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INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Master's degree in  
International Relations and Global Studies



BUILDING NARRATIVES

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NTY REPORTING ON ABUSES  
AGAINST MUSLIM MINORITIES IN CHINA AND IN INDIA

Supervisor: Prof. dr hab. MAGDALENA RATAJCZAK  
Co-Supervisor: Prof. PIETRO DE PERINI

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Clelia Vettori'.

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UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, LAW,  
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Master's degree in  
Human Rights and Multi-level Governance



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# *Abstract*

## ENGLISH

The present study fits into a broader body of work that can be traced back to the so-called Propaganda model, an analytical framework developed by Herman and Chomsky to identify the US government's efforts aimed at manufacturing public support for its foreign policies. More specifically, this thesis sets out to attest whether the US administration is taking active steps to build propaganda narratives that seek to contain its current strategic competitor, China, in an effort to maintain its position of hegemony in world affairs. However, proving intent is always a challenging task: there might be various reasons behind Washington's desire to limit Beijing's increasing clout. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to examine the narrative around a specific issue i.e., abuses against Muslim minorities in China, and assess whether the increasingly hostile tones adopted by the administration towards China are the result of genuine concerns over human rights violations or whether they are merely following the economic and political interests of dominant elites. To this end, another comparable situation i.e., abuses against the Muslim community in India, is also studied. A quantitative content analysis was chosen as methodology to dissect and scrutinise a total of 92 news articles published by *The New York Times* over a two-year period (2020-2021). As anticipated, the analytical framework that guides this study is Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, in conjunction with Robert Entman's cascading activation model. The findings of this work illustrate how the US government is indeed instrumentalising the human rights narrative to depict China as a wicked state that deserves US hostility: the coverage of abuses against Muslim communities in China is significantly more intensive and aggressive than that reserved to Muslim minorities in India. The reasons for this difference in tones can only be political in nature, given that they are merely a reflection of elite interests.

Keywords: China, US, Propaganda model, Cascading activation model, Media, Foreign policy

## POLSKI

Niniejsze studium wpisuje się w szerszy nurt prac, których początki sięgają tak zwanego Modelu propagandy - analitycznych ram opracowanych przez Hermana i Chomsky'ego w celu

zidentyfikowania wysiłków rządu USA zmierzających do wytworzenia społecznego poparcia dla jego polityki zagranicznej. Mówiąc dokładniej, celem niniejszej pracy jest sprawdzenie czy administracja amerykańska podejmuje aktywne kroki w celu stworzenia narracji propagandowych, które mają na celu powstrzymanie obecnego strategicznego konkurenta - Chin - w dążeniu do utrzymania pozycji hegemonia w sprawach światowych. Udowodnienie intencji jest jednak zawsze trudnym zadaniem: za dążeniem Waszyngtonu do ograniczenia rosnącej siły przebiecia Pekinu mogą stać różne powody. Dlatego też celem niniejszej pracy jest zbadanie narracji wokół konkretnej kwestii, tj. nadużyć wobec mniejszości muzułmańskich w Chinach, i ocena, czy coraz bardziej wrogie tony przyjmowane przez administrację wobec Chin są wynikiem autentycznego zaniepokojenia łamaniem praw człowieka, czy też wynikają jedynie z ekonomicznych i politycznych interesów dominujących elit. W tym celu przeanalizowano również inną porównywalną sytuację, tj. nadużycia wobec społeczności muzułmańskiej w Indiach. Jako metodologię wybrano ilościową analizę treści, w ramach której przeanalizowano 92 artykuły informacyjne opublikowane przez dziennik „The New York Times” w ciągu dwóch lat (2020-2021). Jak przewidywano, ramy analityczne, które nadają kierunek temu badaniu, to model propagandy Hermana i Chomsky’ego w połączeniu z kaskadowym modelem aktywacji Roberta Entmana. Wyniki tej pracy ilustrują, jak rząd USA rzeczywiście instrumentalizuje narrację o prawach człowieka, aby przedstawić Chiny jako państwo niegodziwe, które zasługuje na wrogość USA: relacje o nadużyciach wobec społeczności muzułmańskich w Chinach są znacznie bardziej intensywne i agresywne niż te, które dotyczą mniejszości muzułmańskich w Indiach. Przyczyny tej różnicy tonów mogą mieć jedynie charakter polityczny, jako że odzwierciedlają one interesy elit.

Słowa kluczowe: Chiny, USA, model propagandowy, kaskadowy model aktywacji, media, polityka zagraniczna

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## *Abbreviations*

ASPI	Australian Strategic Policy Institute
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CAM	Cascading Activation Model
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CN	China
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IN	India
KMT	Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party
MSM	Mainstream Media
NYT	The New York Times
PD	Public Diplomacy
PIIE	Peterson Institute for International Economics
PM	Propaganda Model
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China, today better known as "Taiwan"
TTP	Transatlantic Trade Partnership
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War II

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# *Introduction*

The history of relations between the US and China is extremely multifaceted, in the sense that these two countries, over the past decades, have been allies but also adversaries, depending on the various changes in international dynamics. The status of their relation has not always been relevant to the development of international affairs themselves: only very recently has it begun to be regarded as “the most important bilateral relationship in the world”<sup>1</sup>. Looking back at history is one of the preconditions for a deeper understanding as well as for any analysis efforts on the current state of their bilateral relation and the challenges and tensions but also cooperation opportunities that characterise it: the backbone of the foreign policy of virtually every country with a role in the international system today lies in its past. This assertion finds its theoretical foundations in path dependence theory and, more specifically, in James Mahoney’s understanding of path dependence<sup>2</sup>: he argues that there are two cases in which path dependence occurs i.e., self-reinforcing and reactive sequences. The present work follows the latter, namely the case of a reactive sequence, according to which “the contingent period corresponds with a key breakpoint in history, while the deterministic pattern corresponds with a series of reactions that logically follow from this breakpoint”<sup>3</sup>. A practical example of such case – which provides a useful reading of Chinese foreign policy to this day – is the century of humiliation, a century in which the Chinese empire was subjected to various unjust treaties and instances of exploitation by Western forces. It is true that this occurrence was neither abrupt nor swift; however, it falls within the category of “key breakpoint” because it can be circumscribed to a precise moment in history, and because it represented an intense shock for the Chinese civilisation whose development up until that point had advanced in almost absolute isolation from the rest of the world. Therefore, one of the goals of Chinese politics ever since that moment has been to vindicate such century of humiliations—a key element for the understanding of foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government to this day.

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<sup>1</sup> Baijia Zhang, “Understanding changes in Sino-US relations from a historical perspective”, *China International Strategy Review* 2 (2020): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00048-6>.

<sup>2</sup> James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology”, *Theory and Society* 29, no. 4 (2000): 507-548, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3108585>.

<sup>3</sup> *Ivi*, 535.

Similarly, foreign policies adopted by the US after the victorious outcome in World War II should be studied considering the implications of that victory, namely the establishment of the US as world hegemon in what was still a largely unipolar world. However, this is a case that follows the self-reinforcing sequence of path dependency, according to which “the contingent period corresponds with the initial adoption of a particular institutional arrangement, while the deterministic pattern corresponds with the stable reproduction of this institution over time”<sup>4</sup>. The institutional arrangement in question is the reorganisation of power structures at the end of WWII, while the stable reproduction of this institution over time are all the policies and efforts that the US has taken over the years to maintain this position. However, now this institution, namely the United States’ hegemonic position, is threatened by further rearrangements in the power structures of world affairs: realist theories on hegemonic war debated by a large number of scholars (among which Wallerstein, 1984; Gilpin, 1988; Kupchan, 1994; Allison, 2017) predict that, once the hegemon starts declining (economically but also in terms of values that it embodies), and feels threatened by a rising power, then it is more likely to engage in preventive measures to avoid such decline. In the worst case, the preventive measure is war—the considerations at the basis of the present study originate precisely from this insight: indeed, one of the issues that stimulated the reflections that brought to the formulation of the research question is whether war is still a viable preventive measure or whether, in this contemporary age, such preventive measures take different forms.

## 1.2. Research Questions

As a result of the considerations in the previous paragraphs, the following question was formulated as first attempt to understand what exactly was going to be the purpose of this work:

**Q:** In the context of great power rivalry, is the US government resorting to propaganda techniques to try and build a biased narrative around its leading competitor, China, in order to contain the challenge that this country’s increasing clout in international affairs is posing to US hegemony?

However, the scope of such articulation was deemed too wide, and the question needed to be restricted to a more concise formulation. After some consideration, it was decided that the investigation would

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

focus on how the US-China rivalry was influencing the way in which these countries addressed issues concerning the opponent. For linguistic reasons, the choice fell on the analysis of narratives endorsed by the US against China: more specifically, this analysis of narratives will be conducted through the scrutinization of the reporting of a mainstream US publication i.e., *the New York Times*. The abuses that Muslim minorities in Xinjiang have been facing ever since the Chinese government has decided to eradicate terrorist extremism in the region in the early 2000s was selected as a case study. Similar abuses committed in another country, in this case India, were designated as yardstick against which to compare the quality of reporting. Therefore, two research questions have been formulated to structure and guide this content analysis of abuses against Muslim minorities in China and India:

**RQ1:** Is the *New York Times*' coverage of abuses against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang biased in comparison to the coverage of similar abuses committed in another country e.g., India?

**RQ2:** If so, can this biased narrative be defined as propaganda and be understood as arising from a larger situation i.e., the ongoing strategic competition between the US and China?

### **1.3. Research Strategy**

The research design for the present investigation was constructed in the following manner: first, as anticipated, the case study of abuses against Muslim minorities in China and India was selected. The choice to explore a topic involving human rights was not accidental: the US has often used the human rights narrative to legitimise its position on various foreign policy issues, making it part of the aims of this work to inspect the role that it plays in this case study as well. Furthermore, the rights violations that Muslim communities are subjected to in China and India were selected not only because of their broad compatibility but also, more crucially for the purposes of the second research question, because of these countries' stance towards Washington: one (India) can be considered if not an ally, then at least a "client state" of the US, while the other (China) falls within the "enemy state" category. This distinction is based on Herman and Chomsky's victim categorisations outlined in their propaganda model: indeed, they argue that victims of client states tend to be marginalised, obtaining only limited media coverage, while victims of enemy states tend "to be subject to more intense and indignant coverage"<sup>5</sup>. The PM was chosen as analytical framework to guide this investigation, in conjunction

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<sup>5</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 21.

with Robert Entman’s cascading activation model. As mentioned above, the reporting of the *New York Times* on abuses against Muslim minorities in China and India – where a climate of intolerance against these minorities has been mounting in recent years, following the governing party’s own Hindutva inclinations – is the selected object of the inquiry. A quantitative content analysis was deemed to best fit the purposes of this work and was thus chosen as methodology to examine the relevant collection of articles retrieved from the NYT’s own archival functions using specific keywords (“China” / “India” and “Muslim” and “abuse”) and selecting a predetermined time frame (01/01/2020 – 31/12/2021).

#### **1.4. Structure of the Thesis**

The next chapter offers a wide-ranging summary of the most important information about the contemporary history of China, with particular emphasis on the instances in which such history has crossed paths with that of the United States. Moreover, the chapter also includes a lengthy discussion on the state of US-China relations today—all this knowledge was deemed valuable as it explains the background against which this analysis is conducted.

Chapter 3 focuses on one of the technical requirements of the research part i.e., the literature review. Providing a comprehensive overview of the most relevant literature in the field of political communication and discussing the specific theoretical dimensions that directed this investigation is important to signal to the reader to which body of existing research the present analysis can be ascribed to.

Chapter 4 describes the methods employed in the present work and discloses why a quantitative content analysis approach, relying on the examination of a cluster of articles, and guided by the combination of two analytical tools described in the literature review, was chosen to answer the two research questions.

Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis. The chapter is organized following the five hypotheses that were formulated to find an answer to the research questions.

Chapter 6 offers a discussion of the findings: each hypothesis is addressed individually, and the implications of the results obtained are briefly reviewed. The limitations of the study are debated in the perspective of formulating useful recommendations for future research. The thesis concludes by providing a concise answer to the research questions.

## *China-US Relations: from History to Contemporary Issues*

As argued in the introduction of this work, to understand the contemporary world and its developments, it is crucial to first look at the past; the purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold: first, the focus will be on the history of China from the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century up until the end of the Cold war, and on highlighting the points in which such history encounters that of the US—how both countries responded to the challenges and changes of the international system and how, in turn, their mutable dynamics influenced the world, especially since the end of World War II. The second purpose of this chapter is to discuss the current state of the relationship between China and the US: questions such as how this relation can be framed and whether the competition between these two countries can amount to a new Cold war will drive the discussion. The structure of the chapter follows the dual nature of the questions that will be explored: there are two macro-sections, the first one dealing with the historical part, and the second one with the debate on the current Sino-American relationship. Before diving into the chapter, it might be useful to lay out some prerequisites that will serve as lens through which to read the facts that will be described in the next sections: these premises can be found in the preface of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s book, *On China*—they are key elements in the understanding of the strategic thinking and policies adopted by the two countries.

The first aspect is the exceptionality that characterises both countries. As Mr. Kissinger pointed out, “both societies believe they represent unique values”<sup>6</sup>. On the one hand, American exceptionalism is of missionary nature: in fact, “the belief that God provides a warrant for America’s mission”<sup>7</sup> is at the core of its ideology—the so-called *manifest destiny* of the United States. The mission in question is, of course, the promotion of liberty or liberal democracy to the rest of the world<sup>8</sup>, a narrative which is used to justify certain decisions that the United States takes on the

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<sup>6</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), xvi.

<sup>7</sup> James W. Ceaser, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism”, *American Political Thought* 1, no. 1, (Spring 2012): 10-11, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664595>.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

international level to this day. On the other hand, China's exceptionalism is cultural: as a matter of fact, "no other country can claim so long a continuous civilization, or such an intimate link to its ancient past and classical principles of strategy and statesmanship"<sup>9</sup> as China. It is object of debate for how long the Chinese civilization has existed: however, what is certain is that it is one of the oldest and largest civilisations that still maintains a strong presence in the modern world. What is even more impressive is that throughout its entire history, China managed to remain the touchstone of the East Asian international system, and this is what legitimises its cultural exceptionalism. It is no coincidence that China was formally known as *zhongguo* i.e., the "Middle Kingdom" or the "Central Country"<sup>10</sup>, a wording which encloses both its strategical position and the role it played in its sphere of influence. Last but not least, China never embraced "the American notion of universalism to spread its values around the world"<sup>11</sup>: on the contrary, it was other civilizations coming to the Chinese empire to seek out its philosophies.

The second premise, which to some extent is a corollary to the first premise, concerns the different interpretations that the US (and, more broadly, the Western world) and China give to the concepts of "international relations" and "diplomacy". International relations in the West have been understood through the balance of power concept for centuries: the idea is that, since there was no single state stronger than the others or no single religion with a strong enough authority to sustain universality<sup>12</sup>, states started to rely on this principle to regulate relations among themselves. International relations in China are viewed differently: throughout its history, the Chinese civilization has "never encountered societies of comparable culture or magnitude"<sup>13</sup>. However, this does not mean that the Empire was never faced with the threat of an invasion from neighbouring peoples or other such dangers—according to the Chinese tradition, diplomacy mainly consisted in the manipulation of barbarians. Conflict, to the extent possible, should be avoided and barbarians should be used to keep in check other barbarians in a system that was essentially defensive. As Kissinger explains in *On China*, this strategy based on "subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage"<sup>14</sup> is also reflected in *wei qi*, the most popular intellectual game in China, comparable to chess. With these premises in mind, it is possible to proceed to the next section, which will consist of an analysis of Chinese history from the Open-Door Policy to the end of the Cold war.

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<sup>9</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ivi*, 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Ivi*, 17.

<sup>12</sup> *Ivi*, 16.

<sup>13</sup> *Ivi*, 17.

<sup>14</sup> *Ivi*, 23.



## 2.1. Early Stages of Western Incursion in China and the Open-Door Policy

The starting point for this recollection of historical events is the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the violent and humiliating Western incursion in China, which brought along – amongst other things – the realisation, for the Chinese empire, that it was no longer the strongest and most prosperous civilisation, and that it had fallen behind as far as technological advancement was concerned. In fact, up until that moment, the Chinese empire was a satisfied empire, with little interest in conquest and exploration. The notion that China was a unique civilization was widespread among its elites and reinforced by the fascination that Chinese culture exercised on other nations. Chinese scientific and technological achievements, the size of its population and territory and its economic power were not less impressive: for instance, by 1820, the Chinese empire “produced over 30 percent of world GDP—an amount exceeding the GDP of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the United States combined”<sup>15</sup>. It is not a surprise that Western powers, including the United States, started taking interest in this country and its wealth.

The process that brought China into the modern international system resulted in “one of the most wrenching social, intellectual, and moral strains on Chinese society in its long history”<sup>16</sup>. Indeed, one of the most despicable aspects of the Western foray into China was the unrestricted trade of opium that Britain insisted on conducting even though this substance was banned in China. After initially considering the legalization of opium to be able to manage its sale, the Qing court ultimately decided to crack down and eradicate the business, which lobbyists for the “China trade” perceived as an unacceptable affront and, thus, decided to petition the British parliament for a declaration of war. The Opium war began when the British government decided to order a blockade of all the main Chinese ports: in 1842 the Qing court, overwhelmed by the technological advantage of the British fleet, was forced to surrender, and to accept the humiliating conditions that the Treaty of Nanjing provided for. Not long after, US President John Tyler decided to seize the opportunity and send a mission to China to obtain similar concessions for the Americans<sup>17</sup>: the delegation managed to obtain the signing of the Wang Xia Treaty in 1844, which granted the US “Most Favourite Nation” status; other Western powers also started acquiring the same status in rapid succession. The signing of these concessions marked the beginning of the “century of humiliation” for China, which is commonly described as “a period between 1839 and 1949 when China’s government lost control over large portions of its

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<sup>15</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 12.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ivi*, 54.

territory at the hands of foreigners”<sup>18</sup> and which is one of the key elements to understand the narrative behind the founding of modern China<sup>19</sup>.

Western powers trying to take advantage of China were not the only factors that characterized the century of humiliation. China had two additional issues: Russia’s expansionism and Japan’s will to supplant China as East Asian power. While Western powers and Russia “only” wanted to exploit China’s wealth and had little to no interest in dismantling the integrity of the Chinese territory – on the contrary, doing so would have resulted in more losses than gains for them – Japan “had no vested interest in the survival of China’s ancient institutions or the Sinocentric world order”<sup>20</sup>. In fact, its goal was to supplant “Beijing as the center of a new East Asian international order”<sup>21</sup>: this aspect of Japan’s expansionism is crucial because it lies at the basis of the first and second Sino-Japanese wars that will be described shortly. Nevertheless, despite all the threats and humiliations, China’s statesmen managed to preserve the country’s cultural essence and territorial integrity: thanks to the savvy use of the little margin of manoeuvre they still had, they were able to manage their decline through all the 19<sup>th</sup> century and up until the end of World War II.

In parallel to the Opium war and the imposition of the unequal treaties on China, it is worth mentioning another episode that might be of little importance on the international stage, but that is essential to understand how American citizens in the mid-1800s perceived the Chinese. Indeed, the first Asian immigrants to enter the US were precisely Chinese, “lured to California by the Gold Rush of 1848”<sup>22</sup>. By 1850 there were over 20,000 Chinese immigrants in the United States, a number that only increased when the construction of railroads all over the country began, reaching a high of over 100,000 Chinese in America by 1880<sup>23</sup>. However, the increase of Chinese immigrants was also accompanied by the development of an anti-Chinese sentiment by Caucasian workers: this negative reaction with racist undertones was the result of a nationwide depression that hit the country in mid-1870 combined with the “threat” that this new immigrant workforce was posing to wage levels and working conditions. This sentiment grew to the point that the US Congress decided to pass a bill that took the name of “Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882”: to put it simply, no more Chinese immigrants

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<sup>18</sup> Alison A. Kaufman, “The Century of Humiliation and China’s National Narratives”, Testimony before the *US-China Economic and Security Review Commission* Hearing on “China’s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy”, March 10, 2011, transcript available at: <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 58.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Xiaohua Ma, “The Sino-American Alliance During World War II and the Lifting of the Chinese Exclusion Acts”, *American Studies International* 38, no. 2 (June 2000): 40, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41279769>.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

were allowed to enter America. It was the “first racially restrictive immigration law in American history”<sup>24</sup>, which, as one could easily imagine, had long-term repercussions on China-US relations. What is more, this provision was only the first of many anti-Asiatic pieces of legislation: even more relevant is the fact that this anti-Chinese immigration policy was only reversed after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour, almost sixty years after the first Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted (and only because in that moment the narrative “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” came into play).

Returning to the situation on the Asian continent, the Sino-Japanese war that took place in the years of 1894-95 further exposed China to Japan’s territorial ambitions: in fact, one of the most important consequences of this conflict was that it “eliminated China as a contender for influence in Korea and left a new competition to be played out between Japan and Russia”<sup>25</sup>. To make matters worse (for China), the United States – threatened by these powers’ larger spheres of influence in Asia – decided to take action and increase its presence on the continent<sup>26</sup>. In 1899 Secretary of State John Hay proclaimed the “Open Door” policy, a policy intended to grant the United States the same economic and strategic benefits as other imperialist countries in China. The Open-Door policy was completely abandoned only with Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931, when the former colonialists started cooperating to defend China’s territorial integrity against the invader.

## **2.2. End of the Empire, the Chinese Civil War and World War II**

Before proceeding to the second Sino-Japanese war and, subsequently, to World War II, there are a few more events worth mentioning. While the policy of Open Door was being proclaimed for the first time, the Qing dynasty was also dealing with a popular internal revolt, the Boxer Uprising. In the years of 1898-1900, people started a violent campaign against “foreigners and the symbols of the new order they had imposed”<sup>27</sup>. To suppress this uprising and bring some order, an eight-power allied expeditionary force, including France, Britain, the United States, Japan, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, was set up and sent to Beijing in 1900: the result of this expedition was another “unequal treaty” enforcing on China a cash indemnity and further occupation rights<sup>28</sup>. Shortly after, in 1912, the Qing dynasty collapsed, plunging the country into a period of warring states: the Chinese

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Marius B. Jansen, Samuel C. Chu, Shumpei Okamoto and Bonnie B. Oh, “The Historiography of the Sino-Japanese War”, *The International History Review* 1, no. 2 (April 1979): 191–227, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/40105728>.

<sup>26</sup> The backdrop for this decision was the US victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, which marked the country’s official entry into world affairs.

<sup>27</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 86.

<sup>28</sup> *Ivi*, 87.

Republic was, in fact, led first by a president, nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen, then by a military leader, Yuan Shikai, and, finally, by regional governors and military commanders. In parallel, a new Communist movement was forming in the heartland of China: this movement grew until in 1921, with Soviet support, it managed to establish the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

After World War I, and especially after President Wilson's inclusion of the principle of self-determination in his Fourteen Points speech, Western powers had no longer any authority over Chinese territory—Russia was too busy dealing with its own internal revolution, and Germany was deprived of all its colonies. The only power left to threaten the independence of the Chinese territory was Japan: in the mid-1920s, the struggle over who controls China had been resolved with the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) – led by Chiang Kai-shek – exercising “nominal control over the entirety of the ancient Qing Empire”<sup>29</sup>, while the CCP initially collaborated with this government. However, China was still too weak to defend itself and no other power was available to come to its rescue: this is how Japan managed to invade and occupy – in a matter of a few days – the Chinese province of Manchuria in September 1931 and set up a puppet state there. To make matters easier for Japan, between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s the ideological confrontation between the KMT and the CCP turned into an all-out civil war: it was in this context that, after the 1935 Long March, Mao Zedong established himself as party leader of the CCP. So it was that by 1937 Japan controlled the largest harbour cities of China and had invaded the Eastern part of the country<sup>30</sup>, while the Nationalist government was forced to retreat to the inland city of Chongqing<sup>31</sup>. War crimes against the Chinese became commonplace<sup>32</sup>: rapes, depredations and destructions were only some of the offences reportedly perpetrated by the Japanese military.

Western powers gradually started opposing Japan's invasion: the same countries that less than a couple of decades earlier were occupying and exploiting China now became defenders of its territorial integrity. In fact, while the Open-Door policy was originally “intended to claim for the United States the benefits of other countries' individual imperialism, it was transformed in the 1930s into a way to preserve China's independence”<sup>33</sup>: Western powers joined forces to “vindicate the

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> William R. Keylor, *A World of Nations*, in its Italian version *Un mondo di nazioni* (Milan: Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati SpA, 2014), 249. Translation is my own.

<sup>31</sup> Rana Mitter, “China and the Cold War”, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0008.

<sup>32</sup> “Invasion of Manchuria”, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, accessed November 14, 2021, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/invasion-manchuria>.

<sup>33</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 88.

integrity of China” and oppose Japan “first politically and eventually militarily”<sup>34</sup>. In particular, the military clash between Western powers and Japan was triggered by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941: internationally, this offence marked the official entry of the United States into World War II, while domestically it led to the immediate reversal of America’s anti-Chinese immigration policy (as mentioned earlier)—in the US, sympathy for the Chinese people, who had been fighting Japan’s occupation for years by themselves, grew ever stronger. The US and China jointly declared war to Japan and joined the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in a military alliance whose purpose was to fight against the Axis powers<sup>35</sup>. Both countries had great enthusiasm and expectations for each other<sup>36</sup>; however, “the alliance, with continued disputes and frictions, lasted only four years”<sup>37</sup>.

It is important to highlight the way in which the perception and the role of China changed in this crucial moment: from a country that needed protection against Japan’s expansionist ambitions to a key ally. In fact, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs T. V. Soong was the fourth signatory – following President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Maxim Litvinov of the USSR – of the Joint Declaration of the United Nations issued on January 1, 1942, which formalized the Allies of World War II. The inclusion of China as a major power in the Declaration is clear evidence of how much China had become indispensable to Washington’s war strategy<sup>38</sup>. Another sign of China’s newfound importance is encapsulated in the phrase that President Roosevelt started using in 1942 when referring to the four major allies of WWII i.e., the “four policemen”. President Roosevelt, while discussing with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in May-June 1942<sup>39</sup>, emphasized the importance of post-war cooperation among these “four policemen”, a clear signal that the willingness to grant China “Great Power” status was not just a mere response to the situation, but it also implied some long-term responsibilities.

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Xiaohua Ma, “The Sino-American Alliance During World War II and the Lifting of the Chinese Exclusion Acts”, *American Studies International* 38, no. 2 (June 2000): 41, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41279769>.

<sup>36</sup> Baijia Zhang, “Understanding changes in Sino-US relations from a historical perspective”, *China International Strategy Review* 2 (2020): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00048-6>.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> Xiaohua Ma, “The Sino-American Alliance During World War II and the Lifting of the Chinese Exclusion Acts”, *American Studies International* 38, no. 2 (June 2000): 41, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41279769>.

<sup>39</sup> *Ivi*, 42.

### 2.3. The Establishment of the People's Republic of China

While China emerged from World War II a great power, this new status did not automatically solve all its domestic problems: in fact, after a century of economic and territorial exploitation by various foreign powers, a (still unresolved) civil war and a world war, it came as no surprise that China was economically devastated and politically divided. Hostilities between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and Mao Zedong's Communists resumed, with the former relying on "a strategy of holding cities" and the latter on guerrilla armies based in the countryside<sup>40</sup>: domestically, during World War II popular support for the Communist Party increased<sup>41</sup>. On the contrary, in the US Chiang Kai-shek was depicted by the media as a symbol of building a "strong" and "democratic" China<sup>42</sup>, while Mme. Chiang's US tour between November 1942 and May 1943<sup>43</sup> aroused a wave of enthusiasm and further reinforced America's sympathy towards Nationalist China<sup>44</sup>. Thus, the Nationalist government continued to receive US support when the civil war restarted: preventing Communists from taking control of China was the ulterior motive behind Washington's assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in this context<sup>45</sup>.

Nonetheless, by 1945 the Nationalist government was beset by corruption, and its military was profoundly dysfunctional<sup>46</sup>: despite wasted efforts of the United States to promote an agreement between the two parties, the civil war continued, and with each passing year a Communist victory became more and more likely. Eventually, in October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), while the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek started retreating to the Island of Taiwan. There, they declared Taipei the temporary capital of the Republic of China (ROC), with the objective of regrouping and planning their efforts to someday return on the mainland. These actions marked the beginning of the "two Chinas" era: at the time, many observers believed that the establishment of a second government in Taipei would have helped

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<sup>40</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 89.

<sup>41</sup> Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, "The Chinese Revolution of 1949", U.S. *Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev>.

<sup>42</sup> Xiaohua Ma, "The Sino-American Alliance During World War II and the Lifting of the Chinese Exclusion Acts", *American Studies International* 38, no. 2 (June 2000): 49, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41279769>.

<sup>43</sup> A tour designed to address concerns regarding Nationalist China and raise the consensus of the American public for more military aid to China.

<sup>44</sup> Xiaohua Ma, "The Sino-American Alliance During World War II and the Lifting of the Chinese Exclusion Acts", *American Studies International* 38, no. 2 (June 2000): 48-51, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41279769>.

<sup>45</sup> Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, "The Chinese Revolution of 1949", U.S. *Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev>.

<sup>46</sup> Rana Mitter, "China and the Cold War", in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0008.

foreign governments to recognize the new PRC. On the contrary, the Truman administration, for instance, yielded to the public's pressure for the recognition of Chiang's government, which in turn infuriated Mao and hindered any possibility for diplomatic relations between the two countries. An additional reason behind Washington's decision can be found in the developments of the international situation: the Cold war had begun, and another large communist country in such a strategic position was a threat of significant proportions for the US. Moreover, the debate over who had "lost" China to Communism during the Chinese civil war was still very strong in the States: this is also part of the reason why Taipei, and not Beijing, ended up retaining the seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, another event that further thwarted any possibility for diplomatic relations between the US and the newly established People's Republic of China was the beginning of the Korean war, which saw these two countries on opposite sides of the conflict.

Before moving on to the Cold war, it is worth to mention a few features of the PRC. With Mao's accession to power began the so-called period of "continuous revolution"—Chinese people under Mao's rule were never allowed to rest on their achievements: the ultimate objective of all this virtuous exertion was the purification of society, which Mao planned to achieve by tearing apart Chinese traditions. The idea was to "smash" China like an atom to destroy the old order while simultaneously liberating enough "popular" energy to lift the country to "ever greater heights of achievement"<sup>47</sup>. Yet, the final goal of this revolution, the goal of "Great Harmony", was a vague promise and the efforts that were required of the Chinese people were strenuous—indeed, the incessant purges spared no one: in the end even Mao's long-serving Premier and chief diplomat Zhou Enlai succumbed to them<sup>48</sup>. On the international level, Mao's attitude centred around his affirmation that "the Chinese people have stood up" after having endured a century of humiliations. However, as Kissinger put it, "to stand up to the world was a daunting prospect for China in 1949"<sup>49</sup>: the country was still underdeveloped and, having entered the socialist economic model promoted by the USSR, it could not draw on US economic assistance, unlike Nationalist-run China.

## 2.4. China and the Cold War

Shortly after the establishment of the PRC, the Cold war started shaping relations between countries all over the world, and China was no exception: when the Korean war broke out, Mao decided to side

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<sup>47</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 94.

<sup>48</sup> *Ivi*, 92.

