⁰ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990).p.20

⁸⁶¹ Ibid

power by some guerrilla commanders⁸⁶². To avoid being discredited by the general public, he decided to hold his first Congress in Cassacá, in the country's south, to deliberate on plans that could provide political-military support and guide the PAIGC towards independence⁸⁶³.

Among the resolutions passed by Congress was one calling for increased knowledge⁸⁶⁴. This occurred through the establishment of schools, investments in the education of adults and children, and incentives for individuals to invest in their own education in order to improve the Party's boards⁸⁶⁵. There was a priority in improving the population's quality of life in the territories of Guinea governed by the PAIGC, where there were more educational institutions, better healthcare, and other basic services⁸⁶⁶. These liberated zones provided Guineans with hope for a better quality of life away from Portuguese colonialism, and they were also critical in the liberation struggle⁸⁶⁷. In 1971 the PAIGC already governed about two thirds of the country, once again proving the superiority of the Guinean armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism⁸⁶⁸

After they started their armed struggle in Tite, probably the most important battle was the Battle of Komo Island⁸⁶⁹. The Guineans were able to take the island quite effectively, which was a very important milestone not only in the history of the liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde but in general in the African struggles⁸⁷⁰. The Portuguese made several attacks to try to recover the island of Como, however this proved to be a failure⁸⁷¹. The case of the battle of the island of como proved how well the PAIGC was organized and also the difficulty that the Portuguese had and would have during the armed struggle led by the PAIGC⁸⁷².

⁸⁶² Ibid

⁸⁶³ Ibid

⁸⁶⁴ A. (2022, September 13). A Educação Política para a Libertação na Guiné-Bissau entre 1963-1974. Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid

⁸⁶⁹ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal. p.1134

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid

⁸⁷¹ Ibid

⁸⁷² Ibid

The battle for the Komo Islands in early 1964—arguably the most important military event in the African wars—represented a far-reaching turning point⁸⁷³. For more than three months, the Portuguese army launched successive attacks on the Como islands, in an attempt to secure a strategic base from which to attack the southern front of the PAIGC⁸⁷⁴. This operation was, however, a failure, constituting a serious military and psychological setback for Portuguese colonialism and an enormous boost to the morale and determination of the PAIGC⁸⁷⁵. Even so, the PAIGC found itself in a position to announce in 1966 that it controlled two-thirds of the national territory⁸⁷⁶.

Given the peculiar circumstances of the country, which lacked staff, the PAIGC began to become bureaucratized after that first major meeting, allowing it to create hierarchical structures in order to coordinate its actions in different locations where its bases were implanted⁸⁷⁷. This attitude was decisive, as it allowed the struggle to continue and ensured mechanisms that streamlined the functioning of the movement, both in terms of controlling the relationship that the guerrillas maintained with society, and with regard to organizational performance⁸⁷⁸.

In areas liberated from colonial administration control, the PAIGC established its own state structures, the embryo of the future independent republic: an effective system of communal administration and popular justice, the provision of health and education services for the first time, the establishment of a market network and the distribution of peasant products, As a result, the residents of the liberated zones saw their lives improve. Even though they had never seen a colonist or a Portuguese soldier, they understood the reason for their fight⁸⁷⁹.

The spectacular victories of the liberation struggle led by the PAiGC compelled Portuguese colonialism to take an audacious step in Guinea — a step unrivaled in other war-torn colonies. in Portugal. To the appointment of António de Spínola, in 1968, to

⁸⁷³ Ibid

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷⁷ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.21

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid

⁸⁷⁹ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal. p.1135

the position governor-general in Bissau represented a qualitative development of the fight⁸⁸⁰. Unlike his predecessor, Arnaldo Schultz, and nearly the entire military hierarchy in Lisbon, Spínola recognized a serious problem in that small and inhospitable western Portuguese "province"⁸⁸¹. The war would be nearly lost militarily, and the colonial authorities' complete disregard for the needs and aspirations of the people under his nominal administration had provided the PAIGC with a fertile field of recruitment and a solid base of support⁸⁸². Spínola's strategy, which was the only viable option given the circumstances, was twofold: Reinforce the morale and effectiveness of the colonial army in an attempt to establish a "military balance" with the guerrillas; 2) Launch a campaign that aimed to gain the "sympathy and commitment" of the Guinean people, seeking to face their main shortages, thereby undermining the political base of the PAIGC⁸⁸³.

