Gender and political terrorism

Militants' specificities in RB, PIRA and PLO

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ABSTRACT

Many narratives about women and their involvement in terrorist activities have depicted them as deviant, mad and monstrous. Although already much research has been made to assess their reasons to join armed groups, gender perspectives are rarely taken into consideration and terrorist specialists tend to target them in the same dehumanising and degrading way compared to their male counterparts. My intention is to present a different side of the same coin and to demonstrate that women underwent political violence even for a feminist cause. The analysis focuses on three specific cases: the Italian Red Brigades, the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The adoption of the New Social Movements theory is beneficial to grasp the whole life and characteristics of female rebels, the influence of the protest movements of the 1968 and the tumultuous geopolitical times, signed by the threat of a nuclear war, various cultural transformations as well as global economic crises.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CRM Civil Rights Movement
DC Democratic Party
DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
ibid. ibidem
INLA Irish National Liberation Army
IRA Irish Republican Army
GAP Gruppi Armati Proletari/ Proletarian Armed Groups
GUPS General Union of Palestine Students
MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano
NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
OT Occupied Territories
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano/ Italian Communist Party
PD People’s Democracy
PLA Palestine Liberation Army
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
RB Red Brigades
RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDS Student for a Democratic Society
SDT Second Demographic Transition
UDA Ulster Defence Association
UDR Ulster Defence Regiment
UUP Ulster Unionist Party
UVF Ulster Volunteer Force
YAF Young Americans for Freedom
INTRODUCTION

Abandoning the misconception that women are only victims, feminists have reported the plenty of women that participate now, and in the past, in what we can classify as terrorist acts. However, if you start to do research on gender and terrorism, the first results will give you a ruthless and aggressive image of the female terrorist (Gentry, 2004). Traditional literature hence tends to show you the example of Mata Hari (Elshtain, 1991), a famous exotic dancer and spy during WW1, mostly known for her beauty rather than her political and diplomatic skills. Yet, Mata Hari is not the right model for a study in gender and political violence, as she was obliged to be a secret agent and her motivations for such a role were purely economic. Classic association between women and violence inappropriately depicts them as *femme fatale*, dangerous and always sexually attributed. Many attempts to explain involvement in terrorism centred on defining a vulnerable demographic, e.g. a set of static and contextual factors relating to the individual that increases the risk of offending (Jacques and Taylor, 2013). Pacifist theories linked to feminism and international relations cannot accept the idea of politically militant women. Gandhi (1930) professed that ‘if non-violence is the law of our being, the future is with women’ and unconsciously relegated women to a perpetual peaceful misconception. Reasons for terrorist acts are wrongly associated with emotions rather than ideologies, as if women could not bear and have a political identity. Researchers who are convinced that women act more emotionally than men tend to describe female terrorists as people who are particularly cruel and irrational when using violence because they transgress gender borders (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Still, few narratives about women terrorists recognise or even approach them as complex beings (Rajan, 2021). In sum, women in armed groups pass as victims or exaggeratedly abnormal individuals and we can credit this idea to the dominant gender regime, which effectively dehumanised violent women (Grisard, 2014).
However, in the history and bibliography of terrorist organisations of the 1970s and 1980s, therefore strictly during the political wave of terrorism (Rapoport, 2004), many women were members and even leaders of these armed groups. If in real life the representation of women in terrorist organisations was not scarce, this means that academics and journalists have always presented the wrong image of women and political violence. Moreover, since women were gaining their rights and freedoms from the 1960s onwards, they have consequently been actors in the social movements that were formed exactly in the same period. At the beginning of the XX century, we witness the existence of feminist groups and related marches for women’s rights. Nevertheless, early feminists gathered and protested for their right to vote, especially in the United States and in Great Britain. In the mid-XX century, other kinds of feminists felt the necessity to rally and advance demands to the governments.

In the 1980s, scholars like Alberto Melucci realised there was a lack of definition for a sociology of collective action which would have been capable of linking actors and systems, class relations and incidents of conflict. In the following years post-war, people began gathering in social groups rather than around political parties. Groups of individuals with common interests were expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single individuals are often expected to act on behalf of their personal interests (Dalton et al., 1990). From the development of new forms of collective action in advanced capitalist societies to the advent of the explosive social conflicts in the societies depending on them, the 1960s have been the base for the elaboration of a theory about social movements (Melucci, 1980). According to Beck (2008), prior to the 1970s, the study of social movements was dominated by collective behaviour accounts that focused on movements as products of grievances or social strain. Traditionally, scholars have broadly categorised social movements whether as Marxists or structural functionalists. However, after the incorrect appropriation of Marx’s thought by Lenin and then Stalin, the
first classification needed to be revisited. As an analysis of the mode of capitalist production, Marxism defines the conditions under which the system enters a state of crisis. As a theory of revolution, it lacks the analytic instruments required for defining the actors and political forms of socio-economic transformation. We can speak specifically of a class movement, using Marxist terms, namely a movement involved in a conflict over the mode of production and over the misuse and orientation of social resources. It was not completely a social movement because Marxism failed to differentiate between synchrony and diachrony, between structure and change. Moreover, Marxism is no more adaptable to post-war situations, although many movements took inspiration from his doctrine. In comparison with the industrial phase of capitalism, the production characteristic of advanced societies required that control spread beyond the productive structure into the areas of consumption, services, and social relations. The mechanisms of accumulation were no longer fed by the simple exploitation of the labour force, but rather by the manipulation of complex organisational systems, by control over information and over the processes and institutions of symbol-formation, and by intervention in interpersonal relations (Melucci, 1980). In contrast, American sociologists have described collective behaviour as coming from dysfunctions in the system’s integrative mechanisms, including the whole spectrum of types of behaviour ranging from the panic to changes in fashion, from crowd behaviour to the revolution. Yet, equal to Marxist theory, these classifications are both shaped by the ability of their actors and their charisma. Mancur Olson (1965) elaborated a rational choice model to explain the arrangement of groups, which held that individuals will not participate in large collective actions unless their expected "benefits" exceed the "costs" of their participation. Therefore, according to the sociologist, social movements were not motivated by psychological feelings of deprivation or concern for societal goals (Dalton et al., 1990). Instead, we could also assume that collective action derives from resource mobilisation theory, in which political
dissatisfaction and social conflicts are inherent in every society and in consequence the formation of social movements depends not on the existence of these interests but on the creation of organisations to mobilise this potential (ibid.).

Eventually, collective action is always considered to be the result of a strain which disturbs the equilibrium of the social system. In advanced capitalist societies, social movements have challenged the optimistic models which foresaw a gradual modernisation taking place without rupture in the existing political and social systems. After the two world wars, societies moved too fast for populations that demanded everything and craved to receive it in the shortest period possible. This was the counter side of capitalism, which was also the only possible background for the creation of social groups. Thus, new social movements, generally associated with the Left, questioned the emphasis on wealth and material well-being that was prevalent in industrial democracies but in the 1960s they transformed and advocated greater attention to the cultural and quality of life issues that received less attention in the post-war rush to affluence (Olson, 1965).

 Described by Melucci (1980) as crisis behaviour or aggregative behaviour, social movements gathered as a simple aggregation of atomised individuals, facilitated by the diffusion of a generalised belief. Through a crisis, social movements could develop without involving solidarity among the actors, be decomposed down to the limit of the individual without losing their distinguishing characteristics and properties or, finally, orient the behaviour of their members exclusively toward the exterior without reference to the group itself.

 ‘I define collective action in the strict sense as the ensemble of the various types of conflict-based behaviour in a social system. A collective action implies the existence of a struggle between two actors for the appropriation and orientation of social values and
resources, each of the actors being characterised by a specific solidarity.’

But this definition could only describe a conflict-based action collective. To reach a proper meaning for social movements, which is not mandatorily aggressive, we must imply that:

‘Collective action [...] includes all the types of behaviour which transgress the norms that have been institutionalised in social roles, which go beyond the rules of the political system and/or which attack the structure of a society’s class relations.’

For instance, social movements must be characterised by collective action, solidarity, anti-establishment and must strive for shared values. Most theories of collective action attribute the birth of social movements either to the breakdown of the social system or to the formation of new interests or of new forms of solidarity and collective identity (Tilly, 1975). It is not only a question of breaking the rules because it is not just deviance. In deviant types of behaviour, there is a total absence of direct conflict between two actors for the control of some specific resource or value. Furthermore, there are social movements, which are shaken by an ideology, for example a determined policy. Class political movements are thus collective actions not only aimed at enlarging political participation but also directly challenging the hegemony of the dominant political forces and their link with class interests. Conversely to Melucci’s (1980) opinion, a major breakthrough in social movement research came when social movements were accepted to develop and succeed not because they emerged to address new grievances, but rather because something in the larger political context allowed existing grievances to be heard.

Yet, since the 1980s these studies have been improved. Old theorists argued that participation in such mass movements could not be predicted by class location. Moreover, participants were not seeking to gain political and economic concessions from institutional actors, e.g. to
further their interests in conventional terms, but rather a recognition of their new identities and lifestyles (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Nowadays, new social movements combine political goals with more culturally oriented efforts, including a necessary legal inclusion. In broader terms, (new) social movement theory provides now a mainly macro- and meso-level view of culture and identity movements, like leadership, membership and others, helping us to create for this thesis a more in-depth understanding of terrorist organisations (Gentry, 2004). Although being made by groups and collectives, new social movements struggle mainly for the individual’s biological and interpersonal identity. The form of expropriation of social resources changed but the issue persisted as this production continues to be controlled by a dominant class. Defence of the identity, continuity, and predictability of personal existence is beginning to constitute the substance of the new conflicts (Melucci, 1980). Social movements fight for collective control over socio-economic development, thus for the reappropriation of time, space, and relationships in the individual’s daily existence. Even modern scholars have agreed on this point, which links social movements and the assertion of an identity in public life. Citing McCright and Dunlap (2015), ‘of particular importance is how participants’ identities shape and are shaped by movement dynamics’.

Research on social movements is wide and detailed but we can restrain the field topic to the exclusive armed social groups. "Collective political violence" is defined by Edward N. Muller (1985) as deaths that occur from domestic political conflict. Citing Tarrow (1994), contentious collective action serves as the basis of social movements, not because movements are always violent or extreme, but because it is the main and often the only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate their claims against better-equipped opponents or powerful states. Therefore, political violence is not necessarily the “insurgency of the deprived” (Muller, 1985; White, 1989).
‘Since “collective political violence” is perpetrated by groups competing for power in societies, including groups that are relatively advantaged, a death from "domestic political conflict" may be caused by any of various agents, including rebels, state security forces, and counterinsurgents.’ (White, 1989)

According to Schraut and Weinhauer (2014), sociological and social movement research has yielded path-breaking results, among others, on terrorist milieus, on the interaction between terrorists and the state, and on group cultures in clandestine terrorist organisations. However, attention to extreme forms of political violence in the social sciences has been episodic, with some peaks in periods of high visibility of terrorist attacks, but little accumulation of results (della Porta, 2008). Based on this information, we can analyse terrorism considering it as one form of contentious politics and therefore, apply the approach used for social movement theory (Beck, 2008). In fact, terrorist organisations are subject to the same dilemmas and dynamics as other movement organisations and terrorism accounts as a method for creating and maintaining a collective identity. Social movements approach places political violence in the context of other forms of protest borrowing Tilly’s concept of repertoires of action (Tilly, 1978). A repertoire of action describes a limited set of forms of protest that are commonly used in a particular time and place. The idea of standard repertoire provides insight into contagion and spontaneity in collective action. A flexible repertoire permits continuous, gradual change in the group’s means, which may occur through imitation of other groups or through innovation. There is no doubt that a sort of group getting somewhere with the tactic spreads the expectation that employers and governments will be vulnerable to the same tactic in the hands of other similar groups. However, it is also true that new social movements ideology is quite different from that of a politically violent group. Movements are usually open, quite big and spend less time attempting to mobilise and recruit new members. Social movement
approaches have analysed the structure of terrorist groups and patterns of state repression, while research on political violence contributed to the integration of terrorism into the broader spectrum of violent action (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Following Gentry’s (2004) discourse, terrorism studies have always welcomed multidisciplinary approaches, such as anthropology, sociology, philosophy and economics, but have seldomly applied a gender lens or feminism. Terrorism studies remain profoundly unaware of the internal dynamics and human characteristics of their subjects. Often they assume that men and women have a different historical or anthropological relation to political violence, or otherwise, that terrorists are gender-specifically treated by their organisations (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). For instance, female terrorists are thought to be more radical, subversive, and violent than their male counterparts (Pickering and Third, 2003). To uncover the proper understanding of exactly what it means to be a member of a movement and/or a politically violent organisation, the analysis provided by historians about the cultural and social legacies of armed groups and female engagement is not enough (Gentry, 2004). Indeed, similarly to social movements, feminists express organisational identities, although these are not dictated by one ideology or political style (Rupp and Taylor, 1999). New social movement theory, like international relations and terrorism studies, fails to look closely enough at leadership, membership and how gender affects group interactions - all of which are microlevel activities (Gentry, 2004). Without applying gender as an analytical category, one risks considering female violence as a symbol of gender deviance and a challenge to the social order (Ness, 2005; Herschinger, 2014). Hence, limiting the research on armed groups and intersecting it with feminist studies and gender perspectives would be beneficial for a typical masculine argument, which for sure was influenced in the first stage of the new social movement theory by a chauvinist view.
To understand extensively the social movements theory and female terrorism is still necessary to pose the research in a sort of historical framework. According to Tilly (1978), historians treat legitimately the history of collective action as a subsidiary form of political, social, or economic history. According to the “gap hypothesis” of Huntington (1968), social mobilisation is much more destabilising than economic development, generating social frustration and dissatisfaction. Then frustration of its demands and denial of the opportunity to participate in the political system may make a group revolutionary. Then, protests can be conceptualised as elements of the political exchange and, in particular, the bastions of these new protests were the institutions of traditional rank and privilege (Dalton et al., 1990). In this context, strikes and demonstrations serve as the moral equivalent of the statesman’s memoirs and provide evidence of the quality of life among the lower orders (Tilly, 1978). This analysis will therefore start from a turning point, what many have regarded as a revolutionary year, 1968. In Europe, the rebellion in which an existing, functioning group cast off its constituted authorities, commissioned that successor to present a set of grievances and demands to a higher authority, resisted with determination until those demands have been met or until it has been utterly destroyed, then returned to its previous state of submission to the constituted authorities (Tilly, 1978). The revolutionary dimension of social movements has emerged when some groups or issues of the groups become co-opted by the mainstream, risking heightening the level of deviance (Gentry, 2004). Yet, student protestors, environmental activists and even women’s movements were not drawn from the ranks of the socially deprived. They were all middle-class movements, whose members benefited from the existing social and political orders (Dalton et al., 1990). Anyways, before 1968, no organised international movement existed (Tarrow, 1994), hence transnational bound social movements could only be those constrained by scholars, not self-identified. Generally, the rise of protest increased public concern for law and order, prompting the more
conservative elites to choose hard-line tactics, but, at the same time, demands for a more liberal understanding of citizen rights also spread in the society. 1968 was in the domain of cultural and social historians, as for social movements theory, but it has always been confined to historical research. New social movement has developed as theory starting from the students’ strikes. With the same terminology used by Huntington, Ted Gurr in *Why Men Rebel* (1970) presented a model for this new subject in which frustration induces aggression. Even White (1989) acknowledges this passage, assessing that grievances produce frustration and eventually political violence. 1968 as a global or transnational phenomenon is able to explain the simultaneity of the crises that erupted throughout the world (Tarrow, 1994). Moreover, 1968 is the year when modern international terrorism is widely accepted as having been ushered in (Ness, 2015) and according to Gentry (2004), making a connection between the revolutionary dimension and politically violent groups aids the study of terrorism. Therefore, new social movement theory should expose politically violent groups as the social phenomena they are.

‘Politically violent groups do not just come into being fully formed and ready to commit violence. They have a previously formed identity and located history somewhere and a macro- and meso-level understanding of new social movement theory allows the researcher to discover these roots.’

This dissertation will therefore try to reveal a political stance in women behind their reasons for joining armed groups.

Which kind of legacy is there between 1968 and political terrorism?

How much did feminism influence female terrorists?

The focus on a specific past timeframe, beginning with the year 1968 and concluding around the end of the 1980s, allows us to find much material and literature, of that time and also recent. Anyways, being 1968 a
revolution in cultural and social terms, social movements theory should be applied with special attention to the subjects who were part of the revolution and not limited to historical facts. Since women in terrorist organisations were principally supporters, involved in logistics, intelligence gathering, and provided safe houses or mental support (Cunningham, 2003), many researchers settled for this brief role, neglecting in their articles that women were also leaders inside their organisations. This invisibility, wanted or not, makes female terrorists an even more difficult target for scholar inquiry in a field that traditionally struggles with the problem of how to collect primary source (Herschinger, 2014). Anyways, the context of the analysis is new and there will be a need to construct the content taking pieces from different topics, i.e. terrorism, sociology, feminism, national politics. I will often cite the works of Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg (2008; 2011; 2015) as they apply a similar approach in their research. Yet, also the works by Donatella della Porta (1989; 1995; 2008; 2019) and Maud Anne Bracke (2012; 2015) were particularly inspirational for the writings. Women’s experience of warfare is still a relatively uncharted area (Dowler, 1998; Ward, 1989) and my intention is just to unveil the field. Through second data analysis, I will therefore build up a theory of the political violence and female participation in terrorist activities of the 1970s – 1980s through a constructivist approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods will be used since I will grasp numbers and names from past literature but I will apply my personal interpretation to find out the legacies among women and political violence.

Three detailed cases will be presented in Chapter Five, Six and Seven, which consist respectively of the Red Brigades, the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The choice of cases is done on the basis that major studies miss a gender approach or it is not enough developed. Furthermore, I want to test how feminism had an impact on all these different examples of terrorism. The
paragraphs’ topics will be more or less the same in order to let us compare the cases. In fact, they were all active during the considered period but diverged in many dynamics. The Red Brigades, as the Provisional IRA, derive from a Catholic context, while the PLO is from both a Christian and a Muslim reality. The Red Brigades and PIRA contextualise in the European setting, whereas the PLO struggle against Israel and all the countries and institutions favouring it, comprehending even the states in the European Economic Community. The Provisional IRA and the PLO have in common the nationalistic approach, both organisations in fact moved under a national commitment.

The First Chapter will introduce in a broader way the main events and actors of 1968. During that time, the prominence of Third World liberation movements precisely in the heyday of “The American Century” and “Goulash Communism”, with revolutions and revolts from Algeria to Vietnam disturbing daydreams of classless societies in both the East and the West, made it difficult to apply the consensual model of development to all corners of the globe, though not for want of trying (Horn, 2017). Witnesses of the 1968 revolution are the student and in general the youth. Indeed, we cannot find many elderlies among the protesters, especially among those who became terrorists (Jacques and Taylor, 2013). There are political ideology shifts, such as the rise of a new Left. This Left is seeking social change, giving priority to self-expression and quality of life. The core meaning of Left is no longer simply state ownership of the means of production and related issues focusing on social class conflict (Inglehart, 1990). The New Left is based now on post-materialistic values. From this time onwards, the terminology “the personal is political” became used and abused. Women elaborated private issues, like housework and abortion, as political stakes. Some of the most virulent “anti-imperialist” resistance groups of the period in which women played significant roles arose in Western nations where feminist struggles were simultaneously being waged. In the 1960s, wealth
increased but also the size of families due to the second demographic transition. The convergence of women’s rights and mass mobilisation greatly influenced the development of a unique brand of female militancy (Ness, 2005).

The Second Chapter is instead focused on traditional institutions, which impacted in particular women’s lives in the aftermath of the Second World War. Patriarchy has an impact on religion and politics, albeit the social movements advocated the liberation of the mind and the body. Yet, with an increasing sense of individualisation, acquired by the American example, the legitimation of the established order is no more of a sacred type. The growing secularisation of society is linked more and more with instrumental rationalisation. In this situation, the appeal of religion, freed from the ritual and organisational apparatus of the churches, becomes one of the possible components of the new movements. The religious component, functioning as a global myth capable of providing a foundation for the construction of an identity, can become the cultural form of resistance to the instrumental rationality of the apparatus of domination. For instance, Rapoport (2004) classified a fourth wave of terrorism, the most recent one and probably the last one, dominated by a religious ideology. All waves presented a degree of religious influence, but this fourth one address religion as the only reason behind terrorist acts, granting terrorists with a clear-cut identity struggle. Indeed, we acknowledge the Islamic terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, to have committed the most dramatic events of the century, namely 9/11 and the Paris attacks in 2015. Religion had a sort of revival already in the 1980s due to the rise of conservative governments in the capitalist societies and scholar kept targeting women as the most religious devotees.

The Third Chapter contextualises gender securitisation. This term arose in international relations and recognises the interconnection of gender and security issues. For example, the anti-nuclear and women’s
liberation movements of the 1970s embraced conceptions of violence, power and resistance that were often at odds with long-standing currents on the post-war extra-parliamentary Left (Henshew, 2012). During the period taken into consideration, academy finally admitted the existence of women in conflict and war studies. Before this achievement, competition, violence, intransigence, and territoriality were associated with a "male" approach to human relations, including relations among sovereign states, whereas moderation, compromise, tolerance, and pacifism are seen as a "female" perspective on world affairs (Tessler and Warriner, 1997). We start therefore dealing with women and militarism, women and revolution, and then women and terrorism. A paragraph will be dedicated to women and Marxism, as this thought was popular during the 1960s and 1970s worldwide. The New Left indeed took into account the hypotheses elaborated by Marx and revisited them. Yet, feminism has always had a space of action inside Marxism and was developed even in Third World countries.

The Fourth Chapter goes into detail about terrorism. It is still difficult to find a common definition of terrorism, but we extract the principal characteristics by citing the works of notorious academics, like Marta Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman and Walter Laqueur. These scholars wrote especially during the 1980s, so we can compare their articles and papers with more recent ones but always on the topic of women and terrorism in the 1970s – 1980s. Many were the triggers of terrorism during this time. Politics was a relevant issue, as well as nationalism. Nonetheless, in this period we witness a major international type of terrorism, due to innovations in the field of communication, transport and technology. Besides the cases we will cover singularly, it is opportune to cite the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), located in Germany and known for its famous leaders Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin; the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Spanish nationalistic organisation with Iratxe Sorzabal and the
Weather Underground Organisation (WUO), active in the USA and with a Women’s Brigade led by Bernardine Dohrn.

Finally, it is a fact that there are far fewer studies about the quality of masculinity of male terrorists than about the quality of femininity of female terrorists. Apparently, this differentiation refers to the anticipated greater distance to political violence of women in contrast to men (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Gender must be applied as an analytical category to overcome the gender blindness of the term terrorism in political sciences, to deconstruct the political myth of protection and to challenge the myth of an intrinsic second sex (Herschinger, 2014).
CHAPTER I – The legacy and heritage of 1968

1 – Youth revolts

1968 is ideally described as the year of revolution, one that changed the social norms of our everyday lives and that we can perceive closer to our days. From Berkeley University, in the US, to France and the rest of Europe, students were the main actors as they started the uprisings. WWII was the past, and the new youth generation felt completely detached from the society their parents have rebuilt for them. The loss of credibility of the previous generations was expressed through demystification, irreverence, and transgression (della Porta, 2019). New topics arose in the agenda of the protesters. They did not put so much care into traditional family and religion, but into freedom: whether educational, political, sexual, etc. Urbanisation, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction (Huntington, 1968). The economic boom and the interventionist welfare states brought a substantial broadening of the middle classes and an exponential increase in the number of university students (Jobs, 2009), and thus the number of intellectuals who could face political stakeholders. Simultaneously, the student body of neoliberal universities was becoming increasingly heterogeneous in terms of social background, age, sex and country of origin. In the past, only rich or middle-class youth could attend university, whereas with the economic boom universities’ doors opened to the masses. Power was in the hands of a new diversified generation, of youth, which can be accounted as the first global generation (Edmund and Turner, 2005). New technologies, namely communication and travel developments, were at the base of shared experiences, which united youth under the same traumatic political events, consumerism and global music in opposition to the values and spaces of the old static cohort. Key features of what began as a distinctive youth culture (pop/rock music, convention-defying fashion) were welcomed into the
wider culture (Horn, 2004). In his masterpiece, *La Jeunesse, nouveau tiers état*, Jérome Ferrand attributed the events of 1968 to this youth movement representing a new international social class. Citing his exact words, they were “the new Third Estate, who were nothing and became everything”. Huntington (1968) developed a “gap hypothesis”, seeing social mobilisation as more destabilising than economic improvement. Therefore, the gap between these two forms of change furnishes some measure of the impact of modernisation on political stability, explaining, with some limits, political violence. Moreover, it was not limited to Western society. As insurrections spread in Europe, similar revolts were taking place in the less expected zones of the world. Young people were creating an identity beyond borders, ‘emphasising what the Times had called “generational frontiers” over the traditional “national frontiers”’ (Jobs, 2009). Young boys and girls tried their best not to grow and become like their parents, as many terrorists of the 1970s – 1980s revealed in their biographies. It was ‘a period of intense struggle between global uprisings and global reactions, a pivot around which protesters appeared to loose momentum as “repressive tolerance” shed its tolerant appearance’ (Katsiaficas, 1987). The street violence of 1968 was perhaps a more serious test of tolerance on the part of the older generation towards the younger, although in many cases the vicious actions of the police swung sympathy to the side of the student demonstrators (Marwick, 2011).

2 – Politics and election

The events of 1968 seemed to carry the threat of the overthrowal of the established society and could be read as testimony to the politicisation of a whole student generation (Marwick, 2011). The “cultural revolution” was in fact subject to a basic tension between consumerism and politicisation. Protesters were trying to define democratic values, fed up with political actors who appeared stuck in the war settings. Watching the political legacy of the movements, we can affirm that the 1960s are a
turning point in movement experiments with democracy. The notion of multiple goals and participatory democracy merged together and became a common, or “prefigurative” practice, signing a crucial break with communist theories of social change (Maeckelbergh, 2011). Youth were politically very active, as it was in these years that the eighteens gained their right to vote in many Western countries; 1974 in France and Italy, 1972 in West Germany and the United States, and 1968 in the United Kingdom. However, the participatory democracy of the 1960s was messy and confusing, slow and unstructured. If young people were celebrating their gained right to vote in their adolescence age, women just won universal suffrage and this big goal was not achieved in every Western country, i.e. women in Switzerland accessed it in 1971. This remarks that while second-wave feminism started to challenge the patriarchal foundations of post-World War II Western Europe’s welfare states, some countries were still in the process of implementing essentially first-wave goals (Buikema, 2016). Women’s insistence on being included on equal terms within the struggles of the 1960s led to a politicisation of the personal that was essential to the development of both prefigurative politics and inclusive democratic practices (Maeckelbergh, 2011). Rises in feminine participation rates are strongly associated with increasing women's activity in the labour market as well as with attitude changes resulting from the impact of 'second-wave' feminism (Lovenduski et al., 2011). Furthermore, women participated in the movement organised by students, but they remained invisible, as only male leaders were getting public attention. Sara M. Evans (2009) acknowledged this second wave as a radical, multiracial feminist movement that grew directly out of the civil rights, antiwar, and related freedom movements of the 1960s. Participants were diverse from the first wave of feminism, with students being the majority. Young minds in fact were ductile compared to those of the female generation born in the 1930s and early 1940s. They needed to form an identity and thus were more receptive than established adults. Henceforth, even older women and mothers shared the same concerns.
Perhaps these women cannot be called feminists, since they did not participate in organised activities or protests per se, but supported movement ideology, acknowledging the role it played in their life choices and sense of self. Indeed, reported to have high self-esteem, middle-aged women were found to be comfortable with themselves but unhappy with socioeconomic and personal opportunities open to them (Agronick and Duncan, 1998). While politicising and complicating the fixed connotations of the private sphere, second-wave feminists also directed their actions toward the gendered politics of the public sphere (Buikema, 2016), asking for more rights in employment and work-life balance policies.

