


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A Comparative Analysis of Media  
Representations of President Javier Milei in  
Argentine and Brazilian News Outlets During  
the 2023 Argentine Presidential Elections

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of the representation of President Javier Milei during the 2023 Argentine presidential elections in four prominent media outlets—Clarín and La Nación in Argentina, and Folha de São Paulo and O Globo in Brazil. Utilizing Critical Discourse and Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis, the study aims to explore the diverse ways these influential newspapers construct narratives around Milei. By employing a qualitative approach, the research seeks to unveil patterns and nuances in media portrayal, shedding light on cross-border variations in political representation through an examination of language choices and multimodal elements.

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## INTRODUCTION

From 1998 to 2015, Latin America went through what is called the first ‘pink tide’, when a considerable number of the region’s presidents were left-wing. They were: Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (Brazil), Ricardo Lagos (Chile), and José Alberto Mujica Cordano (Uruguai). They not only held legislative majorities in their countries, but had strong parties and social movements behind them. During the 2010s they faced mass protests, mainly against internal corruption cases, which started a breakdown all over the region. Consequently, they were replaced by a second wave of leftist governors, who were loosely organized and had no legislative majority. In Brazil, for example, the second term of former president Dilma Rousseff was interrupted by an impeachment process that is often referred to as a coup (Kitzberger, 2016; Van Dijk, 2017).

From 2015 to 2020, most of these countries were governed by conservatives, but they also had to deal with divided governments and mostly broken economies. In 2022, center-leftist and leftist leaders formed what is being called the second ‘pink tide’, but this one is not as strong as the first was. For instance, the region has been facing increasing structural problems, among them, a massive rise in crime levels, including in places that were considered safer such as Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Additionally, leftist presidents such as Gabriel Boric in Chile and Gustavo Petro in Colombia saw their approval drop from 50% to 31% and from 61% to 40% respectively in 2022 (*news article on Presidential Approval Ratings in Latin America (November-December 2022)*, 2023). This lack of power and public support for leftist leaders, plus the concerning levels of political polarization in Latin America societies increases preoccupations with the emergence of extremist political figures. In Brazil, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, a far-right-wing candidate with extremely conservative values, won the Brazilian presidency in 2018 (Kitzberger, 2016). Just one year after Bolsonaro’s defeat in Brazil, in Argentina Javier Milei, a self-proclaimed libertarian, with ultra-liberal values, won the elections.

The principal objective of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of the portrayal of the presidential candidate Javier Milei within the Argentinean newspapers *La Nación* and *Clarín*, alongside the Brazilian newspapers *Folha de São Paulo* and *O Globo*. Secondary aims encompass the scrutiny and characterization of the discursive patterns inherent in these four newspapers, an examination of how each digital publication delineates the figure of Javier Milei, and the identification of the framing of each of them.

The main reason that led me to choose this topic was my personal interest with the history of the rising of the far-right in Latin America. I am a Brazilian woman who had just finished high school when national news conglomerates began the anti-populist battle that is briefly discussed in this thesis. I was in my last year of the bachelor in political science when Jair Bolsonaro's presidential campaign created a cleavage that moved from the news and infiltrated our everyday family dinners. I took part in the many protests against his extremist policies, and witnessed how much the economic crisis in my country was aggravated because of Bolsonaro's ultra-conservative and far-rightist approach.

As the following chapters will explain, the political stories of Brazil and Argentina share some similarities, as such: both countries went over military dictatorships that ended in the 80s, the leftist movement has a strong presence in their societies, and their media systems are deeply interconnected with their national politics. Being aware of these similarities and knowing there was a new far-right wing figure in the Argentine presidential elections made me want to understand how the discourse of this candidate would be received in Brazil.

Thinking from the theory that language can construct social realities, it is reasonable to conclude that the media and the cultural industries work as channels for these ideas and values, through which they will be spread, socialized, and institutionalized into public opinion. In other words, the media facilitates the introduction of specific discourses into our cognitive frameworks, portraying them as inherently natural rather than the deliberate constructs of individuals (Civita et al., 2020). Media discourse makes use of tools and mechanisms to ensure that the desired opinion will be interpreted and absorbed by non-critical readers. For instance, the repetition of expressions and words, the selection of some adjectives that already carry a

pre-determined connotation with the public, and even the transposition of some concepts and quotes from their original space to fit in a position that better conveys what the newspaper or the writer wants (Civila et al., 2020).

This work is divided into three chapters. The first is a brief outline of the political and social contexts of the two countries from where newspapers are going to be investigated in this thesis, followed by a literature review that explores the connections between discourse and power. The second offers details about the methodology used for the analysis, looking into Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis of selected documents, as well as the historical background of each of the selected newspapers. The third chapter contains the analysis. First of all Milei's Party Manifesto is analyzed, as a way to provide the candidate's representation of himself by explaining his political positions and government plans. Then, the comparative analysis of four small corpora of articles about Milei from the Argentine papers *La Nación* and *Clarín*, and the Brazilian newspapers *Folha de São Paulo* and *O Globo*, which is followed by a more detailed analysis of single articles from each of these papers each of which introduces Javier Milei to their readers, and a final comparison between the four of them.

The analysis of the newspapers revealed that despite them showing Milei's controversies and extremist ideas, they all perpetuated the same anti-populist rhetoric that was used in the past elections of both countries. This was done at different levels by each news outlet, with only *La Nación* being more supportive of Milei, while the other three newspapers supported his plans but presented reservations regarding his persona.

All four newspapers introduced the candidate by highlighting the polemics in which he was involved, be it his turbulent relationship with the press or his problematic connections with authoritarian politicians from the far-right around the world. *La Nación* also presented this side of Milei, but the emotional connotation the newspaper used to refer to his difficult childhood or his passion for changing the country, for example, softened the aggressivity that was attributed to him by the other three newspapers.

Despite the doubts concerning his ethics and personal behavior that *Clarín*, *Folha* and *O Globo* raised, all three of them showed positive expectations for his economic plans. Milei follows a radical liberal approach and some of his government

plans involve the end of the Argentine Central Bank, and incentive for international investment in the country as ways to contain its increasing inflation. The newspapers here analyzed are supportive of liberal policies because they help them to maintain the concentration of media ownership, and consequently, their influence over society. In this sense, none of the newspapers were openly opposing to Milei as the new president, because his victory meant that liberal forces, be it in one's country or in the neighbor country, would still be in place. This attempt of the newspaper to maintain the *status quo* is behind the anti-populist discourse they keep perpetuating.

Another important finding was that the political ideology followed by the candidate was more explored by the Brazilian newspaper than the Argentine, and different terms were used by each country. The use of 'ultra-right' by *Folha and O Globo* instead of 'libertarian', as ways used by *Clarín and La Nación*, could be a reflection of the growing ideological polarization in Brazilian society. The following chapters provide the detailed literature Review and analysis that led to these conclusions.



## CHAPTER I

### Introduction of the political contexts of Brazil and Argentina

Since this study is concerned with the media systems of Brazil and Argentina, it is important for the comprehension of the following analysis to briefly discuss the political context of each country and how they intersect during Argentina's presidential elections of 2023.

Argentina's presidency has been mainly occupied by leftist parties after the reinstatement of democracy in 1983, that is until the recent election of Javier Milei. The current main leftist coalition is led by the *Partido Justicialista* (Justicialist Party) that is the official Peronist party. Peronism is a political movement that began in the 1940s, created by the army general then President Juan Perón, and that is still the biggest political theory in Argentina. Inside the *Partido Justicialista* there is a branch denominated Kirschnerism (*Kirschnerismo*) that is not a movement *per se*, but it is the definition used to refer to the governments of former-presidents Nestór Kirchner (2003-2007) and his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015) (Stefanoni, 2023; Peruzzotti, 2017).

In contrast to Peronism, the liberal right in Argentina never thrived, because it could never build a stable political coalition with the popular sectors. In 2008, Mauricio Macri and his party PRO managed to build an appealing discourse with the people, and in 2015 he was elected president. However, he lost the reelection in 2019 to a Peronist candidate, Alberto Fernández, and his vice, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Stefanoni, 2023).

Up until the 2023 presidential elections<sup>1</sup>, Argentina's political system was fractured between Kirschnerists and anti-Kirchnerists, a scenario that was denominated '*la grieta*' (the crack). The coalitions running for the presidency in 2023 that represented the traditional '*la grieta*' were: *Juntos por el Cambio* (Together for Change — JxC), as the anti-Kirchnerist part, that supported Patricia Bullrich, a far-right-wing

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<sup>1</sup> This thesis was being produced during the presidential elections and the first weeks of the elected president, Javier Milei. Since this is an ongoing scenario, we decided to opt to use data and literature referring to the elections before the 2023's.

candidate with ultra-liberal proposals; and *Frente de Todos* (Everyone's Front- FdT), as the Kirchnerist part, supporting Sergio Massa, Minister of Economy during Alberto Fernández term. It is fundamental to notice that both coalitions were internally unstable, much because of the lack of cohesion of political values shared by its members. In this sense, the FdT was considered a center-left coalition that gathered different streams of Peronism/Justicialism. On the other hand, the JxC gathered the neoliberal sectors, then, represented right-wing tendencies, and was considered the main opposition to Kirchnerism (Stafanoni, 2023; Torcal and Carty, 2023).

This already controversial context was worsened by the rise of a third way in the figure of Javier Milei. The candidate was supported by the coalition *La Libertad Avanza* (Freedom Advances — LA), a party that self-defines as anti-caste and liberal libertarian, coming from the most radical section of JxC (Stefanoni, 2023; Torcal and Carty, 2023).

The downfall of President Alberto Fernández's popularity in 2020 created dissatisfaction that helped rightist movements to develop more populist characteristics. He faced high approval levels during the first months of the pandemic, but people went to the streets to protest against him after the prolonged quarantine, which in their interpretation was worsening the economic crises and poverty levels in the country. Additionally, some scandals, including members of his coalition breaking the quarantine, increased the population's negative feelings toward him (Stefanoni, 2023).

Following this breach, some leaders from the center-right and right-wing opposition joined the anti-quarantine demonstrations. Especially Patricia Bullrich, former president of the party PRO, who was also running for the 2023 presidency. She called the marches a protest against privilege and oligarchy and asked people to “(...)march in peace...for the anguished older people, for the feeling of the injustice of those who are on the front line against COVID-19, and for the indignation provoked by the appropriation of the vaccine by the oligarchy”(Stefanoni, 2023, p.305). Other politicians of the center-right coalition, *Cambiamos* (which later became *Juntos por el Cambio*), also endorsed the demonstrations as a way to criticize President Fernández (Stefanoni, 2023; Anria and Vommaro, 2020).

Despite joining these protests, the right-wing was not showing other signs of organized articulation. This lack of clear directions and of a leader is a pattern in the Argentinian right-wing movement. The fact that Macri and the leaders of his party

responded to these demonstrations in different ways proves that the center-right populist appeal in Argentina is very weak and uncoordinated. Therefore, it is of historical importance to the country that Javier Milei, a self-proclaimed far-right-wing candidate, has been elected the president. He represents the nearest approximation to a populist of the liberal right within the nation's political history (Stefanoni, 2023; Anria and Vommaro, 2020).

In August 2023, Argentinians voted for the mandatory primary elections (PASO), in which the population chooses the names from each coalition that are going to officially become candidates. According to the results, less than 20% of the country's voters approved the last four years of the Fernández government (Stefanoni, 2023). Even more, the popularity of the leaders of the two main coalitions was extremely low in comparison to previous years, which could indicate that the morale of traditional Argentinian politicians is decaying on the views of the citizens. Moreover, the candidate that had the best result in this pool was not from either of the two main coalitions, the “Frente de Todos” and the “Juntos por el Cambio”. Javier Milei, who emerged in national politics in 2021, obtained 30.04% of the votes, hence, the highest share of votes (*Argentina's Primary Presidential Election (PASO) Results August 2023*, n.d.)

Javier Milei is an auto-proclaimed libertarian whose government plan propositions included the dollarization of the national currency, the cessation of the operations of the National Central Bank, and the privatization of healthcare. Despite his countless online discourses in favor of individuals selling their organs as an expression of freedom, he had said that if elected, he would try to overturn the newly approved national abortion law (Stefanoni, 2023).

Predominantly marked by political polarization, inherited from the 2014 election and exacerbated by the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the 2018 Brazilian elections resulted in the victory of the far-right-wing candidate, Bolsonaro (Araújo and Prior, 2020). The candidate won the election under an anti-elitist, moralist, and anti-corruption discourse, positioning himself as the only possible alternative to the national economic and political crisis. His discourse was also based on the fight against “gender ideology” and the “communist threat”. The radicalized speech perpetrated by this new far-right wing in the country was mostly a result of a controversial

impeachment process that led to the removal of President Dilma Rousseff from Congress (Araújo and Prior, 2020).

Despite losing re-election in 2022, the movement initiated by Jair Bolsonaro became bigger than him. Proof of the power held by the movement is the assaults of January 8th in Brazil's capital, Brasília. On this occasion, the buildings that represent the country's democracy were deprecated by Bolsonaro's supporters as a protest against an election that they argued, with no proofs, that was corrupted<sup>2</sup>. The current president of Brazil is Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, from the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party — PT), who was also one of the presidents of Latin America's first 'pink tide'. Lula has kept some level of silence and distance from Milei during the latest campaigns. Apart from that, Bolsonaro had openly supported Milei's candidacy. Such similarities have created a parallel between the political context of Brazil and Argentina that is difficult to ignore.

In the examination of the political landscapes of both nations, a crucial consideration resides in the manifestation of polarization. Hence, it becomes imperative to comprehensively grasp the contextual dynamics of polarization within Brazil and Argentina, thereby facilitating insight into the respective positions of journalists and readers within the intricate framework of their national political arenas.

In the article '*Populismo, ideología y polarización afectiva en Argentina*' (2023), the scholars Torcal and Carty analyze the affective polarization in the country during the 2021 legislative elections. The main coalitions were the *Juntos por el Cambio* (JxC) and *Frente de Todos* (FdT). As it was already explained, the Argentine political fracture is called '*la grieta*' (Kirschnerists versus anti-Kirschnerists) and it is not a new phenomenon, being a constant mainly in the presidential elections. The country has been facing a process of increasing polarization.

Firstly, the authors define affective polarization as the tendency to focus on the sentimental aspects that the opposition, be it an individual or a group, generates in voters. From these sentiments could arise both a high affinity for the other members of the same groups and a high hostility towards the opposition. This concept was first studied and developed for the bipartisan case of the United States, however, recent

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[https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-mark-anniversary-january-8-attack-democracy-2024-01-08/#:~:text=8%20attack%20on%20democracy.-By%20Ricardo%20Britoandtext=BRASILIA%2C%20Jan%208%20\(Reuters\).protest%20against%20an%20election%20result](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-mark-anniversary-january-8-attack-democracy-2024-01-08/#:~:text=8%20attack%20on%20democracy.-By%20Ricardo%20Britoandtext=BRASILIA%2C%20Jan%208%20(Reuters).protest%20against%20an%20election%20result).

efforts have been made to analyze the topic under multiparty democracies, as in Argentina and Brazil. It is important to keep in mind that polarization has different characteristics according to the democracy that is being analyzed, and as in most cases, affective polarization and ideological polarization can overlap. Besides that, the characteristics of polarization in Argentina are common in democracies that have had a strong presence of populist conflicts or ideologies. And this is the case in most South American countries, including Brazil (Torcal and Carty, 2023).

Torcal and Carly have concluded four influential points about the Argentine case. The first is that, even with a multiparty system, ideology is strongly attached to the affective distancing between the labels 'right-wing' and 'left-wing'. The second is that this ideological identity increases affective polarization. Third, the Justicialismo conflict is at the center of the fears and passions that arise towards the two main coalitions that ran the 2021 legislative elections. And lastly, that affective polarization in Argentina is high mainly because of the hostility towards voters with different political opinions, and not exactly because voters that support the same candidate/party connect among themselves (Torcal and Carty, 2023).

This discussion is fundamental to understanding the difference between following a determined politician/party because of its political agenda, and following a determined politician/party because of a matter of identity. Hence, when an individual is strongly attached to an ideological label, and, especially, when they have strong positions in relation to a populist politician/party, they are mostly likely to develop an identity inside a group and a feeling of belonging that will guide their election choices. The individuals are so immersed in a political/party's discourse that they begin to see themselves as direct representatives of such politicians/parties, thus, any attack from the opposition is a personal attack. This dynamic represents an intense risk for the proper functioning of democratic systems since choices are being made regardless of the politician's/party's government plans (Torcal and Carty, 2023).

Finally, according to the same study, *La Libertad Avanza* and its supporters presented higher levels of hostility towards the opposition than affinity among its electorate. Additionally, throughout the election process, the number of voters who changed their positions to become supporters of LA was bigger than the ones who moved to FdT or to JxC. According to the authors, this is meaningful because it is the

common path for the rise of an extremist right-wing party that tries to change the political fracture by introducing itself as a new option, an ‘outsider’ (Torcal and Carty, 2023).

The Brazilian case is here explored based on the research elaborated by Fuks and Marques (2022) that measured and explained the types of polarization that are more evident in this society. In contrast to Argentina, the polarization fluctuates more around political figures instead of parties, which are unstable and lack a strong social base. The affective polarization is recent, as well as the radicalization of the right, which has helped with the overall process of political fracturing. This significant rise of a radical right is necessary for the ideological alignment that stimulates society to move to the extreme poles of the right-left political spectrum, leaving the center empty.

In contrast to the right, which is becoming more radicalized, the leftist movement has been slowly losing its essence. The Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores — PT) has been going through ideological transformations since its rise in the 1990s, which makes it closer to the center than to the left. The consequence is that its electoral base is not exactly ideologically aligned with the party, because those who consider themselves leftists have moved their support to other parties (Fuks and Marques, 2023).

In this context of an unorganized left and a rising radical right, the polarization in Brazil is asymmetric and led by the radical right. Another interesting point about the Brazilian electorate is that only a minority of it identifies with a party. This is fundamental to understanding why polarization in this country is mostly not ideological, despite the current fight between a leftist and a far-rightist coalition (Fuks and Marques, 2023).

Indeed, the studies made by the authors revealed that affective polarization expanded significantly during the 2018 presidential elections in comparison to the previous one, in 2014, when the right had not yet undergone pronounced radicalization. In 2018, supporters of Bolsonaro, representing the radical right, exhibited a heightened level of hostility towards candidates of the Workers' Party (PT) compared to the reciprocal sentiment (Fuks and Marques, 2023). Their data lead Fuks and Marques to the conclusion that what was happening in the country was affective polarization. And to support the theory that ideological polarization was not as evident in 2018 as

affective polarization, the authors introduce information about how there was not a substantial increase in the poles of the polarization rule. There was a slight increase in the right. However, the center wasn't emptied and the electorate did not necessarily move to the extremes. In other words, people were not voting according to their political alignment, they were voting on the candidate that had more chances to prevent the opposition from winning. It is important to remember that Brazil is, like Argentina, a multi-party democracy and more than two candidates can run for the presidency at the same time. What happened in 2018, could be considered the beginning of a path leading to ideological polarization, but its development and its performance in the 2022 presidential elections are yet to be analyzed, considering the novelty of the events (Fuks and Marques, 2023). In sum, Brazilians vote against a specific candidate, and Argentinians vote against a party.

To conclude, as it also happens in Argentina's case, affective polarization in Brazil is more likely to happen among political activists that are in its majority, the elite, and people who had access to formal superior education. Therefore, both countries are currently in a process of affective polarization. This is considered damaging to democracy because it distances voters from the most important issues to maintain a society: the government proposals, public policy plans and the social and economic directions of the candidate (Fuks and Marques, 2023; Torcal and Carty, 2023).

These are the political and social contexts of the two countries from where newspapers are going to be investigated in this thesis. Newspaper analysis and comparison was chosen because of the influence and impact of their discourses in the building of political opinions. Language can construct realities through symbols that contain hidden ideas and values, and news media's use of language can sediment specific ideas into our cognitive framework (Civila et al, 2020).

Media discourse makes use of tools and mechanisms to ensure that the desired opinion will be interpreted and absorbed by non-critical readers. For instance, the repetition of expressions and words, the selection of some adjectives that already carry a pre-determined connotation with the public, and even the transposition of some concepts and quotes from their original space to fit in a position that better conveys what the newspaper or the writer wants (Civila et al., 2020).

However, when analyzing newspapers in search of bias it is important to remember that the function of newspapers is not to provide detailed and complex information, on the contrary, they are channels that provide descriptions of events. Consequently, the absence of elaborate explanations on determined topics is not necessarily indicative of bias, as the news is the final product of a process that includes information sourcing and traditions of news framing that guide news outlets (Machin and Mayr, 2023).

The following chapters will provide an overview of relevant literature that explains the concepts of framing and positioning, which are two of the most used tools to convey the news outlet's ideas and values. Besides that, the next chapter exemplifies how Clarín, La Nación, Folha de São Paulo and O Globo made use of their power to initiate and perpetrate the anti-populist discourse that still prevails in Brazil and Argentina.



## CHAPTER II

### Discourse and Power

This chapter is divided into three topics. After an introduction to the concepts of discourse and language developed by Fairclough (1995; 2011), the first two topics of the chapter present the literature review on the journalistic cultures, the media systems, and the journalists' profiles in Argentina and Brazil. Also, it briefly introduces how media ownership works in both countries, a topic that will be better discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the last section explains the theoretical frameworks of framing and positioning in news production which are the fundamental concepts to understand the role of news media in the portrayal of a presidential candidate.

Understanding some concepts is fundamental for developing the analysis and discussion proposed by this thesis. Therefore, this section will be dedicated to explaining in more detail how discourse is entwined with power. This is the primary argument of the methodology chosen for the analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, as well as the line that connects news outlets and political influence. To begin with the concept of discourse, we describe it according to Fairclough's work 'Discourse and Power' (2011). The term 'discourse' entails that the use of language overlays social relations and processes, which, in return, transform language. A characteristic of this overlay is that language ends up being the embodiment of ideology, in other words, the concrete application of ideology. Additionally, language is 'invested by ideology'.

In this sense, discourse is modeled by structures while reshaping, reproducing, and transforming them. These structures are of a 'discoursal/ideological' nature because they include symbols of discourse, such as codes and vocabulary while also including relations that pertain to the social sphere. Namely, gender and work relations, and the relation between civil society and state institutions, the so-called *extra-discoursal* structures. This association between discourse and *extra-discoursal* structures is what supports the language action of creating and recreating relations, subjects, and objects of the social world. For example, the parent-child relation is determined by the way each interacts with the other in terms of discourse, that is to say the language they use with

each other. Meanwhile, discourse also contributes to the solidification of the positions each occupies in this relationship (Fairclough, 2011).

Hence, discourse is composed of social practice, text production, distribution, consumption, and text, and each of these components interacts with the other. These connections generate interpretation, and the investment of ideology enters here when it adds meaning to a text. So, many are the levels of language and discourse that are ideologically invested, however, much more attention is given to linguistic meaning. However, the point of difference in Fairclough's definition of discourse and ideology, is that the latter can also be found hidden in presuppositions, implications, and metaphors, not just in the vocabulary used in a specific situation. The significance of these concepts to this study lies in the understanding that a newspaper's choice regarding its portrayal of a presidential candidate, is in itself a configuration of how to shape a subject through ideological means.

Another term that is theoretically close to ideology, therefore to language and discourse, is hegemony. Hegemony here is understood as the economic, political, cultural, and ideological dominance of a group over another through the construction of alliances rather than simple subordination. This domination can occur through the use of discursive practices since it reproduces and transforms existing social and power relations. Therefore, discourse is re-articulated to make a group's (or an individual's) beliefs and ideas obtain the trust of the people for this group to become the one in power. This opens a cycle of using language to obtain hegemonic power at the same time it is used to maintain this position. Hence, ideology in discourse emerges in societies characterized by rooted hegemonic relations (Fairclough 1995, 2011).

Nevertheless, it is not given that ideology in discourse can't be reversed. In the same way that a group takes power and becomes hegemonic, as well as its ideologies, this same group can also be deposed, and society can transcend the ideologies imposed. Ideologies can indeed be naturalized and become the so-called 'common sense', which presents challenges to its uncovering. However, when subjects face contradictory positions concerning the ideas they have been following as natural and unbreakable, they start reflecting and problematizing what was once given as a fact. In discourse, for example, this can be the comprehension that some expressions or words are sexist or racist, and must not be used (Fairclough, 2011).

Discourse cannot be understood as a simple gathering of words. Much is said through omission and implicit intention. Discourse is used to obtain power, and the ideology that arises from this process gives meaning to language according to the interests of the dominant group, or groups. Thereby, language is intertwined with ideology, power, and, consequently, control over who builds our societies and how, and what is believed to be reality (Machin and Mayr, 2023). For this reason, a critical discourse analysis must be constantly vigilant about who is building critiques and if the exercise of certain discourses is not naturalizing ideological practices.

The following section of this chapter will present the structures and the roles played by news media conglomerates in Argentina and Brazil. The comprehension of the characteristics of the journalistic environments in both countries is essential to understanding the context in which the language used by the news is created. Furthermore, this overview will give us a better contextualization of the framing used in the news articles that will be analyzed.

### **1.1 Media system, journalistic culture, and media ownership in Argentina**

The configuration of media systems and journalistic culture in Argentina and Brazil is inserted in the specific case of Latin America. Despite the differences among countries in the region, most of them have experienced authoritarian governments and diverse forms of transition to democracy that influenced the way news media is organized and the role it plays in society (Oller et.al., 2017). Ultimately, the main conditions affecting journalism in Latin America can be highlighted as limitations on press freedom, the public's lack of trust in the news, and challenges faced by news professionals to adapt to these conditions (Jacob and Amado, 2023). All these three points can be observed in the case of Argentina, as the present topic will discuss.

Press freedom across Latin America has been suffering a relative decline in the past decades, for instance, Argentina and Brazil are classified as partially free. This is a consequence of many factors, among them, organized crime, government corruption, urban violence, and weak rule of law, as well as an increasing intrusion of the state in the media, both directly and indirectly. Indeed, Argentina occupies a worrying position as the first country in the list of “countries to watch”, concerning governmental changes in press freedom (Márquez-Ramírez and Guerrero, 2017).

There are a variety of theories that explain the context of the interplay between media and politics in the region. These theories have been reassessed and restructured over the years to better adapt to the quick changes the news media has been going through (Kitzberger, 2022). This study has decided to focus on two theories. For instance, the authors Guerrero and Marques-Ramírez (2017) sustain the theory of the “Captured Liberalism” model to describe the media system in the region. In brief, the media system is considered liberal because on the surface most countries in Latin America are formal democracies with commerce and markets protected by Constitutions. However, media systems are captured in the sense that journalism is constantly being instrumentalized for particular gains, for example, of political parties, governments, elite groups, and the market, among others. Consequently, media regulation has become a political discourse reshaped by national circumstances.

This theoretical framework adeptly elucidates a facet of the historical dynamics characterizing the interplay between media and politics in Argentina during periods governed by neoliberal leadership, when there wasn't much conflict between the government and media conglomerate owners. However, an additional emergent theory appears to offer insight into the media-political landscape in Argentina, particularly during the ascendancy of left-wing populism (Kitzberger, 2022). The rise of such left-wing populist heads of State in the country coincided with journalistic battles between governments and national media conglomerates (Oller et al., 2017).