<sup>49</sup> *Ivi*, 98.

with its then ideological ally, the Soviet Union. But why did he decide to enter a war if the country was already on its last legs? Essentially, for two reasons: first, Mao's commitment to anti-imperialist liberation was authentic; and secondly, the war in Korea was a great opportunity to establish the PRC on the international level and expand its ideological influence<sup>50</sup>. In the end, both Communist leaders managed to gain something from this war: Mao obtained Soviet military supplies to modernize his army and Stalin managed to involve China in a conflict with the United States, increasing its dependence on Moscow<sup>51</sup>. Even though none of the powers involved obtained all its objectives, one thing was clear after the signing of the armistice in 1953: the newly founded People's Republic of China was officially a military power, an awareness that revived national pride in a population strained by decades of exploitation and weakness (in other words: Mao had managed to achieve one of its goals).

However, the Korean war was also the moment when Sino-Soviet relations started deteriorating—indeed, during the war Stalin proved an uncertain ally: the brutality with which he had pressed China to intervention, the way he had failed “to provide much-desired air cover for Chinese troops at a crucial moment in 1950”<sup>52</sup>, and the reluctant support he had granted in the form of repayable loans are only some of the causes of this decline. In addition, on the Chinese side the memories of the “century of humiliation” were still fresh: Mao's vision of spreading an anti-imperialist communist revolution was genuine and Eastern Europe was seen by Beijing as essentially a “colony of Moscow”<sup>53</sup>. For this reason, when the Soviets started planning to intervene with military means in the Polish uprisings of 1956, Chinese representatives were exceptionally wary. The relations between the two giant communist states bottomed when all Soviet advisors withdrew from China in 1960: Mao had little respect for Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, and disapproved his attempts to lessen tensions with the Western bloc. Khrushchev, on his part, “had become increasingly disillusioned by what he saw as both Mao's willingness to risk confrontation with the West and his establishment of a cult of personality”<sup>54</sup>. Shortly after, an important occasion presented itself for Beijing to prove both its commitment to anti-imperialist liberation and its newfound independence from the USSR, namely the Vietnam war. However, China's sinocentric attitude towards its neighbours soon became a problem for the Vietnamese, causing one of the major rifts between the

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<sup>50</sup> Rana Mitter, “China and the Cold War”, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0008.

<sup>51</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012), 143-144.

<sup>52</sup> Rana Mitter, “China and the Cold War”, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0008.

<sup>53</sup> *Ivi*, 9.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*



two countries. This issue, combined with the realization for Vietnam that it had to choose between support from the USSR or from the PRC, led to the withdrawal of Chinese troops in 1970.

Domestically, after the rupture with the Soviets, Mao promoted a series of controversial campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution following the “profound desire on the part of the chairman and his generation of revolutionaries to make China strong and to revive its central position in the world”<sup>55</sup>. Despite these efforts, the campaigns resulted in economic stagnation and, by the early 1970s, it became clear that “some source of external technical knowledge was needed to replace the Soviets”<sup>56</sup>. This, combined with the feeling that China was lacking global allies, led to Beijing’s rapprochement with Washington, who was also showing some interest in this sense. The symbol of this reconciliation is President Nixon’s one-week visit to China, which started on February 21, 1972: of course, the biggest “loser” in this scenario was Taiwan, whose seat at the United Nations’ Security Council was taken by the PRC. “In a deeper sense, Beijing’s cooperation with Washington and confrontation with Moscow changed the essence of the Cold War”<sup>57</sup>: the ideological component, the fundamental confrontation between communism and liberal capitalism, seemed to be of less value at that time.

Another event that further changed the rules of the game was Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. The following period was dominated by another strong figure, Deng Xiaoping, who initiated the “reform and opening” policies in the late 1970s, in search for a new source of domestic legitimacy to substitute for the ideological radicalism that had characterized the country until that moment. The end of the Cold war certainly allowed China to become the power with the global reach that it had been aspiring to since the end of the “century of humiliation” first, and the creation of the People’s Republic then. The next sections will discuss the current dynamics between the United States and China, the differences and similarities of the current situation with the Cold war and, to some extent, possible future developments of the relation.

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<sup>55</sup> Chen Jian, “China and the Cold War after Mao”, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 185.

<sup>56</sup> Rana Mitter, “China and the Cold War”, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0008.

<sup>57</sup> Chen Jian, “China and the Cold War after Mao”, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 183.

## 2.5. US-China Relations Today: Beyond the Cold War?

The purpose of this second part is to briefly analyse the nature of US-China relations today: more specifically, as the subheading suggests, the discussion will centre around the question of whether this relationship can be described as a new Cold war. In order to do that, it might be useful to first determine which international relations theory best explains the events of the Cold war and then use that theoretical framework to assess the status of the relation. At first glance, the security dilemma seems to be a fitting theoretical framework for this analysis: in particular, the tensions, escalations and de-escalations of the Cold war seem to provide a very good example for it. In short, the argument brought forward by the security dilemma is that “in the absence of a supranational authority that can enforce binding agreements, many of the steps pursued by states to bolster their security have the effect – often unintended and unforeseen – of making other states less secure<sup>58</sup>. The fundamental problem of this theory is that it is not able to explain the peaceful end of the Cold war: some argue that “not even the best diplomacy could have brought an end to the Cold war”<sup>59</sup> and that it is not a coincidence that it only ended after fundamental changes in the Soviet Union and its subsequent collapse. This is not uncommon: the end of the Cold war has completely changed the rulebook of International Relations theories, triggering many debates on how to improve existing theories with new issues emerging from the Cold war, or simply with issues that until that moment had been overlooked.

One of these theories is, for instance, Charles Glaser’s “Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation”, where he used some examples, including the end of the Cold war, to test the theory and illustrate its ability to explain states’ choices when it comes to competition and cooperation. Very briefly: this theory “is a rationalist, strategic choice theory”, which analyses the strategies a state *should* choose i.e., the strategies that a rational state decides to adopt, “in the face of the constraints and opportunities imposed by the international system”<sup>60</sup>. To accurately represent a state and the international situation it faces, the author identified three variables: motives, material, and information. Motives are substantially the state’s “fundamental interests and goals”, while the two remaining variables embody the international environment:

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<sup>58</sup> Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?”, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 36, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26925099>.

<sup>59</sup> *Ivi*, 26.

<sup>60</sup> Charles Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010: 2-3.

*material* variables “determine the military capabilities a state can build” and *information*<sup>61</sup> variables “influence the reactions a state anticipates to its actions”<sup>62</sup>. Each of these variables determines (at different degrees) the strategy that a state is likely to adopt in response to the international situation.

When applied to the end of the Cold war, these variables would be declined as follows: 1) Motives: why did the Soviet Union decide to dramatically change its security policy during the second half of the 1980s? Power appears to be a significant component of the answer to this question: Soviet leaders arrived at the conclusion that, due to severe economic constraints, they were no longer able to sustain an effective military competition with their Western counterpart. Therefore, their goal should be to prevent another arms race, which is consistent with the theory: “a state that expects to lose an arms race because it lacks the power to compete should try to avoid it”<sup>63</sup>. 2) Material variable: offense-defence balance i.e., the necessity to balance increasing the Soviet Union’s nuclear armament to increase its defence possibilities while reducing investment in military forces and engaging in a preventive war, taking advantage of the current capabilities before the decline (this, however, was never an option, given the “reality of massive nuclear vulnerability”<sup>64</sup> that the USSR would be exposed to in case it decided to engage in such war). 3) Information variable: information about motives is the last variable that, together with the first two, allows for a solid explanation for the peaceful ending of the Cold war. In fact, Gorbachev changed the Cold war narrative and started arguing that the United States did not pose a threat to the Soviet Union, which in turn made cooperation more attractive to the Soviet leadership (if the US is not a threat anymore, the risks of confrontation are lower). All these variables contribute to the explanation as to why the Cold war ended the way it did, and different values on any single variable could have led to different Soviet policies<sup>65</sup>: therefore, it is crucial to consider all the variables together, otherwise the picture would not be complete.

Now that a theoretical background has been set, the discussion will shift to outlining the similarities and differences between the Cold war and the state of the US-China relation today; then, the nature of such relation (today) will be examined from an academic perspective; and, finally, some

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<sup>61</sup> This variable consists in “both what the state knows about its adversary’s motives and what it believes its adversary knows about its own motives”.

<sup>62</sup> Charles Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010: 3.

<sup>63</sup> *Ivi*, 208.

<sup>64</sup> *Ivi*, 209.

<sup>65</sup> *Ivi*, 210.

conclusions will be drawn using Glaser’s three variables – motives, material, and information – to frame the current US-China relationship.

## 2.6. Lessons from the Cold War

As anticipated, the aim of this paragraph will be to highlight some similarities and differences between the US-China competition now and the US-USSR competition then. This exercise is particularly relevant because of the tendency to underplay the mistakes and costs of the Cold war, especially since the US came up a winner: indeed, it is not uncommon that, once a conflict or dispute is over, everyone, and especially the winning party, tends to forget the mistakes made that, with different circumstances, might have led to another outcome. To make this comparison, it is helpful to maintain the setup that Michael McFaul used in his article “Cold War Lessons and Fallacies for US-China Relations Today”<sup>66</sup>. Indeed, in this article, he compares the state of present-day relations between China and the US with that of the Cold War and he makes his argument by following four dimensions which, according to him, are the most important “for shaping great power relations: (1) power, (2) ideology, (3) interdependence and multilateralism, and (4) bilateral cooperation”<sup>67</sup>. His goal is to identify positive achievements that can be emulated today while at the same time avoiding the mistakes that were made by the two superpowers of the past century.

When it comes to power, there are some similarities, but also significant differences between today and the past: the most striking of the latter is China’s economic might, which “presents a much greater challenge for American strategists today than they confronted during the Cold War”<sup>68</sup>. Another aspect in which today’s situation differs from the Cold war is military power: while the USSR was able to achieve nuclear parity with the US, China is still lagging in this area—moreover, as far as military spending is concerned, China’s investments pale when compared to those of the US. Instead, what can be considered very similar to the Cold war is the re-emergence of bipolarity: despite the difference in spending, the US and China rank first and second, respectively, in aggregate military power, while in economic terms they are the only two “superpowers” today<sup>69</sup>. However, while Washington’s approach to world order is that of hegemonic unipolarity, Beijing seems to favour a multipolar stability approach.

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<sup>66</sup> Michael McFaul, “Cold War Lessons and Fallacies for US-China Relations Today”, *The Washington Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (December 2020): 7-39.

<sup>67</sup> *Ivi*, 9.

<sup>68</sup> *Ivi*, 11.

<sup>69</sup> *Ivi*, 9-10.

Undeniably, ideology played a crucial role during the Cold war and, just as back then, today's confrontation is also between two opposite value systems: a democracy and "a Leninist one-party communist dictatorship, which has become more autocratic in recent years"<sup>70</sup>. However, because "CCP leaders do not promote their ideology or system of government to the same degree or with the same blunt instruments used by Soviet leaders"<sup>71</sup> and because China has welcomed market capitalism, the ideological competition between China and the US today is qualitatively different from Soviet-US competition. It seems that, for Washington, the ideological factor is prominent in this competition: indeed, the PRC is still seen "through the prism of its authoritarian government and the threat this poses to the liberal order and democracy"<sup>72</sup>. This claim is confirmed by the statement released by Robert O'Brien, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, on January 5, 2021, titled "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific", where he mentions a "growing rivalry between free and repressive visions of the future"<sup>73</sup>. On the other hand, Beijing does not appear to be so concerned with ideology: it is not "supplying military assistance for insurgents seeking to overthrow democratic regimes"<sup>74</sup>, nor does it "champion communism as a superior model to the same degree that the CPSU promoted the Soviet system"<sup>75</sup>. China's priorities remain strictly domestic, with the overwhelming task of sustaining "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "national rejuvenation"<sup>76</sup> being just two of them.

As far as independence and multilateralism are concerned, McFaul starts his argument by mentioning that "throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States dominated the international system and anchored opposing alliance systems"<sup>77</sup>. The question that automatically arises is whether China has a comparable system of allies today. Certainly, the answer must be no: what the Soviet Union was able to build, albeit through the use of coercion, with the Warsaw Pact "vastly exceeded what China has thus far constructed"<sup>78</sup>. Because of this coalition, the USSR was able to have extensive room for manoeuvre in all the actions it wanted to take (e.g., with the Hungarian invasion of 1956, the invasion of Czechoslovakia of 1968 and that of Afghanistan in 1979).

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<sup>70</sup> *Ivi*, 14.

<sup>71</sup> *Ivi*, 16.

<sup>72</sup> Andrei Lungu, "The US-China Clash Is About Ideology After All", *Foreign Policy*, April 6, 2021.

<sup>73</sup> National Security Council. *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, by the former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. O'Brien. Washington, D.C., 2021.

<sup>74</sup> Michael McFaul, "Cold War Lessons and Fallacies for US-China Relations Today", *The Washington Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (December 2020): 16.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ivi*, 9.

<sup>78</sup> *Ivi*, 11.

By contrast, the same does not apply to China today: the only formal military alliance that Beijing maintains is that with Pyongyang.

Finally, in the field of cooperation on bilateral issues, “the United States and China have provided leadership on several cooperative projects, including most dramatically the 2015 Paris climate accords”<sup>79</sup>. However, during the Trump administration, many factors have contributed to a rapid decrease in bilateral cooperation: among these factors it is worth mentioning the trade war, the failure of the TTP, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the US’ withdrawal from the Paris agreement first and the WHO then. It is true that President Biden re-joined both the Paris accord and the WHO: nonetheless, it is still early to tell whether the new administration will somehow reverse or relax its attitude towards China. All in all, it is essential to note that, “compared to US-Soviet relations, Chinese and American leaders share a much longer history of bilateral cooperation”<sup>80</sup>, which was only recently disrupted.

## 2.7. Economic Perspectives on US-China Relations Today

According to Thomas Fingar, the biggest attitude shift occurred in the business community (one of the key areas of the relation): in fact, this community has become “a much less consistent advocate of stability in US policy toward China and a stronger voice for government action to change Chinese behavior”<sup>81</sup>. Initially, the business community was supporting a greater integration and engagement with China but, according to Fingar, it got tired of unfulfilled promises and other dirty dealings that China was resorting to e.g., theft of intellectual property or pressures to transfer technology<sup>82</sup>: thus, the competition phase began. Although – he further argues – the US and China are well able to manage their relation and keep it from disruptively deteriorating, that might not be enough, and the two countries should try to do better to tackle critical transnational issues—on this point, more will be said later.

Wang Jisi, instead, lists four factors that may be causing the “radical transformation of US policy towards China”<sup>83</sup>:

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<sup>79</sup> *Ivi*, 27.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Thomas Fingar, “Forty years of formal—but not yet normal—relations”, *China International Strategy Review* 1 (2019): 18, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00003-0>.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Wang Jisi, “Assessing the radical transformation of U.S. policy toward China”, *China International Strategy Review* 1 (2019): 195, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00029-4>.

1. China's growth in terms of national wealth, military capabilities, and international influence, which is posing a challenge to the hegemony of the US.
2. The political systems, values, and rules of the two countries which are fundamentally irreconcilable and thus lead to worries such as the concern "that artificial intelligence and 5G technology developed by China may not only threaten the national security of the United States but also infringe on privacy and personal freedom of the American people"<sup>84</sup>.
3. Promotion of US national interests: "those Americans who are doing business with China are complaining about Chinese practices [...] but their motivation is to make more profits in China rather than to disrupt China's economic growth"<sup>85</sup>. This point addresses and shows the flip side of the coin of Fingar's point illustrated above.
4. The domestic landscape of the US: it is convenient to blame other nations for Washington's own problems—the author claims that China is sometimes used as a scapegoat for US failures.

"Only through a comprehensive understanding of all four perspectives can we fully grasp the issue"<sup>86</sup>: Fingar might have been right in arguing that the biggest attitude shift in the relation between the US and China originated in the business community. However, there are many other aspects that need to be considered, and Jisi has provided a more comprehensive picture: both China and the US are now undergoing a "dramatic domestic transformation, the direction of which will determine whether, and how, they can find a way to rehabilitate the links that have benefited the two countries over the last 40 years"<sup>87</sup>. In short, given all these changes in attitudes and perceptions, what the US and China should do now is try to find a new way to frame their relations.

In this respect, back in 2013 Stephen J. Hadley, the former national security advisor to President George W. Bush, made a similar remark: he argued that the type of challenges the two countries faced at the time were rather of global than of bilateral nature and, therefore, the two countries needed to revise their bilateral dispute resolution model to efficiently tackle such issues. Indeed, challenges such as climate change, terrorism, piracy, and organized crime, but also the need to strengthen the global economy and reform the financial system, required cooperation between the two powers—without cooperation on these matters, Hadley maintained, the US and China would not be able to

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<sup>84</sup> *Ivi*, 199.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ivi*, 203.

“achieve [their] own national objectives for stability and prosperity”<sup>88</sup>. This view of the relations between the two countries seems to acquire a new meaning after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, which, to a certain extent, disproved Hadley’s insight: not only did the two countries fail to cooperate and form a joint leadership to help guide the world out of this state of emergency, but they also accused the other of mishandling or even causing the breakout of the pandemic, seizing every opportunity to discredit the counterpart. It is true that, since then, there has been a change in administration in the US; nevertheless, so far there do not seem to be any significant changes in the administration’s attitude towards China.

Another aspect that Hadley mentioned as crucial for the construction of this new framework is the United States’ acceptance of China’s peaceful rise: the tariffs imposed on China by the Trump administration, which have started the so-called “trade war” between the two countries, can be seen as clear proof that the US is indeed trying to counter or, better, contain this rise. Moreover, in the 2017/18 US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific<sup>89</sup>, it is stated clearly that Beijing is Washington’s “strategic competitor”. Given these premises, the possibilities that Washington will “sit tight” and simply accept China’s rise seem to be very dim. Hadley further claims that the US is not trying to contain China; on the contrary, every president until that moment had welcomed “a strong, prosperous, and successful China”<sup>90</sup>. His argument is that if the US are indeed trying to “keep down” China, then they are doing a terrible job at it, given that their trading relationship had reached “well in excess of five hundred billion dollars a year” and that China is the United States’ number one import market, its number two trading partner, and its number three export market. As maintained by Peter Hessler<sup>91</sup> in an article published on *The New Yorker*, this trend has stood the test of time and US-China trade relations have never been more prosperous than today, despite the trade war and the pandemic. In fact, contrary to one might think, the tariffs imposed on Chinese products (because of the trade war) ended up being paid by American customers, since the solution many Chinese entrepreneurs adopted was to raise the prices of their products. However, claiming that the US is not trying to contain China is no longer a credible statement: as the present study will prove, Washington’s narrative on issues

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<sup>88</sup> Stephen Hadley, “A New Type of Great Power Relations”, interviewed by Paul Haenle, *China in the World Podcast*, Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, November 4, 2013. Transcript available at: <https://carnegietsinghua.org/2013/11/04/new-model-of-great-power-relations-pub-53434>.

<sup>89</sup> National Security Council, *U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific*, declassified in part by the former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. O’ Brien, NSC SCG: Washington, D.C., 2021.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Peter Hessler, “The Rise of Made-in-China Diplomacy”, *The New Yorker*, March 8, 2021, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/03/15/the-rise-of-made-in-china-diplomacy>.



that concern China has increasingly soured over the past few years, and the administration has not shied away from explicitly communicating its dissatisfaction with the CCP's leadership.

Furthermore, the economy follows its own rules, that do not necessarily reflect a country's political line. A recent example of this is the US-China gas deal that was signed in December 2021: part of China's plan to cut its carbon emissions is to switch from coal to liquefied natural gas, which has led to "a wave of deals with US exporters of the fuel"<sup>92</sup>. Thus, the argument that the US is not trying to contain China's rise could well be reversed: while the Biden administration is announcing that its goal for the China policy is to build "resilience and competitiveness for American workers and the economy overall"<sup>93</sup>, US-China trade has not experienced any significant changes in 2021<sup>94</sup>. Although this policy was just recently announced, so far it seems to be perfectly in line with the strategy adopted by the previous administration—a strategy, as mentioned earlier, that views China as the US' strategic competitor (at least formally). It appears that the US has indeed done a "bad job" in containing China's rise, but perhaps it was not intentional: hard-hitting decisions such as initiating a trade war or, more recently, announcing the diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics<sup>95</sup> do have a strategic containment component and their effectiveness (or lack thereof) does not negate or invalidate the intention with which they have been adopted.

## 2.8. Political Perspectives on US-China Relations Today

Another way in which the relation between China and the US has been described and analysed is with Graham Allison's "Thucydides Trap" argument. In short, Allison claims that the US and China today run the risk of following the same path that Sparta and Athens undertook 2,500 years ago: in the words of Thucydides, "it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable". In other words, it was pride, arrogance, and paranoia that brought the two cities to the war that destroyed classical Greece: now this same dynamic where a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power is developing also between China and the US, and the fundamental question is whether they will be smart and brave enough to manage their rivalry and avoid a war that has the

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<sup>92</sup> Justin Jacobs and Derek Brower, "US-China gas deals defy tensions between world powers", *Financial Times*, December 20, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/c267b3ea-a874-4bea-9105-860ae1847176>.

<sup>93</sup> Tom Lee, "The Biden Administration's U.S.-China Trade Strategy: A Primer", *American Action Forum*, October 6, 2021, <https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/the-biden-administrations-u-s-china-trade-strategy-a-primer/>.

<sup>94</sup> "Trade in Goods with China", Foreign Trade, United States Census Bureau, accessed December 19, 2021, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>.

<sup>95</sup> Christina Lu, "U.S. Declares Diplomatic Boycott of Beijing Olympics", *Foreign Policy*, December 7, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/07/olympics-boycott-us-china-human-rights/>.

potential to be catastrophic. Chunman Zhang and Xiaoyu Pu<sup>96</sup> have reviewed what different scholars have said on the matter, and one insight in particular is useful to this analysis: according to Brendon Yoder, preventive war can be avoided if the rising states' cooperative signals are sufficiently credible<sup>97</sup>. The author argues that "China's cooperation has been sufficiently credible to avert preventive war, but not to avoid a substantial degree of competition with the US"<sup>98</sup>. However, he also adds that "American observers have often misinterpreted the credibility of both cooperative and non-cooperative Chinese signals, and the current US government is far too confident that China harbors hostile intentions"<sup>99</sup>. The arguments presented in previous section seem to substantiate this insight. If this fear turns into paranoia, there will be one more characteristic of the current US-China competition that will resemble the Cold war i.e., McCarthyism and the so-called "witch trials".

Similarly, Baijia Zhang<sup>100</sup> argues that China does not have the capabilities nor the will to supplant the US as world hegemon. This paper is particularly interesting because it brings to the table the Chinese perspective on whether a new Cold war is on the horizon. The author argues that what will put an end to the current unipolar world order is the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world: this is noteworthy especially given that very often, in discussions on the future of US-China relations, there only seem to be a few possible outcomes, all of which strictly predict a unipolar world order where either the US or China will prevail. It is also worth highlighting how the author recommends continued "patience, [...] communication and negotiation to avoid the escalation of tensions"<sup>101</sup>; if tensions escalate anyway, then the author recommends avoiding confrontation and, no matter how bad the relation becomes, there should always be "room for a turnaround"<sup>102</sup>. This approach, in line with the *wei qi* strategy explained at the beginning of this chapter, seems to be different from the prevailing realist approach that is popular in Western countries: it is a useful and important reminder that there is an emergent string of IR scholars born and raised in countries that are not part of the Western world that are bringing fresh insights and new ways of looking at world affairs.

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<sup>96</sup> Chunman Zhang and Xiaoyu Pu, "Introduction: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides Trap?", *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 24 (2019): 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-019-09609-y>.

<sup>97</sup> *Ivi*, 7.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> Baijia Zhang, "Understanding changes in Sino-US relations from a historical perspective", *China International Strategy Review* 2 (2020): 1–13, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00048-6>.

<sup>101</sup> *Ivi*, 13.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

After analysing the US-China relation from different angles, it is now time to answer the question that was posed at the beginning of this section: can the current competition between these two countries be described as a new Cold war? To do that, as anticipated in the introduction, the three variables from Glaser's theory i.e., motives, material, and information, will be applied.

- (1) *Motives*: the motives for an American attitude shift towards China, as highlighted by Thomas Fingar and Jisi Wang, were economic in nature, at least at the beginning. Now they have acquired a more ideological component: in Washington's view, China exploits international bodies and rules to its own ends, represses opposition in Hong Kong, behaves atrociously in Xinjiang, and bullies its Asian neighbours<sup>103</sup> and, therefore, needs to be deterred and contained with actions such as the Winter Olympics boycott. China's motives are less clear: it seems that Beijing's attitude is more a reaction to the US administration's attitude: as argued by Baijia Zhang, China does not have the capabilities nor the will to take the US' place as hegemon. McFaul's insights about the ideological component of this competition substantiate this claim: China's priorities remain strictly domestic.
- (2) *Material*: this variable can be found in the "Lessons from the Cold war" section, in the discussion of the differences in power between the US and USSR and the US and China: China does not have a military power comparable to that of the US. However, Beijing's military capacity has ballooned in the Indo-Pacific<sup>104</sup>, prompting the current US administration to take actions to maintain its primacy in the region e.g., strengthening "alliances and partnerships in Asia as well as elevating the importance of Taiwan's security to US interests"<sup>105</sup>.
- (3) *Information*: this is arguably the hardest variable to determine because, as the Cold war made apparent, information about intentions or about the real power of the opponent are vastly prone to inaccuracy. An additional problem is the fact that both sides have resorted to fake news or have inflated some narratives to discredit the counterpart and show how much better is one system e.g., democracy, when compared to the flaws that characterize the other e.g., authoritarian regime, and vice versa.

To sum up, there has been a certain continuity between the previous and the current US administrations in framing their relationship with Beijing as competitive, which is something that has

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<sup>103</sup> "10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022", International Crisis Group, originally published on [Foreign Policy](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022), accessed January 3, 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022>.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

disappointed Chinese leaders, who were hoping “for improved ties with Washington under Biden”<sup>106</sup>. This consideration confirms what has been mentioned above: it seems that China is reacting to challenges coming from the US rather than actively seeking confrontation with Washington. The virtual meeting between presidents Biden and Xi Jinping that took place in November 2021 raised hopes for more working-level cooperation between the two powers—moreover, as forecasted by the International Crisis Group, “in 2022, with the Beijing Winter Olympics, the 20th Party Congress, and US midterm congressional elections, both sides likely want quiet fronts abroad”<sup>107</sup>. However, depending on how much these variables change, especially the material variable and the situation in the Indo-Pacific, things could escalate quickly, transforming this “strategic competition” into a new Cold war.

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<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

## *Review of Existing Academic Literature on Media-State Relations*

The aim of this chapter is to review the existing academic literature on media-state relations, with special emphasis on the functioning of US mainstream media and their role as a propagator of government interests when it comes to foreign policy issues. It is true that in a democracy the press should be free from any form of censorship: in particular, in the United States the ideal of a press independent of government is encapsulated in the First Amendment. According to the Supreme Court justice Potter Stewart's formulation of this ideal, the First Amendment creates "a fourth institution outside the government as an additional check on the three official branches"<sup>108</sup>. However, even though American journalists have – in theory – the freedom to report criticism of public officials and their policies, this chapter will show that in practice the independence of media is somewhat constrained, especially when it comes to the coverage of international affairs involving the US. These limitations are connected e.g., to who owns or finances the media, to the fear of flak or ideological environment in which the journalists operate and to the state of elite debate. The starting point for this media bias analysis is the defeat in Vietnam, which "has left the United States deeply divided, and no issue has been more bitterly divisive than the role of the media"<sup>109</sup>. Indeed, the following academic literature review will cluster around works that were published in the late 1980s and early 1990s—of course, with fitting adjustments and updates that take into consideration the impact of the internet and, more recently, social media.

The way in which the authors considered here have gone about their analysis of US mainstream media is by exploring their reporting on several major foreign policy events: the results of such analyses showed the general tendencies of press-state relations hence allowing to build a clearer profile of the functioning of US democracy across different issue areas<sup>110</sup>. As anticipated, the general

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<sup>108</sup> Quoted in Jonathan Mermin, *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 6.

<sup>109</sup> Daniel C. Hallin, *The "Uncensored War": the Media and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3.

<sup>110</sup> Lance Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States", *Journal of Communication* 40, no. 2 (1990): 122.

trend points to the media being particularly compliant in supporting the government's agenda when it comes to "military decisions, foreign affairs, trade, and macroeconomic policy-areas of great importance not only to corporate economic interests but to the advancement of state power as well"<sup>111</sup>. In other words, when it comes to core state interests in international conflicts, US media seem to be less critical of the government's line of action: this is relevant because the media have a social-cultural position which makes it possible for them to legitimise particular narratives<sup>112</sup>. Being able to impact the public's perception<sup>113</sup> around noteworthy events is undoubtedly a great responsibility and, therefore, it is essential to be aware of how news is being delivered and what kind of mechanisms and interests underlie news choice and framing.

This chapter is divided into several parts, with two clusters of school of thought as baseline: the starting point is the so-called hegemony school of thought (also referred to as "elitist school of thought"), which emerged in the second half of the 1980s. The second main group of theories, the indexing hypothesis school of thought, emerged in the same years with Daniel Hallin's analysis of the Vietnam war reporting but fully developed only later, in the 1990s—in fact, the name of the theory comes from Lance Bennett's work published in 1990. Two theories are dealt with more thoroughly than others i.e., Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model (part of the first cluster) and Robert Entman's cascading activation model (part of the second cluster). This choice is justified by the fact that these authors, starting from insights already present in the field combined with their own research, have developed actual models, which require more careful consideration.

### 3.1. The Hegemony School of Thought

The starting point for this first cluster is three books, all written in the 1980s, in which the authors took a critical stance on mainstream media in the US by analysing their performance and subsequently developing a theory to explain their functioning. These authors are part of the "hegemony" school of thought (or "elite-driven model"<sup>114</sup>) because their core claim regarding media-state relations in the US is "the close proximity of news media to political and economic elites"<sup>115</sup>. The first of these books (in chronological order) is Ben Bagdikian's *The Media Monopoly* (1983): for the purposes of this

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<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> Samantha Cooper et al., "Media Coverage of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Regional Australia: A Critical Discourse Analysis", *Media International Australia* 162, no. 1 (February 2017): p. 78-89.

<sup>113</sup> Alberto Tagliapietra, "Media and Securitisation: The Influence on Perception", *IAI Papers* 21 no. 34 (July 2021): 6.

<sup>114</sup> Piers Robinson, "The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?", in Noam Chomsky. *Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 79.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

work, the 7<sup>th</sup> and latest version of the book will be considered i.e., *The New Media Monopoly* (2004). Here, Bagdikian examines the growing concentration of media in the US in the hands of corporate owners which, he argues, poses a serious threat to freedom of expression and independent journalism and, thus, the democratic process itself. When the first edition of the book was published in 1983, Bagdikian noted that around fifty corporations controlled what most people in the United States read and watched: today, this number decreased to five: as Bagdikian himself wrote in *The New Media Monopoly*, this gives each of these five conglomerates and their leaders “more communications power than was exercised by any despot or dictatorship in history”<sup>116</sup>. A useful infographic shared by the Business Insider<sup>117</sup> shows in a visually effective manner the implications of this media conglomeration.

The second book is *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media* (1986) and was written by Michael Parenti. Here, he argues that the mass media “exert a subtle, persistent influence in defining the scope of respectable political discourse, channelling public attention in directions that are essentially supportive of the existing politico-economic system”<sup>118</sup>. Therefore, once again, it is the elites that define the media’s agenda in ways that help maintain the status quo. In Chapter 12, Parenti explains how media can manipulate the news and promote elite-approved messages: outright lies, unbalanced treatment, framing, “the greying of reality”<sup>119</sup>, and auxiliary embellishments such as impactful headlines, political cartoons and caricatures, photographs—these can all change how a story is perceived, if carefully crafted. These techniques, together with the “bias in the pattern of ownership and control, the vested class interests, the financial muscle of big advertisers, and the entire capitalist social and cultural order”<sup>120</sup> is how news manufacturers have become merely conduits for official and moneyed interests, “in a process that is not immediately recognized as being the propaganda it is”<sup>121</sup>.