5.4 Spínola "For a better Guinea"

Spínola's "For a Better Guinea" campaign was a courageous attempt at political liberalization, social reform, and economic development, acquiring its own dynamic and achieving notable results in the context of Portugal's congenitally backward colonialism⁸⁸⁴. The new governor reorganized Bissau's military commands, surrounding himself with ardent and idealistic young officers who dedicated themselves to investigating Guinea's living conditions and presenting innovative projects to improve them⁸⁸⁵. Schools were built, and a literacy campaign was launched. Some peasant farmers were given agricultural cooperatives and money⁸⁸⁶. Attempts were made to integrate Africans into colonial administration⁸⁸⁷. The so-called "people's congresses" pioneered a form of popular consultation. Money was spent on public works (mostly using military labor) on an unprecedented scale, and in a constant whirlwind of official

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸⁸¹ Ibid

⁸⁸² Ibid

⁸⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁸⁵ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal. P.1135-1136

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid

ceremonies and carnival parties, in which Spínola, projected himself as a savior of the Guinean people, as a "anti-imperialist" and supporter of a true "social revolution" in that small, impoverished, and insignificant land⁸⁸⁸. Meanwhile, the war continued, and the accelerated recruitment of African soldiers brought the number of armed men in the service of the colonial state to 36,000 - about one soldier for every fifteen population⁸⁸⁹

The ultimate goal of Spínola's "smiles and blood" policy, at least in Guinea¹⁴, was to compel the PAIGC to negotiate. to reach an honorable political agreement in order to avoid the humiliation of a total military defeat⁸⁹⁰. He cherished the "crazy dream" of reaching an agreement with the PAIGC that would result in the incorporation of the movement's political and military personnel into the existing colonial state apparatus — obviously under its benign leadership, and with Cabral at its right as one of the two general secretaries. Spínola, as noted by the PAIGC, was not a free agent⁸⁹¹. His appointment to Bissau coincided with Salazar's political death and the first months of Caetano's political openness in Lisbon, but by 1972, Caetano's position within the politically dominant class had weakened significantly, and Spínola's subtle plans for a "evolution in diversity" of the overseas territories were deprived of the approval of the hardline ultras, whose position gained strength⁸⁹². Caetano, probably under pressure, told Spínola to cut off all contact with the PAIGC and told him: For the global defense of the overseas territories, it is preferable to leave Guinea for a military defeat with honor rather than a negotiated agreement with the terrorists, which would pave the way for future negotiations⁸⁹³. Any direct talks with the PAIGC would acknowledge the movement's legitimacy, which the colonial dictatorship had always denied guerrilla organizations, and would have far-reaching consequences in Angola and Mozambique⁸⁹⁴.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁸⁹ Ibid

⁸⁹⁰ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal.

P.1136

⁸⁹¹ Ibid

⁸⁹² Ibid

⁸⁹³ Ibid

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid

With the completion of the congress's work, the PAIGC leaders believed they had resolved the issues that threatened the party's objectives⁸⁹⁵. Obviously, at some point, the contradictions were suppressed tacitly, and the common goal - the abolition of Portuguese colonialism - was achieved⁸⁹⁶. In 1970, during an extended meeting held from April 12 to 15, the movement reinforced the Cassacá deliberations by establishing additional bodies to support its political, military, and administrative actions⁸⁹⁷. The Superior Council of Struggle (CSL), Executive Committee of Struggle (CEL), National Committees of the Liberated Regions (CNRL), and Local Armed Forces are some of these (FAL)⁸⁹⁸. The visit in April 1972 of the United Nations Special Mission to the regions under the control of the PAIGC, known as liberated zones, was regarded as a significant political-military advance⁸⁹⁹. This visit later resulted in the PAIGC's legitimization during the UN General Assembly's XXVII session, which authorized its specialized organizations to collaborate with the PAIGC for the improvement of the material and cultural living conditions of the populations in the liberated zones where the movement has an administrative life⁹⁰⁰. The second was the establishment of Guinea's National People's Assembly (ANP) that was the first Constituent Assembly, in which 120 people elected representatives participated⁹⁰¹.

We can say that holding this first Constituent Assembly legitimized the PAIGC's existence as a political party⁹⁰². As a result, the revolutionary movement has ceased to exist. In theory, one cannot speak of the existence of a party, whether capitalist or socialist, without first considering its own representative decision-making arena⁹⁰³. That is, the emergence of modern parties, according to specialized literature, is linked to the existence of a parliament⁹⁰⁴. According to Amílcar Cabral, despite the existence of all

⁸⁹⁵ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.21

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹⁹ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.21-22

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid

⁹⁰¹ Ibid

⁹⁰² Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.22

⁹⁰³ Ibid

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid

institutional and bureaucratic apparatus since 1968, the PAIGC lacked the fundamental thing, popular legitimacy of its power⁹⁰⁵.