The so-called ‘left turn’ has brought up discussions over the possibility of using the concept of political parallelism to characterize determined Latin American media-politics realignments, especially in the context of populist leftist governments. The concept was first designed for the Western European situation, however, the populist/anti-populist divide in Argentina may have set up a particular form of political parallelism. The arguments that this feature of the media system can be applied to the new context of Argentina's political cleavage defend that the news media alignment against Kirchnerism, which started during Cristina Kirchner's first term in 2007, changed news media coverage and journalistic practices in the country. The journalism war mode, which took over newsrooms and brought together news outlets that were once considered enemies, was central in the spread of anti-Kirchnerism (anti-populism). Therefore, the proposition is that news outlets weren't just being instrumentalized by

political actors/institutions, as it is proposed by the ‘Captured Media’ model, but they were also being active forces shaping and being shaped by the national political context (Kitzberger, 2022; de Diego, 2017).

The past few years have been especially challenging for the news media worldwide. Changes in the way the media market works due to the digital revolution on the production and dissemination of information have been some causes of the journalistic crisis all over the world (Jacob and Amado, 2021). In Argentina, for example, the public interest in the news has decreased in the aftermath of COVID-19, with data from Clarín, the country’s biggest news outlet, news articles that at the end of 2022, its Sunday circulation was of 150,000 printed newspapers, far less than the 200,000 that were circulating in the previous year (Grupo Clarín Financial Statement, 2022)<sup>3</sup>. Reuters Digital News news article of 2023 showed that Argentinians were consuming less news in 2023 than in the years before the pandemic, which is one of the consequences of the low levels of media trust in the country. As stated in the news article, only one in three Argentinians trust the traditional media (Newman et al., 2023).

Distrust in the news media in the context of Argentina has been perpetrated by governments that openly declared journalists and the media as liars and transgressors of the order. This problematic relationship between heads of State and the press is historical. Indeed, before President Alberto Fernández (2019-2023/ Frente de Todos) discredited non-governmental sources of COVID-19 information during the years of the pandemic by urging the population to only rely on official sources, his vice, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, had starred an open war against the press.

When Cristina Kirchner was the President, from 2007 to 2015, she would constantly attack journalists through official channels, especially regarding the coverage of her corruption trials. One of the examples of her acts against the press was her attempt to criminalize investigative journalism, which according to her was conspiring with politicians and the judiciary to manipulate the application of the law to her disadvantage (Jacob and Amanda, 2023). The shift of the president and government’s political orientation from the radical branch of Peronism to a central-left neoliberal government, represented by Alberto Fernández (2019-2023), didn’t seem to have changed this press-politics dynamic. Indeed, the ‘Foro del Periodismo Argentino’, a

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<sup>3</sup> Grupo Clarín Financial Statement 2022.

<https://finance.yahoo.com/news/grupo-clar-n-announces-full-004500115.html>

civil society organization that monitors the situation of journalism in the country, declared that in 2023, the main aggressors of journalism were official figures from many jurisdictional levels and hierarchies of various party affiliations (FOPEA, 2021).

The deterioration of the relationship between official figures and the press has been accompanied by an increase in direct attacks against journalists when they try to cover public events. In 2020, the attacks had increased by 40% compared to the previous year, according to the Argentine Journalist Forum (Jacob and Amado, 2023).

In addition to this complex and problematic relationship, the Argentine government is the major advertising client of several media companies, making it the main source of funding for journalism. The lack of regulation for the written press leaves open breaches for the State to exert a strong indirect influence on the press through advertising, both for small and medium-sized media (Repetto and Mastrini, 2022). The State is also the principal provider of official information, and this privileged position makes it easier for the government to limit access to official documents and hinder independent investigations (Jacob and Amado, 2023). Over the years, there have been some attempts to regulate the field of media and journalism. For example, Former President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) promulgated the Decree 1172/03<sup>4</sup> on access to Public Information, establishing guidelines for the process of requesting access to information from the National Executive Power. Additionally, during Macri's term, the Law 27,275/16 was approved, guaranteeing to any individual the Right of Access to Public Information without the necessity to file any formal request (Repetto and Mastrini, 2022). Nonetheless, in practice, media access to this official information hasn't been facilitated by either of the mentioned laws (Jacob and Amado, 2023)

Government transparency has also been obstructed by the almost absence of presidential press conferences in the past two decades. They have been held sporadically since the social and political crisis of 2001, when the Peronist president Nestor Kirchner (2003 to 2007), Cristina Kirchner's husband, introduced the use of online channels and social media for official announcements. The following presidents maintained this limited contact with the press, independent of the president's political spectrum. For instance, Mauricio Macri (2015 to 2019) the first non-Peronist

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<sup>4</sup> To access the full text of the Decree:

<http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/9000094999/90763/norma.htm>

democratically elected president since the re-democratization, reduced the number of press conferences by the end of his mandate while his popularity was also decreasing amongst Argentinians. President Alberto Fernandez used to hold press conferences to inform people about lockdown restrictions but interrupted them after his management started receiving criticism. By the end of his mandate, he gave only a few interviews to selected media outlets. These restrictions on freedom of information harm the exercise of independent journalism (Jacob and Amado, 2023).

The main media conglomerates (*Clarín* and *La Nación*) have often used lobbying and their influence capacities to shape laws in their favor, potentially impacting the communication sector without negative repercussions for their business. For years, it seemed that the media refrained from being too critical of ruling politicians in exchange for the media markets not suffering substantial interference from media policies. This dynamics only changed in 2009, with the passing of Law 26,522 by then President Cristina Kirchner, which became known popularly as *La Ley (The Law)*. Indeed, this law, which tried to change the media ownership configuration of media conglomerates and was specially directed to *Clarín*, was one of the igniting reasons for the major conflicts between the press and ruling politicians that took place mostly from 2009 to 2015 (Repetto and Mastrini, 2022).

The news media conglomerates in Argentina have emerged as prominent detractors of populism within the nation, leveraging their journalistic influence to reinforce the propagation of social polarization on a national scale. The 2008 agrarian crisis and the passing of *La Ley* unleashed a populist/anti-populist conflict that divided the media scenario between the pro-government, including the newspaper *Página/12* and some other minor outlets, and the opposition, fueled mainly by *Clarín* and *La Nación*. Pluralism inside newsrooms and amongst news outlets became almost nonexistent since news content was progressively becoming more one-sided, with corruption news articles, for example, being focused on the opponent (Reuters Institute, 2019; Kitzberger, 2022). Shortly after 2008, the critiques of populism surpassed its economic features and reached debates over the morals and ethics on which populism was based. This antagonistic construction between “us”, good citizens, and “them”, the evil government, contributed to the popular mobilization that defeated Kirchnerism in

2015 in the name of banishing Argentine society from populism (Kitzberger, 2022; de Diego, 2017).

In the post-Kirchnerist phase, during Mauricio Macri (2015-2019) and Alberto Fernández' (2019-2023) governments, *La Nación* and *Clarín* kept their anti-Kirchnerism approach to news making. For instance, Kirchnerist sources and perspectives were marginalized and devalued by these newspapers. In contrast, government materials of this post-populist Argentina were rarely questioned (Zunino, 2019; Kitzberger, 2022; Repetto and Mastrini, 2022).

Argentina's populist phase realigned the national journalistic practices and values. The aftermath of the conflicts between the news media and the populist government left journalists in the middle of a new battlefield. A journalist could be accused of Kirchnerism if they openly criticized the new president. During Macri's term, journalists who had worked in Kirchnerist government media or identified as Kirchnerist or militant were stigmatized and mostly set aside. This pressure brought up massive layoffs in the field (Kitzberger, 2022, 2016).

Despite the news media's success in preventing Kirchnerism from returning as head of State in the presidential elections after 2012, its relationship with future presidents continued to be controversial.

### ***Journalist Profiles and Journalistic Practices in Argentina***

In order to be a journalist in Argentina, no academic degree is required, consequently, there is no specific and official body that regulates the profession, although some non-profit organizations and worker unions are focused on the protection of journalists (Repetto and Mastrini, 2022).

The low level of affiliation to worker unions among journalists in Argentina and the media-politics conflict in which news outlets have taken part since 2008, has made it challenging for researchers to compile enough data to describe with precision the profile of Argentinian journalists as well as the country's prevailing journalistic culture. The legal framework of journalism, the Statute of the Professional Journalist, hasn't been updated since 1948 (Repetto and Mastrini, 2022; Amado and Waisbord, 2018). One of the consequences of this lack of information is the difficulty in understanding to which



extent structural factors influence occupational practices and informative quality in Argentina (Amado and Waisbord, 2018).

In 2016, the Worlds of Journalism Study published a news article that provided detailed data about journalists in the country from 2013 to 2014 (Amado, 2016)<sup>5</sup>. The period covered by the news article coincides with the practice of war journalism in the newsroom, led especially by *Clarín*, but followed closely by *La Nación* (Kitzberger, 2022). Using a questionnaire, the study analyzed some fundamental topics to understand the overall practice of journalism in the country, among them: the roles of journalism, the ethical orientation of journalists, and professional autonomy and influences. The study also helped to shed light on how professionals perceived their positioning in the field.

Concerning professional role orientations, most journalists interviewed considered news articleing things as they were the most important, followed by promoting tolerance and cultural diversity and providing analysis of current affairs. Remarkably, more than 49% also answered that influencing public opinion and motivating people to participate in political activity was extremely or very important in the activities of journalists' roles (Amado, 2016).

In the context of professional ethics, 87.5% of the respondents agreed that they should always follow the codes of professional ethics, despite prevailing circumstances. However, more than the majority justified the occasional use of confidential business or government documents without authorization, as well as the use of hidden microphones or cameras (Amado, 2016). Indeed, during the period analyzed, government officers were ordered to avoid *Clarín*, and inside the newspaper's editorials, the side contact between news articles and government officers was unauthorized. The reliance on asymmetrical and partisan sources was justified because of the outlet's goal of undermining any possibility of Kirchnerism to remain in power (Kitzberger, 2022).

Despite the turbulent media-politics relationship during the period in which this survey was conducted, most journalists expressed that they had a great deal of freedom to choose their stories and what parts of it should be highlighted. Still, less than half of them would take part in editorial coordination activities (Amado, 2016). This low

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<sup>5</sup> The next country news article from Words of Journalism Study will be published by second semester of 2024, with data from the past ten years. The document used for this thesis was the newest to be released.

participation could be explained, in the case of Argentina, by the high level of bureaucratization of organizational procedures that is part of the national media culture. Factors such as media managers, editors and supervisors, editorial policy, and media ownership were pointed out by the interviewed journalists as part of what exerted the biggest influences on their work in the analyzed period of 2014-2015 (Amado and Waisbord, 2018). The lack of information access and sector laws and regulations were also pointed out as a source of influence in their work (Amado, 2016).

Journalistic professional practices and work conditions are influenced by several factors that are internal and external to news editorials. News production is impacted by some complex circumstances, for instance, the individual (professional and personal backgrounds and organizational hierarchy) and ideological levels (concerning news production routine and sources) are inserted in particular organizational contexts, like editorial decisions and field conventions. This organizational context, in turn, is determined by the system's social, cultural, political, and ideological factors (Amado and Waisbord, 2018).

The subsequent chapter will discuss the intricate interactions between *Clarín* and *La Nación* with Kirchner's government, elucidating the transformative impact on the media-politics dynamics within the country. Nevertheless, the next section of the present chapter delves into the characteristics of the Brazilian media system.

## **1.2 Media system, journalistic culture and media ownership in Brazil**

The case of Brazil can't be characterized exactly like Argentina because both countries have different political histories and contemporary context. However, they do share similarities that are recurring for Latin American countries, as explained in the last section (Oller at.el., 2017). One of those similarities is the use of the political parallelism theory to also describe the Brazilian media system.

In the book "*A grande imprensa e o PT (1989-2014)*" (*The Big Press and The Workers' Party (1989-2014)*), published in 2017, the Brazilian researcher Fernando Antônio Azevedo explains the press-politics relation in Brazil using the concept of political parallelism. He proposes that the newspapers of the main media conglomerates

in the country have been acting as political actors in parallel to center-right political forces (Oliveira, 2018; Azevedo, 2018).

The book analyzed the editorials and news articles of *O Globo*, *Folha de São Paulo*, and *O Estado de São Paulo* (the three leading Brazilian newspapers) during the presidential elections from 1989 to 2014. From this extensive study, he concluded three points about the relationship between media and politics in the country. The first is that the anti-populism journalistic movement in Brazil has its origins in the first presidential elections after the re-democratization, in 1985. That's when researchers found evidence of the biggest news outlets being politically positioned on the center-right, in the cases of *O Globo* and *Folha de São Paulo*. While *Folha de São Paulo* purported editorial neutrality compared to *O Globo*, it still exhibited a pronounced negative stance toward the populist party, the “*Partido dos Trabalhadores*” (PT-Workers Party) than to the opposition (Oliveira, 2018; Azevedo, 2018).

The second point defends that media conglomerates in Brazil are more inclined to their economic gains than to a specific ideological alignment. This means that one of the presuppositions behind their initiative to act as political actors is that they do so to build customer loyalty. In this sense, the political parallelism of Brazilian media is not because media owners are necessarily conspiring with political rulers, but because the left-wing values proposed by PT candidates were antagonistic to the liberal-conservative ideology followed by the three main media conglomerates, *O Globo*, *O Estado de São Paulo* and *Folha de São Paulo* (Oliveira, 2018; Azevedo, 2018). Indeed, for decades, the three newspapers mentioned above have aligned their editorials with presidential candidates who defended neoliberal policies for the economy, especially those in favor of reducing the state's regulatory role in the media. This was the case for presidents such as Fernando Collor de Mello in 1989 and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994, and also in 2018 presidential elections, when they made massive use of the anti-populist rhetoric to the point of minimizing and even naturalizing the authoritarian bias of the ultra-liberal candidate Jair Bolsonaro (Araújo and Prior, 2020).

This hypothesis is then reassured by the book's last conclusion, according to which newspapers from national media conglomerates have been following what the author calls ‘interpretative packages’ to criticize any opposition to center-right

ideologies. Such ‘interpretative packages’ include ideological and moralist framing, and the reproduction of the anti-populist rhetorical strategies used by liberal parties to build opposition to candidates, parties, and governments that are aligned with center-left or leftist ideals (Azevedo, 2018; Olveira, 2018; Van Dijk, 2017).

Some scholars like Teun van Dijk (2017); Araújo and Prior (2020), Alfonso de Albuquerque (2019), and Azevedo (2018) have pointed to the influence that the main Brazilian newspapers have exerted in the public imaginary of anti-populism of left-wing that culminated in the impeachment of the left-wing President Dilma Rousseff, in 2016 and the resurgence of the far-right in the country. Besides, they have consistently acted as the “Fourth Power” in decision-making in Brazil.

According to Teun van Dijk (2017), who analyzed 18 editorials from *O Globo* during March and April 2016, the newspaper manipulated public opinion about the impeachment process of President Dilma Rousseff. The main manipulative strategy deployed by it was the omission of information from experts, scholars, and the international press on their opinions about the process. Furthermore, the focus on accusations against PT leaders used a legal framework that readers were unable to understand or verify. Besides that, *O Globo* and other major newspapers’ coverage of the corruption scandals taking place in the country during the ruling of the Workers Party (PT) selectively focused on Lula and Dilma Rousseff, even though there were other politicians and parties involved. In the aftermath of the left-wing populist ruling in Brazil, the main media conglomerates have allegedly received an increase in advertising financed by the government (de Albuquerque, 2019).

The media-politics dynamics in Brazil can also be characterized by a mediatization of politics. This term is used to explain the dependence politicians/parties have on the media to disseminate their ideas, build their public image, and gain the approval of voters. The building of a political persona can be done using all types of media as intermediates (Araújo and Prior, 2020), but this study focuses specifically on the case of newspapers. As already pointed out by Amado and Wisborn (2018) the coverage of political events is part of a complex process that permeates production routines, individual beliefs and background, as well as the organizational structure of the newspaper.

The media in Brazil is divided among state, public, and private media. State media is the one that broadcasts the activities of the justice, legislative, and executive powers of the federal government. The public refers to the autonomous media that is financed, in parts, by the government and committed to contents that highlight citizenship values, cultural diversity, and political plurality. Because of its connection to the federal authorities, public media is often under scrutiny for potential partisan manipulation (Paiva et.al., 2015).

Regarding private media, it is highly concentrated in the hands of a few media owners that are in constant and complex relations of clientelism and patrimonialism with Brazilian politicians (Paiva et.al., 2015). The Brazilian media environment is characterized by a high concentration of ownership and lacks a robust regulatory framework. These conditions hinder political diversity, allowing media conglomerates to wield significant political influence with limited accountability obligations. For Instance, when President Lula proposed legislation to establish the *Conselho Federal de Jornalismo* (Journalism Federal Council) in 2004 the mainstream news media (understood as the biggest main media conglomerates) resisted the government regulatory efforts by labeling them as authoritarian and as constraints on press freedom (de Albuquerque, 2019).

### ***Journalist Profiles, Journalistic Practices, and violence against journalists in Brazil***

The future of the profession of journalism in Brazil has been debated for decades. In addition to the impact of new technologies in the exercise of the profession, the country also faces challenges of shortage in job opportunities and generally low salaries, much as a consequence of the political, social, and economic crisis that has persisted over the past ten years in the country (Paiva et.al., 2015; Nicolletti, 2019).

The research named “*Perfil Do Jornalista Brasileiro 2021*” (*Profile of the Brazilian Journalists 2021*), led by the Laboratory of Sociology of Work from the University of Santa Catarina, Brazil, surveyed more than 7,000 journalists around the country to understand their work conditions during 2021. The results pointed to the precariousness of the work conditions, be it in the mainstream media (formed by media

hegemony companies), and the recent independent arrangements (mainly online) (Lima et.al, 2021).

The efforts of the mainstream media to survive the crisis led to their restructuring, with massive layoffs and a consequential increase in job overload of the remaining Workers. Indeed, the research found out that the main limiting aspects in the journalistic practice, according to journalists themselves, were: an unbalanced increase in working hours, low availability of sources to collect news, and the impositions of editorial supervisors (Lima e.tal.,2021; Nicoletti, 2019).

Regarding the unionization of journalists, the study found that 68.6% of the surveyed workers declared to not have a union membership. Despite the low level of unionization among journalists, the number of memberships has increased by almost 6% from 2012 to 2021. Moreover, party affiliation by journalists is not common in the country, with only 10.3% having declared to be associated with a political organization. However, most of the journalists that answered the survey were said to be ideologically inclined to leftist/center-leftist ideals (Lima et.al, 2021).

More than half of the journalists, 57.8%, have claimed to enjoy freedom of speech in their work. Despite the lower numbers, it is still worrying that there are journalists in the country who consider themselves to be in a position of partial freedom of speech. The study doesn't specify what types of limitation of freedom of speech the journalists claim to suffer, but it explains that different media organizations are more or less susceptible to censorship. Media organizations associated with the government in 2021, such as state-owned outlets, faced a heightened risk of censorship. This was particularly evident as President Jair Bolsonaro consistently encouraged violence against journalists, actively spread misinformation, and discredited newspapers (Lima et.al., 2021).

The worlds of journalism and communication in Brazil are facing a process of informational disorder, that consists of the spread of misinformation to generate damage. This disorder is followed closely by the increase in the number of cases of violence against journalists since they became one of the targets of this process, which was widely perpetuated by the president of the country between 2018-2022, but continued to be spread by his supporters and party members. Indeed, misinformation

and discretization of journalism represent challenges and risks to the exercise of the profession (Gould and Blotta, 2022).

Despite the results of the study “*Perfil do Jornalista Brasileiro*” showing that in 2021 the journalists interviewed didn’t perceive limitation of freedom of speech in their work routines, the news articles Without Borders’ news article (2021) for the same period revealed that the indicator of press freedom in the country retreated six positions from 2018 to 2021, ending the rank in 111 out of 180 analyzed countries.

The types of violence suffered by Brazilian journalists since 2018 include physical aggression, threats, verbal aggression, impediments to the exercise of journalism, and the main cases being censorship and press discretization. Notably, the press discretization was institutionalized by the emergence of the far-right in the country with the election of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency in 2018. The systematic violence against the profession of journalism was perpetrated not only by him, but also by his supporters and government members (Gould and Blotta, 2022).

Indeed, politicians have become the main aggressors of the press since Bolsonaro’s election (Márcio Garoni, et al., 2022). For instance, in 2021, Jair Bolsonaro was responsible for 147 cases of aggression against the press (34.19% of the total), among them, 129 were press discretization, and 18, were verbal aggressions against journalists. In 2022, after a process led by the *Sindicato dos Jornalistas do Estado de São Paulo* (São Paulo State Workers Union), he was sentenced to pay a R\$100,000 fine to be reverted to the *Fundo Estadual de Defesa dos Direitos Difusos* (Estate Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Rights) (Gould and Blotta, 2022).

Despite *Folha de São Paulo* and *O Globo* influence on the spread of the anti-Petismo (anti-populism) discourse that culminated in the election of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency in 2018, both newspapers expressed concerns over the possible risks that such a polarizing election posed to the Brazilian democracy. However, this was done using very different tones in each newspaper. For instance, *Folha* has shown concern over Bolsonaro and Fernando Haddad (Workers Party -PT) discourses by saying that the ideas defended by them could pose a threat to Brazilian democracy. When Bolsonaro was elected the new president, *Folha* released an editorial drawing attention to how Bolsonaro, in 27 years as a politician, has released numerous statements that disregarded the fundamentals of democracy (Araújo and Prior, 2020).

*O Globo*, despite expressing concerns about the risks to democracy in polarized elections, strategically presented its content in a manner that refrained from creating a highly damaging image of Bolsonaro. In the post-election period, *O Globo* defined the elections as proof of the strength of the Brazilian democratic game, highlighting how the change in power from the Workers Party to Bolsonaro was beneficial to democracy, framing his victory in a highly positive way (Araújo and Prior, 2020).

The literature review on how press media works in Argentina and Brazil presented some similarities between the two countries, especially the incisive anti-populist rhetoric used by the countries' main news outlets. Moreover, the countries' economic and political crises are two fundamental points to understand how journalists have been working, and in which aspects the exercise of the profession has been challenged by the limitation of freedom of speech. An apparent difference between their press-politics relationship is how in Argentina much of this persecution of journalists was done by the center-left populist governments of the Kirchner's, while in Brazil, it has origins in the far-right populist government of Jair Bolsonaro (Oller et.al, 2017). The following sections will discuss the framing theory and how it can influence reader's perceptions of a determined topic.

### **1.3 Framing and Positioning Theories**

Framing and positioning are conceptual frameworks that have been used by discourse analysts to understand how interlocutors create meaning, connections, and identities through linguistic and paralinguistic means. Briefly, in the context of face-to-face verbal communication, *framing* refers to how people define a situation, and *positioning*, refers to how they create identities for themselves and others inside a determined situation (Gordon, 2015).

Both theories integrate the notion of intertextuality, in that previous experiences are related to how interlocutors and receptors interpret and use communication. The linguistic expressions people use carry history made up of prior interactions, which adds more layers of meaning to every new encounter. Therefore, it is essential to consider the context of a communication scene to have a better interpretation of its framing and of how the actors position themselves and others in the specific situation (Gordon, 2015).



In discourse analysis, framing is used to understand the application of a variety of linguistic phenomena in everyday communicative interactions between individuals. Some of these phenomena are: how people create meaning, how contextualization cues work, and how interaction is constructed through collaboration. Positioning, on the other hand, is more related to identity construction. People position themselves and others through specific linguistic choices inserted in broader cultural and ideological categories. In the context of a dialogue setting, the narrator articulates views from their cognitive framework, while the receptor assimilates the communicated content based on their individual background. The significance of intertextuality becomes apparent, as the absence of contextual elucidation may lead to divergent interpretations of words and expressions, potentially deviating from the intended discourse (Gordon, 2015).

Framing and positioning are theoretical frameworks that try to explain how meanings, situations, relationships, and identities are part of ongoing discourse processes that are collaboratively constructed by several levels of language and human interaction (Gordon, 2015).

The notion of framing in media studies can be used to understand news making. In this perspective, framing can be used in two ways. The first is about how newspapers use words, images, and sentences to present information to their readers. Analyzing news through this lens can help to understand what the writer of the text considers important to highlight or omit. The other way to use a frame in journalism is concerning the individual cognitive understanding of a specific situation. The framing here is comprehended as what the reader considers to be more significant among the information that is being read (Macêdo, 2018).

Another perspective on the use of framing in journalism studies is explained by Tuchman (2002). According to her, framing compiles random events into stories that carry meanings, hence, news are frames produced by newspapers that offer to the reader the newspapers' definition of social reality. That is why the author considers it essential to use framing theories to identify how events are selected to become news, and how journalists' individual values and the newspaper's organizational culture influence such decisions.

In a similar line, Scheufele (1999) emphasizes that the way journalists frame a topic can be influenced by a variety of socio-structural and organizational variables. The

author proposes some questions that should guide the studies of news framing, and they include: what values influence how journalists frame a specific topic; how the selection process works; and what types of news framing influence the reader's perception of a determined subject.

Thus, framing is a theoretical framework that has a variety of definitions in journalism studies. Despite being different from positioning theories, both can be used in concordance with each other to examine the production of news. Furthermore, they highlight the complexity of human interaction through language, and how critical it is for discourse analysts who make use of framing and positioning theories in the context of news, not to assume that media owners, journalists, and editors can simply influence readers' opinions (Macêdo, 2018). Indeed, the legitimacy of journalism also relies on the readers' acceptance of what is being news articles. Media influence on this acceptance is limited by a range of factors that were exhaustively exposed here, such as the social, cultural, and economic context in which the individual is inserted (Rocha and Alves, 2019). Hence, by transferring framing theory to the context of a newspaper, it can be assumed that both readers and journalists assume certain positions according to their individual circumstances (Macêdo, 2018).

This understanding of how language and media are connected and function is also linked to the constructivist paradigm. From the constructivist perspective, the journalist assumes the role of mediator between the many sides of reality, being one of those who is responsible for spreading such views, thus, making it possible for people to retain the information and interpret it according to their knowledge schemas. Thus, the perspective of the constructivist theory of journalism attributes journalism, as an institution, with the duty of positioning itself concerning topics that can influence and transform society. This approach is very different from the theory of objectivity, according to which journalism must be impartial and neutral (Rocha and Alves, 2020).

Indeed, this supposed impartiality helps in the development and sedimentation of a universality that excludes perspectives that are in contrast to the hegemonic ones. The idea of “impartiality” and “neutrality” in news production is part of a system that imposes the perspective of the dominant groups over the others, under the disguise that they are universal categories (Miguel and Biroli, 2010; Rocha and Alves, 2020).

The theoretical framework exposed in this section in addition to the contextualization of journalism and politics in Brazil and Argentina will help to provide the knowledge schema necessary for the further analysis of the newspapers *Clarín*, *La Nación*, *F. de São Paulo*, and *O Globo*. Indeed, the news articles gathered for this analysis are framed in the context of a presidential election that is historical to Argentina because of the unprecedented rise of an ultra-liberal candidate (Stefanoni, 2023; Torcal and Carty, 2023), and in the context of Brazil because this candidate is closely aligned with the recent ultra-liberal movement that lost the national presidential elections of 2022 to leftist politicians (Fuks and Marques, 2023). The next chapter explains the detailed process of this comparative analysis to be executed and discussed in the fourth chapter.