Chapter 13 tackles the question of how a supposedly democratic government manages to control a “pluralistic press that is neither formally owned nor officially censored by the state”<sup>122</sup>, and the answer is twofold:

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<sup>116</sup> Ben H. Bagdikian, *The New Media Monopoly* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 3.

<sup>117</sup> Ashley Lutz, “These 6 Corporations Control 90% Of The Media In America”, *Business Insider*, June 14, 2012, <https://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6?r=US&IR=T>.

<sup>118</sup> Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), ix.

<sup>119</sup> The “greying of reality” refers to the blurring of popular grievances and social inequities—in other words, the opposite process of sensationalization.

<sup>120</sup> Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 214.

<sup>121</sup> *Ivi*, 226

<sup>122</sup> *Ivi*, 228.

1. Through government agencies such as the FBI and the CIA: there have been many reports of undercover agents working as journalists for news organizations—many stories run by newspapers such as the NYT were later proved to be planted by CIA agents. Stories about the war in Vietnam, the situation in El Salvador or Nicaragua: all scenarios in which the US government had a strong interest in promoting a specific narrative supportive of its agenda. According to Parenti, “the CIA runs the biggest news service in the world with a budget larger than those of all the major wire services put together”. He further reports that “in 1975 a Senate intelligence committee found that the CIA owned outright “more than 200 wire services, newspapers, magazines, and book publishing complexes” and subsidized many more”<sup>123</sup>. This would mean that the US did own – and probably still does – its very own propaganda machine.
2. The second explanation relates to a common ideology: indeed, Parenti argues that “the social institutions of capitalist society are the purveyors of its cultural myths, values, and legitimating viewpoints” and that, therefore, “to the extent that news producers—from publishers to reporters—are immersed in that culture, they may not be fully aware of how they misrepresent, evade, and suppress the news”<sup>124</sup>. To fully examine this topic would require a separate work, especially since proving or disproving the effects of a so-called “prevalent ideology” on the way people think is extremely challenging. However, for the purposes of this work, it will be assumed that it is unavoidable that the environment in which one grows and forms oneself is going to affect one’s way of thinking at least to some degree. As will be discussed later, many political communication scholars have made the same assumption.

Before moving to the third and last book, it is necessary to address a critic to the media hegemony theory raised by David L. Altheide in “Media Hegemony: A Failure of Perspective” (1984): by taking into consideration a series of studies analysing the attitudes of journalists, editors, and business leaders, he concludes that the biggest flaw of this theory is that it assumes a passive spectator and manipulation theory. However, the fact that the media might act a certain way does not necessarily mean that they succeed in manipulating their public: Herman and Chomsky themselves made a similar argument—the extent to which this propaganda of the media works is unclear and beyond the scope of the studies under consideration. What truly is a matter of inquiry here, is whether the media act as a propagator of government interests, in particular when it comes to foreign policy issues: if indeed they do serve as tools of the government (to some extent), depriving the public of

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<sup>123</sup> *Ivi*, 233.

<sup>124</sup> *Ivi*, 240.



essential information and, in effect, selling government policy<sup>125</sup>, then they should be condemned, for their primary objective should be to inform the public and enable it “to properly assess policy and potentially influence decision making”<sup>126</sup>. This is what the democratic process requires in the First Amendment, as discussed in the introduction, and, therefore, if the media is not living up to such ideal of freedom, then they should be held accountable, and the public should be made aware.

### 3.2. Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model

The third book under consideration is *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*<sup>127</sup> written by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky. It is the result of years of research about the functioning of the media system in the United States and it presents a multi-layered theory on media-state relations in the US, the so-called “Propaganda Model”. According to Herman and Chomsky’s own definition, the Propaganda Model is “an analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of the US media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate”<sup>128</sup>. The premise for this model is the same as for other authors that are part of the hegemony school of thought i.e., that the “societal purpose” of the media is to defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state<sup>129</sup>, and that the media serve this purpose “through selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by keeping debate within the bounds of acceptable premises”<sup>130</sup>. The idea is that the public is not sovereign over the media, but it is the media that offer certain readings of current events, and the public can only choose among them.

The difference with the authors introduced so far is that Herman and Chomsky put all these considerations in a structured model: they propose five filters which, according to them, account for all the limitations and constraints that make US mainstream media a dummy for the elites. These filters are:

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<sup>125</sup> Edward S. Herman, “The Media’s Role in U.S. Foreign Policy”, *Journal of International Affairs* 47, no. 1 (1993): 29.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008).

<sup>128</sup> *Ivi*, 12.

<sup>129</sup> *Ivi*, 374.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

1. The first filter refers to the size, corporate ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media companies: the argument is substantially the one presented by Bagdikian in “The Media Monopoly” i.e., US media are in the hands of corporations owned by a few wealthy businessmen whose main interest is profit. Therefore, constraints on news choices come from whoever owns or manages the media corporation, from other market-profit-oriented forces and from the close connections the corporation has with its investors e.g., other major corporations and banks. Finally, since every media company requires government licenses and franchises, they are also legally depended on the government itself.
2. Advertising as the primary source of income of the mass media is the second filter: media have increasingly started to rely on advertising both as a means of survival (to cover production costs) and as substantial portion of their profit. This in turn resulted in an increased power of advertisers to influence both the media’s affluence and their continued existence: indeed, media that do not attract advertisers are significantly disadvantaged and cannot compete effectively with media that, on the contrary, are able to attract this kind of revenue. It is especially working-class and radical media that take the biggest hit, given that they are more likely to suffer from the political discrimination of advertisers<sup>131</sup>: in fact, “many firms will always refuse to patronize ideological enemies and those whom they perceive as damaging their interests”<sup>132</sup>. Therefore, this filter explains why mainstream media have become increasingly profit oriented: their goal is to attract audiences, especially ones that are most favourable to advertisers i.e., audiences with money to spend.
3. The third filter discusses the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business and “experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power: in short, the mass media’s sources of information. Given that reporters and cameras cannot be always everywhere, news companies must rely on outside sources: Herman and Chomsky argue that the media have developed a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information because of economic necessity and reciprocity of interest<sup>133</sup>. City halls, the police department, business corporations and trade groups, and government officials are all sources considered “credible” and “objective”, given their authority and prestige: therefore, they are all granted special access to the media. Moreover, they have the resources and personal

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<sup>131</sup> *Ivi*, 77.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> *Ivi*, 79.

connections to “shape the supply of experts” or even influence the media into following a specific agenda or promoting a certain framework.

4. “Flak” as means of disciplining the media is the fourth filter: the authors define flak as “negative responses to a media statement or program”<sup>134</sup> and argue that if these negative responses are produced on a large scale, they can result in uncomfortable as well as costly consequences for the media. However, it is equally costly to produce flak, and it requires a certain degree of power: the main producers of flak are therefore institutions such as Freedom Media, the Media Institute or the Centre for Media and Public Affairs, but also the government, always ready to assail, threaten and “correct” the media to maintain the narrative on a preestablished line.
5. “Anti-communism” as a national religion and control mechanism is the fifth and last filter of the model: the two academics postulate that this mechanism makes it so that issues tend to be framed in terms of “a dichotomized world of Communist and anti-Communist powers”<sup>135</sup>. This clear distinction between “us” (the “good guys”) and “them” (the “bad guys”) legitimizes any course of action taken to contrast or contain the bad guys and makes it perfectly acceptable news practice to root for “our side”. In the updated version of “Manufacturing Consent” – published in 2008 – the authors argue that the force of anti-communist ideology has possibly weakened with the end of the Cold war<sup>136</sup>. However, they further claim that media in the US have internalized the prevalent ideology that resulted from the triumph of capitalism i.e., market liberalism, and that this ideology has substituted anti-communism in serving as a lens through which news are reported—in particular, news regarding foreign policy issues and involving “enemy states”.

Because of all these filters, the two authors contend that the US media present a truncated and fundamentally distorted view of the world, one that serves the interests of US political and economic elites<sup>137</sup>.

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<sup>134</sup> *Ivi*, 87.

<sup>135</sup> *Ivi*, 92.

<sup>136</sup> *Ivi*, 19.

<sup>137</sup> Piers Robinson, “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?” in *Noam Chomsky. Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 77. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-32021-6\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-32021-6_5).

Herman and Chomsky further tested the PM on a few case studies<sup>138</sup>: the comparison is always between two situations that are largely similar in nature but involve two kinds of actors—one that is favourable to the US government, and one that is unfavourable. The expectation is that victims of enemy states receive much more coverage and sympathy than those who have been wronged by the United States: these assumptions proved to be true. This means that, according to US media, there are “worthy” and “unworthy” victims: “the public does not notice the silence on victims in client states”<sup>139</sup>—it is much harder, and it takes much longer to notice the absence of something, especially when it is the main sources of information that purportedly decide to silence or underreport certain issues. This distinction between worthy and unworthy victims essentially helps US policymakers to build a narrative against enemy states, showing how they can be “wicked and deserving of US hostility”<sup>140</sup>, while at the same time reaffirming the goodness of US values and ideology. The same mechanism applies to all other cases analysed by the two authors: for instance, in the coverage of elections in enemy states vs. elections in client states, unsurprisingly, the former were presented by the media as undemocratic and a farce, whereas the latter were described as legitimate and a triumph of democracy. In sum, Herman and Chomsky depict the mass media of the United States as “effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by

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<sup>138</sup> The first case study presented in Chapter 2 is the murder of Polish priest Jerzy Popiełuszko (worthy victim because he was killed by the Polish police i.e., Communism) vs. victims of murder in Latin America (a US client state), including Archbishop Oscar Romero and four American churchwomen (unworthy victims).

Chapter 3 describes the coverage of elections in “third world” countries, namely El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Elections in friendly client states are often held under U.S. sponsorship and with extensive U.S. management and public-relations support: this was the case of the Dominican Republic in 1966 and Guatemala in 1984-85, while the elections in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984 were “demonstration elections” and the ones in Nicaragua in 1984 were intended to legitimize a government that the Reagan administration wanted to overthrow and were therefore depicted as deficient and farcical.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to “The KGB-Bulgarian Plot to Kill the Pope”, where Herman and Chomsky argue that the media have played a larger role in promoting suitable frames to ensure that the government’s agenda was not seriously challenged—in fact, in the previous case studies it was always the government pushing for its preferred frames and only providing certain types of information, while here claims were originated by the media themselves.

The media coverage of US wars in Indochina is dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6: the former describing coverage of the Vietnam war and the latter analysing the reporting of events taking place in Laos and Cambodia. The Vietnam war showed how narrative around an event can change when there is strong popular opposition to it: indeed, during the period of growing involvement, “the watchdog actually encouraged the burglar to make himself at home in a distant land, and to bomb and destroy it with abandon” (Herman and Chomsky, 2008: 377). Finally, the reporting around Cambodia demonstrated how media permit and encourage debate as long as it remains faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus (Herman and Chomsky, 2008: 379): once again, there are worthy and unworthy victims, and this is why media have largely ignored Indonesian atrocities in East Timor and the US responsibility for the aggression and massacres and only focused on the Khmer Rouge instead.

<sup>139</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008), 59.

<sup>140</sup> *Ivi*, 22.

reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion”<sup>141</sup>. The functioning of this propaganda machine is different than that of a totalitarian state: debate, criticism and dissent are permitted, albeit only “as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus”<sup>142</sup>.

### 3.3. The Propaganda Model Updated

Despite being initially ignored or cast aside (as the two authors themselves had predicted<sup>143</sup>), the PM has been recently re-examined in light of radical changes such as the arrival of the internet and social media in a book titled *The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Perception and Awareness*<sup>144</sup>. For the purposes of this work, only the chapter concerning the update of the model will be considered i.e., “Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media”, written by Christian Fuchs. The other main source for this part is Piers Robinson, who is also one of the authors that contributed to *The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Perception and Awareness*: however, a different work of his is cited here, namely “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”<sup>145</sup>. Indeed, in their analysis of the continued relevance of the PM, both authors make very similar arguments and reach analogous conclusions. They contend that the major traditional news media brands have not been unseated as the major providers of news but have rather moved to the online environment<sup>146</sup>, while big conglomerates still own them. According to Fuchs, this private ownership matters because “it locks users out from the control of algorithms that determine the priorities of how search results and news are presented”<sup>147</sup>. If anything, it can be maintained that ownership has an even bigger impact on the news that appear on users’ screens.

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<sup>141</sup> Ivi, 382.

<sup>142</sup> Ivi, 379.

<sup>143</sup> Andrew Mullen, “Twenty years on: the second-order prediction of the Herman–Chomsky Propaganda Model”, *Media, Culture & Society* 32, no. 4 (2010): 673-690.

<sup>144</sup> Pedro-Carañana, Joan, Daniel Broudy and Jeffery Klaehn, ed, *The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Perception and Awareness* (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018).

<sup>145</sup> Piers Robinson, “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”, in *Noam Chomsky. Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 77-96.

<sup>146</sup> Ivi, 82.

<sup>147</sup> Christian Fuchs, “Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media”, in *The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Perception and Awareness*, ed. Joan Pedro-Carañana, Daniel Broudy and Jeffery Klaehn, (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018): 74.

As far as the second filter is concerned, “the Internet has made the newspaper industry even more reliant upon advertising as source of revenue”<sup>148</sup>: it is true that the effects of targeted online advertising are unclear because it is problematic to establish how long a user has been on the advertising page for and whether they bought something in the end. Nonetheless, social media have allowed multiple audiences to be targeted at once instead of the typical reading audience as is the case with newspapers<sup>149</sup>. In sum, “there is little reason to question the continued relevance of the economic filters identified in the propaganda model”<sup>150</sup>. Contrarily, when it comes to the sourcing filter, it is not easy to observe clear results: on the one hand, supporters of the media empowerment thesis have argued that technological advances such as 24-hours news have led to a “greater potential for alternative non-elite sources to influence the news agenda”, while smartphones and social media have allowed virtually everyone who finds themselves in the middle of a newsworthy event to become a reporter and share updates without filters. On the other hand, attracting visibility and attention online is challenging, especially because of this plurality of news sources available. Moreover, the evidence that journalists’ dependence on official sources has decreased is equally unclear: Robinson cites a study conducted by Livingston and Bennett in 2003 which led them to the conclusion that “while event-driven news had increased, officials seem to be as much a part of the news as ever”<sup>151</sup>. Finally, Robinson argues that, on their part, “governments have also become increasingly adept and professional at developing sophisticated ways of shaping the information environment”<sup>152</sup>.

Robinson, due to space constraints, did not address the fourth filter i.e., flak. Fuchs, on his part, speaks of mediated lobbying attempts: indeed, lobbying for certain interests has been extended to social media with the aim to “directly transmit political messages to as many internet users as possible”<sup>153</sup>. The dangers of this tool are exemplified by the use that right-wing lobbying movements are making of social media: spreading conspiracy theories, fake online stories, and similar features to achieve their goals resulted in the creation of an atmosphere of hatred, prejudices, and overall

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<sup>148</sup> Piers Robinson, “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”, in *Noam Chomsky. Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 82.

<sup>149</sup> Christian Fuchs, “Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media”, in *The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Perception and Awareness*, ed. Joan Pedro-Carañana, Daniel Broudy and Jeffery Klaehn, (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018): 76.

<sup>150</sup> Piers Robinson, “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”, in *Noam Chomsky. Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 82.

<sup>151</sup> *Ivi*, 82-83.

<sup>152</sup> *Ivi*, 84.

<sup>153</sup> Christian Fuchs, “Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media”, in *The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Perception and Awareness*, ed. Joan Pedro-Carañana, Daniel Broudy and Jeffery Klaehn, (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018): 86.

authoritarian populism that combined form ‘a right-wing attack machine and echo-chamber’<sup>154</sup>. In response to this reckless use of media channels, fact-checking organizations have emerged: as the name suggests, their aim is to verify the news circulating on social media – especially the most sensationalistic ones – and assess their veracity.

As mentioned earlier, Herman and Chomsky themselves updated the ‘anti-communism’ filter, substituting it with market liberalism: similarly, Robinson maintains that this filter “should be understood as part of a much broader agenda regarding *free market rhetoric*”<sup>155</sup> (emphasis added). He further adds that in recent times, other ideological constraints have emerged e.g., the war on terror or nationalism, whose continued importance “limits the ability of media to be critical and independent of their respective governments”<sup>156</sup>. A significant consequence of this consideration is that “media operate against an ideological backdrop regardless of who owns what, the relationship between officials and sources, and the technology that shapes the media environment”<sup>157</sup>, giving the ideology filter newfound importance. Overall, except for a few criticisms that will be addressed in the next Chapter, the PM remains a powerful framework to analyse the power structures in media systems.

### 3.4. The Indexing Hypothesis School of Thought

This section opens with another theory formulated in the 1980s and more precisely in 1986, when Daniel Hallin’s book, *The “Uncensored War”: the Media and Vietnam*, was published. In this book, the author describes the journalist’s world as being comprised of three different concentric regions, called the “media spheres” (hence, the name of the theory), each of which is governed by different journalistic standards: in Figure 1 it is possible to see how he imagined the model, with the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy, the Sphere of Consensus, and the Sphere of Deviance being the names of the three sections. The bounds of the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy (the middle ground, in a way) are defined “by the two-party system—by the parameters of debate between and within the Democratic and Republican parties—as well as by the decision-making process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch. Within this region, objectivity and balance reign as the supreme journalistic virtues”<sup>158</sup>. In other words, journalists do not go outside of the bounds of elite debate and are driven

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<sup>154</sup> Fuchs quoting Herman and Chomsky, “Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media”, 83.


<sup>155</sup> Piers Robinson, “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”, in *Noam Chomsky. Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 86.

<sup>156</sup> Ivi, 87.

<sup>157</sup> Ivi, 88.

<sup>158</sup> Daniel C. Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”: the Media and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 116.

Figure 1. Spheres of consensus, controversy, and deviance.



Source. Hallin, 1986: 117.

by “objectivity and balance”. In the Sphere of Consensus, “region journalists do not feel compelled either to present opposing views or to remain disinterested observers. On the contrary, the journalist’s role is to serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values”<sup>159</sup>—therefore, journalists operating in this region are merely supporting the establishment. Last but not least, in the Sphere of Deviance journalism “plays the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus”<sup>160</sup>, reinforcing the idea that debate in the news needs to be tightly relegated within accepted bounds.

In subsequent years, others have tried to build theories on the functioning of media in the US: in his article “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”, Lance Bennett puts forward the indexing hypothesis (1990). The core argument of this theory is that “[...] restricting the range of voices in news stories is not overt censorship but results instead from routine “professional” decisions about who and what the media should cover with their limited resources”<sup>161</sup>. Media in the US look at government sources as their primary sources for their daily reports therefore restricting the number of opinions that are going to be displayed in the news to those commonly held by one category of people i.e., the elites. While it is perfectly reasonable for the press to grant government sources a greater share of attention – after all, as mentioned in the introduction, one of the main objectives of the media is to keep the government in check – what happens in practice is that “news is indexed implicitly to the range and dynamics of governmental debate but has little relation to

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<sup>159</sup> *Ivi*, 116-117.

<sup>160</sup> *Ivi*, 117.

<sup>161</sup> Lance Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”, *Journal of Communication* 40, no. 2 (1990): 103.



expressed public opinion”<sup>162</sup>. The indexing hypothesis, Bennet argues, integrates the “media monopoly” theory by explaining how news boards ensure that only the news that fit are published: he claims that it is unlikely that boardroom discussions incorporate vocabulary that explicitly refers to economic and state interests. Instead, given that there is an implicit “indexing” norm shared at all levels of the news industry, there is no need to discuss which news fit—everyone already knows what news are compatible with political and economic interests. Hence, media are simply informing the public on the actions of the government<sup>163</sup>: the indexing hypothesis predicts that the media will only challenge the political frame when there is discord among the elites.

In *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era* (1999) Jonathan Mermin builds on and extends Hallin and Bennett’s theories to offer systematic evidence of the impact of foreign-policy debate in Washington on the spectrum of foreign-policy debate that is reported in the news<sup>164</sup>. He does so by analysing the coverage of US intervention in the post-Vietnam era of some media outlets such as the *New York Times*, *World News Tonight*, and the *MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour*. More specifically, the events that he considers are the US interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), the build-up to the Gulf War and the Gulf War itself, the US bombing of Libya (1986) and the US interventions in Somalia (1993) and Haiti (1994). He concludes that the evidence provided for in these case studies supports “not just the correlation version of the indexing hypothesis, but the marginalization version”<sup>165</sup> as well, which means that critical viewpoints on US foreign policy are ignored or relegated to the margins of the news unless they have been expressed by official actors first. Mermin further highlights that, in the coverage of the events listed above, the media did report tangible facts: however, the difference lied in the narrative around those facts because reporting that “the United States liberated Panama from an oppressive dictator and shut down a major arm of the international drug trade” is vastly different from reporting that “the United States violated international law to punish a disloyal client”<sup>166</sup>. Clearly, the former formulation supports the government’s agenda, while the latter criticizes such agenda (and US foreign policy as a whole). Facts are thus a function of each side’s perspective, and the media should avoid “defining

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<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>163</sup> *Ivi*, 110.

<sup>164</sup> Jonathan Mermin, *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 5.

<sup>165</sup> *Ivi*, 143.

<sup>166</sup> *Ivi*, 144.

*what happened as what the government says happened*<sup>167</sup> i.e., they should avoid indexing (or relegating) debate in the news to debate in Washington.

### **3.5. Media Framing and the Cascading Activation Model**

Before introducing the next theory on media-state relations – the cascading activation model – it is necessary to first stop and look at a theory that does not describe how media work, but instead it explains how media are able to promote one narrative over the other i.e., media framing. It is necessary to first introduce media framing because it constitutes a central part of the model itself. Many authors from different fields of research have dealt with the media framing theory: in the field of mediated public diplomacy, Tamir Sheafer and Itay Gabay studied and applied media framing in their article “Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest over International Agenda Building and Frame Building” (2009). Here, they analysed the competition between two rival national actors (the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority) for access to and influence over the international media as part of their competition to sway international policymaking and gain political control<sup>168</sup>. Their argument is that there are some other actors involved in the process<sup>169</sup> with their own specific interests that they wish to promote, and there are several strategies they employ to affect the way in which media frame the issue at hand. Indeed, sympathetic media coverage is a prerequisite for political influence; yet to achieve that, actors need to go through a two-step process: agenda and frame building. Agenda building means successfully competing for access to the media: in fact, Sheafer and Gabay argue that media attention is the most important limited resource in the political communications arena and all actors interested in promoting their narrative must struggle to obtain such access. The second step in this competition is the ability to control “the selected version of reality that will be presented by the media”<sup>170</sup>: this is what the authors define as “frame building”. As a result, once a certain actor manages to (a) obtain media attention and (b) successfully control the narrative surrounding a specific issue, they will be able to gain political influence and shape policymaking processes.

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<sup>167</sup> Ivi, 145.

<sup>168</sup> Tamir Sheafer and Itay Gabay, “Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest over International Agenda Building and Frame Building”, *Political Communication* 26 no. 4 (2009): 447.

<sup>169</sup> The Israeli government, the Palestinian Authority, but also the UK and US governments and the media.

<sup>170</sup> Tamir Sheafer and Itay Gabay, “Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest over International Agenda Building and Frame Building”, *Political Communication* 26 no. 4 (2009): 448.

Definitions of media framing can be found in the field of political communication in war and peace (that will be explored more in depth later): Teresa Joseph, for instance, has argued that the way the media frame a certain issue—determining what is selected, what is excluded and what is emphasised<sup>171</sup>—can shape public opinion and, therefore, change the circumstances in which policymaking takes place<sup>172</sup>. Similarly, Alberto Tagliapietra has described frames as “organised sets of assumptions imposed by news professionals on events’ coverage aimed at simplifying complex phenomena for audiences, potentially leading to a biased outcome”<sup>173</sup>. The general idea is that journalists can (more or less intentionally) pick and choose what to highlight and what to conceal in order to promote the narrative that best fits various interests that change with the actors involved and their own power to influence this process.

Finally, Robert Entman, before introducing the “cascading activation model”, describes framing as the process that “entails *selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution*”<sup>174</sup> (emphasis in the original): his definition of framing largely reflects the ones presented so far. He further adds that “framing is the central process by which government officials and journalists exercise political influence over each other and over the public”<sup>175</sup>, which brings his idea of framing closer to that of Sheaffer and Gabay, since they all include government officials as actors who actively engage in framing processes. Indeed, the cascading activation model, using insights from the hegemony and indexing schools of thought, explains how interpretative frames spread from the White House to the network of non-governmental elites, to news organizations and all the way down to the public—Entman even provides a visual representation of his model, which can be seen in Figure 2. He compares the model to an actual waterfall, where “moving downward [...] is relatively easy, but spreading ideas higher, from lower levels to upper, requires extra energy”<sup>176</sup>: if this idea is translated into the model, this means that the administration has “the most independent ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of moving their own thoughts into general circulation”<sup>177</sup>. The way in which the administration manages to spread activation of frames is by

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<sup>171</sup> Teresa Joseph, “Mediating War and Peace: Mass Media and International Conflict”, *India Quarterly* 70 no. 3 (2014): 225.

<sup>172</sup> *Ivi*, 226.

<sup>173</sup> Alberto Tagliapietra, “Media and Securitisation: The Influence on Perception”, *IAI Papers* 21 no. 34 (July 2021): 5-6.


<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11”, *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 417.

<sup>176</sup> *Ivi*, 420.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*

Figure 2. Cascading network activation.



Source. Entman, 2003: 419.

cultivating (professional) contacts with upper-tier journalists: sometimes these relations are so symbiotic that it becomes hard “to determine where the line between “elite” and “journalist” should be drawn, or who influences whom”<sup>178</sup>. On the contrary, public opinion in the cascade model is a dependent variable: sometimes the public manages to bring some information all the way up to the elites and influence them. This happens – once again – through the media: when they succeed in creating the impression that a certain idea is held widely and intensely by large swaths of the public, it becomes possible for the latter to influence the elites’ activities and decisions.

One of the implications of the model is that “the farther an idea travels between levels on the cascade, the fainter the traces of the “real” situation are”<sup>179</sup>: this happens because the process of constructing news is not linear and “news frames are shaped through the flow of information and ideas, with varying levels of resistance and adaptation, among the administration, other elites, the media, and the public”<sup>180</sup>. Consequently, before reaching the public, a news frame goes through a long and multifaceted process: to ensure that “the White House’s preferred version actually flows down and dominates thinking and communication at each level”<sup>181</sup>, Entman identifies four variables

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<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> *Ivi*, 421.

<sup>180</sup> Gadi Wolfsfeld and Tamir Sheafer, “Competing Actors and the Construction of Political News: The Contest Over Waves in Israel”, *Political Communication* 23, no. 3 (2006): 334.

<sup>181</sup> Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11”, *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 421.

i.e., motivations, power, strategy, and cultural congruence. Motivations indicate each actors' drivers, the reasons they have for wanting to promote a certain frame over the other: for instance, the drivers for news professional are economic pressure and incentives; professional customs, norms, and principles; and normative values<sup>182</sup> e.g., the media's self-perception of being the guardian of democracy. Power refers to each actor's physical influence over facts and their ability to shape frames, while strategy includes both the actual process of framing (deciding what to include, exclude, emphasize, and so on) and the planning and timing activities that will lead to the release of news information. Finally, cultural congruence measures the facility with which a certain frame will cascade from one level to the other of the process: "the more congruent the frame with schemas that dominate the political culture, the more success it will enjoy"<sup>183</sup>.

### 3.6. The Cascading Activation Model Updated

In 2018 Robert Entman, together with Nikki Usher, published a paper entitled "Framing in a Fractured Democracy: Impacts of Digital Technology on Ideology, Power and Cascading Network Activation" revising and updating the cascade activation model so that it reflects the increased role of social media in the news production, distribution, and assimilation processes. The authors introduce five digitally enabled "pump-valves" and explain how they affect the flow of socio-political information and frames:

1. Platforms: they are mainly social media, but also search engines, wikis, blogging software, and so on. They are not impartial—every platform has its own rules and "constraints" (e.g., the character limit on Twitter).
2. Digital analytics: Elites and media (including and especially social media) have developed proprietary analytic tools with the dual aim to understand who's receiving their messages and mine data about their audiences which allows them to selectively target users for customized advertisements<sup>184</sup>—the consequences and risks of these kinds of operations in terms of privacy protection for and manipulation of the public are significant.
3. Algorithms: Although they are created by humans, algorithms are essentially automated and designed to make predictions and suggest content based on every user's preferences therefore

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<sup>182</sup> *Ivi*, 422.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid*.


<sup>184</sup> Robert M. Entman, and Nikki Usher, "Framing in a Fractured Democracy: Impacts of Digital Technology on Ideology, Power and Cascading Network Activation", *Journal of Communication* 68 (2018): 302.

shaping their experience and perceptions of the world—this is how they acquire influence over frame distribution<sup>185</sup>.

4. Ideological media: “Citizens can readily access ideologically driven media messages unshackled by old norms of detached, quasi-scientific reporting and editing”<sup>186</sup>—this dynamic reinforces people’s ideas and beliefs to the point that they do not require factual proof when they read news from sources that they “trust”, thus fostering a self-reinforcing cycle of misinformation and polarization of views.
5. Rogue actors: “Hackers, “fake news” creators, and bots disrupt the news ecosystem”<sup>187</sup>: in the best scenarios these actors are “benevolent”, and they choose to enhance government transparency. However, they can also align with other (non)state actors and foster misinformation, feelings of panic and unsafety with the result of influencing the state of a country’s democracy by changing the course of important events such as elections.

Figure 3 shows how digitalization changed the strength and direction of communication pathways and networks: economic incentives play a greater role (which in turn decreases media independence), while platforms weaken the connections from traditional journalists to elites and publics and bolster newer ideological media<sup>188</sup>. What remains relatively unchanged is the power of elites to set in motion the framing process and control what information is released and what narrative fits better their interests. Even though platforms have also allowed the public to express their opinions

Figure 3. Revised cascade.



Source. Entman and Usher, 2018: 303.

<sup>185</sup> *Ivi*, 301.

<sup>186</sup> *Ivi*, 302.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>188</sup> *Ivi*, 304.

and be heard and (in)validated by others, Entman and Usher observe that “ability to speak doesn’t confer ability to be heard”, and “any one citizen’s social media postings will rarely be heard without a significant boost from elites and institutional or ideological media”<sup>189</sup>. Overall, the updated model confirmed the fundamental power relations between media, the elites, and the public theorized in the original version: the authors argue that, in order to confirm their findings, more research will be needed—nonetheless, digitalization led to an increased sensitivity of the media to economic interests, which is concerning because economic interests rarely coincide with the interests of the general public and, more in general, with democracy.