3 – Family management

The whole conception of family planning changed, opening the path to a new life for women who could even think of being more than mothers. Betty Friedan, a popular feminist emerging in the period of protests, explained the feeling of women, e.g. the necessity to resort to marriage and children to locate an identity and a life. For the first time in history, women were gaining their places in the public sector, leaving their home nests to go work elsewhere. In the meanwhile, men were considering the idea of not being the exclusive breadwinner of the home. 'The first part has evidently been unbalancing the family, reducing fertility and disrupting unions as men and women have struggled with women’s new roles' (Frejka et al, 2018). This increase in divorce rates, delays in union formation and childbearing and changes in the number of children planned to have caused the sociologically defined “Second Demographic Transition” (SDT). Some authors argue that the period from the early to mid-1960s marked the end of the “Golden Age of the Family”, characterised by high marriage and birth rates at relatively young ages, few divorces, and a low prevalence of non-traditional family forms (Oláh, Katowska and Richter, 2018). On the contrary, Van Bavel et. al (2018) state that the 1960s were the starting point for this golden age, as
marrying and having children were almost universally valued and widely shared aspirations, among both men and women. The economic explosion that characterised the post-war assets was determined by growth in education and the welfare state, seen also in the increased number of females attending university and participating in the workforce. However, education and fertility were inversely proportionated and culturally, women were not supposed to combine their family roles with a professional career. Even more, women holding higher academic qualifications were rare and typically had low marriage and fertility rates. A focal change in the demographic setting was the invention and, more than that, the widespread diffusion of the contraceptive pill. On the one side, female emancipation was facilitated by new techniques of contraception and abortion but, on the other hand, it derived above all from the growing sense of personal autonomy and independence among women (Shorter, 1973). A structural shift in the economy and society of the first half XIX century start to free young, lower-class women as regards their sexuality and then reached the older and more prosperous women. Saying that, emancipation in the absence of birth control resulted in the upward bound of fertility, while emancipation in the presence of birth control elicited fertility decline. Female emancipation involves in conclusion the replacement of women subordination with independence (ibid.). Nevertheless, the past presented a different lane. In the middle of the twentieth century, a baby boom interrupted the decades-long decline of fertility dating back to the nineteenth century (Van Bavel et al., 2018). The expected implication of the diffusion of contraception was fertility decline and postponement, whereas the opposite occurred. A marriage boom was first identified as people tended to marry sooner and consequently have children at young ages like in the golden era. Even if there is no conclusive, generally accepted explanation for the phenomenon, explanations based on increasing opportunities for the cohorts coming of age after the Great Depression are plausible. Parents of the baby boomers started to limit their family sizes and
invested more in the education of their offspring, but this tendency was not applied by the following generation, who went against every foreseen prediction of sociologists and demographers. Surprisingly, education and fertility both expanded. Even a highly educated cohort of women presented high fertility levels. A new demographic regime manifested, in which pursuing a professional career after obtaining advanced education could be combined with motherhood thanks to family size limitations. It is also true that divorce was a reality, but practically marital dissolution was infrequent. This combination enabled subsequent changes in family life, leading to the gender revolution (Goldscheider et al., 2015), but not in the short term. Nonetheless, final conclusions to address this paradox are not agreed upon. Both ideas of fertility decline and baby boom are valid, but we can see why the ’68 is blamed for the disintegration of traditional family structures (Klimke and Schaloth, 2008). It was the first step in women’s role evolution in life. Yet, while it challenged traditional constructions of manhood (militarism, financial success, the trade-off of sexuality for the responsibilities of marriage and family), the revolt of sons against the authority of their fathers and the patriarchal rigidity of traditional institutions did not defy the hierarchies of gender (Evans, 2009). There is a difference between powers, therefore between what sons could protest against and what daughters could strike for. Even though, infamous ’hippies’ were used to exchange the concepts bound to gender and sex. Boys wore long hair and tight trousers, and girls cut their hair short and wore masculine clothes. They became the target of the police as if they were disrupting the ordinary world in which everybody was living. Past examples from the US, Mexico and Germany showed that the policemen were used to facing male protesters by blocking them and cutting their hair. Sexual freedom was meant to contrast militarism and the traditional conflict asset. The slogan ’make love. not war’ reflected the close, but veiled association between gender, or better sexuality, and violence. There should be stressed a distinction between sex and love at this point. Love in the strict romantic sense was an exclusive Eurocentric
concept, i.e. German romantic movement, Provencal poetry. It was only during the 1960s that some scholars argued that the feelings and conceptions of courtly love were universally possible in any time or place and at any level of society (Passerini, 2004), creating consequently a discourse on ‘double love’ connected to the postulate of free love. The 1960s youth culture was indelibly associated with sex and drugs, which can very nearly be explained by the key notion of “Having a Good Time,” mixed in with the prevailing ideas of experimentation and challenging authority (Marwick, 2011). Hippies adopted the principles of the anarchist movement of the XX century: non-conformity, creative individuality and mutual aid (Tomasi, 2020). As even Wallerstein (1989) suggested, it would have been hard to miss the centrality of sexuality to the world revolution of 1968. The expression of “political eros” (Marcuse, 1955; Katsiaficas, 1987) is pretty accurate and denotes the relevance of sexual freedom integrated with the political campaigns as well since the Greek term ‘eros’ symbolises passionate and desired love.

4 – The New Left

‘Key ideological circumstances were a revival of wartime aspirations as recovery gave way to affluence and some aspects of the Cold War faded; strong reactions, particularly, but not exclusively among young people, against the conformist practices and taboos of the fifties, new developments in Marxism, especially those combining Marx with Freud; yet, at the same time, a revived emphasis on the liberal principles of democratic rights and due process’ (Horn, 2004). Anyways, more relevance was given to the New Left movement. This ‘New Left’ erupted as something completely original, inasmuch it was directed against both capitalism and real world socialism, against both authoritarian power and patriarchal authority (Katsiaficas, 1987). It was not a communist-inspired movement, but it did arise during the Cold War, and it was not a strictly political revolution. Sociologically speaking, the "ideology" of the new left was not a set of beliefs, theories, or concepts, but a critical,
questioning attitude toward the world (Stryker, 1993). It encompassed politics, the social sphere, economy and went beyond these basic categories. Slavoj Žižek (1994) claims that this insurrection was against what organisers perceived to be the three pillars of capitalism: factory, school, and family, but never embodied a revolution in the Marxist way. Some New Left leaders thought that if their own violent actions could provoke an extreme “capitalist” response, this would bring an end to the “bourgeois” society (Horn, 2004). In particular, these individuals contributed greatly to the destructive aspects of the Cultural Revolution but were of least long-term historical significance, albeit developed the wave of terrorism that will be debated in this thesis. The fact that the civil rights movement and the New Left were not traditional, centrally organised, disciplined, left-wing party formations was absolutely crucial to the development of the women’s liberation movement (Breines, 1979). Even though, some feminists argue that the second wave of feminism was a reaction to the sexism of the civil movement and the New Left itself. As Hanshew (2012) reports, Left feminists insisted that the overthrow of the repressive, capitalist system had to begin at home, with the “internal dictatorship” between men and women, husbands and wives, parents and children. The second wave of feminism, and in particular women’s revolts of the 1960s, began as conflict within student movements themselves. Evans (2009) states that the American left-wing student association reflected sexual stereotypes in the society and embraced the heritage of the feminine mystique, citing Betty Friedan’s most popular workpiece title (1963). The term ‘second wave’ in feminism stands for the resurgence of this ideology as a social, cultural and political movement; a sequel to the first wave where female activists fought to gain their right to vote. 1968 is indeed also the year of the Women’s Liberation Movement. Given the direct link between 1968 and subsequent feminist activism, at first glance, it is surprising to discover the absence of gender as a category of analysis in the vast majority of secondary as well as primary (Evans, 2009). Research on the interconnection between the feminism of the
second wave and the events of 1968 is missing, even if the links are
evident. Almost all books about the New Left note a turning point or an
ending in 1968 when the leadership of the movement turned toward
militancy and violence and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) as
an organisation was collapsing (Klatch, 2001).

5 – US students organisations

Social movement strikes and 1968 are broadly associated with the United
States. Here the largest and most prominent youthful left-wing movement
at the national level was the Student for a Democratic Society (SDS),
which countered the right-wing group of the Young Americans for
Freedom (YAF). In the 1930s, SDS existed under Student League for
Industrial Democracy (SLID), the first youth movement to organise
students to participate in protesting political, military and social issues
of the day. It is believed that the SDS grew out of the New Left movement,
trying to give order to a confusing political stand, which was represented
by American Socialism. Nevertheless, there is no agreement on which
movement arose first but clearly both waves diffused soon and widely in
the world. University towns constituted radical islands, where mostly
middle-class students could act out their dreams in splendid isolation
from the rest of their respective lands, providing a spectacle on television
screens (Horn, 2017). Many SDS groups were formed in several North
European countries as well. Still, the student group was originally and
formally institutionalised by Tom Hayden, who proposed to improve the
organisation of the students’ association to make it suitable for national
politics. In 1962, SDS held a meeting in Port Huron, Michigan, to decide
the fate of the organisation. The future Statement took its name from the
city of the event and became a sort of Manifesto to awaken the current
generation of youth. SDS, as a communist-inspired movement, express
concern about the United States being sidetracked in the competition
with the Soviet Union. Following previous philosophies and precedent
revolution mottos, i.e. the 1871 Paris Commune, they stated that “men
have an unrealised potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity” (Students for a Democratic Society, 1987) and these forces can be maximised only through a system based on participatory democracy, e.g. a means of transforming powerlessness into shared competence and responsibility (Breines, 1979). SDS should have been "a surrogate family where [...] horizontal relations of trust replaced vertical relations of authority" (Port Huron Statement, 1962). Nonetheless, the early Sixties do seem almost innocent in contrast with the later years. As the director of the FBI at that time, J.E. Hoover wrote, the SDS changed rapidly and perceptibly. It became more militant, more hostile, more anti-everything (Hoover, 1969). In the spring of 1968, SDS was a spearhead in the violent student demonstration at Columbia University, born in response to the attempt to assassinate the German SDS leader Rudi Dutschke with protests against Springer offices in Rockefeller Center in New York (Gassert et al., 1998). That academic year saw further violence on many campuses, including the conviction of an SDS member at a Midwestern university under the federal sabotage statute for attempting to bomb a Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) building on campus. However, not only in the US but even in Europe the SDS movement was changing means and actions. In West Germany, based on the urging of radical Italian and French delegates and of American deserters, the local SDS devised a plan to storm the US Army's McNear Barracks in Berlin to provoke a mutiny of US soldiers (Gassert et al., 1998). The previous year, L’Innovation, a department store in Brussels, was burned down causing the death of nearly three hundred people and, according to Marwick (2011), the declared aim was to attack consumerism. Nevertheless, the shift to a strategy of revolutionary armed struggle marked the students’ decline as a viable social movement (Stryker, 1993).

6 - The European events
Mark and vor der Goltz (2013) stress the transnational sense of the 68er movements and the fact that emphasis has always been put on western and northern countries solely. Although socialist ideas have spread widely in the West, their impact on the East side and Global South has been marginalised but affected massively these countries. The New Left raised also issues that had never been central to the theoretical debates among Marxists (Gassert, 1998). Even Eastern European states were impacted by student movements and New Left ideology, signing an emergence of new possibilities for exchange between democracies and dictatorships. Václav Havel, the Czech writer and future president, was in New York in May and June 1968, witnessing the protests and occupations at Columbia University and spreading the movement to his home country. Yet, it was the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 that politicised Czechoslovak students as never before (Horn, 2004). However, what really allowed Czechoslovakia to be part of this global revolution is the modernisation period that led to the Spring Prague. Previously banned books went on sale; films from the West arrived in cinemas; students packed their bags and travelled West for the first time, and the previously ignored communist newspapers turned into lively forums of debate. Consequently, in East Germany there were demands for "Freedom for Vietnam-Freedom for Czechoslovakia". However, besides decolonial studies, there is a wide difference in American and European literature concerning the feminist movements of the 1960s. First of all, European literature lacks consistent research on the consequences of 1968 and women’s emancipation. Concerns, as Stryker (1993) admits, are in most existing literature on the New Left and the ideological polarisation of American society in the 1960s. It demonstrated the irrelevance of Marxist-Leninism in contemporary social movements in the United States since the European equivalent couldn’t but deal with communism by analysing New Left movements. The US had many internal social issues to deal with but forced its political capacities and diplomacy to prevent any possible Soviet attack, material, military or
social/ideological. The left-wing milieu of the 1960s and 1970s was appealed to by western European Marxism, the “heterodox kind”, more democratic and open to cultural imaginaries than its eastern European variant (Charalambous, 2022). There was a conviction that 1968 was the prelude of a revolution, and the US feared a socialist one. Furthermore, in Europe feminist movements were active thanks first to the communist parties, where women shook up the patriarchal and hierarchical structures before and after 1968. Therefore, it can be said that women’s emancipation activities were in place also before the emergence of the New Left. In fact, since the mid-XIX century, the Radical Left had spread in Europe through trade unions, political clubs during the period of the French Revolution, anti-fascist militia groups in 1920s Italy, public intellectuals and other ways. Western Europe appeared to stage a re-enactment of the heady spring and early summer of 1936, when Popular Fronts emerged as challenges to the seemingly irresistible rise of fascism across Europe, first in Spain and then in France (Horn, 2017). We can cite different European movements that constituted a ground for second-wave feminism, and they are all interconnected with the movements of the 1960s. One of them is Provo, a group of young people in Amsterdam who used to meet and protest the political and cultural society from 1965 on. Marwick (2011) believes that rather than political activists, Provos were “radical pacifists” with a highly developed sense of fun, who were succeeded in the 1970s by the kabouters and may have prompted the base of the Greens today. The first destabilising event in this specific case was the royal wedding of Princess Beatrix to Claus von Amsberg, a German diplomat who had fought in the Second World War. Provos were displeased that this engagement could have symbolised a revival of the past. More connected to the feminist cause, we remind the Dutch Mad Mina’s (‘Dolle Mina’) burning of bras to pay homage to those who burned their corsets during the first wave of feminism, as even the name recalls the suffragette Wilhelmina Drucker. Students became very active in May 1966 throughout the Flemish half of Belgium, initially focusing on the
fate of the Catholic University of Leuven, but soon mutating into a regional, then national and finally intra-European mobilisation (Horn, 2017). Later in Germany, several youths from all over Western Europe reunited to learn from the militant German SDS (Socialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund). However, after the rapid escalation of events in May, Paris became the leading destination for student protests. France developed the organisation called Situationist International, which developed out of a period of profound change within postwar French Marxism (Bonnet, 1989). Many French philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre debuted all over Europe, together with Foucault and Marcuse. To summarise, in the 1960s and 1970s, the enemy was corrupt democracy on the Left and Right and Stalinist authoritarianism, thus it was also identified in the socialist camp (Charalambous, 2022), in particular among the Americans. On the contrary, the Left was not immediately associated with communism and the socialist model was taken as a starting point for many social movements.

7 – Critics to the New Left

It must be stressed that the white new left occupied the privileged central position while other movements, particularly the black-power and women’s movements, were marginal (Breines, 1996). Nevertheless, we must recognise that the largest influence on SDS’s vision was the black-led Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, as its organisers practised decentralised, consensus-oriented decision-making when registering black voters in the South (Tomasi, 2020). Moreover, the roots of direct action strategies lay in the African American civil rights movement and the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley (Klimke and Scharloth, 2008). Female academics were also fewer than male ones, so we cannot find abundant pro-feminist research. Furthermore, in the two opposite poles’ groups – SDS and YAF – there was a similarity in the internal female division over whether they perceived women in the organisation as being treated as second-class citizens (Klatch, 2001). In
other words, not all women recognised mistreatment or inequality within their organisation, even if they were clearly male-dominated. For New Left male authors, the sixties were over by not later than 1969. White feminist women who came of age during the sixties and seventies, by contrast, still experienced feminist issues as alive and contested, which made the task of representation more daunting. In every instance, women placed a priority on speaking for themselves, seizing language ("on a pris la parole") to tell their own stories, centering their analyses and their protests on the female body, and insisting on leaderless ultra-democracy (Evans, 2009). Even if New Leftists claimed to bring up issues from the ‘Third World’, women in post-colonial countries viewed Western feminism as an anti-male philosophy or a male-mimicking quest for equality (Donert, 2022). Many other authors highlight how women’s empowerment through identification with other women was linked with a growing sense of individualism in Western societies. Neoliberal feminism is thought to be at risk of serving the status quo and, in that process, reducing subjects to economic actors, to servants of capital, encouraged to invest in their own individual liberation and autonomy instead of striving for social justice for all (Buikema, 2016). Another concept believed to be a tool for women’s oppression was the idealisation of women as the only ones capable of proving and valuing romantic love (Passerini, 2004). Second Wave feminism, as critics from the Right and the Left have noted, emphasised self-realisation for women, an emphasis that can be attacked as individualistic but that also proved an important counter to the prior cult of female self-sacrifice (Rosenfelt and Stacey, 1987). Many feminist organisations in the United States and Western Europe attempted during the 1970s and the 1980s to expand the sense of common identity and destiny among women and to politicise that group identification into support for collective action, e.g. consciousness raising, which is a prerequisite to political mobilisation (Wilcox, 1991). Considering Mannheim’s (1970) generational consciousness, we can build a bridge between the two concepts. Anyways, if Mannheim focuses
on generations, the concept was already developed by Marxists as they referred instead to class consciousness. Klein is one of the only authors to analyse the feminist consciousness within the studies of European feminism and defined it as ‘the belief that personal problems result from unfair treatment because of one’s group membership rather than from a lack of personal effort or ability’ (Klein, 1987; Kaplan, 1982; Klatch, 2001). Many Western European feminists reject the gender-blind equality favoured by many American feminists. They might reject marketplace-equity feminism but support a more radical feminism or a social one, in which they promoted a radical transformation of society and pay for housework. In the 1970s and 1980s there was an incentive to protest, but no means to protest because of generational closure and world recession (Edmunds and Turner, 2005). Many of the early female militants remembered their fathers as strong, politically active figures, which influenced their own politically inclined rebelliousness (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Moreover, besides political violence, even female activists of 1968 often distanced themselves from their mothers. Feminists after about 1983 were confronted with a renewed patriarchy that had not only not been vanquished but had co-opted some of the language and values of feminism (Tambor, 2017). Other authors claim that by embracing a politics of recognition over redistribution, women’s liberation movements even helped to enable the neoliberal forms of capitalism that have flourished since the 1970s (Donert, 2022; Fraser, 1995). Although admitting the trap into which second-wave feminists fell, European people, organisations, and practices that were involved in 1960s movements did not all disappear when this revolt period ended, but kept shaping, merging and adapting to time and circumstances. The “radical left” of the 1970s and 1980s superseded the New Left and partially transformed into autonomous, squatter, and commune movements, such as the terroristic ones in Italy and Germany (Maeckelbergh, 2011).
8– The rise of political violence from 1968

Samuel Huntington (1968) pointed out that during the 1950s the correlation between the rate of economic growth and domestic group violence for 53 countries was a mildly negative one of 43. West Germany, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, the USSR, Italy, and Czechoslovakia had very high rates of economic growth and little or no domestic violence. The study of Huntington (1968) indicated that social mobilisation and economic development are the causes determining social frustration, accounted as the motivation behind 1968 social movements. Hence with an increase in these two factors, we can explain the eruption of political violence in the period. Consequently, social frustration and mobility opportunity induces political participation and then political participation and institutionalisation produce political instability. 1968 thus persuaded people to take a stance. The writings of Mao and Che Guevara convinced people that change, and eventually revolution, was possible in their societies as it was in China and Cuba. Furthermore, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud were re-read, deconstructed and adapted to their struggles (Pagani, 2018). Along these lines, 1968 can rationally be taken as one of the crucial years for terrorism studies. It was first this year that the American insurgents launched their guerrilla warfare and Palestinians initiated their attacks to draw public attention to their cause (Agara, 2017). Insofar as many institutions were conservative and reactionary - the churches, the universities, and, above all, the police - they played a major part in provoking the conflict and violence, which are a component of 1968 that must never be ignored (Horn, 2004). Catelli (1976b) deemed armed struggle as either a form of unconscious violence or marginality, e.g. the non-participation in collective action and the estrangement, through the refusal of class rights. In this way, the scholar suggested that if you didn’t side with the collective action, you were excluded from the whole system. If the actor joined political violence, this means that he or she felt obliged to
participate and act in order to grant recognition from a group. Underground organisations evolved within and then broke away from larger, non-violent, social movement organisations (Terhoeven, 2021). In Italy, the large New Left group split precisely on the issue of violence, after having created semi-clandestine militant subgroups, namely Potere Operaio and Lotta Continua. In the US, the Weather Underground developed as a fraction of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) when they blew over the issue of the use of violence, among other things. However, similar experiences happened elsewhere in the world: Germany resembled the Italian situation and in Japan events were comparable to the US ones. As Rapoport (2004) noted on ‘New Left’ terrorism, the 1960s-1970s terrorist movements combined a sense of radicalism with national questions as in the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Corsican National Liberation Front (FNLC), and the IRA. The feminist movement appears to have had a greater impact on changing the image of the female offender than the level of violence in which she is likely to be involved (Steffensmeier et al., 1979). The production of knowledge of terrorism has relied on a narrative structure that pits rebellious sons against figural and literal fathers, a frame that is overtly masculine and familial (Grisard, 2014). Indeed, the study of family relations of militant activists could help bridge the gap between the private (traditional family culture) and the political (protests, and eventually terroristic acts) (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Consequently, this generational frame is equally used to make sense of terrorist acts committed by women. In conclusion, this period of crisis, which can be defined as a global eruption, lasted only three years. The role of youth changed from the past as they were considered less prone to conventional action and more to protest action (della Porta, 2019). The youth was the actor, labelled as a rebel and coming directly from a new social class. However, Gerd-Rainer Horn (2007) points out that ‘1968 was only the latest instalment in a long series of unpredicted and unpredictable popular insurrections which have, time
and time again and in a great variety of historical contexts, attacked privilege, autocracy, and hierarchy in the name of justice, equality and self-determination’. In the Communist world, they fought against authoritarian governments and for liberal democracy, in the West, they fought against social repression, hierarchical structures, the tyranny of consumption, personal emancipation and "true" participatory democracy (Gassert, 1998). The Global ’68 is thus the result of the division in the world system into three different realities: student and worker protests in the West; anti-bureaucratic dissidents in the Soviet bloc; and national liberation movements in the so-called Third World, all of which were fighting for democracy (Charalambous, 2022; Katsiaficas, 1987). And yet this was more than just an expression of transnational solidarity (Jobs, 2009). The New Left movement hoped that a transformation in the cultural realm, the replacement of formal, monolithic structures with alternative and oppositional subcultures that exuded spontaneity and wit, egalitarianism and critical perspectives, would accelerate the transformation of national and international politics (Gassert, 1998). Moreover, 1968, the authoritarian revolts, the student movements and the generational conflicts modelled female militancy in the extreme breakthrough to political terrorism (Stagno, 2018). A whole chapter of this thesis should have comprehended the legacy of 1968 since this has shaped social networking, national and international politics and the mentality of today’s global leaders in their 70s and 80s.
CHAPTER II – State, law and religion

1 – Traditional roles

In a broad way, the 1960s bring up to our minds Woodstock, psychedelic music and free love. In the United States of America, women could look at Janis Joplin and consider her an example, wishing to live her life, sleeping with different men every night and taking drugs as leisure activity. Even if cases like the one of Janis Joplin happened, not all young people during the 1960s were ‘adrift in a sea of permissiveness’ as popular magazines warned (Aidala, 1985). Film actresses and celebrities depicted in newspapers conducted a life that probably none of the subscribers could experience. Furthermore, women were ghettoised, as magazines showed them how to live a crazy and laissez-faire life but then, flipping the page, explained to them the best way to knit, cook and keep the house clean. The majority of women were constrained in a society that had just started comparing women’s to men’s lives. Home remained both the principal focus and, importantly, the place where women continued to exercise power (Eccles, 2017). ‘Tradition’, from a conservative point of view, was linked to the post-WWII economic boom. The embrace of family values politics promoted the idea that the white, middle-class family with a bread-winning father and a housewife with at least two children was the traditional family, the leading and only model, without acknowledging that this recent and idyllic phenomenon was dependent more on one’s class, gender and race than on any innate familial characteristics. Actually, another figure to raise and oppose to the free spirit woman was exemplified by Mrs Jacqueline Kennedy. The wife of the 1960s Irish Catholic USA President JFK embodied the perfect image of the good wife. However, the situation that Americans were experiencing was not reflecting European reality. “Enlightenment liberalism” appears as more strongly entrenched into the USA than in “secular Europe” (Madeley, 2003). The Old continent preserved those values and principles that were characterising the first half of the XIX
century onwards and replicated more the idealisation of Jackie Kennedy. Even if the war settings forced women out of the home and into new roles and responsibilities, the political regimes under which many European countries laid during the Second World War strengthened patriarchy. Dictatorship served itself with single male autocrats to exercise power. Families then reflected politics reinforcing the image of the father as the sole authoritarian force.

2 - Secularisation

The 1960s unbalanced the family structures in determining religious roles. The collapse of the traditional family through the coming of ultra-low fertility in the 1960s and 1970s corresponded to the “crisis of religion” (Brown, 2014), followed by rising divorce, the decline of marriage, rising illegitimacy and the ending of the shame of birth outside marriage. People stopped perceiving their personal or national identity as Christian (Bruno-Jofré, 2019) and we can account for the term sociologists use to define the situation: secularisation. According to Brereton and Bendroth (2001) the word “secularisation” was used positively by people who have been glad to see institutional religion lose some of its hold on culture, and negatively by people who either did not perceive or resisted seeing religion as in decline. Yet, the term confuses critical demands on religion as church structure, e.g. hierocratic structure, with the fall of religion as religiosity, the sense of mystery and the community link, which has value in itself (Ferracuti, 1990). Adding to that, religion was just anticipating the decay of the Western culture (Huntington, 1993). In the 1960s, capitalism took the path to substitute spirituality but, following this narrative, because men entered the public sphere on the basis of gender difference instead of equality, middle-class women did not encounter the forces of secularity directly, or at least in the same way (Brereton and Bendroth, 2001). Female emancipation was, in the absence of birth control, responsible for the upward slope of the nonmarital fertility parabola and for the increase in the marital fertility of those young
women who entered marriage already pregnant (Shorter, 1973). Opinion polls have shown that general acceptance of premarital sex increased considerably between the years 1969 and 1973 and the number of persons cohabitating increased over 700 per cent in the decade between 1960 and 1970 (Aidala, 1985). When in later years sex before marriage became commonplace, it was because a new generation of sexually active young men and women felt their behavior was socially accepted, at least by their peers (Shorter, 1973). Religion and sex were moving inversely in tandem (Harris, 2018) but still, as Evans (1979) states, a woman’s status could rise or fall according to changes in her sex life. Entering the employment world, women start to feel the same men's pressure. Motherhood, for long seen as a female duty, became a profession with standards of achievement and codes of conduct. So existing theories of secularisation do a good job of explaining men's religious disaffiliation and a bad job of explaining the situation of women, until their entrance into paid employment. Obviously, some concerns were socio-economic and others were connected to geography and culture. Religious historians had to witness radical changes during this period when private life and religious prescription developed but still influenced one another. The process of secularisation had a particular impact on women more than on men. Even though, these theories have upheld a norm of masculine rationality, meaning that when men leave religion, religion is said to be dying, regardless of its continuity in women's lives (Vincett et al., 2008). Religion shaped the week and the season (Hufton, 2016), offering sociability for women participating in masses, holidays for special feasts and individual ceremonies to mark the receiving of religious sacraments. From the mid-XX century, women revolt against their assigned role of religious and moral guardians of the nation, rejecting church authority in favour of sexual liberalism and feminism (Brown, 2006). Women stopped going to church not because they suddenly became feminists, but rather because the ideas of female autonomy advanced by the women’s movement made it more possible for many women to abandon
domestic roles, and the churchgoing piety integral to this role (Ambrose et al., 2022). Samuel Huntington in his masterpiece *The clash of civilisation* (1996) opposed the peace prospects after the Cold War end with a new form of geopolitical struggle, raised by religious conflicts. Jürgensmeyer (2021) stresses how radical political movements that include religion as part of their identity and ideology have for instance emerged to challenge the secular state. Some observers clarified that Islam may be seen as the most violent religious tradition fighting secularisation. However, this accusation does not stand, rather the violence is specific to those regions where American and European culture and political power have been rejected and hence the religious sphere should be in second place. According to Rajan (2021), the Western imperial eroticisation of Muslim women has resonated with Western Christian imperial anxieties. They feared being unable to maintain control over the native, non-Western and non-Christian cultures they were attempting to colonise in the past. Western projections of the veiled Muslim woman as sexually dangerous to Western men signified Western anxieties about Islam masculinity. Indeed, Franz Fanon claimed that to destroy the structure of Algerian society required conquering the women. Nowadays, Muslim women terrorists are viewed as *femme fatales*.

3 - Feminine devotion

Females are labelled as more religious than males because of their structural location in society (Francis and Wilcox, 1998; Miller and Hoffman, 1995). The confessional is embraced so enthusiastically because religion is the first site of an important new development for women, encouraging them to reflect upon and put into words their own experiences and hence developing self-awareness (consciousness) amongst devout women. Accordingly, religious participation is considered a household activity, as secularism is based on a set of polarities that place both women and religion into the private sphere (Anić and Spahić Šiljak, 2020). Lower participation in the labour force granted them, or
pushed them, to engage in church-related activities. Religion could give women a space for personal identity and commitment. Since such religions like Catholicism, Islam and Judaism insist on clear gender differentiation, they appeal to women who want ‘to know their place’, be honoured for their work of care, find support in female solidarities, and protect themselves from divorce and male flight from family commitment (Woodhead, 2008). As Andrew Greeley (1990) says, where religion does attract female commitment it is likely to do so because it manages to assist in one way or another in helping women deal with their double dose of commitments. In fact, in places such as Poland, the institutional harbour for democratic hopes following the crackdown was the Catholic Church, which held out traditional gender roles within the family as a bulwark against intrusive and authoritarian state power (Evans, 2009). According to Swatos (1994), the new dimensions of feminist spirituality served to undermine the organised rage of the 1960s – 1970s and cool out the political feminist movement. Some have argued that religious affiliation has been an important limiter of feminism in Europe, although the Italian women’s movement is often described as the largest and most effective in spite of any influence of Catholicism (Francis and Wilcox, 1998). Anyways, we can say that the secularisation process may have started in big cities, and later spread to rural areas, but did not reach women in large numbers. There was still something that prevented them from detaching from religious institutions. Moreover, the process of the confessionalisation in different European societies under different confessional labels was greatly accelerated as, territory by territory, confessional conformity became a badge of political loyalty and belonging (Madeley, 2003). From the 1920s, in Great Britain became common the term “new feminism”, which was represented by a group of women that contrasted suffrage feminists stressing the importance of motherhood and “traditional” female qualities. Moreover, popular philosophers between the New Left activists and feminists, like Sartre and de Beauvoir, rejected Christianity because, as Nietzsche thought, it was too feminine.
Scholars have noted that in rejecting religion as deeply implicated in patriarchy, second-wave feminism uncritically adopted a very Western, and very Protestant, concept of secularism, which saw secularism as the progressive endpoint of a Western rationalist tradition (Ambrose et al., 2022). We must draw a difference from Protestantism here as regards the devotion to Mary, which is typical only in Catholic or Orthodox Christianity. Protestantism is then correlated to stable democracy and higher engagement of women in political discussions compared to traditional Catholic countries (Lesthaeghe, 1991). In another monotheistic religion, Islam, women have been intimately involved as recipients of the revelation and as active participants to the tradition. At the basic level, there is the human female who, as muslima, follows the tenets of her faith and participates in the requirements, rituals and rewards of Islam, albeit in a lesser capacity compared to her male counterparts. On the other level, the most spiritual one, the feminine or ideal woman exists in the Muslim imagination, symbolising virtue and divine compassion, an ideal to which all women should aspire (Eccel, 1988). As for Catholics, Muslims concentrate the feminine dimension into the image of Mary, but also of Fatima, who was the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, offered as complete example of womanhood. The main difference with Judaism instead, is that traditionally women were excluded from the practice of rites, communal participation, leadership and religious education, as even the Torah lack a gender perspective (Millen, 1993). In the XX century, Jewish women belonged to the middle-class, educated group of society, and this factor helped them through theological emancipation. In the US, they participated in mass to feminism and social movements and now we can affirm that women have reached many positions in Judaism that are still a far objectives for the other monotheistic religions. Moreover, there is a belief in women’s tendency to religiosity, which was portrayed upon older notions about female superstition, irrationalism and fanaticism. Women have also outnumbered men in those forms of “alternative” spirituality which have
burgeoned since the late 1980s, and which include the New Age, holistic therapies, and neo-paganism (Woodhead, 2008). Some spiritual feminists have for example created the Goddess movement, which has been connected to the feminist witchcraft (Rountree, 1999). The many women who have left traditional religion, thus, have not necessarily experienced secularisation but may have acquired other, non-sexist spiritualities (Vincett et al., 2008). Social bonding deriving from religious rituals is acknowledged as helping the release of emotions, which is supported and validated by the community (Swatos, 1994). The social structure, which is here presented as the Church, could be replaced by the organisation’s membership, in our specific case of a terrorist organisation.