## CHAPTER III

### Methodology

#### 2.1 The newspapers

The current study analyzed four digital newspapers: *Clarín*, *La Nación* from Argentina; *Folha de São Paulo*, and *O Globo*, from Brazil. This section describes the data used and explains the data collection methods, as well as the foundations of the data analysis.

The choice of the newspapers to be analyzed followed a set of steps that were conducted in both countries. First, the list of the three biggest news conglomerates was gathered using the information available online from two non-profit initiatives, the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) and the *Instituto Verificador de Comunicação* (IVC). The first is a mapping tool developed to continuously make available information about owners of relevant mass media outlets. It was developed by the German section of news articles Without Borders in 2015, and it was implemented in each country with the cooperation of national partners. The IVC audits the performance metrics of printed and digital vehicles in Brazil. It was created in 1951 and is affiliated with the International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Certification (IFABC) (IVC-Brasil Webpage, 2023). The final list was:

Argentina	Brazil
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Infobae</i></li> <li>2. <i>Clarín</i></li> <li>3. <i>La Nación</i></li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>O Globo</i></li> <li>2. <i>Folha</i></li> <li>3. <i>Estadão</i></li> </ol>

From these two lists, it was analyzed which of the conglomerates had newspapers with printed and digital versions. In Argentina, Infobae is a news web that doesn't follow the structure of a daily newspaper, hence, it was discarded from the data selection. The two lasting newspapers, *Clarín* and *La Nación* are part of the biggest media conglomerate in the country and are also the main circulation newspapers (MOM, 2018). In the case of Brazil, all three conglomerates are websites of printed newspapers, however, the third one, *Estadão*, has a public that is highly concentrated in the State of São Paulo (Oliveira, 2018). Since its reach is not widely spread around the country, like the other two in the list are, it was also discarded from the analysis. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, besides *Folha de São Paulo* and *O Globo* historical political activity in the country, their level of national circulation hints at their capacity to influence readers and opinion makers (Oliveira, 2018).

To avoid personal biases, the analysis of each newspaper's political inclination relied on the literature review of other scholars on the topic. Additionally, information from MOM and IVC about media ownership, and media concerning politics was also taken into consideration.

In the case of Argentina's newspapers, both had a political position against the governments of Fernández de Kirchner, from 2007-2015 and were in favor of Macri's government, from 2015-2019. The strong media opposition to *Kirchnerism* generated a vast amount of academic studies that analyzed those two newspapers during that time. However, the studies pointed out differences between the coverage of the two newspapers that are important for this thesis (Prinetti, 2022).

For example, *Clarín* presented a greater predisposition to publish news articles in which the interpretation was more detrimental to Kirchner and more favorable to Macri. This was not the case for *La Nación*. Indeed, *Clarín* was openly opposing the government, while the discourse of the second newspaper was of a more moderate opposition (Prinetti, 2022).

The website *Clarín.com* is the portal of the newspaper of the same name, it was created in 1996, and in 2018 was listed as the second-biggest news portal in the country. In 2017, the *Clarín Group* decided to unify the digital and printed versions of the newspaper, turning it into 100% digital (Who Owns the Media in Argentina?, 2019).

The group is the biggest communication conglomerate in Argentina, according to MOM (2018), it concentrates 25.28% of the country's cross-media communication. Apart from the newspaper, it owns the main radio station (*Radio Mitre y FM 100*), the second-largest open TV channel (*El Trece*), publishers, and cable TV channels. Additionally, it is a partner of the State and *La Nación* in the only factory of newspaper paper in the country (*Papel Prensa S.A.*). The group is the one that benefits the most from advertising from the National Government and the provincial governments. It is the majority shareholder of two of the most important companies in the communication sector of Argentina: *Cablevisión*, the main cable service provider, and *Telecom*, the telecommunications operator. The group has a dominant presence in almost all communications sectors, therefore, it is no surprise that it plays a protagonist role in the political and cultural life of the country (MOM Latin America news article, 2019).

The newspaper, in particular, is mostly known and recognized nationally for its political and economic positioning. From 2007-2015, it was ahead of what one of its editors named “war journalism” against the government, whose leader was Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (MOM Argentina news article, 2018; Kitzberger, 2022; Prinetti, 2022). Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is part of one of the new facades of Peronism in Argentina, the Kirchnerist movement, that is also one of the leaders of the political coalition of Milei's opposition, the *Frente por Todos*. The newspaper's political positioning seems to follow a pattern according to which it supports a newly-elected presidential government just to become its most avid critic after *Clarín* has achieved its goals (Kitzberger, 2016; Prinetti, 2022).

The *Manchetometro* is a Brazilian project created in collaboration with public national universities that monitors the biggest media outlets in Latin America. In 2015, it developed a project that monitored and analyzed the political coverage of *Clarín* and *La Nación* during that year's presidential elections between Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Mauricio Macri. They found out that both newspapers were mostly against Kirchner's government. For example, out of all the news published by *Clarín* between August and November of that year, 60% of the newspaper's mention of Kirchner was contrary to her, while Macri was mentioned mostly in a neutral way. A similar result was also found for *La Nación* (Hermina et.al., 2017)

When Mauricio Macri was the president (2015-2019), the *Clarín Group* became the owner of the highest concentration of media and telecommunication market in Latin America, after the government allowed the fusion of *Cablevisión* and *Telecom*. This was not the first time the group benefited from a government's communication policy to acquire higher control over national communication. In 2007, under Néstor Kirchner's presidency, it merged with another company, Fintech, in a move that was considered a violation of the laws that regulate this sector (Who Owns the Media in Argentina?, 2019).

The second newspaper of choice for Argentina is *La Nación*, created in 1870 by Bartolomé Mitre (1821-1906), who had been the President of the Republic two years before. It was the first newspaper to release its news portal in Argentina, in 1995. *La Nación Group* owns the newspaper and the news portal, and like *Clarín*, it is a joint-stock company, in which the majority of its shares (60%) are held by the *Saguier Family* (Who Owns the Media in Argentina?, 2019).

Until its creator's death, the newspaper adhered to a conservative and nationalist stance. While adjustments have been made over the years, certain core principles have endured. In general terms, the newspaper is more inclined to support the point of view of the dominant sectors of society and the economy. The articles mostly demand answers and explanations from the government, the authorities, and its liberal-conservative tradition (Borrelli, 2008; Castrelo, 2021).

In a similar move to that of *Clarín*, it omitted negative declarations about the civic-military dictatorship that ran the country from 1974 to 1983. It declared that what happened wasn't a coup or a dictatorship, but the revival of democracy. Nonetheless, *La Nación Group* benefited from this new government. As previously mentioned (Borrelli, 2008), in 1977, the group managed to acquire a third of the shares of the country's sole newspaper paper producer, Papel Prensa S.A. While this acquisition doesn't directly affect press freedom in the country, it certainly offers some restrictions to small and medium-sized newspapers, through control of paper prices and its offer to the market.

*La Nación* was one of the most vocal media outlets in favor of the dictatorship, despite sustaining dissidents in the economic sphere. In the period of state terrorism in which the military junta oppressed and persecuted its opposition, the newspaper was firmly by its side. It supported the government by spreading the idea that such acts of

violence were a well-intended “fight against subversion”. However, when the army was about to fall, *La Nación* began a process of changing its discourse, making it more flexible to the new times of democracy and popular uprising against the Armed Forces.

During the historically called “*Juicio a las Juntas*”, in 1985, when the authorities of the coup were being prosecuted for massive violation of human rights, *La Nación* was an active actor. The newspaper is up until now remembered for its role in the construction of the country’s collective memory about the victims of the military dictatorship. It hid its own opinion, and actively used the newspaper to change the narrative of historical events in favor of the Group’s allies (González and Borrelli, 2009).

The situation of media concentration in Brazil is not very different from that of Argentina. In overview, according to the Media Ownership Monitor news article on Brazil (2017), from all the ten countries investigated by the project, Brazil has the worst scenario. The *Globo Group* owns the absolute monopoly of media in the country, including free TV, paid TV, news channel, online news portal, radio, and newspapers. It is the 19th largest media conglomerate in the world, and on its website, it announces how the group reaches over 100 million Brazilians per day, half of the country’s total population. In addition, most of the 26 corporations monitored by the mentioned study, not only own different types of media outlets, but invest in other sectors of the economy such as education, financial services, and agribusiness. This gives them even more economic, political, and social power.

One of the strongest and most dangerous characteristics of Brazilian media is how close its owners are associated with politics, and politicians in power. In 2017, 32 federal Deputies and 8 Senators from the National Congress owned a broadcast station. There is even the extreme case of the Record Group, one of the biggest conglomerates, that is controlled by a religious entity and has a political party, the *Partido Republicano Brasileiro (Brazilian Republican Party-PRB)*. Other groups have family ties with politicians in power, or partnerships that have influenced the appointment of Ministers. Indeed, in the 2016 elections, 94 out of 2016 local radio station controllers were elected as mayors in the ballots ((Who Controls the Media in Brazil?, 2017)).

The newspaper, *O Globo*, was created in 1925, and it's the pioneer project of the *Globo Group*, fully owned by the Marinho Family. It is currently the biggest media



conglomerate in Brazil and Latin America. In 2009, following the advent of new technologies, the newspaper went through a rebranding in which it claimed to be “Much more than a newspaper”, by setting itself up as a multiplatform outlet. This means that columnists often work as news anchors and presenters in other positions among the many media-related positions offered by the *Globo Group* ((Who Controls the Media in Brazil?, 2017)).

Despite its founders' claim of creating a newspaper that would be independent of political and economic forces. Not only *O Globo*, but all the group's outlets, have been tightly involved with the most delicate topics in the country's history. To mention a few, it openly supported the 1964 military coup that dragged the country into an almost twenty-year military dictatorship, and it supported the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, in 2015-2016 (Oliveira 2018; Azevedo, 2018; Albuquerque, 2019).

The newspaper has been pointed out as one of the media outlets that made possible the rise of Jair Bolsonaro and his far-right wing movement (Van Dijk, 2017; Azevedo, 2018, Oliveira, 2018). For instance, Olavo de Carvalho, the self-proclaimed philosopher who built most of the ideological base for the existence of *Bolsonarismo* used to write to *O Globo*, among other outlets. The coverage of the *#EleNão* (not him) movement, the direct opposition to the candidate in the 2018 elections, was also poorly done by the *Globo Group* on many of its media platforms (MOM, 2019).

*Folha de São Paulo* is the daily digital and printed newspaper of the Brazilian conglomerate *Grupo Folha*, owned by the *Frias* family since 1962. The group also runs an online news portal (UOL), a news agency, the *DataFolha* Research Institute, a publisher, printing plants, logistics, and distribution companies (Oliveira, 2020). Its activities started in 1921, and only in the past two years did it lose its position as the daily digital and printed newspaper with the largest paid circulation in the country to *O Globo* (Yahya, 2023).

The history of the newspaper is closely connected to the history of the city of São Paulo. Before it was acquired by the *Frias* Family, it was structured as three separate newspapers, whose director's boards had been formed by men with tight connections with the government. Hence, in the 1920-30s, following the fast development of the city, each of the three newspapers was directed at a specific public. For example, there was a time in which the *Folha da Manhã* (Morning Folha) aimed at

small business owners and self-employed professionals, while the *Folha da Noite* (Night Folha), had a more popular language, aiming at the working class. Some articles were even published in the languages of the large immigrant community looking for work in the city ((Who Controls the Media in Brazil?, 2017)).

In terms of its political affiliations, it was openly opposed to the 1930 Revolution, which removed the oligarchies of the states of *São Paulo and Minas Gerais* from their long rule in the national political power. The three newspapers were unified in *Folha de São Paulo* a little before its acquisition by the *Frias* Family, which turned it into the newspaper of highest circulation in the country. Furthermore, *Folha de São Paulo* supported the 1964 military coup but tried to maintain the image of an independent position concerning the regime in the years after ((Who Controls the Media in Brazil?, 2017); Oliveira, 2020).

The leader of *Movimento Brasil Livre* (MBL—Free Brazil Movement), Kim Kataguri, used to have a column in the newspaper. He used it to spread the ideas of the far-right political movement that gave rise to Jair Bolsonaro's candidacy and supported the impeachment process. However, it was also the same newspaper that opposed Bolsonaro's government and published news articles on corruption schemes in which he and his sons would be involved ((Who Controls the Media in Brazil?, 2017)).

Despite the newspaper's active role in the rise of the populist/anti-populist polarization, it seems that it attempts to present itself as “impartial” and apolitical (Oliveira, 2020). Examples of such attempts are the existence of the ombudsman and the self-correction sections. *Folha de São Paulo* was the first in Brazil to have an ombudsman. The position, created in 1989, consists of a journalist who receives and analyzes feedback from the readers and transforms them into a column that criticizes the newspaper. *Folha* also maintains a section named *Erramos* (we committed a mistake), dedicated to correcting mistakes made by journalists in news news articles or opinion articles. Mistakes that are usually pointed out by readers or noticed only after its publication. These tools show a relative interest in *Folha* with the diversity of information and opinion in the journalism field (Who Controls the Media in Brazil?, 2017; Oliveira, 2020).

This brief explanation of each newspaper's story and the previous exposition of their complex relationship with the national governments of Argentina and Brazil

presents two news media contexts characterized by high levels of media ownership concentration, state intervention, and lack of transparency. Such features are detrimental to the right of its citizens to have access to a plurality of voices in journalism and to the practice of journalism.

In addition to what was already explained, on November 12, 2023, Mauricio Macri (PRO) declared his support for Milei's candidacy, through an official document<sup>6</sup> posted by La Libertad Avanza on the party's social account X (former Twitter). Given *Clarín* and *La Nación's* opposition to Kirchnerist populism and their support for ex-president Macri, who was aligned with candidate Javier Milei. The hypotheses of this thesis are two:

H1: Clarín and La Nación depicted Javier Milei positively, and indirectly endorsing his campaign.

H2: Folha de São Paulo and O Globo depicted Milei as a potential threat to the democratic values of Argentina, without making any judgment of value over the candidates' ultra-liberal tendencies.

The second hypothesis concerns the two Brazilian newspapers. Folha de São Paulo and O Globo have contributed to the anti-populist narrative, essential for the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. However, since the ascension of this far-right populism, journalists have faced direct attacks from Bolsonaro and his supporters. Given the alignment of Bolsonarism with the campaign of Javier Milei<sup>7</sup>, the second hypothesis posits that these newspapers depicted Milei as a potential threat to the democratic values of Argentina.

To understand how the presidential candidate Javier Milei is portrayed in the coverage of all newspapers, this thesis analyzed their utterance choices. The next sections will demonstrate the strategies employed, and the theories selected for this analysis.

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<sup>6</sup> Document can be accessed here:

<https://twitter.com/LLibertadAvanza/status/1723497304118685840>

<sup>7</sup> In August 2023, Jair Bolsonaro officially declared support to Javier Milei through a video posted on Milei's social media. This alignment was news articles by several news outlets in Brazil and Argentina. Here is a news article on the topic selected by the author of this thesis: <https://www.poder360.com.br/brasil/bolsonaro-declara-apoio-a-conservador-para-presidencia-d-a-argentina/>

## 2.2 The Methodological Framework

The preparatory stage of this analysis was the contextualization of Argentina and Brazil in terms of national politics and journalistic culture, and a further investigation of the history of each selected newspaper. These extensive readings were essential to understand the content of the news articles that were being gathered. This preliminary exploration of the literature review and news content offered the necessary theoretical framework for the formulation of the research questions and hypotheses. The second stage consisted of the selection and compilation of the appropriate data for the execution of the analysis. The news articles were selected from the websites of the previously selected newspapers and simplified into plain text documents (Aluthman, 2018).

The third stage was the selection of the most suitable Corpus Linguistic tools. Four corpora were created by the online tool Sketch Engine with the data gathered from the websites of the newspapers *Clarín*, *La Nación*, *Folha de São Paulo*, and *O Globo*. From each of these corpora, one sub-corpus was extracted, they were the articles entitled: “El perfil de Javier Milei: un excéntrico al que le entusiasma enfrentarse a lo desconocido” from *Clarín*; “Javier Milei: El candidato místico obsesionado con el dólar” from *La Nación*; “Quem são os candidatos a presidente na eleição Argentina” from *Folha de São Paulo*, and “Eleição na Argentina: Javier Milei, outsider que saiu da TV para liderar a extrema-direita” from *O Globo* (Aluthman, 2018).

The fourth stage was identifying the lexical patterns that emerged from the keyword extraction, and the generation of collocations grouped by semantic categorizations. In this stage, the aim was to find common topics and themes in each corpus. The fifth stage was the qualitative exploration and investigation of such findings through concordance analysis.

After the concordance analysis, each sup-corpus was analyzed using only the Critical Discourse Approach. The first document analyzed was the Party Manifesto of Javier Milei since it is the official means through which Javier Milei and his party communicate their values, aims, and principal government characteristics to the electorate. The analysis of the Party Manifesto was constantly being compared with how each newspaper described Milei. Then, a CDA method was applied in the remaining four news articles with an attempt to identify a set of categories elaborated with the support of the literature review on the media-politics relations in Argentina and

Brazil. In this stage, the patterns recognized by the Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse were used to try to situate the specific article in question in the general portrayal of Javier Milei by the newspaper in which it was published. The conclusive stage consisted of the comparison between Argentine and Brazilian newspapers and between the different national newspapers. From this, the research questions and hypotheses were revised and implications were drawn (Aluthman, 2018).

The present study adopts the CACDA and MCDA to explore the discursive patterns of the representation of the presidential candidate for the Argentine elections of 2022, Javier Milei, in four newspapers from Argentina and Brazil. The second country was selected because of the similarities of the rise of its far-right movement with the one that is potentially taking place in Argentina with the emergence of Javier Milei as a strong candidate for the presidency. Besides this, both countries share controversial and complex relationships between the news media conglomerates and Heads of State. This paper is aimed at improving understanding of how news outlets represent prominent political figures in the context of democracies going through an intense process of affective polarization. Newspaper readers are not easily and simply influenced by newspapers' rhetoric, and the production of news is part of an intricate procedure. Hence, this study attempts to offer more information on the techniques and strategies used by news media conglomerates to persuade public opinion in their favor, maintaining the prevailing neoliberal establishment of Argentinian and Brazilian society.

In this sense, this study addresses the following questions:

1. How did the newspapers under study portray the figure of Javier Milei considering each country's political and journalistic contexts?
2. What are the lexical patterns and political utterances used in the Party Manifesto?
3. What lexical patterns and political utterances can be observed in the framework constructed by each newspaper to characterize and make reference to Javier Milei?

### 2.2.1 A Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis Approach

The analysis of this study was divided into two parts to offer a more detailed view of each newspaper portrait of Javier Milei. The first part is the Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis (CACDA), and the second is the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which will be further explained in this chapter. Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis (CACDA) is the integration of Corpus Linguistics (CL) into Critical Discourse Analysis studies (CDA). It provides a combination of the qualitative methods of CDA and a quantitative overview of linguistic patterns existent in the text that is being studied. Hence, CACDA has a multidisciplinary nature, and the analysis of its results needs to take into account the cultural context in which the text was produced and the cultural context of the language used (Aluthman 2018).

The utilization of Corpus Linguistics (CL) in this thesis serves as an attempt to address certain criticisms directed at the application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the examination of discourse within political contexts. A significant critique revolves around the potential bias introduced by researchers using CDA, who might selectively choose texts that align with their pre-existing positions. The incorporation of CL into the methodology offers a potential enhancement by leveraging large-scale corpora, thereby diminishing the impact of researcher bias on the selection process (Aluthman, 2018).

The empirical procedure of this research followed Aluthman's (2018) steps for a Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis, and consisted of daily data collection of news news articles, editorials, and opinion articles from the websites of the following newspapers: *Clarín*, *La Nación*, *Folha de São Paulo*, and *O Globo*. The timeframe was one week before the first poll, from October 15th to October 22nd, and one week after, October 23rd to October 29th. As the election process was postponed for a second poll that took place on November 19th, the gathering of data continued following the same structure. One week before, November 12th to November 19th, and one week after, November 20th to November 26th. Only articles making direct reference to Javier Milei were collected. Each article was randomly selected on the morning following its publication date. This decision was driven by the time differences between the location of the author conducting this thesis and the respective time zones of Argentina and Brazil.

Each article underwent a systematic process of transformation wherein it was encapsulated within a plain text document. The document encapsulation encompassed essential components such as the title, lead, publication date, author's name (if applicable), the substantive content, and any accompanying visual elements. Therefore, 30 articles were collected from each newspaper, making a total of 120 articles.

Table 1 illustrates the types of articles per newspaper:

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>News news article</i>	<i>Opinion Article</i>	<i>Editorials</i>
<b>Clarín</b>	15	4	11
<b>La Nación</b>	12	5	13
<b>F. de São Paulo</b>	19	11	-
<b>O Globo</b>	25	23	2

The data gathered from each newspaper was then transformed into four corpora in the online software Sketch Engine. The Party Manifesto of Javier Milei was also analyzed as a single document containing 4,721 words. Sketch Engine is a corpus linguistics (CL) tool that analyzes features of texts according to specific criteria. It compiles large numbers of documents into a corpus. The analyses selected for this study were keywords, word collocation, and word concordance. Since this software offers corpora in Spanish and Portuguese, the data was analyzed in their original languages, and translations provided throughout the text were done by the writer of this thesis with the support of online dictionaries.

The table 2 illustrates the general information of each corpus:

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Numb Thiser of Articles from October 15th to 29th</i>	<i>Number of Articles from November 12th to 26th</i>	<i>Articles in Total</i>	<i>Number of words in total</i>
<b>Clarín</b>	15	15	30	23,079
<b>La Nación</b>	15	15	30	28,606
<b>F. de São Paulo</b>	15	15	30	21,382

<b>O Globo</b>	15	15	30	23,436
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The following sections explain in more detail the Critical Discourse Analysis used in conjunction with corpus linguistics (CL).

### 2.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

According to Wodak and Meyer (2009), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a method that deals with discourses, be it in the format of texts or spoken language (Machin and Mayr, 2023) and works in the following seven dimensions:

1. it is interested in the language that is daily used, not in the grammar,
2. it is not focused on a limited unit of the language, but includes texts, discourse, and conversation,
3. the study of linguistics is stretched past the sentence grammar,
4. non-verbal acts of communication are also considered in these studies, such as semiotic, multimodal and visual,
5. it focuses on the socio-cognitive dynamic of language,
6. as well as the social, cultural and situational roles that language plays in each context,
7. studies many phenomena of text grammar, such as coherence, topics, speech acts.

Additionally, CDA also considers the social phenomena behind the use of language, the reason it is necessary to follow a multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach when using CDA. According to the many scholars that theorize on CDA, the use of the discourse, be it written, spoken or visual, has social consequences, once it can be operated to transform the status quo, either to maintain or to reproduce it. But not only that, discourse is also modified by the context in which it works, hence, there is a lot of power involved in the movement of influencing and being influenced by its surroundings. Therefore, CDA researchers have to keep in mind that even their own works are not independent of the researchers' social, economic, and political views (Wodak and Meyer, 2006).



Nonetheless, the set of tools provided by CDA makes it possible for us to recognize the reality underneath the surface of the words. For instance, CDA is constantly asking questions such as what are the assumptions hidden in the text, or what stereotypes are being reaffirmed. The analysis carried on is guided by linguistic expertise since it provides a more systematic analysis of language and texts. This type of analysis is rooted in the grammatical features of language for believing they can create meaning and even induce people's opinions on the specific event that is being described. Another important feature of this mode of analysis is that it takes into deep consideration the everyday use of language, not just the grammatically official. Every instance of communication carries within a selection of points of view (Machin and Mayr, 2023).

Two important concepts drive CDA: ideology and power. Ideology, according to CDA scholars, is spread through the use of conceptual metaphors and analogies hidden in the communication we, as a society, exercise daily. Power follows a Werberian definition according to which it is the feasibility of an individual, or a group, to do whatever they want inside a social relationship, irrespective of resistance from the other parts of this relationship. In other terms, it is the dominance of an idea over the others (Wodak and Meyer, 2006).

On that account, many CDA scholars choose to focus on media and periodicals as units of analysis because they are the instruments that can be significantly used by dominant groups to exercise power over many people. This can be done through the use of hidden ideologies in the language selected by such means (Wodak and Meyer, 2006).

In the use of CDA, either considering it as a method (Wodak and Meyer, 2006) or as an analytical practice (Van Dijk, 1998), it is important to highlight that the researcher can and should self-reflect on their own research process. As well as position themselves in relation to the chosen scientific methodologies. In other words, the way in which the researcher interacts with the topic and with the analysis is also significant for the final considerations of the work (Wodak and Meyer, 2006).

This being said, comes another central concept to CDA and MCDA: 'critical'. Here, the term means more than denaturalizing language to disclose the true meaning behind the grammatical choices or the absences and assumptions in texts (Machin and Mayr, 2023). In his works, Fairclough (2001) defines this idea of 'critical' language

study as the analysis of linguistic features to unveil the relations between power, ideology, and language that are usually camouflaged by linguistic choices that seem simple and meaningless.

Language is one of the bases through which an individual or a group can reach and sustain a powerful position in our society. One of the most common ways in which the picture and imagination around these people are created is through the media. For the purpose of this study, the media selected was the digital newspaper.

### **2.2.3 Lexical components to be analyzed in the Corpora and the Sub-Corpora**

To make the exploring of the newspapers more clear, the analysis of the lexical choices of the texts was divided into four focus points: connotation of adjectives referring to Milei, overlexicalization, and ‘ideological squaring’. This study analyzed each of these four points, taking into consideration how each sub-corpus uses such aspects of lexical choice to characterize and define the presidential candidate in question. Hence, the analysis explored how these lexical choices are allocated in the texts to present the candidates’ political ideology, governability qualifications, ethical behavior and personal characteristics (Pereyra et.al., 2022). These categories were taken from the article “News Coverage of Electoral Candidates” (Pereyra et.al., 2022) and analyzed how each of them was used by newspapers in Argentina to evaluate the presidential candidates of the 2019 elections.

The most basic and essential step of CDA is the lexical analysis, which consists of questioning the words or lexical items that include nouns, verbs, and adjectives that carry specific meanings important for the comprehension of any sentence. In sum, the first step is to examine what is the vocabulary used in the text, how it is being used, and why. This is critical because, from different lexical choices, one can identify hidden identities and values of the speech, features of the author's thoughts that are being foregrounded while others are being suppressed. In this sense, the following analysis will focus on how adjectives are used in the texts. They usually identify qualities and compare entities or people. They also intensify the text with emotion and evaluation, depending on which adjective is associated with a person, the individual could be given either a positive or negative characteristic (Machin and Mayr, 2023).

To comprehend its lexical choices, it is fundamental to look at word connotation. Every word carries meanings that vary according to the social context of its placement because this social context determines the dominant ideology in which social practices are inserted. This said, to grasp connotation is to perceive beyond a word's definition by a dictionary. To do so, it is essential to ask some questions, such as: what is the purpose of the use of this word in this context? What are the cultural, social, and economic aspects that constitute it? (Machin and Mayr, 2023). The present study focused on the connotation of adjectives used to refer to Milei.

Another point of attention for the CDA of this study will be overlexicalization. This term refers to the excessive use of words or their synonyms, and the over-elaboration of certain statements. When this happens, it could mean that the writer is trying to persuade the readers, and it often indicates that the topic in question is highly controversial. Hence, overlexicalization possibly hides ideological issues (Machin and Mayr, 2023).