### 3.7. Insights from the Field of Peace Communication

Dedicating some space to peace communication research is relevant to the present work because, given the nature of the events that are being analysed in this field, the state of relations between media and government interests is more obvious and thus more easily observable. Among the various tools that reporters use to indirectly give their opinion on the situation or to frame an issue in a way that fits the narrative they wish to support it is possible to find sensationalism and securitisation. Wolfsfeld argues that “when sensationalism is considered a central news value, it influences every stage of the news production process”<sup>190</sup>: indeed, news that stir up passions are more likely to attract audiences and sell more. In other words, sensationalism can be defined as the tendency of media to inflate or exaggerate events to be able to publish news in terms of big attractive headlines and boost sales. One declination of this process is securitisation: “the idea behind securitisation is that an issue becomes a security issue when the public perceived it as such. [...] From this perception, the securitarian actors could find the legitimacy to address an issue through the tools they present as adequate”<sup>191</sup>. Barry Gan<sup>192</sup> points out that many of the conflicts fought by the US were possible only because of the process of securitisation and the fact that the mass media misinformed the public and drew a very negative picture of opponents. One such example is the misinformation campaign that led to the invasion of Iraq: the media created the perception that war was the only option and solution to the situation and, therefore, by the time the invasion took place, the public was already prepared to accept

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<sup>189</sup> *Ivi*, 306.

<sup>190</sup> Gadi Wolfsfeld, “Promoting Peace through the News Media: Some Initial Lessons from the Oslo Peace Process”, *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 2, no. 4 (1997): 15.

<sup>191</sup> Teresa Joseph, “Mediating War and Peace: Mass Media and International Conflict”, *India Quarterly* 70 no. 3 (2014): 3.

<sup>192</sup> Barry L. Gan, “Pressed into War”. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 17, no. 4 (2005): 341-348.

it as fair and just<sup>193</sup>. Gan further lists government distortion and media irresponsibility as leading causes behind the public opinion's acceptance of the necessity of entering various wars, the most recent and evocative ones being the Vietnam war and the war on Iraq: a mixture of over sensationalized stories published to drive up profits, omissions on part of government officials when justifying their country's actions, and media reporting without investigating the facts provided by their sources are.

Gadi Wolfsfeld, one of the most prominent voices in this field, developed an analytical model by observing media performance during peace processes. This framework, the political contest model, was developed in his book, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (1997), and it explains relations between the media and policymakers and the struggles over content and control of the news in *unequal political conflicts*<sup>194</sup> (emphasis in the original). Wolfsfeld introduces the paradigm by portraying a "magnificent arena" where struggles for control over event outcomes between different combatants take place: to enter this arena, the elites (among which it is possible to find royals, combatants, journalists, and other spectators) use approved portals (the "Royal gate"), while people from poorer classes must go through a small gate at the back of the arena called the "Deviant's gate". However, these people are only allowed to enter if they provide unexpected entertainment or diversion: sometimes, when the cause seems moral, they even manage to inspire journalists in the crowd to support the underdog. Therefore, the combatants in the arena usually include an actor with far weaker coercive resources (the "challenger") and one with preponderant resources (the "authority"). Wolfsfeld argues that the political process (i.e., what happens in the arena) is more likely to influence the media than vice versa: "the construction of news is primarily a reactive process"<sup>195</sup> and the media are rarely able to initiate or control events. Moreover, the role of news media varies over time and circumstance: in times of crisis, the media are more likely to play the "faithful servants" role and emphasize official frames and ignore or discredit challengers.

The media's influence over the outcome of conflicts depends on many factors, including the political resources, skills, and power of the antagonist, the perceived state of public opinion, the ability of journalists to gain access to events, and the nature of the events themselves. Wolfsfeld does acknowledge the structural advantages that government elites utilise to shape media coverage, but he

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<sup>193</sup> Teresa Joseph, "Mediating War and Peace: Mass Media and International Conflict", *India Quarterly* 70 no. 3 (2014): 228.

<sup>194</sup> Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 4.

<sup>195</sup> Gadi Wolfsfeld, *The News Media and Peace Processes: The Middle East and Northern Ireland* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001): 10.



also identifies some forces that can counterbalance these advantages: indeed, he claims that the ability of challengers to influence the media depends on each side's value to the media, divided by its dependence on the media. Value refers to a participant's political and social status, their degree of organization and resources, their willingness to engage in exceptional (and thus newsworthy) behaviour, and their ability to exert some control over political events, while "dependence is determined by a group's access to government power and its need for external support"<sup>196</sup>. As a consequence, authorities do not automatically have more power over the media than challengers: for instance, when there is no unified "government" version of events, the challengers have more possibilities of shaping media coverage of an event<sup>197</sup>—this feature of the model largely reflects Bennet's indexing hypothesis: when elites are divided on an issue, the media are more likely to challenge the political frame. Finally, Wolfsfeld mentions the extent to which journalists rely on official sources: governments are the principal "movers and shakers" of issues and events and, therefore, so many journalists are assigned to cover the government daily. Thus, this dependence on official sources, already mentioned by Herman and Chomsky<sup>198</sup>, seems to have become one of the major axioms in the field of political communication<sup>199</sup>.

Overall, when it comes to political communication theories and models regarding media-state relations, there seems to be a general consensus on the existence of a certain media bias in support of government policies, especially regarding foreign policy issues. On the one hand, it is true that reporting news in a completely unbiased manner is nearly unfeasible; on the other hand, it is critical for the public to be aware of such bias and the extent of it: giving the correct interpretation and the appropriate weight to the news they gather is crucial to be able to form cognisant opinions. The next chapter will present the methodology, analytical framework, and materials at the basis of the present work, in an effort to "close the loop" and explain how the considerations made in these first chapters come together.

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<sup>196</sup> Robert M. Entman, review of *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*, by Gadi Wolfsfeld, *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000): 522.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>198</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008).

<sup>199</sup> Gadi Wolfsfeld, "Promoting Peace through the News Media: Some Initial Lessons from the Oslo Peace Process", *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 2, no. 4 (1997): 54.

# *Methodology*

The present work sets out to investigate whether the coverage of a US mainstream publication, namely the *New York Times*, is biased against China, the administration's "strategic competitor". The idea is to verify whether, in the context of this increasing competition, Washington is also resorting to Cold war techniques such as the careful construction of propaganda narratives against Beijing. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, presented in the previous chapter, was selected as the analytical framework for this research, together with Robert Entman's cascading activation model. A quantitative content analysis was chosen as the methodological strategy—these tools will guide the collection, categorisation, and subsequent interpretation of all the data. In order to attest whether the NYT is contributing to this "manufacturing of consent", the case study of abuses against Muslim minorities in China was selected: following Herman and Chomsky's "worthy and unworthy victims" categorisation, the coverage of a largely similar situation i.e., the abuses against Muslim minorities in India, was chosen as yardstick against which to determine the objectiveness of the reporting. Thus, since the aim of this chapter is to describe the research design and the methods employed to answer the research question, the subsequent sections have been organised in the following manner: first, the topic choice will be justified and a brief description of the issues at hand will be provided. Secondly, the benefits and limitations of the chosen theoretical framework will be discussed, and the research question formulated. Finally, the methods and materials that will be employed to carry out the research work will be presented and briefly discussed.

### **4.1. The Case Studies**

As mentioned in the introduction, the focus topics chosen for the present research are the abuses perpetrated against Muslims communities in India and China: these two situations are believed to be similar and, therefore, comparable, for a variety of reasons. First, both states are very similar when it comes to population size and composition: more than 1.3 billion people live in each country, with a clear religious or ethnic majority i.e., Hindu and Han, and many minorities, including Muslim communities. Secondly, both countries play a major role in the region and are involved in longstanding territorial disputes (including among one another), some of which involve the above-mentioned Muslim minorities e.g., the Kashmir region in India and the Xinjiang region in China.

However, such territorial disputes will not strictly be the object of the present analysis, given that they originated from fundamentally different historical circumstances. Thirdly, from a political perspective, both countries have seen a change in leadership in the early 2010s, with the new governments increasingly promoting nationalistic narratives—in particular, in recent years these narratives were translated into more systematic efforts to harmonize the ethnic and religious compositions of the two states, resulting in rising pressures and various degrees of abuses towards Muslim communities.

In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu-nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have fostered anti-Muslim sentiment first by erasing the statehood of what had been India's only Muslim-majority state, Jammu and Kashmir<sup>200</sup> on August 5, 2019, and then by passing the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) on December 11, 2019, a law that gives “migrants of all of South Asia's major religions a clear path to Indian citizenship—except Islam”<sup>201</sup>. Both these measures were met with protests<sup>202</sup> across the country, protests to which the police have responded with sectarian violence, turning a blind eye on government supporters beating up Muslims or lower-caste Dalits and even terrorizing, torturing and, in the worst of cases, killing the latter groups themselves. On their part, police and state officials have denied using excessive force or singling out Muslims, emphasizing the need to “preserve order and protect innocent people against “radical groups” with “deep-rooted conspiracies” to commit violent acts”<sup>203</sup>. The Covid-19 outbreak has only exasperated this trend<sup>204</sup>, providing officials with “an occasion for the free play of authoritarian impulses”<sup>205</sup>, targeting anyone who dares criticise the government and its management of the pandemic (among other things).

In China, Muslim minorities living in Xinjiang, and especially the Uighurs, have reportedly been the target of repressive measures such as strict government surveillance and forced labor. In

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<sup>200</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman, Sameer Yasir, Suhasini Raj and Hari Kumar, “How Delhi's Police Turned Against Muslims”, *The New York Times*, March 12, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/asia/india-police-muslims.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article>.

<sup>201</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman and Suhasini Raj, “India Steps Toward Making Naturalization Harder for Muslims”, *The New York Times*, December 9, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/world/asia/india-muslims-citizenship-narendra-modi.html>.

<sup>202</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman and Maria Abi-Habib, “In India, Modi's Policies Have Lit a Fuse”, *The New York Times*, March 1, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/asia/india-modi-hindus.html?searchResultPosition=11>.

<sup>203</sup> Kai Schultz and Sameer Yasir, “As India Violence Gets Worse, Police Are Accused of Abusing Muslims”, *The New York Times*, January 2, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/asia/india-protests-police-muslims.html?searchResultPosition=2>.

<sup>204</sup> Siddharth Varadarajan, “In India, a Pandemic of Prejudice and Repression”, *The New York Times*, April 21, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/opinion/coronavirus-india.html>.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*

fact, in past decades, tensions between Muslim ethnic minorities and China's Han ethnic majority in the region have occasionally erupted in violence: in 2009 the situation escalated in Urumqi, the regional capital of Xinjiang, leaving nearly 200 people dead, most of them Han<sup>206</sup>. The government has cited these attacks as basis for the enactment of tough policies. However, "after a succession of violent antigovernment attacks reached a peak in 2014"<sup>207</sup>, the new Communist Party chief, Xi Jinping, sharply escalated the crackdown, in an effort to "turn ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities into loyal citizens and supporters of the party"<sup>208</sup>. Reports of ethnic Hans being relocated to Xinjiang, a campaign of forced sterilization for Uighur women, "vocational" or "reeducation" camps being built especially for ethnic Uighurs (and other minorities) are just some of the measures adopted. "The Chinese authorities have [...] acknowledged the existence of the region's labor transfer programs, but defended the camps as job-training centers that teach the Mandarin Chinese language and practical skills, and that also warn people of the dangers of religious extremism"<sup>209</sup>. Nonetheless, whatever the reason behind the implementation of such policies, it is inevitable that they will result, at least to some degree, in the erosion of Uighur customs and traditions—which some claim is exactly the objective of the government.

In sum, it could be argued that both governments are, more or less explicitly and with varying degrees of awareness and participation by the civil population, pursuing nationalistic policies that aim at the homogenization of their peoples, to the detriment of other minorities and, in particular, their respective Muslim communities. The one difference between the two countries, which plays a major role for the purposes of the present research, is their political system: in fact, one is a democracy and a US ally, while the other is an authoritarian state and Washington's "strategic competitor". The expectation is that news coverage of the enemy state will be more intense and the tone more indignant, with frequent references to sanctions to end the situation, while the coverage of the client state will be more moderate, with less references to human rights issues, and with less "official" voices being cited as sources.

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<sup>206</sup> Elian Peltier, Claire Moses and Edward Wong, "'I Have Told Everything,' Says Whistle-Blower in China Crackdown", *The New York Times*, December 7, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/world/europe/uighur-whistleblower.html>.

<sup>207</sup> Chris Buckley, "China Is Detaining Muslims in Vast Numbers. The Goal: 'Transformation.'", *The New York Times*, September 8, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-detention-camp.html>.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*

## 4.2. Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks

As mentioned in the introduction, the theoretical framework that will be used to conduct the present research is Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, in combination with insights largely drawn from Robert Entman's cascading activation model. The motivation for merging these two models lies in the fact that while the PM is an excellent analytical tool that explains "the performance of the US media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate"<sup>210</sup>, the cascading activation model and its focus on frame spreading allows to analyse "intentionality" in the news coverage—something that the PM marginalizes. In other words, by studying the language of various articles i.e., an element that is almost entirely under the journalist's control, it will be possible to identify the framing of the issue and compare it to the administration's own position to verify whether they are aligned or not. After all, as Entman argues, it is precisely the administration that has "the most independent ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of moving their own thoughts into general circulation"<sup>211</sup>: hence, this exercise will reveal how far down the "cascade" the elite's frames have travelled. Given that the role of the cascading activation model in the research design is limited, no further considerations will be made on it: instead, the focus will now shift to the definition of propaganda first and to the PM and its explanatory abilities then.

The concept of propaganda differs from other tools that governments might decide to employ to entice and win over foreign publics (or any other potential targets). In fact, the idea that governments rely on the media to promote their interests is widespread in media and international communication literature: much has been said about tools such as soft power, public diplomacy, and propaganda. Soft power is an instrument that allows governments to influence foreign publics through the power of attraction: in other words, when a country uses assets such as policies and culture to attract, it is using its soft power. Public diplomacy is a phenomenon with common historical roots and roughly similar characteristics as propaganda; however, the crucial difference between the two lies in their pattern of communication. Modern public diplomacy is a two-way street, it is persuasion by means of dialogue: in other words, the targets of public diplomacy are not just passive receivers of information, but they play an active role, and the government is required to listen to them. Propaganda, on the contrary, is a one-way street communication process whereby the receiver only

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<sup>210</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 12.

<sup>211</sup> Robert M. Entman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11", *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 420.

plays a passive role and is often unaware of the nature of the process they are being subjected to. Welch defines propaganda as “the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly”<sup>212</sup>. Although this definition is satisfying, it is not comprehensive: in fact, another significant difference between public diplomacy and propaganda is that the former is often used in issue areas that pertain to the cultural sphere—for instance, PD was largely employed in the past to improve the image abroad of countries like Germany and France after World War II. Instead, propaganda is employed more frequently when national (security) interests and state power are at stake: for this reason, it is commonly viewed as the process of manipulation and deceit of foreign publics.

Some regime types, because of their nature, are able to exercise propaganda in a more explicit and efficient way, especially if they combine it with censorship. However, as the literature review in Chapter 3 demonstrated, many scholars argue that democratic regimes also resort to propaganda efforts, albeit in a more subtle way e.g., by controlling the way in which certain core issues are framed. In democracies, the news media are considered the fourth branch of government—the “watchdogs” on the exercise of power. For this reason, their role in the process of disseminating information to the public is crucial, particularly when it comes to topics such as foreign affairs, over which the public has little direct contact with, thus making it easier for governments to actively promote their preferred narrative. In particular, “Herman & Chomsky’s analysis of the mainstream media’s coverage of US foreign affairs suggests that it contains a propaganda function as it consciously emphasises and downplays certain information based on whether it legitimises establishment views”<sup>213</sup>. They analysed this pattern on various case studies, one of which involved a comparison between “the media’s treatment of victims of enemy states and those of the United States and U.S. client states”<sup>214</sup>—their prediction was that the victims of enemy states would be found “worthy” and would be subject to more intense and indignant coverage than those victimized by the United States or its clients, who are implicitly “unworthy”<sup>215</sup>. This is precisely why this theoretical framework was deemed a fitting reference point to conduct the present investigation whose aim is to verify whether media coverage of a specific issue, namely abuses against Muslim communities in two different

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<sup>212</sup> David Welch, “Propaganda: An Historical Perspective”, accessed March 17, 2022, <https://www.socialismonline.co.uk/Explore/Essays/Welch>.

<sup>213</sup> Malavika Mysore, *Manufacturing Consent: An Investigation of the Press Support Towards the US Administration Prior to US-led Airstrikes in Syria* (London: Media@LSE, 2020): 6.

<sup>214</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 21.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*

countries, reflects a wider government agenda and is therefore instrumentalized for the sake of geopolitical competition. The validity of the model has been tested by several studies of the mainstream media's news coverage relating to US foreign affairs, which have obtained results consistent with the predictions of the framework (Dickson, 1992; Krishnaiah et al., 1993; Guitterez-Villalobos et al., 1994; Klaehn, 2002; Klaehn, 2005; Boyd-Barrett 2004; Good, 2008; Mullen and Klaehn, 2010).

Moreover, insights coming from different issue areas of political communication such as war and peace studies have confirmed the soundness of the PM filters—ownership, advertising, reliance on official sources, fear of flak, and ideology. For instance, Gadi Wolfsfeld's intuition that at times the media play the "faithful servants" role is also emphasized by Teresa Joseph, who claims that "in times of crises, the media often succumb to patriotism at the expense of objectivity, resulting in jingoistic reporting, reinforcing stereotypes and prejudices"<sup>216</sup>. In her paper "Mediating War and Peace: Mass Media and International Conflict", Joseph analyses the way mainstream media of different countries reported about the same international conflicts. In doing so, she refers to the profit orientation and advertising filters of the PM, arguing that the increasingly market-driven mainstream media are constrained in what they report on by their need to sell their product to readers and advertisers<sup>217</sup> and that they tend to largely ignore dissenting voices to favour the government, especially where foreign policy/security issues are concerned. Only in cases where consensus begins to disappear, the media is forced to reflect public debate, as she argues was evident in the news coverage of United States intervention in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, the bombing of Libya, the Gulf wars, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc<sup>218</sup>. She also maintains that "the media need to be viewed within the context of the political, economic and socio-cultural institutions of a given country"<sup>219</sup>. Wolfsfeld, in *The News Media and Peace Processes: The Middle East and Northern Ireland*, makes some considerations that resemble the flak filter of the PM: indeed, he maintains that "broadcasters and newspaper publishers [...] will be extremely reluctant to offend major segments of the audience"<sup>220</sup> and that "editors also will get continual feedback from their audience if they appear to move too far in a particular direction"<sup>221</sup>. Finally, in the same work he validates the ideological

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<sup>216</sup> Teresa Joseph, "Mediating War and Peace: Mass Media and International Conflict", *India Quarterly* 70 no. 3 (2014): 232.

<sup>217</sup> *Ivi*, 234.

<sup>218</sup> *Ivi*, 227.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>220</sup> Gadi Wolfsfeld, *The News Media and Peace Processes: The Middle East and Northern Ireland* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001): 14.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*

filter: the idea is that “journalists always write stories within a particular cultural framework” and, thus, “presumptions about collective identity are an especially important element in the construction of news”<sup>222</sup>. The significance of the ideological filter is further reinforced by Robert Entman’s claims about frame activations: he argues that the more culturally resonant a frame is, the more likely it is to be effective and influence the public’s opinion on a certain topic<sup>223</sup>.

However, before moving forward it is necessary to also address some of the criticism that has been raised about the PM: for instance, in the chapter “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”<sup>224</sup>, Piers Robinson argues that war and conflict are relatively easy test cases for the PM. The present work might contribute to the existing literature precisely in this regard: given that so far there is no ongoing direct conflict between the US and China, this study will show whether the PM framework can be applied to other kinds of confrontations. His second criticism concerns “the relative explanatory weighting of each of the filters. Put simply, under what circumstances are each of the filters more or less important in terms of shaping media output?”<sup>225</sup>. Of course, not all filters have the same weight in the construction of consent: however, some filters – as the present work will show – cannot be coded for in a news coverage analysis because of their systemic nature. Owner wealth, advertising, and fear of flak: they all need to be studied separately and using different techniques than those employed to verify the reliance on official sources and ideological filters—whose influence on the reporting can be assessed by observing the content of the news itself. Robinson’s last criticism that will be addressed here is his assertion that one obvious weakness with the propaganda model “relates to its static description of media-state relations. The filters [...] provide little guidance as to the factors that work against elite control of the media and the conditions under which manufacturing consent breaks down”<sup>226</sup>. It should be noted that “Herman & Chomsky do not assert that the media is a monolith on all issues”<sup>227</sup>: they recognize that the media do encourage debate, albeit within the premises that conform to the elite consensus. If the consensus is not uniformed, then the bounds of debate will simply be more wide-ranging and, as argued by Robinson himself, more voices will manage to make their contribution. Now that the topic of inquiry and the analytical framework have

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<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup> Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11”, *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 417.

<sup>224</sup> Piers Robinson, “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”, in *Noam Chomsky. Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 77-96.

<sup>225</sup> *Ivi*, 89.

<sup>226</sup> *Ivi*, 90.

<sup>227</sup> Malavika Mysore, *Manufacturing Consent: An Investigation of the Press Support Towards the US Administration Prior to US-led Airstrikes in Syria* (London: Media@LSE, 2020): 8.



been defined, the next sections will present and explain in detail the research questions and the methods chosen to address them.

### 4.3. Research Strategy

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the two research questions that will structure and guide the present investigation of narratives used to describe abuses against Muslim minorities are the following:

**RQ1:** Is the *New York Times*’ coverage of abuses against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang biased in comparison to the coverage of similar abuses committed in another country e.g., India?

**RQ2:** If so, can this biased narrative be defined as propaganda and be understood as arising from a larger situation i.e., the ongoing strategic competition between the US and China?

As anticipated, this comparative study attempts to find an answer to the research questions by analysing the NYT reporting on abuses against Muslim communities in China and in India—indeed, any difference in the news coverage of these two largely similar situations will provide useful insights on the degree of importance of each country in the government’s agenda. These two countries were selected precisely because of the different nature of their relationship with the US government: one (India) maintains friendly relations with the US and can be thus labelled as a “client state”, while the other (China) has strained relations with Washington, thus earning the “enemy state” categorisation.

Based on the literature and theoretical framework described above, the analysis will be conducted by testing the following hypotheses:

**H1:** The victims of the enemy state i.e., China, will be found “worthy” and will be subject to more intense coverage than those victimized by the client state i.e., India.

**H2:** Official sources will be cited more than non-official sources in articles covering the actions of the enemy state, and vice versa.

**H3:** Human rights will be mentioned more often in articles covering the actions of the enemy state, to justify elite-driven policy decisions and marginalise or exclude alternative positions.

**H4:** Sanctions against the “wicked” state will be emphasised and supported.

**H5:** News articles about the enemy state will be framing the abuses more harshly, with mentions of “genocide” or “crimes against humanity”.

A quantitative content analysis is the research strategy that was chosen to investigate the *New York Times* coverage of the abuses that Muslim minorities face in China and in India over a period of two years, between 01/01/2020 and 31/12/2021. The content analysis research method was chosen because, according to Krippendorff, the purpose of such analysis is to make sense of “what is mediated between people—textual matter, symbols, messages, information, mass-media content, and technology-supported social interactions—without perturbing or affecting those who handle that textual matter”<sup>228</sup>. Thus, given that the present work is essentially a close study of precisely “what is mediated between people” i.e., media coverage, content analysis was deemed to be a fitting procedure. As a research technique, content analysis aims to produce “replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the context of their use”<sup>229</sup>. In other words, it is a technique that allows the researchers to understand particular phenomena by yielding results that are open for careful scrutiny and, thus, reliable.

Moreover, according to Hansen, a quantitative content analysis is a particularly suitable systematic method to describe and analyse media content “in a more comprehensive way, a way less prone to subjective selectiveness and idiosyncrasies”<sup>230</sup>. This is because the research methodology consists in identifying and counting the occurrence of specific elements within texts that, taken together, allow the researcher to be able to interpret the meanings they contain and, therefore, make considerations about their wider social significance and impact. It is important to point out that “counting the occurrence of specific elements within texts” does not amount to passively counting words—which Hansen argues would be a limitation of the method since it implies “a lack of a theory

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<sup>228</sup> Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2004): xiii.

<sup>229</sup> *Ivi*, 18.

<sup>230</sup> Anders Hansen, “Content Analysis”, in *Mass Communication Research Methods* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998): 91.

or meaning”<sup>231</sup>. Instead, it requires careful consideration because the dimensions that are being counted must be those specified by the theoretical framework—in this case, such dimensions taken from the theoretical framework are official and non-official sources (PM), references to human rights and sanctions (PM), and frames used to describe the nature of the abuses (CAM). As for the limitation regarding the lack of objectivity<sup>232</sup>, it could be argued that, while absolute objectivity was never a criterion in definitions of content analyses, the subjective choices and interpretations are not arbitrary<sup>233</sup>: indeed, they are always justified by the theoretical framework, “which provides the researcher with the relevant properties to search for within texts”<sup>234</sup>.

Finally, given that the purpose of the present work is to test whether the news coverage of two comparable situations exhibits similar traits in both instances or whether it only exhibits specific traits in one of the cases (therefore resulting in a propaganda effort), the research process will require an analysis of a large number of texts from which to isolate and count the occurrence of the elements that comprise the propaganda model. This is why a quantitative research method was chosen over a qualitative research method: indeed, collecting and analysing numerical data for the purposes of descriptive, correlational, or experimental research<sup>235</sup> is precisely the definition of quantitative research.

#### **4.4. Material and Sampling Considerations**

The news outlet choice, the *New York Times*, was based on theoretical as well practical considerations: the former refers to the fact that the NYT is one of the most widely read mainstream publication in the US, while the latter explains why the NYT was chosen over other MSM publications such as the *Washington Post* i.e., because of the better performance of its archival functions. In fact, owing to a lack of access to databases such as LexisNexis, which are often used in these studies, the NYT’s own archival function was used to retrieve the news articles: the unit of analysis was each news article. “China” and “Muslim” and “abuse” and “India” and “Muslim” and “abuse” were used as keywords to find the basic materials: the third keyword, “abuse”, was selected purely to restrict the sample. In fact, only searching for the word “Muslim” in association with both

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<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>233</sup> Malavika Mysore, *Manufacturing Consent: An Investigation of the Press Support Towards the US Administration Prior to US-led Airstrikes in Syria* (London: Media@LSE, 2020): 19.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>235</sup> Pritha Bhandari, “What Is Quantitative Research? Definition, Uses and Methods”, published on June 12, 2020, <https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/quantitative-research/>.

countries, a sample of 1,379 search results was produced: even limiting the period under consideration, for instance, to the six months preceding the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the overall number was still considerable (458 results). Given the impossibility of randomly arranging the search results to select a sample size, it was judged appropriate to resort to a third keyword, which was selected because of the variety of actions that can be labelled as “abuse” and its relative semantic neutrality.

Subsequently, a two-year period was chosen as analysis time frame: as mentioned above, the years of 2020 and 2021 were selected. This range was deemed optimal based on a few considerations:

1. Since the argument of this work is that one of the reasons why China and the repression of one particular Muslim minority, the Uighurs, are so high up on the US government’s agenda is the increasing competition between Beijing and Washington, the time frame needed to be set after 2017/18—indeed, as argued in Chapter 2, this is when China was officially denominated the US’ “strategic competitor” in the “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific”.
2. The citizenship law in India that discriminates against Muslim citizens was passed in December 2019, while the Kashmir region was stripped of its autonomous status a few months earlier, in August 2019—hence, the selected time frame needed to be subsequent to such events in order to attest whether they raised any indignation and, if so, to which extent.
3. Between 2020 and 2021 there was an administration change in the US: given that the NYT is considered a left-leaning publication, selecting a period in which two politically rivaling administrations are in power at the time of reporting will offer more diversity by providing a two-dimensional interpretation and discussion of US foreign policy towards China and India.

The total number of results that was obtained entering the selected timeframe and keywords is 318: all of these have been categorised and listed in Annex I and II. Of course, this list of results included articles that were not relevant to the topics under consideration: such articles have been categorised as “non relevant” and have not been analysed. The distinction between relevant and non-relevant was made based on whether the article mentioned the issue at hand at least once: indeed, in some cases, the selected keywords were present in the article, but they had been used to refer to other unrelated situations. Similarly, all the results that the NYT’s website coded as “Briefing” were discarded: only Opinion Articles, News Articles, Editorials and Feature Articles were considered for the purposes of

the present analysis. Consequently, the overall sample of articles was narrowed down to 92, which, following Krippendorff's guidelines<sup>236</sup>, is a manageable number of texts to realistically analyse.

#### **4.5. Construction of the Coding Frame**

Just as for the construction of the hypotheses, the variables selected for the coding frame i.e., the instruction manual for the data collection process, were derived from the literature review and theoretical framework. The coding scheme contains three main categories: (1) the reliance upon institutionally affiliated sources; (2) the focus on human rights and sanctions; and (3) the language used to describe the abuses. The aim of these categories is to identify certain frames within the news coverage, which is an especially challenging task given that such frames are not immediately recognizable and are even harder to code for. Therefore, the coding process will entail breaking down these three main categories into smaller elements, whose occurrence can be easily counted and categorised; these elements will be reassembled during the analysis and interpretation phase, leading to the identification of the news framings.

More specifically, then, the first category i.e., the reliance upon institutionally affiliated sources, contains two main variables, (1) official sources and (2) non-official sources. The former is defined as a US governmental or business-related source: universities and think tanks are considered as businesses and are therefore counted as part of this variable. Accordingly, a non-official source is defined as a non-US-governmental or non-business-related source. For instance, the sentence ““The United States will not stand idly by as the C.C.P. carries out human rights abuses targeting Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs and members of other minority groups in Xinjiang,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement on Thursday, referring to the Chinese Communist Party”<sup>237</sup> was coded as citing an official source. On the other hand, the sentence “A spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry, Zhao Lijian, said on Friday that in response, Beijing would take reciprocal measures against the relevant U.S. institutions and individuals for “egregious” conduct on Xinjiang-related issues”<sup>238</sup> was coded as having cited a non-official source. The aim of this category is to see how much news coverage depends on official sources and replicates the agenda pushed by such actors—the

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<sup>236</sup> Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2004).

<sup>237</sup> Pranshu Verma and Edward Wong, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Officials Over Mass Detention of Muslims”, *The New York Times*, July 9, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/world/asia/trump-china-sanctions-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=68>.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*

expectation is that for the enemy state, the news coverage will cite more official sources, while the opposite will be true in the case of the client state.

The second category contains two variables: (1) the number of times an article contains the phrase “human rights” and (2) whether or not sanctions are mentioned as a countermeasure to the abuses. The first variable is a reflection on the ideological filter: in many instances the United States has defined itself as a human rights watchdog—it could be argued that the more times “human rights” are mentioned, the more the issue is framed as something that needs to be addressed collectively. The second variable is directly linked to the first, in the sense that it refers to what would be the “next step”, after having denounced a situation in which abuses are taking place: it indicates the willingness to follow-up on such accusations. For example, the sentence “When Beijing staged the Summer Olympic Games in 2008, many argued — or at least hoped — that the international attention would improve human rights in China”<sup>239</sup> was coded as having brought up the issue of human rights, while the sentence “[China] is facing mounting calls for a boycott over its rights abuses, from stripping Hong Kong of its promised democratic freedoms to the mass incarceration of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang”<sup>240</sup> was coded as having mentioned a specific kind of sanction.