4 - Religious wave of terrorism

In Western societies, through the secularisation process, religious voices have been replaced with approaches more dependent upon rationality and social science methodologies (Gentry, 2019). Within the discipline of International Relations, the ontology of the state system and the epistemology of security have remained unchallenged as regards Christian realism. Nonetheless, the marginalisation of religion has never worked well in the West (Jürgensmeyer, 2021). This tradition needs to be taken into account since it has many things to offer: some politicians still rely upon it and it takes the power and justice discourse seriously. Christian realism provides people with a grounded theological approach to security, accepting the existence of evil. Before the XIX century and the advent of nationalism, anarchism and Marxism, religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror (Hoffman, 1995). Violence was adopted in several historical occasions, even to move war, i.e. the Crusades and the “Reconquista”. Even if terrorist movements like the Provisional IRA, ETA, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Tamil Tigers are known for their nationalist-ethnic ideology, they do have a strong religious element. We can also feel the legacy of the Christian faith from left-terrorists’ profiles, for instance from Renato Curcio and
Margherita Cagol. For religious terrorists, indeed, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative (ibid.). According to Weber, state power should have the monopoly on morally sanctioned violence. Without the state’s ability to threaten to kill, anarchism would reign. Consequently, any act of religion-related violence is revolutionary because it challenges the state’s sovereignty on the use of force (Jürgensmeyer, 2021). David C. Rapoport (2004) defined four phases of modern terrorism, the last one motivated by a religious stance. Religion is used as a form of identity, declaring the pursuit of religious objectives but eventually goals are political. Hence while the aims are religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political. The use of sacred texts and historic examples leads secular terrorism, compared to other forms of terrorism, to develop a culture of actions and boundaries that restrains the scope of violent acts (Gregg, 2014). Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension. Religion is not a recent ideological trend for violence and terror but found a revival moment nowadays. Besides Western societies, the secularisation that came with European colonisation was never completely integrated. In fact, in these regions ‘people have increasingly turned toward traditional religion to find a resource for thinking about the moral basis for social and political order when secular politics seems to have listed its moral bearings’ (Jürgensmeyer, 2021). Religion enters politics when the old secular politics seems corrupt or insufficient. Religious ideologies take over after other philosophies failed to achieve the desired end. Indeed, most of today’s Islamic terrorists see religion as a means of achieving political, economic, social, and security objectives, rather than as a goal in itself (Badey, 2002). Extreme secularisation can provoke violence in the name of religion. According to Schraut and Weinhauer (2014), religious communities eventually resort to violent means when experiencing political and social isolation and when feeling under threat. With the growing number of incidents of large-scale indiscriminate violence in the
1980s, we can deduct some traits of religious terrorism which distinguish it from the secular one: high intensity and many fatalities (Badey, 2002; Hoffman, 1995; Jenkins, 1986). Rapoport in his studies has focused on Islamist terrorism, albeit recognising this kind of violence in other religions as well. Before HAMAS, Hezbollah and the other Islam-based terrorist organisations of the 1990s, the 1970s and 1980s offered several extreme versions of Christianity and Hinduism, which caught up “true believers” in militancy (Harmon, 2010). The Jewish Defence League operated in the eastern US while in India Sikh sects were active and ready to kill. Religion terrorism is also thought to derive from right-wing terrorism, i.e. the Ku Klux Klan and many neo-Nazis armed groups. Even among the troubles in Northern Ireland, the political contest between two ethnic groups, the Catholic Irish and the Protestant English, religious leaders and images were involved and invoked violence. There are shreds of evidence from the second half of the XX century which show that terrorists are regarded as heroes, or at least as martyrs hence explaining the pathetical use and politicisation of Christian thought and metaphors (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014), but female martyrdom in the Christian tradition has been exempt from political secularisation since the French Revolution. Sometimes ‘the reproduction of normative gender values is critical to achieving the popular support base necessary for sustaining a culture of female martyrdom’ (Ness, 2007), in the Christian mentality as well as in the Islamist one. Terrorists operated on the principle of the minimum force necessary (Hoffman, 1995), meaning that it is unnecessary to kill many, if killing a few suffices for their purpose. Nevertheless, this strategy, accounted to be true for secular terrorism and abandoned by religious terrorism, is already shaky since the late 1970s – 1980s. Thus, terrorism is one of the most anxiety-inducing security threats of this time (Gentry, 2019). On one side, populations are frightened and anxious, while on the other side, terrorists may act rationally but due to social or political frustration. The social isolation of the illegal group contributes to a growing radicalisation of actions and of
thinking. In these situations, ideology, or in some cases religion, can function as media of compensation (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). On the contrary, others point out that de-individualisation often goes hand in hand with a growing dependence on group members, and strong internal emotional ties develop, whether religious or terroristic. Sjoberg (2010), speaking about those joining a rebel group, finds common to the individuals who followed an ideological path the presence of deeply rooted family and/or local traditions of counter-hegemonic consciousness, highlighting the relevance of religion and family bonds. When the conventional terrorist groups and individuals of the early 1970s are compared with terrorists of the early 1990s, religious fundamentalist and new religious groups emerge espousing the rhetoric of mass-destruction terrorism (Galvin, 1983).

5 - Catholic women

Violence and religion are recognised as two opposite concepts. In the debate around the recent wave of terrorism, religion is the ideology moving people to commit violent attacks. However, this stream is often associated uniquely with Muslims, as Islam was the only religion “permitting” violence. Christianity has been depicted as nonviolent and pacific. Nevertheless, when the Romans converted to Catholicism, their religious authority was used to buttress political power and to give religious legitimacy to the protests of political rebels (Jürgensmeyer, 2021). Christians are required to love without expectation and without self-interest, apparently defining a role that can be easily taken by women. The Catholic Church has never exercised a powerful political stance during the XX century, nor during the wars, albeit the many agreements between the Pontificate and fascist states. People realised that the political must have separated from the religious sphere. Nevertheless, this belief was easily achieved for the most intellectual part of the population, while the lowest parts of society still found comfort and protection in the hands of the church. It needs to be acknowledged that
besides big cities, in the county’s towns and the suburbs, the Church was culturally influential and attracted inhabitants through different activities. In France, for example, the weakness and small size of the 1968’s movement in comparison with the US and UK, is the result of the ideologies and institutions of Catholicism, the legacy of Roman law, the conservatism of French society, and the peculiar political history of French republicanism, especially the Radical Party during the Third Republic (Scott, 1986). Usually attended were leisure centres owned and managed by the Church, together with after-work places where workers could meet and a sort of kindergartens run principally by nuns. The secular long presence of the Church in certain countries could not vanish in a short period, even more where citizens could do anything but rely on their religious institution. First there was the family, and second the Church. Moreover, if secularisation was meant to happen, there must have been a replacement ready. Nevertheless, the Pontiff was scared. Times were changing and the Catholic Church had to find something to hold its devotees tight, maintaining its conviction. As Marwick (1998) states, throughout the sixties the Catholic Church tended to operate as a centre of opposition to all the great movements aiming towards greater freedom for ordinary human beings. In 1968, with the publication of the encyclical Humanae Vitae, they tried to uphold opposition to birth control declaring every kind of contraception blameworthy and illegal under their rule. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), called by Pope John XXIII, aimed to align the Church’s institutions and teachings to a contemporary context in order to fortify the Church’s assemblage. It was supposed to bring a revolution inside the Catholic Church. It encouraged dialogue with the secular world, and often it promoted a new “globalised Catholicism”, opening up reforming Europeans’ programmes to inspiration from Latin American theology (Bracke and Mark, 2015). From here afterwards, Catholic social doctrine has turned increasingly to a human rights discourse, encompassing women’s rights as well. Still to understand the commitment of the Church to this cause and to consider
the final purposes of this shift. Moving on, in fact, communications by
the Catholic Church became more strategic. This is what Pope John Paul
II stated in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (1995):

In transforming culture so that it supports life, women occupy a
place, in thought and action, which is unique and decisive. It
depends on them to promote a ‘new feminism’ which rejects the
temptation of imitating models of ‘male domination’, in order to
acknowledge and affirm the true genius of women in every aspect of
the life of society, and overcome all discrimination, violence and
exploitation.

Interpretation of this new Catholic approach to gender was given by many
‘new feminist’ theologians, who argue to be able to find a compromise
between gender equality and religious commitment. In this sense, men
and women together make up the bride of Christ, which means that men
in this regard are called to ‘femininity’ no less than women (Hallonsten,
2011). Nonetheless, the Roman Catholic Church has always defended a
traditional stand on gender, although Pope Wojtyla’s words were
promising. Following what Ginsborg (2000) claims, the duty of the
Church is to defend itself, as well as Christian families, from the hostile
interference of modern states. Even if males and females share the same
rights and enjoy the same social and cultural life, as they are called to
contribute to the apostolate of all the baptised, there is an implicit
subordination of women (Hallonsten, 2011). What the 1960s movements
were bringing up was a sense of individualism that the church wanted to
avoid. Families are the core of Christianity and the single person could
not exemplify family in a Christian way, i.e. a natural form of social
institution. In the view of the Church, egoism and materialism were
coming to take the place of Christian duty and filial piety (Ginsborg,
2000). Eve was created from Adam’s rib, aimed to be a ‘helpful mate’
(Genesis 2-3) and the image of Mary preserved women from rebelling
against their subordinate condition, perpetrating chastity and purity.
Catholicism places the Virgin Mary on a very high pedestal so that it is extremely difficult if not impossible for women to leap into knowing and understanding their own female identity (Keary, 2011). In her analysis of radical Basque nationalism, and comparing the Irish Republicans too, Hamilton (2007) underlines a strong tradition of Catholicism and Marian worship in these societies, in which the roles of mother and warrior have not historically been considered compatible. In 1967, Pope Paul VI, probably inducted by the pending nuclear war and protest movements, accepted violence in his encyclical “Populorum progressio”, in case of an evident and prolonged tyranny that threaten fundamental human rights and endanger the common good of the nation (Panvini, 2012). The just war tradition, says Elshtain, constituted men as "just Christian warriors, fighters, and defenders of righteous causes". However, there is an exception, namely Jean of Arc, the only young heroine that Catholicism counts. Women, being more emotional, are thus supposed to take instinctive decisions, justifying in this sense violent acts. Because ‘most of the time emotions link us to items that we regard as important for our well-being’ they have a particular impact on notions of personal security (Nussbaum, 2003).

6 - Motherhood

Citing Anne Oaktley, all women need to be mothers, all mothers need their children and all children need their mothers (McGlynn, 2000). Simplistically, motherhood constitutes the normative notion of family and love was supposed to be the glue keeping it all together by ensuring the identity of interests of the spouses (Rubio-Marín, 2015). Every country has reacted to secularism, with its time, more or less open to modernity. Accordingly, the quality of welfare state services varies enormously among European countries. Even France, popular for its struggle for laïcité, had long preserved the religious stereotype of family. Later on, in France and in Sweden, for instance, the acceptance of an activist state in family affairs and the weak role of organised religion in politics created
approval for both wage-earning mothers and state policies to support them. On the contrary, in the Netherlands and in Germany there was stronger opposition to both government family policy and shifting gender roles, reflecting in part the greater influence of organised religion on both politics and society (Morgan, 2006). In the same context, great relevance assumed the fight for abortion right in the 1970s in many European countries, from the most Catholic ones to the most liberal ones, like Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, Germany and others. Conservative institutions and the Church opposed harshly and the female body became a political matter. As the interdiction of abortion was based on an "official" public consensus, the attempt to break with this accord immediately became an international phenomenon (Horn, 2004).

However, in this specific case as in others, ideologies did not cause violence but simply provide an effective means of polarising populations (Badey, 2002). Terrorism arises from an exaggeration of political - or religious or nationalistic - mobilisation. Women did not become terrorists because they struggled and militarised for abortion rights. The New Left terrorism which developed in the 1970s in Germany, France, Italy or even Japan was an array of movements in which men and women participated as equal partners (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). However, equality was intended within the limits of traditional patriarchal values. Men, being aggressive, could kill and plot political violence, while women, caring and nurturing the protection of their loved ones, could kill just in defence of someone. The narratives of the 1970s showed that women could engage in terrorism and violence besides their emotions. Women were ‘weepers, on occasions of war, and keepers of the flame of nonwarlike values who cannot effectively fight the mortal wounding of sons, brothers, husbands, fathers’ (Elshtain, 1985). It has been argued that wage-earning mothers create latchkey children who become tomorrow’s delinquents and social misfits (Smart, 1979). Changing sex role definitions that encourage direct competition of women with men in the worlds of work, education, social activity and sports corresponded also to great participation of women in
traditionally male-dominated, violent kinds of crime (Steffensmeier et al., 1979). Criminality in women became the focus of considerable concern because, in their role as mothers, they were identified as the biological source of crime and degeneracy (Zedner, 1991). According to Åhäll (2012), we cannot understand female agency in political violence without paying attention to motherhood. Violent women inspired by motherhood are not considered responsible for their actions because they are women (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). In terrorism, mothering violent men is mothering no less. Ulrike Meinhoff represented an example: she was a mother of two when she militated for the RAF but took part actively in the deadly activities too. Women, more than being recognised as combatants, were the mothers of the “fighters” and, sacrificing their children to the struggle, they garnered a great deal of respect for their sacrifice (Cruise, 2016). This constitutes women’s heroism, which is measured in terms of their life-giving capacities, since the more children/soldiers a woman gives birth to, the more significant her heroism. In this sense, we can say that motherhood plays the role of a “weapon” (Åhäll, 2012). In the armed groups, women were thus expected to take care of the revolutionaries, as if the militants were their children. As Mia Bloom (2011) observed, even in the case of suicide terrorism, female suicide bombers in Palestine are often described as chaste wives and mothers of the revolution. Women’s participation in violence has been claimed to be connected with their maternal nature.

7 - International law constraints to gender equality

As constructed primarily in the early years of the Industrial Revolution and lasting until the mid-twentieth century, the traditional family was defined in direct contrast with the world of the marketplace, thus delimiting a second-order private sphere for women (Rubio-Marín, 2015). A regulating element of the sexual order, family policies and the question of reproduction has always played an important role in the discourse on the relationship between state/law and the individual’s self-
determination (Horn and Kennedy, 2004). Hence women's opposition to the continued illegal status of abortion in the 1970s can be seen as a challenge to the sexual order as such. Until the legal reforms that took place between 1965 and 1975, State governments did little to legally enhance gender equality and emancipate women. Legal cases showed that during the 1970s husbands could still control their wives' incomes and forbid them to take up paid work positions (Anić and Spahić Šiljak, 2020). Furthermore, female adultery remained for long punishable and reparatory marriages were widely accepted and encourage in case of rape. Restrictions to abortion were relaxed in France in 1974, while the Italian government legalised abortions in 1978. In 1970 divorce was made possible in Italy, causing challenges with the Catholic Church, and in 1975 a new family code finally established parity between husband and wife, as well as between children born in and out of wedlock. Instead, in Ireland, the principle of marital indissolubility remained in the constitution until 1995, always due to Catholic opposition. However, the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe was probably the more restrictive regime. For example, in 1973, the Hungarian government introduced a new population policy, which aimed to increase fertility rates imposing a three children family as a model. From an equal rights perspective, the version of Shariah law upheld in many national statutes is problematic nowadays as well. Laws in many Muslim countries are based on non-critical interpretations from ten or more centuries ago rather than on the modern context and its challenges (Anić and Spahić Šiljak, 2020). Nonetheless, even in European states, where the leading religions are Christian, these newly gained women's rights were applied on paper, but not urged in reality. Family law reform, like other political conflicts, revolves around the struggle for power (Htun and Weldon, 2011). Until the last quarter of the century, therefore, formal equality between the sexes in the public sphere masked the lack of equal rights in the home (Ginsborg, 2000). Following Goldfarb’s (1997) discourse, ‘if the existence of feminism depended only on the existence of gender injustice, and the need to
address it, feminism would be a thriving enterprise in Central Europe and this injustice did not disappear during the democratic transition, but rather intensified’. Feminists may face several struggles in their battles at the national level, considering that they are identified as guardians of the culture and traditions. As Tessler and Warriner (1997) argued concerning the US, ‘reforms relating to women may be judged injurious to nationalist efforts to protect or unify the community’. Worse is the situation in which nationalism and national identity are influenced by religious fervour. Yet a number of feminist studies have identified gender as a theoretically important aspect in the calculus for understanding interstate conflict (Caprioli, 2005). Therefore, traditional gender concepts cross national and even religious cultural borders and have an impact on the whole of terrorism studies. Speaking in particular about laws and rules, constitutionalism in Europe after the Second World War was interpreted as a mix between continuity and progressive change but had not yet enfranchised women. Parliaments, police, courts, prisons and every other state organisation are in fact masculine institutions that produce and disseminate gendered knowledge of terrorism. Women also appear relatively rarely before the courts, as for years it was difficult to accept that even females could commit crimes. During the 1970s, with the peak of female participation in armed groups, there were several reported cases of lawyers attempting to reduce or eliminate charges against women by arguing that they were ignorant girlfriends or wives of male militants, or simply “by reason of their sex” (Hamilton, 2007). Alexander and Turkington (2019) cite in their research a 2015 study of felony cases that found that women were 58 percent less likely to be sentenced to prison than men, and that judges were inclined to treat female defendants differently when they conformed to traditional gender roles. Nevertheless, whether the women’s liberation movement has actually caused an increase in female criminality and given rise to a new female criminal has rarely been questioned, although statistics showed an increase in arrests and female commitment to violence after WWII. The
benefits of women’s rights seem to occur in the case of domestic terrorism, but not transnational terrorism (Harris and Milton, 2016).

8 – Conservative feminism

Throughout the 1970s, left-wing radicalism and political violence, protest movements, the impact of trade unionism and the rise of alternative politics paved the way to a narrative of de-politicisation and growing individualism. In fact, across Europe in the 1970s, the Left movements retained an immense influence on the transformation of sexual norms and practices. Conversely, some scholars advocate and label that period as “red decade” or “bewegtes Jahrzehnt” because of the high level of politicisation. The novelty of feminism as an ideology, the novelty of autonomous women’s organising and, perhaps most significantly, the absence of a sizable female working class precluded any real influence on the politics and positions of the Left organisations’ (Moghadam, 2018).

Clearly, the impact of a consumeristic society was more vivid in the US, where also a focus on the self was higher. In addition, in the Western cultural imaginary, consumers were generally seen as passive and feminine (Grisard, 2014). In Europe, countercultural and left-wing political movements represented the ‘seedbed of future crises’ (Ferguson, 2010). The new legislations of those years gave the impression that marriage and parenthood were going to be strengthened by the elimination of old constraints, but in the 1980s all institutions were in the dock, accused of failing to live up to the “Great Expectations” (Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1987). The 1970s also witnessed the decline of supporting cultures of socialism (Papadogiannis and Gehrig, 2015) and, consequently, it turned out that parenthood was still valued by a large majority of the European Community population despite the shift towards tolerance of non-conformism. Plans deriving from the 1968 protests were not actualised and the dialectical relation between defeat and ‘mourning’, on the one hand, and self-celebration by former protest leaders on the other, nurtured a series of silences (Hajek, 2018). Since
the ability of a transnational society to achieve these aspirations increased much more slowly than the aspirations themselves, a gap developed between aspiration and expectation, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspirations function and the level-of-living function (Huntington, 1968). Although proposals made for change were not concretised, we shouldn’t blame the system, because the emancipation idea of movement was promoted by a group of people, who were almost entirely composed of white men. The core characteristics of secularising modernity were mainly driven forward in the public arena by men, while women were positioned as the irrational others of this process (Vincett et al., 2008). Generation, as a sociological model of classification, became “a hegemonizing narrative” which provoked 'a reluctance to investigate other forms of conflict: gender conflict, religious conflict, industrial and class-based conflict' (Bracke, 2012). Terrorism, which had been characterised by Left-wing ideologies, reasserted Right-wing goals that were pursued only in another case, e.g. in the decades of the two World Wars. The sub-category of Socialist/Marxist terrorism, although active during the Cold War, has been declining since the 1980s, being replaced by a religious wave categorised as a new breed of right-wing terrorism (Gregg, 2014). Although women gained their entry into the public sphere, e.g. the labour market, due to this conservative shift they had to improvise techniques in which they took on new roles while still adhering to the gender dictates of the dominant social structure (Ness, 2007). Tambor (2017) claims that feminists in the Eighties were confronted with a renewed patriarchy that had not only not been vanquished, but had co-opted some of the language and values of feminism. For instance, women manifested frustrations in attempting to combine motherhood and work. In the book *A Lesser Life*, Sylvia Hewlett complains that the 1980s provided no progress in terms of gender equality as bleak economic conditions and lack of family support policies American working women encounter in contrast with those in advanced industrial European societies were mediocre (Rosenfelt and Stacey, 1987). Nevertheless,
women in Europe were not living their best lives. There has been both stability and change, in which the first one reflects the constraining effects of economic slowdown in the post-Fordist era and the latter the institutionalisation of different approaches to the work-family issue. Actually, in several contexts, the early 1980s may be construed as a clear rupture in terms of left-wing politics towards gender and sexuality (Papadogiannis and Gehrig, 2015). Economics was for instance a topic of concern, more than gender equality, and once the financial crisis started, policies targeting women’s conditions were put aside. By embracing a politics of recognition over redistribution women’s liberation movements even helped to enable the neoliberal forms of capitalism that have flourished since the 1970s (Fraser, 2017). In the marketplace, women were “fit” to use their physicality in other forms besides mothering and caregiving. However, economic trends can also explain why, in the 1970s, women of all classes gradually began to mete out violence (Ness, 2007). Moreover, the emergence of female suicide bombers can be traced back to 1985 (Bloom, 2012), whose action is often justified by the supposed disappointment in love and marriage and thus driven to violence (Sjoberg and Cantry, 2015). Hence, the 1980s experience represented a shift backward in terms of female emancipation.
CHAPTER III - Gender securitisation and international relations

1 – Feminism reaches international relations

International relations is a subject that has fascinated many. In this context, feminist reviews have been introduced in the early 1980s, exactly when a shift in conservatism appeared to take distance from the objectives of human rights and social sciences (Tickner, 2006). Feminism could be introduced in the international relations discourse because, as MacKinnon (1983) claims, ‘feminism has no theory of the state; it has a theory of power’, and that is a matter for IR. From 1975 onwards, the feminist inquiry gained legitimacy in the academy (Hajek, 2018; Tickner, 2001), exactly when the United Nations’ Women Decade was launched. Blanchard (2003) affirms that the feminist incursions in this field can be usefully situated in the widening side of the “widening” versus “narrowing” debate within the IR security scholars. Nevertheless, could this new subject be limited to war and conflict in their pure sense? With the forthcoming collapse of the Soviet Union, the apparently settled unipolar world and the plurality of new issues in the global agenda, Tickner (2001) asserts that there have been increased calls for rethinking the foundations of the discipline that was out of touch with the revolutionary changes in world politics. Feminist theories could thus emerge and bloom in this setting. As traditional IR, feminist studies intersect different epistemologies. The first feminist approaches started from a liberal conception and passed through radicalism in the 1970s, postmodernism and Third Worldism in the 1980s, arriving at a postpositivist era in the third debate of IR. We have many influential feminist IR academics, i.e. Ann Tickner, Sara Ruddick, Rebecca Grant, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Judith Shapiro, and others. What these main representatives of feminist security studies have argued is that gender perspectives outline our viewpoint and perpetrate into research a masculine stand. Advocates of realism, as Morgenthau and Waltz, describe power in association with the behaviour of states controlled by
men and not of states per se, neglecting women’s positions in society. As women are always unequal in both economic and political spheres, without distinctions across cultures, gender equality becomes a useful cross-national variable (Caprioli, 2000), even in International Relations. For instance, domestic social factors may have greater explanatory potential in predicting state militarism. Countries characterised by gender inequality are more likely to be involved in interstate disputes and to resort to violence to settle the conflict (Caprioli, 2005). Consequently, the higher levels of gender equality have resulted as reliable attribute of less belligerent nations in recent analyses. Moreover, war has a “productive destructiveness” meaning that it can define men’s and women’s identities and therefore the boundaries of a community. States can legitimise warfighting because wars are fought to protect the vulnerable ones, women and children. Joshua Goldstein (2001) deems that men will fight for women even when they are averse to conflict and have nothing else to fight for. Moreover, production refers solely to sexual reproduction in the case of women. Several evolutionary theorists of IR suggest that wars are fought because men need access to women with whom to reproduce (Sjoberg, 2015). Women’s role is to have children, hopefully boys, who would grow up to contribute to the “cause” (Cruise, 2016). In the narratives, mothers were the real heroes of WWII: they said goodbye with a smile on their lips and a prayer in their hearts (Elshtain, 1991). Related to the feminist discourse is on the contrary the concept of “moral motherhood”, which on the contrary establishes that ‘women as mothers have a responsibility to eliminate violence in the resolution of conflicts’ (Tessler and Warriner, 1997). ‘War produces power, individual and collective’ (Elshtain, 1991) and this constitutes the ground of International Relations. Anyways, the term “individual” itself is barely inscribed in both IR and feminist theories complaining about political action and activity. Yet, “maternal thinking” (Ruddick, 1980) views both individual and collective violence as abhorrent. Finally, citing Francis Fukuyama (1998), ‘the problem with the feminist view is that it sees these
attitudes toward violence, power, and status as wholly the products of a patriarchal culture, whereas in fact it appears they are rooted in biology’.

2 – Gender sensationalisation and violence

In her book *Women and War*, Jean Bethke Elshtain wrote about the *par excellence* dichotomy marking the inequality between women and men in conflict. Male “just warriors” march to war and female “beautiful souls” march to peace. Stereotypes about women assume that they are peaceful and many research studies have confirmed this statement. The assumption of neutrality of gender and the natural pacifism of women permeates studies of political violence, cruelty, terrorism, counter-terrorism and war. Widely recognised by feminist literature is the belief, particularly held in the United States by both men and women, that military and foreign policy are the arenas of policy-making least appropriate for women. Several feminist authors tend to believe that conflicts would be less frequent in a world with political equality or even with the dominance of women. Page and Shapiro (1992) found that in practically all realms of foreign and domestic policy, women are less belligerent than men. Taking into consideration a concrete situation, Mary Caprioli (2000), through the works by Nancy Gallagher (1993), analysed the support for attacking Iraq and she concluded that women in support of attacking Iraqi forces were at 22 per cent versus men’s 48 per cent, and women opposed to attacking Iraqi forces at 73 per cent versus men’s 48 per cent. This survey showed that even with the same goal pursued by the whole US population, namely getting Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, women manifested a more anti-militaristic stance (Tessler and Warriner, 1997). In general, the problem is that women are viewed as the victims of violence and not as its perpetrators. Feminism has defined violence, whether interpersonal or as part of political conflict, as something always done to women by men (Steffensmeier et al., 1979; Banks, 2019). Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg (2015) identified three narratives of violent women: mothers, monsters and sexually-gone-wrong
women. Mothers are seen as excessively nurturing or out of revenge. If a mother commits violence, her instinctual desire to be maternal is seen as enough of a motivation for this kind of engagement. The second type of violent woman is monstrous, evil incarnated with an insane mission born of anger. Female terrorists, as well as other women combatants and criminals, are accused of being mentally ill, mostly to find a justification for violent events. For example, with the intent of demonstrating a sort of (in)culpability of RAF leader Ulrike Meinhof, her brain was retained and examined without any consent in order to demonstrate that a surgery she went under in her past caused her a mental injury, making of her a disabled, crazy, irrational person (Bloom, 2011). In addition, women who commit crimes display a “lack of femininity”, implying that they are betraying their gender (Gentry, 2004). Indeed, a diffused myth about women and violence involves lesbianism, as if sexuality was bound to gender. If women exhibit violent tendencies, they are not women but rather masculinised beings (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). Women offenders are morally charged with having transgressed both the criminal law and social regulation of “proper feminine conduct”. During the “Years of Lead”, when the Red Brigades were a threat to the Italian government, the Communist politician Rossana Rossanda herself pointed out how, in a moment of decision-making urgency regarding a demonstration, she discovered that she could not “escape the feminine” (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2008). Many authors agree with labelling crime and violence as “masculine” activities, albeit they have not investigated the correlation. Other terrorist specialists have instead elaborated the myth of innate female radicalism, which could explain women’s resort to terrorism. Sjoberg (2015) goes further on in tracing a “gender sensationalisation”. Women are denied agency to commit violence or are intended as acting for personal reasons, rather than political. Motivations behind violence are obsessive and pathological in nature. Another narrative is finally linked to sexual deviation. The reality of women’s violence is indeed buried under the language of sex in stories about them (Gentry and
Sjoberg, 2008). Most commonly, recent female terrorists are blamed to be brainwashed by their partners, especially within the recent ISIS/Daesh organisations. What it is told is that a woman suicide attacker would have been rewarded with the right to be the “head virgin”, the “fairest of the fair” (Sjoberg, 2015). In this scenario, if women are not deliberately acting, they are trained and pushed or forced by men to do so. Alternatively, women, being more idealistic than men, might be more impelled to perpetrate terrorist activities in response to the failure to achieve change or the experience of death or injury to a loved one (Galvin, 1983). “‘Real’ women are peaceful, conservative, virtuous and restrained’ (Smeulers, 2015), thus female perpetrators cannot be ordinary women according to current literature. By demonising female perpetrators, a distance between these “abnormal and unnatural” and normal peaceful women was created. Nonetheless, criminologists have registered increases in female criminality in concomitance to the liberalisation process occurring in the XX century and, consequently, have built a link between liberation and crime. Female criminality became an indicator of the degree of female emancipation in a particular society. The challenging of traditional roles and entering paid labour market have therefore freed women in many fields, from the legal to the illegal ones (Smart, 1979; Adler, 1975; Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1979). To conclude, whether or not feminists accept political violence, has been highly debated. Nevertheless, many authors found a justification for violence, although condemning its use. On one hand, there is a recognition of the use of violence with the pursuit of certain political goals shared by some feminist scholars during the last century (Hutchings, 2020). For Ruddick (1980), on the other hand, political violence is not only antithetical to feminist values, but also produces and reproduces gendered relations of power. Furthermore, Kimberly Hutchings (2020), in her analysis of feminist Simone de Beauvoir’s “Ethics of Ambiguity”, notes that the philosopher indicates “revolt” as the only option for the tyrant’s victims, which will take the form of resistant violence. Hence, we can
suppose that Beauvoir supported political violence, but it is important to highlight her move from the individualist terrain of existentialist analysis to the collectivist analysis of syndicalism, which contrasts the popular academic literature on women and terrorism, claiming that female involvement in political violence tends to be highly individualistic due to personality factors, social problems, boredom (Hamilton, 2007). Collectivism is, to be precise, a feature of Marxism. Not surprisingly, Simone de Beauvoir can be targeted as a feminist socialist. Being regarded as the “second sex”, women resort to violence, or terrorism, to free their companions, e.g. as a mean to advance a progressive political project aimed at protecting marginalised and vulnerable populations from indiscriminate and oppressive forms of violence (Jackson, 2008). Companionship is thus another motivating factor in a woman’s joining a terrorist group (Galvin, 1983). For instance, Susanna Ronconi and Ulrike Meinhof "craved love, comradeship, and emotional support” from their mates.