Lastly, there is the analysis of words in hidden contexts done by the application of the 'structural opposition' tool, often used to analyze ideology in language. The oppositions consist of concepts that are contrasting with each other, and usually, one of the sides is not mentioned. In news language, it means that when a politician is described as an 'extremist' it means that there are other individuals who the article considers to be 'moderate', or someone that fits in the society's expectations of a 'good citizen'. This is normal in journalistic texts, however, an exaggeration of these oppositions in a text could mean the existence of an 'ideological squaring' (Van Dijk, 1998). The exacerbated use of 'structural opposition' doesn't necessarily mean that the text is categorizing someone/something as either 'bad' or 'good', but this categorization is implied. Hence, without explicitly saying it, any time someone's behavior or characteristics falls into a categorization that was previously considered 'bad' by the author of the document, this person will consequently be considered 'bad' by the reader (Machin and Mayr, 2023).

## CHAPTER IV

### Analysis

#### 3.1 Sketch Engine

##### 3.1.1 Party Manifesto

###### *Keyword Analysis*

Keyword analysis is important because selecting a list of the most mentioned words in the corpus presents the readers with the main topics of the text. It works by comparing the frequency of particular words in a corpus (one for each newspaper and the Party Manifesto) with a reference corpus (word list of Portuguese and Spanish Languages pre-downloaded in the software) (Aluthman, 2018).

The first 100 keywords were generated from the document ‘Party Manifesto’ containing the government plans for Javier Milei’s candidacy. The document has thirteen pages and was extracted from the website of the *Cámara Nacional Electoral* (National Electoral Chamber)<sup>8</sup>. The document was analyzed using the online software Sketch Engine, and the reference corpus used was Spanish Web 2018 (esTenTen18). Below is the list of the 15 most mentioned words (Table 1).

**Table 4**

*The Fifteen Most Mentioned Words in La Libertad Avanza Party Manifesto*

<b>Words</b>	<b>Absolute Frequency</b>
incentivar	5
achicamiento	4
subsistema	4

<sup>8</sup> The original document can be accessed in this link:

<https://www.electoral.gob.ar/nuevo/paginas/pdf/plataformas/2023/PASO/JUJUY%2079%20PARTIDO%20RENOVADOR%20FEDERAL%20-PLATAFORMA%20LA%20LIBERTAD%20AVANZA.pdf>

Words	Absolute Frequency
paternalista	2
reafirmación	2
coadyuvar	3
magistratura	3
reformular	2
intromisión	2
populista	2
ministerios	2
pujante	3
improductivo	2
seguridad	3

Note. The absolute frequency demonstrates how many times the word was found in the document.

The most mentioned keywords that are of interest for this study, because they summarize Milei's plans, were: *achicamiento* (shrinking), *penitenciario* (penitentiary), *incentivar* (incentivize). The analysis of multi-word terms shows that *inversión privada* (private investment) and *fuerza de seguridad* (security force) were the most used terms. Another word mentioned twice and is of interest in the context of this analysis is *populista* (populist).

Figure 1

*Concordance Analysis of the Words ‘incentivar’, ‘populista’ and ‘achicamiento’*

<input type="checkbox"/> Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
1 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	or la Constitución Nacional y que respete e	<b>incentive</b>	el esfuerzo y el mérito.</s><s>La administr
2 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	; cuya titularidad es del Estado.</s><s>10-	<b>Incentivar</b>	las inversiones privadas para la ejecución c
3 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	RA 1- Expandir la industria naval.</s><s>2-	<b>Incentivar</b>	la inversión en turismo.</s><s>3- Promovei
4 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	; eólica, hidrógeno verde, etc.).</s><s>12-	<b>Incentivar</b>	las inversiones en comunicación, petróleo, i
5 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	idades y talentos de cada uno, en pos de	<b>incentivar</b>	su desarrollo individual y colectivo, con el fi

<input type="checkbox"/> Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
1 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	us países de origen.</s><s>Los gobiernos	<b>populistas</b>	y totalitarios que marcaron el cambio de ép
2 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	vacas y agua potable.</s><s>Las políticas	<b>populistas</b>	que parecían bien intencionadas demostrai

<input type="checkbox"/> Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
1 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	iros voluntarios de empleados públicos y	<b>achicamiento</b>	del estado.</s><s>Por otro lado se propo
2 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	ros del Estado.</s><s>2- Optimización y	<b>achicamiento</b>	del Estado.</s><s>3- Incentivos para la c
3 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	proponemos: SALUD.</s><s>1- Que el	<b>achicamiento</b>	del estado y reducción del gasto público i
4 <input type="checkbox"/> ⓘ doc#0	; derechos de los justiciables.</s><s>40-	<b>Achicamiento</b>	del Estado en dependencias que solo tier

Fig. 1: Screenshot of the concordance analysis in the Party Manifesto sub-corpus.

These keywords reflect the overall intentions of Milei as a presidential candidate, who is a self-proclaimed libertarian with liberal policies. The concordance analysis shows that the Spanish word for shrinking (*achicamiento*) is always connected to the shrinking of State power and State initiative, while incentivize is connected to ideas of investment, development, and meritocracy. For instance, the candidates’ plans are mostly directed toward economic incentives rather than social policies.

The terms Liberal and Libertarian are fundamental for the comprehension of this analysis and Milei's self-positioning in the context of the Argentine crisis. The definitions of both concepts are constantly being discussed in political science, which is why it is important to present the definitions that served as the basis for the present study. Firstly, it is essential to not confuse the American “liberal” politician, who is connected to progressive viewpoints, with liberalism in economic and political thought.

The liberalism defended by Milei refers to the reduction of the interference of the State in the provision of social services and the movements of the market, with free trade and competition, and freedom of the individual above all. This conservative branch of liberalism directs its meaning to liberality rather than liberty (Brown, 2003). Libertarianism is another ideology used in the field of economic thoughts that supports maximal equal liberty, mostly understood in terms of private property and non-interference of the State in what it considers private matters; the disregard for distribution of property rights, in other words, a tendency to be against federal taxation, and the libertarian state, which exists solely for the protection of property rights and self-ownership (Brown, 2003).

The word *populista* (populist) is used with a negative connotation to describe the opposition, which this manifesto claims is responsible for the country's current crisis. Milei's options for such words are in accordance with his liberal approach, as well as the five mentions of private investment. At the same time, the frequency of appearance of the security topic reflects the importance of it to the electorate. Inflation and social insecurity were the main pressure points of this election (Stefanoni, 2023).

Some examples that expose the overall idea of this manifesto are:

<p><i>Example 1: REFORMA ECONÓMICA</i>  <i>En relación a esta cuestión, se prevé: 1- Eliminación de gastos improductivos del Estado. 2- <u>Optimización</u> y <b>achicamiento</b> del Estado. 3- <u>Incentivos</u> para la creación de empleos genuinos y de calidad. 4- <u>Privatización</u> de las empresas públicas deficitarias. 5- Fomento de las <u>inversiones privadas</u>.</i></p>	<p>Translation Example 1: ECONOMIC REFORM In relation to this issue, it is foreseen: 1- Elimination of unproductive expenses of the State. 2- <u>Optimization</u> and <b>shrinking</b> of the State. 3- Incentives for the creation of genuine and quality jobs. 4- <u>Privatization</u> of loss-making public companies. 5- Promotion of <u>private investments</u>.</p>
<p><i>Example 2: Las políticas <b>populistas</b> que parecían bien intencionadas <u>demonstraron</u> a la postre que eran producto de una <u>planificación asfixiante</u> para alcanzar el</i></p>	<p>Translation of Example 2: The <b>populist</b> policies that seemed well-intentioned ultimately <u>demonstrated</u> that they were the product of <u>suffocating planning</u> to</p>

<p><i>enquistamiento de quienes las aplicaban y que las oposiciones que la sucedieron "no supieron, no quisieron o no pudieron" revertir, <u>agravando</u> aún más el problema.</i></p>	<p>achieve the entrenchment of those who applied them and that the oppositions that succeeded them "did not know, did not want to or could not" reverse them, further <u>aggravating</u> the problem.</p>
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Note: Words underlined by the author of this thesis.

### Collocation Analysis

Collocation is the sequence or combination of words that happen to show up together in a text more times than expected by chance. They consist of two parts, and the combination between these two parts can determine if the collocation is weak or strong. It is weak when both parts can be combined with a lot of other different words, and strong when both parts are usually used together in a text. What expresses this strength in Sketch Engine is the logDice score (Aluthman, 2018).

The collocation analysis of the word *achicamiento* (shrinking), for example, shows that its strongest collocation occurs with *empleado* (employee) and *Estado/estado* (state). Indeed, the party manifesto emphasizes the importance of shrinking the State by cutting the number of public employees. An interesting result is the occurrence of *optimización* (optimization) connecting shrinking to an optimization, an improvement for the Argentinian State.

### Figure 2

Screenshot of the Collocation Analysis of the Word 'achicamiento'

Word	Grammatical relation	Count	Score ↓
1 <b>empleado</b> empleados públicos y achicamiento	"achicamiento" and/or ...	1	13.0 ...
2 <b>estado</b> achicamiento del estado	"achicamiento" de ...	2	12.7 ...
3 <b>Optimización</b> Optimización y achicamiento	"achicamiento" and/or ...	1	12.7 ...
4 <b>Estado</b> achicamiento del Estado	"achicamiento" de ...	1	11.1 ...



The collocation analysis of the other most mentioned word, *incentivar* (incentivize), shows its occurrence mostly connected to investment, effort, and development, all words that reflect the candidate's liberal values. As was shown before, incentivize is mostly associated with private (investment), hence, by constantly using these words together, the manifesto tries to imply that private incentives are the answer to solve the country's economic and social issues.

### Figure 3

*Screenshot of the Collocation Analysis of the Word 'incentivar'*

	Word	Grammatical relation	Count	Score ↓	
1	<b>inversión</b> Incentivar las inversiones	objects of "incentivar"	3	12.4	...
2	<b>respetar</b> respete e incentive	"incentivar" and/or ...	1	12.4	...
3	<b>esfuerzo</b> incentive el esfuerzo	objects of "incentivar"	1	11.8	...
4	<b>desarrollo</b> incentivar su desarrollo	objects of "incentivar"	1	11.3	...

The following sections will develop the analysis of the four newspapers selected, while comparing the results among them and with the Party Manifesto.

#### 3.1.2 Clarín

##### *Keyword Analysis*

Similarly to what was done in the case of the Party Manifesto, the keyword analysis of *Clarín* was also generated using Spanish Web 2018 (esTenTen18) as the reference corpus. The list of the 15 most mentioned words can be seen in Table 4.

#### Table 4

*List of the 15 Most Mentioned Words in the Clarín Corpus*

<b>Lemma</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Relative Document Frequency</b>
Milei	257	93,33%
libertario	77	73,33%
Massa	87	73,33%
balotaje	34	56,67%
Bolsonaro	7	6,67%
motosierra	8	16,67%
Bullrich	55	46,67%
casta	12	16,63%
empobrecedor	3	3,33%
privatizar	13	16,67%
Haddad	3	3,33%
dolarización	3	10%
ultraderecha	3	10%
laicidad	4	3,33%
ministro-candidato	12	10%

Note. Frequency is the number of times the word was mentioned in the corpus, and Relative Document Frequency is the percentage of documents in which the word appeared.

The main words found, and most important for this thesis, were: Milei and Javier, which was already expected since he is our main topic of discussion. The names of the other candidates, from the first and second polls, were among the most mentioned words as (Sérgio) Massa, Patricia Bullrich, and (Horacio Rodríguez) Larreta. The names of other politicians who are prominent figures in Argentina were also in the results, among them, (Mauricio) Macri, former right-wing president and Milei's ally in the 2023 elections, and *Kirchnerismo* (Kirchnerism), a name given to refer to supporters of the then Vice-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Notably, the name of President

Alberto Fernández (2020-2023) is not on the keyword list. However, Brazilian politicians were listed, as (Jair) Bolsonaro, former president for the 2018-2022 mandate and Milei's ally, and (Fernando) Haddad, Minister of Economy of President's Lula 2023-2026 mandate.

The main lexical choices of the newspaper deserve our attention because of the meaning they carry when referring to Milei's proposals in the context of the economic struggle of a polarized country. For instance, *libertario* (libertarian), was the most used adjective to define Milei, which aligns with the candidate's self-definitions; *motosierra* (chainsaw), an object used in Milei's campaign to symbolize his groundbreaking politics that aim at cutting the roots of Argentina's problems; *dolarización* (dollarization) the project base of his campaign, also mentioned in the Party Manifesto, as well as *casta* (caste) and *privatizar* (privatize).

Since the main topic of discussion in this study is the portrayal of Javier Milei, it is pertinent to start the concordance analysis of this newspaper by his name. The concordance analysis is used to understand the discursive patterns linked to determined nouns (Aluthman, 2018), and the present study will mostly focus on the concordance analysis of the main keyword of each corpus. For instance, the concordance analysis of the word Milei presented the following results:

Figure 4

## Concordance Analysis of the Word 'Milei' From Clarín Corpus

tail	Left context	KWIC	Right context
doc#15	ra ganar la elección”, repasó la fiscalía.</s><s>¿Sí o no?</s><s>Parece que sí”: la chicana que Javier	Milei	le devolvió a Sergio Massa en su primer discurso como presidente electo. Sonriente, el libertario contestó
doc#7	apuntarán a tener dos por cada escuela.</s><s>Fonte da captura: Sin nombrarlo, el Papa le contestó a	Milei	: &quot; Sin nombrarlo, el Papa le contestó a Milei: "El Mesías es uno solo, los demás son todos payasos"
doc#2	en una entrevista en Radio Mitre.</s><s>¿VIENE EL PAPA A LA ARGENTINA?   La invitación de Javier	Milei	a Francisco. Desde ese escenario es que insisten en la posibilidad de alcanzar el 40% y sacarle 10 puntos
doc#9	a Karina Milei, también apoderada del espacio -que no se presentó porque aún está en Córdoba, donde	Milei	cerró su campaña-, ya que ambos fueron los firmantes de la denuncia que La Libertad Avanza presentó
doc#27	endió en un principio, tocó los primeros acordes de la marcha peronista.</s><s>Poco, y mucho.</s><s>	Milei	durmí esa noche en el lugar que adoptó para continuar su vida tras haberlo usado como búnker de campaña
doc#20	undas y terceras líneas de su gobierno.</s><s>Créditos UVA: tras el naufragio de la ley K, ahora Javier	Milei	dice que quien tomó el préstamo "tiene que hacerse cargo de su mala decisión" Créditos UVA: los tomará
doc#2	l único orador.</s><s>Ahora sumó a Alberto Benegas Lynch -el padre del candidato a diputado- a quien	Milei	considera un "prócer" del liberalismo. "Me voy a dar ese gusto", aseguró días atrás.</s><s>De hecho, Milei
doc#14	ia ante la Cámara Nacional Electoral," se ordenó "la formación de una investigación preliminar".</s><s>	Milei	fue entrevistado ayer por el periodista Samuel "Chiche" Gelblung en su programa que emite la señal de
doc#23	Javier Milei pedirá sesiones extraordinarias en el Congreso para impulsar un paquete de leyes. A Javier	Milei	lo desvelan dos cuestiones de cara a su gobierno: resolver "la bomba" de las lilelqs -Luis Caputo ya está
doc#12	El embajador Gustavo Martínez Pandiani, hombre de Massa, debatió en el CARI ante Mondino (	Milei	) y Federico Pinedo (Bullrich) y fue el único que llevó números que resaltan los peligros: si se cierra la economía
doc#15	io Massa.</s><s>Foto Juano Tesone.</s><s>Acompañado de Victoria Villarruel, Fátima Florez y Karina	Milei	, el libertario aseguró también que atronó la elección "más importante de los últimos 100 años". "Vaya que
doc#4	, que fue clave para el triunfo de La Libertad Avanza en las PASO.</s><s>Además de agitar la visión de	Milei	en relación al medio ambiente y su negativa al cambio climático, un eje sensible entre los más jóvenes, es
doc#14	ado de la agrupación, el abogado Santiago Viola.</s><s>González tomó la decisión a raíz de dichos de	Milei	en un programa televisivo donde esbozó la "posibilidad" de que "le hagan fraude" y por ello manifestó que
doc#1	.. Esto no es nuevo, la forma de actuar de este Gobierno".</s><s>Más temprano, entrevistado por LNA,	Milei	había revelado cuáles fueron los objetivos que alcanzó en el intercambio con Massa: "¿Yo salí del eje económico
doc#10	esa.</s><s>La aparición de un cisne negro como en agosto, de alguna manera, representó el triunfo de	Milei	.</s><s>¿Qué Massa acorte las distancias con el diputado libertario? .</s><s>¿Qué Bullrich desplace a
doc#7	tación de Javier Milei a Francisco. Pero lo más sugestivo vino después.</s><s>Siempre sin mencionar a	Milei	, Francisco dijo tenerle "mucho miedo a los flautistas de Hamelin porque son encantadores", en referencia
doc#7	</s><s>A su tiempo, Guillermo Francos -señalado como ministro del Interior de un eventual gobierno de	Milei	- dijo que si con esas afirmaciones el Papa estaba aludiendo al candidato de La Libertad Avanza eran correctas
doc#23	objetivo primario es "poner en caja las cuentas públicas rápidamente" y que lo había prometido el propio	Milei	en la mesa de Mirtha Legrand.</s><s>"Cuando ingresemos al Gobierno vamos a llamar a sesiones extraordinarias
doc#21	era de evitar que, sin aspiraciones presidenciales, Juntos por el Cambio vote al futuro jefe porteño y por	Milei	a la vez.</s><s>Algunos chats, a propósito, llegaron al teléfono de Leandro Santoro.</s><s>En este trayecto
doc#16	con la prensa.</s><s>ES/DS</s><s>Donald Trump publicó un video en el que elogia el triunfo de Javier	Milei	: "El mundo te está mirando" Fue en un posteo en su red social "Truth Social".</s><s>El libertario admiró

Two statements were extracted from the concordance analysis of the word Milei, because they show an interesting development in the use of the term *ultraderecha* (ultra-right).

Example 3 <sup>9</sup> : “En medio de la polémica, <b>Milei</b> contestó: "Yo no soy la ultra derecha, soy liberal libertario. Que expresen lo que les parezca".”	Translation of Example 3: "In the midst of the controversy, <b>Milei</b> replied, "I am not ultra-right, I am a libertarian liberal. Let them express whatever they think.""
Example 4 <sup>10</sup> : “El actual Presidente dijo después que sintió que Milei lo había escuchado. También reveló, por primera vez, que con su vice, Cristina Kirchner, está "enfrentado". Nunca lo había dicho	Translation of Example 4: ““The current President later said he felt that Milei had listened to him. He also revealed, for the first time, that he is 'at odds' with his vice president, Cristina Kirchner. He had

<sup>9</sup> Original:

[https://www.clarin.com/politica/javier-milei-aseguro-apoyo-macri-bullrich-incondicional-dijo-neutralidad-favorece-massa\\_0\\_Vb56zltquA.html](https://www.clarin.com/politica/javier-milei-aseguro-apoyo-macri-bullrich-incondicional-dijo-neutralidad-favorece-massa_0_Vb56zltquA.html)

<sup>10</sup> Original: [https://www.clarin.com/politica/dias-locos-javier-milei\\_0\\_bqK9kclbn7.html](https://www.clarin.com/politica/dias-locos-javier-milei_0_bqK9kclbn7.html)

<p>de modo tan directo. La comunicación entre el hombre de ultraderecha, <b>Milei</b>, a quien hasta denunció en los tribunales, es mejor que la que tiene con quien lo ungió como candidato a Jefe de Estado. El poder cambió en la Argentina.”</p>	<p>never stated it so directly before. Communication with the ultra-right figure, <b>Milei</b>, whom he even news articleed to the courts, is better than the one he has with the person who appointed him as a candidate for Head of State. Power has changed in Argentina.”</p>
--	---

In the first extract, Milei expresses his disapproval with being called an ultra-right candidate, claiming that he is a libertarian liberal. In the second extract, however, that is from another news article, the text mentions Milei as an ‘ultra-right man’. This is the only time in the corpus that Milei is referred to as an ultra-right. The fact that the journalist decided to use this term even though the candidate himself claimed it didn't fit him, could hint to a controversy between how Milei portrays and sees himself to how he is understood in other people's point of view. Milei prefers to be portrayed as a libertarian liberal because this term leads the electorate into thinking he has disruptive ideas (Dal Pai, 2018), while being associated with the ultra-right condemns him to a class of politicians that have been negatively categorized as populist leaders worldwide (Araújo and Prior, 2020). It is important to remember that populist leaders are appointed by Milei's party manifesto as responsible for the Argentine crisis.

### ***Collocation Analysis***

The collocation analysis of ‘Milei’ can be informative on what adjectives the newspaper used to describe the candidate. One modifier pointed out that he was called *volcánico* (vulcanic), which seems to be one of the few directly negative references to him. In the article, the author uses many metaphors with the wild world to describe Milei, such as calling him someone that has a ‘feral tone and logorrhea’ (*tono y una verborragia silvestres*). These comparisons with uncontrolled and uncivilized behavior implies the author's idea that Milei is not exactly fit for the position of a president of a country. Here it can be briefly observed the idea of ‘structural parallelism’, in this case, Milei's characterization of wild contrast to the unspoken opposite, that is of a civilized and more controlled candidate that seems to appeal more to the opinion of the journalist of how the behavior of a possible future president should be.

### 3.1.3 La Nación

#### *Keyword Analysis*

Similarly to *El Clarín*, the result of the keyword analysis of *La Nación* also showed the names of the main politicians of the 2023 presidential elections. Javier Milei, Sergio Massa, and Patricia Bullrich were mentioned again, as well as Jair Bolsonaro. The difference is that the name Karina Milei, Milei's sister and the chief of his presidential campaign in 2023, was mentioned in 12 news articles, something that didn't occur in the Clarín corpus. The keywords generated can be seen in Table 5, below.

**Table 5**

*List of the 15 Most Mentioned Words in the La Nación Corpus*

<b>Word</b>	<b>Word Frequency</b>	<b>Relative Document Frequency</b>
Milei	380	100%
Massa	120	76,6%
libertario	104	76,67%
Bolsonaro	14	10%
Bullrich	34	46,67%
bilardista	10	13,33%
kirchnerismo	32	43,33%
motosierra	8	13,33%
Karina	17	40%
outsider	5	6,67%
Vox	8	6,67%
felicitanionces	6	10%
kirchnerista	11	23,33%
ultraderecha	7	6,67%

Word	Word Frequency	Relative Document Frequency
economista	36	53,33%

Another point of coincidence between the two Argentinian newspapers is the high occurrence of *libertario* (libertarian) as the main definition of Javier Milei. Other words used as adjectives were Kirchnerist and Bolsonarism. Furthermore, different concepts were used with the same purpose, such as *bilardista*, and outsider. The first is a term used commonly for the followers of the soccer coach Carlos Bilardo, whose strategies Milei claims to follow in his campaign. The term can imply a variety of characteristics, among them, being focused on the collective needs instead of one's interests, and being result-driven (Morales, 2020). The second, outsider, was used by Milei to refer to himself as someone who represents a change in Argentina's political scene. The use of *economista* (economist) in reference to Milei occurs in eight news articles, which covers him with an expertise title that seemed to be a meaningful position, especially in an election process that has the national economic crisis as its main topic of concern.

**Figure 5**

### Screenshot of the Concordance Analysis of the Word 'Milei' in the La Nación Corpus

Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
doc#10 -hacemos Nuestro Pais).	En las elecciones generales del 22 de octubre, Massa obtuvo 36,78% y	Milei	29,99%.</s><s>La cosecha del resto de los competidores fue la siguiente: Bullrich, 23,81%; Schiaretti, €
doc#23 luctor Leo Cifelli, Javier Milei y, con la batuta, Ángel Mahler Pocas horas antes del comienzo de la veda,		Milei	utilizó la ocasión para hacer un anuncio político.</s><s>Es que, luego del evento, trascendió una foto, a
doc#0 18%.</s><s>La previa del acto de cierre de Javier Milei en la ciudad de CórdobaMario Sar - LA NACION		Milei	llegó poco después de las 14 a la ciudad de Córdoba y se alojó en un hotel, donde fue esperado por un
doc#6 gastos improductivos del Estado" y la "optimización y achicamiento del Estado".</s><s>En este sentido,		Milei	prometió que en caso de asumir reduciría el PBI en 15 puntos y los ministerios a ocho.</s><s>Su plataf
doc#18 ire del año pasado, en medio de un asado, Massa anunció que no sería candidato a presidente.</s><s>		Milei	fue lo contrario a Massa y algo muy distinto a lo que venía siendo a una escala difícil de comprender.</s
doc#14 /s><s>Fonte da captura: Milei recibió el apoyo de nueve expresidentes y un Premio Nobel - LA NACION		Milei	recibió el apoyo de nueve expresidentes y un Premio Nobel Casi 24 horas antes del comienzo del debat
doc#1 torio para los ciudadanos de países que exijan ese seguro a los argentinos.</s><s>Sobre la educación,		Milei	impulsa un sistema de "vouchers cheque educativo".</s><s>En su punto uno, propone "descentralizar li
doc#23 durante el acto en el Movistar Arena.</s><s>Se ubicó en uno de los palcos, desde donde se saludó con		Milei	instantes antes del comienzo del discurso del libertario.</s><s>Ambos hicieron un gesto como dibujandi
doc#16 del dirigente libertario.</s><s>Fonte da captura: Massa vs Milei: todo clarísimo - LA NACION Massa vs		Milei	: todo clarísimo "No tengo nada que ver con Massa". (De Juan Schiaretti) 12 de noviembre de 2023 Allre
doc#26 radicalismo y la Coalición Cívica.</s><s>Frente opositor.</s><s>Luego de derrotarla en las elecciones,		Milei	recibió el apoyo de Patricia Bullrich y se alió con Macri Su camino hacia la Casa Rosada acumula más c
doc#11 de 202316:49 https://www.lanacion.com.ar/autor/pedro-lacour-14480/ Pedro Lacour LA NACION Javier		Milei	y Jorge Macri en los estudios de LN+, en agostoTomás Cuesta - LA NACION El duro golpe a las expecte
doc#25 cio en las primarias.</s><s>Solo una vez un vencedor logró un salto de la magnitud del que necesitaría		Milei	para consagrarse mañana: fue el salterío Gustavo Sáenz en 2019 A los fines de este relevamiento, LA N
doc#28 y batallas públicas del hombre que se montó en la bronca para llegar al poder - LA NACION Javier Milei		Milei	responde a la "campaña del miedo" y niega que su agenda sea privatizadora Javier Milei difundió su úti
doc#0 lrich y con duras críticas a Massa CÓRDOBA.- "Córdoba nos va a dar la victoria", repitió confiado Javier		Milei	, candidato a presidente de La Libertad Avanza, quien cerraba anoche su campaña electoral en esta ciu
doc#7 "Si es necesario, hablaré con él y veré por qué", expresó.</s><s>El momento incómodo de la entrevista		Milei	protagonizó un incómodo momento en medio de la entrevista e interrumpió la charla para pedir a los pro
doc#23 Bullrich sorprende y contradice los pronósticos de los encuestadores, el partido será más riesgoso para		Milei	</s><s>Allí es cuando los libertarios apuestan a sus fronteras porosas con el PJ, dado que Milei ya cos
doc#5 ><s> "Vamos en noviembre por la gloria".</s><s>Cuándo es el ballottage para definir presidente Javier		Milei	y Sergio Massa irán al ballottage el domingo 19 de noviembre El calendario electoral prevé que la segur
doc#29 ón de nuestra propuesta contra la casta", se lamentó un referente y candidato.</s><s>Bunker de Javier		Milei	Elecciones 2023Anibal Greco También apuntaron de forma crítica a los episodios que protagonizaron la
doc#15 ones del Trabajoaceptó levantar la feria judicial para tratar el amparo de la CGT contra el DNU de Javier		Milei	A toda esa estética, más parecida a un recital que a un acto político tradicional, se sumó la aparición de
doc#11 Je LN+, en agostoTomás Cuesta - LA NACION El duro golpe a las expectativas presidenciales de Javier		Milei	, graficado en la remontada de Sergio Massa a partir del amplio porcentaje logrado por Axel Kicillof en la

Notably, the collocation analysis of the term *ultraderecha* (ultra-right) showed that it was used by the newspaper to mention foreign parties and politicians like Bolsonaro and Vox, the Spanish ultra-right party. Despite their mentions as the then-candidate allies, there seems to be a distancing from them, since the text never alludes to Milei as an ultra-rightist.