The third category encompasses all the different ways in which the abuses have been described and categorised in the news coverage. It is an attempt to code for what Robert Entman calls “mental associations”<sup>241</sup>: according to him, it is the administration that enjoys the “most independent ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of moving their own thoughts into general circulation”<sup>242</sup>. Therefore, if the government frames a certain situation a genocide, then newspapers and, more broadly, all media are more likely to frame that situation in terms of genocide as well. Moreover, as Herman and Chomsky suggest in their analysis of “worthy and unworthy victims”, categorisations such as “genocide” are readily applied to “cases of victimization in enemy states, but rarely if ever to similar or worse cases of victimization by the United States itself or allied regimes”<sup>243</sup>—classifying and counting how many times a situation is

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<sup>239</sup> Steven Lee Myers, “China Is Preparing for Another Olympics in Beijing, Like It or Not”, *The New York Times*, February 19, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/asia/china-olympics-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=23>.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>241</sup> Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11”, *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 420.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>243</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 22.

referred to as e.g., genocide, will thus directly constitute further proof of propaganda efforts. The categories that have been identified comprise:

- (1) Crimes against humanity<sup>244</sup>;
- (2) Genocide<sup>245</sup>;
- (3) Repression<sup>246</sup>;
- (4) Violence<sup>247</sup>;

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<sup>244</sup> Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as “any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

- a. Murder;
- b. Extermination;
- c. Enslavement;
- d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
- e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
- f. Torture;
- g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
- h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
- i. Enforced disappearance of persons;
- j. The crime of apartheid;
- k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” (International Criminal Court, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, Article 7).

<sup>245</sup> Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (General Assembly, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, Article II).

<sup>246</sup> For the purposes of this research, the definition of repression outlined by Marc Owen Jones in his book *Political Repression in Bahrain* will be adopted: repression is “the process by which the dominant hegemonic order attempt to maintain power by destroying, rendering harmless or appeasing those organizations, people, groups or ideologies that potentially threaten their position of power or privilege” (Jones, “Defining Political Repression”, 23).

<sup>247</sup> The World Health Organization defines violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (World Health Organization, “World report on violence and health: summary”, 4).

(5) Torture<sup>248</sup>.

Each of these words has a different meaning and, more importantly, has a different degree of gravity. Therefore, registering how a situation is defined not only is a strong indicator of the stance adopted by the newspaper, but it will also provide additional evidence of propaganda. The following chapter will present and analyse the results of the study.

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<sup>248</sup> Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions” (General Assembly, “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, Article 1).



### *Analysis and Results*

The aim of this chapter is to present the results of the quantitative content analysis that was used to investigate the *New York Times*' news coverage of two comparable situations i.e., the abuses against Muslim communities in India and China, in the 2020-2021 period. Out of a total sample of 318 results that were found in the archive section of the NTY using the key words indicated in Chapter 4, only 92 articles were deemed relevant and were therefore analysed: the complete list of results—including title, authors, date, link, and many more information—can be found in the Annexes. The articles were categorised and examined following a chronological order. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model is the theoretical framework that was used to construct the coding frame: therefore, this chapter will be organised following the PM's filters. First, the intensity of coverage will be outlined; then, the usage of sources, divided between official and non-official, will be analysed. Thirdly, the ideology filter, coded for with references to human rights and sanctions, will be discussed; lastly, the framing of the issues will be investigated by looking at the cultural resonance and magnitude of the language used.

#### **5.1. Intensity of Coverage**

The starting point of this data analysis is to simply look at the intensity of the coverage for both situations: Table 1 summarises the overall number of results found in the NYT archive (318), divided per year (2020/2021) and country (India/China). The items found using the keywords "India" and "Muslim" and "abuse" in 2020 were 64 in total, while the number dropped to 29 in 2021—less than half of the previous year. On the other hand, the pieces found inserting the keywords "China" and "Muslim" and "abuse" in 2020 were 124 in total, almost double the number of those covering India in the same year. In 2021, that number decreased as well, albeit not as much as it did for India: 101 was the total sample of results covering China. This preliminary finding is already noteworthy since it clearly shows that abuses against the Muslim community in China were mentioned with significantly higher intensity than abuses against the Muslim community in India. However, to assert this with more certainty, it is necessary to sift through all the results and focus on the articles that were deemed relevant to the topics, catalogued in Table 2.

**Table 1.** Total number of results found entering the chosen keywords in the NYT archives, divided per year and country.

	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<i>N</i>
<b>India</b>	64	29	93
<b>China</b>	124	101	225
<i>N</i>	188	130	<b>318</b>

While Table 1 only displays the raw results of the archive search, Table 2 displays the number of articles that, after a first quick read, were found to cover the topics at hand and were subsequently analysed more carefully. In 2020, 10 articles reported about the situation of Muslims in India, while only 6 articles reported about the same issue in 2021. Abuses against Muslim minorities in China gained considerably more media attention: 45 articles covered the topic in 2020, while 31 did so in 2021. This means that the overall number of articles regarding India is only 17.4% of the total number of relevant articles analysed (92), while articles about China represent the remaining 82.6%.

**Table 2.** Total number of articles that were deemed relevant and thus analysed, divided per year and country.

	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<i>N</i>
<b>India</b>	10	6	16
<b>China</b>	45	31	76
<i>N</i>	55	37	<b>92</b>

Nevertheless, one could argue that this number of results is biased because the third keyword selected i.e., “abuse”, in a way already typifies the search results. Such keyword was added only for the purpose of restricting the sample to a manageable number of articles: expanding the search by including results from the years 2000 to 2021 and only using the keywords “China” and “Muslim” and “India” and “Muslim”, will provide a better overview of the trend. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 4, until the year 2013 the word “Muslim” associated with India and China, respectively, appears to follow the same pattern—in other words, both topics received similar patterns of media attention. However, from 2014 onwards the topic of Muslim minorities in China seems to have


received much more attention, with a peak in the years of 2019 and 2020, which confirms what the earlier intuition had already outlined.

**Table 3.** Number of results retrieved from the NYT archives using the keywords “India” and “Muslim” and “China” and “Muslim” for the years 2000-2021.

<b>Year</b>	<b><i>N</i> Results for India</b>	<b><i>N</i> Results for China</b>
2000	202	216
2001	409	374
2002	478	277
2003	253	250
2004	307	292
2005	327	392
2006	599	655
2007	363	346
2008	477	521
2009	288	344
2010	186	216
2011	187	217
2012	347	259
2013	248	191
2014	274	299
2015	195	271
2016	193	403
2017	315	525
2018	245	413
2019	386	571
2020	289	537
2021	194	359

It is interesting to note that, after reaching a new high point, both topics have received declining attention between the years of 2020 and 2021: perhaps as a consequence of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in February-March 2020, media attention shifted to other, more pressing, issues.

**Figure 4.** Graphical representation of the trend of NYT articles covering the issue of Muslim minorities in China and in India, 2000-2021.



Overall, for the period under consideration in this study, it can be safely maintained that the victims of the enemy state were subjected to a more intense coverage than those victimized by the client state. To verify whether the “worthy/unworthy victims” categorisation fully applies in this case, the next sections will proceed with the analysis of the quality of coverage.

## 5.2. Official Sources and Non-official Sources

As seen in Chapter 3, the third filter of the PM discusses the sourcing of mass-media news: Herman and Chomsky’s argument is that news outlets tend to heavily rely on “official” sources for the coverage of stories considered to be particularly newsworthy. This is because sources such as government officials, business corporations, trade groups, and even independent experts and academics are all considered “credible” and “objective”, given their authority and prestige. However, Herman and Chomsky claim that “powerful sources regularly take advantage of media routines and dependency to “manage” the media, to manipulate them into following a special agenda and

framework”<sup>249</sup>. This manipulation goes so far as to what they call “co-opting the experts”, which essentially means “putting them on the payroll as consultants, funding their research, and organizing think tanks that will hire them directly and help disseminate their messages”<sup>250</sup>. Therefore, the expectation is that articles that report on issues that the government views as concerning its core interests the number of official sources cited will be higher than the number of non-official sources. As outlined in Chapter 4, US business representatives, think tank experts, and academics all fall within the “official source” categorisation, together with government officials.

In the 45 articles analysed for China in 2020, official sources were cited 399 times in total, while non-official sources were 282. In 2021, the articles under scrutiny were 31: official sources were 273, non-official sources 224. Overall, official sources were cited 672 times, with an average of 8.84 per article. Non-official sources were 506 in total, 6.66 per article on average: thus, these two variables contained a mean differential of 2.18, which indicates that each article on average contained 2.18 more citations of official sources than non-official sources, confirming the PM’s predictions. In the case of India, the situation is the opposite: the 10 articles analysed for 2020 cited only 19 official sources and 173 non-official sources. The trend did not change in 2021: 2 official and 78 non-official sources for a total of 6 articles. It is true that the number of articles retrieved on abuses against the Muslim minority in India is significantly smaller than the number of articles covering the same topic in China: however, the difference in the utilization of official and non-official sources is so remarkable that it had to be mentioned. Indeed, 19 official and 251 non-official sources in 16 articles means an average of 1.3 official and 15.7 non-official sources per article: in other words, each article covering Muslim minorities in India on average contained 14.37 more citations of non-official sources than official sources. A summary of this data can be found in Table 4: unfortunately, because of a lack of statistical knowledge, the statistical significance of each mean difference could not be estimated.

**Table 4.** Summary of official and non-official sources found, divided per country.

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N Sources</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean Diff.</b>	<b>N Articles</b>
Off. Sources CN	672	8.84	2.18	76

<sup>249</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 84.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*

Non-Off. Sources CN	506	6.66		
Off. Sources IN	21	1.31	-14.37	16
Non-Off. Sources IN	251	15.69		

Not only did the analysis of sources show that official sources were used more frequently in articles regarding the enemy state, and non-official sources were cited more often in articles on the client state, but it also exposed that, among the official sources for articles covering abuses against Muslim minorities in China, an abundance of experts working for various research institutes, think tanks, and universities was quoted. Among these establishments, it is possible to find for instance the Hudson Institute, a think tank and research centre dedicated to “promoting American leadership and engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future”<sup>251</sup>, headquartered in Washington, DC. Another such organization, also based in Washington, DC, is the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), “an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to strengthening prosperity and human welfare in the global economy through expert analysis and practical policy solutions”<sup>252</sup>. Last but not least, researchers working for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges”, whose “purpose is to define the future of national security”<sup>253</sup>, were also cited in 5 of the articles about China.

Separate consideration needs to be dedicated to another institute whose reports on the situation in Xinjiang were mentioned in 10 of the 76 articles about Muslim community abuses in China. The reports in question are: “Uyghurs for sale”<sup>254</sup>, “Genomic surveillance”<sup>255</sup>, and “Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang”<sup>256</sup>, and were all published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), an independent, non-partisan think tank that, according to its website is also “one of the most authoritative and widely quoted contributors to public discussion of strategic policy issues in the Indo-

<sup>251</sup> “About the Hudson Institute”, Hudson Institute, accessed March 21, 2022, <https://www.hudson.org/about>.

<sup>252</sup> “About PIIE”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, accessed March 21, 2022, <https://www.piie.com/about-piie>.

<sup>253</sup> “About Us”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed March 21, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/programs/about-us>.

<sup>254</sup> Vicky Xiuzhong Xu et al., *Uyghurs for sale* (Australia: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020, 2020).

<sup>255</sup> Emile Dirks and Dr. James Leibold, *Genomic surveillance* (Australia: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020, 2020).

<sup>256</sup> Fergus Ryan et al., *Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang* (Australia: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020, 2021).

Pacific region”<sup>257</sup>. ASPI was established by the Australian Government in 2001 and it receives funding from many entities such overseas governments, including the US government. What is relevant to the present work is that, according to the 2020-2021 funding documents published on the think tank’s website, the US Department of State (via the Institute for War & Peace Reporting) gave ASPI funding for research that specifically focused on human rights in Xinjiang, and on “China tech and systems of influence projects”<sup>258</sup>. Moreover, China tech projects (among other projects) also received funding from the US Department of State via the US Embassy in Canberra. For this reason, whenever reports produced by the ASPI were cited in the articles analysed, such reports were coded among the “official sources”, even though the headquarters of this institution are not located in the US. Other governments are also funding various projects of the institute: however, the US government is the only body that reportedly financed projects that concern such precise topics.

The last remarks about official sources cited in articles about China concern a German anthropologist and researcher named Adrian Zenz and his study titled “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang”<sup>259</sup>, published by the Jamestown Foundation, an anti-communist think tank based in Washington, DC. In fact, according to its website, the Jamestown foundation was founded in 1984 and “made a direct contribution to the downfall of Communism through its dissemination of information about the closed totalitarian societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”<sup>260</sup>. The foundation’s mission today is to “inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information”<sup>261</sup>—hence, Zenz’s research on Xinjiang and the Uyghurs. Overall, it seems that Herman and Chomsky’s notion of “co-opting the experts”, explained at the beginning of this section, was confirmed by the results obtained with the present study: a series of knowledgeable analysts was cited in multiple articles to support the arguments against the US government’s enemy state i.e., China.

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<sup>257</sup> “About us”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, accessed March 21, 2022, <https://www.aspi.org.au/about-aspi>.

<sup>258</sup> Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “Annex H: ASPI by the numbers”, in *ASPI Annual Report 2020-2021* (Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021): 155.

<sup>259</sup> Adrian Zenz, *Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang* (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2020).

<sup>260</sup> “About Us”, The Jamestown Foundation, accessed March 21, 2022, <https://jamestown.org/about-us/>.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*

### 5.3. Emphasis on Human Rights and Sanctions

In “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”<sup>262</sup>, Piers Robinson argues that the ideological filter functions in two ways: “on the one hand, it serves to justify substantively elite-driven policy decisions by making policies appear legitimate, natural and inevitable. On the other hand, ideology helps to marginalize or to exclude alternative positions that might destabilize official frames”<sup>263</sup>. When Herman and Chomsky first published “Manufacturing Consent”, the dominant ideology that served to justify government actions, while at the same time marginalising alternative views was anti-communism. According to Robinson, after the end of the Cold war, other ideologies emerged to replace anti-communism in its role: the war on terror, humanitarian warfare ideology and nationalism<sup>264</sup>. Others, including Herman and Chomsky themselves, have instead claimed that anti-communism was replaced by “the neoliberal ‘belief in the *miracle of the market*’”<sup>265</sup> (emphasis added).

The present study assumes a slightly different stance on the matter, maintaining that what Herman and Chomsky have called “ideology” is seen here rather as what provides the moral justification that the US administration uses to legitimise its decisions and discredit dissenting views. Such moral justification for the issue under consideration here is the human rights narrative. As reasoned by David, “the very concept of ‘ideology’ as a key political term comes from its use in the writings of Karl Marx”<sup>266</sup>. Therefore, such concept is still widely understood in connection with its Marxist definition i.e., as a manifestation of power tied to “different economic systems and the dominant modes of production”<sup>267</sup>—for this reason, the term has come to assume a negative connotation and was never really studied in connection with “the positive and highly moral intentions human rights”<sup>268</sup>. Davis goes so far as claiming that human rights are an ideology because “a) they offer an account of the existing order, a world-view, meaning they offer (relatively) clear moral boundaries of the world as it should be; b) they advance a model of a desired future, a vision of ‘good society’; and most importantly c) they explain how political change can and should be brought about”<sup>269</sup>. It is not the intention of the author to categorize human rights as an ideology and it is

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<sup>262</sup> Piers Robinson, “The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?”, in Noam Chomsky. *Critical Explorations in Contemporary Political Thought*, ed. Alison Edgley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 77-96.

<sup>263</sup> *Ivi*, 86.

<sup>264</sup> *Ivi*, 88.

<sup>265</sup> Christian Fuchs, “Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media”, in *The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Perception and Awareness*, ed. Joan Pedro-Carañana, Daniel Broudy and Jeffery Klaehn, (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018): 72.

<sup>266</sup> Lea David, “Human Rights as an Ideology? Obstacles and Benefits”, *Critical Sociology* 2020 46, no. 1 (2018): 39.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>268</sup> *Ivi*, 40.

<sup>269</sup> *Ivi*, 43-44.



beyond the scope of the present work to discuss the definition of ideology itself; nonetheless, the understanding of human rights as an analytical tool “to systematically evaluate the evolution of the Western-led global institutionalization of values and norms”<sup>270</sup> will be adopted here as a variable for the PM’s fifth filter.

The phrase “human rights” was mentioned a total of 269 times in the China coverage, 3.54 times per article on average. The same phrase was only mentioned 14 times in the coverage of abuses against Muslim communities India: 0.87 times per article on average. This result is in line with the expectations: in “Manufacturing Consent”, Herman and Chomsky claim that the ideology filter is a powerful control mechanism because it “helps mobilize the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is fuzzy it can be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests”<sup>271</sup>. Of course, in this case they referred to the anti-Communism filter; nonetheless, the assertion, *mutatis mutandis*, holds true for the human rights ideology as well. Indeed, any state that does not respect human rights will be seen as evil and as deserving to be stopped in its abuses and punished. This contention is further confirmed by looking at the other variable that was part of this category of the coding frame i.e., sanctions. Out of 76 articles covering China, 59 mention sanctions or comparable countermeasures at least once. It is important to highlight that mentions of sanctions were only counted if they were explicitly promoted by the US against China and if the argument that substantiated the punitive measure were human rights concerns—therefore, if the entity that was suggesting the imposition of sanctions was, for instance, a foreign government or, if the sanctions were suggested following worries over the Hong Kong protests, then they were not considered. The same, *mutatis mutandis*, applied to Indian. Finally, in the 16 articles on India, there is no mention of sanctions—human rights issues are referenced 14 times, the articles report on the violence and tortures that Muslim citizens are being subjected to, yet no countermeasures are considered to address the situation: suddenly it does not seem to be up to the US government to “right this wrong”. No bills are being discussed in the US House of Representatives and Senate, no boycotts are being considered, no tariffs are being raised—it is almost as if minority rights mattered only in enemy countries, while the client states are granted a “free pass”.

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<sup>270</sup> Ivi, 44.

<sup>271</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 91.

#### 5.4. Framing of the Issues

As remarked in Chapter 4, this category encompasses a series of definitions that were used in the articles mentioning the abuses against Muslim minorities: the aim of this last inquiry is to verify whether there are significant differences in the framing of the news in the two countries under consideration. The idea, once again, derives from the “worthy/unworthy” victims categorisation developed by Herman and Chomsky: indeed, they argued that political bias in the coverage of two largely similar situations can be identified by looking at the usage of specific words. For instance, they exemplify how “*genocide* is an invidious word that officials apply readily to cases of victimization in enemy states, but rarely if ever to similar or worse cases of victimization by the United States itself or allied regimes”<sup>272</sup> (emphasis added). Following this line, five main categorisations were found in the present investigation, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, repression, violence, and torture—each word is able to evoke different feelings about the events that it describes according to the degree of severity that it carries: thus, word choice is the first indicator of a frame. It needs to be pointed out that, according to Article 7 of the Rome Statute<sup>273</sup>, acts of “torture” fall under the category of “crimes against humanity”: however, torture was still listed as its own category because of the abundant usage of the word in the articles retrieved. This point directly connects to the second measure that helps distinguish a specific frame from the rest of the news i.e.,

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<sup>272</sup> Ivi, 22.

<sup>273</sup> Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as “any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

- l. Murder;
- m. Extermination;
- n. Enslavement;
- o. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
- p. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
- q. Torture;
- r. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
- s. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
- t. Enforced disappearance of persons;
- u. The crime of apartheid;
- v. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” (International Criminal Court, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, Article 7).

magnitude. Magnitude refers to the “prominence and repetition of the framing words and images”<sup>274</sup>: significant numbers of exposure to a specific word combined with its the cultural resonance can “stimulate support of or opposition to the sides in a political conflict”<sup>275</sup>—which is exactly the aim of the framing process.

Table 5 illustrates how, in the news coverage of China, “crimes against humanity” was used 16 times, while “genocide” was cited 84 times, with a peak around the time the Trump administration officially defined the situation of Muslim minorities in China as genocide, in January 2021. Indeed, the 10 articles found in the period between the months of January and April 2021, the word genocide was mentioned 52 times—almost two thirds of the overall number. “Repression” was employed 54 times, “violence” 8 times, and “torture” 12 times.

Table 5. Categorisation of terms used in the articles covering China.

<b>Categorisation</b>	<b>N mentions</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N articles</b>
Genocide	84	1.10	
Crimes Against Humanity	16	0.21	
Repression	53	0.70	76
Violence	8	0.10	
Torture	12	0.16	

On the other hand, as anticipated above, articles on India did not use the categorisations “crimes against humanity”, “genocide”, and “repression”, as the results collected in Table 6 show. Following the definition of repression provided in Chapter 4—repression as “the process by which the dominant hegemonic order attempt to maintain power by destroying, rendering harmless or appeasing those organizations, people, groups or ideologies that potentially threaten their position of power or privilege”<sup>276</sup>—the abuses committed against Muslim minorities in India described in the articles under consideration should fall within this category. Nevertheless, no usage of the word “repression”

<sup>274</sup> Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11”, *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 417.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>276</sup> Marc Owen Jones, “Defining Political Repression”, in *Political Repression in Bahrain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020): 23.

was found in the sample analysed. In contrast, the more general term “violence” was cited 65 times—4.06 times per article on average; lastly, “torture” was found 13 times, which translates to an average of 0.81 mentions per article against the average of 0.16 mentions of the same word per article for China.

**Table 6.** Categorisation of terms used in the articles covering India.

<b>Categorisation</b>	<b>N mentions</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N articles</b>
Genocide	0	0	
Crimes Against Humanity	0	0	
Repression	0	0	16
Violence	65	4.06	
Torture	13	0.81	

Last but not least, as Robert Entman argues, another way to frame an issue “entails *selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution*”<sup>277</sup> (emphasis in the original). Therefore, using culturally resonant terms to describe some events will automatically bring to the reader’s mind thoughts and feelings that they associate with such terms. Entman says that “some words and images possess sufficient resonance to impress themselves on public consciousness without requiring a significant number of exposures: airliners flying into the World Trade Center on September 11, for instance”<sup>278</sup>. The use of specific terminology and images will thus result in a frame that is more likely to move into general circulation<sup>279</sup> and have a significant (usually negative) influence on the narrative around the issue at hand. In the articles examined in this study, one such example is the description of the riots that erupted in India after the government adopted measures eroding the rights of Muslim citizens in India<sup>280</sup> as “pogroms”—an evocative word that originated in the 19th- and 20th-century as a result of the antisemitic violence in the Russian Empire that was aimed

<sup>277</sup> Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11”, *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 417.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>279</sup> *Ivi*, 420.

<sup>280</sup> The removal of Kashmir’s semiautonomous status, and the discriminatory citizenship law described in the previous chapter.

precisely at “violently demolish” Jewish communities. The word “pogrom” was used at least once in 2 of the 16 articles covering India.

Similarly, many articles on the ongoing abuses against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang did not shy away from framing the issue in an ominously negative way by making a parallel with Nazi Germany, using phrases such as “concentration camps” or making explicit references to the Holocaust. Moreover, 2 articles about the Winter Olympics held in China this past February directly compared the event to the Olympics that were held in Nazi Germany in the summer of 1936. Understandably, all these images and descriptions are bound to have a strong impact on the readers of the NYT, this is why they were chosen. However, it is interesting to highlight that, while the framing of the situation in Xinjiang is coherent with the US government’s standing on the topic, the framing of riots in India as “pogroms” is somewhat an exception and exposes a certain duality in the reporting. In fact, the riots are compared to pogroms (a word that refers to violent riots incited with the aim of massacring or expelling an ethnic or religious group), yet the overall atmosphere of intolerance resulting from the Hindu extremism that has flourished under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi only seems to lead to abuses that never go beyond the general notion of “violence” and the occasional episodes of “torture”.

# *Discussion and Conclusions*

The purpose of this final chapter is to reflect on the work done by discussing the analysis results more in depth, by acknowledging the limitations of the methods employed, and by making some recommendations for future research. In addition, the last section provides a concise answer to the research question that has served as guiding framework for this study.

### **6.1. Discussion of Findings**

The results obtained from the analysis not only were consistent with the PM, but they also yielded valuable insights with regards to the model and the overall theoretical background outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. Herman and Chomsky argue that “a propaganda model suggests that the *societal purpose* of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state”<sup>281</sup> (emphasis added). Their model theorises five filters that governmental and economic elites use to promote their preferred narrative, narrow the premises of debate, and eliminate dissenting views with the objective of engineering popular support for their political and economic interests. Similarly, Entman argues that it is the elites who have the power to set in motion the framing process and control what information is released and what narrative fits better their interests. In his cascading activation model, he explains how interpretative frames spread from the White House to the network of non-governmental elites, to news organizations and all the way down to the public. The present work has used the PM as framework to study elements such as the intensity of coverage, the sourcing of news, and the ideological component that legitimises sanctions. Moreover, the “worthy/unworthy” victim categorisation is drawn from one of the case studies that the two authors discuss in Chapter 2 of *Manufacturing Consent*, namely the analysis of the coverage of the murder of Polish priest Jerzy Popiełuszko and the victims of murder in Latin America. The CAM, on the other hand, was applied to examine the

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<sup>281</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 374.

framing of the abuses and, more broadly, of the overall word choice of the articles. In the following paragraphs, each hypothesis will be considered individually and discussed briefly.

**H1:** The victims of the enemy state i.e., China, will be found “worthy” and will be subject to more intense coverage than those victimised by the client state i.e., India.

In line with the predictions of the propaganda model, the victims of abuses perpetrated by China, the enemy state, did receive more intense coverage than those victimised by India, the client state—despite the broad comparability of the two situations. In this case, the argument that “difficulty in getting evidence on “unworthy” victims can account for the application of such a gross double standard”<sup>282</sup> is reversed: in fact, a lot of resources seem to be dedicated to searching greater amounts of evidence of the egregious violations that the Chinese government is committing against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang—a region where obtaining access to freely conduct independent research is extremely taxing. On the contrary, in India, a country where reporting would be more accessible, minorities rights are being stripped away in broad daylight and dissent is progressively silenced<sup>283</sup>, resulting in heightened ethnic and sectarian tensions<sup>284</sup> that more often than not escalate into violence, torture and, in the worst cases, killings. Yet, less voices are covering such issues, confirming Herman and Chomsky’s insights on the quality of media’s treatment of victims, which can only be explained by political factors: if an issue does not fit the interests of the elites, then it will be less likely to make it on their agenda and will thus end up receiving less media attention.

**H2:** Official sources will be cited more than non-official sources in articles covering the actions of the enemy state, and vice versa.

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<sup>282</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008): 22.

<sup>283</sup> Emily Schmall and Sameer Yasir, “‘Are We Human?’ Modi’s Use of Antiterror Law Draws Scrutiny From Courts”, *The New York Times*, October 12, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/12/world/asia/modi-india-antiterror-law.html?searchResultPosition=17>.

<sup>284</sup> Mujib Mashal, “In a Region in Strife, India’s Moral High Ground Erodes”, *The New York Times*, November 6, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/world/asia/india-region-muslim-hindu-strife.html?searchResultPosition=21>.

With regards to the third filter of the propaganda model, news sourcing, the results suggested that news frameworks of enemy states were dominated by official sources: government officials, businesses, lawmakers, researchers working for various think tanks, and university professors (among others) were cited frequently in an effort to give the articles a semblance of prestige and objectivity. However, following an argument that was brought forward by many scholars presented in Chapter 3, among which Lance Bennett, this practice resulting from routine “professional” decisions “about who and what the media should cover with their limited resources”<sup>285</sup> lays the groundwork for a news coverage that restricts the range of voices – and thus, the debate – within bounds that conform to the interests of elites. The most striking evidence of this process is the finding, presented in the previous chapter, that one of the think tanks that was cited more frequently in the 76 articles concerning China, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, receives funding from the US Department of State specifically to conduct research on human rights in Xinjiang, and on “China tech and systems of influence projects”.

**H3:** Human rights will be mentioned more often in articles covering the actions of the enemy state, to justify elite-driven policy decisions and marginalise or exclude alternative positions.

**H4:** Sanctions against the “wicked” state will be emphasised and supported.

The data collected demonstrated that human rights were indeed mentioned more frequently in articles covering the enemy state. As a matter of fact, foreign policy matters relating to China almost exclusively revolve around human rights issues, a narrative aimed at justifying the heightened attention and concern dedicated to the country and at substantiating the adoption of hostile policies as permissible countermeasures. These findings legitimise this study’s assumption that human rights can constitute the PM’s fifth filter. Furthermore, the findings for the fourth hypothesis will help explain the next point: the article analysis confirmed that sanctions against the enemy state were suggested – and welcomed – with considerable emphasis. In fact, in this category the bias is even more evident, given that no sanctions were mentioned to address the situation in the client state. These results are relevant to the creation of a propaganda narrative as they provide a highly skewed depiction of US foreign policy objectives: the economic and political reasons behind the countermeasures were

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<sup>285</sup> Lance Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”, *Journal of Communication* 40, no. 2 (1990): 103.



overlooked, leaving human rights concerns as the only purpose for this involvement—a half truth. Last but not least, the focus on human rights makes it more unlikely for someone to raise objections about the validity and necessity of hostile policies.

**H5:** News articles about the enemy state will be framing the abuses more harshly, with mentions of “genocide” or “crimes against humanity”.

The final category set out to identify all the different ways in which the abuses have been framed in the news coverage and verify whether there are significant differences between China and India: unsurprisingly, the expectation that abuses in the enemy state would be framed more harshly was confirmed by the analysis results. Once again, it was Herman and Chomsky who ascertained that the most clear-cut allegations are made in cases of victimization in enemy states: the findings presented in Chapter 5 substantiate this claim. The expressions “genocide”, “crimes against humanity”, and “repression” were only used in articles covering the abuses against Muslim minorities in China. On the other hand, “violence”, an especially general term, was mentioned on average 4 times per article in the case of victims of the client state, while it was mentioned on average less than once per article in cases of victimization in China. The frames of abuses against Muslim minorities in China as repression, genocide and crimes against humanity so thoroughly dominate the media “that alternative readings become virtually irrelevant to politics”<sup>286</sup>—moreover, the frequent associations between the situation under consideration and Nazi Germany, concentration camps and the Holocaust provide an additional, extraordinarily potent and culturally resonant frame that further discourages even slightly dissenting interpretations, therefore cementing the hold of the dominant frame.

## **6.2. Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research**

While the findings of this investigation provided significant support for the hypotheses, there are various limitations within the methodology that must be addressed. Acknowledging such limitations is crucial because it allows to make insightful recommendations for future research: first and foremost, the analysis sample could be broadened to improve the accuracy of the results obtained. For instance, a database such as LexisNexis could be used to retrieve the materials, and the keywords

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<sup>286</sup> Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11”, *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): 418.

could be limited to “China” or “India” and “Muslim”, in order to expand the range of the articles to include a more comprehensive coverage narrative on Muslim minorities in both countries. In this regard, it is necessary to pause for a moment and briefly discuss an issue that was not yet fully addressed and that might be viewed as a limitation of some sorts i.e., the validity of the case studies examined. It may be reasoned that the comparison between the two situations is not convincing because of the differences in the execution of the abuses: indeed, in China the policies targeting Muslim minorities are imposed by the central government in Beijing and carried out by local officials, while in India the abuses are committed by the police and average citizens in a less systematic and more chaotic fashion. However, one element, namely the intention to perpetrate the abuses, is common to both situations: in India, this intention is justified by arguments involving a religious component (the aspiration of Hindu extremists to build a Hindu country), while in China they involve an ethnic component (the aspiration to build a strong and unified Han country). Attention needs to be drawn to the fact that both these aspirations are endorsed and, if not explicitly promoted, then at least not disputed, by the highest government representatives of both countries, which gives additional legitimacy and strength to the aspirations themselves. Finally, the validity of this case study finds further confirmation in one of the articles analysed, which claims that “human rights experts say it is troubling that the United States talks so strongly about human rights abuses in China, but is willing to engage in deeper diplomatic and strategic ties with India where similar situations are occurring”<sup>287</sup>.