3 – Women and militarisation

According to Gurr (1988), the modern militarised state is ruled by an elite whose policy agenda is dominated by preparations for war and national defence. The police state maintains a large internal security establishment and is ruled by a class that relies primarily on coercion to control domestic opposition and implement state policies. The state institutions, however, are highly gendered and need to be studied consequently. Although women have always been associated with peace, they have participated even in wars and other conflicts. However, their experience is often made invisible. Thinking about World War I and World War II, women were essential in every aspect of society. They continued the work of their husbands, fathers and brothers who were fighting and, at the same time, they provided administrative and logistical support, in particular through their participation in resistance movements. Hajek (2018) cites especially one legacy that the feminist of the 1970s did look
back on, e.g. the female partisanship in the anti-fascist resistance movement, thanks also to a number of publications about the “silenced” resistance that appeared around 1975. The US military intervention characterising the 1991 Gulf War was not only relevant because a large number of women disregarded it. It was also a watershed in gender equality since America deployed for the first time female soldiers to war zones (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). Nevertheless, the US is still on the top list of countries sharing the highest number of women enrolled in the military forces. Data provided by the official US defence website accounts women at 17 per cent of the active-duty force in 2022. Surprisingly, a Statistica report (2021) positions the USA in the second place in the national share of female active-duty military personnel in 2019, with Hungary in the pole position with 20 per cent. While some countries made conscription mandatory for women as well, i.e. Israel and North Korea, other countries like Sweden and Norway have selective service systems, where young people, boys and girls, are required to dedicate some time to the military or a social cause. Even with people in favour of female combatants, there is still gender discrimination within the national armed forces which retain women to take a military career. In Western Germany during the 1970s - 1980s, the government tried to persuade females to enlist in order to keep the number of recruits high. Albeit an opinion poll showed that 71 per cent of women between 18 and 24 favoured this new opportunity in the Bundeswehr, left-wing and pacifist movements protested in masses (Elshtain, 1991). Finally, data is not comparable at all as proper statistics are not shared by many countries, i.e. China. Moreover, some nations still exclude women from combat roles, thus it’s impossible to speak about active-duty female soldiers in these cases. However, according to liberal feminists, the accession to combat roles for women has opened a path to gender equality in the state, with regard to citizenship status and rights (Sasson-Levy et al., 2011). When women used their military contributions to make demands, it was for equal opportunities within the military organisations and never
transferred into a political voice challenging military policies. What Sasson-Levy et al. (2011) stressed is that military service can be a mechanism for legitimising men’s political activism in the public sphere, but it does not contribute to women’s. In fact, the role of the female combatant is ambiguous and ‘indicates a tension between different conceptualisations of societal security, where female combatants both fight against societal insecurity posed by the state and contribute to internal societal insecurity within their ethno-national groups’ (Alison, 2004). Militarism may be defined as the commitment of social resources to the waging of war, but this is true only in the function of patriarchy (Kaplan, 1994). Traditional gender divisions have shaped the organisation of the militaries and the ways in which soldiers are motivated to fight (Sjoberg, 2015). Women were opened to combat roles, especially during the Gulf War, for second ends. As Sjoberg (2010) points out, women were deployed against the Third World, and the Middle East, to illustrate the supposed benevolence, moral superiority, and progressiveness of the West. However, if females were presented as models of emancipation, frequent and harsh were the allegations of sexual violence against women soldiers in Iraq from male soldiers in their units. Moreover, there is a tendency to consider all males - even the unarmed ones - as combatants and women as civilians. Subsequently, many women are victimised and suffer as a consequence of war, but so do many men (Smuelers, 2015). Many modern societies can be considered militaristic, even more states involved in protracted armed conflict such as Israel (Sasson-Levy, 2011). Here, citizenship is structured hierarchically by the republican ethos, which defines the subject’s membership in the community according to his or her contribution to the collective’s "common good". At the same time, this republican ethos, characterising the late 1970s and 1980s period, constrains women’s political voice, which is perceived as irrelevant when security is at issue (Tickner, 2006). This is what the radical feminists complain about: the use of violence and the deeply masculinist culture of the military that eventually depends on the
oppression of women (Enloe, 2000). Maternal politics is offered as an antidote to a male-dominated, militarist culture that privileges the experience of war. However, several are the cases of discrimination against military women being mothers and contemporarily going to war for patriotic reasons. The fate of women soldiers is often discussed in terms of what happens to their children if a mother dies in combat, implying that the loss of a mother is more serious to children than the loss of a father (Sjoberg, 2010). Unlike the vast majority of studies on war and terrorism, much research, i.e. *The Demon’s Lover* by Morgan (1998), puts sexual politics and gender power relations at the centre of political violence, thus obscuring the historical specificities and complexities of women’s motivations for participating in, and their experiences of, armed activism (Hamilton, 2007). Women’s military service, on the other hand, has never been acknowledged as a basis for anti-war protests, albeit the feminist movements’ participation in the 1968 strikes. On the contrary, maternal thinking brought up organising anti-war demonstrations in the name of caretaking (Ruddick, 1980). Subtly, the caretaking woman is exploited for making war, excluding them from decision-making processes and co-opting women’s resistance to conflicts. By "keeping the flame of nonwarlike values," i.e. by caretaking, women may be playing a militarist rather than an anti-military role (Kaplan, 1994). Female participation in political violence could be considered a form of feminist militancy. In contrast to conventional wars, contemporary conflicts tend to “privatise” violence, thus targeting civilians as well and breaking down the separation between belligerents and inhabitants (Alison, 2001). In these circumstances, the stereotype men-soldiers and women-pacifist is no more valid, particularly in civil wars and wars of liberation. Going further, the focus of this thesis on the 1970s’ violence suggests in particular the unclear state-response actions and maintenance of social and security order to contrast the evolving radicalisation of society. Police officers were ready to stop the masses of students rioting outside their universities, but when it came to political violence and enacting
paramilitary policies to block and prevent social unrest triggered by organised social movements, it was unprepared. In Italy, for example, they were ready for “communist-led riots” and not for small armed groups, like the Red Brigades or Prima Linea (della Porta, 2008). Violence against state actors is however more appropriately defined as armed struggle, rather than terrorism (Ruggiero, 2006). Encounters between the movements and the state apparatus produced exactly what the states wanted to avoid: an escalation of violence; which eventually transformed into terrorism.

4 – National and international politics

The year 1968 is mentioned in this dissertation not only for the global social movements. The presence or absence of working-class radicalism in the course of 1968 in Western Europe signed of course a tension between the two powers that emerged from the ashes of WWII. This year marked also the assassination of Martin Luther King, the election of Nixon as President of the United States, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the Chinese cultural revolution and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In this framework, modernisation theorists in the West viewed late capitalist societies as the sole models to strive for and to perfect (Horn, 2017), profiting from the Third World goods and ignoring respect for human rights there. The only war which could have revolted this apparent peace-setting would have come from an escalation of the Cold War. On the other part, Soviet ideologists twisted and distorted Marxist precepts to predict a similar conflict-less future in the socialist East. In terms of relations between the US and the Soviet Union, the period was peaceful. In 1969 negotiations on strategic arms limitations took place and led to the first SALT agreement in 1972. The year of social revolution was even more crucial as the ‘Soviet and US leaders’ pursuit of détente allowed them to repress domestic unrest while representing themselves as international peacemakers’ (Roman, 2018). Yurii Andropov, the newly appointed head of the KGB, opposed J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI’s long-time director. Both
had to deal with internal protest movements, anti-Soviet dissent on one side and “Black Hate Nationalist Group” on the other. What's interesting to notice is that whereas Soviet activists defined human rights in a manner that US journalists considered quintessentially “American” by focusing on political and civil rights, the Black Panthers [...] pursued the social and economic rights that Soviet leaders prioritised, and which US officials refused to recognise as human rights' (Roman, 2018). More interesting, in the 1980s black women constituted over 40 per cent of all enlisted women in the US Army, an unbalanced number if we take into consideration the percentage of the black population. They felt compelled to rely on the armed forces as employment last resort and due to the opportunity to reshape their life (Enloe, 1993; Halloran, 1986). However, if relations between the two competing powers were quiet, they were still fighting elsewhere to support and spread their ideology. In this scenario, many important figures, especially in the discipline of International Relations, operated. From the early 1970s, we can reckon Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor and US Secretary of State under both Nixon and Ford, who promoted the so-called Realpolitik. Furthermore, many events were shaking international relations and they were happening in the Global South as well. To remark is the “Six Days” War of 1967, which signed the victory of Israel over Egypt and its allies and contemporarily observed a critical event in the history of this never-ending conflict. The International Vietnam Congress was held in 1968 too, in particular in West Berlin, and we clearly recognise [it] as the most impressive demonstration of the transnational character of the so-called “68 movements” (Terhoeven, 2021). Despite the really American involvement in the Vietnam War, a wave of mass protests was set off not only in the United States but in many of the NATO countries and beyond (Weinberg and Eubank, 2011). The location of this international conference was not casual. It clearly signed a divide between the Eastern and the Western bloc. However, if the Soviets sympathised with American socialist anti-war activists, neither the US nor the Soviet Union expected
the growth of underground organisations, which belong to the Western society but manifested the violent teachings of Marx and gave birth to the New Left. The Vietnam Congress had also a clandestine side, comprehending various meetings in private Berlin apartments where the possibility of a “third” front was established (Terhoeven, 2021). These secret clubs were brought up by activists who wanted to contrast the American imperialism, as Vietnam and Latin American countries were doing, but through partisan armed groups in Europe. Armed underground units thus started to sprout in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Italy, represented respectively by the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and the Red Brigades. As part of his plan to create an international network for the German student movement, Rudi Dutschke, the spiritus rector of the event, had contacted the wealthy Milan publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in the late summer of 1967 and convinced him to provide financial support for the planned rally in West Berlin. Feltrinelli was also a supporter of the Cuban Revolution that brought into power Fidel Castro and has travelled many times to Cuba to meet this friend of his. In 1967 Feltrinelli’s publishing house also brought out Guevara’s guerilla-foco theory in a new edition and, at his death, it was Feltrinelli who made “Che” an icon for the global protest movement with its most famous evocative photographic portrait. 1968 has been recognised as the formation year of international terrorism, in correspondence with the creation of the Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO). In the 1970s, the political global scene changed dramatically: the military returned to the barracks in Latin America, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, while the Asian tigers, namely South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan, made their powerful entrance into the global market, and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe started to crack down (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). Feltrinelli lately became the patron of an emerging radically anti-imperialist minority, identified with the fight against colonial and postcolonial structures of oppression, which was eventually increasingly prepared to use violence. Thanks to his financial
support and his international contacts, the Italian publisher helped Italians, Germans and then French and Palestinians mingle, making their organisations survive the decline of student protest movements.

5 – Feminist Marxism

To begin with, what feminism has in common with communism is the inclusion of colonialism into their agenda. For example, Eastern Europe has been engaged with the Third World since the mid-1950s, concerning trade, labour training, military assistance, education, cultural promotion and humanitarian assistance (Madeley, 2003). Bloom (2011) also expressed that women in radical organisations have engaged in anticolonial and revolutionary struggles in the Third World for decades. The XX century inherited several forms of violence that dramatically influenced politics and terrorism (Harmon, 2010). Three relevant kinds of violence to mention were labour militancy, anarchism and communism. From its origins, Communism, here intended as the socialism proposed by Marx and Engels, has been more equal than other ideologies in terms of female emancipation. Many statements could make us intend that Marx promoted gender equality. Some hints can be found in the Capital and in a particular letter from Marx to Dr Ludwig Kugelmann from 1868, ‘... great progress was evident in the last Congress of the American “Labor Union,” in that, among other things, it treated working women with complete equality... Anybody who knows anything of history knows that great social changes are impossible without the feminine ferment’. He also appointed a woman, Elizabeth Dmitrieva, as one of the leaders of the First International in Paris, who later became an organiser of the “Union de Femmes”, remembered for participating in the first people’s uprising, the Paris Commune (Monzó, 2016). Famous feminist and Marxist author of the beginning of the XX century, Alexandra Kollontai, argued that the transformation of the family to one that is based on mutual love, equality, freedom, and respect for each other, unencumbered by property relations, economic necessity, or the division of labour, and relieved of
moral or religious codes that have historically been aligned to capital – is absolutely necessary (Monzó, 2016). Indeed, Marx considered women’s oppression as integral to the capitalist production, hence calling for a feminist revolution. Philosophies of class struggle and revolution were drawn as a strategy by Leftist movements through which to liberate peasants, workers and other oppressed class groups (Wood and Thomas, 2017), eventually people of colour and women. Thereafter, Marx claims that class revolution is a function of value changes-class consciousness-which leads to specific institutional rearrangements. As such, women’s liberation in the family, or better the dissolution of the first property relation, was recognised by Marx as morally necessary and by Che Guevara ‘as necessary for the development of the “new [wo]man” – a human being who valued collective social responsibility above individual desires, who understood the value of sharing, social responsibility toward each other, and sufficiency so that everyone would be able to live beyond necessity and instead develop their creative labour for personal intellectual, social and moral development and that of society’ (Monzó, 2016). In Central and South America, Marxist ideology engaged many women in armed groups and especially in combat activities. Marxism found fertile ground in these contexts as Latin American societies were struggling with US dominance during the Cold War, both on the economic market and the political side. We can cite the experiences of Sandinista and Zapatista guerrilla groups, which also counted several female rebels. Furthermore, the Sandinista leadership expressed commitment to female emancipation by calling for an end to laws discriminating against women, for the eradication of prostitution and domestic servitude, and for women to organise in defence of their rights. The situation is different in the countries under the Soviet governance. In Eastern Europe, gender equality was recognised even in early Constitutions. However, if gender equality was a thing, it referred to female labour and gave both concretely and legally no tool for protection in case of discrimination and harassment. Women could leave their homes to work, and there was
some sort of kindergartens and elderly care, but they had no real rights as women. In fact, for many women under the USSR, a life dedicated to the family and the home was much more desirable than enforced public engagement. Broadly, the apparent success of Soviet development policies in other parts of the world, like in Central Asia, was used to sell the Soviet model of women’s emancipation to postcolonial countries, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, which was based on the productive forces of the proletarian chain. Marxism was only a source in the societies of the Soviet Union and thus revenged by feminists. Nonetheless, a growing number of young male Communists in Italy, Spain and Greece in the late 1970s displayed some openness towards second-wave feminism and began to argue that they had hitherto displayed sexism against women in their group, recognising women’s struggle (Papadogiannnis and Gehrig, 2015). Recent scholarship has, however, sought to redefine women’s political engagement in communist parties and mass organisations as a broad-based “transnational left-feminism”, before the era of the New Left (Donert, 2022). Nevertheless, not only women under the USSR implemented and spread Marxist beliefs. In the mid-XX century, Marxism was popular in Asia, Europe and the United States as well. The most famous Marxist feminist is for sure Angela Davis, who argued that women are a sort of “domestic slaves” and widened the feminist discourse with race intersection. In addition, in the 1970s a new school of Marxist thought developed, inherent to the discipline of International Relations. This was called neo-Marxism and can be embraced under the New Left wave, but focused on the cleavage between North and South, building a “modern world-system theory” (Wallerstein, 2004). An example of Marxist terroristic group is to be found in the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), which warred the Colombian government till 2016. Even a movement of socialist feminism has for instance adopted some theories of Marx. Fed up with radicalism, which was too essentialist in defining women’s minority status, socialist feminists looked at differences in men’s and women’s
material existence as a reason for women’s oppression (Tickner, 2001). Leftist terrorist groups have been frequently led by women. Research by Wood and Thomas (2017) demonstrated that women are often motivated to engage in high-risk collective action by their commitment to political or social causes, like men, and that Marxist groups are more likely to include substantial numbers of female combatants compared to Islamic/religious groups. From 1968 onwards, women became involved in terrorist groups, from Marxist organisations in Europe to nationalist movements in the Middle East. Citing Charles Tilly (1969), collective violence is normal and that explains why men seeking to seize, hold, or realign the levers of power have continually engaged in collective violence as part of their struggles. ‘The oppressed have struck in the name of justice, the privileged in the name of order, those in between in the name of fear’ (Tilly, 1969). Marxism is one of the three main ideologies influencing the evolution of contemporary international terrorism since the late 1960s and opposed nationalist and religious ideals (Madeley, 2003). Although women are present even in other ideology-based movements, New Left groups derived from Marx’s thoughts share a huge number of female participation and leadership. Marxist rebellions have also turned out to be likely to adopt irregular warfare as a combat strategy.

6 – Gender and revolution

According to Francis Fukuyama (1998), ‘revolutions and wars are caused by social facts such as economic change, class inequalities, and shifting alliances’. Therefore, revolutions can be said so if they bring a certain degree of change into society. Foran’s (1993) research on revolutions analysis of the 1980s is tied up to states’ vulnerability. Conclusions on this topic recorded higher exposures in states that are repressive and personalistic, or in other words authoritarian. Marxist theories have tended to view the state as simply an expression of class power, rather than as a distinctive institution with its interests and dynamics, but
revolutions have evidently multiple causations (Sewell, 1985). We need to assume that not all revolutions are triggered by an ideology. Like the French Revolution, they can be shaken by a crisis. In this specific case, the Old Regime state was thrown into a crisis by impending bankruptcy (ibid.). This does not mean that ideologies do not define the goals of the revolution, but just that they may contribute consequently. Historically, we have passed through many revolutions: the American Revolution (1775-1783), the Paris Commune (1871), and the Iranian Revolution (1979), just to cite some. The feminist waves of the last century can be viewed as revolutions and 1968 can also be targeted as a modern revolution. Quite the opposite, Marwick (2004) claims that the word “revolution” may seem inappropriate or hackneyed in referring to the “Long Sixties”, and one could more precisely speak of “transformation” or rather “dynamic years”. Yet, “years of contestation” is too narrow to describe what was happening and how these activities could bring change. Revolutions on the Marxist model are simply not materialising while the 1968 movements entailed a multiplicity of such single-topic revolutions taking place simultaneously, reacting and interacting with each other. This period marked the overthrowing of the “Old Left” and the rise of the new social movements which were characterised by a non-violent spirit. Huntington (1968) employed the studies of Hannah Arendt to tie the concept of revolution to the one of violence. She argued that:

‘Violence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic... can we speak of revolution.’

The forms of action of 1968 were initially disruptive because they were unconventional, but they were still peaceful and had moderate aims, mainly claims for reform of the existing institutions (Sjoberg, 2010). However, this was an exception. Quite often, revolutions are connected
to terror as violence is an inevitable development of the revolution’s ideology and ‘as violence flows from politics, and more precisely from political change’ (Tilly, 1969). Conflicts occur in relation to changes in the composition, interests, and relative positions of groups, and so does violence (Sewell, 1985). Terrorism is part of a revolutionary strategy and is manifested in acts of socially and politically unaccepted violence (Crenshaw, 1972). The most known revolution is obviously the 1789 French Revolution, which brought up the “Age of Terror”. Nonetheless, terror was used as a tool in the name of revolution by the Bolsheviks as well (Bishara, 2017). Citing Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of what would become the KGB, “Red Terror” denoted ‘the terrorisation, arrests and extermination of enemies of the revolution on the basis of their class affiliation or of their pre-revolutionary roles’. Robespierre’s aim through revolutionary violence was instead to protect the democracy which had been just set. Terror in these two cases had a cause and was meant to benefit the majority of the population, albeit the use of violence is not legitimate in many democratic countries. Another example is provided by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, addressed as a terrorist group but self-identified as a liberation movement. In fact, LTTEs are waging a violent secessionist war to obtain recognition for the Tamil ethnic minority community. Nevertheless, we cannot affirm that terrorism gives birth to revolutions, or vice versa. A complete revolution also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalisation of a new political order (Huntington, 1968) and terrorism, till now, has not produced a new political system. Still, some authors do not agree with this statement. In fact, Drake (1999), studying Italian terrorism of the 1960s–1970s, labelled it as a phenomenon taking something from both war and revolution. In classifying the different types of revolutions, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) in *The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism* addressed social revolutions and world revolutions. The firsts are class-based rapid transformation projects that build or strengthen states, while the latter are clusters of revolutionary activity and social movements,
including separatist and colonial revolutions. Saying so, women’s role has been neglected in relevant studies concerning revolutions. Moghadam (1997) focused on this and in combining women’s emancipation and revolutions, developed a model of gendered revolutionary processes and outcomes, by which bourgeois, socialist and populist revolutions are classified as either egalitarian (“the women’s emancipation model”) or patriarchal (“the women in the family model”). The first classification links women’s liberation and rights to the revolution’s goals, modernity, or the project of social transformation. The second model excludes women from definitions and constructions of independence, liberation and liberty, and sometimes expressly designates women as second-class citizens or legal minors. Nevertheless, Monzó (2016) highlights that ‘in all major socialist revolutions, women have played a significant part, loudly staking their claim to a better world in protest, agitating, organising, and even taking up arms against the establish capitalist order’.

7 – Women in the lead of a conservative decade

We can say just one thing about women and conflicts: besides Elizabeth I, Margaret Thatcher and other few, they are never the ones to start a war (Elshtain, 1991). Anyways, Ms. Thatcher can be considered a model of her time, being a strong female political leader who has beaten men at their own game and played on the same ground as US President Ronald Reagan and USSR Secretary Brezhnev. Feminists may have been content with a female leadership but, at the same time, she proposed a conservative, right-wing polity that didn’t enhance gender mainstreaming, as it was auspicated in the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, 1985. Anyways, British feminists were advantaged compared to their international mates, because of the European Community’s influence, which constantly monitored its member countries on women’s equality and respect of human rights. Conversely, women’s movement prospects in the United States were undermined by
the social conservatism consonant judicial activism of the Reagan era. In a broader sense, right-wing governance has shifted from collective action to individualisation, accordingly to their view. Indeed, collectivism suits a more liberal stance, taking care of institutions and cooperation. Neo-conservatism in general has attempted to reduce and size the scope of governmental activity by devolving some state functions to the voluntary sector or sub-national levels of government, in the case of confederation. Privatisation of previously public enterprises and deregulation of private sector activity was applied (Bashevkin, 1994). Interestingly, through an analysis of US election campaigns and terrorist threats, Holman et al. (2016) discovered that Democratic female leaders are disadvantaged in a situation where the population feels menaced by terrorism. In a time of crisis, individuals come to place even more value on traits and capabilities that are stereotypical masculine and on which the Republican party is perceived as better. We can also speak about a conservative period because of the decline and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the re-emergence of both the traditional churches and other religious movements (Madeley, 2003). For instance, key feminist policy demands were denounced by an interest denominated “the new religious right”. The US political class of the 1980s was dominated in particular by conservative evangelical Protestants. The Church and the New Right went on well and religious broadcasting became a tool for political conservative purposes (Petchesky, 1981). Concerning socialism and its extremist form, feminism has been struck due to this decline phase, since feminism had to live in a predominantly capitalist world, whose necessary element for survival is patriarchy. According to Goldfarb (1997), the emergence of an open civil society and free public life in the former communist societies has included a diminishing status of women. Moreover, Bracke and Marks (2015) showed the example of how Western European Christian and conservative organisations took the lead in shaping support for the Solidarity movement in Poland, in contrast to how social democratic and
other leftist groups shied away from expressing equally enthusiastic solidarity. Then, the late 1970s and 1980s political elections were played on family, sexuality, and reproduction questions. Feminists have waited long for this moment, but the topics on the agenda were treated in a distorted way and not as they wished. Focus shifted from human rights to the “serious” matter, e.g. economy and foreign policies, albeit electoral campaigns dealt with sexual-family issues and abortion rights (Petchesky, 1981). The structure of gender equality policy allowed politicians to promote antifeminist politics. On the spot, we had abortion rights which were used by conservatives through their inverse pro-family and right-to-life strategy. As Rosalind Pollack Petchesky (1981) pointed out, embedded in the New Right’s "moral" offensive are two interlocking themes: the antifeminist backlash and the antisocial welfare backlash. The first, aimed initially at abortion, extended then to all aspects of sexual freedom and alternatives to traditional, or patriarchal, family life. The second stresses the principle that the state has an obligation to provide for economic and social needs through positive government-sponsored programs. Nonetheless, one of the reactions to President Ronald Reagan’s hostility to abortion was encouraged antiabortion violence (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). This approach appealed not only to new-conservative European and Western states but even post-colonial countries, which viewed ‘Western feminism as an anti-male philosophy or a male-mimicking quest for equality which is unnecessary for citizens and political economies’ (Donert, 2022). Although few women participated in the terrorist violent attacks carried out on behalf of right-wing causes, i.e. the Ku Klux Klan, the defence of racial segregation and the “New Right” (Weinberg and Eubank, 2011), this cannot conduct us to think that there was no female involvement in terrorism of the 1970s-1980s. On the contrary, what can mislead us is that neo-conservatism was particularly crucial in the USA, which experienced fewer terrorist attacks than European and Middle East countries and shared a restricted minority of Left, or even Communist, thinkers. Finally, Papadogiannis
and Gehrig (2014) help us assess the origins of the conservative revival since the late 1970s. In political history, this period tends to be depicted as merely an anti-climax decade of radical politics, constituting little more than an atmospheric backdrop for the re-awakening of neo-liberal theory and political thought. We don’t disregard this time and jump directly to the next one, but we try to draw a connection between the feminist questions, violence and political militancy.
CHAPTER IV – International terrorism and gender

1-Definition of terrorism

Studies on international terrorism have benefited a lot from the huge shock 9/11 provoked in public opinion. Western inhabitants felt insecure about their daily living and started realising that terrorism, which in the past was principally confined to national borders, was menacing even civilian targets at the international level. Conflicts needed no longer to be local, terrorists could strike on any continent (Jenkins, 1986). The Twin Tower attack led to repercussions that have touched countries through economic spillovers, collateral damages or security expenditures (Enders and Sandler, 2005). Anyways, terrorism, as we might understand it, relies solely on the images illustrated by scholars, politicians and the media, hence passed as a very recent invention (Jackson, 2008). Still, there is no agreement on the right definition of a terrorist act, and no guidelines are provided by any UN Security Council Resolution. According to Schraut and Weinhauer (2014), terrorism is a derogatory attribution, since the label terrorist/terrorism aims to delegitimize social movements, political groups, individuals and more actors. As a consequence, those targeted as terrorists may then be legally subject to torture and internment and cause indirect harm to the suspect communities they belong to (Jackson, 2008). It also turned out that accepted definitions are applied in a persistently inconsistent manner, as the analysis was put on groups that were predefined by Western political interests. For instance, there is abundant literature on the Left-wing and religious wave of terrorism, while right-wing, Christian and Jewish terrorism are less searched. Research on terrorism started in the USA and in Western Europe, around the 1960s, and either engaged in National Socialism or the Stalinist states. H.H.A. Cooper (2001), in attempting to find a definition of terrorism, argues that any coherent legal system will reveal many crimes where the creation of great fear in the victim is a central, defining feature. Thus many would agree that rape is
a terroristic act. Basically, also states could be seen as terrorists. As a matter of fact, the number of victims and sufferings caused by oppressive, tyrannical governments has been infinitely greater than that caused by small groups of rebels (Laqueur, 1986). Remembering the Jacobins’ State of Terror in Revolutionary French, which aimed to make the French fit for democracy (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001), we can assess that terrorism is not even a recent phenomenon. Ted Robert Gurr et al. (1988; Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001) found that "modern" states are more violent than developing countries and that the legitimacy of the regime inhibits violence. For instance, Western Europe experienced high levels of terrorism. Even Rapoport and Weinberg (2001) pointed out that terrorist groups appear more frequently in all democratic forms than in undemocratic ones. Jenkins (1986) defined terrorism as that proposition pursued to its most violent extreme, but stressed that not all politically motivated violence is terrorism. Henty and Egglestone (2018) agree with some UN definitions in saying that, ‘in contrast to terrorism, violent extremism encompasses actions that threaten a country’s core values and principles, including human rights, the rule of law, democracy, equal opportunity and freedom’. The aim of violent extremism is to aggravate the victim into a ‘disproportionate response to radicalise moderates and build support for its objectives in the long term’. Violent extremism is hence much broader than terrorism. What further complicates the distinction between the two terms is the existing tension between the political and legislative frameworks of every country and international organisation. Even the concept of “total war”, developed during the Second World War, was acquired by modern terrorism. In particular, this motive has been used by religious terrorists who rather define themselves as activists because they pursue a “common goal”. Since the increasing impracticability of conventional war (Jenkins, 1986), today-like terrorism derives largely from twentieth-century theories of guerrilla warfare. Cooper (2001) would address it as a form of surrogate warfare and, as a tactic, it is constantly changing its means, reasons and actors. Mao Tse-
Tung deserves credit for theorising guerrilla riots in the context of the Chinese civil war of 1945-49, since he formulated a series of relationships that differed both from conventional military strategies and from earlier Marxist theories of revolution (Jenkins, 1986). Accordingly, guerrillas are based more on military capacity than political one, which on the contrary were essential to Marxist revolutions. Many examples of guerrillas take place in Latin America, where the outcomes result in a militarised overthrown of power. In the period of anti-war protest movements of the 1960s, Western terrorists also tried to emulate the way of the Northern Vietnam guerrilla fight and learned some skills from the Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella’s Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, a practical guide to urban guerilla warfare that openly praised genuinely terrorist forms of action. However, guerrillas are not to be confused with terrorism, because they have different purposes and terrorism is not reserved exclusively for those trying to overthrow governments. Terrorism can finally be interpreted in different ways. According to Laqueur (1986) ‘terrorism is the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy’. Then, he highlighted that ‘terrorism is not an ideology but a strategy that can be used by people of different political convictions’. Martha Crenshaw (1981) says that ‘terrorist violence communicates a political message and its ends go beyond damaging an enemy’s material resources’. Furthermore, terrorism is a ‘form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor, the terrorist organisation’. Meanwhile, Jenkins (1986) shortly deems modern terrorism as ‘incidents that have clear international consequences’. Louise Richardson (2000) identifies ‘terrorism as politically motivated violence directed against non-combatants or symbolic targets which are designed to communicate a message to a broader audience’. Instead, Enders and Sandler (2005) depicted terrorist acts as ‘purposely brutal to create an atmosphere of
fear while publicising the terrorists’ cause’. Instead, Davis et al. (2021) include military targets because in the modern age of terrorism, these are also attacked in their home countries in acts of “domestic” or homegrown terrorism, and therefore affirm that terrorism is ‘an act, tactical in nature, that targets civilians, infrastructure, and sometimes military forces’. Schmid (2011), in trying to write an accepted academic definition of terrorism, concludes that:

Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.