5.5 Problems within the PAIGC

The two peoples' historical relationship was founded on the need to make unity the strength to face a common enemy. However, conducting a successful mobilization in the islands was difficult because the Cape Verdeans' differentiated status was an impediment to the PAIGC's goals⁹⁰⁶. Cabral was aware of reality, and he sought viable mechanisms in the alliance for the advancement of the liberation struggle. Why was Guinea chosen? In contrast to Cape Verde, it offered the necessary conditions for a safer revolutionary practice, not only because it could count on the connection of the land borders of neighboring countries, but also because it took advantage of the feeling of revolt against colonization that was more visible in the behavior of the natives of the then Portuguese Guinea⁹⁰⁷. For the treatment that Cape Verde received was distinct, and much of the society supported the colonial presence in the archipelago⁹⁰⁸. Aside from the aspects mentioned, unity had social significance in the sense that it sought to create an identity between different social classes, and Cape Verde, in turn, had a social structure of citizens with a higher academic level, despite being a homogeneous society⁹⁰⁹. As a result, it primarily contributed to the critical mass of the liberation movement that was in charge of the organizational and diplomatic aspects. Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, concentrated more on the operational side, directing guerrilla actions due to the condition of indigeneity imposed on it⁹¹⁰. Despite the PAIGC being a collaboration between Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde in the struggle for independence for both, the former colonies had rivalries with each other. the rivalry was the fact that Portugal, during the Portuguese occupation, provided more opportunities for education, they had higher-level positions in society and generally benefited from better opportunities and, due to this, they also had a better quality of life. In contrast, the

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid

⁹⁰⁶ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.52

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid

⁹¹⁰ Ibid

Guineans did not have the same benefits as the Cape Verdeans, and this was the spark that started the rivalry between the two. In addition to the fact that Guineans felt wronged, and Cape Verdeans felt a certain superiority, this tension was aggravated by the struggle for national liberation. In the armed struggle against the Portuguese, most of the combatants and also those who died the most were the Guineans, this generated a feeling of revolt in the Guineans because they were the ones who fought and died while the Cape Verdeans simply benefited from the advances of the Guineans.

Amílcar Cabral, having Cape Verdean origins, also contributed to tensions between Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau⁹¹¹. As previously mentioned, tensions were high among Cape Verdeans and these tensions were heightened in the struggle for independence. Amílcar Cabral ended up having a lot of Guineans killed for different ideologies followed or for having abandoned the PAIGC. Later on, this tension inside the PAIGC would culminate in his death

One of the most difficult challenges was balancing the interests of Guineans and Cape Verdeans⁹¹². Difficulties in managing incentives made conflicts, sometimes violent, the "natural way" to rise to power in the past. Both during their resistance to Portuguese colonial occupation, which resulted in several assassinations, and after independence, which was also marked by struggles and tensions between Guinean-Cape Verdean cleavages at first, then between Guineans themselves⁹¹³. Guineans initially felt wronged and turned to the power of arms as a means of assuming leadership of the organization⁹¹⁴. This dispute weakened the party to the point where, of the two major statutory objectives to be met (freeing the country from colonization and then putting it on the path of development), the party only achieved the first, which was considered a minor goal by its program⁹¹⁵. The other, more important objective collided with conflicts and the party's closed and authoritarian organizational structure⁹¹⁶. However, it

⁹¹¹ Amílcar Cabral was born in Bafatá, on September 12, 1924, the son of Professor Juvenal Lopes Cabral (Cape Verdean of Guinean descent) and Iva Pinhel Évora (Guinean of Cape Verdean descent). At the age of eight, the family moved to Santa Catarina (Santiago Island/Cape Verde), where he attended primary school.

⁹¹² Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.19-21

⁹¹³ Ibid

⁹¹⁴ Ibid

⁹¹⁵ Ibid

⁹¹⁶ Ibid

is worth noting that the minimum objective was achieved amidst intense internal conflict and socio-cultural antagonism among the militants. It is said that the expulsion of the Portuguese forces was successful because there was a reasonable awareness that it was necessary to defeat a common enemy, the colonialists, and then resolve internal issues of power struggle⁹¹⁷. In short, while the end of colonialism was viewed as necessary for the affirmation and self-determination of Guinean society, the truth is that, in practice, it was not enough to build a Nation, as the PAIGC advocated in its program⁹¹⁸.