**Figure 6**

*Screenshot of the Collocation Analysis of the term 'ultraderecha'*

modifiers of "ultraderecha"	verbs with "ultraderecha" as object	... de "ultraderecha"
español ... ultraderecha español	invitar ... ultraderecha europeos están invitados	partido ... del partido de ultraderecha
francés ... ultraderecha francés		grupo ... de grupos de ultraderecha
europeo ... ultraderecha europeos		instrumento ... instrumentos de la ultraderecha
		líder ... líder de ultraderecha

The occurrence of the word *casta* (caste) is linked to negative connotations. It is essential to remember here that in his Party Manifesto, as well as in his whole campaign, Milei blames what he calls the ‘political caste’ as those responsible for the economic crises that in 2023 led Argentina to annual inflation of 211.4% (‘INDEC: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República Argentina’, 2023). And while doing so, he hints at the existence of a political group, the caste, which he is not a part of, distancing himself from the responsibility of the creation of the crisis, but positioning himself as the one with the ability to solve it. This can be seen in the example below:

Example 1<sup>11</sup>: “Al igual que antes de las PASO, el candidato de La Libertad

Translation of Example 1: “Just like before the primary elections (PASO), the

<sup>11</sup> Original:

<https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/con-un-llamado-generalizado-a-votar-javier-milei-cerrara-su-campana-enfocado-en-alzarse-con-una-nid17102023/>



<p>Avanza encabezará este miércoles un acto en el estadio Movistar Arena del barrio de Villa Crespo, donde insistirá con sus diatribas contra la <b>casta</b> en el marco de una puesta en escena más parecida a un recital que a un acto político tradicional.”</p>	<p>candidate from La Libertad Avanza will lead an event this Wednesday at the Movistar Arena stadium in the Villa Crespo neighborhood. There, he will persist with his diatribes against the <b>caste</b> in the context of a staging more resembling a concert than a traditional political event.”</p>
<p>Example 2<sup>12</sup>: “Massa es candidato de un gobierno kirchnerista, pero se autopercebe opositor, y Milei es un opositor que desprecia la <b>casta</b> en la que también confía porque, sin la casta, va a ser muy caro el costo que podría pagar después de dos años de ser el ogro que se comía a los chicos crudos para convertirse finalmente en león herbívoro.”</p>	<p>Translation of Example 2: “Massa is a candidate of a Kirchnerist government, but he perceives himself as an opposition figure. On the other hand, Milei is an opposition figure who despises the <b>caste</b> in which he also relies on because, without the 'caste,' the cost he might have to pay after two years of being the ogre that devoured children raw would be very high. Ultimately, he transforms into a herbivorous lion.”</p>
<p>Example 3<sup>13</sup>: “Milei no ostentó de su autoatribuida calidad de académico. No apareció su rugir de león anti <b>casta</b> con autoestima alta. No apareció tampoco la osadía que lo llevó tan lejos, hasta un balotaje.”</p>	<p>Translation of Example 3: “Milei did not flaunt his self-attributed status as an academic. His roar as an <b>anti-caste</b> lion with high self-esteem did not surface. Nor did the audacity that took him so far, all the way to a runoff, make an appearance.”</p>

Note. Highlighted by the author of the thesis.

In all three examples, the writers show some dissatisfaction with how Milei turned this fight against the caste as his motto. The first one describes his criticism as abusive and bitter and alludes to his speeches as too emotional to be considered a traditional political event. The second example openly contests Milei’s position as an outsider. The last one calls his run for the presidency as an audacious move and describes how he, in the view of the writer, became a weak person in the last live debate. He proved that he wasn’t a qualified candidate when he was confronted with technical questions about his government plans.

<sup>12</sup> Original: <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/massa-vs-milei-todo-clarisimo-nid12112023/>

<sup>13</sup> Original: <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/sergio-massa-javier-milei-y-la-superioridad-politica-que-sigue-vacante-nid14112023/>

The quotes above seem to mock the candidate's claims of not being part of traditional politics because they use these characteristics to describe him exactly in moments that are his lowest. This suggests that writers could be trying to make the reader remember that when it is most important, he won't act as the outsider he has been affirming to be.

### 3.1.4 Folha de São Paulo

#### ***Keyword Analysis***

The first 100 keywords were generated from a corpus containing the *Folha de São Paulo* data for October and November, and it used Portuguese Web 2020 (ptTenTen20) as the reference corpus. The 15 most mentioned keywords generated can be seen in Table 3.

**Table 6**

*List of the 15 Most Mentioned Words in the Folha de São Paulo Corpus*

<b>Word</b>	<b>Word Frequency</b>	<b>Relative Document Frequency</b>
Milei	273	100%
ultra-liberal	53	76,67%
peronista	43	73,33%
Bullrich	27	40%
peronismo	28	36,67%
dolarização	9	16,67%
Fernández	22	36,67%
kirchnerismo	9	23,33%
Macri	18	36,67%
anarcocapitalista	7	20%
populista	6	10%
bizarrice	2	3,33%

Word	Word Frequency	Relative Document Frequency
ultradireitista	3	6,67%
direitista	6	20%
motosserra	4	20%

The analysis showed two important things about Folha de São Paulo coverage, that former presidents and main figures of Argentina’s political context were mentioned by more than 50% of the news articles gathered, and that political science concepts mostly connected to the most radical areas of the right-wing were used to characterize Milei.

For instance, the list of concepts used as adjectives consists of variations of Peronism, in *peronista* (peronist) and *peronismo* (Peronism); Kirchnerism, under the variations of Kirchnerismo (Kirchnerism), Kirchnerista (Kirchnerist), and antikirchneristas (Anti-Kirchnerists); the term Macrista (as in Macri supporters) was also mentioned.

Other political science concepts used as adjectives also appeared in the list. They were *ultra-liberal* (ultra-liberal), and variations of *direita* (right) were also strongly present in the text such as *centro-direita* (center-right), *ultra direita* (ultra-right), *direitista* (rightist), *anarco direitoista* (anarcho-rightist), and *ultra direitoista* (ultra rightist), as well as *populista* (populist), and *libertario* (libertarian). This points to a difference between Folha and the other two newspapers above. These appearances weren't remarkable enough in the Argentine newspapers to result in the keywords list, and they each carry complex meanings.

Trying to understand the pattern of the usage of ultra-right in all four corpora, we also did a concordance analysis of the term ‘ultra direita’ in the *Folha de São Paulo* corpus. It only showed the term being used once, and it was to refer to Milei, and it is shown in the example below. The closest term to ultra-right that was found in this corpus was ‘extrema direita’ (far-right). As can be observed in figure 7, below. This shows that, similarly to *Clarín*, *Folha de São Paulo* is not aligned with Javier Milei’s efforts of not being portrayed as a far-rightist or ultra-rightist.

Example 1<sup>14</sup>: “Milei reforça onda de ultradireita na América Latina; agora é a vez da Argentina Chegou a vez da Argentina. Javier Gerardo Milei, economista de 53 anos(...)”

Translation of Example 1: "Milei reinforces the wave of ultra-right in Latin America; now it's Argentina's turn. The time has come for Argentina. Javier Gerardo Milei, a 53-year-old economist(...)"

**Figure 7**

*Screenshot of the Concordance Analysis of the Word ‘direita’*

Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
① doc#16	da miséria.	Isso não justifica o voto na <b>extrema direita</b>	, mas explica sua racionalidade. Infelizmente, não
① doc#16	mente, não podemos estender a análise para a	<b>extrema direita</b>	brasileira. Deste lado, o capitão cloroquina tinha
① doc#17	tas e a inelegibilidade de Jair Bolsonaro (PL), a	<b>extrema direita</b>	enfrentou desmobilização e fragmentação no Brasil.
① doc#17	abilidade de Jair Bolsonaro (PL) Especialista em	<b>extrema direita</b>	e membro do grupo Monitor do Debate Político no Meio
① doc#17	airas hoje restritas a grupos mais reduzidos da	<b>extrema direita</b>	, favoráveis, por exemplo, à abolição total do Estado, nur
① doc#17	ipitalista.	Essas correntes da far-right [ <b>extrema direita</b> ]	defendidas por Milei atraem e têm grande apelo a um f
① doc#22	chamar a atenção para o medo do avanço da	<b>extrema direita</b>	. Argentinos votam no primeiro turno da eleição j
① doc#24	denominado anarcocapitalista e querido da	<b>extrema direita</b>	Javier Milei é maior do que o receio de continuismo, me

Here it is important to present this study's definition of anarcho-capitalism and anarcho-rightist since they are both mentioned more than once by the Brazilian newspapers. These terms refer to a project of society in which all of its social relations are regulated by the market. Supporters of anarcho-capitalism claim that what destroyed the proper implementation of capitalism was the existence of the State, which interferes in the life of the people and their liberties. The use of the prefix “anarch” gives this project an idea that it is subversive of the status quo. However, this is an opportunistic presentation of what this term is because the anarchist theories believe in the destruction of capitalism and of the State as the only way for people to reach liberty. Anarcho-capitalists and anarcho-rightists believe the State needs to be destroyed for capitalism to flourish. Hence, anarchism and capitalism are terms that should not be used together, and when they are done in this way it hints at a manipulation strategy. The so-called anarcho-rightists appropriate the anarchist trajectory to convince

<sup>14</sup> Original:

<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2023/11/milei-reforca-onda-de-ultradireita-na-america-latina-agora-e-a-vez-da-argentina.shtml#:~:text=Chegou%20a%20vez%20da%20Argentina,atravesando%20outros%20pa%C3%ADses%20da%20regi%C3%A3o.>

individuals in a situation of social and economic struggle of their undercover conservative ideas that will, in reality, only exacerbate the problem (Dal Pai, 2018).

The most frequent words in this corpus are Javier and Milei, which was expected since he was specifically the topic of research when selecting the news articles/articles. Ultra-liberal is a concept that was used 56 times to either define or make reference to the candidate. Similarly, Peronist (*peronista*) was used 48 times to refer to the opposition leader, Sergio Massa. This denotes the newspaper's urge to connect Milei with a specific political spectrum that carries heavy conceptualizations per se, and that in no point of Milei's Party Manifesto is quoted as his economic approach. Remarkably, he hints at being an ultra-liberal through the actions he proposes, but he never defines himself as one.

The concordance analysis of the word 'Milei' shows the newspaper's overall concern and pessimism with this election. A picture of the concordance analysis can be seen below, in Figure 8.

**Figure 8**

### Screenshot of the Concordance Analysis of the Word 'Milei'

Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
doc#13	Aires às vésperas das eleições para participar de atos de campanha.	Bolsonaro conversou com	Milei na manhã desta segunda-feira (20), numa ligação de celular feita por vídeo, quando ouviu o convite [vej
doc#5	ele acumulou na votação do último domingo.	Desde que recebeu os resultados naquela noite,	Milei deu um grande giro em seu discurso, indicando que buscaria uma aliança com a coalizão de Bullrich, Ju
doc#1	dos ao movimento, como San Luis, San Juan e Chaco, que nestas eleições registraram mais votos para		Milei .
doc#8	entina tem de gostar da democracia e do Mercosul País terá segundo turno entre Sérgio Massa e Javier		Milei , que já criticou relações com Brasil 14.nov.2023 às 10h02 O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) al
doc#22	te Bullrich migre para Milei.	Mas não todos.	Milei , apesar de ter as mesmas bandeiras, era muito mais radical e pouco apresentável.
doc#16	iedade contemporânea moedora de carne: sonhar por algumas horas.	A chance de um governo	Milei dar certo é ínfima, mas a outra opção era a hiperinflação e a continuação da miséria.
doc#2	culo de poder eram comuns; deu indultos a repressores da última ditadura (1976-1983), como a vice de		Milei , Victoria Villarruel, deseja fazer.
doc#13	ria de Comunicação (Secom), Paulo Pimenta, disse que Lula –que reconheceu de imediato a vitória de		Milei no domingo (19) –só deveria conversar com o o novo mandatário depois de ouvir um pedido de desculp
doc#17	lo que isso poderia ajudar a arrastar para a direita jovens brasileiros.	Embora afirme que o efeito	Milei no Brasil no longo prazo dependerá de seu sucesso ou fracasso, ela prevê que a vitória do argentino se
doc#12	le Milei - Júlia Barbon/Folhapress Já no palco da casa de shows, com capacidade para 15_mil pessoas,		Milei puxou cantos, agradeceu efusivamente à irmã Karina Milei e procurou demonstrar seu lado romântico a
doc#13	*Tenha certeza que tudo o que for possível fazer por você, estarei à sua disposição", disse Bolsonaro a		Milei , na ligação.
doc#4	ntam 2_milhões de empregos a menos", disse ele.	Os candidatos à Presidência argentina Javier	Milei e Sergio Massa participam de último debate antes das eleições - Luis Robayo/Pool/AFP O direitista rebe
doc#13	ro (PL-SP) também participou da conversa - @jaibolsonaro no X (antigo Twitter) Durante a campanha,		Milei deu uma entrevista afirmando que não se reuniria com Lula (PT) caso fosse eleito porque ele seria "um
doc#0	plamente curioso, porque o meio anarcocapitalista e libertário é de onde eu vim.	Os autores que	Milei cita –Mises, Rothbard, Friedman– são os autores que eu lia e discutia ativamente na minha formação.
doc#9	jela noite, expressa no momento em que as telas apontaram 36,7% dos votos válidos a Massa e 30% a		Milei , que era tratado como favorito.
doc#6	a, foi uma das que mais conquistou cadeiras na ocasião.	Foi de 3 deputados –sendo dois deles,	Milei e sua vice, Victoria Villarroel– para 38 e de nenhum senador para 7, alcançando com isso o título de terc
doc#6	no no Legislativo, e muitas vezes apresenta projetos apenas para demarcar sua agenda.	Agora,	Milei e seu A Liberdade Avança precisarão fazer concessões.
doc#18	2024.	Milei manda carta para Lula e convida para posse O presidente eleito da Argentina, Javier	Milei , enviou uma carta ao presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) neste domingo (26) em que convida o pe
doc#17	nos memes: um dos mais compartilhados comparava os dois vizinhos, citando que a Argentina elegeu		Milei , ganhou a Copa-2022 e terá aliados como Estados Unidos e Europa, enquanto o Brasil seria próximo d
doc#13	do para a Argentina na próxima terça-feira, contra o Brasil [risos], brincou.	Ao final da conversa,	Milei afirmou que seria uma honra receber o ex-mandatário brasileiro para a sua posse na Presidência da Arg

An example of the pessimistic feeling is:

Example 2<sup>15</sup>: “(...) *compatriotas com a ideia de que "abolir" o Banco Central resolverá a questão. Autodeclarado "anarcocapitalista", Milei é a versão argentina*

<sup>15</sup> Original: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2023/11/decisao-na-argentina.shtml>

*do outsider de direita em voga nas democracias ocidentais. Difamador das instituições, semeador (...)*”

Translation of Example 2: “(...) compatriots with the idea that "abolishing" the Central Bank will resolve the issue. Self-proclaimed "anarcho-capitalist," Milei is the Argentine version of the right-wing outsider prevalent in Western democracies. Defamer of institutions, sower (...)

Note. Highlighted by the author of the thesis.

Casta (Caste) is mentioned here again, as it was in La Nación, with a negative connotation:

Example 2<sup>16</sup>: “Se naquele ano atacavam-se a corrupção e a deterioração econômica apontando apenas para o kirchnerismo, em 2023 essa insatisfação cresceu de modo mais hostil, abraçando também a oposição. O achado de **Milei**, de chamar a todos, incluindo a oposição, de "casta" lhe deu vantagem desde o início de sua escalada, nas eleições legislativas de 2021, quando se elegeu deputado.”

Translation of Example 2: “In that year, they attacked corruption and economic deterioration, pointing solely at Kirchnerism. In 2023, this dissatisfaction grew more hostile, encompassing the opposition as well. **Milei's** insight, to label everyone, including the opposition, as the 'caste,' gave him an advantage from the beginning of his ascent, in the 2021 legislative elections, where he was elected as a deputy.”

This quote gives a very negative picture of who Javier Milei is through the use of nouns with pessimistic connotation as defamer, sower. When putting anarcho-capitalist in scare quotes to define the candidate, the writer implies that Milei is not exactly one, but this is mentioned just because he is a self-proclaimed follower of the anarcho-capitalist philosophy. Another point that connotes the pessimistic idea the writer has of Milei is defining the candidate's self-declaration as an outsider, as an artifact that most politicians from the right-wing have been using in Western democracies to win elections. Indeed, this anti-system self-characterization is common in populist rhetoric (Araújo and Prior, 2022).

Concerns with the victory of Milei are mostly about how he would carry on the relations between Brazil and Argentina. He had already mentioned he was not willing to maintain relations with countries led by communist Presidents, and Brazil was on his

<sup>16</sup> Original:

<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2023/11/milei-reforca-onda-de-ultradireita-na-america-lati-na-agora-e-a-vez-da-argentina.shtml>

list. It is important to highlight that Lula is very far from being a communist President. This is a common misconception spread by the far-right wing in Latin America to try to demoralize the opposition and instill fear in the population. This unstable relationship with the current Brazilian President is a recurring topic in further news articles and articles after Milei's election, and it is constantly compared with the support he received from Jair Bolsonaro and his family. At the time of the second poll, the permanence of Milei in Mercosur was strategically relevant for the Brazilian government since it was one of Lula's priority to resume Mercosur relations, which had been stronger during his two previous mandates (2002-2009) (Planalto, 2024).

*Example 3<sup>17</sup>: “Resta saber se o apoio da centro-direita do ex-presidente Mauricio Macri e da ex-rival Patricia Bullrich na reta final das eleições se traduzirá em governabilidade. Há dúvidas ainda sobre como será daqui para frente a relação com o Brasil, maior parceiro comercial da Argentina. Enquanto candidato, **Milei** chegou a dizer que sairia do Mercosul e não se reuniria com Lula (PT), a quem chamou de comunista e corrupto, defendendo que as relações privadas entre empresas não seriam afetadas.”*

Translation Example 3: “It remains to be seen whether the support from the center-right former President Mauricio Macri and ex-rival Patricia Bullrich in the final stretch of the elections will translate into governability. There are still doubts about the future relationship with Brazil, Argentina's largest trading partner. As a candidate, **Milei** even mentioned leaving Mercosur and refusing to meet with Lula (PT), whom he labeled as a communist and corrupt, asserting that private business relations would not be affected.”

### **Collocation analysis**


The collocation analysis shows that the adjectives related to both Javier and Milei are mostly political science concepts that also appeared as keywords. They are the extremist variations of *direita* (right-wing) and of *liberal* (liberal), such as ultra-liberal (ultra-liberal), ultradireita (ultra-right), anarco direitista (anarcho-rightist), as well as *populista* (populist), *fascista* (fascist) is also mentioned.

### **Figure 9**

<sup>17</sup> Original:

<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2023/11/ultra-liberal-javier-milei-rompe-polarizacao-na-argentina-e-e-eleito-presidente.shtml>

*Graph of the Collocation Analysis of 'Milei' in the F. de São Paulo Corpus*



### 3.1.5 O Globo

#### **Keyword Analysis**

The keyword analysis of *O Globo* provides a similar result to that of *Folha de São Paulo* concerning the occurrence of political science terms. These terms have been frequently used by the Brazilian electorate since the deeply polarized 2018 presidential elections (Araújo and Prior, 2018). The terms are: *ultradireitista* (ultra rightist), *ultra direita* (ultra-right), *ultra-liberal* (ultra-liberal), *bolsonaristas* (Bolsonaro supporters), *bolsonarismo* (Bolsonarism), *populismo* (populism), *populista* (populist), *extrema-direita* (far-right), and *centro-direita* (center-right). Table 5 presents the 15 most mentioned words.

#### **Table 7**

*List of the 15 Most Mentioned Words in the O Globo Corpus*



Words	Words Frequency	Relative Document Frequency
Milei	453	100%
peronista	65	70%
bullrich	34	56,67%
ultradireitista	17	30%
kirchnerismo	12	26,67%
ultra-liberal	9	23,33%
Macri	16	30%
estrategista	15	20%
antissistema	6	10%
Fernández	15	33,33%
extrema-direita	12	20%
libertário	10	23,33%
populismo	7	16,67%
Bolsonaro	109	83,33%
populista	9	20%

As expected, since it happened in all the other three newspapers analyzed here, Argentinian politicians are also mentioned, with the addition of the then President Alberto Fernandez (2020-2023). He was not mentioned that many times by the Argentinian newspapers in comparison to the Brazilian. Political movements of both countries also had a high occurrence here, such as Peronista/Peronismo, Kirchnerismo/Kirchnerista. Notably, the newspaper employs the term *Mileistas* to refer to Milei supporters, like *Kirchneristas*, *Macristas* and *Bolsonaristas*. This is the first time such a word occurs in all four newspapers.

And following a similar line to *Clarín*, *La Nación* and *Folha*, the term *libertario* (libertarian) is here used to describe Milei. For the same purpose, there are also variations of *ultradireita* (ultra-right) and *ultra-liberal* (ultra-liberal). This list also

includes *antissistema* (anti-system), and outsider. His career is described with the adjective *meteorica* (disruptive) in 5 out of 15 documents.

**Figure 10**

*Screenshot of the Concordance Analysis of the Word ‘direita’*

Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
doc#15	22%, trava câmbio e sobe juros, após vitória da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	nas primárias Para o consultor internacional Welber Bar
doc#24	o: Estrategistas do PT tentam evitar vitória da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	no primeiro turno na Argentina O ex-representante da A
doc#24	aram formar parte de um eventual governo de	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	, assim como peronistas que não estão com Fernández
doc#26	ilizam "núcleo duro" de apoio ao candidato de	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	à Presidência da Argentina Por Julia Noia – Rio de Jane
doc#24	Em entrevistas a rádios locais, o candidato da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	chegou a dizer que nomearia Macri como um embaixac
doc#26	a último comício de Javier Milei, candidato de	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	à Presidência da Argentina – Foto: Editoria de Arte Entr
doc#28	e nas redes sociais é motor de candidatura da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	na Argentina Antes de entrar para a política como uma
doc#11	resentear matéria -- O candidato argentino da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	Javier Milei – Foto: Maximiliano Luna - AFP / Telam O c
doc#24	ticulador político do candidato presidencial da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	afirmou que está 'conversando com todos' Por Janaina
doc#24	do fontes próximas a Milei, pelo candidato da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	para assumir o comando do Ministério do Interior, em c
doc#12	ite associam possível eleição do candidato de	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	em primeiro turno à volta da direita na região e lembran
doc#24	Guillermo Francos, assessor do candidato da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	argentina Javier Milei – Foto: Janaina Figueiredo Nas úi
doc#24	ueiredo Nas últimas semanas, o candidato da	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	argentina para as eleições presidenciais do próximo do
doc#11	los.</s><s>A fórmula do bufão impulsionou a	<b>extrema</b> <b>direita</b>	em diversos países.</s><s>Foi replicada na Itália com f

The concordance analysis of ‘Milei’ presents an overall inclination of *O Globo* against the candidate. His name is connected to Bolsonarism, and the articles alternate between calling him an ultra-rightist and a far-rightist. There is also the link between the candidate and the words ‘polemics’ that refer to videos of him being a gun supporter or raising his voice in TV programs. Even the word ‘fear’ is mentioned to say that Argentinians voted for Massa in the first poll because they feared Milei’s proposals.

**Figure 11**

*Screenshot of the Concordance Analysis of the Word ‘Milei’*


Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
doc#7	casos, confiantes.	Milei	, o veterano político Guillermo Francos, "sempre soubemos que estaríamos no segundo turno, nunca pe
doc#19	da etapa do pleito Por OGLOBO 18/11/2023 11h09 Atualizado há um mês Presentear matéria --- Javier	Milei	defende 'dinamitar' o Banco Central, dolarizar a economia e privatizar a saúde e a educação – Foto: Gei
doc#0	diam, a candidata a vice-presidente disse estar surpresa pelo fato de o peronista Sergio Massa, rival de	Milei	no segundo turno, estava "incendiando tudo e pretenda assumir o poder no dia 10 de dezembro".
doc#4	outsider da História da Argentina a assumir o cargo de presidente.</s></s>- Veja: Candidatos a vice de	Milei	e Massa refletem disputa sobre memória da ditadura argentina Numa disputa com idas e vindas e, por n
doc#15	tico Por Eliane Oliveira – Brasília 18/11/2023 14h00 Atualizado há um mês Presentear matéria --- Javier	Milei	ao lado do deputado Eduardo Bolsonaro – Foto: Reprodução Desde que seu nome começou a ganhar fi
doc#10	deputado por Buenos Aires, com 17% dos votos.</s></s>Foi sua primeira vitória política.</s></s>Javier	Milei	é eleito presidente da Argentina; fotos 9 fotos ... Nas últimas semanas, Lemoine, que tinha se tornado u
doc#0	ra sobre Milei domina último debate presidencial na Argentina As polêmicas falas da candidata a vice de	Milei	desta semana deram ainda mais impulso ao movimento de organizações de defesa dos direitos human
doc#19	desse candidato, a três dias das eleições", postou um internauta.</s></s>Outro internauta partidário de	Milei	postou um vídeo que mostra o momento em que o ultradireitista é cumprimentado por algumas pessoas
doc#11	esquecidos pela "casta" – como ele se refere, com desprezo, a todos os políticos tradicionais.</s></s>	Milei	se projetou como polemista em programas populares de TV.</s></s>Ganhou fama ao gritar com os cole
doc#23	no primeiro turno – contrariando o resultado das primárias e da maioria das pesquisas, que apontavam	Milei	na liderança.</s></s>A alegação surge a quatro dias do segundo turno e é mais uma de uma série de aq
doc#7	A campanha do medo foi reforçada por uma estratégia bem sucedida de viralizar vídeos polêmicos de	Milei	sobre livre porte de armas, compra e venda de órgãos e privatização da educação, entre outros.</s></s>
doc#21	ele comparada a Moisés.</s></s>Os cachorros – vivos e mortos – também são muito importantes para	Milei	, que dedicou o resultado das primárias de agosto, quando foi o mais votado, "aos filhos de quatro patas
doc#24	es Presentear matéria --- Guillermo Francos, assessor do candidato da extrema direita argentina Javier	Milei	– Foto: Janaina Figueiredo Nas últimas semanas, o candidato da extrema direita argentina para as eleic
doc#0	naína Figueiredo – Buenos Aires 17/11/2023 04h31 Atualizado há um mês Presentear matéria --- Javier	Milei	tem propostas que desagradam ao povo argentino, como permitir a venda de órgãos – Foto: Luis Robay
doc#28	a campanha, a relação entre ambos se rompeu.</s></s>Eurmekian sempre reconheceu a inteligência de	Milei	, mas não apoia o caminho escolhido pelo economista para conquistar o poder.</s></s>Solitário O candi
doc#18	Argentina para uma dimensão desconhecida.</s></s>Muitos argentinos votaram em Massa por pavor a	Milei	, que era exatamente o que os estrategistas, entre eles a equipe que já trabalhou em campanhas do PT
doc#26	terior do país; veja mapa – Diferentemente da campanha eleitoral de Bolsonaro, a campanha de Javier	Milei	foi menos centrada nas questões das guerras culturais e mais centrada nas questões econômicas.</s></s>
doc#24	argentinos escolheram o dólar como refúgio.</s></s>Em entrevista a meios locais, a candidata a vice de	Milei	, a deputada Victoria Villarruel, afirmou que "Schiairetti pode ter uma atitude de colaboração", num event
doc#10	ante eleito deixou em suas mãos, antes da campanha de 2021, todos os detalhes de seu visual.</s></s>	Milei	em campanha – Foto: Luis Robayo/AFP Ex-colegas de trabalho de Milei em grandes grupos econômico
doc#8	s>Fonte da captura: &apos Um sopro de esperança: bolsonaristas comemoram vitória do ultradireitista	Milei	na Argentina Apoiadores do ex-presidente brasileiro tentaram surfar nas redes sobre a vitória da direita i

## Collocation Analysis

The collocation analysis of 'Milei' shows that the corpus describes him as indecifrável, agressivo (aggressive), forte (strong) and extremista (extremist).