What we can find in common in all definitions of terrorism is the transnational implication (Jenkins, 1986; Enders and Sandler, 2005), rationality (Enders and Sandler, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981), violence (Laqueur, 1986; Crenshaw, 1981; Enders and Sandler, 2005; Davis et al., 2021; Schmid, 2011), political aim (Laqueur, 1986; Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid, 2011), fear-instillation (Laqueur, 1986; Enders and Sandler, 2005; Schmid, 2011) and the publicity (Laqueur, 1986; Crenshaw, 1981; Enders and Sandler, 2005; Schmid, 2011). In addition, there is a degree of victimisation that accompanies modern terrorism. Together with Laqueur (1986) and Richardson (2000), Jackson (2008) sustained that the selection of targets has been abandoned in the early 1980s and terrorism shifted primarily but not solely to attacking civilians, e.g. raised awareness of the power of the deeds. Laqueur (1986) focused also on state terrorism and found that it is not oppression by the state but state-sponsored terrorism that characterised modernity. To explain the same phenomenon, Jackson (2008) underlined how the Afghan Mujahedin were sold to the Western population as “freedom fighters” in the 1980s.
and later transformed into “Islamic terrorists” when the US attacked terrorism in Afghanistan. Indeed, Grisard (2014) affirms that the male Muslim terrorists were feminised purposely to bolster American masculinity and morale. Our focus will be on modern terrorism and we will discuss the different types of it in chronological order. David C. Rapoport will be our main reference in defining terrorism through the discipline of political science. He classified in particular four waves of modern terrorism: anarchic, anticolonial, new left, and religious (Rapoport, 2001). Similarly, Gregg (2014) separates traditional terrorism and religious terrorism; the first typically divided into three sub-categories: left, right and ethnic-separatist. Every stream is driven by a common energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships. Some features may be universal, for instance, nationalism was present in almost every wave. Moreover, it can be said that every group’s life lasted about a generation each, albeit the last one should have been finished nowadays but doubts arise on this point. Rapoport claims instead that a major difference is to be found in the role of women and in the definition of revolution. Other authors stressed also the importance of innovation and communication. If we compare the wave of Anarchism, which started in the late years of the XIX century, the level of technological development would be of course less advanced as regards the new religious stream. Alberto Ferracuti (1982) suggests introducing a “subculture theory” in the analysis of terrorism, since all these classifications do not take into account that terrorists live in their own subculture, with their own value system. Even supposing that terrorist behavior is normative, and that if they exceeded certain constraints and employed weapons of mass destruction they would completely alienate themselves from the public and possibly provoke swift and harsh retaliation (Galvin, 1983). We know that this ideology did not stand, as many secular terrorist organisations used violence and lethal tools. Religious terrorists have been using poisoning of water supplies, toxic chemicals dispersing through internal building ventilation systems and
attacks on power grids as some of their horrible methods (Hoffman, 1995). However, “New Left” terrorists have not been less. For instance, PIRA members have plotted to blow up buses in Northern Ireland. A peculiar aspect of Leftist terrorist groups or operations, in general, is the frequent female leadership. It is difficult to analyse women’s involvement in terroristic activities and their affiliation to feminism when the most abundant and available literature on feminist movements develops only in the United States, which has been interested less in terrorism compared to the European countries, especially during the second wave of feminism and the busiest terroristic period, the 1970s – 1980s. Nevertheless, in the 1961-1970 period, out of 87 countries, the United States was ranked as having the highest number of terrorist campaigns (Crenshaw, 1981); a trend that changed in the sequent decade. Although Americans remain the number one target of international terrorism (Jenkins, 1986), the number of Americans killed inside the United States in 1985 as the result of terrorist attacks was only two (Laqueur, 1986). In addition, several of the most famous attacks against US targets would not constitute acts of terror on the basis of the strictest interpretation of terrorism (Bloom, 2012). Until the 1980s, many tended to think of terrorism in almost “climatological terms” (Cooper, 2001), meaning that terrorism was viewed as a Cold War phenomenon, therefore, being sponsored by the Soviet Union (Hoffman, 1999). We don’t neglect the fact that the Soviets encouraged these violent groups in many different ways (Rapoport, 2001), however, Hoffman (1999) explicated that ‘even when their principal enemies were homegrown Marxist-Leninist movements, the Europeans tended to disagree sharply with the United States over the extent of Soviet backing for these campaigns’. As Hughes (2014) precises, the KGB and its Warsaw Pact counterparts did support Palestinian and extreme left European movements, but European countries did not subscribe to the conspiracy theory which presented international terrorism as part of a global Soviet plot to undermine the West. For sure, the USSR pursued some interests in assisting the PLO and other
organisations, but it was not like the United States presented international terrorism. The US offered a divergent approach to terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s for the listed reasons and others. With a different position, European governments used to cut secret deals, especially with Middle East countries, in exchange for the terrorists' agreement not to strike within these countries' borders or target their citizens. In a time permeated by the economic crisis, they feared a reaction from those states, but they couldn't afford to worsen their relationships because they were highly dependent on oil. Since the 1970s, terrorism studies have indeed concentrated on economic consequences of terrorist activities, the nature and target of attacks, the challenges posed by democratic governance, and the effectiveness of counterterrorism (Cruise, 2016).

2- Democracy and Nationalism

New democracies may appear more sensitive to changes and revolutions, to the same degree as civil wars and rebellions. However, analyses of democracy and states reveal that terrorist acts happen more in settled democratic countries. 'The likelihood of terrorist groups occurring in democracies is three and a half times greater than ... in non-democracies' (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). Democracies are for definition more politically open and grant people some freedom that in some cases may exceed the limits of civil liberties and fundamental rights. Indeed, also the presence of a free press provides opportunities for greater publicity that permits rebel groups to reach their target audiences more easily (Lutz and Lutz, 2010). Democracy made West Germany more vulnerable to terrorism compared to East Germany. It is also assumed that no substantial difference between various types of democracy exists. For instance, after WWII, even many anti-colonial terrorists argued to be moved by democratic ideals. However, democratic countries may experience different kinds of terrorism, since recent suicide attacks have instead manifested in less open political systems like Pakistan and
Lebanon. From the 1960s onwards, separatist guerrilla struggles, and conflicts between ethnically or religiously divided populations, increasingly came to characterise the landscape of collective violence (Ness, 2007). Laqueur (1986) retains terroristic acts to attempt to destabilise democratic societies and to show that their governments are impotent. The “new” violence reflects ethnic concerns and easily escalates into aspirations for national self-determination, aspirations related to or stimulated by the democratic ethos (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). Huntington (1968) argued that if a democracy acts in an "undemocratic" manner by obstructing the expression of political participation, it may well encourage revolution. Revolution is considered here as the extreme case of the explosion of political participation and often it requires an alliance around an ideology of nationalism. For example, the Russian Revolution moved around a coalition between the intellectual society and the peasants. Yet, in late XIX century Russia, the creators of the modern doctrine and strategy for rebel terror announced parliamentary democracy as the final aim (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). Democratic states may be the perfect location for terrorism for reasons unrelated to their domestic politics. Because of weaker security forces, concerns for civil rights, freedom and a free press, these countries may be chosen by dissidents for attacks against their home governments (Lutz and Lutz, 2010). Therefore, democracy does not protect from domestic terrorism at all. In addition, since national self-determination claims cannot be satisfied universally, they are a chronic, albeit intermittent, source of potential violence in democratic states (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). Sjoberg (2010) insists that exclusive political systems and unstable democracies produce more radical opposition and violent escalation than any other. Nonetheless, due to their dictatorial nature, they could not only persecute the rebels internally but also track down dissidents abroad in order to eliminate them. Still, while authoritarian states often use militaries at home to preserve illegitimate rule, liberal democracies have sufficient legitimacy that their militaries are devoted exclusively to
the defence of borders and the projection of power (Karatnycky, 2004). This means that also most of the "hard" power of democracies can be projected externally, but was not managed properly, as many domestic and international terroristic activities happened in the European countries between the 1970s and the 1980s. For instance, domestic terrorism is more frequent and even more deadly than transnational terrorism. Catastrophic transnational terrorist events, such as September 11, are exceedingly rare and, as this example demonstrates, tend to target the US. Nevertheless, even the United States, as a democratic country, experienced domestic terrorism, i.e. the Weather Underground organisation. In Europe, the 1968 evolution of the conflict from the social to the political sphere offered social movements the possibility of building larger alliances, absorbing for example feminism. Anyways, the protests threatened also their adversaries, e.g. national stakeholders, who intended the cause of the strikes as an attack on democracy itself. Closing political opportunities shaped mobilisation in Northern Ireland, as the inclusive and reformist mobilising messages of the 1960s Irish civil rights movement lost ground face to police repression, lack of political responsiveness, and counter-mobilisations, bringing about an exclusivist nationalist frame in the next decade (Jürgensmeyer, 2021). Moreover, national groups and minorities usually have grievances, and some of them may be quite justified. Therefore, we can account for national-ethnic terrorism to have performed better than Left and Right terrorism for this motivation (Laqueur, 1986). However, the Basque Homeland and Liberty group (ETA), as well as the Corsican militants, are not to be defended. These groups' demands are by no means shared by most of their fellow countrymen, and the majority of the population in either the Basque region or Corsica are of different ethnic backgrounds from the terrorist groups. To remark, anyways, is that even though women were involved in separatist struggles before the Cold War, armed groups started in the late 1970s the deliberate recruitment of women and children, while in the past this process was made through
coercion, hence using violence to oblige to commit violence. Unfortunately, rebel movements have spread in Latin America and South Asia and engaged women *en masse* due to the widespread poverty and lack of economic opportunity that has historically afflicted third-world nations. The dichotomy between men and women that underscores structural inequality and violence is also an integral part of nationalism. Feminists often join nationalism, as it goes well with their cause. Alison (2004) claims that anti-state, “liberatory” nationalisms usually provide more space for women to participate as combatants than do institutionalised state or pro-state nationalisms. Fareed Zakaria (1997) used the phrase “democratisation of violence” to reflect the increased access to violence and its instruments, for both men and women.

3- The third wave

New Left terrorism tried initially to gain the support of the working class, but it was clearly manifested by middle-class youth, who had a good education on the back. It developed out of a nearly global feeling of societal dissatisfaction, which saw the existing consumer society, state structures and political order as inherently repressive and alienating (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Many terrorist militants originated in the social movements, and consequently, I find it extremely important to deal with 1968 while speaking about the third wave of terrorism. According to Weinberg and Eubank (2001), the most visible terrorist groups on the political left appeared largely from the mass protest movements linked to the Vietnam War and a list of other issues relating to the exploitative nature of capitalism. Indeed, many Western terrorist groups saw themselves as vanguards for the Third World masses (Rapoport, 2004) and deliberately imitated the behaviour of these Third World liberation movements. Citing Jenkins (1986), terrorist tactics were adopted by radical students in Europe, the United States, and Japan when the mass protest movements of the late 1960s failed to bring about the changes they sought. younger, well-educated Western Europeans
who felt personally inspired by the anticolonial message of Fanon that the enslaved consciousness of the “wretched of the earth” could advance and become truly human only by taking the path of liberating violence. Some authors talk about a “contagion” while referring to terrorism, especially during these decades, because it diffused internationally and used adjacency mapping techniques. Strategies that spread were kidnapping, assassination of prominent figures and plane hijacking. ETA killed the Spanish Prime Minister in 1973, RAF kidnapped the German industrial leader and former SS member Hanns Martin Schleyer in 1977 and PFLP hijacked four airplanes in Dawson’s Field in 1970. Jean Elsthain (1991) claimed:

‘It would be unwise to assume that the combined effects of Vietnam, feminism, and the involvement of over 50 per cent of adult American women in the labor force … undercut received webs of social meaning as these revolve around men, women, and war’.

Assuming that within Western Europe terrorism might follow a hierarchical contagion pattern, the probability of each country experiencing a terrorist incident increased after the occurrence of a prior incident in another country; and in the case of reinforcement, the propensity to experience acts of terrorism increased for each country after the experience of terrorism within the country (Midlarsky et al, 1980). Western European terrorist groups fall into two categories: universalists or millenarians, which pursue a world socialist revolution, and parochials or separatists, which usually focus on specific territorial gain; but these could also display characteristics from both ideologies. Communism and left-wing revolutionary philosophies espoused by organisations such as the Red Army Faction of Germany, the Red Brigades of Italy, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine dominated the early development of contemporary international terrorism in the 1970s. Nationalism and reactionary ideals represented in organisations such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Basque Nation and
Liberty Movement (ETA) of Spain, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka took the forefront in the 1980s (Badey, 2002). Bulgaria, East Germany, Libya, North Korea, and Syria were named as Soviet-controlled sponsors of anti-American terrorism but the only actual evidence is that the US was really wary about a possible escalation of the Cold War (Turk, 2004), while neglecting every other kind of terroristic act. Moreover, most terrorists were in nongovernmental organisations that set their own ideological, ethnic, nationalist, or religious agendas and when adopting a Marxist view, it was rarely connected to the USSR but rather shared socialist objectives. In this period, international terrorism was revived. Some groups conducted more assaults abroad than on their home territories (Rapoport, 2004), i.e. the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. In general, Midlarsky et al. (1980) feel the adoption - or renewal - of a terrorist strategy by a dissident group with a long history of violent resistance to a central government and with concrete objectives understandable, whereas the resort to terrorism by minuscule “New Left” groupings in liberal democratic states less comprehensible, and the answer may lie in the contagion process rather than in identifying specific grievances. Nevertheless, one of the most striking features of Western European and American terrorism during the ‘60s and ‘70s was the role(s) played by women (Weinberg and Eubank, 2001). Ness (2007) suggests that girls and women make up 30 to 40 per cent of the combatants in numerous ethno-separatist struggles.

4- Women’s involvement

In the twentieth century, gender did not seem to be a suitable analytical category to analyse terrorism or political violence (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Just since the 1990s feminist research has increased, followed by a greater interest in the first decade of the next century. Yet, inquiries into the relation between terrorism and gender have not increased at the same speed (Herschinger, 2014). Literature and analysis of women’s involvement in terrorism available has to be debated. Davis
et al. (2021) studied this topic research through the platform Google Scholar and showed that significant spikes occurred after 9/11, but also in 2007, 2011, and 2016, reflecting the overall increased visibility of women in terrorist activities, specifically women’s role as suicide bombers in a variety of conflicts, including the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, and Nigeria. The most-studied regions in the sub-field of women in terrorism include Israel/ Palestine territories, Chechnya, and the West, in particular Northern Ireland. However, there is a lack of research in the Global South, namely South-East Asia and Africa. Women’s participation has been under-studied or ignored due to assumptions about women’s desire to participate in a particular group/movement and the organisation’s willingness to include women (Davis et al., 2021). A significant number of theses and dissertations on women and terrorism remain unpublished, and the issue is that much of the literature in this subfield has been published outside the main terrorism studies journals. Many prejudices have obscured the related research on gender and terrorism. Lack of awareness and historical de-contextualisation favour the reproduction and reinforcement of gender stereotypes, following extensive and deeply rooted lines of tradition (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2010).

The characterisation of a female terrorist as an isolated individual who lacks attachment to a social group was not consistent with the low rates of immigration and single status found within the female data (Jacques and Taylor, 2013). Similarly, the stereotype of female terrorists as uneducated fell once investigated. Female terrorists tended to come from privileged families and be more upper-class with respect to the average male terrorist. Girls and women who participate in militancy and terrorism are, at the outset, frequently forced to do so, but coercion alone does not account for the mobilisation of thousands of female combatants in guerrilla wars (Ness, 2007). Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the number of women involved in political violent organisations in the 1970s – 1980s oversee that of every other period. The history of female participation in terrorist movements has taken from the New Left wave,
when women became a topic in the agenda of terrorism. In these years, the research was characterised by different regional foci (Latin America, Russia, and Western Europe), different types of violent activity (guerilla warfare or extremism) and different types of motivational explanations (societal pressure, psychological reasons) (Herschinger, 2014). Grisard (2014) shows that few female terrorists in the 1970s called themselves feminists, while it was not common for feminists to campaign against the imprisonment of female members of the RAF or the Movement Second June. The majority of female terrorists professed that they did not see themselves and their motives to be any different from those of their male counterparts, thus neglecting a feminist cause. On the contrary, Hudson (1999) argues that feminism has also been a motivating ideology for many female terrorists. Rajan (2021) argues that women in the Red Brigades have used their political activities to express their interest in feminist agendas. Furthermore, Leila Khaled (2002), the female role model from the Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) stated:

‘Today there is a big religious influence in our society, and that is the reason there are so many suicide bombers. When the religious leaders say that women who make these actions are finally equal to me, I have a problem. Everyone is equal in death – rich, poor, Arab, Jew, Christian, we are all equal. I would rather see women equal to men in life.’

Emancipation is not directly proportional to political violence, but it is also true that male terrorists were never questioned about their masculinity as a driving principle to commit to armed fights. Men and masculinity have never been a research topic for terrorist studies. Moreover, men are rarely questioned about their motivations to join a terrorist organisation. Their actions are immediately taken seriously, logically and aligned with the principles of their nations (Rajan, 2021). Hanshew (2012) wisely observed that if feminism offered a space for the incipient critique of counter-violence, efforts to de-legitimate the
movement by connecting women’s liberation to the rise of international terrorism complicated matters. The justification to commit to violent organisations would be that many females have come from societies in which women are repressed, such as Middle Eastern countries and North Korea, or Catholic countries, such as in Latin America, Spain, Ireland, and Italy. The idea that female terrorists resort to violence to liberate themselves, to achieve feminist goals and feminist emancipation, i.e. that women are fighting against oppression in their societies has also been voiced (Herschinger, 2012). However, this idea has been criticised for being Western-based, especially by non-Western authors. Galvin (1983) also argues that the female terrorist enters into terrorism with different motivations and expectations than the male terrorist, such as the promises of a better life for their children and the desire to meet people’s needs that are not being met by an intractable establishment. In many cases, women’s reasons for engaging in terrorist activities are the same or similar to those of men, i.e. support for a cause, nationalism and community building, but according to Cruise (2016), it is also true that in other instances the motivations are predominantly female-specific and gender, for example restoring pride to the family after a cultural breach or revenging for rape or sexual violence. Discussing female involvement in German terrorist organisations, Hudson (1999) depicted several theories, summing up that German women are more emancipated and liberated than women in other European countries and. that the anger of German women is part of a national guilt complex, the feeling that if their mothers had had a voice in Hitler’s time many of Hitler’s atrocities would not have happened. Another view is provided by Bloom (2012) while addressing religious terrorists, indicating usually suicide attacks. In fact, she links their motivation almost exclusively to their status as rape victims and furthermore, she believes that some women find themselves in impossible situations and in cultures that value them in death as they could never be valued alive. These females are considered to act as revenge for their role in a society in which they are publicly restricted.
Nevertheless, I aim to discourage this approach, as many other scholars have done (Sjoberg, 2009; Herschinger, 2014). Despite their potential merits in describing female commitment to violence, the greatest part of these studies is not interested in gender as an analytical category but in gender as difference in se. Women are underrepresented in the study of the perpetration and consequences of the actions that fall within our traditional understandings of terrorism. Various terrorism experts have noted that the number of women involved in terrorism has greatly exceeded the number of women involved in crime, some pointing out that in this way they gain more attention (Galvin, 1983). Still, wives, sisters, and mothers of male terrorists are disproportionately arrested for the crimes of their relatives, even though they may be not committed to their violent ideology. Considering that females are less likely than males to have early experience with guns, terrorist membership is, therefore, a more active process for women than for men because women have more to learn (Galvin, 1983). Women were depicted as seeking emancipation “with a gun in hand” (Hanshew, 2012). Although many women shared leadership roles within their organisations, men-rebel terrorist groups initially prohibited their women constituents from rising to key positions (Rajan, 2021). Usually, women were forced to support men’s activities and were given jobs more suited to “females”, performing the ‘silent bystanders and supporters of the regime’ (Smuelers, 2015). Administrative and supporting personnel was a typical female feature. Among the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) women were openly recruited only after a significant loss of men’s lives in 1997. Lately, women have gained prominence in terrorist groups despite the conservative cultural values imposed on them and, for example, 50 per cent of the RAF and an estimated 80 per cent of its supporters were female (Rajan, 2021). Anyways, it is important to underline the difference between a Western terrorist organisation like the Rote Armee Fraktion and a Southern group like the Tamil Tigers. Many terrorist groups have created women-only units that have proven critical to the success of their
terrorist organisation as a whole (Rajan, 2021). To cite is the Free Women’s Union of Kurdistan, which was part of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), and the German Rote Zora, which had also an exclusive feminist program. In the 1980s, Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers began to recruit, equip, and deploy female suicide bombers, giving journalists and terrorism experts the opportunity to define women in armed groups as martyrs and stop. Then, in January 2002, Wafa Idris became the first Palestinian female suicide bomber. What is sometimes described as the act of a liberated feminist or the outcome of gender oppression is most of the time hidden by reporters. Patriarchal cultural practices and male manipulation of family honor were recognised as motivating factors for acts of suicide (Banks, 2019), forgetting about the model represented by women during the political wave of terrorism. Nonetheless, religious authorities have enabled women to be designated as shahidas – martyrs – a status formerly reserved to men, and thus women have gained status within Islamic society (Margolin, 2016). Since 1985, terrorism’s so-called invisible women have accounted for a quarter of fatal attacks in Iraq, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Morocco, and Palestine (Cunningham, 2012).

5- Communications and use of the media

When other forms of communication fail, political violence becomes a primary form of communication (Badey, 2002). Terrorists knew exactly that innovation in technology, which has advanced fast radio broadcasting and television, could have been used to their advantage. In the past, journals tended to show the irrationality and pathologic nature of terrorists, whether or not their true characteristics. The aim was to depict those individuals as loveless lives and frustrated, disturbed psychos. In the XIX century, newspapers printed caricatures of anarchists deranged or bearded, encouraging the belief that political violence in opposition to authority is both criminal and lazy (Turk, 2004). Today, terrorism not only interacts with some media, but with media
societies (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Citing Laqueur (1978), ‘terrorist action is nothing, publicity is everything’. Visible and unusual violence is essentially newsworthy and attracts the international publicity necessary for cross-regional and cross-cultural spread (Midlarsky et al., 1980). Even when some recognition is given to the possibility that grievances may arise from real injustices, reportages accentuated the constant non-debatable unjustification of violence. Governments were prompted to minimise the risks of both public sympathy for terrorists and public fear of terrorism. ‘When people and events come to be regularly described in public as terrorists and terrorism, some governmental or other entity is succeeding in a war of words in which the opponent is promoting alternative designations such as "martyr" and "liberation”’ (Turk, 2004). States and media used arbitrarily, and continue today, the phenomenon of terrorism. In the same way, militant organisations could aesthetically exaggerate and contextualise women’s involvement to play with public opinion and the national authorities (Loken, 2021). Language and photographs centred on women’s physical appearance (hair, bodies, clothing, etc.), highlighting the supposed contrast between their external femininity and the masculinity associated with arms and violence (Hamilton, 2007). These media stories are not about gender equality but ideal-typical women, aimed to be read and consumed (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015). Indeed, according to Grisard (2014), the masculine gaze of mass media and state apparatuses objectified the terrorists. Instead of acknowledging the falseness of the underlying stereotype, public and publicised stories emphasised the singularity of violent women through victimisation or sexual depictions. Western reportages usually and actively searched for alternate explanations beyond political justification for women’s violence. Portrays oscillate between the contemporary female terrorist as being trapped by cultural circumstances tied to gender and as a silly girl who has been manipulated by males (Herschinger, 2014). Negative corporal attributes are associated with female bodies: femininity, vulnerability, dependence, lack of agency and its unfounded
linkage to becoming a victim, along with vulnerability and its unfounded connection to being a victim (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2010). Terrorism was structured by individualised, often non-political narratives, mainly around victim-based communication (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). When not described as fragile individuals, sexuality is politicised at its maximum, representing a *femme fatale*. One of the most flagrant examples of sexualisation of women’s violence is the treatment of Leila Khaled, long-time member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who captured the world’s attention when she hijacked two planes in 1969 and 1970. She was frequently depicted in a sexual light, suggesting that she was an uncivilised, yet pretty brute, and was appropriated as the basis for the bikini- and loin-cloth-clad character, Leela, from Dr Who (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2008). In the 1970s, women started appearing in action films, as well as in literature and later in video games, hence changing the consolidated perception that women cannot be aggressive. Thereafter, also feminist analyses of women’s roles as armed activists became a challenge to dominant media representations. The unprecedented number of women militants from the 1970s to recent years was thus manoeuvred to sell as many stories as possible. The allure of danger is what catches the attention of the spectator and the female terrorist is unusually eye-catching. However, is still difficult to accept women’s violence as moved by political imperatives. West-German print media constructed violent women, not just as terrorists, but even as unfit mothers, as hysterical or as phallic women. Sensationalised misnomers like “Nazi bride,” “black-widow,” and “jihadi bride” are still amply used (Alexander and Turkington, 2019). Later on, the use of female suicide bombers increased as they draw much more media attention than the attacks by men (Smuelers, 2015). Palestinian women are told to have failed marriages, to be unable to have children, and to have lost familial honour to justify their blowing up. Nowadays, the image of pacifist woman has been challenged and a ‘discursive space has opened up in which we can problematise the social basis of, and the symbolic
structures associated with, females both acting and being constructed as “naturally” violent’ (Ness, 2007). When men commit acts of terrorism their gender is seldom noticed and their act is often put in the larger perspective of the group rather than the individual (Cruise, 2016). Yet, the RAF history was unique in the fact that reduced gender to an identity marker of the terrorist perpetrator (Grisard, 2014). Women offenders, it can be argued, suffer because they are fitted into a system designed to control the much larger and more visible problem of male crime. The publication of an increasing number of autobiographies in the early 2000s is instead an expression of the pluralisation of memories of terrorism. Nonetheless, the influential volume Research on Terrorism of 2004 does not even include an entry on gender (Herschinger, 2014). Eventually gender, as an analytical category, is applied only in studies of women as victims of terrorist or counter-terrorist violence. Conversely, discussing women as perpetrators of terrorist violence, gender is not treated to signify relationships of power (ibid.).
CHAPTER V - Women in Red Brigades

1-Social layout

After the Second World War, Italy came out weak and had to reconstruct its buildings as well as its society. More than two-thirds of its industrial capacity and almost 80 per cent of its infrastructure were in need of repair or replacement (Scrivano, 2005). It was a hard time, but soon things changed. Economic advances bloomed from the 1960s, such that Paul Ginsborg (1997) described the period between 1958-1963 as the beginning of a social revolution. From the peasant country Italy was in the years before the war, it transformed into an industrial nation, developing along the lines of the American consumerist model (Drake, 1999). The “miracle” consisted of an increase of 90 per cent of the industrial production between 1958 and 1962. However, there was a huge difference in the Italian territory. In the industrial areas of the north-west, military operations had been in large part responsible for the postwar situation while in the rest of the country, the state of poverty had for the most part been inherited from the pre-war years and aggravated by the conflict (Scrivano, 2005). There were strong variations in terms of the quality of the welfare services for families: being ill in Naples was not the same as it would have been in Turin (Ginsborg, 2000). Worsening conditions due to the overlapping 1973 crisis underlined the degeneration of the South. An example is constituted by southern hospitals, which were unable to handle the breakout of the cholera epidemic. Between 1955 and 1970, the country registered 25 million residential changes (Balestracci, 2013). This number witnesses the issue of internal migration, which pervades Italy even today and is mainly single-directional from the South to the North. The implementation of the constitutional provision for regional autonomy in 1970, as a result of the depolarisation of the party system and of Socialist participation in the government, multiplied the opportunities for access to policy-making (Confalonieri, 1995). Within the terrorist organisations, many militants
were born in the big cities or in the industrial zones, but there were also a lot of individuals coming from the rural areas and Southern regions. Indeed, the mayors of Bologna and Turin, respectively Novelli and Zangheri, blamed immigrants from the South for the rise of terrorist groups during the 1970s (Novelli and Tranfaglia, 1988; Tranfaglia, 1989). Italian capitalism developed but failed to provide essential mass services for the workers considering regional differences, i.e. homes, public health, social security, and so on. It combined some elements of great modernity and some of extreme backwardness; in fact, one could even say that the latter are exploited by the former (Spini, 1972). The industrial North exploited the unemployed South, as the New Left took advantage of the students’ and workers’ protests to claim that the Old Left was betraying the Leninist revolutionary orthodoxy, applying a feasible “strategy of reforms”. The social movements of 1968 had to take into account some backdrops which were crucial for the Italian scenario, i.e. the history of fascism and resistance, war and rebuilding, regionalism and massive demographic change, and Catholicism and communism (Hilwig, 2009). Similarly, Ginsborg (2000) recognised two dominant post-war cultures, which were Catholicism and Communism, and both of which had their own foreclosures in relation to the creation of a modern civil society. In fact, the civility of Catholic-based civil society was not measured in any way by its autonomy or pluralism, whereas Italian communism tried as well to suck into the Party and its minor organisations. Nonetheless, according to Tarrow (1990), a new generation of movements in Italy emerged from the realignments of the early and mid-60s rather than “1968”, and emerged first as an insurgency within the party system. The Democratic Catholic Party (DC) was deeply influenced by the power of the Church, and consequently all its organisations and media. For instance, the Eurovision Song Contest of 1974 was broadcasted in Italy after some months since Italian contestant Gigliola Cinguetti brought her song “Si” and RAI (the Italian Television
Broadcaster) feared this would have persuaded Italians during the divorce referendum.