Among the liberation movements in the then-Portuguese colonies, the PAIGC had the most internal conflicts⁹¹⁹. Conflict violence became visible On January 20, 1973, in Guinea-Conakry, its main leader and founder of Guinean and Cape Verdean nationalities, Amílcar Cabral, was assassinated⁹²⁰. This occurred on the eve of the PAIGC of the State of Guinea-unilateral Bissau's declaration of independence⁹²¹. Guinean Inocêncio Cani, commander of the Navy and leader of the Guineans opposed to unity with the Cape Verdeans, fired the shots. Despite this, the party did not hold a debate on the unit's situation⁹²².

One of Amílcar Cabral's final acts was to announce that elections for a Popular National Assembly would be held in the liberated zones, which occurred in the summer of 1973⁹²³. On September 24, during its inaugural session in Medina do Boé, the Assembly solemnly declared the independence of the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau, which was already recognized by around 70 sovereign states by the end of October⁹²⁴. The United Nations, which had already recognized the PAIGC as the "only and authentic representative of the people of Guinea"²³, invited Portugal to end its "illegal occupation" of the Republic and "immediately withdraw its troops" in November⁹²⁵.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid

⁹¹⁸ Ibid

⁹¹⁹ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.22-23

⁹²⁰ Ibid

⁹²¹ Ibid

⁹²² Ibid

⁹²³ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal.

p.1137

⁹²⁴ Ibid

⁹²⁵ Ibid

The PAIGC's unilateral declaration of independence was simply a political strategy to demonstrate to the international community that it controlled a significant portion of the territory and that Portugal would be forced to recognize Guinea and Cape Verde as independent states⁹²⁶. Portugal did not yield to pressure, and its position only changed with the coup d'état on April 25, 1974, which overthrew Salazar's regime and opened the way for negotiations between the belligerent parties⁹²⁷. However, on September 10, 1974, the peace agreement was signed, and Portugal officially recognized Guinea-Bissau's and, as a result, the PAIGC as solely responsible for the new State's political, social, and economic life⁹²⁸. It is worth remembering that during the liberation struggle, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was supported by socialist countries, especially the USSR, Cuba, and China⁹²⁹. Therefore, with the foundation of the Republic, the country adopted the Marxist socialist development model as a strategy to follow the path of development, like Mozambique and Angola, which also received the support of socialist countries in their struggles for independence⁹³⁰.

5.6 The Portuguese defeat

Portuguese colonialism in Guinea was defeated on all fronts: military, political, and diplomatic. All additional initiatives now appeared to be impossible in the context of the Lisbon regime⁹³¹. The great irony of the situation was that, strictly economic or strategic terms, Guinea had no significance for Portugal or its NATO partners⁹³². Furthermore, Guinea's military and war material could have been usefully reused in Mozambique,

⁹²⁶ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.23

⁹²⁷ Ibid

⁹²⁸ ibid

⁹²⁹ Nhasse, C. F. (2022, August 3). Guiné-Bissau: um estudo sobre o impacto da Guerra Civil de 1998/99 no processo de desenvolvimento socioeconômico (2000-2019).

⁹³⁰ Ibid

⁹³¹ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal. p.1137

⁹³² Ibid

where the war was becoming increasingly visible⁹³³. But a military withdrawal—a defeat inflicted by someone who had always been described in official reports as one of a handful of terrorists operating across the border—was unthinkable⁹³⁴.

The morale of armed forces stationed in other colonies would have suffered as a result of a defeat in Guinea, which would have triggered a "domino" effect throughout the Empire⁹³⁵. More than that, any form of political concession or "military personnel economy" was anathema to the regime's ultras, for whom Portugal would always be "an indivisible nation, from Minho to Timor"⁹³⁶. Under any circumstances, no amputation or split would be permitted. «The Fatherland is not discussed, it is defended!» said Salazar⁹³⁷. Thus, for the second time²⁸, the oppressors deceived themselves with their own propaganda, believing in their cultural (and racial) superiority and unable to accept the possibility of defeat coming from a handful of “ black communists⁹³⁸”