Returning to more strictly methodology-related matters—always in the interest of increasing the accuracy of the results obtained, future research could broaden the analysis sample also by examining news coverage over a much longer period or by studying specific time periods over the years. To decide which periods to inspect, it could be useful to first look at the general trend, as was done in Figure 4 in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the examination could be expanded to more than one mainstream publication and include other US media outlets such as the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, or *USA Today*, which are all among the most read newspapers in the country—this would allow to identify with greater precision the degrees of subservience of each publication to government framings of the issue at hand. To make matters even more interesting, future studies could also focus on mainstream right-leaning publications in the sample: this would allow to gain a more wide-ranging understanding of how news outlets in the US function in relation to the propaganda model. Finally, in connection to the methodology adopted in this work, a second coder could be asked to code for a randomly selected sample to ensure the reliability of the data

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<sup>287</sup> Pranshu Verma, “In Wake of Recent India-China Conflict, U.S. Sees Opportunity”, *The New York Times*, October 3, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/world/asia/india-china-trump.html?searchResultPosition=103>.

collected. Statistical tools such as t-tests and regression analyses could be used to mathematically verify the overall differences and trends in the presentation of content and to highlight trends and associations between variables across different coding categories.

### 6.3. Concluding Remarks

The concluding part of this study will offer concise answers to the two research questions posed in the introduction—each question is considered individually:

**RQ1:** Is the *New York Times*' coverage of abuses against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang biased in comparison to the coverage of similar abuses committed in another country e.g., India?

The research conducted here showed exactly in which respects the NYT's coverage of the abuses in China differed from that of the abuses in India: disparities in intensity, sourcing, emphasis on human rights and sanctions, and framing have been well recorded in the discussion above. Overall, it can be safely argued that the coverage of human rights violations against the Muslim community in China is rather biased. If the US administration was truly concerned for the state of Muslim minorities in the world, the coverage of the situation in India would be at least slightly more indignant, with a few mentions of the word "repression" and a higher number of official sources i.e., the indicator of the degree to which government narratives on specific issues are being echoed (and, to some extent, endorsed). Therefore, it can be inferred that the US is in fact instrumentalizing the human rights narrative to legitimize its increasingly hostile attitude towards China. This insight is further confirmed by a sentence contained in one of the articles analysed—the topic of discussion was the Trump administration's last-minute decision to declare that China is committing genocide, and the author's comment was that "the decision to push through significant foreign policy measures so quickly – and during a time of turmoil in Washington – risks politicizing the issues and undermining their ability to gain global traction"<sup>288</sup>.

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<sup>288</sup> Amy Qin, "Trump's Last-Minute Moves Against China Complicate Biden's Agenda", *The New York Times*, January 20, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/asia/trump-china-biden.html?searchResultPosition=9>.

**RQ2:** If so, can this biased narrative be defined as propaganda and be understood as arising from a larger situation i.e., the ongoing strategic competition between the US and China?

The concept of propaganda was defined in Chapter 4: following Welch’s definition, propaganda can be described as “the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly”<sup>289</sup> and it is mainly employed when foreign policy issues are at stake. As established above, ruling out the genuine interest of the US government for human rights violations in China allows to argue with a good degree of certainty that such narrative is being exploited for ulterior motives, which can only be political or economic in nature. Therefore, the bias registered in the coverage of the two situations at hand possesses all the characteristics that define propaganda. This does not mean that the repression of Muslim minorities should not be condemned: it just means that it should not be instrumentalised, and similar situations should be equally emphasised and not marginalised for the sake of geopolitical competition.

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<sup>289</sup> David Welch, “Propaganda: An Historical Perspective”, accessed March 17, 2022, <https://www.socialismonfilm.amdigital.co.uk/Explore/Essays/Welch>.

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ANNEX I

*Complete List of Articles: China*

Title	Author(s)	Date (DD/MM/YY)	Type of article	Relevant*	Link
The Best and the Worst of the Golden Globes	The New York Times	06/01/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/movies/golden-globes-best-worst.html?searchResultPosition=1">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/movies/golden-globes-best-worst.html?searchResultPosition=1</a>
Trump Administration's Actions in Middle East Complicate Its Criticisms of China	Edward Wong	09/01/20	News analysis	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/world/asia/trump-china-iran.html?searchResultPosition=1">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/world/asia/trump-china-iran.html?searchResultPosition=1</a>
Bernie Sanders Wants to Change Your Mind	The Editorial Board	13/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/bernie-sanders-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=3">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/bernie-sanders-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=3</a>
Cory Booker Has More to Say	The Editorial Board	13/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/cory-booker-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=4">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/cory-booker-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=4</a>
Andrew Yang Is Listening	The Editorial Board	15/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/15/opinion/andrew-yang-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=5">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/15/opinion/andrew-yang-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=5</a>
Amy Klobuchar on Plans vs. Pipe Dreams	The Editorial Board	15/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/15/opinion/amy-klobuchar-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=6">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/15/opinion/amy-klobuchar-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=6</a>
Pete Buttigieg Says He's More Than a Résumé	The Editorial Board	16/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/16/opinion/pete-buttigieg-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=7">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/16/opinion/pete-buttigieg-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=7</a>
Joe Biden Says Age Is Just a Number	The Editorial Board	17/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=8">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=8</a>
Australian Open, Meng Wanzhou, Uighurs: Your Monday Briefing	Melina Delkic	19/01/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/briefing/australian-open-meng-wanzhou-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=9">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/briefing/australian-open-meng-wanzhou-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=9</a>
Her Uighur Parents Were Model Chinese Citizens. It Didn't Matter.	Sarah A. Topol	29/01/20	Feature article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/magazine/uyghur-muslims-china.html?searchResultPosition=10">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/magazine/uyghur-muslims-china.html?searchResultPosition=10</a>
*0 = No; 1 = Yes.					

Here's What Joe Biden Is Saying in Iowa, and Why	Katie Glueck	30/01/20	Annotations Analysis	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/31/us/politics/joe-biden-campaign-speech.html?searchResultPosition=11">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/31/us/politics/joe-biden-campaign-speech.html?searchResultPosition=11</a>
Here Are the Guests for the State of the Union	Neil Vigdor	04/02/20	US elections project	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/us/politics/state-of-the-union-guests.html?searchResultPosition=12">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/us/politics/state-of-the-union-guests.html?searchResultPosition=12</a>
Pete Buttigieg - Foreign Policy	Maggie Astor and David Sanger	06/02/20	US elections project	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/pete-buttigieg-foreign-policy.html?searchResultPosition=13">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/pete-buttigieg-foreign-policy.html?searchResultPosition=13</a>
Elizabeth Warren - Foreign Policy	Maggie Astor and David Sanger	06/02/20	US elections project	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-foreign-policy.html?searchResultPosition=14">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-foreign-policy.html?searchResultPosition=14</a>
Bernie Sanders - Foreign Policy	Maggie Astor and David Sanger	06/02/20	US elections project	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/bernie-sanders-foreign-policy.html">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/bernie-sanders-foreign-policy.html</a>
Tom Steyer - Foreign Policy	Maggie Astor and David Sanger	06/02/20	US elections project	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/tom-steyer-foreign-policy.html">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/tom-steyer-foreign-policy.html</a>
China - Foreign Policy	Maggie Astor and David Sanger	06/02/20	US elections project	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/2020-democrats-china-foreign-policy.html?searchResultPosition=17">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/2020-democrats-china-foreign-policy.html?searchResultPosition=17</a>
U.S. Designates China's Official Media as Operatives of the Communist State	Lara Jakes and Steven Lee Myers	18/02/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/world/asia/china-media-trump.html?searchResultPosition=18">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/world/asia/china-media-trump.html?searchResultPosition=18</a>
Your Thursday Briefing	Melina Delkic	26/02/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/briefing/coronavirus-new-delhi-modi-india.html?searchResultPosition=19">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/briefing/coronavirus-new-delhi-modi-india.html?searchResultPosition=19</a>
Coronavirus, Democrats, Milwaukee: Your Thursday Briefing	Chris Stanford	27/02/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/briefing/coronavirus-democrats-milwaukee.html?searchResultPosition=20">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/briefing/coronavirus-democrats-milwaukee.html?searchResultPosition=20</a>
U.S. Lawmakers Propose Tough Limits on Imports from Xinjiang	Austin Ramzy	11/03/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/world/asia/xinjiang-china-labor-bill.html?searchResultPosition=21">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/world/asia/xinjiang-china-labor-bill.html?searchResultPosition=21</a>
Critics Hear Political Tone as Pompeo Calls Out Diplomatic Rivals Over Human Rights	Lara Jakes	11/03/20	"Politics"	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/us/politics/pompeo-global-human-rights.html?searchResultPosition=22">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/us/politics/pompeo-global-human-rights.html?searchResultPosition=22</a>



Making Connections: 56 Teenagers Suggest Creative Ways to Link School Curriculum to the World of 2020	The Learning Network	13/03/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/learning/making-connections-56-teenagers-suggest-creative-ways-to-link-school-curriculum-to-the-world-of-2020.html?searchResultPosition=23">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/learning/making-connections-56-teenagers-suggest-creative-ways-to-link-school-curriculum-to-the-world-of-2020.html?searchResultPosition=23</a>
Virus Guidelines, Market Collapse, Primaries: Your Monday Evening Briefing	Victoria Shannon and Hiroko Masuike	16/03/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/briefing/virus-guidelines-market-collapse-primaries.html?searchResultPosition=24">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/briefing/virus-guidelines-market-collapse-primaries.html?searchResultPosition=24</a>
The Terrorist Who Got Away	Yudhijit Bhattacharjee	19/03/20	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/magazine/masood-azhar-jaish.html?searchResultPosition=25">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/magazine/masood-azhar-jaish.html?searchResultPosition=25</a>
Spit On, Yelled At, Attacked: Chinese-Americans Fear for Their Safety	Sabrina Tavernise and Richard A. Oppel Jr.	23/03/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.html?searchResultPosition=26">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.html?searchResultPosition=26</a>
How Asian-American Leaders Are Grappling With Xenophobia Amid Coronavirus	Matt Stevens	29/03/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/us/politics/coronavirus-asian-americans.html?searchResultPosition=27">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/us/politics/coronavirus-asian-americans.html?searchResultPosition=27</a>
Of the Virus and God, Orange Peels and the Party	Yangyang Cheng	03/04/20	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-china-US.html?searchResultPosition=28">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-china-US.html?searchResultPosition=28</a>
Trump Again Promotes Use of Unproven Anti-Malaria Drug; Deaths in Country May Be Undercounted	Various authors	05/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=29">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=29</a>
White House Adviser Warned of Risks of Pandemic; Trump Misleads on Testing	Various authors	06/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=30">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=30</a>
Trump Attacks W.H.O. and Ousts Watchdog for Pandemic Fund	Various authors	07/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/world/coronavirus-updates-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=31">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/world/coronavirus-updates-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=31</a>
Coronavirus Caseload Tops 1.6 Million, as Countries Greet Easter Weekend with Lockdowns	Various authors	10/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/world/coronavirus-world-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=32">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/world/coronavirus-world-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=32</a>
Britain Surpasses 10,000 Coronavirus Deaths as Boris Johnson Leaves Hospital; Pope Speaks of ‘Contagion of Hope’	Various authors	12/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=33">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=33</a>
The Foreign Correspondents Explaining America to the World	Jane Perlez	13/04/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/13/t-magazine/foreign-correspondents.html?searchResultPosition=34">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/13/t-magazine/foreign-correspondents.html?searchResultPosition=34</a>
W.H.O. Failed to Tell Syrian Kurds of Their First Coronavirus Death	Various authors	17/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/world/coronavirus-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=35">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/world/coronavirus-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=35</a>

Germany Starts Broad Antibody Testing to Assess Spread of Coronavirus; Israel Relaxes Restrictions	Various authors	18/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/coronavirus-cases-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=36">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/coronavirus-cases-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=36</a>
In Ecuador, Coronavirus Deaths Go Uncounted	Various authors	23/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=37">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=37</a>
'This Government Is Lucky': Coronavirus Quiets Global Protest Movements	Vivian Wang, Maria Abi-Habib and Vivian Yee	23/04/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/asia/coronavirus-protest-hong-kong-india-lebanon.html?searchResultPosition=38">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/asia/coronavirus-protest-hong-kong-india-lebanon.html?searchResultPosition=38</a>
E.U. Waters Down Report on China's Coronavirus Propaganda	Various authors	24/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/world/coronavirus-world-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=39">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/world/coronavirus-world-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=39</a>
Global Virus Death Toll Crosses 200,000; Italy to Ease Restrictions in May	Various authors	26/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=40">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=40</a>
Scientists Race For a Coronavirus Vaccine	Various authors	27/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/world/coronavirus-world-pandemic.html?searchResultPosition=41">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/world/coronavirus-world-pandemic.html?searchResultPosition=41</a>
Sister Fights to Free Uighur Businessman Held in China After U.S. Trip	Edward Wong	09/05/20	"Politics"	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/us/politics/china-uighurs-arrest.html?searchResultPosition=42">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/us/politics/china-uighurs-arrest.html?searchResultPosition=42</a>
Xi Jinping Uses Pandemic to Strengthen His Rule in China	Various authors	20/05/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/world/coronavirus-world-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=43">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/world/coronavirus-world-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=43</a>
Reported Coronavirus Cases Top 5 Million Worldwide	Various authors	21/05/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/coronavirus-world-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=44">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/coronavirus-world-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=44</a>
Trump Bans Travel From Brazil, Citing Pandemic	Various authors	24/05/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/24/world/coronavirus-news-update.html?searchResultPosition=45">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/24/world/coronavirus-news-update.html?searchResultPosition=45</a>
House Passes Uighur Human Rights Bill, Prodding Trump to Punish China	Catie Edmondson	27/05/20	"Politics"	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/politics/house-uighurs-china-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=46">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/politics/house-uighurs-china-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=46</a>
Global Anger Grows Over George Floyd Death, and Becomes an Anti-Trump Cudgel	Javier C. Hernández and Benjamin Mueller	01/06/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/world/asia/george-floyd-protest-global.html?searchResultPosition=47">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/world/asia/george-floyd-protest-global.html?searchResultPosition=47</a>
Minneapolis, Tiananmen Vigil, Israel: Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic and Carole Landry	01/06/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/briefing/minneapolis-protests-tiananmen-hong-kong.html?searchResultPosition=48">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/briefing/minneapolis-protests-tiananmen-hong-kong.html?searchResultPosition=48</a>
China Shuts Vast Beijing Market as It Hunts Coronavirus Cluster	Various authors	12/06/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/world/coronavirus-us-usa-updates.html?searchResultPosition=49">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/world/coronavirus-us-usa-updates.html?searchResultPosition=49</a>

China Is Collecting DNA From Tens of Millions of Men and Boys, Using U.S. Equipment	Sui-Lee Wee	17/06/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/China-DNA-surveillance.html?searchResultPosition=50">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/China-DNA-surveillance.html?searchResultPosition=50</a>
Runners-Up From Our 7th Annual Student Editorial Contest	The Learning Network	17/06/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/learning/runners-up-from-our-7th-annual-student-editorial-contest.html?searchResultPosition=51">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/learning/runners-up-from-our-7th-annual-student-editorial-contest.html?searchResultPosition=51</a>
Chinese Surveillance, Bolton Book, North Korea: Your Thursday Briefing	Melina Delkic	17/06/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/briefing/chinese-surveillance-bolton-book.html?searchResultPosition=52">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/briefing/chinese-surveillance-bolton-book.html?searchResultPosition=52</a>
The Accusations in John Bolton's Book About Trump	Various NYT readers	18/06/20	Letters to the editor	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/opinion/letters/bolton-book-trump.html?searchResultPosition=53">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/opinion/letters/bolton-book-trump.html?searchResultPosition=53</a>
The Biggest Obstacle to China Policy: President Trump	Edward Wong and Michael Crowley	18/06/20	News analysis	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/us/politics/trump-china-bolton.html?searchResultPosition=54">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/us/politics/trump-china-bolton.html?searchResultPosition=54</a>
China's Man in Washington, Named Trump	Nicholas Kristof	20/06/20	Opinion	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/opinion/sunday/trump-china-john-bolton-book.html?searchResultPosition=55">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/opinion/sunday/trump-china-john-bolton-book.html?searchResultPosition=55</a>
Trump Says He Avoided Punishing China Over Uighur Camps to Protect Trade Talks	Michael Crowley	21/06/20	"Politics"	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/us/politics/trump-uighurs-china-trade.html?searchResultPosition=56">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/us/politics/trump-uighurs-china-trade.html?searchResultPosition=56</a>
The Risk of 'Overnight Ruin'	Unclear	22/06/20	Dealbook Newsletter	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/business/dealbook/clayton-sec-berman.html?searchResultPosition=57">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/business/dealbook/clayton-sec-berman.html?searchResultPosition=57</a>
Hajj, Novak Djokovic, Europe Travel: Your Wednesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	23/06/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/briefing/hajj-saudi-arabia-fauci-djokovic.html?searchResultPosition=58">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/briefing/hajj-saudi-arabia-fauci-djokovic.html?searchResultPosition=58</a>
China and America Are Heading Toward Divorce	Thomas L. Friedman	23/06/20	Opinion	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/opinion/china-united-states-trump.html?searchResultPosition=59">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/opinion/china-united-states-trump.html?searchResultPosition=59</a>
Europe Travel Ban, Hajj, Burkina Faso: Your Wednesday Briefing	Isabella Kwai	24/06/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/briefing/europe-travel-hajj-burkina-faso.html?searchResultPosition=60">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/briefing/europe-travel-hajj-burkina-faso.html?searchResultPosition=60</a>
Why the Coronavirus Is Winning	David Leonhardt	24/06/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/briefing/kentucky-primary-rayshard-brooks-major-league-baseball-your-wednesday-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=61">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/briefing/kentucky-primary-rayshard-brooks-major-league-baseball-your-wednesday-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=61</a>
Bogus Ideas Have Superspreaders, Too	Shira Ovide	01/07/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/social-media-superspreaders.html?searchResultPosition=62">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/social-media-superspreaders.html?searchResultPosition=62</a>
President Trump Has Tools to Pressure China. Will He Use Them?	The Editorial Board	01/07/20	Editorial	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/opinion/china-hong-kong-uighur-trump.html?searchResultPosition=63">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/opinion/china-hong-kong-uighur-trump.html?searchResultPosition=63</a>

Senate Sends Trump a Bill to Punish Chinese Officials Over Hong Kong	Catie Edmondson	02/07/20	"Politics"	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/us/politics/senate-china-hong-kong-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=64">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/us/politics/senate-china-hong-kong-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=64</a>
Facebook, Israel's outbreak, Uighurs: Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	06/07/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/briefing/facebook-hong-kong-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=65">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/briefing/facebook-hong-kong-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=65</a>
U.K. Sanctions, Facebook, Jair Bolsonaro: Your Tuesday Briefing	Isabella Kwai	07/07/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/briefing/uk-sanctions-facebook-jair-bolsonaro.html?searchResultPosition=66">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/briefing/uk-sanctions-facebook-jair-bolsonaro.html?searchResultPosition=66</a>
Over 100 Lesson Plans Based on New York Times Articles	The Learning Network	08/07/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/learning/lesson-plans/over-100-lesson-plans-based-on-new-york-times-articles.html?searchResultPosition=67">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/learning/lesson-plans/over-100-lesson-plans-based-on-new-york-times-articles.html?searchResultPosition=67</a>
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Officials Over Mass Detention of Muslims	Pranshu Verma and Edward Wong	09/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/world/asia/trump-china-sanctions-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=68">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/world/asia/trump-china-sanctions-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=68</a>
China Imposes Tit-for-Tat Sanctions on Three American Lawmakers	Keith Bradsher	13/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/world/asia/china-sanctions-rubio-cruz.html?searchResultPosition=69">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/world/asia/china-sanctions-rubio-cruz.html?searchResultPosition=69</a>
Hong Kong Restrictions, Seoul Mayor, Christchurch Shooter: Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	13/07/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/briefing/hong-kong-virus-seoul-mayor-accusations.html?searchResultPosition=70">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/briefing/hong-kong-virus-seoul-mayor-accusations.html?searchResultPosition=70</a>
U.S. Weighs Sweeping Travel Ban on Chinese Communist Party Members	Paul Mozur and Edward Wong	15/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/us/politics/china-travel-ban.html?searchResultPosition=71">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/us/politics/china-travel-ban.html?searchResultPosition=71</a>
European Union Fund, Bulgaria Protests, Mars Mission: Your Monday Briefing	Isabella Kwai	20/07/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/briefing/european-union-bulgaria-protests-mars-mission.html?searchResultPosition=72">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/briefing/european-union-bulgaria-protests-mars-mission.html?searchResultPosition=72</a>
Top Democrats Send Letter on Possible Foreign Meddling in November Election	Various authors	20/07/20	Elections updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/us/elections/biden-vs-trump.html?searchResultPosition=73">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/us/elections/biden-vs-trump.html?searchResultPosition=73</a>
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on 11 Chinese Companies Over Human Rights	Ana Swanson	20/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/business/economy/china-sanctions-uighurs-labor.html?searchResultPosition=74">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/business/economy/china-sanctions-uighurs-labor.html?searchResultPosition=74</a>
Banned Chinese Companies Deny Allegations They Abused Uighurs	Ana Swanson	21/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/business/china-us-trade-banned.html?searchResultPosition=75">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/business/china-us-trade-banned.html?searchResultPosition=75</a>
How the Cold War Between China and U.S. Is Intensifying	Rick Gladstone	22/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/world/asia/us-china-cold-war.html?searchResultPosition=76">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/world/asia/us-china-cold-war.html?searchResultPosition=76</a>
Coalition Brings Pressure to End Forced Uighur Labor	Elizabeth Paton and Austin Ramzy	23/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/fashion/uighur-forced-labor-cotton-fashion.html?searchResultPosition=77">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/fashion/uighur-forced-labor-cotton-fashion.html?searchResultPosition=77</a>
China Is Harvesting the DNA of Its People. Is This the Future of Policing?	Emile Dirks and James Leibold	24/07/20	OP-ED	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/opinion/china-dna-police.html?searchResultPosition=78">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/opinion/china-dna-police.html?searchResultPosition=78</a>

Once a Source of U.S.-China Tension, Trade Emerges as an Area of Calm	Ana Swanson and Keith Bradsher	25/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/business/economy/us-china-trade-diplomacy.html?searchResultPosition=79">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/business/economy/us-china-trade-diplomacy.html?searchResultPosition=79</a>
Migrant Workers, Poland, TikTok: Your Tuesday Briefing	Isabella Kwai	28/07/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/briefing/migrant-workers-poland-tiktok.html?searchResultPosition=80">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/briefing/migrant-workers-poland-tiktok.html?searchResultPosition=80</a>
What Would a Cold War With China Look Like?	Spencer Bokart-Lindell	28/07/20	Opinion	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/opinion/trump-china.html?searchResultPosition=81">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/opinion/trump-china.html?searchResultPosition=81</a>
Report: N.B.A.'s Academies in China Abused Athletes	Sopan Deb	29/07/20	Report?	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/sports/basketball/nba-china-abuse.html?searchResultPosition=82">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/sports/basketball/nba-china-abuse.html?searchResultPosition=82</a>
U.S. Adds Sanctions Over Internment of Muslims in China	Ana Swanson and Edward Wong	31/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/us/politics/sanctions-china-xinjiang-ughurs.html?searchResultPosition=83">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/us/politics/sanctions-china-xinjiang-ughurs.html?searchResultPosition=83</a>
Trump Administration Penalizes Hong Kong Officials for Crackdown on Protesters	Pranshu Verma and Edward Wong	07/08/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/world/asia/trump-china-hong-kong-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=84">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/world/asia/trump-china-hong-kong-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=84</a>
Hong Kong Officials Condemn and Mock Trump Administration Sanctions	Paul Mozur	08/08/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/world/asia/hong-kong-sanctions-united-states.html?searchResultPosition=85">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/world/asia/hong-kong-sanctions-united-states.html?searchResultPosition=85</a>
U.S. Suspends Bilateral Agreements With Hong Kong, Escalating Tensions With China	Pranshu Verma	19/08/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/trump-china-hong-kong.html?searchResultPosition=86">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/trump-china-hong-kong.html?searchResultPosition=86</a>
California vs. Ride-share Companies	Sanam Yar and Ian Prasad Philbrick	20/08/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/kamala-harris-california-aleksei-navalny-your-thursday-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=87">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/kamala-harris-california-aleksei-navalny-your-thursday-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=87</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	20/08/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/south-korea-outbreak-china-crackdown-navalny.html?searchResultPosition=88">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/south-korea-outbreak-china-crackdown-navalny.html?searchResultPosition=88</a>
Republicans Renominate Trump in a Roll Call Infused With Fear-Mongering	Annie Karni	24/08/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/us/politics/rnc-trump.html?searchResultPosition=89">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/us/politics/rnc-trump.html?searchResultPosition=89</a>
C.D.C. Changes Testing Guidance to Exclude People Without Covid-19 Symptoms, Worrying Experts	Various authors	25/08/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/world/covid-19-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=90">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/world/covid-19-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=90</a>
China Locks Down Xinjiang to Fight Covid-19, Angering Residents	Javier C. Hernández	25/08/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/world/asia/china-xinjiang-covid.html?searchResultPosition=91">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/world/asia/china-xinjiang-covid.html?searchResultPosition=91</a>
Pompeo Delivers R.N.C. Speech From Israel, With Eye Toward 2024	Lara Jakes	25/08/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/us/politics/pompeo-trump-jerusalem-republican-convention.html?searchResultPosition=92">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/us/politics/pompeo-trump-jerusalem-republican-convention.html?searchResultPosition=92</a>

Your Wednesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	25/08/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/briefing/xinjiang-lockdown-alibaba-ant-group.html?searchResultPosition=93">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/briefing/xinjiang-lockdown-alibaba-ant-group.html?searchResultPosition=93</a>
U.S. Penalizes 24 Chinese Companies Over Role in South China Sea	Ana Swanson	26/08/20	News	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/business/economy/trump-sanctions-south-china-sea.html?searchResultPosition=94">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/business/economy/trump-sanctions-south-china-sea.html?searchResultPosition=94</a>
Parties and Covid-19 Outbreaks Threaten University Reopenings in the U.S.	Various authors	07/09/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/world/covid-19-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=95">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/world/covid-19-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=95</a>
U.S. May Ban Cotton From Xinjiang Region of China Over Rights Concerns	Ana Swanson	07/09/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/business/economy/us-china-xinjiang-cotton-ban.html?searchResultPosition=96">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/business/economy/us-china-xinjiang-cotton-ban.html?searchResultPosition=96</a>
Why Calls to Boycott ‘Mulan’ Over Concerns About China Are Growing	Amy Qin and Edward Wong	08/09/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/08/world/asia/china-mulan-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=97">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/08/world/asia/china-mulan-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=97</a>
Disney Wanted to Make a Splash in China With ‘Mulan.’ It Stumbled Instead.	Brooks Barnes and Amy Qin	12/09/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/business/media/disney-mulan-china.html?searchResultPosition=98">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/business/media/disney-mulan-china.html?searchResultPosition=98</a>
U.S. Restricts Chinese Apparel and Tech Products, Citing Forced Labor	Ana Swanson	14/09/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/business/economy/us-china-forced-labor-imports.html?searchResultPosition=99">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/business/economy/us-china-forced-labor-imports.html?searchResultPosition=99</a>
Senate Democrats Present \$350 Billion Strategy to Counter China	Catie Edmondson	17/09/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/politics/democrats-china-strategy.html?searchResultPosition=100">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/politics/democrats-china-strategy.html?searchResultPosition=100</a>
Under 10 Percent of Americans Have Covid-19 Antibodies, Study Finds	Various authors	25/09/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/world/covid-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=101">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/world/covid-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=101</a>
Rebuffed by Vatican, Pompeo Assails China and Aligns With Pope’s Critics	Jason Horowitz and Lara Jakes	30/09/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/world/europe/pompeo-pope-francis-china.html?searchResultPosition=102">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/world/europe/pompeo-pope-francis-china.html?searchResultPosition=102</a>
In Wake of Recent India-China Conflict, U.S. Sees Opportunity	Pranshu Verma	03/10/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/world/asia/india-china-trump.html?searchResultPosition=103">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/world/asia/india-china-trump.html?searchResultPosition=103</a>
Your Monday Briefing	Carole Landry	04/10/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/04/briefing/trump-coronavirus-india-us-china-kenzo.html?searchResultPosition=104">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/04/briefing/trump-coronavirus-india-us-china-kenzo.html?searchResultPosition=104</a>
‘We Were Bulletproof’: As Child Soldiers Grow Up, Legacy of War Lingers	Hannah Beech	12/10/20	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/world/asia/myanmar-thailand-gods-army-htoo-twins.html?searchResultPosition=105">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/world/asia/myanmar-thailand-gods-army-htoo-twins.html?searchResultPosition=105</a>
The 25 Most Influential Works of American Protest Art Since World War II	Thessaly La Force, Zoë Lescage, Nancy Hass and M.H. Miller	15/10/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/t-magazine/most-influential-protest-art.html?searchResultPosition=106">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/t-magazine/most-influential-protest-art.html?searchResultPosition=106</a>
Your Monday Briefing	Carole Landry	25/10/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/briefing/china-virus-hongkong-southkorea-us-election.html?searchResultPosition=107">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/briefing/china-virus-hongkong-southkorea-us-election.html?searchResultPosition=107</a>

Who Will Fill Biden's Cabinet?	The New York Times	11/11/20	"Politics"	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/us/politics/biden-cabinet.html?searchResultPosition=108">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/us/politics/biden-cabinet.html?searchResultPosition=108</a>
How Steve Bannon and a Chinese Billionaire Created a Right-Wing Coronavirus Media Sensation	Amy Qin, Vivian Wang and Danny Hakim	20/11/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/20/business/media/steve-bannon-china.html?searchResultPosition=109">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/20/business/media/steve-bannon-china.html?searchResultPosition=109</a>
China's Surveillance State Sucks Up Data. U.S. Tech Is Key to Sorting It.	Paul Mozur and Don Clark	22/11/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/technology/china-intel-nvidia-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=110">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/technology/china-intel-nvidia-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=110</a>
Pope Calls Uighurs 'Persecuted,' Prompting Pushback From China	Gaia Pianigiani	24/11/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/world/europe/pope-francis-uighurs-persecuted.html?searchResultPosition=111">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/world/europe/pope-francis-uighurs-persecuted.html?searchResultPosition=111</a>
The Best Books to Give This Year	Various authors	25/11/20	Book reviews	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/25/books/gifts-for-book-lovers.html?searchResultPosition=112">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/25/books/gifts-for-book-lovers.html?searchResultPosition=112</a>
Maradona, Covid-19, Macron: Your Thursday Briefing	Natasha Frost	25/11/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/25/briefing/thanksgiving-covid-macron-islam-maradona.html?searchResultPosition=113">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/25/briefing/thanksgiving-covid-macron-islam-maradona.html?searchResultPosition=113</a>
Nike and Coca-Cola Lobby Against Xinjiang Forced Labor Bill	Ana Swanson	29/11/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/29/business/economy/nike-coca-cola-xinjiang-forced-labor-bill.html?searchResultPosition=114">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/29/business/economy/nike-coca-cola-xinjiang-forced-labor-bill.html?searchResultPosition=114</a>
Australia Condemns Lurid Tweet by Chinese Official as 'Disgusting Slur'	Livia Albeck-Ripka and Austin Ramzy	30/11/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/world/australia/china-tweet-soldier.html?searchResultPosition=115">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/world/australia/china-tweet-soldier.html?searchResultPosition=115</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Victoria Shannon	03/12/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/briefing/vaccine-us-britain-hongkong-china.html?searchResultPosition=116">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/briefing/vaccine-us-britain-hongkong-china.html?searchResultPosition=116</a>
Justice Dept. Suit Says Facebook Discriminates Against U.S. Workers	Cecilia Kang and Mike Isaac	03/12/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/technology/facebook-hiring-discrimination-suit.html?searchResultPosition=117">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/technology/facebook-hiring-discrimination-suit.html?searchResultPosition=117</a>
I.C.C. Won't Investigate China's Detention of Muslims	Javier C. Hernández	15/12/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/world/asia/icc-china-uighur-muslim.html?searchResultPosition=118">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/world/asia/icc-china-uighur-muslim.html?searchResultPosition=118</a>
Your Wednesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	15/12/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/briefing/virus-vaccines-icc-uighurs-korea-couriers.html?searchResultPosition=119">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/briefing/virus-vaccines-icc-uighurs-korea-couriers.html?searchResultPosition=119</a>
As China Tracked Muslims, Alibaba Showed Customers How They Could, Too	Raymond Zhong	16/12/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/technology/alibaba-china-facial-recognition-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=120">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/technology/alibaba-china-facial-recognition-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=120</a>
Read the Criminal Complaint Against Julien Jin	Unclear	18/12/20	PDF document	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/18/nyregion/julien-jin-complaint.html?searchResultPosition=121">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/18/nyregion/julien-jin-complaint.html?searchResultPosition=121</a>
China-E.U. Talks Hit Another Snag as Biden Camp Objects	Jack Ewing, Steven Lee Myers and Ana Swanson	23/12/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/business/china-european-union-united-states.html?searchResultPosition=122">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/business/china-european-union-united-states.html?searchResultPosition=122</a>