## Figure 12

*Graphic of the Collocation Analysis of the Word 'Milei'*



A remarkable word that results from this analysis is ‘bufão’, according to the dictionary this is an expression that officially is used to describe someone who enjoys making jokes. However, in some contexts, it connotes someone who is a fool or acts extravagantly just to get attention. In the example below, the author of the opinion article compares Milei to former Brazilian Ministry of Economy Paulo Guedes, whose moves, according to the article, were also responsible for worsening Brazil’s economy. Additionally, the author narrates Milei as a far-right populist who is acting according to the interests of the market.

This holds a strong negative connotation since it is not alluding to Milei’s market-driven proposals as positive for the nation. It goes straight to the point when providing the reader with the author’s pessimistic opinions about the candidate.

Example 1<sup>18</sup>: “O lobo e as ovelhas: Favorito na Argentina, **Milei é bufão** a serviço do mercado Candidato à Casa Rosada, populista de extrema direita defende ideias que nem Paulo Guedes teria coragem de endossar.”

Translation of Example 1: “The wolf and the sheep: A favorite in Argentina, **Milei** is a **buffoon** in the service of the market. A candidate for Casa Rosada, the far-right populist advocates ideas that not even Paulo Guedes would dare to endorse.”

<sup>18</sup> Original:

<https://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/bernardo-mello-franco/coluna/2023/10/o-lobo-e-as-ovelhas-favorito-na-argentina-milei-e-bufao-a-servico-do-mercado.ghtml>

## 3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis of selected news articles

### 3.2.1 The Party Manifesto

The first document to be analyzed is the party manifesto<sup>19</sup> of Javier Milei's party, the Libertad Avanza (Liberty Advances, LA or LLA). The core function of a manifesto is to build the identity of the party, and consequently of the candidate. Then, the message is translated by the media to the population that does not access the manifesto directly. Despite it not being read by the majority of the population, the party's manifesto provides the cues for the questions and comments that are raised by the media (Eder et al., 2016).

This is a strategic document written by the party's political elite. Party manifestos have three main functions: to provide a compilation of the party's positions; to serve as the supreme guide through the party's policies, and to inform voters of the party's plans once elected. These documents lay out the structure of the campaign, party coalitions, and government policies. During the whole election process, candidates rally behind the manifesto, defending its contents, and positioning themselves according to it (Eder et al., 2016).

When writing the documents, parties use some strategies to highlight their values and government plans. Functional analysis of party manifestos provides two axes of manifesto content building: past versus future on one side, and positive versus negative on the other. The first one refers to the manifesto's decision to prioritize either the party's achievements, emphasizing its policy records, or the party's pledges, giving more space to the party's plans once elected. This future-oriented writing is more evident when the party is relatively new (Eder et al., 2016). The second axis concerns the tone of the manifesto. Here the focus is to understand if the party has taken a positive approach, in which the text is personalized, as if the candidate is directly talking to the reader, and prioritizes their honors and goals. Negative campaigns, on the other hand, are summarized by attacks on the opposition. Ultimately, a manifesto can contain all four sides of these axes, but two of them stand out (Dolezal et al., 2018).

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<sup>19</sup> The original document can be accessed in this link:  
<https://www.electoral.gob.ar/nuevo/paginas/pdf/plataformas/2023/PASO/JUJUY%2079%20PARTIDO%20RENOVADOR%20FEDERAL%20-PLATAFORMA%20LA%20LIBERTAD%20AVANZA.pdf>

Javier Milei's party manifesto is entitled "*Bases de acción política y plataforma electoral Nacional 2023*" ( Political action bases and national electoral platform 2023). It follows the standard structure of this type of manifesto by pointing to the mission, vision, and values of *La Libertad Avanza*. Economic, tributary, and work reforms are described in the format of a numbered list. The party's plans for other areas of government, such as education, health, and national security, are also displayed in the format of lists.

The document begins by using the term 'liberalism' to define the political philosophy followed by Javier Milei, and his main principles are the free market, free competition, division of labor, and social cooperation. On the second page, the content under the subtitle "*Diagnóstico y plataforma electoral Nacional*" ( Diagnosis and national electoral platform), is framed as a narrative. It briefly tells a story of Argentina that, according to the manifesto, starts in the last century, and overcomes the instability of the last 70 years. It ends with the demonstration of the plan that pledges to fix the economic problems of the country.

Terms constantly used to describe and refer to the opposition are *gobiernos populistas* (populist governments), *estado paternalista* (paternalistic state), *políticas populistas* (populist policies), *planificación asfixiante* (asphyxiating planning). This text presents an overlexicalization of the term 'populism', presenting its many variations to refer to Milei's opposition. Hence, this manifesto can be characterized as pertaining to the negative axis, in which the opposition is constantly demoralized.

The extensive references to the groups identified as *jovenes* (youth) and *clase media trabajadora* (working middle class) appear to suggest that they constitute the main demographic focus of Milei's campaign. This is in accordance with recent findings that the majority of his supporters are between 16 and 29 years old (Pérez, 2023), mostly frustrated with the traditional politicians that have been ruling a country in which 40% of the population was under the line of poverty during the first half of 2023 ("INDEC: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República Argentina", 2023). The emphasis on the middle-class struggles and their importance for the country's economy is a reflection of the candidate's alignment with liberal and rightist politics (Brown, 2003).

The content of Milei's party manifesto takes advantage of Argentina's economic, political, and social drain to insert the candidate into this narrative as a new figure, someone who didn't take part in any of the mistakes of the past, and who is an alternative. Hence, when the manifesto blames past and present politicians for the current crisis in Argentina ('paternalistic state' and 'populist governments') it automatically refers to decades of the political tradition of Peronism and Kirchnerism, despite not directly mentioning them. This can be observed and contextualized in Example 1.

Example 1: “ *La intromisión del estado paternalista, que proveía de bienes de capital a sus habitantes, **inhibió la iniciativa privada de crecimiento** de esa clase media y fundamentalmente de las clases más bajas y necesitadas, y **llevó a la relajación de los esfuerzos que nos han colocado en el estado de situación actual.**”*

Translation of Example 1: “The interference of the **paternalistic state**, which provided capital goods to its inhabitants, **inhibited the private initiative for growth** in that middle class and, fundamentally, in the lower and more disadvantaged classes. **This led** to a relaxation of efforts that have placed us in the current state of affairs.”

Note. Highlighted by the author of this thesis.

Another concept that has to be taken into account here is the use of the phrase 'populist governments' to refer to the above-mentioned politicians. Populism is a highly controversial concept in political science because of the challenges in its definition, and it has been used, in Latin America, with a negative connotation on the part of rightists about leftists. However, it is important to remember that the region has already experienced the leadership of populist presidents who were from the far-right. One example is Jair Bolsonaro, who was the president of Brazil from 2018 to 2022 (Urbinati, 2019, Laclau, 2009).

The manifesto mentions in the section dedicated to *agricultura, ganadería y pesca* (agriculture, livestock, and fishing) how people that live in rural places, and agricultural machinery, are not safe anymore, as can be seen in Example 2, below. The text blames leftist ideas for the environment of insecurity in rural areas by claiming that this ideology disrespects the values of individual freedom. However, it doesn't point out specific actions done by the so-called 'ideological impulses' or what these impulses are.

Example 2: “*Tomas las medidas necesarias tendientes a velar por la seguridad rural, tanto de personas como de bienes que, en los últimos años, ha sufrido una escalada motivada por impulsos ideológicos alejados de la realidad y de la libertad.*”

Translation of Example 2: “To take the necessary measures aimed at ensuring rural security, both for individuals and property, which in recent years has experienced an escalation driven by ideological impulses distant from reality and freedom.”

It is a constant feature of the discourse of the far-right to blame specific problems on what they call “an ideology”. The ‘war on ideology’ was present also in the discourse and in the campaign of Jair Bolsonaro, in Brazil. Ideology is mentioned one more time in the document under the section of “*seguridad Nacional y reforma judicial*”, in which the text claims that the left-wing ideology protects the incarcerated population to the detriment of citizens in freedom. These tactics of reversing human rights discourses are, once again, common to the far-right as a strategy of placing the population against the values that are most often defended by the left. This includes the decriminalization of abortion, the legalization of same-sex marriage, and the protection of the rights of all people, among them the incarcerated population (Arajo and Prior, 2022).

Example 3: “El servicio penitenciario federal se encuentra colapsado por la falta de políticas penitenciarias con objetivos claros sostenidos en el tiempo (...) la ideologización a favor del detenido y no de los ciudadanos.”

Translation of Example 3: "The Federal Penitentiary Service is overwhelmed due to the lack of penitentiary policies with clear, sustained objectives over time (...) the ideological focus in favor of the detainee and not the citizens."

Another important point to highlight here is the document uses of the verb “*volver*” (to go back), be it to go back to the times when Argentina had a rich economy, or when the labor class was at the center of the country’s economy. This denotes an attempt by Milei and his party to win the electorate through emotions, by making use of a mix of nostalgia with disappointment with Argentina’s critical situation of the past decades.



Example 4: “*Volver a llevar a nuestro país al camino del éxito y el progreso*”; “*volver a ser potencia*”; “*volver a ser el país pujante que éramos a comienzos del año 1900*”; “*volver a ser la potencia agropecuaria que dejamos de ser*”; “*el país volverá a ser un exportador importante*”

Translation of Example 4: "Return our country to the path of success and progress"; "return to being a power"; "return to being the thriving nation we were at the beginning of the year 1900"; "return to being the agricultural power we ceased to be"; "the country will once again become a significant exporter."

The actions proposed by the party, in case the candidate is elected, are always followed by the aim of taking Argentina to the same status of success and economic development it once occupied in front of Latin America. The reason for such mentions is the fact that at the beginning of the 20th century, the country was considered the richest in the region. In 1913, its income per capita was similar to those of Germany and France. During most of the 1990s, the country benefited from prosperity and social stability. It lasted up until the economic crisis of 2001/02, which led to a recession and chronic instability that has been marking the country's history ever since (Maute, 2006).

The analysis of the party manifesto of Javier Milei provides an understanding of three main points that the candidate emphasized during his campaign: the efforts to make the country return to a status of growth and stability, the need for structural and radical reforms, and blaming the opposition for the unstable situation in which the country was positioned during the 2023 elections.

The features here lead us to conclude that the axes chosen by the authors are to write a manifesto that focuses on the future. The coalition La Libertad Avanza is relatively young, being created in 2021, and the approach is majorly negative, because of the recurring degrading mentions to the opposition.

The next sections of this work will analyze what has been said about Javier Milei, his reactions, his discourse, and his actions during the campaign, and after he was elected president. Each analysis will connect the terms used by the newspapers with the ones found in this party manifesto since this is the starting point of the construction of Milei's public image.

### 3.2.2 Newspaper Analysis

In the following sections, four newspaper articles, from four different digital newspapers, will be analyzed. Since the aim of this study is to look into how Javier Milei was portrayed by the selected news outlet, it was decided that the most suitable news articles to be analyzed were the ones in which they introduced the candidate to the public, before he was elected as the new president.

The analysis will begin with the Argentine news articles, since the event in focus here occurs in this country. The order of newspapers inside each country was decided randomly since this won't influence the conclusions of the analysis.

Once again, the discussion will focus on four main aspects of the lexical choices of each corpus: word connotations, overlexicalization, adjectives, and 'structural opposition'.

#### Lead and Title Analysis

#### Figure 13

*The Full Content of the Analyzed Newspapers in the Following Order: Clarín, La Nación, Folha de São Paulo and O Globo*

## Clarín

### El perfil de Javier Milei: un excéntrico al que le entusiasma enfrentarse a lo desconocido

Hace apenas dos años que decidió meterse en política. Fue maltratado en la adolescencia, pero dice que perdonó a sus padres. Asegura que habla con sus perros.

[Dónde voto | Elecciones 2023, EN VIVO](#)

[Elecciones 2023, EN VIVO](#)

[Resultados de las elecciones 2023, EN DIRECTO](#)



Javier Milei, en el cierre de su campaña en Córdoba. Foto: EFE



NICOLÁS  
WIÑAZKI

18/11/2023 23:33/ Actualizado al 19/11/2023 18:15

Javier Milei presentó a Javier Milei así: "Soy Javier Milei, economista, liberal libertario, especialista en temas de crecimiento económico, con y sin dinero. Por lo tanto, sé cómo hacer crecer una economía, sé como crear puestos de trabajo de calidad, de remuneraciones, sé como terminar con la pobreza, la indigencia, y sobre todas las cosas, sé cómo terminar de una

Lo veía el país y tenía apenas un minuto, **el tiempo estipulado para ese momento** en el último debate televisado, en el que se enfrentó a su rival Sergio Massa, con el que definirá en la segunda vuelta electoral cuál de los dos será el nuevo Presidente de la Nación.

Como todas, su vida fue y es más compleja. **No alcanza un minuto de relato oral para describirla**. Ni siquiera este texto. Ni muchos más. ¿Quién es el candidato que sorprendió al resto de la política llegando al balotaje sin experiencia previa y haciendo proselitismo disruptivo?



Javier Milei y su pareja, Fátima Florez, el viernes en el Teatro Colón. Foto: Reuters

Javier Gerardo Milei nació el 22 de octubre de 1970 en Buenos Aires. Es un superviviente de una familia de clase media, según se definió a sí mismo. **Vivió una adolescencia traumática** muchos años más de dramas familiares, también. Su padre, el empresario del rubro del transporte Norberto Milei, **soía castigarlo con golpes físicos** cuando era chico. Y de adulto lo laceraba con palabras muy hirientes. La mamá de Milei se llama Alicia Luján Lucich. Dejó de ver a sus padres. En la pandemia los perdonó.

cargo de diputado nacional. Fue en el 2021. Más extraordinarios aún fueron sus segundos comicios. Éstos. Con partido nuevo, La Libertad Avanza (LLA), **tiene chances concretas de ser electo titular del Ejecutivo**.

Llegó a la política de grande. Nunca militó en la universidad, por ejemplo. Y pasó buena parte de su vida en los claustros académicos.

Fanático del fútbol, entrenó como arquero y llegó a jugar en la reserva de Chacarita Juniors. "Lo que te quiero decir es ésto: trabajo mucho mejor bajo presión. Jugaba al fútbol de arquero, **con una hinchada puteándome detrás mío**. Yo me preocuparía más si estuviera en una campaña tranquila. Y ésta, por suerte, no lo es", dice cuando lo consultan.

Milei es un excéntrico. Llegó a la política luego de años de ser un economista "mediático", y también, por qué no, **una especie de celebridad de la televisión**. Sus primeras apariciones fueron en emisiones de actualidad clásicas. Por su carisma, su pelo despeinado y su vehemencia, pronto fue un invitado habitual de programas dedicados a temáticas diversas. Su look siempre llamó la atención. En sus años de facultad era el único que vestía chaleco de traje.

En tévé habló de sexo, de espiritualidad, de su estudio del judaísmo, peleó con vedetes mientras sus colegas parlamentaban en el Congreso. También mediatizó el amor por sus perros, pero sobre todo por uno: Conan, un mastín inglés que lo acompañó en el peor momento de su vida. Fue cuando se quedó sin trabajo. Sin plata, **comía solo pizzas para que Conan pudiera alimentarse mejor**. Su pasión por sus perros generó polémica en la campaña. Él mismo admitió que, tras la muerte de Conan, decidió usar su ADN para clonarlo. Hoy tiene otros cinco mastines más. **Jura que habla con ellos**.

Trabajó en un banco, una consultora de economía y entró al holding de Eduardo Eurnekian, su gran benefactor. En esos tiempos conoció a economistas como Leonardo Madcur y Guillermo Nielsen. El tiempo hizo que **ambos militen con Sergio Massa**. También a Guillermo Michel. Paradojas. O no.



Karina Milei, apoderada de LLA, este sábado en la Cámara Nacional Electoral. Foto: Fernando de la Orden

En el 2004 se transformó en el principal divulgador de la llamada "Escuela austríaca" de la Economía. Está convencido de que el Estado es el gran problema del país. **Propuso achicarlo**. Usó una motosierra en campaña para ilustrar el concepto.

Milei armó su partido político como pudo, quiso o supo. Los candidatos a puestos provinciales y municipales **fueron un reunte caótico**. "No puedo ocuparme de todo", se excusaba él. El 7 de agosto del 2021 dio su primer discurso público. Fue en la Plaza Holanda. Dijo entonces lo mismo que en esta campaña: **se debe eliminar el Banco Central, dolarizar la economía**, y criticó al resto de la dirigencia a la que llamó "la casta", ya entonces habló de periodistas corruptos que nunca identificó.

En las PASO logró que sus propuestas sean el eje central del debate público. En su libro "El Loco", Juan González es crítico de su modo de hacer política, su estabilidad emocional y su pasión casi mística con sus perros. Milei fue el candidato único más votado en las PASO. **Eso lo enfervorizó**. Se hace llamar El León.

Usó las redes sociales como ningún otro candidato y captó el voto joven. Terminó peleado con la Iglesia. Su candidata a vice, Victoria Villarreal, minimiza no de modo solapado el accionar de la dictadura militar que empezó en 1983. Sus voceros y dirigentes **propusieron proyectos insólitos e impracticables**. Él dejó hacer. Incluso anunció que que Argentina dejaría de comerciar con Brasil y China.

Quedó azorado cuando Massa le ganó en las generales. Escribió su discurso de derrota en el Hotel Libertador, del que nunca más se movió. Sigue allí. Sorprendió en medio de la campaña anunciando su noviazgo con la actriz e imitadora Fátima Florez.

radical Haul Aitonsin. Elisa Carrió jamás aceptó sus propuestas, a las que considera contrarias al respeto por los Derechos Humanos. Su alianza con Macri lo cambió. Macri lo instó a filmar un spot en el que Milei asegura que no quiere que se libere la venta de armas, o de órganos para transplante. Son planes que figuran en su plataforma de gobierno. Sus referentes a nivel mundial son Jair Bolsonaro y Donald Trump. **Copió sus modos más reprochables**. Como el maltratar a un sector de la prensa, elevar la voz frente a disidentes o anunciar un "fraude colosal" antes del balotaje.

Si gana Milei, la Argentina se enfrentará a lo desconocido. Es lo que lo asusta a los mercados y a quienes lo consideran un peligro para la democracia. **Y lo que más lo entusiasma a él**.

# La Nación

## ELECCIONES

ELECCIONES  
2023

### Javier Milei

El candidato místico obsesionado con el dólar



Texto de Hugo Alconada Mon  
16 de noviembre de 2023

Arquero impetuoso, cantante rolling, economista libertario, escritor cuestionado, líder bilardista. Javier Milei vive por estas horas el fin de semana más importante de su vida. Puede llegar al lunes como Presidente electo. Una realidad muy distinta a la que padeció hace pocos años, cuando debió optar si comía él o su perro. Ahora, la "batalla cultural" que promovió puede depositarlo en la Casa Rosada. Y acaso esa sea clave de su ascenso fulgurante: Milei encarna un sentimiento social de bronca y frustración con la dirigencia tradicional que carecía de representación política en la Argentina.

Su camino fue arduo. Muy. El domingo de las elecciones generales, 22 de octubre, cumplió 53 años. Lo poco que se sabe de su infancia y adolescencia es áspero y doloroso. Padeció violencia física y psicológica en su casa y bullying en el colegio Cardenal Copello de Villa Devoto, contó más de una vez, abusos que lo llevaron a cortar todo vínculo con sus "progenitores" durante años, sin interés alguno por calificarlos como "padres" o "papás".

El vínculo con "Beto" (80), colectivo devenido empresario del transporte, y Alicia (72), ama de casa, fue nulo por largo tiempo. Sólo se restableció cuando el Covid-19 dominó el mundo, gracias a la intercesión de dos figuras decisivas en la vida de Milei: el economista Diego Giacomini, el gran y quizá único amigo íntimo que ha tenido -aunque luego siguieron caminos diferentes-, y su hermana Karina, su sostén emocional.

El vínculo fraterno es estrechísimo. Él la define como "la jefa". O más. Como en septiembre de 2021, cuando Viviana Canosa le preguntó cómo es el vínculo entre ellos. "Vos sabés que Moisés era un gran líder, pero no era bueno divulgando. Entonces Dios le mandó a Aarón para que, digamos, divulgue. Bueno...", respondió, emocionándose. "Kari es Moisés y yo soy solo un divulgador, nada más".



UNA INFANCIA DURA. Hijo de un colectivo devenido empresario del transporte y una ama de casa, Milei sufrió violencia física y psicológica en su casa

De aquellos primeros años le quedaron un apodo y dos aficiones. "El loco", lo llamaron en el colegio. Y así lo conocían, también, en las inferiores del club Chacarita, donde lo recuerdan como un arquero impetuoso que se lanzaba de cabeza, si era necesario, contra los tapones de los delanteros rivales. Tiempos en que ostentaba una melena rubia con flequillo al estilo Rod. En la Universidad de Belgrano estudió Economía y cosechó su primera experiencia laboral. Fue como pasante, seis meses, en el Banco Central (BCRA), aunque terminó mal, como debió admitir ante la insistencia de Sergio Massa durante el debate del domingo. Se graduó, completó su primera maestría y sumó otra en la Universidad Di Tella, mientras terminaba de consolidar su adhesión a las ideas libertarias o al "anarcocapitalismo", como él lo caracterizó.

Aquellas experiencias iniciales en el mercado laboral le permitieron concluir sus estudios, tras otra pelea con su "progenitor". También lo mostraron muy lejos de su repudio posterior a la "casta". Asesoró al legislador nacional Ricardo Bussi y fue el economista jefe de la Fundación Acordar, el think tank que montó Guillermo Francos para proveerle ideas a la campaña presidencial del entonces gobernador Daniel Scioli, del mismo modo que entre 2013 y 2015 se acercó al búnker de Massa junto a Giacomini y Guillermo Nielsen. Y trabajó en Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 para Eduardo Eurnekián, figura señera de los contratistas del Estado.

Fueron años duros para Milei. Debía hacer malabares para llegar a fin de mes, recuerdan sus allegados, mientras afrontaba muy serios problemas con la Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos (AFIP). Fueron tiempos en los que contaba con un solo y gastado traje oscuro a rayas y llegó a pesar 120 kilos por una opción de vida: comió pizzas durante mucho tiempo para comprarle mejor comida a "Conan", su perro.





REFUGIO EMOCIONAL. "Kari es Moisés y yo soy solo un divulgador, nada más", llegó a decir

*La relación con el mastín inglés fue profunda y compleja. Milei lo definió como su "hijo". Y sostiene que Dios les tiene asignada una misión aun mayor, según coincidió una docena de fuentes consultadas por LA NACION durante los últimos meses. Milei ha llegado a sostener entre sus íntimos que él y "Conan" se conocieron hace 2000 años, en el Coliseo romano. Era gladiador y león, pero no llegaron a pelear. Porque "el Uno", como el economista alude a Dios, les comunicó que unirían fuerzas cuando llegara el momento indicado. Y ese momento llegó. En la Argentina de 2023. (Interesting, is the article gonna say he cloned his dogs and that the process of cloning animals kills many others?)*

En público evita ahondar por la senda mística. "A mí me han pasado cosas muy fuertes que exceden toda explicación científica", fue lo máximo que contó cuando Luis Novaresio le preguntó por qué creía en Dios si la existencia divina era improbable. Pero Milei está convencido de que "el Uno" le habla, aunque a veces recurra a las dotes tarotistas de su hermana para evaluar en quién puede confiar, o a la veterinaria Celia Melamed para conversar con sus perros, algo que no confirmó ni desmintió en una entrevista con el diario El País de España. "Lo que yo haga puertas adentro de mi casa es problema mío", dijo.

Otras veces, salió al cruce de las preguntas como cuando calzaba guantes. "¿Sabés cuál es la diferencia entre un genio y un loco? El éxito", planteó. Una visión de la vida que lo emparenta con Carlos Salvador Bilardo, campeón del mundo como jugador de Estudiantes de La Plata y como técnico de la Selección Argentina. "Yo soy bilardista", confirmó Milei, "en lo único que creo es en el resultado".



Católico de origen, Milei se inclinó hacia el judaísmo durante los últimos años. Recurre al rabino Axel Shimon Wahnish como su guía espiritual mientras estudia la Torá. Tiene a Moisés como su "ídolo" y a Eduardo Eiztain como punto de referencia, lo que lo ha llevado a definirlo como uno de los empresarios locales que más respeta.

Milei está convencido, además, que "el Uno" y él comparten una visión económica y abrevia para sostenerlo en las ideas del catedrático Jesús Huerta del Soto. "Dios es libertario", pregona el español desde YouTube, donde afirma que "el Estado es la encarnación del Maligno, del demonio, la correa de transmisión del mal".

Esa misma visión la aplica a sus interlocutores y rivales, a quienes define en términos religiosos. Al jefe de Gobierno porteño, Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, por ejemplo, lo definió como "Mefistófeles" ante un interlocutor que dialogó con LA NACION, del mismo modo que calificó al Papa Francisco, el argentino Jorge Bergoglio, como "un demonio en la tierra".