The PAIGC militants' euphoria reflected the essence of historical reality: Guinea was the weakest link in Portugal's colonial chain, and the Lisbon regime could not survive defeat in Africa⁹³⁹. The colonial dictatorship was unable to provide any sort of solution to the Guinea problem⁹⁴⁰. It had proven itself incapable of tolerating any kind of political concessions, caught in a web of contradictions created by its own myths and ideology⁹⁴¹. The armed forces on the ground were disheartened by the Government's sabotage of their efforts to end the war through negotiations with the PAIGC, aware that the military situation was rapidly deteriorating, and haunted by the memory of Goa were faced with only one alternative: either they became the scapegoat for the military which they had tried to avoid at all costs, to overthrow the government⁹⁴². The roots of the military insurgency that culminated on April 25th had been thrown into Guinea's

⁹³³ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal. P1137-1138

⁹³⁴ Ibid

⁹³⁵ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal. p1138

⁹³⁶ Ibid

⁹³⁷ Ibid

⁹³⁸ Ibid

⁹³⁹ Woollacott, J. (1983). A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal p1140

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid

⁹⁴¹ Ibid

⁹⁴² Ibid

inhospitable swamps and savannas⁹⁴³. The idea then spread, among the military stationed in Guinea, that their true enemies were not the guerrillas of the bush, but rather the politicians and high-ranking military installed in the metropolis⁹⁴⁴.” The history of the armed forces revolt, the formation of the Movement of Captains, and the events leading up to the coup have been reported numerous times, so there is no reason to repeat it here⁹⁴⁵. It is important to note that the revolt was conceived, inspired, and organized in Guinea. Despite being able to detect, after thirteen years of war, in all theaters of operations, signs of demoralization and fatigue in the armed forces, it was in Guinea that this feeling was found more generalized and expressed itself openly — especially after the break of contacts with the PAIGC, in 1972⁹⁴⁶.

Despite the size of Guinea, the population being much smaller than in comparison with other colonies, Guinea was the one that gave the Portuguese forces the most difficulty in their armed struggle. The fact that this colony was “put aside” by the Portuguese, because Portugal did not enjoy natural resources and as it was a colony not as relevant as Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese did not see it as a threat. When the PAIGC began its armed struggle, this situation was taken very lightly by the Portuguese who believed that even if there were armed struggles, this would not pose a serious problem.

Why was Guinea's national liberation movement more successful? When we compare Angola and Mozambique, the tensions within these countries were much more critical than in Guinea. Both Angola and Mozambique had great divergences between the parties that were fighting for liberation, in addition to this, not only ideological differences but also a pronounced ethnic rivalry⁹⁴⁷. This made the fight in these former colonies more difficult since they had to fight against the Portuguese but also with the population of the country itself. In the case of Guinea, although there were ideological differences and social tensions, they were not as pronounced as Angola and Mozambique⁹⁴⁸. Because of this, Guinea had an advantage in all its armed struggle

⁹⁴³ Ibid

⁹⁴⁴ Woollacott, J. (1983). *A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal* p.1139

⁹⁴⁵ Ibid

⁹⁴⁶ Ibid

⁹⁴⁷ Woollacott, J. (1983). *A luta pela libertação nacional na Guiné-Bissau e a revolução em Portugal* p1133

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid

efforts against the Portuguese. Another important factor is the geographical factor that Guinea had: quote now “Historical and geographical factors were certainly more favorable to the development of the liberation struggle in Guinea than they were in Angola or Mozambique: most of the interior of the country was inaccessible to the Portuguese, providing excellent terrain for guerrilla warfare, and the independence of Guinea-Conakry (1958) and Senegal (1960) provided the PAIGC with a safe haven in the north, east and south, as well as valuable bases both for military training such as supplies of war material⁴, propaganda broadcasts, etc.”⁹⁴⁹

Due to these two factors, this played in favor of Guinea having an advantage over the Portuguese, who, due to these two factors, never managed to implement their colonial rule as profoundly as they did in Angola and Mozambique.