Globetrotting	Tammy Tarng	23/12/20	Book preview	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/books/new-books-international.html?searchResultPosition=123">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/books/new-books-international.html?searchResultPosition=123</a>
China and E.U. Leaders Strike Investment Deal, but Political Hurdles Await	Jack Ewing and Steven Lee Myers	30/12/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/business/china-eu-investment-deal.html?searchResultPosition=124">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/business/china-eu-investment-deal.html?searchResultPosition=124</a>
'From Crisis to Crisis': The Moments That Defined a Historic Congress	Emily Cochrane	02/01/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/02/us/politics/congress-impeachment-coronavirus-trump.html?searchResultPosition=1">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/02/us/politics/congress-impeachment-coronavirus-trump.html?searchResultPosition=1</a>
China's New Rules Could Hit U.S. Firms and Send a Message to Biden	Amy Qin	09/01/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/business/china-rules-trump-biden-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=2">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/business/china-rules-trump-biden-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=2</a>
Fiji Will Lead U.N. Rights Body, Over Russian and Chinese Opposition	Nick Cumming-Bruce	15/01/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/world/UN-rights-council-fiji.html?searchResultPosition=3">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/world/UN-rights-council-fiji.html?searchResultPosition=3</a>
Pompeo, Who Led Trump's Mission at State Dept., Leaves With a Dubious Legacy	Lara Jakes	18/01/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/18/us/politics/mike-pompeo-secretary-of-state.html?searchResultPosition=4">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/18/us/politics/mike-pompeo-secretary-of-state.html?searchResultPosition=4</a>
U.S. Says China's Repression of Uighurs Is 'Genocide'	Edward Wong and Chris Buckley	19/01/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trump-china-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=5">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trump-china-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=5</a>
The U.S. calls China's repression of the Uighurs 'genocide,' echoing Biden's earlier comments.	Edward Wong and Chris Buckley	19/01/21	Quote	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/the-us-calls-chinas-repression-of-the-uighurs-genocide-echoing-bidens-earlier-comments.html?searchResultPosition=6">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/the-us-calls-chinas-repression-of-the-uighurs-genocide-echoing-bidens-earlier-comments.html?searchResultPosition=6</a>
China's Oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang, Explained	Austin Ramzy	20/01/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/asia/china-genocide-uighurs-explained.html?searchResultPosition=7">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/asia/china-genocide-uighurs-explained.html?searchResultPosition=7</a>
A Capital Under Siege	David Leonhardt	20/01/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/briefing/inauguration-2021-trump-pardons-jack-ma.html?searchResultPosition=8">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/briefing/inauguration-2021-trump-pardons-jack-ma.html?searchResultPosition=8</a>
Trump's Last-Minute Moves Against China Complicate Biden's Agenda	Amy Qin	20/01/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/asia/trump-china-biden.html?searchResultPosition=9">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/asia/trump-china-biden.html?searchResultPosition=9</a>
I Grew Up Witnessing Forced Labor. U.S. Companies Must Step Up.	Nury Turkel	20/01/21	Opinion	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/opinion/uighur-forced-labor.html?searchResultPosition=10">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/opinion/uighur-forced-labor.html?searchResultPosition=10</a>
Lesson of the Day: 'China's Oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang, Explained'	Michael Gonchar and Nicole Daniels	25/01/21	Learning Network	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/learning/lesson-of-the-day-chinas-oppression-of-muslims-in-xinjiang-explained.html?searchResultPosition=11">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/learning/lesson-of-the-day-chinas-oppression-of-muslims-in-xinjiang-explained.html?searchResultPosition=11</a>
Blinken Takes Over at State Dept. With a Review of Trump's Policies	Lara Jakes	26/01/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/politics/blinken-state-department.html?searchResultPosition=12">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/politics/blinken-state-department.html?searchResultPosition=12</a>



Who's Making All Those Scam Calls?	Yudhijit Bhattacharjee	27/01/21	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/magazine/scam-call-centers.html?searchResultPosition=13">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/magazine/scam-call-centers.html?searchResultPosition=13</a>
Your Monday Briefing	Natasha Frost	31/01/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/briefing/aleksei-navalny-vaccines-myanmar.html?searchResultPosition=14">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/briefing/aleksei-navalny-vaccines-myanmar.html?searchResultPosition=14</a>
Democracy Hero? Military Foil? Myanmar's Leader Ends Up as Neither	Hannah Beech	01/02/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/world/asia/myanmar-coup-aung-san-su-kyi.html?searchResultPosition=15">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/world/asia/myanmar-coup-aung-san-su-kyi.html?searchResultPosition=15</a>
Declaring Democracy Won't Be Subverted, Biden Demands Russia and Myanmar Reverse Course	David E. Sanger	03/02/21	News analysis	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/us/politics/biden-myanmar-russia.html?searchResultPosition=16">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/us/politics/biden-myanmar-russia.html?searchResultPosition=16</a>
In Geopolitical Struggle Over Myanmar, China Has an Edge	Steven Lee Myers and Hannah Beech	05/02/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/world/asia/myanmar-coup-china-united-states.html?searchResultPosition=17">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/world/asia/myanmar-coup-china-united-states.html?searchResultPosition=17</a>
In China, an App Offered Space for Debate. Then the Censors Came.	Amy Chang Chien and Amy Qin	08/02/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/08/world/asia/china-clubhouse-blocked.html?searchResultPosition=18">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/08/world/asia/china-clubhouse-blocked.html?searchResultPosition=18</a>
China Bars BBC Programs After British Ban on Chinese Broadcaster	Chris Buckley and Isabella Kwai	11/02/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/world/asia/china-bbc-cgtn-banned.html?searchResultPosition=19">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/world/asia/china-bbc-cgtn-banned.html?searchResultPosition=19</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	11/02/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/vaccines-china-india-lunar-new-year.html?searchResultPosition=20">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/vaccines-china-india-lunar-new-year.html?searchResultPosition=20</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Natasha Frost	11/02/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/impeachment-coronavirus-valentines-day.html?searchResultPosition=21">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/impeachment-coronavirus-valentines-day.html?searchResultPosition=21</a>
These Women Confront Dictators. Why Can't We?	Nicholas Kristof	17/02/21	Opinion	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/opinion/saudi-arabia-biden.html?searchResultPosition=22">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/opinion/saudi-arabia-biden.html?searchResultPosition=22</a>
China Is Preparing for Another Olympics in Beijing, Like It or Not	Steven Lee Myers	19/02/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/asia/china-olympics-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=23">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/asia/china-olympics-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=23</a>
Myanmar's Military Deploys Digital Arsenal of Repression in Crackdown	Hannah Beech	01/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/asia/myanmar-coup-military-surveillance.html?searchResultPosition=24">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/asia/myanmar-coup-military-surveillance.html?searchResultPosition=24</a>
Complaints of Emotional Abuse Roil Synchronized Swimming	Jeré Longman and Gillian R. Brassil	09/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/sports/olympics/synchronized-swimmers-abuse.html?searchResultPosition=25">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/sports/olympics/synchronized-swimmers-abuse.html?searchResultPosition=25</a>
Your Wednesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	09/03/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/briefing/myanmar-military-rohingya-china-vaccine-passport.html?searchResultPosition=26">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/briefing/myanmar-military-rohingya-china-vaccine-passport.html?searchResultPosition=26</a>
Your Wednesday Briefing	Natasha Frost	09/03/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/briefing/myanmar-meghan-harry-canada-elderly.html?searchResultPosition=27">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/briefing/myanmar-meghan-harry-canada-elderly.html?searchResultPosition=27</a>

How Close Are China and Germany? Consider 'Little Swabia.'	Keith Bradsher and Jack Ewing	19/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/business/china-germany-economy-trade.html?searchResultPosition=28">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/business/china-germany-economy-trade.html?searchResultPosition=28</a>
U.S. Joins Allies to Punish Chinese Officials for Human Rights Abuses	Pranshu Verma	22/03/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/us/politics/sanctions-china-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=29">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/us/politics/sanctions-china-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=29</a>
Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	22/03/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/briefing/vaccine-inequity-xinjiang-sanctions-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=30">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/briefing/vaccine-inequity-xinjiang-sanctions-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=30</a>
Baidu raises \$3.1 billion in Hong Kong listing, but its shares end flat.	Alexandra Stevenson	23/03/21	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/23/business/baidu-raises-3-1-billion-in-hong-kong-listing-but-its-shares-end-flat.html?searchResultPosition=31">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/23/business/baidu-raises-3-1-billion-in-hong-kong-listing-but-its-shares-end-flat.html?searchResultPosition=31</a>
Why Are China's Consumers Threatening to Boycott H&M and Other Brands?	Sui-Lee Wee and Keith Bradsher	25/03/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/business/china-boycott-hm.html?searchResultPosition=32">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/business/china-boycott-hm.html?searchResultPosition=32</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	25/03/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/briefing/astrazeneca-serum-institute-north-korea.html?searchResultPosition=33">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/briefing/astrazeneca-serum-institute-north-korea.html?searchResultPosition=33</a>
An Alliance of Autocracies? China Wants to Lead a New World Order.	Steven Lee Myers	29/03/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/29/world/asia/china-us-russia.html?searchResultPosition=34">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/29/world/asia/china-us-russia.html?searchResultPosition=34</a>
What Is Going On With China, Cotton and All of These Clothing Brands?	Vanessa Friedman and Elizabeth Paton	29/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/29/style/china-cotton-uyghur-hm-nike.html?searchResultPosition=35">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/29/style/china-cotton-uyghur-hm-nike.html?searchResultPosition=35</a>
State Dept. Reverses Trump Policies on Reproductive and Religious Freedoms	Lara Jakes	30/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/politics/blincken-human-rights-women.html?searchResultPosition=36">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/politics/blincken-human-rights-women.html?searchResultPosition=36</a>
Japan Is Finding It Harder to Stay Quiet on China's Abuse of Uyghurs	Ben Dooley and Hisako Ueno	01/04/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/world/asia/japan-uyghurs-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=37">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/world/asia/japan-uyghurs-xinjiang.html?searchResultPosition=37</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	01/04/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/briefing/virus-vaccines-hong-kong-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=38">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/briefing/virus-vaccines-hong-kong-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=38</a>
Michigan, George Floyd, Baseball: Your Thursday Evening Briefing	Will Dudding and Sarah Hughes	01/04/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/briefing/michigan-george-floyd-baseball.html?searchResultPosition=39">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/briefing/michigan-george-floyd-baseball.html?searchResultPosition=39</a>
Swelling Anti-Asian Violence: Who Is Being Attacked Where	Weiyi Cai, Audra D. S. Burch and Jugal K. Patel	03/04/21	News analysis	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/03/us/anti-asian-attacks.html?searchResultPosition=40">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/03/us/anti-asian-attacks.html?searchResultPosition=40</a>
Here's How to Handle the 'Genocide Olympics' in Beijing	Nicholas Kristof	07/04/21	Opinion	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/opinion/beijing-olympics-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=41">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/opinion/beijing-olympics-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=41</a>
It's Time to Rethink the Olympics	Kurt Streeter	12/04/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/12/sports/olympics/olympic-games-boycott-tokyo-beijing.html?searchResultPosition=42">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/12/sports/olympics/olympic-games-boycott-tokyo-beijing.html?searchResultPosition=42</a>

China's Solar Dominance Presents Biden With an Ugly Dilemma	Ana Swanson and Brad Plumer	20/04/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/business/economy/china-biden-solar-panels.html?searchResultPosition=43">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/business/economy/china-biden-solar-panels.html?searchResultPosition=43</a>
Women Are Battling China's Angry Trolls. The Trolls Are Winning.	Sui-Lee Wee	24/04/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/world/asia/china-feminism-weibo.html?searchResultPosition=44">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/world/asia/china-feminism-weibo.html?searchResultPosition=44</a>
China Targets Muslim Women in Push to Suppress Births in Xinjiang	Amy Qin	10/05/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-women-births.html?searchResultPosition=45">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-women-births.html?searchResultPosition=45</a>
Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	10/05/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/briefing/israel-palestinians-india-virus-lockdown.html?searchResultPosition=46">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/briefing/israel-palestinians-india-virus-lockdown.html?searchResultPosition=46</a>
Your Tuesday Briefing	Natasha Frost	11/05/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/11/briefing/jerusalem-coronavirus-xinjiang-women.html?searchResultPosition=47">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/11/briefing/jerusalem-coronavirus-xinjiang-women.html?searchResultPosition=47</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Natasha Frost	14/05/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/briefing/israel-gaza-tigray-masks.html?searchResultPosition=48">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/briefing/israel-gaza-tigray-masks.html?searchResultPosition=48</a>
The Crisis of Anti-Semitic Violence	Michelle Goldberg	24/05/21	Opinion	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/24/opinion/israel-palestine-zionism.html?searchResultPosition=49">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/24/opinion/israel-palestine-zionism.html?searchResultPosition=49</a>
Biden Expands Trump-Era Ban on Investment in Chinese Firms Linked to Military	David Sanger and David McCabe	03/06/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/us/politics/biden-ban-chinese-firms-trump.html?searchResultPosition=50">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/us/politics/biden-ban-chinese-firms-trump.html?searchResultPosition=50</a>
China's Leader Wants a 'Lovable' Country. That Doesn't Mean He's Making Nice.	Steven Lee Myers and Keith Bradsher	08/06/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/world/asia/china-diplomacy.html?searchResultPosition=51">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/world/asia/china-diplomacy.html?searchResultPosition=51</a>
Your Thursday Briefing	Natasha Frost	10/06/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/briefing/biden-europe-navalny-coronavirus-testing.html?searchResultPosition=52">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/briefing/biden-europe-navalny-coronavirus-testing.html?searchResultPosition=52</a>
Showdown Over Omar's Comments Exposes Sharp Divisions Among Democrats	Jonathan Weisman	10/06/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/us/politics/ilhan-omar-israel.html?searchResultPosition=53">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/us/politics/ilhan-omar-israel.html?searchResultPosition=53</a>
China Still Buys American DNA Equipment for Xinjiang Despite Blocks	Sui-Lee Wee	11/06/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/business/china-dna-xinjiang-american.html?searchResultPosition=54">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/business/china-dna-xinjiang-american.html?searchResultPosition=54</a>
Pulitzer Prizes Focus on Coverage of Pandemic and Law Enforcement	Katie Robertson	11/06/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/business/media/pulitzer-prizes.html?searchResultPosition=55">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/business/media/pulitzer-prizes.html?searchResultPosition=55</a>
'We Are Very Free': How China Spreads Its Propaganda Version of Life in Xinjiang	Unclear	22/06/21	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/22/technology/xinjiang-uyghurs-china-propaganda.html?searchResultPosition=56">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/22/technology/xinjiang-uyghurs-china-propaganda.html?searchResultPosition=56</a>

Your Thursday Briefing	Melina Delkic	23/06/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/23/briefing/hong-kong-security-trial-virus-sequences.html?searchResultPosition=57">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/23/briefing/hong-kong-security-trial-virus-sequences.html?searchResultPosition=57</a>
U.S. Bans Imports of Some Chinese Solar Materials Tied to Forced Labor	Thomas Kaplan, Chris Buckley and Brad Plumer	24/06/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/business/economy/china-forced-labor-solar.html?searchResultPosition=58">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/business/economy/china-forced-labor-solar.html?searchResultPosition=58</a>
Genocide Designation for Myanmar Tests Biden's Human Rights Policy	Lara Jakes	30/06/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/us/politics/biden-genocide-rohingya-myanmar.html?searchResultPosition=59">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/us/politics/biden-genocide-rohingya-myanmar.html?searchResultPosition=59</a>
Fashion Retailers Face Inquiry Over Suspected Ties to Forced Labor in China	Elizabeth Paton, Léontine Gallois and Aurelien Breeden	02/07/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/fashion/xinjiang-forced-labor-Zara-Uniqlo-Sketchers.html?searchResultPosition=60">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/fashion/xinjiang-forced-labor-Zara-Uniqlo-Sketchers.html?searchResultPosition=60</a>
Yellen Says China Trade Deal Has 'Hurt American Consumers'	Alan Rappeport and Keith Bradsher	16/07/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/16/us/politics/yellen-us-china-trade.html?searchResultPosition=61">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/16/us/politics/yellen-us-china-trade.html?searchResultPosition=61</a>
'They Have My Sister': As Uyghurs Speak Out, China Targets Their Families	Austin Ramzy	27/07/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/world/asia/xinjiang-china-crackdown.html?searchResultPosition=62">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/world/asia/xinjiang-china-crackdown.html?searchResultPosition=62</a>
You Anon	John Herrman	31/07/21	"For context"	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/31/style/anonymity-pseudonymity-online-identity.html?searchResultPosition=63">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/31/style/anonymity-pseudonymity-online-identity.html?searchResultPosition=63</a>
A Fire in Minnesota. An Arrest in Mexico. Cameras Everywhere.	Kashmir Hill	01/08/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/01/technology/minneapolis-protests-facial-recognition.html?searchResultPosition=64">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/01/technology/minneapolis-protests-facial-recognition.html?searchResultPosition=64</a>
Transcript: Ezra Klein Interviews Lilliana Mason	Unclear	13/08/21	Podcast	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-interviews-lilliana-mason.html?searchResultPosition=65">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-interviews-lilliana-mason.html?searchResultPosition=65</a>
He Was the 'Perfect Villain' for Voting Conspiracists	Susan Dominus	24/08/21	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/24/magazine/eric-coomer-dominion-election.html?searchResultPosition=66">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/24/magazine/eric-coomer-dominion-election.html?searchResultPosition=66</a>
Your Thursday Briefing	Melina Delkic	25/08/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/briefing/afghanistan-evacuations-virus-origin-studies-navalny.html?searchResultPosition=67">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/briefing/afghanistan-evacuations-virus-origin-studies-navalny.html?searchResultPosition=67</a>
Your Thursday Briefing	Melina Delkic	08/09/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/08/briefing/afghanistan-government-seoul-virus-tiananmen-square.html?searchResultPosition=68">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/08/briefing/afghanistan-government-seoul-virus-tiananmen-square.html?searchResultPosition=68</a>
Two Scientific Journals Retract Articles Involving Chinese DNA Research	Sui-Lee Wee	09/09/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/business/china-dna-retraction-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=69">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/business/china-dna-retraction-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=69</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Matthew Cullen	07/10/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/briefing/covid-treatment-nobel-prize-china-climate.html?searchResultPosition=70">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/briefing/covid-treatment-nobel-prize-china-climate.html?searchResultPosition=70</a>

ISIS Bomber Kills Dozens at Shiite Mosque in Northern Afghanistan	Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Wali Arian	08/10/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/08/world/asia/afghanistan-mosque-attack.html?searchResultPosition=71">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/08/world/asia/afghanistan-mosque-attack.html?searchResultPosition=71</a>
'Are We Human?' Modi's Use of Antiterror Law Draws Scrutiny From Courts	Emily Schmall and Sameer Yasir	12/10/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/12/world/asia/modi-india-antiterror-law.html?searchResultPosition=72">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/12/world/asia/modi-india-antiterror-law.html?searchResultPosition=72</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Natasha Frost	15/10/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/briefing/beirut-fighting-pandemic-america.html?searchResultPosition=73">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/briefing/beirut-fighting-pandemic-america.html?searchResultPosition=73</a>
How the American Right Fell in Love With Hungary	Elisabeth Zerofsky	19/10/21	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/magazine/viktor-orban-rod-dreher.html?searchResultPosition=74">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/magazine/viktor-orban-rod-dreher.html?searchResultPosition=74</a>
Democrats' Plan to Overhaul Legal Immigration Focuses on Green Card Backlog	Zolan Kanno-Youngs and Luke Broadwater	29/10/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/us/politics/immigration-green-cards-visas.html?searchResultPosition=75">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/us/politics/immigration-green-cards-visas.html?searchResultPosition=75</a>
Facebook, Citing Societal Concerns, Plans to Shut Down Facial Recognition System	Kashmir Hill and Ryan Mac	02/11/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/technology/facebook-facial-recognition.html?searchResultPosition=76">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/technology/facebook-facial-recognition.html?searchResultPosition=76</a>
Your Thursday Briefing	Natasha Frost	03/11/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/briefing/coal-deal-afghanistan-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=77">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/briefing/coal-deal-afghanistan-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=77</a>
In a Region in Strife, India's Moral High Ground Erodes	Mujib Mashal	06/11/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/world/asia/india-region-muslim-hindu-strife.html?searchResultPosition=78">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/world/asia/india-region-muslim-hindu-strife.html?searchResultPosition=78</a>
Taiwan, Trade, Tech and More: A Tense Era in U.S.-China Ties	Raymond Zhong and Steven Lee Myers	15/11/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html?searchResultPosition=79">https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html?searchResultPosition=79</a>
The Question the I.O.C. Is Too Weak to Ask	Kurt Streeter	19/11/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/sports/olympics/where-is-peng-shuai-ioc.html?searchResultPosition=80">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/sports/olympics/where-is-peng-shuai-ioc.html?searchResultPosition=80</a>
In I.O.C.'s 'Quiet Diplomacy,' Critics See Whitewash of China's Actions	Tariq Panja and Steven Lee Myers	26/11/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/26/sports/olympics/olympics-china-peng-shuai.html?searchResultPosition=81">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/26/sports/olympics/olympics-china-peng-shuai.html?searchResultPosition=81</a>
Twitter and Facebook hit back at Chinese propaganda campaigns.	Paul Mozur	02/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/02/business/facebook-twitter-china-propaganda.html?searchResultPosition=82">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/02/business/facebook-twitter-china-propaganda.html?searchResultPosition=82</a>
Israeli Company's Spyware Is Used to Target U.S. Embassy Employees in Africa	Katie Benner, David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes	03/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/03/us/politics/phone-hack-nso-group-israel-uganda.html?searchResultPosition=83">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/03/us/politics/phone-hack-nso-group-israel-uganda.html?searchResultPosition=83</a>
U.S. Will Not Send Government Officials to Beijing Olympics	Zolan Kanno-Youngs	06/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/us/politics/olympics-boycott-us.html?searchResultPosition=84">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/us/politics/olympics-boycott-us.html?searchResultPosition=84</a>

Your Tuesday Briefing	Matthew Cullen	06/12/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/briefing/myanmar-biden-olympics-diplomatic-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=85">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/briefing/myanmar-biden-olympics-diplomatic-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=85</a>
How Many Countries Will Follow the U.S. Official Snub of Beijing's Olympics?	Steven Lee Myers and Steven Erlanger	07/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/07/world/asia/us-boycott-beijing-olympics-reaction.html?searchResultPosition=86">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/07/world/asia/us-boycott-beijing-olympics-reaction.html?searchResultPosition=86</a>
Beijing Silenced Peng Shuai in 20 Minutes, Then Spent Weeks on Damage Control	Paul Mozur, Muyi Xiao, Jeff Kao and Gray Beltran	08/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/08/world/asia/peng-shuai-china-censorship.html?searchResultPosition=87">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/08/world/asia/peng-shuai-china-censorship.html?searchResultPosition=87</a>
U.K. Won't Send Top Officials to Beijing Winter Olympics	Megan Specia	08/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/world/europe/uk-china-olympics-diplomatic-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=88">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/world/europe/uk-china-olympics-diplomatic-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=88</a>
Your Thursday Briefing: Pfizer's Booster and Omicron.	Melina Delkic	08/12/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/briefing/omicron-pfizer-booster-scholz-germany-olympics.html?searchResultPosition=89">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/briefing/omicron-pfizer-booster-scholz-germany-olympics.html?searchResultPosition=89</a>
House Votes to Impose Forced Labor Ban on Goods Made in Xinjiang	Catie Edmondson	08/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/us/politics/china-xinjiang-labor-ban-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=90">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/us/politics/china-xinjiang-labor-ban-uyghurs.html?searchResultPosition=90</a>
The Diplomatic Boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, Explained	Victor Mather	09/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/diplomatic-boycott-olympics.html?searchResultPosition=91">https://www.nytimes.com/article/diplomatic-boycott-olympics.html?searchResultPosition=91</a>
U.S. and Others Pledge Export Controls Tied to Human Rights	Ana Swanson	10/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/10/business/economy/human-rights-export-controls.html?searchResultPosition=92">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/10/business/economy/human-rights-export-controls.html?searchResultPosition=92</a>
How Beijing Influences the Influencers	Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong, Aaron Krolik, Aliza Aufrichtig and Nailah Morgan	13/12/21	Unclear	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/13/technology/china-propaganda-youtube-influencers.html?searchResultPosition=93">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/13/technology/china-propaganda-youtube-influencers.html?searchResultPosition=93</a>
Its Human Rights Record in Question, China Turns to an Old Friend	Li Yuan	14/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/14/business/china-olympics-peng-shuai-samaranch.html?searchResultPosition=94">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/14/business/china-olympics-peng-shuai-samaranch.html?searchResultPosition=94</a>
The Year in Pictures 2021	Meaghan Looram	15/12/21	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/year-in-pictures.html?searchResultPosition=95">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/year-in-pictures.html?searchResultPosition=95</a>
The Harvard Job Offer No One at Harvard Ever Heard Of	Jeffrey Gettleman, Kate Conger and Suhasini Raj	16/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/technology/harvard-job-scam-india.html?searchResultPosition=96">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/technology/harvard-job-scam-india.html?searchResultPosition=96</a>
Congress Passes Ban on Goods From China's Xinjiang Region Over Forced Labor Concerns	Catie Edmondson	16/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/us/politics/congress-uyghur-forced-labor.html?searchResultPosition=97">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/us/politics/congress-uyghur-forced-labor.html?searchResultPosition=97</a>

U.S. Cracks Down on Firms Said to Aid China's Repression of Minorities	Julian E. Barnes	16/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/us/politics/us-china-biotech-muslim-minorities.html?searchResultPosition=98">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/us/politics/us-china-biotech-muslim-minorities.html?searchResultPosition=98</a>
U.S. Olympic Leader Calls On China to Investigate Star's Allegations	Matthew Futterman and Andrew Keh	17/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/17/sports/olympics/usoc-peng-shuai-china.html?searchResultPosition=99">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/17/sports/olympics/usoc-peng-shuai-china.html?searchResultPosition=99</a>
The Year in 41 Debates	Various authors	21/12/21	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/21/opinion/2021-essays-opinion.html?searchResultPosition=100">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/21/opinion/2021-essays-opinion.html?searchResultPosition=100</a>
U.S. Effort to Combat Forced Labor Targets Corporate China Ties	Ana Swanson, Catie Edmondson and Edward Wong	23/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/23/us/politics/china-uyghurs-forced-labor.html?searchResultPosition=101">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/23/us/politics/china-uyghurs-forced-labor.html?searchResultPosition=101</a>
<b>Overall number of relevant articles</b>				<b>76</b>	

ANNEX II

***Complete List of Articles: India***

Title	Author(s)	Date (DD/MM/YY)	Type of article	Relevant*	Link
Australia Fires, Oyo, Martin Scorsese: Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	02/01/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/briefing/australia-fires-oyo-martin-scorsese.html?searchResultPosition=1">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/briefing/australia-fires-oyo-martin-scorsese.html?searchResultPosition=1</a>
As India Violence Gets Worse, Police Are Accused of Abusing Muslims	Kai Schultz and Sameer Yasir	02/01/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/asia/india-protests-police-muslims.html?searchResultPosition=2">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/asia/india-protests-police-muslims.html?searchResultPosition=2</a>
Quotation of the Day: Police Are Accused of Abusing Muslims as Demonstrations Sweep India	Unclear	02/01/20	Quotation	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/todayspaper/quotation-of-the-day-police-are-accused-of-abusing-muslims-as-demonstrations-sweep-india.html?searchResultPosition=3">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/todayspaper/quotation-of-the-day-police-are-accused-of-abusing-muslims-as-demonstrations-sweep-india.html?searchResultPosition=3</a>
Bernie Sanders Wants to Change Your Mind	The Editorial Board	13/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/bernie-sanders-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=4">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/bernie-sanders-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=4</a>
Cory Booker Has More to Say	The Editorial Board	13/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/cory-booker-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=5">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/13/opinion/cory-booker-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=5</a>
Joe Biden Says Age Is Just a Number	The Editorial Board	17/01/20	Editorial	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=6">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html?searchResultPosition=6</a>
Her Uighur Parents Were Model Chinese Citizens. It Didn't Matter.	Sarah A. Topol	29/01/20	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/magazine/uyghur-muslims-china.html?searchResultPosition=7">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/magazine/uyghur-muslims-china.html?searchResultPosition=7</a>
Meet the Bird Medics of New Delhi	Oliver Whang	07/02/20	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/science/kites-birds-conservation-india.html?searchResultPosition=8">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/science/kites-birds-conservation-india.html?searchResultPosition=8</a>
Trump Sees Commitment to Religious Freedom in India as Riots Break Out	Peter Baker, Michael Crowley and Jeffrey Gettleman	25/02/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/us/politics/trump-modi.html?searchResultPosition=9">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/us/politics/trump-modi.html?searchResultPosition=9</a>
*0 = No; 1 = Yes.					