Antes y después de esos y otros comentarios incendiarios, Milei acudió a un psicólogo, todos los viernes por la tarde, aunque los encuentros terminaron de manera abrupta. El profesional falleció durante la pandemia. Luego acudió a otro terapeuta, pero abandonó las sesiones mientras leía "La muerte de la muerte", un libro de David Wood y José Luis Cordeiro sobre "la posibilidad científica de la inmortalidad física y su defensa moral". Pero entre los suyos explicó de otro modo su decisión de cortar con la terapia: "Ya abordé los temas que me preocupaban", les comunicó. "Ya estoy curado".



PAREJA. Poco se sabe de la vida amorosa del liberario, que mantuvo una relación con Daniela Mori, exintegrante del grupo Las Primas y desde hace unos meses está de novio con la humorista Fátima Florez

En público, alude muy poco a esa faceta de su vida, que el periodista Juan Luis González abordó en "El loco". Pero en mayo de 2022, por ejemplo, acusó a Rodríguez Larreta de querer inmiscuirse en su "historia clínica", según le dijo a Laura Di Marco. "Una de las amenazas que recibo es: o accedo a correrme de la política o cuenta qué psicofármacos tomo".

Para entonces ya había decidido clonar a Conan, esa posibilidad que evaluaba hacía tiempo. Lo esbozó en público en un congreso en la que se abordó el concepto de "singularidad tecnológica". En privado, buscó un laboratorio en Estados Unidos. Así aparecieron sus cuatro "nietitos", como los definió, con nombres de economistas. Los mastines ingleses Milton [por Milton Friedman], Murray [por Murray Rothbard], y Robert y Lucas [por Robert Lucas].

Fueron tiempos de desafíos emocionales para Milei. Él mismo definió a su departamento en el barrio de Abasto -regalo de su padre, que luego invocó ese regalo para la extorsión emocional- como lo más parecido a "Kosovo". Y novió durante meses con la cantante Daniela Mori, otrora integrante del grupo Las Primas. El romance no prosperó, pero ella guarda de él los mejores recuerdos. Porque cuando diagnosticaron con cáncer a su hija, él mostró su mejor faceta. "Eso no lo olvidaré jamás", le reconoce ella.



## Folha de São Paulo

### Veja quem são os candidatos a presidente na Argentina

#### Eições no país estão divididas entre peronismo, oposição macrista e o ultraliberal Javier Milei

22.out.2023 às 13h08

**Júlia Barbon**

**Buenos Aires**

Os argentinos decidem neste domingo (22) o futuro político do país em clima de profunda incerteza. As principais forças políticas da [Argentina](#) estão representadas nas figuras de três candidatos.

A coalizão peronista União pela Pátria tem como cabeça de chapa o atual ministro da Economia, [Sergio Massa](#) —o presidente Alberto Fernández decidiu não disputar a reeleição.

Ele disputará com [Patricia Bullrich](#), ex-presidente do partido de [Maurício Macri](#) (PRO), da oposição republicana Juntos por el Cambio.

**Publicidade**

Mas o favorito na disputa, depois de ter saído na frente nas eleições primárias, é o deputado ultraliberal [Javier Milei](#), líder do A Libertade Avanza, que se apresenta como uma rara terceira via.



Os candidatos à Presidência da Argentina Sergio Massa, Javier Milei e Patricia Bullrich - AFP, Reuters e Xinhua

Abaixo, veja quem é cada um dos principais postulantes ao primeiro turno, realizado neste domingo. O segundo turno, se necessário, acontece em 19 de novembro.

#### GOVERNISTA PERONISTA

##### [Sergio Massa, 51](#)

Foi o terceiro ministro da Economia nomeado por Alberto Fernández, em julho de 2022. Antes disso, foi presidente da Câmara dos Deputados por três anos e prefeito da cidade de Tigre, vizinha a Buenos Aires, por outros seis. Também foi chefe de gabinete de Cristina entre 2008 e 2009.

Formado em direito e de perfil conciliador, ele assumiu quando o presidente decidiu unificar três pastas para centralizar as ações diante da [piora da crise econômica do país](#). Tem sido o responsável por "segurar as pontas" do governo até as eleições e lidera a renegociação da [dívida bilionária que o país tem com o FMI \(Fundo Monetário Internacional\)](#).



O ministro da Economia da Argentina, Sergio Massa, fala durante encontro com autoridades brasileiras na Casa Rosada, em Buenos Aires - Luis Robayo - 23.jan.23/AFP

#### OPOSIÇÃO MACRISTA

##### [Patricia Bullrich, 67](#)

É uma das lideranças da coalizão Juntos por el Cambio e, até abril, era presidente do Proposta Republicana, do qual pediu uma licença para participar da campanha. Considerada mais "finha dura", foi ministra da Segurança de Macri (2015-2019) e deputada federal por Buenos Aires (2007-2015).

Antes, atuou como ministra do Trabalho e Segurança Social na gestão de Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001). Tem se movimentado para se aproximar do concorrente [Javier Milei](#), dizendo que atuará junto com ele em propostas se ganhar, de olho nos eleitores de direita do rival.



A ex-ministra Patricia Bullrich em Brasília, durante entrevista - Pedro Ladeira - 16.jan.19/Folhapress

#### ULTRALIBERAL

##### [Javier Milei, 53](#)

Economista e professor, o ultraliberal foi eleito deputado federal em 2021. É líder do Partido Libertário e da sua coalizão, A Libertade Avanza. Ficou conhecido a partir de 2018 por críticas contundentes às gestões de Cristina, Macri e Fernández e por seu modo agressivo de falar.

Naquele ano, chamou uma jornalista de "burra" e teve que pedir desculpas na Justiça. Define-se como anarcocapitalista e tem como principal proposta a dolarização da economia argentina. Costuma atrair principalmente o eleitorado jovem, e sua vice é a também deputada Victoria Villarruel.



O direitista Javier Milei durante evento conservador na Cidade do México - Luis Cortes - 19.nov.22/Reuters

## O Globo

### Eleição na Argentina: Javier Milei, outsider que saiu da TV para liderar a extrema-direita

#### Candidato pela coalização A Liberdade Avança tem principais inspirações políticas nos governos do peronista Carlos Menem, e em Jair Bolsonaro e Donald Trump

Por

[Janaina Figueiredo](#)

— Buenos Aires

21/10/2023 02h00 Atualizado há 3 meses

Presentear matéria



O candidato à presidência da Argentina Javier Milei durante comício que tocou jingle em português no formato de samba, em Buenos Aires, na última quarta-feira (18) — Foto: Luis Robayo/AFP (constant linking of Milei to Brazil and to Bolsonaroism)

Alunos que tiveram [Javier Milei](#) como professor na Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da Universidade Nacional de Buenos Aires (UBA) lembram que o agora [candidato presidencial](#) da extrema-direita [argentina](#) sempre foi impulsivo, com tendência a zangar-se quando é contrariado, e temperamental. Esse mesmo Milei tornou-se um personagem frequente em programas de debate na TV nacional, e até mesmo em peças de teatro nas quais, em épocas em que ninguém imaginava que faria uma carreira política, já dizia que o Banco Central devia ser destruído. Tudo o que Milei defende como candidato é conhecido faz tempo pelos que o seguem nas redes sociais, onde sua presença é dominante e expressiva há muitos anos.

- [Patricia Bullrich: ex-militante peronista que se tornou o rosto da direita tradicional](#)
- [Sergio Massa: candidato peronista é articulador com longa lista de desafetos](#)

Mas Milei não era levado a sério pela política argentina que tanto abominava. Isso mudou nas Legislativas de 2021, quando foi eleito deputado, com 17% dos votos na cidade de Buenos Aires, representando o partido que acabara de fundar, A Liberdade Avança. Naquele momento, Milei iniciou sua campanha pela Presidência, considerada um delírio por analistas e jornalistas locais, que, em muitos casos, subestimaram a força do candidato — e ridicularizaram seus eleitores — até as Primárias Abertas Simultâneas e Obrigatórias (Paso) de 13 de agosto passado. O candidato ficou em primeiro lugar e, somente então, o sistema político assimilou o fato de que o primeiro outsider da História da Argentina tem chance de ser presidente.

Até entrar para a política, Milei trabalhou como assessor de grandes grupos econômicos, que, segundo fontes de sua equipe, ajudaram a financiar sua campanha, entre outros.

Milei é uma figura exótica, em vários sentidos. Nunca se casou, mora com cinco cachorros e sua principal colaboradora é sua irmã, Karina, que o candidato chama de “chefe”. Até anunciar em setembro um midiático namoro com a humorista Fátima Florez, famosa por imitar Cristina Kirchner, o líder de extrema-direita dizia que, se fosse eleito, sua irmã seria primeira-dama.

Milei, que tem apelidos como leão e peruca (o candidato jura que seu cabelo é natural), tem uma conexão emocional com seus seguidores. Em seus atos de campanha, seus seguidores gritam “serra elétrica” — um dos símbolos da campanha — quando o candidato fala em acabar com os privilégios da casta política, entre outras promessas.

#### Bolsonaro e Trump

Milei adotou o judaísmo como religião, tem como tutor um rabino marroquino, e já avisou que, se for presidente, seu alinhamento será com os Estados Unidos e Israel. Muitas de suas decisões, confirmaram ex-colaboradores do candidato, são tomadas com base no tarô, uma das ferramentas usadas por sua irmã para, por exemplo, determinar se aliados e colaboradores são ou não confiáveis.

All four news articles analyzed this topic and commented on the profile of Javier Milei as the new prominent presidential candidate for the Argentine elections of 2023. The first was published by *La Nación* on November 16. The *Clarín* news article was published on November 18 and edited the next day to add a footnote about Javier Milei's election as the new president. Nonetheless, both original news articles were published before his victory in the second poll, which took place on November 19. The news articles present the candidates' journey from childhood to the present day. However, they emphasize different aspects of it and narrate the same topic using distinct connotations.

Regarding the Brazilian newspaper news articles, the first is from *Folha de São Paulo*, published on October 22, the exact day of the first poll. The second is from *O Globo* and was published on October 21st. The leads and title of each newspaper were translated into English and can be seen below:

*Clarín*

*Javier Milei's profile: an eccentric enthusiast who loves confronting the unknown*

It's been only two years since he decided to enter politics. He was mistreated in adolescence but says he forgave his parents. He claims to talk to his dogs.

*La Nación*

*Javier Milei: The mystical candidate obsessed with the dollar*

Impetuous goalkeeper, rolling singer, libertarian economist, controversial writer, and Bilardist leader. Javier Milei is currently experiencing the most important weekend of his life. He could end up on Monday as the elected President. A reality very different from what he endured a few years ago when he had to choose between eating for himself or his dog. Now, the “cultural battle” he promoted could land him in the Casa Rosada. Perhaps that is the key to his meteoric rise: Milei embodies a social feeling of anger and frustration with the traditional leadership that lacked political representation in Argentina.

*Folha de São Paulo*

*See Who the Presidential Candidates in Argentina Are*

Elections in the country are divided between Peronism, Macri's opposition, and the ultra-liberal Javier Milei.

*O Globo*

*Election in Argentina: Javier Milei, an outsider who left TV to lead the far right*

Candidate for the coalition Freedom Advances has main political inspirations in the governments of Peronist Carlos Menem, and in Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump

In the case of Argentine newspapers, both picked adjectives that are not usual in the description of political figures. “Eccentric” implies a deviation from the norm, while “mystical” refers to spirituality, the unknown. On their own, they don’t necessarily carry negative or positive meanings. However, in this specific context of the adjectives'



assimilation to a political figure, the reader can understand its use as a form of underlying criticism. Instead of using technical words to refer to his attributes, the newspapers use adjectives that evoke the idea that this candidate is unconventional and mysterious. In contrast, the Brazilian newspapers refer to the candidate's ideological values. It is interesting to note that *Folha de São Paulo* opted for analyzing the candidate through an opinion news article, instead of a news article, which is why the news article selected is not exclusively about Javier Milei. In the lead, *Folha* describes him as an ultra-liberal, a term that according to the previous analysis is constantly used by this specific news outlet to describe him.

*O Globo*, on the other hand, defines the candidate as an *outsider*. The adjective was used by the candidate himself and that when echoed by the media can support Milei's narrative of being the leader who challenges the system and the social order (Araújo and Prior, 2020). Notably, the lead does something that wasn't seen in any of the corpuses analyzed: it chose to emphasize that one of Milei's inspirations was 'the Peronist Carlos Menem'. Despite Menem's affiliation with Peronism during his election, he carried economic policies that distanced him from traditional Peronism and even promoted a crack inside his party. This happened because he adopted a clear neoliberal agenda by promoting the privatization of state enterprises to foreign corporations. The move led to high rates of unemployment and conflicts between the president and organized labor, who were historically the supporters of Peronism. Considering this brief explanation, and that Milei's opposition, Sergio Massa, was the leader of the Peronist coalition, this lead can be confusing for readers that do not have a background on Argentina's complex political history (Anria and Vommaro, 2020). This could lead the reader to think that Milei, a far-right candidate, has some type of Peronist affiliation, or even to misunderstand the Peronist movement, which is formed by many parties and includes different features of the political spectrum, which makes it inherently complex.

A notable difference can be observed in the topics chosen to be highlighted between Argentine newspapers and Brazilian ones, and this can be explained by their different political background and the levels of polarization in each country. Argentina's presidential election happens in a time of extreme economic crisis. The country that was

once the richest in South America now sees 40% of its population in poverty and by November 2023, the inflation rate reached 142.70 percent (INDEC, 2023).

For the past 40 years, since democratization, *Casa Rosada*, the center of Argentina's executive power, has been run by parties associated with the Peronist movement. This political ideology emerged as a populist and nationalist movement under the command of Juan Domingo Peron. Peronism's force is still significant in the nation's political landscape, especially because of its flexibility to adapt to the new times (Peruzzotti, 2017). Nowadays, Peronism mostly influences Milei's opposition, the coalition of Peronists and center-leftists named *Frente de Todos* (Front for All), whose presidential candidate was Sergio Massa (Stefanoni, 2023).

In contrast, Brazil is experiencing its worst political polarization. The 2022 presidential elections were the most polarized in Brazil's history since its democratization (Barbosa, 2023). They deepened the already huge gap between the right (concentrated in the figure of former president Jair Bolsonaro) and the left (concentrated in the figure of current president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva). As happens in an extremely affective polarized democracy, the vote is not done according to the candidates' proposed policies and work background. The vote is decided according to how much the population like him or dislike the opposition, and debate between the two sides is almost impossible (Fuks and Marques, 2023).

The terms "ultra-liberal" and "Libertarian" are deeply politicized concepts that cannot be used vaguely, when used to describe a politician they each carry a clear meaning and connotation. "ultra-liberal" is someone who strictly follows the rules of classical liberalism, and advocates for minimal government intervention in the economy. "Libertarian" is someone who advocates for individual liberty, free markets, and limited government intervention. They have similar meanings but are used by opposite movements in an attempt to give the other a negative connotation (Fuks and Marques, 2023; Araújo and Prior, 2020).

### 3.2.3 La Nación Content Analysis

An analysis of the content of each news article provides a deeper understanding of each newspaper's framing of the candidate. Starting with *La Nación* (Figure 1), the

article was signed by Hugo Alconada Mon, it is entitled “Javier Milei, The mystical candidate obsessed with the dollar”<sup>20</sup>.

The news article of *La Nación* starts with an emotive connotation that is supported by sentences such as:

Example 1: “Milei **encarna un sentimiento** social de bronca y frustración con la dirigencia tradicional que carecía de representación política en la Argentina.”

“Su camino fue **arduo**.”

“(…) su infancia y adolescencia es **áspero y doloroso**. Padeció violencia física y psicológica en su casa y bullying en el colegio.”

Translation of example 1: “Milei **embodies a social sentiment** of anger and frustration with the traditional leadership that lacked political representation in Argentina.”;

“His journey was **arduous**.”;

“(…) his childhood and adolescence were **rough and painful**. He suffered physical and psychological violence at home and bullying at school.”

Note. Highlighted by the author of this thesis.

This is an example of how this news article presents the ethical behavior and personal characteristics of Javier Milei. When these specified terms are sequentially arranged, they subtly convey the notion that the individual in question is justified in making vehement and offensive remarks due to the arduous nature of his journey, characterized by experiences of violence and suffering. Moreover, when the author asserts that Argentina was devoid of a political leadership that effectively represented the collective frustrations of the nation, the implication extends beyond the mere exoneration of Milei's assertive rhetoric; it tacitly authorizes such discourse by positing that this form of leadership aligns with the perceived needs of the country, as suggested by the author of the news article.

<sup>20</sup> The original news article can be accessed in this link:  
<https://www.laNación.com.ar/politica/javier-milei-el-candidato-mistico-obsesionado-con-el-dolar-nid07082023/#/>

The words selected to describe Milei's familial ties also portray someone to whom the family is of extreme importance. As in "The sibling bond is extremely close", from the extract quoted below. The news article highlights the difficulties of the candidate's infancy in the first paragraph, which is followed by five pictures of him with his sister.

**Example 2: "El vínculo fraterno es estrechísimo. Él la define como "la jefa". O más. Como en septiembre de 2021, cuando Viviana Canosa le preguntó cómo es el vínculo entre ellos. "Vos sabés que Moisés era un gran líder, pero no era bueno divulgando. Entonces Dios le mandó a Aarón para que, digamos, divulgue. Bueno...", respondió, emocionándose. "Kari es Moisés y yo soy solo un divulgador, nada más"."** (La Nación, sentences in bold were added by me).

Translation of example 2: "**The sibling bond is extremely close.** He defines her as 'the boss.' Or more. Like in September 2021, when Viviana Canosa asked him about their connection. 'You know that Moses was a great leader, but he wasn't good at spreading the message. So God sent Aaron to, let's say, spread the message. Well...', he responded, **getting emotional.** 'Kari is Moses, and I'm just a disseminator, nothing more.'" (La Nación, sentences in bold were added by me).

Note. Highlighted by the author of the thesis.

The pictures of Milei and his sister support the text's affirmation that the siblings have always been close, while adding to the sentimentality of the running text. The narrative of siblings who went through tough childhoods together and grew up to support each other plays a central role in this article, as one of the pillars of the humanization the author planned for Milei's figure. Indeed, as the Sketch Engine analysis showed, out of all four corpora, La Nación was the only one that mentioned Karina Milei in 12 out of its 15 documents.

The presentation of the candidate's governability qualifications is suggested by the paragraphs in which the journalist describes his academic background and apparently 'innocent' episodes of his childhood, like the candidate's behavior during his time as a soccer player. He is characterized as: "(...)an impetuous goalkeeper who would throw himself headfirst, if necessary, against the studs of opposing forwards." (Original: "*arquero impetuoso que se lanzaba de cabeza , si era necesario, contra los tapones de los delanteros rivales*"). The constant mention of Milei as a natural leader shows the presence of 'structural opposition' in the text. It generates a subconscious

picture of Milei as a natural leader, who has been fighting against unfairness since he was a child, in contrast to other presidential candidates who, instead of fighting injustices, create them. The framing chosen by the news article is of the poor guy who suffered as a child and is now about to become the president of one of the largest countries in South America. And not only any president but a 'libertarian' someone that is going to free the country from its crisis.

The news article goes on through his undergraduate life, stating that those were "Those were tough times for Milei " (Original: "*Fueron años duros para Milei*"). It picks two key points to make the reader sympathize with the candidate: him working for big corporations while he was starving. This creates a duality that is exactly the one his Party Manifesto and discourses defend, that is of him being an agent against the political and the elite caste. It also denotes one of liberalism's pillars: meritocracy, the idea that anyone can grow up to have economic success under capitalism as long as the person fights for it (Brown, 2003). This paragraph of the news article depicts an alignment between the news article's ideas with Milei's. There is no impartiality in what is being narrated, even if at first sight it may look like a simple story of someone who has said to have a difficult past.

The second part of this news article is dedicated to Milei's values and personal beliefs. It starts by pointing out his catholic origins, which can be seen by the readers as a positive point since Roman Catholicism is the official religion of Argentina. It seems that the news article has a very light and superficial approach to some delicate topics, such as Milei using his religion to offend his opponents, the way he intertwines religion with politics and the controversial cloning of his dogs. And his actions are always explained as consequences of the emotional damage that he went through.

The presence of his sister in the content of this news article is massive. When it introduces his current girlfriend, Fatima Florez, both women are described as the ones who exert power of decision and influence on his life. The use of the female figure here has the purpose of softening Milei's aggressive image, as women in politics are often perceived as peaceful and associated with calmer behavior. By placing his sister as such a strong and heavy presence in his life, the news article is following exactly this prescription. The picture created is of an aggressive player (as the news article itself

describes him) who has an extremely soft point that limits the possible negative consequences of his character.

The news article ends by describing the controversies he has been accumulating during his public life. What is interesting to note here is that this very important topic, which offers a few critiques to him, is left as the last one in a particularly big news article. This is purposeful, this profile was designed to make the reader leave the page with the picture of a political figure who has undoubtedly committed some mistakes, but they can all be forgiven since he suffered a lot in life. He is a self-made economist, who has received a college education and believes in God.

Lastly, the political ideology followed by the candidate is pointed out as liberalism and libertarianism. There are no mentions of him as a far-rightist or ultra-liberal.

This detailed analysis leads us to the question: why is the author of this article emphasizing the pains and downs of Milei's life if not to humanize him and make his journey closer to the ones of ordinary citizens? Despite the documents analyzed being a small fracture of a bigger amount of news articles published of Milei in La Nación's website, it offered us the position of one of the newspaper's journalists that was in charge of the election coverage. As the overall analysis of this article showed the author's positive inclination towards the candidate, it is expected that most of this journalist's text would carry a similar tendency to portray Milei as the leader Argentina needed.

It is also important to remember that this article aligns with Sketch Engine results, that pointed to the newspaper highlighting his economist status, his libertarian values, while distancing him from the ultra-right politicians who are his allies abroad.

### 3.2.4 Clarín Content Analysis

The news article, published by Clarín, is signed by Nicolas Winazki and is entitled "Javier Milei's profile: an eccentric enthusiast who loves confronting the unknown"<sup>21</sup>. The article starts with Milei defining himself as the person that has the

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<sup>21</sup> The original can be accessed in this link: [https://www.Clarin.com/politica/perfil-javier-milei-excentrico-entusiasma-enfrentarse-desconocido\\_0\\_z14YBjJiTg.html](https://www.Clarin.com/politica/perfil-javier-milei-excentrico-entusiasma-enfrentarse-desconocido_0_z14YBjJiTg.html)

solution for the main problems affecting the country. It is interesting how the author opens this article with such a strong assurance about the candidate because later on this same article will not present such positivity and confidence on the candidate's ability to lead the country.

Some adjectives used to define him or his career are *extraordinarios* (extraordinaries), in “Even more extraordinary were his second elections” (Original: “Más extraordinarios aún fueron sus segundos comicios.”); fanático del fútbol (soccer fanatic); excentrico (eccentric); economista “midiatico” (media economist); celebridad de la television (television celebrity).

The text introduces him as an economist that stood out for his charisma and vehemence, characteristics that added to his eccentric personality led him to be always present on TV programs in which he was supposed to discuss the economy. However, in the ninth paragraph, right after calling Milei someone who had charisma and was vehement and passionate, the author plays with sarcasm by saying that while on TV, Milei “(...) talked about sex, spirituality, his studies on Judaism, fought with showgirls while his colleagues debated in Congress”. At no point does the article mention that the candidate’s time on TV was somehow useful for the nation in terms of economy and politics. In fact, it uses ‘structural parallelism’ pointing to the existence of other economists who were working in politics, here represented as the Congress, where the law is discussed and changed.

In contrast with the first news article, this one exposes a more critical position regarding the candidate. This news article is not so charged with emotive sentences and adjectives as the above analyzed. The difficulties Milei has faced during his life, as for the relationship with his parents, are presented in a lighter tone. The sentences are shorter and sharper, presenting the reader with just the necessary information, without giving it much emotional connotation. An example of this is the sentence chosen to start the third paragraph: “Like everyone's lives, his was and still is more complex.” (Original: “*Como todas, su vida fue y es más compleja.*”). The news article here does not hide the candidate’s troubled past, but highlights that he is not the only one with such experiences, suggesting that Milei's traumas and challenges in life can't be used to defend his controversial public figure.

The same paragraph proposes a question that tells the reader the news article's opinion about Javier Milei's ethical behavior and personal characteristics, when it asks, "Who is the candidate who surprised the rest of politics by coming to the runoff without prior experience and engaging in disruptive proselytizing?" (Original: *¿Quién es el candidato que sorprendió al resto de la política llegando al balotaje sin experiencia previa y haciendo proselitismo disruptivo?*). This question uses three points to describe the candidate: a) someone who surprised negatively the world of politics, b) a candidate with no experience in the field, and c) someone who instills political beliefs in the public.

Additionally, describing Milei as a candidate who engages in disruptive proselytism means that he uses a discourse that is similar to that of religious extremism. Proselytism is a form of convincing a group or an individual of the speakers' values. The news article is expressing an opinion and a concern. This paragraph presents the idea that Milei has no qualifications to govern and his ethical behavior is criticized.

While talking about Milei's campaign, the article is rather critical, by stating that the choices for his local candidates were a "chaotic assortment" (*"rejunte caotico"*). The mentions of Milei's main topics of discourse give the impression that the author finds them empty of meaning. This happens especially because of the emphasis on the candidate calling government leaders the "casta" without naming them and what positions they exactly occupy. Besides that, the article highlights Milei's recurring speech against corrupt journalists without specifically identifying who they are. Here is another framing of the candidate's governability qualifications. As can be seen in the example below:

Example 3: "Dijo entonces lo mismo que en esta campaña: **se debe eliminar el Banco Central, dolarizar la economía**, y criticó al resto de la dirigencia a la que llamó "la casta", ya entonces habló de periodistas corruptos que nunca identificó."

Translation of Example 3: "He said the same thing back then as in this campaign: the Central Bank must be eliminated, the economy must be dollarized, and he criticized the rest of the leadership, whom he called 'the caste.' Even back then, he spoke of corrupt journalists whom he never identified."

Further, the article criticizes the governability qualifications of the candidate. It describes his political proposals as "unusual and impractical" (*"insólitos e*



*impracticables*”), and claims that he is pragmatic, but just to criticize the speed at which Milei quickly allied with his former enemy, Patricia Bullrich, the presidential candidate who came in third on the first poll, and whose proposals have a similar rightist direction, but whom Milei openly criticized at the beginning of his campaign.

There is an emphasis here on how despite Milei publicly saying he wouldn’t allow the selling of guns or organs for transplants, such actions were still part of his government plans. The candidate's ideology is presented with the mention of his international references in a negative tone. It states that Milei copied exactly the behaviors from Trump and Bolsonaro that are most deserving of criticism and disapproval. The adjective used was “*reproachable*” which translates to reproachable, or blameworthy.

An analysis of the layout of both news articles indicates that *La Nación* has dedicated an extensive page for the detailed profile of the candidate (which has been done also for the other candidates). In contrast, *Clarín*'s news article is far simpler, and the data collection of this newspaper's news articles hasn't found any other article that is dedicated to a more detailed profile of the candidate. At least during the period in which the data was collected for this thesis work. This is an interesting contrast, considering the importance of *Clarín* to the formation of political thoughts among its national readers. Not to mention the newspaper's activism against Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's administrations during 2007-2015, a practice that was considered “war journalism” by one of its editors. Considering this, it was expected that *Clarín* would align with the candidates that represented a strong opposition to Kirchnerism. However, this article does not contain an overall positive connotation of Milei.