Galli (1986) cut a timeline of the revolts in Italy. They took place at the University of Trento and Pisa between 1966 and 1967 but they generalised in Winter 1967-1968. Syndicalist revolts of the “Warm Autumn”, period identified with 1969, culminated in the general strike of 18 November, with the death of policeman Antonio Annarumma, and the disaster of Piazza Fontana on December 12. Never before, so many hours of work were lost. Strikes and random work stoppages paralysed the country. Frightened and outraged, employers demanded government action, but it was not forthcoming (Drake, 1989). Just after these events, the extreme Left organised the armed fight, which was hypothesised already in 1968 by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli. From the Communist Party and in particular the New Left, we can recall the birth of the “operaisti” movement, which tried to achieve a revolutionary thrust and the solution to the problem of democratic socialism by means of worker’s control (Spini, 1972). These little organisations took inspiration from the magazine Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks), which eventually closed in 1966, but signed an epoque of communist newspapers and the transition of many old socialist voters to the Communist Party. Other periodicals were indeed Classe Operaia, Potere operaio and Quaderni Piacentini, which gathered all the working-class members under a determined political side. In the second half of the 1970s, the large New Left organisation, which acted as an umbrella for all the smaller groups, split on the issue of violence and provoked the creation of semi-clandestine militant subdivisions. The cultural revolution that diffused worldwide was harsh to achieve for Italy, which compared to other nations like the UK or France was the most backward, most priest-ridden, and most patriarchal of them all (Marwick, 1998). Obviously, the Catholic Church played its part in this delay, but couldn’t prevent the increasing individualisation related to the new material well-being culture. Marwick
(1998) confined the “sunny” period of the Long Sixties between 1958 and 1974, in which Italy had not yet entered the terrible “anni di piombo” (years of lead). In a 1984 national poll, Italians were asked to name the historical development of the last fifty years to which future historians of Italy would devote the most attention and it resulted in terrorism for over 36 percent of the targets (Drake, 1999). Even fascism appeared less important. The Red Brigades appealed to a core element in the Italian political tradition, e.g. the religious faith of the extreme Left in revolution (Drake, 1999). This meant that the success of the Red Brigades relied on the support of astonishingly large numbers of people who believed in the revolution as something sacred. Many students and especially those engaging lately in political violence viewed the 1960s as a time of slavery, exactly in Marxist terms, but the Communist Party was statics, unwilling to talk and challenge this threat.

Social protest movements hence started from the students. Indeed, the initial problems were in the middle and high schools as in 1962 the Italian government ordered compulsory education to the age of fourteen. However, unaccompanied by structural reforms in the schools, the mandate created conditions of woeful overcrowding and understaffing. Later, in 1965, universities felt the same pressure since students had no longer to take entrance examinations and masses replaced the trained and upper-class elites who usually attended universities (Drake, 1999). Working-class students, lacking the financial resources to study full-time, tended to fare poorly in the newly expanded universities. Moreover, Italy entered a period of economic stagnation in 1964, increasing unemployment for young graduates. These reasons explained why Marxist critics found much support among the students. Student organisations, divided into the *Unione Goliardica Italiana* (UGI; Italian Goliardic Unity) and the *Intesa* (Catholic students), were made up of socialist, communist and Christian Democrats and they worked together on a set of reforms and projects to solve the struggles of the students.
Nevertheless, in contrast with real political parties, the leaders of student organisations were almost always to be found on the left wing of their respective parts (Spini, 1972). The first nucleus of students of New Left ideology was found at Pisa, when the University was occupied by students who were strongly influenced by Potere Operaio. This group Tesi della Sapienza proposed something different to the traditional representation of students and it was more similar to an industrial trade union system. Italian students in fact revolted against the “feudal” order of universities (Hilwig, 2009). Radicalisation became so extreme that the sociologist and Political Science dean in Padua, Sabino Acquaviva, had to resign from his position because student strikes and threats were such a risk to his life. Even the University of Padua historian Angelo Ventura was destined to be wounded by local terrorists on 26 September 1979. Nevertheless, we report some professors who hyped violence, i.e. Enrico Fenzi, literature professor at the University of Genoa and leader of the BR column in that city, and Giovanni Senzani, sociology professor at the University of Florence and lately head of the BR column in Naples.

To address the consumeristic society, Don Lorenzo Milani, inflamed protests through his Lettera a una professoressa (Letter to a Teacher) in 1967, complaining about the decline of communal and spiritual values. Consequently, one of the most active sited of student protest was the Catholic University of Milan. Thereafter, we can say that Marxist and Catholic traditions had a particular effect on the student movement in Italy. In Mediterranean societies, like Italy, a luxurious rhetoric of values flourished. The attribution of violence to a crisis of values, no further defined, is part of this rhetoric (Ferrarotti, 1981b). Acquaviva stressed the present religious crisis as a vital factor in Italy’s wave of terrorism, claiming the need to establish a “religion kernel”. According to Ferrarotti (1981b):

‘Violence in Italy is the fruit of a rupture and an exclusion, perhaps nourished by, and perhaps unconsciously inspired by, a culture
traditionally incapable of soberly coming to terms with actual
problematic situations and with objective contradiction.’

The pope is a chauvinist figure and the sacred takes on a political
function. The fear of antagonising the church led to Italian political
parties failing to challenge existing laws that forbade the sale or
advertising of birth-control methods. This turned abortion into ‘the most
widely practiced form of birth control’, albeit an illegal and often unsafe
one (Hajek, 2014). Franco Ferrarotti - himself victim of a severe beating
by Autonomia Operaia (Workers Autonomy) students on February 14,
1977 – stressed on the need to search for the roots of Italian violence in
Italy’s tormented past (Drake, 1984). The reason why Italian terrorism
has caught much academic and journalistic attention is the fact that Italy
was not the only unstable country, with poorly functioning political
institutions, unemployment and a crisis of alienation. Indeed, the choice
of terrorism calls forth the impatience typical of a particular homo
religious, now wholly laicised, against the politics of gradualness,
eventually the virtue of prudence (Ferrarotti, 1981b). For instance, many
leaders of the 1968 movements, and especially Lotta Continua, were part
of the generation of high managers of Catholic Youth (Galli, 1986).
Nonetheless, Italian terrorism originated not in political, socio-economic,
or psychological problems—much less in the problem of espionage, but
rather in certain reactions of the Italian people to those problems (Drake,
1984). We can speak about a “società bloccata” theory (Catelli, 1976)
since frustration arising from the protest movements never translated
into an institutional reform. It can be seen clearly in the 1970s, for
instance through the divorce referendum and the elections of 1976. In
Bracke and Mark (2015) it is highlighted how those in favour of the
legalisation of abortion in Italy used arguments around Europeanisation
and the perception of Italy lagging behind other West European countries
such as France and the UK, both in terms of cultural modernisation and
active civil society. Moreover, Italy in the 1960s presented politically left-leaning households being strikingly morally conservative (Clifford, 2012). The most famous clash between students and police was the legendary Battle of Valle Giulia in Rome, on 1 March 1968. Many policemen and students suffered injuries. Anyways, Italy was soon opposed by Germany and then France, where further protests erupted. Students then joined forces with militant factory workers during the hot autumn of 1969 organising violent strikes. Mario Capanna, the Italian activist student leader, tried to separate terrorist claims from the 1968 movements, delegating responsibility for violence to the government reactions, like the bombing on 12 December 1969. In addition, he argued that terrorism came from the right, rather than from the left, accusing secret services and fascist fanaticism. “Red terrorism” was indeed recognised later for what it really was. However, it is true that everybody was in the same game, e.g. revolution, but radicals turned to the extreme version of the strikes, right and left, which eventually stood for terrorism. Still, a segment of the student movement supported the Red Brigades and universities were the centres for activist opposition to the general current of Italian society (Statera, 1979). For instance, Vittorio Bachelet, DC Professor, was assassinated in La Sapienza by the Red Brigades. PCI Secretary General Berlinguer retained that criminal actions were carried out by fascist-like squads, but the issue was that they were justified and even supported by leftist student groups. Yet, the most consistent extra-parliamentary group was Lotta Continua, which lost activists from the 1974. In 1977, whereas the Red Brigades carried out their assaults, mass demonstrations led by students occurred in Rome and became slowly more violent. There were attacks on public buildings through tactics of urban guerrilla, which divided the opinion of the New Left militants. Unlike the 1968 student movement, however, the protests of 1977 lacked a mobilising utopian vision, consisting in an alienation of the protests’ aim. Student movements were fading, radical violent organisation were
increasing and the Red Brigades started to target individuals, using the method of kneecapping. The defeat of the various European student movements after 1968 had indeed an impact in Italy. The end of the Paris movement, the downfall of the Prague Spring and the decline of the German movement signed a decline in 1968-style protests. Urban isolation increased and led to a normalisation of the use of drugs, crime, violence and lack of political commitment. The culmination of unrest happened in March of 1979 when students, common criminals, marginal workers and others engaged in a rash of violence. Militants tried in this way to find justification for small crimes, including assassinations.

This striking participatory tension, in which individuality appears to have been literally moulded into a collective identity, suffered as militancy in the New Left began quite quickly to weigh heavily upon women (Ergas, 1982). The "consumeristic" exploitation of women both as housewives and as sexual objects; the "imperialism" and the "chauvinism" of male values; the "authoritarianism" of male-female relations in the family, in politics, and in all other places of social interaction were forcefully denounced. Just in 1963, public kindergartens were set and Italian women could enter every profession, included the public institutions. Italian women's movement, as in other countries, developed around 1970 when a separatist group was made up of those women who abandoned the mixed left-wing political organisations. The segmentation of the movement favoured bloc-recruitment and the development of internal female leaders. The formation of collectives and the adoption of consciousness-raising techniques generated closely knit female networks (Ergas, 1982). The second half of the decade was dominated by the struggle in favour of the law on abortion, which was passed in 1978 and which mobilised a large part of the feminist movement (Hajek, 2014). Starting in 1974, with the development of direct action for abortion, the feminist movement also began tackling other problems of female existence (Ergas, 1982). Anyways, this appeared to focus more on
women’s health, sexuality, birth-control and safe abortion methods, rather than motherhood. Indeed, some women tried to separate their private life from their political engagement, contradicting the feminist phrase “the personal is political”. There were groups who campaigned for childcare services, in particular those who were active in unions or close to the Unione delle Donne Italiane (UDI; Italian Women’s Union), which was connected to the Communist Party. The New Left organisations mostly concerned with the struggle for abortion were Lotta Continua, Avanguardia Operaia, and the Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo. By the way, with the election of 1976, “1968” is said to be ended, marking the closure of the period of widespread mobilisation that had been inaugurated by the students’ revolts (Ergas, 1982).

2-Political layout

The social and economic changes affecting Italy in the first decade after the end of the second world war were shaped to a significant degree by the USA. In Italy, as well as in other countries included in the European Recovery Plan (ERP), US-funded programs made a fundamental contribution to helping the country resume industrial production and reorganise its collective services and public administration (Scrivano, 2005). The Italian party system has been characterised by a polarised pluralism, with a long tradition of violent antagonism between the Left and the Right. In the 1948 first republican elections, apart from the two giants, the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Communists (PCI), only the Socialist party (PSI) outpolled the pseudo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI; Social Italian Movement). While Centre-parties, being less electorally supported, have appeared consistently as partners in DC-dominated coalitions, the MSI has been excluded from direct participation in all Italian governments (Weinberg and Eubank, 1988). Italy acquired its first centre-left government, led by Moro, in 1963, when the Socialists joined the Christian Democratic-led coalition. According to Confalonieri (1995), the entry of Socialists into government coalitions
prospected a wider tolerance for protest action, since the Socialists were unwilling to become identified with repression. The PCI was the second-largest party and gathered 25 per cent of the votes in the same year. Nevertheless, the components of the Party have evolved, seeing a decrease in the number of workers and an increase among the white-collar class (Balestracci, 2013). Before the social movements, between 1964 and 1968, there was social and political stagnation and immobility. The “opening to the Left” which was signed by this governmental coalition, did not concretise in a modernisation of society. Political participation was channelled through either political subculture, the network of organisation (trade-unions, farmers leagues, women’s unions) established or controlled by the Communist Party or Christian Democrats (Confalonieri, 1995). The Italian DC tied Italy to NATO, championed the emerging united Europe, and developed a social market economy propelled by several semipublic corporations (Hilwig, 2009). However, by the end of the decade the Centre-left coalition government appeared corrupt, weak and unpopular, with no alternatives in sight. From the 1963 elections to 1976, the government was dominated by three eminent DC figures, which alternately assumed and exchanged the role of Presidente del Consiglio (Prime Minister), Ministro degli Esteri (Foreign affairs Minister) and Ministro dell’Interno (Internal affairs Minister), and they were Aldo Moro, Giulio Andreotti e Mariano Rumor. Yet, from the 1950s onwards many collateral and mass organisations distanced themselves from the main political parties, due to the dissatisfaction often bound to ethic-cultural questions like women and family emancipation (Balestracci, 2013). However, remarkable is the first elections of the Italian Republic, which in 1946 let women vote for the first time. Italian parties responded actively to the challenges presented by the social movements. Particularly the Communist Party engaged itself in competition with them for support among the newly mobilised social actors (Confalonieri, 1995).
We need then to refer to the Italian newspapers while dealing with politics, as periodicals are extremely politicised. Conservatives were “Il Mattino” led by Giovanni Ansaldo, which represented the Mezzogiorno (Centre Italy), and “La Stampa”, owned by the Agnelli family and hence Fiat. Socialist and communist opposed their newspapers. The magazine Quaderni Rossi, centred in Turin and founded by Raniero Panieri, was of crucial importance. Indeed it expressed a critique of the capitalist system that the working class was expecting from the political parties, whereas the social democrats were unable to combine the principles of socialism together with the new situation. Although the traditional Left-wing derived from Marxist and working-class beliefs and exerted its influence through political and trade union organisations (Spini, 1972), after the war a “democratic programming” was put before the working-class objectives. By abandoning the factory as the nerve centre of capitalist relationships, the parties of the Left had renounced the struggle against the system (Spini, 1972). The goal of overthrowing the capitalist status quo, perceived by the New Left to be controlled locally by the Christian Democrats and globally by American imperialism, united terrorists of tactically and temperamentally diverse backgrounds (Drake, 1999). During the 1968 elections, the PCI undoubtedly succeeded in benefiting from the current student unrest, a situation which had developed quite outside the Party’s directives. Since the PCI was the largest communist party in Western Europe, with circa 30 per cent of votes, it posed a threat to the leading party of the Christian Democrats (Hilwig, 2009). Nonetheless, the spread of the neo-fascist party MSI was a danger for Italian politics, since at the local election in June 1970 it was collecting votes, previously of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, in many towns of the South. Due to unemployment, Southerns felt unsafe from the new program of reforms proposed by traditional parties. The appearance of the PCI as the leading party in the elaboration of a reforming policy of the PSI, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Soviet policies, domestic and foreign, had repercussions within the Communist
Part (Spini, 1972). As a consequence, we mark the formation of a group of dissidents centred on the magazine *Il Manifesto*, guided by Toni Negri, who later was expelled from the PCI. The periodical believed that the PCI’s strategy of reform would be a failure and that this would bring about a crisis throughout the political Left and in the unions, and that only through this crisis could a revolutionary organisation emerge capable of achieving the conquest of power (Spini, 1972). Instead, the political elite feared a military golpe on the model of the Greek colonels of 1967. In 1969, the split of the Socialist party was intended by the Third International as an attempt of the bourgeoisie to integrate into the Italian system the working-class struggle through revisionism, or to defeat this fight restoring the fascist power (Galli, 1986). Finally the same year, ACLI – the workers’ syndicate under the Catholic Church - declared the end of cooperation with the DC (Guasco, 1989). The parliamentary elections of 1972 reinforced the tendency in the Christian Democratic party to seek new sources of consensus in the conservative electorate (Ergas, 1982). In contrast to the “fomenters of disorder”, the PCI and the MSI, the DC purported to reinstate “law and order” and to reaffirm traditional values. The referendum dealt a severe blow to the Christian Democratic party, for 59 percent of the electorate voted in favour of maintaining divorce (Ergas, 1982). Later, local governments came under the Left control in many areas of the country, particularly after the administrative elections of the mid-Seventies. In 1976, youth above 18 years old gained access to vote and the elections marked a drastic change in the party preferences. The official Communist Party, reaching a historic peak of voter support at 34 per cent, had abandoned the cause of revolution in its drive to become a credible democratic force (Drake, 1999) and accepted eventually the role of NATO. The PCI, aided by its expansion into the "peripheral" areas of the New Left, as well as by the latter’s electoral weakness, tended to concentrate political representation of New Left forces in its own hands (Ergas, 1982). In fact, the PCI of that time was Marxists, but in the manner of Gramsci, with strong humanist and
democratic inclination (Drake, 1984). Nevertheless, the turning point was defined by the incredible *compromesso storico* (historical compromise), which was first proposed in 1972 by Enrico Berlinguer, PCI leader, in the article *Riflessioni sull'Italia dopo i fatti del Cile* (Reflections on Italy after the Chilean facts) published by the communist magazine “Rinascita”. The bargain traded a collaboration between the DC and the PCI, which openly manifested its detachment from the Soviet Union. The PCI wanted indeed to replace the Socialist Party from the traditional governmental coalition. There were also negative consequences, besides this friendly negotiation. At the G7 meeting in Puerto Rico, 1976, US President Gerald Ford, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and UK Prime Minister James Callaghan held an exclusive consultation to examine the “Italian question”. Aware of the instability of the DC at that time, the four Head of States aimed to do anything to oppose the PCI from gaining power. They even promised to sustain financially the Italian government until the Communists would have stayed out to coalition. Meanwhile extreme Left Italian supporters believed in a 51 per cent votes outcome for the PCI. Disappointed by the elections’ statistics, extremist social movements, in particular the Red Brigades, resorted again to violence. What Toni Negri and the Brigadists wanted was a return to Marx and Lenin. Indeed, Nando dalla Chiesa (1981) deemed Italian culture to be marked by the exceptional diffusion and abuse of the term revolution. Yet, violence is to be considered something not new in Italian history. As Ferrarotti (1981) pointed out, in eight years Italy passed from one crisis to another, beginning in 1968 with the political, generational and cultural, then the 1971 predominantly financial, with the establishing of the dollar’s nonconvertibility to gold, and finally to that of 1973, related to the Yom Kippur the oil crisis. In this period, terrorism took on increasingly violent aspects, in a framework of collective fear and psychological blackmail. As the Communist Party lost its revolutionary spirit, leaving behind Marx’s thoughts, many non-sympathisers understood why the Red Brigades
complained about the government, albeit against their use of violence. However, they definitely lost popular consensus after the Moro kidnapping and murder, which in contrast was decided as counterreaction to the historical compromise. According to Drake (1984), the endemic weakness of Italian liberalism has been the essential ideological precondition for that country’s highly volatile, comparatively extremist political and intellectual life, resulting in vigorous socialist, communist, Catholic, and fascist traditions, each offering channels for career advancement in the forms of party jobs, teaching and editorial positions, and networks of literary publications.

The complex system of alliances constructed by the Christian Democrats effectively worked against the realisation of equality for women (Ergas, 1982). Yet, the feminist movement had a considerable impact on the organisation of the new Left party, especially the PCI. Strongly supported by Togliatti, who placed the women’s question at the top of its political agenda, the UDI was designed as an instrument for fulfilling the party’s hegemony and assigned the role to educate non-communists and attract them into the sphere of influence of PCI (Confalonieri, 1995). The PCI, especially throughout the first half of the 1950s, used the UDI to convey its policy, largely suppressing the specific point of view represented by the theoretically autonomous women’s association (Ergas, 1982). In the 1970s, many European Communist women were experiencing a double militancy, since they developed new active and autonomous feminist groups while not renouncing their adherence to the Communist Party (Papadogiannis and Gehrig, 2014). The party’s line had shifted from the "workerism" of pre-war Socialism to full recognition of the role of women in the family, recognising the social value of motherhood. For instance, Rita Montagnana, Communist senator and wife of Togliatti, affirmed in an interview with the newspaper “l’Unità” that communist women were against divorce (Balestracci, 2013). After Fascism, family constituted the only value to preserve and to contrast the corruption and the moral
disintegration of Italy during WWII. Yet, these words can hardly be attributed to the belief of all communist women, as Montagnana was left at the beginning of the Republic when her husband started a relationship with the future President of the Chambers Nilde Iotti. Indeed, Nilde Iotti in her first report as responsible for the Communist Female Section (Sezione Femminile) aimed to reform the traditional family model. A first renovation into the Italian judicial system is to be found in 1963 with the abrogation of the “Bachelorette law” that allowed the dismissal of women who were going to marry. The first group of Italian neo-feminism, DEMAU (Demistification Patriarchal Authoritarianism), formed in Milan in 1966 as a small group of young female intellectuals committed to ideological critique. In 1967 this group committed itself to overt confrontation with the UDI, on the issue of women's social security, labelling as paternalistic the Communists' approach of "tutelage" to the problems of the working women (Confalonieri, 1995). On the contrary, with the decline of female membership in Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action), female registration in the Christian Democratic party suffered proportionately. Nonetheless, the Radical Party was the one more active in the feminist struggle. As this party allowed its members to join the organisation without renouncing previous preferences, the Socialists could maintain a link with parts of Italian society that had been influenced by the mobilisations spawned in 1968 and 1969, but it excluded the mainstream of the New Left. The Socialists thus developed a working relationship with the Movimento di Liberazione della Donna (MLD), the women’s group affiliated with the Radical party, but not with the principal part of the feminist movement, which had developed within the New Left (Ergas, 1982). In 1973-74 feminism rapidly grew into a web of autonomous organisations that were less and less tributary to Marxism (Confalonieri, 1995). In 1975, over 50 percent of its female membership was concentrated in two regions (Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany), which together accounted for 23 percent of the total female population (Ergas, 1982). The impact of feminist politics on the party, which was to become visible after 1986, was
facilitated in the early Eighties by the mounting crisis of identity of the party. Eventually, the ambiguous behaviour of the political elites in its “tolerance” towards the terrorist acts was interpreted by Galli (1986) as a method to stabilise a moderate, and anti-communist, political order thanks to the destabilisation introduced by terrorists.

3- Italian terroristic groups

From 1969 to 1976, the number of terrorist episodes was more or less constant, then in 1977, terrorist actions rapidly increased, until a decline in 1980 (Drake, 1984; Tranfaglia, 1989). First, from 1969 to 1974 terrorism in Italy was an overwhelmingly right-wing phenomenon, remarking the Piazza Fontana massacre on December 12, 1969, and the Italicus and Brescia massacres of 1974 (Drake, 1984). The weight of right terrorism is 95 per cent between 1969 and 1973, 85 per cent in 1974 and 78 per cent in 1975 (della Porta and Rossi, 1984). From 1975 to 1979, right-wing terrorism was obscured by left-wing terrorism episodes. A resurgence of extreme right terrorism occurred in 1980 with the tragic Bologna train station massacre. Thus, the 1980s were a tough period for the government as Italy experienced all kinds of terrorism. Two radical neofascists, Giovanni Ventura and Franco Freda, were linked to the massacre of Piazza Fontana in 1971, which had left seventeen dead and eighty-eight wounded. Freda, an anti-Semite of neo-Nazi sentiments, was the leader of the *Ordine Nuovo* (New Order) in Padua (Drake, 1989).

Between Autumn 1968 and Autumn 1969 were created all the principle New Left organisations. In October 1968 was founded the *Unione dei Comunisti Italiani* (Union of Italian Communists) together with its journal *Servire il Popolo* (To serve the people). In May 1969 we remark the birth of *La Classe*, which transformed into *Potere Operaio* (Worker Power) in September and published the magazine *Il Manifesto*. In the same period as the latter group, there was *Lotta Operaia* (Worker Struggle), which started from the workers’ explosion at Fiat Mirafiori. This last organisation claimed that from Vietnam to Italy is quick:
"Se la spinta delle masse anche in Italia dovesse riprodursi e accrescersi, essa non potrebbe aspettarsi che una dura reazione... Prepararsi al peggio per volere il meglio non è avventurismo, ma una condizione di vita o di morte per il movimento operaio italiano, a scadenza più o meno breve". (Potere Operaio, 1967)

If the mass pressure would reproduce in Italy and augment, it could not but expect a harsh reaction... Preparing to the worst wanting the better is not adventurism, but a condition of life or death for the Italian worker movement, with a more or less short deadline.

Formally Potere Operaio had disbanded itself as an open above ground political organisation in 1972 (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987). These groups, such as Autonomia Operaia and other student-like organisations, had the slogan, "Neither with the State nor with the Red Brigades" (Statera, 1979). However, Drake (1989) specified that it should have been interpreted in this manner: “Against the state, independently of the Red Brigades, but also with them as with all revolutionaries, with all combatants for communism". Still, several thousand members had found their way into the Red Brigades. A breaking point occurred then in 1976, when male and female activists of the Left extra-parliamentary group Lotta Continua (Continuous Battle) physically clashed during a national assembly (Hajek, 2014). Prima Linea (Front Line) was born at Magneti Marelli and Telettra of Crescenzago – Milan -, whereas the Red Brigades had their bases at Pirelli and Sit-Siemens. The moral leaders were the same of Lotta Continua and Autonomia Operaia, e.g. Toni Negri, Oreste Scalzone and Franco Piperno (Galli, 1986). After her brief experience between the Red Brigades, Susanna Ronconi abandoned the group to found Prima Linea in 1975 with other militants. It turned illegal through the use of political violence in due course of the end of the 1970s. In 1976 there was indeed the transition to the armed struggle as a priority, in which some militants like Sergio Segio, but not exclusively from Prima Linea, admitted the possibility of a “golpe dei sergenti” (Sergeant’s golpe)
in Italy. After the happenings in Latin America and the Greek junta, they assumed that giving political power to the hands of military leaders could be an option. The group formalised then as an armed group in May 1977 in Florence. A national command was established, with a division comprehending Milan and Bergamo, and another one in Turin under Marco Donat-Cattin and Roberto Sandalo. Roberto Rosso was the ideological mind behind the organisation. Still, many groups deriving from the student movement oppose terrorism, but just as strongly oppose the violence shown by the State. Furthermore, in 1974 an armed group was created in the Southern regions, and it was the first among all the cited organisations. The *Nuclei Armati Proletari* (NAP; Armed Proletarian Nuclei) connected to the prisons’ struggle in 1972-1973, particularly the ones of Poggioreale (Napoli), Rebibbia (Roma) e San Vittore (Milano). Other Left extra-parliamentary groups, eventually armed struggle, we can cite were *Avanguardia Operaia* (Worker Vanguard), *Fronte Comunista Combattente* (Fighting Communist Front), *Comitati comunisti rivoluzionari* (Cocori; Revolutionary Communist Committees) and *Brigata XXVIII Marzo* (28 March Brigade). In addition, several extreme Left organisations collaborated from the very first beginning, i.e. Gap, Red Brigades and *Potere operaio* acted together on the propaganda and logistic ground (Galli, 1986).

Anyways, many groups were formed even on the extreme Right. Violence was indeed associated more with a right-wing tradition and Italians had clearly in mind the experience with fascism. Despite the republican constitution’s prohibition on the reconstruction of the Fascist party, the authorities permitted a thinly disguised neo-Fascist movement to be organised shortly after the war and allowed it to persist into the decades (Weinberg and Eubank, 1988). For these alienated conservative elites who became the core troops of reaction, Nietzsche’s ideas - which D’Annunzio popularised in Italy - offered a brilliant intellectual defence of aristocratic principles and a most welcome refutation of democracy,
socialism, and communism (Drake, 1984). *Ordine Nuovo* emerged from the neo-fascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI) in the mid-1950s, because apparently it was too moderate. It was led by young veterans of the armed forces of Mussolini’s Social Republic, notably Giuseppe “Pino” Rauti and Clemente Graziani. However, in 1973 many leaders of *Ordine Nuovo* were condemned in front of the national court for reconstructing the Italian Fascist Party. Young extremists remained without guidance and opted for terrorism, whereas others decided to flee abroad. The same year, the police succeeded in uncovering another organisation, *Rosa dei Venti*. This was a federation of neo-Fascist groups operating throughout the country and still committed to the principles of Mussolini’s Social Republic. Yet, new organisations entered the scene, such as *Ordine nero* and *Anno zero*. They operated on the assumption that their best chance for victory depended on continued turmoil in Italy (Drake, 1984).

Similarly, there were founded also *Avanguardia Nazionale* (National Vanguard), *Fronte Nazionale Rivoluzionario* (National Revolutionary Front) and *Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari* (NAR; Armed Revolutionary Nuclei). The right-wing “strategy of tension” sought to pass off acts of public violence as the work of left-wing activists in order to pave the way for the imposition of military rule (Glynn, 2009). Moreover, from 1968 there were so many extra-parliamentary and revolutionary organisations, which also picked similar names, that it was difficult to tell if the action was committed by a Left- or Right-wing group until it was revendicated. For instance, although neofascists had been responsible for the attack at Piazza Fontana, at first the police looked for the guilty party exclusively among those on the political Left (Terhoeven, 2021). Nonetheless, the Italian state was accused in the guise of secret service involvement in these right-wing-led atrocities. For this reason, many scholars have tried to figure out if also red terrorism was supported by external forces and sponsored by states like the USSR. Anyways, no clear evidence was found and, until the 1990s, it was believed that there was no interest from the
Soviet or the American side to “destabilise” the Italian government (Tranfaglia, 1989).