The PAIGC left the negotiations and arrived in Bissau in October 1974, where it faced for the first time the challenge of dealing with the bureaucratic machine's complexity, particularly the contradictions that it necessitates - above all, the distribution of public positions and the guarantee of citizens' well-being⁹⁵⁰. And the situation was complicated because, in addition to being the party's first real contact with governing demands, it also lacked militants with the necessary qualities to keep the public machine running⁹⁵¹. In this regard, it is worth noting how this political-administrative transfer of power occurred⁹⁵². This is because independence was established without the parties taking into account the unique situation of the colonies, particularly in Guinea, where there was a deficient technical-administrative structure capable of ensuring and sustaining governance challenges⁹⁵³. Obviously, resentments from the ten years of military and diplomatic conflict lingered on both sides⁹⁵⁴. Specifically, the PAIGC, which for a long time saw a large majority of society defend being marginalized from social, political, and economic rights, preferred total independence⁹⁵⁵. The total abandonment of the Portuguese armed forces, which were a more effective instrument of the organizational

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid

⁹⁵⁰ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.40

⁹⁵¹ Ibid

⁹⁵² Ibid

⁹⁵³ Ibid

⁹⁵⁴ Ibid

⁹⁵⁵ Ibid

structure that Portugal maintained in Guinea at the time, eliminated the most important organizational mechanism for the post-colonial state's implementation⁹⁵⁶. This attitude developed quickly, as the party was confronted, primarily in administrative terms, with a significant shortage of professionals capable of providing some bureaucratic dynamism to the public service⁹⁵⁷.

What happened was only the substitution of a foreign repressive force for an equally repressive national one. And the contradictions verified, especially in the implementation of public policies, were due to this limited absence of freedom⁹⁵⁸.

5.7 1998/1999 Civil War

After independence was declared in 1974, the military elite of Guinea started to get involved in politics⁹⁵⁹. Their involvement in the emancipation process led to a growing sense of legitimacy for their strength and power⁹⁶⁰. This resulted in the formation of internal factions and the fallout from military coups involving senior military leaders and officers, such as Chiefs of Staff and General of the Armed Forces (CEMGFA)⁹⁶¹.

The first constitutional changes made following the 1980 coup further consolidated the authority of the military elite⁹⁶². The proposed changes enabled the participation and formation of a military elite concerned with the specific issues of civil affairs, with clearly authoritarian characteristics, and not only made it possible for military superiors to receive certain perks but also strengthened their interference in State affairs⁹⁶³.

Guinea-Bissau experienced its biggest political-military conflict, "the civil war of 1998/99", known as the "June 7 war", which lasted eleven months, creating a financial crisis, lack of material resources and destruction of infrastructure, institutional insecurity in the month of June 1998, the country again plunged into a political crisis,

⁹⁵⁶ Ibid

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid

⁹⁵⁸ Semedo, R. J. da C. G. (2009). PAIGC : A face do monopartidarismo na Guiné-Bissau (1974 a 1990). p.41

⁹⁵⁹ Djau, M. (2016). Trinta anos de golpes de Estado na Guiné-Bissau: Uma análise da elite militar. p.3

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid

⁹⁶¹ Ibid

⁹⁶² Djau, M. (2016). Trinta anos de golpes de Estado na Guiné-Bissau: Uma análise da elite militar. p.4

⁹⁶³ Ibid

now in the military environment, which culminated in the political-military conflict in the same year⁹⁶⁴. All this is due to the political instability and the fragility of the state institutions, which is the biggest problem in Guinea-Bissau since its independence⁹⁶⁵. The main catalyst problem for the outbreak of the political-military conflict that completely destroyed the country's productive apparatus, from which until today the country has not been able to overcome the political, economic and social consequences generated by the conflict of June 7, 1998, was the so-called case of arms trafficking to the rebels in the Casamance region, which the Senegalese state has been fighting for a long time⁹⁶⁶.

Here it is important to note that a year before the civil war, Guinea-Bissau joined the UEMOA, with adherence to the *Franco* of the *Comunidade Financeira da África (CFA)* of the members of the monetary alliance of West African countries⁹⁶⁷. In light of this alliance, the relationship between the two countries became increasingly strained, as a result the Senegalese and French authorities' constant allegations that the state of Guinea-Bissau was supplying the state of Guinea-Bissau supplied weapons to rebels in the Casamance region, resulting in frequent frequent clashes between Casamance rebels and Senegalese forces⁹⁶⁸.

The Casamance issue exacerbated the PAIGC crisis over the involvement of some military officers and politicians in arms trafficking to the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC)⁹⁶⁹. Strong indications point to the President of the Republic himself, Joo Bernardo Nino Vieira of the PAIGC, being involved in illegal arms trafficking. Due to these strong indications pointing to his involvement, the president decided to dismiss his partner in the independence struggles, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Ansumane Mané, with whom he had a good friendship relationship, alleging that Mané was responsible for the arms trafficking in Casamansa,

⁹⁶⁴ Nhasse, C. F. (2022, August 3). Guiné-Bissau: um estudo sobre o impacto da Guerra Civil de 1998/99 no processo de desenvolvimento socioeconômico (2000-2019).