Both news articles mentioned how the candidate had to eat only pizza to save money for his dogs' food. They used almost the same words, which one could think was a statement released by Milei's public relations team and overly repeated when narrating his early life. However, this is added in different parts of the news articles, but *Clarín* finalizes the paragraph about the candidates' controversies regarding the cloning of his dogs by stating that “He swears he talks to them” (original: “**Jura que habla con ellos**”), the verb ‘swears’ implies a sense of disbelief and skepticism regarding his claim

to communicate with dogs, ending the paragraph in sarcasm. Additionally, this last sentence was highlighted in the original text.

The last paragraph of the article doesn't hide the author's disbelief behind metaphors and sarcasm. It calls Milei's possible victory as the 'unknown' that is feared not only by supporters of liberal policies ('*los mercados*', 'the market') but also by the opposition to liberalism ('those who consider the market a danger for democracy', '*a quienes lo consideran un peligro para la democracia*'). This means that the author perceives the election of Milei as something that could be bad for everybody.

The analysis of this news article gives more evidence which confirms the analysis of the results from Sketch Engine. Overall, the article shows concern with the possible election of Milei, as the journalist makes it clear that he does not consider him appropriate for the position of president of the nation.

### 3.2.5 Folha de São Paulo Content Analysis

The news article of *Folha de São Paulo* is signed by Júlia Barbon and is entitled "*See Who the Presidential Candidates in Argentina Are*"<sup>22</sup>. This newspaper hasn't published a news article dedicated specifically to each candidate in the same format as the other newspapers analyzed here. However, a link attached to the name Javier Milei takes the reader to an interview with the candidate, done by video call on September 25, 2021, when he was still a federal deputy.

The news article, from October 22, lists the three main candidates for the first poll and describes briefly each of them. The name of Milei is mentioned during the description of his opposition, Patricia Bullrich. His name is attached to a hyperlink that takes the reader to the newspaper section dedicated only to articles that mention him.

Milei is the last to be listed, and his subtitle is "ultra-liberal Javier Milei, 53". As mentioned before, the news article is labeling the candidate as an 'ultra-liberal', and this term carries the connotation of extremism and radicalism. Notably, it is not used by Milei to describe his economic plans in the Party Manifesto, instead, the term used is 'liberalism', which is lighter and, thus, easier to be accepted by the society. There is an overlexicalization of the use of 'ultra-liberal' by the newspaper, and the term is always

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<sup>22</sup> Original: [Quem são os candidatos a presidente na eleição Argentina - 22/10/2023 - Mundo - Folha \(uol.com.br\)](https://www.uol.com.br/mundo/ver/noticia/quem-sao-os-candidatos-a-presidente-na-eleicao-argentina-22-10-2023)

followed by the name Javier Milei. Such lexical choice gives a sense of over-persuasion and it can be evidence that the newspaper is making an effort to portray Milei in a predetermined way.

In the two paragraphs dedicated to him, the news article opts to describe Milei as an economist and university professor who was known for criticizing previous presidents, and for his aggressive way of talking. When portraying him as someone with an aggressive way of talking, it could present 'structural opposition', suggesting the existence of another calm candidate. The second, and last, paragraph, highlights Milei's controversy with journalists, something that was similarly mentioned by both *Clarín* and *La Nación*. It is the first news article in this section to bring up the term 'anarcho-capitalist', stating that Milei defines himself as one. To conclude, it also mentions how Milei attracts mainly young voters.

The news article is short, but the words picked are enough to draw an image of whom the newspaper wants Javier Milei to look like for its readers. In terms of his political ideology and personal characteristics, he is pictured as incisive, aggressive in the way of talking, and an extremist of the free market. According to *Folha*, he is a 'rightist' and a 'conservative', terms that weren't used by the Argentine newspapers. The connotation of such terms in an extremely politicized democracy as Brazil can only be undertaken by the reader as either negative or positive, never any in between.

In this sense, depending on the political inclination of the reader, Milei could be framed as a strong candidate or an unreliable one. The article's lexical choices to describe his ethical behavior depict him as someone who stands out from traditional behavior expected from political figures running for the presidency of a country. For example, it was said that he made 'incisive critiques' of past governments, and even called a journalist 'dumb'. After all, the choice of news articles about this specific event in a newspaper of national circulation shouldn't be read as a coincidence. The former president Jair Bolsonaro, who has openly declared support for Milei, has a background of offending journalists during his political career. Widely known in Brazil is the controversy in which the then-federal deputy said to a female journalist that she was too ugly to be raped, and was sued for sexual harassment right after (Gould and Blotta, 2023).

According to Machin and Mayr (2023) the selection of which events to show in a news article is arbitrary. In the case of *Folha*, out of everything it could have chosen to make this first impression of Milei to its readers, it chose topics that portray him as a political leader that shows no respect for the profession of journalism and who is radical not only in his proposed policies but also in his behavior.

Nonetheless, *Folha's* news article is not exclusively inclined either positively or negatively towards Milei; the words selected can have double connotations depending on who is reading. For example, a rightist reader, who is also a Bolsonaro supporter, may remember the event between the former president and the female journalist and transfer his admiration from the Brazilian politician to the Argentinian. The same could happen to a leftist reader, but instead of admiration, the reader would transfer their opposition.

In just two paragraphs and with a few politicized words, *Folha de São Paulo* managed to nationalize the polarization that was happening in Argentina.

### 3.2.6 O Globo content analysis

The news article analyzed here was published by *O Globo*<sup>23</sup> on October 21st, 2023 and was signed by the journalist Janaína Figueiredo, the newspaper's correspondent in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

The subtitle of the picture that opens the article explains that it was taken while he was at a rally in which his campaign jingle was being played in Portuguese in the format of samba, which is Brazil's national popular rhythm. Interestingly, the author decided to emphasize that in the subtitle, considering that the picture only shows Milei. This strategy underscores the newspaper's deliberate endeavor to establish a thematic linkage between the emergent far-right in Argentina and its Brazilian counterpart.

This corroborates the Sketch Engine analysis of the *O Globo* corpus, which showed how it had far more articles and news articles comparing Bolsonaro to Milei than the Argentine newspaper, and even to *Folha*, which was also investing in this comparison. It is important to remember that *O Globo* was the only corpus to have used

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<sup>23</sup> The full content can be accessed in this link:  
<https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2023/10/21/eleicao-na-argentina-javier-milei-outsider-que-saiu-da-tv-para-liderar-a-extrema-direita.ghtml>

the term ‘Mileistas’ to refer to the candidate's supporters, in the same way that Bolsonaro supporters are called ‘Bolsonaristas’. This implies that the newspaper considers the ascension of Milei to power as a new political movement.

Example 4: “Alunos que tiveram [Javier Milei](#) como professor na Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da Universidade Nacional de Buenos Aires (UBA) lembram que o agora [candidato presidencial](#) da extrema-direita [argentina](#) sempre foi impulsivo, com tendência a zangar-se quando é contrariado, e temperamental.”

Translation of example 4: “Students who had Javier Milei as a professor at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the National University of Buenos Aires (UBA) recall that the now-presidential candidate of the Argentine far-right has always been impulsive, prone to anger when contradicted, and temperamental.”

Example 4 contains the opening sentence of the first paragraph of the text. It is a strong affirmation that shows not only the descriptions offered by Milei’s past student but also how the author frames the ethical behaviors and personal characteristics of the candidate since the adjectives are anticipated by ‘(...)the candidate has always been (...)’. The students were positioned here just to give more credit to the author’s opinions, by emphasizing that those quoted characteristics are not new, and they have been noticed before. Additionally, the adjectives used, “temperamental and impulsive”, carry highly negative connotations for an individual who is running for such an important position for the country, especially with the addition of saying that he “is prone to anger when contradicted”. This ‘structural opposition’ suggests the existence of a candidate that in contrast to Milei, is stable and cautious.

The first appearance of the name Javier Milei is connected to a hyperlink that takes the reader to a page dedicated solely to the politician. The page consists of a brief explanation of who he is, a section of frequently asked questions, a selection of his pictures, and articles from the newspaper related to him.

The news article outlined how Milei was not taken seriously as a politician before becoming a deputy in 2021. The term ‘outsider’ is then repeated with the following statement: “The first outsider in the History of Argentina to have the chance to be president”. The outsider label is emphasized by calling him an ‘exotic figure’, not

because of the polemics he had been involved in throughout his career, but for his single status, and the close relationship with his sister. Hence, this author of this article describes Milei's governability qualifications positioning him as a figure who questions societal norms and established systems.

The last section, entitled “Bolsonaro and Trump”, frames Milei's personal characteristics and ethical behaviors that are considered, by the article, as just ‘peculiar’. The first point is about the change of religion to Judaism and the weight it has in his personal life. It implies that religion is a guiding force in his administrative decisions, especially because right after the text states that Milei “has announced that, if elected president, his alignment will be with the United States and Israel”. The second is that most of his strategies are decided according to tarot readings, an approach to leadership that is not conventional.

Such points could be interpreted differently according to one's beliefs, however, when talking about an individual that aims at becoming the nation's president, they seem to imply more pessimism than optimism. What *O Globo* is trying to say with this paragraph is that if elected, Milei is mostly not going to rely on trustable administrative methods. While talking about his approach to leading the country through this extremely delicate economic crisis, the text doesn't mention government plans or solid policy strategies to make Argentina recover. Instead, it implies that the candidate would rely on religion and mysticism, and on advisors that are young people with no experience in politics.

### **Discussion and comparison of results**

The political utterances used in the Party Manifesto are mostly associated with a rhetoric of right-wing populism. This is manifested in descriptions that create a moralistic divide between the candidate and the opposition. For example, when the text mentions that the party's plan “respects the honesty in the administration of public sources”, and in the next page proceeds to demoralize the oppositions calling it “totalitarian populist governments” with “asphyxiating planning”. This divide is also present in mentions of a “working middle class” and the “corrupt caste”.

The introduction of the document creates a narrative that fully blames the opposition for the current economic and social crises. It offers generalized data without sources, such as “ brain drain because young people are seeking a better future, high rate of child malnutrition as a result of the lack of sewers and drinking water”, framing the economic situation of Argentina as a chaos that can only be solved by the radical structural changes proposed by Milei. This introduction instigates fear of the opposition by presenting an ideological narrative masked as historical, to convince the electorate that Peronists cannot go back to political power. Hence, the manifesto positions Milei as the savior of the nation, but uses his educational background as an economist to pretend that his proposals are supported by scientific research, when in reality, his proposed plan follows ultra-liberal policies that widens the gap between poverty and wealth, and aggravates the economic crisis.

The candidate’s political ideology is mentioned at the beginning of the document as it defends liberalism and emphasizes its main characteristics throughout the text, such as meritocracy, no state intervention, privatizations and the prioritization of international investment in the national industry. The document attests Milei’s governability qualifications by promoting him as a politician that is not part of the group that created the economic and social crises, and this is closely linked to the portrayal of his ethical behavior that is of someone who cares for the collective, as when the text says “unrestricted respect for the life project of the next based on the principle of no aggression”, a candidate that is honest and worried, mainly, with the young people and the working class. It is necessary to make an addendum here because the working class mentioned by the Party Manifesto, despite it not being explicit, is not all working classes, but mainly the “working middle class”.

Milei and the Manifesto use an anti-elitist (anti-caste), moralist, and anti-corruption discourse, promising to fight “ideologies” that have been destroying the country. However, as was pointed out in some parts of the newspapers analyzed, Milei makes an effort to create a distance from extremist ideas. For instance, as some of the articles gathered for this thesis showed, he refuses to be called an ultra-liberal and ultra-rightist, although both ideologies are closely involved with the libertarian liberal approach he claims to follow.

Clarín presents the candidate's political ideology as libertarian. It used the term 'ultra-right' on two occasions: to refer to European ultra-rightist movements, and only once as a reference to Milei. In contrast, the terms 'liberal' and 'libertarian' are mostly used to identify his political ideology. One of the articles published by Clarín describes how young voters against Milei use the term 'ultra-liberal' to classify him and that this was considered a controversy in the country. The candidate publicly contested the definition, as the article states: "I am not the ultra-right, I am a libertarian liberal. Let them express what they think".

The article analyzed by this study contributes to the overall portrayal that Clarín makes of Milei's qualifications to govern the country. The article acknowledges that the candidate has an educational background as an economist, but the author of the article proposes some doubts over his abilities on the field. It does so by saying that Milei wasted time on TV while he could be actually working for the nation as a Congressman, for example. The article also states that Milei's campaign was "chaotic" and led by people with no experience. In general, the newspaper opted for highlighting Milei's economic plans, and it raised doubts over his most controversial plans, such as the dollarization of the Argentine economy, privatizations and his motto of solving the country's problems by cutting the privileges of a certain "political caste". The last term is also criticized by the newspapers for being a generalization that lacks meaning.

The candidate's ethical behavior and personal characteristics are portrayed by the newspapers as uncontrolled and uncivilized. The article analyzed presents him as a charismatic and passionate person who uses such characteristics to convince people of his ideas and values in the same way an extremist religious leader does. When the journalist uses sarcasm to refer to the candidate's relationship with his dogs, they imply a disbelief and disapproval of Milei's personal behavior. It seems that in this article the candidate's lack of governability qualifications is intertwined with his controversial personal characteristics. Clarín seems to be more worried about the skills necessary to lead the country out of its economic crises than about the candidate's political ideology, or if he is a decent person or not. What matters to Clarín is if his personal and ethical characteristics are those of a strong leader, the ones mentioned by the article and by the newspaper are mostly connected with his capacity as an economist and administrator, and he is not portrayed as sufficiently capable for either of these two positions.



Clarín framed Milei as a candidate that lacks leadership skills and economic knowledge to be Argentina's next president. The analysis of Clarín's articles implied that the newspaper's positioning in this election is not of a supporter, as expected, but as the voice that questions the expectations created around Milei's victory. The article analyzed, introduced Milei as an outsider and a libertarian, as he self-declares to be, however, this is not done with a positive connotation. Most of the positive slides of Milei's proposed policies or personal behaviors, are presented with counter-arguments that expose other slides of the stories that are already known. For instance, he graduated in economy and worked in a TV show that aimed at discussing the economy, however, the program wasn't educational; or he claims to have the answers to solve the economic crises but his campaign was not well organized and his team lacks politics experience.

The article taken from La Nación corpus seems to corroborate the results of the corpus analysis. The Corpus Assisted Linguistic Analysis showed that the newspaper categorized Milei's political ideology as a liberal libertarian. Some articles of the corpus do mention his connection with European and Latin American ultra-rightist leaders, but they are careful in making this distinction between 'them', the conservative portion of the right, and 'Milei', who is a radical but not conservative right-wing candidate. Another point to be observed is that despite Clarín's doubts about Milei's capacities, this newspaper also created this distance between him and conservative ultra-rightist leaders. This could indicate that the analyzed Argentine news outlet wanted to picture him as a politician that is not exactly conservative in his ethical and personal behavior.

For instance, the article analyzed in this chapter doesn't mention even once the terms ultra-liberal or far-right. The omission of this side of Milei makes evident the efforts of La Nación and Clarín to deviate the discussion from the political ideology followed by the candidate. The term libertarian is relatively new to the Argentine political scenario and its deliberate use instead of the most commonly known 'far-right' or, to be more precise, 'ultra-right', could point to these media outlets' attempt to frame this presidential election in terms that distance it from 'la grieta', making this anti-populist versus populist battle part of the past.

In relation to his governability skills, he is defined as a candidate that thinks about the collective and that is focused in seeking solutions for the country's problems.

His background in economics is constantly mentioned by the newspaper, reassuring the reader that Milei understands the problems he will have to deal with if he becomes the president. The article analyzed mentioned episodes throughout Milei's life that try to picture him as a natural leader.

His personal characteristics and ethical behaviors are exhaustively explored by the journalist that wrote the article entitled “Javier Milei, The mystical candidate obsessed with the dollar”. He is portrayed as someone with an explosive and emotive behavior that despite being surrounded by controversies has a way of acting that is what Argentina needs.

Similarly to Clarín, La Nación doesn't reiterate Milei's discourse against the caste and this could point to the newspapers' close relationships with the country's elites. Clarín and La Nación have always supported the elites and when the Peronists were in power, the relationship between them and the two newspapers was balanced as long as they had their ownership privileges assured. When the government policies concerning media ownership and media regulation changed and were not following an economic liberalist approach, both newspaper's quickly built an opposition to the Head of State in charge of such chances.

La Nación emphasized the anti-Kirchnerism discourse far more than Clarín. This can be concluded from the amount of times Kirchnerism was mentioned in both corpora and the connotation used in those mentions. For instance, in more than one article La Nación frames Milei as the direct opposition to Kirchnerism, bringing the anti-populist rhetoric back from the Wars journalism of the 2015 election. It is interesting to observe that Clarín seemed to have accepted the candidate Sergio Massa's attempts to detach his political image from Kirchnerism, despite being the leader of the coalition in which the Justicialism Party is also part of.

Despite the differences in their positioning in this election, both newspapers seem to have prioritized their liberal values. However, while Clarín is of the opinion that Milei's election can be more detrimental to Argentina's economy, La Nación has positive expectations concerning what his government can do for the country's economy.

*La Nación* positioned Milei as a hope for Argentina, someone who has the leadership features that the country needs to overcome the current crisis, and by doing

this, *La Nación* endorses Javier Milei's campaign. *Clarín* is skeptical about Milei's governability skills, and it pointed out some flaws in his ethical behavior. Both periodicals appear to allocate limited emphasis to the ideological alignment of the candidate. Hence, the first hypothesis of this thesis is wrong. *Clarín* didn't frame Milei as the best option and, consequently, didn't endorse his campaign. In contrast, *La Nación*'s enthusiasm with Milei could indirectly endorse his election.

*Folha de São Paulo* categorized Milei's political ideology as ultra-liberalism. Other terms that imply the idea of extremism, such as 'anarcho-capitalist' and ultra-rightist, were also employed. It is interesting to observe that the newspaper seemed to agree with Milei's plans to a certain extent. This means that some of the more radical aspects of his economic policies are aligned with the newspaper's historical connection with liberal and neoliberal politicians.

In terms of the candidate's personal characteristics and ethical behavior he is pictured as aggressive. The article analyzed opted for highlighting the candidate's disrespect towards journalists, which could be an attempt by the writer of the article to show a side of Milei that deserves attention. This makes sense considering the newspaper's overall concern with the Brazilian democratic values during and after Bolsonaro's government.

*Folha de São Paulo* provided a succinct introduction to Milei, employing terminology that is highly polarized and politicized within the Brazilian context, while deliberately leaving ample room for conjecture. Despite the article's overt neutrality regarding Milei, an analysis conducted using Sketch Engine suggests a nuanced stance. The analysis revealed the newspaper's reservations concerning Milei's presidential aspirations and apprehension about the potential adverse impacts of his proposed policies on Argentina and Latin America.

The framing used by *Folha* in this election is similar to the anti-populist discourse it promoted during the Brazilian 2018 presidential election. Despite manifesting reservations regarding Milei's competencies and ethical behaviors, it didn't criticize the liberal aspects of his plans, instead, it emphasized the importance of a change in Argentina's government.

*Folha* believes that the victory of Kirchnerism would be worse than Milei's. Here its anti-populist discourse is evident. Similarly to what it did in 2018, *Folha* uses

the discourse that a radical change made by an unknown candidate can not be worse than the situation the country was left in by a succession of populist governments. Milei is not directly supported by the language of the newspaper, but his economic ideas are. The figure of Milei is not necessarily important, and it even seems that *Folha* avoids to exacerbate his figure.

*O Globo* exhibits a notable preoccupation with the candidate's economic perspectives, surpassing its concern for his political ideology. Notably, the article refrains from regarding Milei as a credible contender possessing requisite governance qualifications. Diverging from *Folha de São Paulo*, *O Globo* avoids accentuating the controversies enveloping Milei and refrains from overtly evaluating the candidate's ideological inclinations in a positive or negative light. Despite the titular identification of Milei as a far-right candidate, the article abstains from emphasizing this categorization, and references to Milei's political inspirations are devoid of overtly political terms concerning the cited figures.

Considering the analysis of the Brazilian newspapers' articles, the second hypothesis recommended by this thesis is also wrong. Both *Folha* and *O Globo* framed the Argentine elections in the context of an economic crisis. Hence, their concerns lay on the candidate's approach to the topic, if his governability skills were suitable or not to lead the country out of the crisis. No attention was given to the topic of democratic values.

The analysis provided by Sketch Engine results pointed to *O Globo* being more optimistic with Milei's presidency than *Folha*. However, both were using terms that were more inclined to judge his economic policies than his approach to social movements and social rights. That is what the overlexicalization of the terms ultra-liberal and anarcho-capitalist suggested.

The new far-right in Brazil and Argentina introduced an extremism to the rightist ideas that crossed the line between politics and private life, polarizing these societies. Any one that was not a supporter became considered unethical, undeserving of respect and conniving with corruption and other crimes. News outlets of the biggest media conglomerates of both countries were behind the anti-populist movement that

spread and sedimented such thoughts. The anti-populist discourse perpetrated by the analyzed newspapers opened space for the extremist right that elected Bolsonaro in the 2018 Brazilian election, and that now elected Javier Milei in Argentina.

Newspapers used affective polarization to frame Milei by focusing on the sentimental aspects that he can generate on voters. Justicialism is still at the center of the country's polarization, which can be noticed in the candidate's mentions of the 'caste' responsible for the economic crises. Language as the concrete application of ideology can be detected in news language by the use of politicized concepts that create the idea of extremes, such as 'ultra-liberal' instead of just liberal, for example. Ideology was also noticed in the analyzed texts in hidden meanings, sarcasm, overlexicalization and the use of words and expressions that create sentimentalism towards the candidate.

## CONCLUSION

The main goal of this study was to execute a comparative analysis of the newspapers *Clarín*, *La Nación*, *Folha de São Paulo*, and *O Globo* to understand how they were each framing the Argentinian presidential candidate Javier Milei. The analyses followed the Critical Discourse Approach that comprehends the understanding of the journalists' lexical choices as part of a bigger and more complex web of contexts.

This thesis considered three essential factors that influence the writing of a newspaper article: the country's political context, the country's journalistic culture, and media ownership. These aspects permeate how a person, or an event, is framed in newsmaking, and how the newspaper positions itself and the actors involved in the topic that is being discussed. The concepts of framing and positioning were here used with the meaning of how newspapers define a situation and how they create identities for themselves and others (Gordon, 2015).

In discourse analysis, framing and positioning are theories used to comprehend how people create meaning through linguistic phenomena, in other words, how the background and the knowledge of people impact what they are writing and reading. Therefore, to understand why newspapers portray Javier Milei, it was first necessary to explain how such newspapers were created, what are their historical relations to politics and politicians, and how they have previously influenced their country's political course (Gordon, 2015).

The two selected newspapers from Argentina were *Clarín* and *La Nación*. They are the most read by Argentinians, and they have heavily influenced national politics. They supported the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1976 to 1983 and led the “journalism war” against former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Their effect on public opinion culminated in the election of Mauricio Macri, in 2015, as the country's first right-wing president since re-democratization. On the other side, the practice of journalism in Argentina has been marked by acts of violence against the communication field and its professionals. The anti-populism discourse promoted and perpetrated by both media conglomerates created an environment of hostility between the Heads of States and the news media in Argentina (Kitzberger, 2016; Prinetti, 2022).

*O Globo* and *Folha de São Paulo* are two traditional Brazilian news outlets that have also led the national anti-populist discourse against the candidates of the Workers Party, most specifically President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva and President Dilma Rousseff. In the case of Brazil, acts of violence against journalists and the practice of journalism were mostly perpetrated and incentivized by former president, Jair Bolsonaro. His rise to the presidency was followed by the emergence of an ultra-right committed to an informational disorder that not only discredits the work of journalism but also spreads misinformation and promotes violence against professionals in the field (Gould and Blotta, 2022).

The present thesis proposed first the Corpus-Assisted Critical Analysis of 30 news articles from each outlet, gathered every day between October 15 to October 29th, and November 12th to November 26th. All the data was transformed into four corpora using the online Corpus Linguistic tool Sketch Engine. A Corpus-Assisted Critical Analysis was also done with Milei's Party Manifesto. After this, a single article was extracted from each corpus and analyzed separately using a Critical Discourse Approach. Finally, the results of all five documents were compared among each other and with the results from the Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis.

This analytical process aimed at answering three questions, that were: how has each newspaper portrayed the figure of Javier Milei considering each country's political and journalistic context? What are the lexical patterns and political utterances used in the Party Manifesto? What lexical patterns and political utterances can be observed in the framework constructed by each newspaper to characterize and make reference to Javier Milei?

The answer to each question provided a general idea of how each newspaper, and the Party Manifesto, framed the presidential elections and positioned Javier Milei in it. Hence, the results indicated that Milei framed the elections as the only chance for Argentina to recover from its economic crises and positioned himself as the only person capable of guiding this change, taking the country back to the same economic and social stability it enjoyed at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Argentine newspapers had a different positioning than expected. One of the hypotheses was that considering their pro-liberal and anti-populist discourses, they would both endorse Milei's campaign by portraying him as the candidate who was most

qualified to lead the country. However, the results of the analysis showed that *La Nación* was much more positive with Milei than *Clarín*, that presented more concerns over his personal behavior and morale that seemed to almost balance the newspaper acceptance of his economic plans for Argentina. The frame proposed by both newspapers was of a populist versus anti-populist election, as the previous ones had been. It also seemed to be framed as a very economic-driven election, with the ultra-liberal characteristic of the candidate being constantly highlighted.

Both newspapers made use of emotional connotation and emphasized Milei's ethical behavior and personal characteristics when introducing him, which is in accordance with the deep and widespread affective feature of the polarization the country is going through. Indeed, affective polarization in Argentina is marked by a political scenario in which people were voting for parties with which they felt an emotional connection, rather than trusting their policy proposals.

The Brazilian newspapers were also framing the elections as an economic-driven election, and their concerns were more directed to Milei's capacities to lead the country out of the crises, and thus, how this could affect Latin America and Brazil. A lot of comparisons were made between him and Jair Bolsonaro, and the newspaper discourse relied on the populist/anti-populist discourse it perpetrated on the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. However, a notable difference between *Folha and O Globo* in comparison to *Clarín and La Nación* was the constant and fervent mentions of the candidate's ideological position.

The polarization in Brazil is also prominently affective, but the difference from Argentina is that Brazilian parties are not central in this polarization. The electorate in Brazil is more focused on specific figures within the parties.

Both newspapers demonstrated concern over Milei's qualifications to deal with the economic crises. However, the article analysis showed that while *Folha* was using words and events that could get the attention of both supporters and opposition to Milei. *O Globo* was much more clear in its doubts about the candidates' management and political abilities.

The analysis of this study was limited by the reduced number of data gathered and the selection of news articles instead of newspaper editorials. A larger amount of data could provide a more detailed understanding of the positioning of each newspaper,



as well as the analysis of editorials instead of news articles. However, the selected Brazilian news outlets haven't published editorials on the specific topic of Milei's campaign, hence, it would be an unbalanced analysis to compare editorials from Argentina and news news articles from Brazil.

Most of the data used about the selected newspapers' influence in their national politics was from elections that occurred between 2010-2018 because of their populist/anti-populist appeal. Considering this, one of the suggestions of this thesis for further studies is a broader analysis of the discourses used by each newspaper in this recent Argentine polarized presidential election.

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