4-International terrorism in Italy

Many authors, like Tranfaglia (1989), have asked themselves why thousands of Italians embraced the arms against Italian democracy, and still we cannot find a concise solution. Italian militants started later than in the rest of Europe but grew exponentially in the “Warm Autumn” of 1969. The network of support for terroristic activity in Italy constituted the truly dangerous and unique feature (Drake, 1999), concerning both domestic and international terrorism. However, beyond the contacts between Italian terrorism and the RAF, the PLO and other international groups, the whole Italian terroristic experience is more comparable to the fragile democratic states of Turkey and Argentina in the 1970s (Tranfaglia, 1989). The only difference is that Italy survived in its newly established democracy, while the others fell under the threat of armed groups and turned into authoritarian states with a military regime. Furthermore, Italian revolutionary terrorists were way more “provincial” than their European counterparts (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987). In fact, Italian militants mainly limited themselves to revolution inside the borders and for this reason, the Red Brigades faced many communication problems with other international groups. Albeit many issues and strategies of those times are still confidential, we found some responses with respect to internal negotiations and gatherings concerning terrorism. As Drake (1984) already asked, ‘what was the role of the right-wing P2 Masonic order in these years, or of the Italian secret service agencies, or of foreign secret service agencies, or of the Camorra and of the Mafia?’. Some details were already known, or at least supposed, during the 1970s, right when they were happening. The Left in particular claimed that right-wing terrorism was part of a plot tolerated or even actively supported by Italian state authorities to block the socialists and communists from gaining power and to establish an authoritarian
regime. The CIA and NATO were believed to be the real ‘puppet masters’ behind the alleged conspiracy against Italy (Hänni et al., 2020). Even in a resolution of the BR’s Strategic Direction published in 1978, Italy was documented as being in the grip of an international conspiracy (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987). However, Terhoeven (2021) reiterates that Red Brigades’ crime was all too familiar to Italians from the practices not only of Sardinian bandits but also of the Mafia. There is a long-standing intellectual tradition in Italy that seeks to make violence "photogenic," that is, to justify it and to aesthetise it (Drake, 1984). This showed that in a country used to organised crime and violence not only prominent politicians, but even international actors found easily a fertile ground to play their game. Indeed, according to Giorgio Bocca (1982) ‘terrorism does not invent but rediscovers, recycles, and readapts that which is already in the womb of the nation’. In 1990, the second part of Aldo Moro’s defense written during captivity was discovered in via Montenevoso, Milan, as the BR ex-refuge in that building was being restructured. With these testimonies, the truth came out and further proof of an international force influencing Italian politics was made official and public. Indeed, Moro (L’Espresso, 1990) revealed:

‘Dall’esterno, bisogna dirlo francamente, in molteplicità di rivoli, offrivano per un certo numero di anni gli aiuti della CIA, finalizzati ad una auspicata omogeneità della politica interna ed esterna italiana ed americana. Francamente bisogna dire che non è questo un bel modo, un modo dignitoso di armonizzare le proprie politiche. [...] E invece qui si ha un brutale do et des. Ti do questo denaro, perché faccia questa politica. E questo, anche se è accaduto, è vergognoso e inammissibile.’

From the outside, we have to say it frankly, with the multiplicity of streams, they offered the help of CIA for a certain number of years, with the purpose of wished homogeneity in the internal and foreign Italian and American politics. Frankly we have to say that this is not
a good way, a respectable way to harmonise own policies. [...] And instead here we have a rough do et des. I give you this money, because you have to do this policy. And this, even if it did happen, is dishonourable and inadmissible.

Moreover, the CIA was not the only one financing the Christian Democrats. From 1963 to 1972 Exxon Corporation spent millions of dollars to support anti-Communist parties during the elections and Christian Democratic and Social Democratic officials were also indicted for taking bribes from Lockheed in the sale of Hercules C-130 airplanes. (Drake, 1989). Moreover, Confindustria paid to ensure that the party passed laws that reflected industrialist interests (L’Espresso, 1990). Galli (1986) hence targeted it as the “invisible governance” because Italian governments had secret affairs with the organised underworld, the Neapolitan camorra, and other criminous services. Until 1975 Italian terrorist actions were always labelled as right-wing, while the mass media directed attention to spectacular acts of international terrorism committed on Italian soil by groups from the Middle East (Weinberg and Eubank, 1988).

Conspiracy is particularly connected to the Masonic Lodge Propaganda Due (P2), formed by Licio Gelli and which involved prominent politicians, high-ranking military and police officers. This co-secret organisation promoted neo-fascist violence during the 1970s in order to prepare the way for a coup d’état that would thwart the Communist Party’s march towards power and participation in national government (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987). Another conspirational narrative addresses the “Gladio” mission, insinuating that the stay-behind structures established in most non-socialist states in Europe after the Second World War had created a terrorist network coordinated by NATO and the CIA. In this regard, on December 18, 1981, the BR column in Veneto kidnapped the American General and NATO officer James Dozier from his home in Verona. Anyways, this operation was planned due to the “provincial” reputation
attached to the Red Brigades among other terrorist organisations like the PLO. Most likely, this mission was pursued also to reach the consent of the Bulgarian intelligence agency. The BR hoped that, in exchange for the NATO secrets that might be extracted from General Dozier, the Bulgarians would provide weapons and money so that the revolutionary struggle could be continued (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987). Yet, suspicion about the reliability of Bulgarians emerged on another occasion. On 13 May 1981, the Turkish assassin and former Grey Wolves militant Mehmet Ali Agca shot and severely wounded Pope John Paul II in St Peter's Square. Western narratives blame the Bulgarian connection, claiming that they, together with the KGB, had directed Agca to kill the Pope who had been seen as a threat to communist rule in Poland. An Eastern narrative was proposed to challenge this view, fuelled by disinformation of East German and Bulgarian intelligence services, that alleged that the CIA had orchestrated the assassination attempt in order to implicate Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Then, the theory concerning Field Manual 30-31B attributes left-wing terrorism around the world to US intelligence operations. However, documentation release demonstrated that neither the intelligence services of the Eastern bloc nor those of the NATO countries controlled a large number of international terrorist organisations or even a global terror network. Due to all these narratives, Italian people believed in a right-wing organised political violence and often wrongly credited the Red Brigades as black terrorists.

However, the internal terroristic plots have been obscured by Palestinian terrorism, which cause high numbers of victims in single events. The fuse was the 1972 Munich massacre, where the Palestinian group Black September kidnapped and then killed all the Israeli delegation to the Olympics. Later, in 1973 Italian Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID; Information and Defence Service) found five Arab terrorists with Soviet missile launchers in Ostia. Nonetheless, these individuals would have been soon released and some extradite to Libya. On December 17, 1973,
Palestinian terrorism caused 32 victims as five men entered the airport Roma-Fiumicino shooting randomly and finally throwing a bomb into the Boeing 707 of Pan Am, with direction Teheran. From this tragic event to 1985, Italy did not experience further Palestinian attacks. Following the theory of the “Lodo Moro” (Lomellini, 2022), Italy benefitted from a series of negotiations with the Libyan government and the Palestinian terrorist organisations. Nevertheless, in 1982 the Synagogue in Rome was targeted, bringing Prime Minister Cossiga to reveal something about the secret agreement between Italy and Palestinian terrorism to the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot in 2008. In 1985, the Italian cruise Achille Lauro was seized by four Palestinian terrorists from the PFLP. The same year, the airport Roma-Fiumicino became again the theatre of a massacre. This time the terrorist group was part of the one led by Abu Nidal and provoked 13 deaths. Targets were the lanes in front of the Israeli company El Al and the American TWA. The Red Brigades, among their international contacts, had reached out the Palestine Liberation Organisation and attested to identify with their cause. However, even this Palestinian organisation labelled the BR as provincial. Things changed only after Moro’s death, considered as proof of their commitment to armed struggle. Representatives of the PLO, George Habbash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in particular, held discussion in Paris with Moretti. Later on, the PLO agreed to provide the BR with substantial quantities of arms if the organisation agreed to attack Israeli and NATO targets located in Italy (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987).

5-Red Brigades

The *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades) were the most famous and destructive left-wing terrorist groups in Italy between the 1970s and the 1980s (Drake, 1999). They evolved from a small group of communist students and workers under the command of a former student radical leader at the University of Trento, Renato Curcio. He left university in 1969 and moved with his wife, the other RB leader Margherita “Mara” Cagol, to
Milan. There they met another communist youth from Emilia-Romagna, Alberto Franceschini, and together they founded the *Collettivo Politico Metropolitano* in September 1969. In October 1970, the Red Brigades were created. The announcement was printed in the issue of the Collective’s journal, *Sinistra Proletaria*, where the group was described as the avant-garde of the proletariat’s struggle against capitalism. According to Mario Moretti (2007), they belonged to the tradition and culture of the communist Left in Italy. They were radical Marxist-Leninists whose violent campaign against Christian Democratic establishment had enjoyed widespread and long-term support in the so-called “Movement” to the Left of the official Communist Party (PCI) (Drake, 1999). Unsatisfied with the reformism presented by the PCI, they opted for terrorism to destroy state institutions. By contrast to Feltrinelli and his Gruppi Armati Proletari (GAP), they had no illusions about partisan operations in the mountains or a new Cuba in the Mediterranean. The struggle would be in the great metropolitan centres where the contradictions of capitalism were most apparent and where their prospective clientele, the workers, lived (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987). Still, episodes like guerrilla protracted by Che Guevara, the operates of the Viet Congs and the 1973 Chilean golpe were inspirational. The Brigades tried especially hard in 1974 to disrupt the debate on divorce and to make it impossible for non-violent political debate to occur in Italy. Similarly, they attempted to undermine the 1975 and 1976 elections, and opposed to the formal participation of the communists in the government (Statera, 1979). If the Red Brigades were not able to mould the state as they wanted, the state suffered from their terrorist attacks. According to Peci (1983), BR arose as the militant, revolutionary response of a small group of activists and their motley supporters on the extra-parliamentary left to the perception of such a takeover. All were versed in Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and in such Italian speakers of the revolutionary mystique as Toni Negri, professor and militant in *Potere Operaio* and *Autonomia operaia* (Drake, 1999). Nonetheless, according to the first *pentito* Peci (1983), most of the
Brigatisti had a poor culture and education concerning communism. Besides Curcio, Cagol, Balzerani, Ronconi and others who attended university, a relevant section of the BR read Marx and Mao Tse-Tung without a guide, free to interpret it and its ideology in a personal way. The issue, recognised by Peci himself, was that the Russian and Chinese Revolutions described by the role leaders of the Red Brigades, hardy matched with the Italian situation. With the reformist transformation of the Communist Party, hence the political, material and psychological support of these revolutionary masses, left-wing terrorism in Italy would have faded quickly (Drake, 1999). Citing Peci (1983), the only alternative to the Italian Left was either the Red Brigades or Autonomia Operaia. Since Autonomia Operaia was thought to be declining, he joined directly the Red Brigades. To target their particular political violence, it was coined the term “Cattocomunismo”, due to the fact that many terrorists were devout Catholics or members of the Communist Party, but also because their need for total and definitive answers is either Catholic and Communist (Galli, 1986). In Spring 1970, they distributed the first flyers with their name and the star logo, claiming that “the red autumn had already started” (Casamassima, 2005). Through this action, they exercised armed propaganda, which was designated as the first step toward revolution. They would have passed then to the armed struggle, which would have installed a civil war. The Red Brigades ended soon their violent propaganda as already in September 1979, the Red Brigades performed their first political-military violent operation: the burning of a Sit-Siemens manager’s car. Later they started kidnapping the responsible of the “class oppression” and committing robberies in imitation of Bolsheviks. Tarrow (1990) in fact claimed that the 1965-1975 decade of unrest resembled the years of civil unrest 1919–20, when communists and fascists fought each other on the streets of Italy’s cities. Nonetheless, BR needed to procure some resources to run the complex structured organisation they belonged to and small thefts, as well as ransomware, became a praxis. They soon included physical attacks. In the spring of
1972, they kidnapped a man for the first time. Nonetheless, this action became the paradigm for a long string of politically motivated hostage-taking incidents both in and outside of Italy (Terhoeven, 2021). As I had already pointed out, Italian newspapers were politically sided. On the evening of March 3rd, 1972, the news agency ANSA received a photo of Idalgo Macchiarini, Sit-Siemens manager, in the power of his captors. The scene demonstrated extraordinary brutality, albeit the blitz kidnapping lasted half an hour. He was beaten and driven off in a van, and in the picture he showed a black eye and a pistol pointed to the temple. Franceschini (1988) said that ‘in the eyes of the police and carabinieri, [they] were no longer just a handful of young people who had no future, but instead a group that spread fear’. In a scenario overshadowed by right-wing terrorist attacks, Red Brigades showed up and became nationally known. Newspapers targeted the actions as “Tupamaros”-like and split their opinion. On one hand, “L’Unità” condemned the phenomenon, while on the other hand “Lotta continua” approved the guerrilla-style move against the “proletarian oppressors”. Terhoeven (2021) sustains that the Italian photos were more like demonstrations of total control over the victim and made visible the perpetrators’ omnipotence and domination fantasies. The armed group hence played with media. Still, the Italian media referred to female terrorists using personal offences, depicting them in a sexual way. They focused in a morbid manner to sentimental bound and the physical aspect (Stagno, 2018) and did not point out that women had an equal role inside the organisation. On the 17 of June 1974 they killed for the first time. It was in Padua, Zabarella street, Italian Social Movement headquarter. Giuseppe Mazzola and Graziano Giralucci, members of MSI, were the accidental victims. Although unintentional, these murders characterised the change in the tactics of the Red Brigades. However, the most well-known terrorist act committed by the group was the kidnapping and murder of DC Secretary Aldo Moro, who had dominated Italian politics since 1959. Moro’s kidnapping shocked Italy, and the
ineffectiveness of the authorities in solving the crime further weakened the government (Statera, 1979). The Italian government mounted a furious counteroffensive, but the Red Brigades continued to kill and injure businessmen, judges and professors. Clashes within the group undermined the unity and spirit of the organisation already in 1975, when according to Curcio the group was done. In the short run, their infighting resulted in a worsening of the terrorist violence. In 1972, almost all the promoters of the armed struggle were identified, thus some of them left Italy while others chose secrecy (Galli, 1986). They created the first illegal structure, composed of an executive and the scratch of the colonne. These units, situated at the end of the hierarchy, were dislocated in the Italian six main cities or zones. Parallel to these configurations were various fronts for the irregulars, hence a logistical front, a front for the major factories and a mass front (Weinberg and Eubank, 1987). According to Balzerani (1997), for these sympathisers the Red Brigades were a myth. The same narrative is to be linked to the people supporting the mafia. In 1976, many hideouts were uncovered and the historical leaders were all in prison - and Mara dead. Besides the many existing problems of the organisation, they had a financial difficulty (Galli, 1986). In the past the Red Brigades were funded by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli but, after his accidental death, in the late 1970s they could count only on small robberies and ransoms obtained from kidnapping. Nevertheless, in 1976 the group started to reorganised and hence gave rise to the so-called “new Red Brigades”. A new time, the second period of Red Terrorism, had started. Phrasing Giorgio Bocca (1982):

‘Il vulcano sociale è di nuovo in eruzione nel ’77 e questa volta si può anche avere l’impressione che la prateria abbia preso fuoco, che la sovversione vada estendendosi dal nord al sud, dalle città alla provincia.’

The social volcano is again in its eruption phase in 1977 and this time you could also get the feeling that the meadow is on fire, that
the revolution is going widening from North to South, from cities to peripheries.

Bocca (1985) reflected on the fact that probably without this update, urban guerrilla would have concluded, since the dragging and military regression are the effects of the social and economic crisis. Yet, before the reassemble, we must cite the Sossi case. On the 18 of April 1974, in the middle of the divorce referendum, the Red Brigades kidnapped judge Mario Sossi. He had always intervened against the extra-parliamentary Left, but recently he dedicated to the international smuggling of arms (De Lutiis, 1991). In 1976, the weekly Tempo presented an interview to the general Maletti, in which the ex-chief of section “D” said that:

‘Nell’estate del 1975 [...] avemmo sentore di un tentativo di riorganizzazione e di rilancio [...] sotto forma di un gruppo ancora più segreto e clandestino, e costituito da persone insospettabili, anche per censo e per cultura, e con programmi più cruenti. [...] Questa nuova organizzazione partiva col proposito esplicito di sparare, anche se non ancora di uccidere. [...] Arruolavano terroristi da tutte le parti, e i mandanti restavano nell’ombra, ma non direi che si potessero definire “di sinistra”.

‘In Summer 1975 [...] we had the feeling of an attempt to reorganise and relaunch [...] under the form of an even more secret and clandestine group, and made up of unsuspected people, even for census and culture, and with rougher programs. [...] This new organisation began with the explicit aim of shooting, even though not yet killing. [...] They enrolled terrorists from all the parts, and the instigators remained in shadow, but I wouldn’t say that they could be defined “Left-wing”.

According to Moretti (2007), BR had no problems in finding arms. They bought them directly with or without false documents. Franceschini (1988) mentioned Switzerland and Liechtenstein as countries where they
could buy arms and also remembered that once Moretti went to Lebanon. Suspicion arose even regarding the school for interpreters “Hyperion”, founded in Paris by member of Collettivo politico metropolitano Corrado Simeoni. Investigations linked to the school, Italian magistrates and arms trafficking have never been completely solved (Galli, 1986). A curious case is instead the Israeli offer, which eventually was declined. Israel secret services reached out the BR to provide them with free arms and modern artillery. Apparently, they wanted the Red Brigades to continue their fight and maintain instability in the country, since Italy shared pretty good affairs with the Palestinians. To prove their commitment, they also revealed the names of some Fiat workers who were trying to enter the organisation under fake identities for the Italian secret services (Franceschini, 1988). However, we can just suppose that Mossad tried to get information about the Palestinian groups that were in contact with BR. In 1977, the Red Brigades adopted widely a strategy aimed at targeting persons rather than things, compared to other kinds of Red terrorism (della Porta and Rossi, 1984). Yet, although the Red Brigades were able to finally create a group based in Rome, political violence and terrorism were established with difficulty in the regions and islands of the South. Unsuccessful was the attempt to establish a Sardinian branch, labelled "Barbagia Rossa," exploiting deep-rooted feelings of independence in the island (Ferracuti, 1982). At the end, target centres of terrorist attacks were always Milan, Turin and Rome. Afterwards in 1977, Red Brigades obtained a ransom of one-and-a-half billion lire for kidnapped industrialist, Pietro Costa. This money financed the organisation’s increasingly ambitious plans for 1977 as the country’s political and social environment continued to deteriorate (Drake, 1989). According to Peci (1983), at the beginning each member "earned" 200 thousand lire per month, while in 1979 it was 250 thousand. The amount was calculated on the average salary of a mechanical worker, meaning that home expenses, light, gas bills and medicines were paid by the organisation. Furthermore, a new government of national unity was
established and special measures were adopted with no precedent in autumn 1979. Edoardo Palombi, a Carabinieri general, became the prefect of Genoa, the first military man ever to hold this civilian office. Together with Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, he was recognised as a strong, “of lead” agent against terrorism. The government also stiffened penalties for terrorism, which now included an automatic life sentence for the murder of public officials. Anyways, the most relevant introduction was the new penal law for pentiti, namely repentant terrorists who cooperated with the police. This innovation helped ultimately the defeat of the Red Brigades. During this period, a basic complementarity has developed between the Red Brigades and some other extreme left groups such as the Autonomia Operaia, all of which accept the idea of violence as a means of social change (Statera, 1979). They opposed the clandestine violence of the Brigades and continued to function in the student movement. Nevertheless, the Autonomia Operaia groups in Padua, Genoa, Reggio Emilia and Rome constitute a kind of “reserve force” for the Red Brigades, as well as NAP and some youth from communist families. Yet, violence grew even inside these armed groups. The newspaper Lotta Continua denounced the murder of a young left extremist by the autonomi, but then other organisations were blamed. The extreme Left spent a period of social isolation, they became outcasts. The organisation kept committing terrorist attacks until the last relevant kidnapping of American General James Lee Dozier in December 1981. On January 28, 1982 an Italian antiterrorist team rescued him and captured his kidnappers. The same year, the police captured Giovanni Senzani. He was identified by many pentiti as the real leader of the RB. Indeed, the police found numerous weapons, documents, national union leaders’ dossiers and plans attesting his engagement with the organisation. Moreover, in 1985 Barbara Balzerani was arrested. This defeat signed the decline of the Red Brigades, since there were just a few remaining and even more terrorists changed their minds and became pentiti. Nonetheless, lethal campaigns persisted in the decade of the 1980s, with the last assassination
occurring in 1988. At the end, the Brigatisti can be defined as the responsible of the murder of communism in Italy as a serious alternative to capitalism (Drake, 1999). Successively, the Communist Party changed its name to the Democratic Party of the Left to take distance from this dramatic past and forsaking Marxist-Leninist economic and political models.

6-Women

Women participated side by side during the 1968 social protests. They were students or workers or they simply supported the cause of “revolution”. Many feminists were born in concomitance with these movements, and after taking inspiration from the foreign model. As was true for women in other countries, many Italians soon realised that the sexual revolution may have been liberating for men but was often constraining for women, who felt pressured to be sexually available. For instance, whereas the men often speak of aggression from police, neo-fascists or rival segments of the New Left, these women concentrate on the violence that they experienced at the hands of their own male comrades (Clifford, 2012). However, we should not consider the feminists apolitical. It was the complex economic, social, and political factors that widened the gap separating women from politics (Ergas, 1982). To prove this, Andrea Hajek (2014) analysed the reason behind female militancy in a target group of women who participated into the 1968 social strikes. A witness, Mara, explained that after the 1977 student movement, Italian society fell under a negative cycle of armed struggle, terrorism and drug addiction. Moreover, in this framework, she was pregnant and gave birth the next year, in 1978. Although being a feminist and a supporter of abortion, she decided to keep her child but in political terms, e.g. not bearing in hospital, where she would have lost her identity as well as control over her body. It is also a true that some of them were concerned exclusively in gender equality and women’s rights, but others wanted to reach more, to do more (Stagno, 2018). I disagree therefore with Marta
Serafini (2016), who says in her article about women, terrorism and political violence in “Corriere della Sera” that many women joined the Red Brigades or Prima Linea because disappointed by the feminist movement. In total, 20 per cent of the terrorists in the Italian armed groups were women. However, the majority of women militated in Left-wing terrorism. As many Brigatisti took inspiration from Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism and utopian communist expectations in the “Critique of Dialectical Reason” (1960), many women close to terrorism have undoubtedly read and admired the words of Simone de Beauvoir. Many female terrorists declared themselves feminists and we can suppose this ideology to be the trigger for participation in the armed conflict. Susanna Ronconi (1988) recalled the Venetian operaismo as the antecedent of feminism, which also caused the decline of Potere operaio. In many Left extra-parliamentary organisations women made efforts with the attempt of cutting some autonomous space for feminism inside these groups (Bobbio, 1988).

‘La liberazione della donna, la liberazione della sessualità sono forse i due nodi decisivi per impostare in modo collettivo la nostra volontà di essere felici.’ (Lotta Continua, 1975)

Women’s liberation, sexuality liberation are perhaps the two decisive knots to frame in a collective method our will to be happy.

However, these attempts were always party’s tools toward women and not instruments in the hands of women themselves. Silvia Arancio (1988) hence claimed she could not recognise herself in the statement “the personal is political” because in politics women did not exist. Many Left militants indeed acknowledge the personal is political as the private problems besides women’s question. Yet, Barbara Balzerani (1998) argued that she reached politics from an initial protest for women’s equality in the 1970s. Nonetheless, feminist manifestations were too calm for these terrorists, as they admired more the old communist feminists,
the ones that fought for revolutionary policy. According to Susanna Ronconi (2007):

‘Dire che il pensiero femminile e femminista sia alieno dalla violenza è falso, dal 1970 al 1977 noi che avevamo fatto la scelta delle armi portavamo avanti una doppia militanza: di classe e di genere. Certo, per Margherita e per le donne nelle Br non era così, perché quello era un movimento interno alla logica leninista, la lotta di classe dominava su tutto.’

Saying that the feminine and feminist though is alienated from violence is false, from 1970 to 1977 we who had chosen arms brought forward a double militancy: of class and gender. Obviously, for Margherita and the women in BR it was not like this, because that was a movement inside the Leninist logic, class struggle dominated above everything.

In fact, Ronconi (1997) redeemed her passion for politics as the cause of her violent turn and detachment from the feminist movement. Even Barbara Balzerani (1997) reminisced about her political commitment which instantly brought them to abandon the traditional maternal or marital roles. Another terrorist, Loredana Biancamano (1988) retained the feminist commune where she lived to have granted her a new identity. She was aware of being the “daughters of new times”. On the same lines, Silvia Arancio (1988) regretted her violent experience but stated that, conversely to her radicalisation, the feminist ideology was still alive. Therefore, I would rather affirm that feminism triggered the participation to armed struggle as these terrorists told, but contrarily to their said unique commitment to communism, I doubt that the feminist question was put aside and, instead, I retain that it was advanced even in their political and violent organisations in different ways.

Representations of female terrorists tend to oscillate between polarised depictions of women militants as “token terrorists” (Morgan, 1989) –
incapable of violence and therefore subject and in thrall to the violent men to whom they are attached – and as extremely ruthless and unnatural killers whose thirst for violence far outstrips that of their male counterparts (Glynn, 2009). Some of these young women were on the contrary extremely generous and altruistic, working hard to grant their family a respectful life and hence neglected their studies, such as Angela Vai and Loredana Biancamano. Sometimes they were the only source of income for families but broadly all of them aimed at creating a better society for their loved ones through armed struggle. Many of them curiously wished to become a teacher. Barbara Balzerani even worked as pedagogue with disabled children. In addition, following the protests of 1968 and the new legislation on divorce and abortion, many terrorists represented these changing times. Barbara Balzerani knew her husband in Potere Operaio but separated soon from him. Annamaria Ludmann married a man in 1970 but left him after a few months and returned to live with her mother. Even Adriana Faranda married in 1970 and like Balzerani met her husband in Potere Operaio, but later they split up.

Clandestinity was not an easy option for those women who had parents or children to leave behind. Nevertheless, the number of married women devoted to the armed struggle raised in the second phase of terrorism (Tranfaglia, 1989). Political urgency pushed them to lose sentimental bounds because the armed fight is incompatible with secrecy. Many males in BR tended to believe they have found another family among their comrades. The same feelings were shared less by women (Mantovani, 1997). The engagement would have been total and indeed many refused political violence to stay in contact with their loved ones, like Angela Vai. On the contrary, Adriana Faranda (1997) is an exception as she left her daughter for the cause. In her view, revolution would have manifested in a short period and afterwards, she would have created a better society for her child. Yet, partners both members of the Red Brigades were discouraged to live in the same refuges and apartments. According to Peci
(1983), women were even more engaged in military operations than their male counterparts. Since the number of women adhering to armed struggle was scant, as well as women in the colonne, so they took up arms and killed in the same measures as men. Susanna Ronconi (1997) recalled the time when she enrolled in a shooting club – in Italy you can possess an arm only for determined cases, hunting as a sport is one of them – to train and practice gun fires. At the same time, she understood that owning a gun means that you will be brought to use it. Susanna Ronconi was indeed in the same group of Brigatisti that killed Mazzola and Giralucci in the MSI headquarter of Padua. She was also the executor, together with other Prima Linea comrades, of Professor Alfredo Paolella in 1978. In 1982, then she shot to death Euro Tarsilli and Giuseppe Savastano, who were part of a Carabinieri checkpoint near Siena. The murder of Vittorio Bachelet, DC member and magistrates’ governing body Vice President, was gun down by Anna Laura Braghetti, who called him first to make him turn around and watch his executor. Going underground became a necessity, a weapon in itself (Faranda, 1997).

Abundant literature has appeared from the 1990s written by the BR terrorists themselves. Conversely, right-wing female terrorists’ histories and motivations remain a mystery. Their primary concern in writing a (auto)biography is to construct a post-terrorist identity distinct from a pre-existing self-identified exclusively with the experience of political violence (Glynn, 2009). However, experiences of male expiation differ from the female ones. I will present the biography of the most famous female Brigatista, Margherita Cagol, which is exemplary for the other terrorists as well.

Margherita “Mara” Cagol can be considered one of the founders of the Red Brigades. She was born in Sardagna, near Trento, in 1945. Her parents were Catholic shopkeepers and she manifested her faith too. Mara seemed destined for a musical career, particularly after 1961, when
she finished third in a national music contest. Concerts at the Filarmonica di Trento followed, and in 1963 she went on a tour of France, where her concerts were well received. She decided to enter university in 1964, where she met Renato Curcio, who converted her to an extremely militant form of communism (Drake, 1989). Nonetheless, albeit engaged within the students' movements, she was not particularly remembered by her student peers. Others were the leaders of these protests, even Renato himself, but Mara was always depicted as introvert. Anyways, she graduated in Sociology at the University of Trento, with highest honour. In 1969, she married instead of studying further and began her armed struggle in Milan, where she moved with Renato and the other BR founder Alberto Franceschini. In 1971, it is reported that Mara suffered a miscarriage (Casamassima, 2005) but keep working with a scholarship in a post-lauream institute, “L’Umanitaria”, which was managed by syndicalists. During this time, and before passing underground, Mara kept in contact with her family. Later, when a spy, Marco Pisetta, entered the BR and informed the police about their apartment headquarter, she was obliged to choose clandestinity and her family did not receive any longer information concerning her address, feelings and life in general. In 1972, once in Turin, Mara and Renato started recruiting some members from the Fiat firm. She lived with Renato and other comrades in secrecy. According to Franceschini (1988), they were called "chauvinists" because there was just a girl – Mara - with them, but he admitted that at the beginning of the 1970s a few women chose militancy and eventually clandestinity. Mara did not cook. She claimed she was not able (Franceschini, 1988) but there is reason to believe that she refused to do it in order to avoid the feminine stereotype of the cooking woman. She became a “capocolonna”, as many attacks and plans were conducted under her leadership and initiative. In the years of her leadership, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli published some books about women and guerrilla, for example “Tania the guerrillera”, history of Haydée Tamara Bunke who died in 1967 in Bolivia after an ambush, and “Qui non è
successo niente: una ragazza nella guerriglia”, diary of Angela Zago who organised armed fight in the Venezuelan mountains. Mara also managed the evacuation plan to free Renato from prison. In this operation, there were no shoots at all. All she needed was to present herself with a package to deliver and the guards let her and other Brigatisti enter the prison of Casale Monferrato and liberate Renato. However, after Renato’s evasion, they had to live separately. Mara stationed in Turin, Renato in Milan and Moretti in Genoa. They had to stay apart because with all of them in prison, the Red Brigades would have remained without guidance. She died in an open fire clash between the BR and police during an attempted kidnapping for ransom in 1975. The BR newspaper published an article to commemorate Mara and they complained that the state couldn’t afford the lux of finding dangerous symbols, even more if the corpses were female. Mara became Mrs Curcio for the press, a body without a mind that followed its love. As for Ulrike Meinhof, Mara has been accused of being mad. Rumours abounded at the time of Cagol’s death that a miscarriage she suffered in Milan tipped the balance in her mind toward ever more radical forms of revolutionary protest (Drake, 1989). Once again, media and research explain women’s participation in political violence as a sign of mental instability or a link to an episode of motherhood (Cantry and Sjoberg, 2015). Curious is that for several years somebody brought red roses on the spot where Mara died, but the author is still anonymous and none of the BR did it. Then, striking is the fact that the majority of female terrorists were Catholic and even devoted. Yet, it is also true that after the war, if your family was not Communist you couldn’t be anything else but Catholic. Nadia Mantovani, for instance, taught catechism to children on Sundays. Moreover, Mara was not the only female Brigatista to die, since we recall Annamaria Ludmann, killed during the incursion of via Fracchia in Genoa, 1980.