⁹⁶⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid

in order to divert attention and ease public concern and pressure from France and Senegal⁹⁷⁰.

General Ansumane Mané vigorously denied any involvement in the trafficking and found the arbitrary manner of his resignation unacceptable⁹⁷¹. Refusing to make his position, he set up a military junta to confront the president, who called for troops from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry¹⁴, as an absolute majority of Guinean military personnel sided with the absolute majority of the Guinean military sided with Chief of Staff General Ansumane Mané⁹⁷². Quickly, Mané, with the support of some military personnel, took over the barracks in Santa Luzia barracks, and soon after took over the food storage barracks. With this the government reacted and, thus, began the "civil war" that would last 11 months in the country. It started on June 7, 1998 and ended in May 1999 with the victory of the Military Junta (Mané) over the government⁹⁷³. Defeated, Nino Vieira went into exile in Portugal⁹⁷⁴.

5.8 Post civil war

Following the civil war, legislative and presidential elections were held in 1999 and 2000, without the participation of General Mané⁹⁷⁵. However, it became clear that Mané would refuse to give up his newly acquired influence in the selection of leading figures capable of protecting the military from any more autocratic civilian leaders. Civilian autocracies are ruled by autocratic civilians⁹⁷⁶. A "Co-President" sign was posted on Mané's office door shortly after the 2000 presidential election, and he proceeded to ignore or reject measures taken by the new civilian government to promote or displace troops and officers⁹⁷⁷. Meanwhile, Mané began to lose support within the armed forces as his involvement in the political struggle increased⁹⁷⁸.

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid

⁹⁷¹ Ibid

⁹⁷² Ibid

⁹⁷³ ibid

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid

⁹⁷⁵ O'Regan, D., & Thompson, P. (2013). Promover a Estabilidade e a Reconciliação na Guiné-Bissau: Lições do Primeiro Narco-Estado de África. p.8

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid

The struggle for the presidency has shaped much of Guinea-Bissau's history and is a structural feature of the country's political system, in which this sovereign body wields disproportionate power⁹⁷⁹. People close to the president have access to financial and career advancement opportunities that the general population does not have⁹⁸⁰. Those who are not inside the circle are intimidated and subjected to arbitrary enforcement⁹⁸¹. These practices were partly passed down from President "Nino" Vieira, the authoritarian leader of Guinea-Bissau, who held the presidency from a coup d'état in 1980 until the end of the civil war in 1999, and again after returning from exile in 2005 until his assassination in 2009⁹⁸². The position's authority and his leadership style enabled him to concentrate even more powers in the presidency, which he used to favor allies, reward supporters, and marginalize or punish enemies, whether real, potential, or merely imagined⁹⁸³. The legal changes were conceived as part of a strategy to extend and concentrate the government's power and influence⁹⁸⁴.

More people are aware of the significance of Guinea-Bissau as a transit country for drugs headed to European markets in recent years, as well as the alleged involvement of military personnel⁹⁸⁵. The amount of drug trafficking has increased in a setting where institutions are weak and poverty is widespread⁹⁸⁶. Threatens to undermine Guinea-Bissau's democratization process, act as a base for organized crime, and undermine respect for the law⁹⁸⁷.

5.9 Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe

As for Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe the relations with Portugal differed.⁹⁸⁸ São Tomé e Príncipe, on the other hand since it had less internal stability than Cabo Verde

⁹⁷⁹ O'Regan, D., & Thompson, P. (2013). Promover a Estabilidade e a Reconciliação na Guiné-Bissau: Lições do Primeiro Narco-Estado de África.p.9-10

⁹⁸⁰ Ibid

⁹⁸¹ Ibid

⁹⁸² Ibid

⁹⁸³ Ibid

⁹⁸⁴ Ibid

⁹⁸⁵ O OBSERVATÓRIO para a proteção dos defensores dos direitos humanos. (2008). GUINÉ-BISSAU Um Ambiente Prejudicial para o Trabalho dos Defensores dos Direitos Humanos. P.4

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸⁸ MacQueen, N. (1997). The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa. p.231-232

had a more difficult relationship with the metropole⁹⁸⁹. The regime of São Tomé and Príncipe had a complicated relation with the metropole about the of opposition activity⁹⁹⁰. Long prison sentences were given out to those involved in "conspiracies" sparked protests in Lisbon, after an apparent coup made by a couple of Portuguese⁹⁹¹. Portugal, then responded to MLSTP regime attacks⁹⁹². Portuguese aid was suspended in 1983 after the minister of education in São Tomé and Príncipe criticized its quality and quantity and threatened retaliation if dissident activity in Lisbon was tolerated⁹⁹³. However, the relations did improve in the mid-1980s with Pinto da Costa. Pinto da Costa set out a number of functional arrangements similar to those already in place with Cabo Verde, including the a monthly scheduled flight to Lisbon by the Portuguese airline, which gave São Tomé e Príncipe's the only direct connection with Europe⁹⁹⁴.