Coronavirus, Democrats, Milwaukee: Your Thursday Briefing	Chris Stanford	27/02/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/briefing/coronavirus-democrats-milwaukee.html?searchResultPosition=10">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/briefing/coronavirus-democrats-milwaukee.html?searchResultPosition=10</a>
In India, Modi's Policies Have Lit a Fuse	Jeffrey Gettleman and Maria Abi-Habib	01/03/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/asia/india-modi-hindus.html?searchResultPosition=11">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/asia/india-modi-hindus.html?searchResultPosition=11</a>
Why Delhi Police Did Nothing to Stop Attacks on Muslims	Hartosh Singh Bal	03/03/20	Opinion	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/opinion/delhi-pogrom.html?searchResultPosition=12">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/opinion/delhi-pogrom.html?searchResultPosition=12</a>
How Delhi's Police Turned Against Muslims	Jeffrey Gettleman, Sameer Yasir, Suhasini Raj and Hari Kumar	12/03/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/asia/india-police-muslims.html?searchResultPosition=13">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/asia/india-police-muslims.html?searchResultPosition=13</a>
Making Connections: 56 Teenagers Suggest Creative Ways to Link School Curriculum to the World of 2020	The Learning Network	13/03/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/learning/making-connections-56-teenagers-suggest-creative-ways-to-link-school-curriculum-to-the-world-of-2020.html?searchResultPosition=14">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/learning/making-connections-56-teenagers-suggest-creative-ways-to-link-school-curriculum-to-the-world-of-2020.html?searchResultPosition=14</a>
The Terrorist Who Got Away	Yudhijit Bhattacharjee	19/03/20	Feature article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/magazine/masood-azhar-jaish.html?searchResultPosition=15">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/magazine/masood-azhar-jaish.html?searchResultPosition=15</a>
Under Modi, India's Press Is Not So Free Anymore	Vindu Goel and Jeffrey Gettleman	02/04/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/asia/modi-india-press-media.html?searchResultPosition=16">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/asia/modi-india-press-media.html?searchResultPosition=16</a>
Trump Again Promotes Use of Unproven Anti-Malaria Drug; Deaths in Country May Be Undercounted	Various authors	05/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=17">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=17</a>
White House Adviser Warned of Risks of Pandemic; Trump Misleads on Testing	Various authors	06/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=18">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=18</a>
Trump Attacks W.H.O. and Ousts Watchdog for Pandemic Fund	Various authors	07/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/world/coronavirus-updates-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=19">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/world/coronavirus-updates-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=19</a>
Coronavirus Caseload Tops 1.6 Million, as Countries Greet Easter Weekend with Lockdowns	Various authors	10/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/world/coronavirus-world-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=20">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/world/coronavirus-world-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=20</a>
Britain Surpasses 10,000 Coronavirus Deaths as Boris Johnson Leaves Hospital; Pope Speaks of 'Contagion of Hope'	Various authors	12/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=21">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=21</a>

The Foreign Correspondents Explaining America to the World	Jane Perlez	13/04/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/13/t-magazine/foreign-correspondents.html?searchResultPosition=22">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/13/t-magazine/foreign-correspondents.html?searchResultPosition=22</a>
W.H.O. Failed to Tell Syrian Kurds of Their First Coronavirus Death	Various authors	17/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/world/coronavirus-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=23">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/world/coronavirus-news-updates.html?searchResultPosition=23</a>
Germany Starts Broad Antibody Testing to Assess Spread of Coronavirus; Israel Relaxes Restrictions	Various authors	18/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/coronavirus-cases-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=24">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/coronavirus-cases-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=24</a>
'This Government Is Lucky': Coronavirus Quiets Global Protest Movements	Vivian Wang, Maria Abi-Habib and Vivian Yee	23/04/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/asia/coronavirus-protest-hong-kong-india-lebanon.html?searchResultPosition=25">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/asia/coronavirus-protest-hong-kong-india-lebanon.html?searchResultPosition=25</a>
Global Virus Death Toll Crosses 200,000; Italy to Ease Restrictions in May	Various authors	26/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=26">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/world/coronavirus-news.html?searchResultPosition=26</a>
Kashmir, Under Siege and Lockdown, Faces a Mental Health Crisis	Sameer Yasir	26/04/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/world/asia/kashmir-india-mental-health-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=27">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/world/asia/kashmir-india-mental-health-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=27</a>
Scientists Race For a Coronavirus Vaccine	Various authors	27/04/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/world/coronavirus-world-pandemic.html?searchResultPosition=28">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/world/coronavirus-world-pandemic.html?searchResultPosition=28</a>
Sewer Cleaners Wanted in Pakistan: Only Christians Need Apply.	Zia Rehman and Maria Abi-Habib	04/05/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/world/asia/pakistan-christians-sweepers.html?searchResultPosition=29">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/world/asia/pakistan-christians-sweepers.html?searchResultPosition=29</a>
Xi Jinping Uses Pandemic to Strengthen His Rule in China	Various authors	20/05/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/world/coronavirus-world-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=30">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/world/coronavirus-world-tracker.html?searchResultPosition=30</a>
Reported Coronavirus Cases Top 5 Million Worldwide	Various authors	21/05/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/coronavirus-world-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=31">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/coronavirus-world-news-live.html?searchResultPosition=31</a>
Minneapolis, Tiananmen Vigil, Israel: Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic and Carole Landry	01/06/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/briefing/minneapolis-protests-tiananmen-hong-kong.html?searchResultPosition=32">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/briefing/minneapolis-protests-tiananmen-hong-kong.html?searchResultPosition=32</a>

China Shuts Vast Beijing Market as It Hunts Coronavirus Cluster	Various authors	12/06/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/world/coronavirus-us-usa-updates.html?searchResultPosition=33">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/world/coronavirus-us-usa-updates.html?searchResultPosition=33</a>
Chinese Surveillance, Bolton Book, North Korea: Your Thursday Briefing	Melina Delkic	17/06/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/briefing/chinese-surveillance-bolton-book.html?searchResultPosition=34">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/briefing/chinese-surveillance-bolton-book.html?searchResultPosition=34</a>
University of Michigan to Drop Out as Presidential Debate Host	Various authors	22/06/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/world/coronavirus-updates.html?searchResultPosition=35">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/world/coronavirus-updates.html?searchResultPosition=35</a>
China and America Are Heading Toward Divorce	Thomas L. Friedman	23/06/20	Opinion	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/opinion/china-united-states-trump.html?searchResultPosition=36">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/opinion/china-united-states-trump.html?searchResultPosition=36</a>
Facebook, Israel's outbreak, Uighurs: Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	06/07/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/briefing/facebook-hong-kong-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=37">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/briefing/facebook-hong-kong-uighurs.html?searchResultPosition=37</a>
U.K. Sanctions, Facebook, Jair Bolsonaro: Your Tuesday Briefing	Isabella Kwai	07/07/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/briefing/uk-sanctions-facebook-jair-bolsonaro.html?searchResultPosition=38">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/briefing/uk-sanctions-facebook-jair-bolsonaro.html?searchResultPosition=38</a>
Over 100 Lesson Plans Based on New York Times Articles	The Learning Network	08/07/20	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/learning/lesson-plans/over-100-lesson-plans-based-on-new-york-times-articles.html?searchResultPosition=39">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/learning/lesson-plans/over-100-lesson-plans-based-on-new-york-times-articles.html?searchResultPosition=39</a>
Egyptian Dissident Battles Extradition in Spanish Court	Raphael Minder and Declan Walsh	14/07/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/world/middleeast/egypt-dissident-extradition-spain.html?searchResultPosition=40">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/world/middleeast/egypt-dissident-extradition-spain.html?searchResultPosition=40</a>
India Rounds Up Critics Under Shadow of Virus Crisis, Activists Say	Sameer Yasir and Kai Schultz	19/07/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/india-activists-arrests-riots-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=41">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/india-activists-arrests-riots-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=41</a>
China Is Harvesting the DNA of Its People. Is This the Future of Policing?	Emile Dirks and James Leibold	24/07/20	OP-ED	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/opinion/china-dna-police.html?searchResultPosition=42">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/opinion/china-dna-police.html?searchResultPosition=42</a>
Once a Source of U.S.-China Tension, Trade Emerges as an Area of Calm	Ana Swanson and Keith Bradsher	25/07/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/business/economy/us-china-trade-diplomacy.html?searchResultPosition=43">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/business/economy/us-china-trade-diplomacy.html?searchResultPosition=43</a>
What Would a Cold War With China Look Like?	Spencer Bokart-Lindell	28/07/20	Opinion	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/opinion/trump-china.html?searchResultPosition=44">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/opinion/trump-china.html?searchResultPosition=44</a>
Report: N.B.A.'s Academies in China Abused Athletes	Sopan Deb	29/07/20	Report?	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/sports/basketball/nba-china-abuse.html?searchResultPosition=45">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/sports/basketball/nba-china-abuse.html?searchResultPosition=45</a>
A Friendship, a Pandemic and a Death Beside the Highway	Basharat Peer	31/07/20	Opinion	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/opinion/sunday/India-migration-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=46">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/opinion/sunday/India-migration-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=46</a>

Poor and Desperate, Pakistani Hindus Accept Islam to Get By	Maria Habib and Zia Abi-Rehman	04/08/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/world/asia/pakistan-hindu-conversion.html?searchResultPosition=47">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/world/asia/pakistan-hindu-conversion.html?searchResultPosition=47</a>
Hundreds of Police Killings in India, but No Mass Protests	Jeffrey Gettleman and Sameer Yasir	20/08/20	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/world/asia/india-police-brutality.html?searchResultPosition=48">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/world/asia/india-police-brutality.html?searchResultPosition=48</a>
California vs. Ride-share Companies	Sanam Yar and Ian Prasad Philbrick	20/08/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/kamala-harris-california-aleksei-navalny-your-thursday-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=49">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/kamala-harris-california-aleksei-navalny-your-thursday-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=49</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	20/08/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/south-korea-outbreak-china-crackdown-navalny.html?searchResultPosition=50">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/briefing/south-korea-outbreak-china-crackdown-navalny.html?searchResultPosition=50</a>
U.S. Penalizes 24 Chinese Companies Over Role in South China Sea	Ana Swanson	26/08/20	News	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/business/economy/trump-sanctions-south-china-sea.html?searchResultPosition=51">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/business/economy/trump-sanctions-south-china-sea.html?searchResultPosition=51</a>
Parties and Covid-19 Outbreaks Threaten University Reopenings in the U.S.	Various authors	07/09/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/world/covid-19-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=52">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/world/covid-19-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=52</a>
Facebook Has Been a Disaster for the World	Jamelle Bouie	18/09/20	Opinion	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/opinion/facebook-democracy.html?searchResultPosition=53">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/opinion/facebook-democracy.html?searchResultPosition=53</a>
Under 10 Percent of Americans Have Covid-19 Antibodies, Study Finds	Various authors	25/09/20	COVID-19 Updates	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/world/covid-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=54">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/world/covid-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=54</a>
In Wake of Recent India-China Conflict, U.S. Sees Opportunity	Pranshu Verma	03/10/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/world/asia/india-china-trump.html?searchResultPosition=55">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/world/asia/india-china-trump.html?searchResultPosition=55</a>
Your Monday Briefing	Carole Landry	04/10/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/04/briefing/trump-coronavirus-india-us-china-kenzo.html?searchResultPosition=56">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/04/briefing/trump-coronavirus-india-us-china-kenzo.html?searchResultPosition=56</a>
Trump, Coronavirus, Sanda Dia: Your Monday Briefing	Natasha Frost	04/10/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/04/briefing/trump-covid-uk-contact-tracing.html?searchResultPosition=57">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/04/briefing/trump-covid-uk-contact-tracing.html?searchResultPosition=57</a>
Your Monday Briefing	Carole Landry	25/10/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/briefing/china-virus-hongkong-southkorea-us-election.html?searchResultPosition=58">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/briefing/china-virus-hongkong-southkorea-us-election.html?searchResultPosition=58</a>
The Best Books to Give This Year	Various authors	25/11/20	Book reviews	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/25/books/gifts-for-book-lovers.html?searchResultPosition=59">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/25/books/gifts-for-book-lovers.html?searchResultPosition=59</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Victoria Shannon	03/12/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/briefing/vaccine-us-britain-hongkong-china.html?searchResultPosition=60">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/briefing/vaccine-us-britain-hongkong-china.html?searchResultPosition=60</a>

Justice Dept. Suit Says Facebook Discriminates Against U.S. Workers	Cecilia Kang and Mike Isaac	03/12/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/technology/facebook-hiring-discrimination-suit.html?searchResultPosition=61">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/technology/facebook-hiring-discrimination-suit.html?searchResultPosition=61</a>
U.S. Takes Tougher Tone With Turkey as Trump Exits	Lara Jakes	09/12/20	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/us-turkey-trump-erdogan.html?searchResultPosition=62">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/us-turkey-trump-erdogan.html?searchResultPosition=62</a>
Your Wednesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	15/12/20	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/briefing/virus-vaccines-icc-uighurs-korea-couriers.html?searchResultPosition=63">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/briefing/virus-vaccines-icc-uighurs-korea-couriers.html?searchResultPosition=63</a>
Globetrotting	Tammy Tarng	23/12/20	Book preview	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/books/new-books-international.html?searchResultPosition=64">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/books/new-books-international.html?searchResultPosition=64</a>
Amazon Web Drama Draws the Wrath of India's Hindu Nationalists	Jeffrey Gettleman and Suhasini Raj	18/01/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/18/business/india-amazon-tandav.html?searchResultPosition=1">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/18/business/india-amazon-tandav.html?searchResultPosition=1</a>
A Capital Under Siege	David Leonhardt	20/01/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/briefing/inauguration-2021-trump-pardons-jack-ma.html?searchResultPosition=2">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/briefing/inauguration-2021-trump-pardons-jack-ma.html?searchResultPosition=2</a>
Facebook Invokes Its 'Supreme Court'	Shira Ovide	22/01/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/technology/facebook-oversight-board-trump.html?searchResultPosition=3">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/technology/facebook-oversight-board-trump.html?searchResultPosition=3</a>
Who's Making All Those Scam Calls?	Yudhijit Bhattacharjee	27/01/21	Feature article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/magazine/scam-call-centers.html?searchResultPosition=4">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/magazine/scam-call-centers.html?searchResultPosition=4</a>
Your Monday Briefing	Natasha Frost	31/01/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/briefing/aleksei-navalny-vaccines-myanmar.html?searchResultPosition=5">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/briefing/aleksei-navalny-vaccines-myanmar.html?searchResultPosition=5</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	11/02/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/vaccines-china-india-lunar-new-year.html?searchResultPosition=6">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/vaccines-china-india-lunar-new-year.html?searchResultPosition=6</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Natasha Frost	11/02/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/impeachment-coronavirus-valentines-day.html?searchResultPosition=7">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/briefing/impeachment-coronavirus-valentines-day.html?searchResultPosition=7</a>
Clergy Preach Faith in the Covid Vaccine to Doubtters	Jan Hoffman	14/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/14/health/clergy-covid-vaccine.html?searchResultPosition=8">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/14/health/clergy-covid-vaccine.html?searchResultPosition=8</a>
'I Had to Prove That I Exist': Transgender Anchor Makes History in Bangladesh	Geneva Abdul	16/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/world/asia/bangladesh-transgender-tv-anchor.html?searchResultPosition=9">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/world/asia/bangladesh-transgender-tv-anchor.html?searchResultPosition=9</a>
For Rohingya Survivors, Art Bears Witness	Patricia Leigh Brown	19/03/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/arts/design/rohingya-survivors-art-bangladesh.html?searchResultPosition=10">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/arts/design/rohingya-survivors-art-bangladesh.html?searchResultPosition=10</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Melina Delkic	25/03/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/briefing/astrazeneca-serum-institute-north-korea.html?searchResultPosition=11">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/briefing/astrazeneca-serum-institute-north-korea.html?searchResultPosition=11</a>

India's News Upstarts Challenged Modi. New Rules Could Tame Them.	Mujib Mashal and Hari Kumar	27/03/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/asia/india-modi-media.html?searchResultPosition=12">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/asia/india-modi-media.html?searchResultPosition=12</a>
A Fierce Election Tests Modi's Campaign to Remake India	Mujib Mashal	07/04/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/world/asia/india-modi-west-bengal.html?searchResultPosition=13">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/world/asia/india-modi-west-bengal.html?searchResultPosition=13</a>
Your Tuesday Briefing	Melina Delkic	10/05/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/briefing/israel-palestinians-india-virus-lockdown.html?searchResultPosition=14">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/briefing/israel-palestinians-india-virus-lockdown.html?searchResultPosition=14</a>
Your Tuesday Briefing	Natasha Frost	11/05/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/11/briefing/jerusalem-coronavirus-xinjiang-women.html?searchResultPosition=15">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/11/briefing/jerusalem-coronavirus-xinjiang-women.html?searchResultPosition=15</a>
Your Friday Briefing	Natasha Frost	14/05/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/briefing/israel-gaza-tigray-masks.html?searchResultPosition=16">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/briefing/israel-gaza-tigray-masks.html?searchResultPosition=16</a>
'Are We Human?' Modi's Use of Antiterror Law Draws Scrutiny From Courts	Emily Schmall and Sameer Yasir	12/10/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/12/world/asia/modi-india-antiterror-law.html?searchResultPosition=17">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/12/world/asia/modi-india-antiterror-law.html?searchResultPosition=17</a>
2 Days After Cricket Victory Over India, Pakistan Still Feels the High	Salman Masood	26/10/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/world/asia/pakistan-cricket-victory-india.html?searchResultPosition=18">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/world/asia/pakistan-cricket-victory-india.html?searchResultPosition=18</a>
Democrats' Plan to Overhaul Legal Immigration Focuses on Green Card Backlog	Zolan Kanno-Youngs and Luke Broadwater	29/10/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/us/politics/immigration-green-cards-visas.html?searchResultPosition=19">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/us/politics/immigration-green-cards-visas.html?searchResultPosition=19</a>
Your Thursday Briefing	Natasha Frost	03/11/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/briefing/coal-deal-afghanistan-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=20">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/briefing/coal-deal-afghanistan-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=20</a>
In a Region in Strife, India's Moral High Ground Erodes	Mujib Mashal	06/11/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/world/asia/india-region-muslim-hindu-strife.html?searchResultPosition=21">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/world/asia/india-region-muslim-hindu-strife.html?searchResultPosition=21</a>
The Next Challenge to Vaccinating Africa: Overcoming Skepticism	Lynsey Chutel and Max Fisher	01/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/01/world/africa/coronavirus-vaccine-hesitancy-africa.html?searchResultPosition=23">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/01/world/africa/coronavirus-vaccine-hesitancy-africa.html?searchResultPosition=23</a>
Your Tuesday Briefing	Matthew Cullen	06/12/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/briefing/myanmar-biden-olympics-diplomatic-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=24">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/briefing/myanmar-biden-olympics-diplomatic-boycott.html?searchResultPosition=24</a>
Your Thursday Briefing: Pfizer's Booster and Omicron.	Melina Delkic	08/12/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/briefing/omicron-pfizer-booster-scholz-germany-olympics.html?searchResultPosition=25">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/briefing/omicron-pfizer-booster-scholz-germany-olympics.html?searchResultPosition=25</a>
Taiwan, Trade, Tech and More: A Tense Era in U.S.-China Ties	Raymond Zhong and Steven Lee Myers	08/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html?searchResultPosition=22">https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html?searchResultPosition=22</a>

Covid, Kentucky, Gymnasts: Your Monday Evening Briefing	Victoria Shannon	13/12/21	Briefing	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/13/briefing/covid-kentucky-gymnasts-your-monday-evening-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=26">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/13/briefing/covid-kentucky-gymnasts-your-monday-evening-briefing.html?searchResultPosition=26</a>
The Year In Pictures 2021	Unclear	15/12/21	Unclear	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/year-in-pictures.html?searchResultPosition=27">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/year-in-pictures.html?searchResultPosition=27</a>
The Harvard Job Offer No One at Harvard Ever Heard Of	Jeffrey Gettleman, Kate Conger and Suhasini Raj	16/12/21	News article	0	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/technology/harvard-job-scam-india.html?searchResultPosition=28">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/technology/harvard-job-scam-india.html?searchResultPosition=28</a>
Arrests, Beatings and Secret Prayers: Inside the Persecution of India's Christians	Jeffrey Gettleman and Suhasini Raj	22/12/21	News article	1	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/22/world/asia/india-christians-attacked.html?searchResultPosition=29">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/22/world/asia/india-christians-attacked.html?searchResultPosition=29</a>
<b>Overall number of relevant articles</b>				<b>16</b>	

## ANNEX III

*Variable Categorisation: China*

Title	Date (DD/MM/YY)	Type of article	Official sources	Non-official sources	Human rights	Sanctions	Crimes against humanity	Genocide	Repression	Violence	Torture
Trump Administration's Actions in Middle East Complicate Its Criticisms of China	09/01/20	News analysis	9	7	8	2	0	0	3	0	0
Her Uighur Parents Were Model Chinese Citizens. It Didn't Matter.	29/01/20	Feature article	2	25	4	0	0	0	0	3	1
U.S. Designates China's Official Media as Operatives of the Communist State	18/02/20	News article	15	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Lawmakers Propose Tough Limits on Imports from Xinjiang	11/03/20	News article	13	8	7	5	0	0	0	0	0
Critics Hear Political Tone as Pompeo Calls Out Diplomatic Rivals Over Human Rights	11/03/20	"Politics"	10	2	6	1	0	0	0	0	3
Sister Fights to Free Uighur Businessman Held in China After U.S. Trip	09/05/20	"Politics"	12	16	4	2	0	0	1	0	0
House Passes Uighur Human Rights Bill, Prodding Trump to Punish China	27/05/20	"Politics"	4	1	7	4	0	1	0	0	0
China Is Collecting DNA From Tens of Millions of Men and Boys, Using U.S. Equipment	17/06/20	News article	10	18	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Biggest Obstacle to China Policy: President Trump	18/06/20	News analysis	28	0	3	4	0	0	0	0	0
China's Man in Washington, Named Trump	20/06/20	Opinion	7	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0



Trump Says He Avoided Punishing China Over Uighur Camps to Protect Trade Talks	21/06/20	"Politics"	9	2	6	7	0	0	0	0	1
China and America Are Heading Toward Divorce	23/06/20	Opinion	2	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
President Trump Has Tools to Pressure China. Will He Use Them?	01/07/20	Editorial	9	3	10	3	0	2	2	0	0
Senate Sends Trump a Bill to Punish Chinese Officials Over Hong Kong	02/07/20	"Politics"	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Officials Over Mass Detention of Muslims	09/07/20	News article	7	6	12	5	0	1	0	1	0
China Imposes Tit-for-Tat Sanctions on Three American Lawmakers	13/07/20	News article	1	4	4	3	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Weighs Sweeping Travel Ban on Chinese Communist Party Members	15/07/20	News article	10	3	2	4	0	0	2	0	0
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on 11 Chinese Companies Over Human Rights	20/07/20	News article	8	6	4	4	0	0	1	0	0
Banned Chinese Companies Deny Allegations They Abused Uighurs	21/07/20	News article	4	6	1	2	0	0	1	0	0
How the Cold War Between China and U.S. Is Intensifying	22/07/20	News article	11	5	2	1	0	0	1	0	0
Coalition Brings Pressure to End Forced Uighur Labor	23/07/20	News article	11	3	4	3	0	0	0	0	0
China Is Harvesting the DNA of Its People. Is This the Future of Policing?	24/07/20	OP-ED	5	8	1	1	0	0	3	0	0
Once a Source of U.S.-China Tension, Trade Emerges as an Area of Calm	25/07/20	News article	7	5	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
What Would a Cold War With China Look Like?	28/07/20	Opinion	11	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Report: N.B.A.'s Academies in China Abused Athletes	29/07/20	Report?	14	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0

U.S. Adds Sanctions Over Internment of Muslims in China	31/07/20	News article	6	0	4	6	0	0	1	0	0
Trump Administration Penalizes Hong Kong Officials for Crackdown on Protesters	07/08/20	News article	9	3	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
Hong Kong Officials Condemn and Mock Trump Administration Sanctions	08/08/20	News article	4	12	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Suspends Bilateral Agreements With Hong Kong, Escalating Tensions With China	19/08/20	News article	7	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
China Locks Down Xinjiang to Fight Covid-19, Angering Residents	25/08/20	News article	3	19	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Penalizes 24 Chinese Companies Over Role in South China Sea	26/08/20	News	15	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. May Ban Cotton From Xinjiang Region of China Over Rights Concerns	07/09/20	News article	5	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	0
Why Calls to Boycott 'Mulan' Over Concerns About China Are Growing	08/09/20	News article	8	5	5	4	1	1	3	0	0
Disney Wanted to Make a Splash in China With 'Mulan.' It Stumbled Instead.	12/09/20	News article	9	6	3	2	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Restricts Chinese Apparel and Tech Products, Citing Forced Labor	14/09/20	News article	15	6	8	5	0	0	0	0	0
Senate Democrats Present \$350 Billion Strategy to Counter China	17/09/20	News article	5	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
Rebuffed by Vatican, Pompeo Assails China and Aligns With Pope's Critics	30/09/20	News article	10	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
In Wake of Recent India-China Conflict, U.S. Sees Opportunity	03/10/20	News article	15	7	5	1	0	0	0	0	0
China's Surveillance State Sucks Up Data. U.S. Tech Is Key to Sorting It.	22/11/20	News article	18	12	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Pope Calls Uighurs 'Persecuted,' Prompting Pushback From China	24/11/20	News article	1	14	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Nike and Coca-Cola Lobby Against Xinjiang Forced Labor Bill	29/11/20	News article	25	1	4	4	0	0	0	0	0
I.C.C. Won't Investigate China's Detention of Muslims	15/12/20	News article	3	12	1	0	1	2	0	0	1
As China Tracked Muslims, Alibaba Showed Customers How They Could, Too	16/12/20	News article	3	15	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
China-E.U. Talks Hit Another Snag as Biden Camp Objects	23/12/20	News article	5	10	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
China and E.U. Leaders Strike Investment Deal, but Political Hurdles Await	30/12/20	News article	8	10	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
China's New Rules Could Hit U.S. Firms and Send a Message to Biden	09/01/21	News article	0	5	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Says China's Repression of Uighurs Is 'Genocide'	19/01/21	News article	18	7	6	2	4	16	2	1	0
China's Oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang, Explained	20/01/21	News article	7	4	0	2	1	9	2	2	1
Trump's Last-Minute Moves Against China Complicate Biden's Agenda	20/01/21	News article	8	13	4	3	0	8	2	0	0
I Grew Up Witnessing Forced Labor. U.S. Companies Must Step Up.	20/01/21	Opinion	6	1	1	4	1	0	0	0	0
China Is Preparing for Another Olympics in Beijing, Like It or Not	19/02/21	News article	10	4	7	3	0	1	1	0	0
U.S. Joins Allies to Punish Chinese Officials for Human Rights Abuses	22/03/21	News article	8	1	7	5	1	3	2	0	0
Why Are China's Consumers Threatening to Boycott H&M and Other Brands?	25/03/21	News article	2	12	4	2	0	0	1	0	0
An Alliance of Autocracies? China Wants to Lead a New World Order.	29/03/21	News article	4	18	4	1	0	1	0	0	0

Japan Is Finding It Harder to Stay Quiet on China's Abuse of Uyghurs	01/04/21	News article	2	11	5	2	0	4	1	0	0
Here's How to Handle the 'Genocide Olympics' in Beijing	07/04/21	Opinion	3	0	6	3	1	10	3	0	1
China's Solar Dominance Presents Biden With an Ugly Dilemma	20/04/21	News article	14	7	8	4	0	0	0	0	1
China Targets Muslim Women in Push to Suppress Births in Xinjiang	10/05/21	News article	10	26	0	0	1	2	1	0	0
Biden Expands Trump-Era Ban on Investment in Chinese Firms Linked to Military	03/06/21	News article	8	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	0
China Still Buys American DNA Equipment for Xinjiang Despite Blocks	11/06/21	News article	12	7	9	4	1	0	1	0	0
U.S. Bans Imports of Some Chinese Solar Materials Tied to Forced Labor	24/06/21	News article	14	6	2	7	0	2	3	0	0
Fashion Retailers Face Inquiry Over Suspected Ties to Forced Labor in China	02/07/21	News article	3	13	8	2	1	0	0	0	0
Yellen Says China Trade Deal Has 'Hurt American Consumers'	16/07/21	News article	15	5	3	2	0	0	0	0	0
'They Have My Sister': As Uyghurs Speak Out, China Targets Their Families	27/07/21	News article	3	23	1	0	0	1	2	0	1
Two Scientific Journals Retract Articles Involving Chinese DNA Research	09/09/21	News article	1	10	1	2	0	0	1	0	0
Taiwan, Trade, Tech and More: A Tense Era in U.S.-China Ties	15/11/21	News article	9	11	2	2	0	1	1	0	0
Twitter and Facebook hit back at Chinese propaganda campaigns.	02/12/21	News article	6	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Will Not Send Government Officials to Beijing Olympics	06/12/21	News article	11	9	7	5	1	3	0	0	0
House Votes to Impose Forced Labor Ban on Goods Made in Xinjiang	08/12/21	News article	14	1	4	2	1	1	2	1	1

U.S. and Others Pledge Export Controls Tied to Human Rights	10/12/21	News article	7	0	9	2	0	0	2	0	0
How Beijing Influences the Influencers	13/12/21	Unclear	5	8	0	0	0	6	1	0	0
Its Human Rights Record in Question, China Turns to an Old Friend	14/12/21	News article	4	9	5	0	1	0	0	0	0
Congress Passes Ban on Goods From China's Xinjiang Region Over Forced Labor Concerns	16/12/21	News article	9	0	2	4	0	4	1	0	1
U.S. Cracks Down on Firms Said to Aid China's Repression of Minorities	16/12/21	News article	28	2	2	5	0	0	2	0	0
U.S. Olympic Leader Calls On China to Investigate Star's Allegations	17/12/21	News article	8	6	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
U.S. Effort to Combat Forced Labor Targets Corporate China Ties	23/12/21	News article	24	3	6	5	0	4	1	0	0
<b>Overall N</b>			<b>672</b>	<b>506</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Mean</b>			<b>8.84</b>	<b>6.66</b>	<b>3.54</b>	<b>2.28</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>1.10</b>	<b>0.70</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.16</b>

## ANNEX IV

*Variable Categorisation: India*

Title	Date (DD/MM/YY)	Type of article	Official sources	Non-official sources	Human rights	Sanctions	Crimes against humanity	Genocide	Repression	Violence	Torture
As India Violence Gets Worse, Police Are Accused of Abusing Muslims	02/01/20	News article	0	24	1	0	0	0	0	4	1
Trump Sees Commitment to Religious Freedom in India as Riots Break Out	25/02/20	News article	14	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
In India, Modi's Policies Have Lit a Fuse	01/03/20	News article	2	14	1	0	0	0	0	6	1
Why Delhi Police Did Nothing to Stop Attacks on Muslims	03/03/20	Opinion	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	10	0
How Delhi's Police Turned Against Muslims	12/03/20	News article	0	22	2	0	0	0	0	12	0
The Terrorist Who Got Away	19/03/20	Feature article	2	30	0	0	0	0	0	3	1
Under Modi, India's Press Is Not So Free Anymore	02/04/20	News article	0	23	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
Kashmir, Under Siege and Lockdown, Faces a Mental Health Crisis	26/04/20	News article	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
India Rounds Up Critics Under Shadow of Virus Crisis, Activists Say	19/07/20	News article	1	20	2	0	0	0	0	3	3
Hundreds of Police Killings in India, but No Mass Protests	20/08/20	News article	0	21	3	0	0	0	0	0	7
Amazon Web Drama Draws the Wrath of India's Hindu Nationalists	18/01/21	News article	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

India's News Upstarts Challenged Modi. New Rules Could Tame Them.	27/03/21	News article	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A Fierce Election Tests Modi's Campaign to Remake India	07/04/21	News article	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
'Are We Human?' Modi's Use of Antiterror Law Draws Scrutiny From Courts	12/10/21	News article	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
In a Region in Strife, India's Moral High Ground Erodes	06/11/21	News article	1	7	3	0	0	0	0	16	0
Arrests, Beatings and Secret Prayers: Inside the Persecution of India's Christians	22/12/21	News article	1	26	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
<b>Overall N</b>			<b>21</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Mean</b>			<b>1,31</b>	<b>15,69</b>	<b>0,87</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4,06</b>	<b>0,81</b>