In Cabo Verde they experienced water, food and overall economic difficulties they were able to half successful relationships with external actors, becoming even one of the most aided countries in Africa⁹⁹⁵. Cabo Verde also adopted a more neutral position amid the Cold War and was considered to be in a "harmless position" since its territory was not being disputed and influenced by the US or the USSR⁹⁹⁶.

Guinea distinguishes itself from Mozambique and Angola for not having submerged into a civil war shortly after the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship. Guinea did not follow the same path because in Angola and Mozambique there were multiple parties involved in the liberation war that had different ideologies and aspirations to rule the country after their independence. One common ground between these three was that they all had ethnic rivalries, but still in the case of guinea this was not enough to enter into war after their independence. The particular thing about guinea however was that from all the liberation movements in the African colonies the PAIGC was the most fragmented party. After the leaving of the Portuguese in guinea, the country was in very poor condition and precarious situation, as previously stated, it was the Portuguese

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹⁹¹ Ibid

⁹⁹² Ibid

⁹⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid

⁹⁹⁵ MacQueen, N. (1997). *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*. p.232

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid

African colonies where the Portuguese least invested in infrastructure, healthcare and education. The transition of the power to PAIGC revealed to be quite deficient in the governance of the country. Firstly, they did not had proper bases to manage and govern the country, since it lacked many things to be able to have a good administration. Secondly, there were big divergences in PAIGC amongst Cape Verdeans and Guineans as well as between ethnicities, where some had more benefits that others which consequently caused disagreement. Finally, sharing this with also Angola and Mozambique, there's a huge fight for power. The ones who stay in power is a situation of "the winner takes it all" so there's a significant dispute to reach the power because they benefit from a range of things that the civilian population doesn't. To make clear, not from a western democracy stance but from a typical authoritarian regime point of view. Where in this repressive regime, the corruption runs in the governance, the police are most time also corrupt and bribed, crimes are done with no impunity, overall, the state of law is undeniably weak.

Conclusion

Looking at the cases of the former Portuguese colonies we can highlight certain things that lead to the problems that happened with the decolonization. After the 25th of April the MFA wanted to proceed with a rapid decolonization, since they wanted to leave and dissociate Portugal from the colonies after so many years fighting in the colonial wars. However, the MFA didn't had enough political knowledge on how to proceed and act for this matter. The main focus was just decolonization without any structural reliable plan. Added to this, after the 25th of April experienced a severe political instability. Firstly, with the diverse ideas of decolonization within the MFA, that Spínola wanted a federalist solution while the other members just wanted a decolonization without Portugal having any responsibility in this matter. When the Portuguese proceeded to the decolonization it was done in a careless and organized way. A considerable part of the Portuguese population abandoned the former colonies amid the decolonization and closed and destroyed the businesses they owned. It was also the white Portuguese population living in the colonies that made, owned and ran important infrastructures. Consequently, when they left, these former colonies lost all the important infrastructures and businesses that were crucial for the countries to "function". Another crucial factor was that they were no elections were done, there was simply a direct transfer of power the most dominant national liberation movement of each country. This lead for other opposition movements with different ideologies to contest this transfer of power that eventually led to civil wars. Within these liberation movements it is also important to mention the Berlin conference. When the territories in Africa were divided for the suitable preferences for the European colonial powers, this caused a change in the African territories where rival tribes, ethnicities and people with different religious beliefs now had to share the same territory. This was noticeable in the liberation movements of the former Portuguese African colonies that also contributed to rivalries after the decolonization. Taking all this in matter it was almost inevitable for these civil wars to not take place. The decolonization did not have a negative impact for Portugal but, for the former colonies that were already in precarious conditions amid the decolonization, the civil war had devastating effects for these countries that until now these effects are still very present.

Finally, we can state that there is a correlation between the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal and the consequent decolonization, that after lead some of the Portuguese colonies to enter in a civil war.

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