7- Conclusions
Neither the Red Brigades, nor the other movements, produced changes in the settings of the Italian Republic since they were not able to size real power in organisations or institutions (Novelli and Tranfaglia, 1988). Students exchanged the situation for chaos and institutional crisis. Whether or not 1968 accelerated the rush for violence is only partly true, because in five years violent events appeared disconnected and seldomly. Yet, the trend reversed in 1976, together with the reborn of Red terrorism but it had no more a social target, as for the student protests, rather politics and all the other struggles connected to that. In addition, only a marginal part of the working-class continued to be active in the protests. In 1979, of the 61 layoffs due to terrorism suspect, only 5 were really engaged in the political violence (Novelli and Tranfaglia, 1988). Emerging violent figures from the 1968 movements became marginalised, since syndicalists were finally able to regain their leadership role in the trade unions and registered some successes, i.e. the Workers’ Statute in 1970. According to Ginsborg (1997), the process of social and cultural transformation from the economic miracle and onwards would have not brought to a weakening of familiar relations but to individualisation forms established inside the family, and fundamentally supported by the state policies. Rossana Rossanda, PCI politician and organiser of several meetings of the Sezione Femminile, proposed a program to renovate the Communist Party and to adapt it to the evolution of family as a concept. For long indeed, the operaisti and communist movement posed the female question in a second place (Stagno, 2018). Rossanda was a friend of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli and, thanks to his benevolence, she flew to Cuba where she learned about the local conflicts. Nevertheless, she has never sustained Feltrinelli’s radical and violent idea of revolution and instead represented the traditional, even though socialist, thesis of pacifism and feminism. Italian feminist movement, together with social movements and activist groups, engaged in national political debate and campaigning to change national legislation, reshape transnational ideologies into languages and codes that can be given meaning in national political
discourse (Bracke and Mark, 2015). Nevertheless, terrorist women, as female in any other organisation and institution, were the subaltern (Spivak, 1988). For long, even mafia women were considered naturally unable, subordinated by their husbands. Finally, denying that female militants took part in armed groups to follow political ideas means rejecting them as subjects, excluding them a political identity (Stagno, 2018).
1968 is considered a global phenomenon but Northern Ireland has always been hidden from the stories of that period. The most intense moment of mobilisation was experienced during the autumn of 1968, but a cycle of struggle continued up until the first half of the 1970s (Bosi, 2008). Although Ireland did not participate in the war and consequently had no infrastructural damage, society was not stable. Albeit Ireland officially left the Commonwealth as it proclaimed itself Republic in 1949, Irish citizens were trained and recruited by the British Armed Forces. It was no wonder, then, that during the 1950s nearly half a million Irish people emigrated, mainly to England, leaving the future of the country in doubt (Braidwood, 2016). Many scholars and novelists did not accuse the Irish youth of leaving their homeland, since they acknowledge that they were flying from “nothing”. The Republic of Ireland in 1958, after three decades of autarchy, chronic emigration, and economic crisis, opted for a change of strategy, under the “Program for Economic Expansion” (Bosi, 2008). With this program, the principle of protection was abandoned, and foreign investments were encouraged. Television broadcast was introduced in the country, emigration substantially declined and access to education widened. Ireland was becoming a modern consumeristic society like the rest of Europe. However, in 1959 an aging de Valera was elected Ireland’s President and later, to gain entry to the European Economic Community, Dublin politics had to engage in international and multinational capitalist investment, namely through Great Britain’s help, with whom signed the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 1965. 'It is not extraordinary to think that England has always been an extension of Ireland, and indeed vice versa, although with disastrous consequence' (Braidwood, 2016). Issues were even hotter in the North, as the situation in Northern Ireland has been agitated for many years not only on the economic side. Since its foundation, the unionist regime envisioned Northern Ireland as “a
Protestant state for Protestant people”, barring the Irish-Catholic minority from participating in the political process, and from securing economic and social equality (de Fazio, 2017). The construction of a majority presupposes the construction of a minority’ (Rooney, 2002). The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland had inherited a tradition of Irish nationalism, but the British welfare state offered better health care, education, and unemployment benefits than the Irish government in the South (Van Voris, 1975), therefore complaints were often silenced. Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists lived in separate social microcosms, especially in terms of their residential, educational, and employment settings. Nonetheless, exclusion from the state and discrimination in employment and public housing fostered the Nationalist’s resentment toward the Unionists. In addition, even the Unionist community itself was divided by class, as well as by ideological conflicts in its political culture (de Fazio, 2017). The Unionists can be divided into “Ulster British” and “Ulster Loyalists”. The latter were moved by Protestantism and claimed they were not Irish, emphasising ethnicity and respect for the Crown rather than the British state. Ulster British Unionism instead posed an accent to British loyalty and British principles such as internationalism, liberal democracy, and constitutional government (Moore and Sanders, 2002). Identity was thus expressed in terms of relationships with Britain (ibid.). The failure of Unionists to recognise the Catholic minority was even graphically demonstrated in issues of loyalist paramilitary journals, as well as wall posters, murals, and so on, increasingly stressing the identity and culture struggles.

For these motives, the Campaign for Social Justice was promoted in 1964. It was set up to influence public opinion towards contemplating issues of social justice rather than discussing the “partition issue”. Its leadership was not trying to mobilise a popular campaign but to lobby politicians, particularly at Westminster, on the topic of discrimination. On 29
January 1967, a new broad organisation was formed, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), seeking to physically federate all organisations, political parties, and cultural groups interested in civil rights issues, strengthening inter-organisational communications with social-organisational, human, and material resources essential for solidarity and collective action (NICRA, 1978). In simple terms, NICRA's purpose was to secure the political inclusion of the Catholic minority within the Northern Ireland polity. A loosely organised network of organisations, such as People's Democracy and the Derry Housing Action Committee, lately joined around. However, 1968 is an important intermediary step, since the marches and protests were clear attempts to alter, through non-violent means, the power inequalities between Protestants and Catholics in the North. Actually, in 1968 was created the Civil Right Movement (CRM), which was modelled after the African American nonviolent struggle against segregation and discrimination in the US South (de Fazio, 2020). They took inspiration from the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the anti-Vietnam war campaign, and the students' movements too. Association with other international struggles was a tactic that made CRM's fight recognisable in a worldwide dimension, but Northern Ireland was equally exposed to the economic, social, and cultural changes that were being felt elsewhere in Europe and beyond (Reynolds, 2015). Still, it was primarily a working-class upheaval with a student mix. In fact, when the students of the Queen's University Belfast returned to start the academic year 1968/69, it was their first chance to come together and discuss the French events that had petered out over the summer months (Reynolds, 2017). They lately organised march protests under the name of People's Democracy (PD). Furthermore, the actions of the young, radical elements of the student milieu played a central role in ensuring that their fight extended beyond the confines of the university. The language typically associated with 1968 is to be found in the speeches, slogans, and, perhaps most visually striking, in the organisation’s poster collection from the period. In the
same way, CRM strategies consisted of publicising incidents of discrimination through conventional forms of action, such as newspaper articles, pamphlets, and a regular campaign newsletter. ‘We in the Young Socialists/People Democracy identified particularly with the younger, more radical Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) who like us were in regular conflict with the older leaders of Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference’ (Michael Farrell, 1988). However, the question was: ‘Should the civil rights movement be seen as a misstep on the road to consumerist, post-nationalist, post-ideological “America”? (Mulholland, 2007). According to Bosi (2008), the initial friendly cooperation with the UK was determined by the perception that the best way to undermine partition with Northern Ireland was to obtain the first economic success in the Republic. The entire northern nationalist community became moderately optimistic about the direction in which the political situation was moving in Northern Ireland and internationally. Later on, the issues of civil rights, equality, and social democracy started to broaden across the region, and rapidly manifested into several groups and organisations with a variety of different, frequently conflicting, aims, strategies, values, and ideas (Bosi, 2008). Nevertheless, economic conditions worsened in Northern Ireland: unemployment was high and traditional industries like shipbuilding decreased, discharging trade-union demonstrations. Hence, the new strategy of the CRM was not to assimilate the collective agitation with a sort of Nationalist rhetoric, but to legitimise the CRM in the political system of the region through a civil rights framework capable of creating new political space by differentiating itself from the dominant ethno-national identity cleavage (Bosi, 2008). Obviously, the CRM network was far from being the only actor which was trying to make sense of the combination of regional and international changes that occurred already from the aftermath of the Second World War (Bosi, 2008).
Beyond the CRM proposals, the alternative belief was that the nationalist community was about to enjoy a better future than the unionist community. In addition, the movement, formed by the Young Socialist graduate and later leader of PD Michael Farrell, seemed to convey the radicalism that Northern Ireland has always held to be suspect. Furthermore, the resentment felt by older citizens at any student action other than traditional Rag Days may have enabled some, who had for the first time been confronted with the facts of regional politics, to press for official action against the students rather than for measures of reform (Lavin, 1968). Youth definition of non-violence differed somewhat from the older, Derry-based, moderate elements. Indeed, there was a clear divide between younger and older elements, with the latter seemingly more concerned with the risks at hand than the former. However, if the social movements in France, Italy, and the rest of Europe shared a degree of fluidity, thus a non-determined scope for protesting, the motivations of all involved in Northern Ireland, from NICRA to the PD, in Belfast and Derry, the old and the young, and even Protestant and Catholic, were undeniably rooted in the struggle for civil rights. Yet, many were the reasons for slow, wide participation in civil rights organisations and protests. As CRM representatives complained, there was an uneasy sense that the conventional channels of political participation in the region were not open at all (Bosi, 2008). Moderate leaders were afraid to use direct action tactics, which in their view would have led to diffused dangerous sectarian violence and communal conflict in the region as had already happened in the 1930s, and as would follow later on (Bosi, 2008). Nonetheless, radicals from the CRM were convinced that in raising a civil rights struggle against the Northern Ireland regime they would appeal to sections of the unionist working class, in the name of an abstract solidarity between the oppressed. The activist population was selectively separated, depending on what side of the community they were from. NICRA and PD set out initially from a non-sectarian, inclusive platform, but later inclusivity became problematic. Derry could be presented as the
home of NICRA, whereas Belfast was evidently home to a more prevalent influence from student elements (Reynolds, 2017). Reciprocally, the loyalists, e.g. the unionist Protestant ultras, tried to force a state clamp-down on subversion.

The most salient characteristic of the late 1960s was the divide between the Catholic and Protestant communities, with the latter exercising complete political, economic, and social dominance over the former. An important proposition of the family was the influence of the churches. The family constituted the foundation stone of society; an attitude which is reflected in the way it regards the family unit as sacred and any attack upon it as an attack on the very quality of life itself. Both Protestant and Catholic churches have conservative views on woman’s position (Ward and McGivern, 1980). Although Ireland was also benefiting from the economic boom that swept Europe in the post-war, the Catholics’ struggle did become an increasing burden on the UK economy. Radicals of the Catholic community chose “guerrilla” tactics that echoed the international left’s attempts to unmask liberal democracy’s “repressive tolerance” (Mulholland, 2007). During the fall of 1968, civil rights movements were counter-mobilised by Reverend Paisley and his group of loyalists. Whenever the CRM would plan a demonstration, loyalist groups would organise a counterdemonstration set up in the same location, and at the same time as the civil rights protest. Response from the unionist government ended almost always with the banning of any demonstrations for that day. Hence, the government led by O’Neill indirectly enabled the loyalist attempts to neutralise the CRM.

Since the conclusion of a violent cross-border campaign by the IRA in 1962, the troubled Northern Ireland had been experiencing what appeared to be a period of relative calm and stability. What the events of October 1968 to January 1969 demonstrated was that despite this relative calm and hope for a better future, the age-old problems that had dogged the region for so long lay just beneath the surface and any
attempts to push improvements would not be possible. In Summer 1968, CRM started their march protests. Peaceful protests by the CRM immediately encountered the repressive response of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the local police force dominated by Protestant Unionists, as well as vicious counter-mobilisation by British loyalists. For instance, police were occasionally responsible for unprovoked attacks on nonviolent protesters, as the second organised march in Derry, October 5, 1968, showed. The happenings during the March of 5 October signed a revolution inside the CRM, which began reshaping the principles and approaches of the organisation. Antagonisms between Nationalist and Republican traditional aspirations gathered up toward the Stormont regime. The initial clashes in the fall of 1968 between civil rights and loyalist protesters increased in both frequency and violence during the spring and summer of the following year. PD planned a march from Belfast to Derry in 1969, consisting of a four-day civil-right and unarmed demonstration, consciously inspired by the 1965 Selma to Montgomery marches (de Fazio, 2017). Nonetheless, it was opposed by Major Bunting through its “harassing and harrying” arranged followers and friends. This opposition tried to block the march with an ambush and in the evening, drunk loyalists smashed doors and windows in the Green Bogside of Derry, bringing to the creation of a barricade called “Free Derry”. Just when armed troops were called to respond to the escalating violence in 1969, the period referred to as “the Troubles” began. Actually, whilst France appeared to return to some form of normality in the post-1968 period, Northern Ireland went in an altogether alternative direction (Reynolds, 2015). Those critical of the activists’ protests suggested that their actions somehow triggered or precipitated the onset of the conflict, creating a sense of guilt or responsibility (Reynolds, 2017). The repressive tactics used by the RUC and loyalists against the CRM represented, for many civil rights activists, an initiation to political violence (de Fazio, 2017; Mulholland, 2007). When faced with police brutality and aggressive counter-protesters, nonviolent principles, and practices were hardly
followed and implemented. August 1969 signed the escalation of the protests in the Battle of Bogside, which culminated in 1972 with the *Bloody Sunday*. While the funerals of 11 of the dead of the Bloody Sunday took place in the Creggan area of Derry, in Dublin tens of thousands of people turned out to march to the British Embassy, which was attacked with stones and bottles, then petrol bombs, and the building was burnt to the ground. Confronted with verbal and physical assaults during their street demonstrations, the CRM had to adapt its strategies and claims to address the repression perpetrated by the RUC, as well as the numerous loyalist groups led by Reverend Ian Paisley (de Fazio, 2017). However, violence was adopted by both factions. The Apprentice Boys march, traditionally leading to a harsh opposition from the Nationalist side, comprised three days of rioting, in which the British Army was eventually deployed with the purpose of preventing a degeneration into civil war. Indeed, Northern Ireland lacked the specialised paramilitary policing units able to address the civil unrest before being rapidly withdrawn. The RUC was too weak to deal with rebellion and the “B-Special” auxiliaries, being entirely Protestant and poorly trained and equipped, could not be called without drastically inflaming ethnic warfare (Mulholland, 2007).

The British Army was instead introduced under the spoils of the peacekeeping force and the British government as benignly sacrificial in the interests of human welfare (McClung Lee, 1981). In fact, the Catholic community’s first reaction to the British troops was to welcome them (Wahidin, 2016) but soon they realised they were tasked to maintain the *status quo*. Within a month the British Army had erected reinforced fences, called the “Peace Line”, one and a half miles in extent in Belfast. Catholic communities in Belfast felt targeted and victimised by the British Army and the police, such that Wahidin (2016) used in her book the term “pogroms” to target the situation in which Catholics lived. With this patrolling of the streets of Northern Ireland, paramilitary groups like the IRA re-organised, soon followed by the formation of loyalist paramilitary groups like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence
Association (UDA) (de Fazio, 2020). Many civil rights protesters had never experienced political violence and, aside for some radical activists, it was never one of their intended goals. Hence, repression by the state and non-state actors was effective in increasing the costs of collective action for the CRM, resulting in the demobilisation of many protesters (de Fazio, 2017). This didn’t transform into the conclusion of protests. On the contrary, the violent triadic interactions with loyalists and police forces attracted previously uninvolved youths from the nationalist, working-class areas. Street demonstrations thus increasingly transformed into high-risk activism. Radical tactics became an acceptable tool as a consequence of the socialisation of violence. Furthermore, Catholics began to identify with the IRA as the Army’s attempts to root out armed IRA militants were considered an attack on their right to self-defence.

In July 1970 a helicopter with a loudspeaker circled low over the rooftops and announced that a curfew was being imposed on the area of Falls Road in Belfast and anyone caught out of doors would have been arrested (Wahidin, 2016). This measure was affecting a community of more or less ten thousand citizens. However, rather than quelling disorder, it fuelled further animosity against the British state. By Sunday afternoon, women from outside of the curfew area marched into the barricade with bread and milk, breaking the curfew. It was the first visible direct action taken and organised by and for women. The British response to the “Bread and Milk March” provoked another escalation of conflict. On Monday 9 August 1971, dawn raids by police and Army on houses throughout the region, the so-called Operation Demetrius, announced the introduction of internment without trial. From the suspension of the devolved Stormont government in March 1972, loyalist paramilitarism switched from mass intimidation of Catholics in mixed residential areas to sectarian assassination. New recruits were therefore mobilised for Republican paramilitaries. Despite the August 1971 ban on marches established by Faulkner, the last Prime Minister at Stormont, NICRA held
a protest march in Derry in January 1972. This march, organised as a protest against the law of internment without trial, placed the security forces in dilemma.

According to Cox (2018), the “Troubles” were sustained indirectly by the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, the US and central Irish governments cooperated with Britain but arms and an estimated half million dollars were annually sent to IRA from American sympathisers. More than £50000 of Irish government money helped what became the Official and Provisional IRA factions before they came to depend upon robbing banks and post offices (McClung Lee, 1981). Moreover, it is argued that IRA could fight on in the 1980s thanks to the weapon supply which was granted by Libyan leader President Moammar Ghaddafi. On the strike and protest side, the Black Civil Rights Movement’s strategy of fighting for constitutional rights employing a peaceful but mass protest provided an effective model of non-violent protest for the Northern Ireland CRM network. Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, even claimed that the civil rights movement’s strategy of non-violence was greatly influenced by Martin Luther King’s philosophy. Along the same lines, protesters admired the Palestinian solidarity organisations and the anti-apartheid movements in South Africa.

Feminists in the North of Ireland found themselves in a problematic situation because they were under attack from all sides (Ward and McGivern, 1980). Women’s groups were based in the working class as well as in urban neighbourhoods that have borne the impact of the conflict and some of the highest levels of deprivation (Rooney, 2002). However, it should be remarked that women’s liberation groups reappeared after the first wave of feminism only in 1971 (Roulston, 1989). For Catholic women in Northern Ireland, the options were exclusively motherhood or perpetual virginity (Edgerton, 1987). Similar to the virginal image of Mary, Irish Catholic women shrouded in their private identities became valuable icons of the public institution of strategic
warfare (Dowler, 1998). More than one interviewee of that time reported experiences with sexual violence at the hands of state forces including threats of rape, harassment, and assault (O’Keefe, 2017). As the Civil Rights movement faded and mass involvement in politics was undermined by the renewed IRA violence and creasing sectarianism, the consciousness of women’s rights began to take form. Women, especially mothers, were seen as having a unique insight into the needs of the community and a special role to play in protecting or promoting the interests of the community. In 1974, a “consciousness raising” group appeared in the small town of Coleraine, involving women from the New University of Ulster and from the town itself. The Coleraine Women’s Group quickly became a campaign as well as a discussion group, focusing public attention on the existence of domestic violence against women and the related issue of the problems of single-parenthood. From the Women’s Liberation group set up in Belfast, a general Northern Ireland Women’s Rights Movement was created in 1975. In 1983, a women’s conference was held in Belfast to discuss ten years of feminism in the north of Ireland. Assessments demonstrated that feminism had been fractious and followed by political fallouts that were never really resolved. Some Republican women challenged selective feminist silences about the conflict, in particular about the strip-searching of Catholic women during the Troubles. The first community group to be subjected to political vetting by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in the early 1980s, and have its funding stopped was a woman-run crèche in Conway Education Centre. One workshop focused on Catholic women, nationalism, and republicanism, whereas another on Protestant women, unionism, and loyalism.

2-Political layout

The conflict in Northern Ireland originated in the Partition of Ireland and the establishment of the province of Northern Ireland in 1921 as part of the United Kingdom. The Province’s Union with the United Kingdom was
but the latest chapter in the long and difficult Anglo-Irish relations dating back to the XVII century. While the southern portion became independent from the British Crown, Northern Ireland remained under the authority of Great Britain, keeping a pro-Union and Protestant majority. In 1948 the Irish Free State turned into the Republic of Ireland, withdrawing from the Commonwealth. The Ireland Act (1949) guaranteed the independence of Northern Ireland from the country but dependence on the British crown. Nonetheless, this “de-insularisation” (Bosi, 2008) meant, also considering the growth of new mass media, international pressure, and influence on Northern Ireland’s domestic affairs. Yet, at the beginning central British governments never showed any desire to interfere with the internal politics of what was considered a distant and problematic province (de Fazio, 2017). Northern Ireland has a three-tier political system with twelve seats at Westminster, a Parliament at Stormont, in east Belfast, and local councils. Northern Ireland, composed of the six counties in the north-east of the island – called by the Protestants the Province of Ulster, had a devolved parliament at Stormont, with almost complete power over most internal matters apart from control over taxes, armed forces, communication, the Supreme Court, coinage and external trade. The majoritarian electoral system, ‘first past the post’, which in 1929 substituted the single transferable voting system, seems to have sharpened, or better institutionalised, the traditional “Orange” (Dissenter or Nonconformists and Unionists, after William of Orange) versus “Green” (Roman Catholic and Nationalist, after the national colour of the Republic of Ireland) sectarian division. Concerns about this system presented as reforms in the local communities were redeemed irrelevant because adult suffrage existed for two franchises already in Westminster and Stormont elections (Lavin, 1968). In addition, Northern Ireland’s major cleavage had not been along class lines, but along ethno-national ones (Bosi, 2008). Indeed, issues arose with the exclusion and marginalisation of the Catholic minority that identified with the rest of Ireland, the Nationalists (de Fazio, 2020). Nationalists have also doubts about the partition of the
Province and would call Ulster the whole territory comprehending the nine countries of Northern Ireland. Political concessions to the wishes of unionists were often interpreted by Irish nationalists as continuing oppression, colonialism, or neo-colonialism and maintaining a discriminatory system. On the other hand, loyalists generally assumed any compromise with Irish nationalist wishes as part of a much wider strategy to unite Ireland (Moore and Sanders, 2002). The actual situation is therefore a three-sided politico-economic struggle, with the third side positioned in the plutocratic multinational corporations, such as the UK and the US (McClung Lee, 1981). Consequently, the British security forces who entered the scene were representing the exploitation of the old Orange-Green division. Yet, the military deployment assured the British government that their workers would have exhibited low absenteeism and low labour turnover and work to maintain high rates of productivity at the lowest average wages in the United Kingdom.

As the political system is unique in its genre, an effective third political force in the region has always struggled to settle, mentioning for example the classic British Labour Party. In contrast, it had further entrenched the dominance of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) born at the beginning of the XX century. Unionist socio-political domination was also facilitated by the ineffective attitude of most of the nationalist community and their refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Stormont regime, e.g. “abstentionist defeatism” (Bosi, 2008), and the repeated armed campaigns of IRA. By abstentionism, the Nationalists intended not to take any seats won in the parliaments of Dublin, Belfast, and London. The nationalist community had felt itself to be unfairly treated in the new settlement and refused to participate in the building of the State. It formed a self-sufficient society, with its own social infrastructure, namely the Catholic Church, alienated from the rest of the region and “resigned” to minority status. However, there was proof of manipulation of electoral boundaries to give
Protestants political control in areas where Catholics constituted a numerical majority (Kelley and McAllister, 1984).

In contrast to many European countries, Ireland was a neutral state during the Second World War and this caused in the aftermath a broadening of the social benefits of the welfare state with a subsequent substantial increase in both the size and role of the State and a reinforcement in its relations with Britain (Bosi, 2008). However, this welfare legislation launched by the post-war Labour government was reluctantly implemented in Northern Ireland by the Unionist establishment, which voted against its introduction in the Westminster Parliament at a national level. They feared a spectre of nationalism and hence losing the Unionist autonomy allowing Westminster to interfere with the sectarian balance that maintained stable the situation in Northern Ireland. Later leader of the Nationalist Party, Mr Eddy McAteer, made a speech that manifested this concern:

‘If Belfast is in Ireland, would it be treasonable to work towards rule from Belfast rather than Dublin? Could a two-piece Ireland not be fitted into a sort of little United Nations-type grouping of these islands?’ (Irish News, 7 November 1968)

Yet, the UUP failed and did not find an alternative to cope with the regional financial problems but to cooperate with London. Moreover, the worsening economic condition of the region, with high unemployment rates, deeply strained the inter-class alliance which held the UUP together. The Unionist establishment led by Lord Brookeborough, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1943 to 1963, realistically saw welfare reforms as a way of salvaging the Unionist cross-class alliance in the post-war era (Bosi, 2008). Furthermore, middle and farming classes and border Unionists constituted an internal opposition, unsatisfied with this collaboration with the Labour Party and thus marked initial movements in the whole country of Ireland during the 1960s.
Meanwhile, in 1959 a National Unity emerged with the intent of creating a pragmatic-constructive Nationalist opposition inside Northern Ireland. Usually, Nationalist parties were formed and managed at the national level, therefore stood only in Dublin. Nonetheless, in 1958 the Union Party was already threatened by a new entry into the Stormont Parliament, the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), which eventually failed to instal itself in the long term. Yet, for the Nationalist intelligentsia, what really started to matter most was the improvement of their own economic, social, and political standing in Northern Ireland (Kennedy, 1959). In the 1970s, some ten new political parties have emerged (Connolly, 1990). The five main political groups were the two main unionist parties, Official Unionist Party (OUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP); the main nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP); the Alliance Party, and the main Republican party, Sinn Féin. Yet, the Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which were widely considered to have won the 1919–1921 War of Independence, were banned in Northern Ireland. Whereas the Sinn Féin Dublin-based leadership had always stressed the purchase of Ulster regionalism, and proposed federalism as a way to reach out to loyalists. When in the 1970s Republicans decided on building Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland they conceived it as a political party, not a revolutionary front or proto-national assembly. However, in 1970, the Sinn Féin Party held an Ard Fheis (party conference) in Dublin at which the party split between those who were in favour of ending the policy of abstentionism and those who were against it. A majority of delegates were in favour of ending the abstentionist policy. Those opposed to the move, thus the supporters of the Provisional Army Council, walked out of the meeting thus leaving the organisation. This event was copied from the Irish Republican Army, in which the most active and violent part decided to military contrast the British Army and their followers.
In 1963 there was a shift in Chancellorship, Terence O’Neill was nominated Prime Minister of Ulster. This change could have reshaped the political opportunities of Stormont by allowing the Nationalist parties to ally with Labour groups and compose a different majority from the Unionist one. Nevertheless, it became a real opening of the “Irish question” in London. The program of O’Neill still consisted of the maintenance of the status quo in the region. He looked superficially to modernise the socio-economic structures of Northern Ireland, gaining British funds, by a “twin-track approach”, but no real structural reform was enhanced because he believed that Ulster was living just a behavioural problem. In his first speech as Prime Minister, O’Neill argued that the British investments would have brought Northern Ireland to reach the level of “regional Keynesianism”. He intended to re-launch the UUP in the eyes of British public opinion and assert its establishment as the “natural” party of government for the region (Bosi, 2008). The nationalist community saw this as an opportunity for autonomous action in politics through an expansion of access and improvement in the resources available in the political system but in reality, it was just a sort of palliative. The Prime Minister received the funding but neglected the social needs, dividing society and implementing the sectarian clash. Most of the money and projects went to the east, largely unionist side of the region (Bosi, 2008). Moreover, at that time, one of Captain O’Neill’s most important political actions as Prime Minister was identified in his decision to recognise the Irish Congress of Trade Unions which, like rugby and the Church of Ireland, was organised from Dublin (Lavin, 1968). This example explained to us why the growing CRM groups and organisations believed O’Neill would have been open and favourable to their demands (Bosi, 2008). In the same year of the Campaign for Social Justice, 1964, Harold Wilson was freshly elected with a Labour Government and was considered to be genuinely sympathetic to the nationalist minority, since it was committed to the elimination of any regional disparities. Nonetheless, in Northern Ireland, the British memoirs of war-time
support had faded and there was increasing concern at reports of gerrymandering, job discrimination, and the triumphalist use of British national symbols. The campaign for social justice was politically started by Mrs McCluskey in Dungannon as early as 1965. Mr Fitt was elected for West Belfast on a civil rights platform and in a Council of sixteen was elected for the Northern Ireland Civil Right Association, of which Captain O’Neill was made an Honorary President (Lavin, 1968). On the other side, the UUP’s manifesto “Forward Ulster to Target 1970!” for the Stormont elections of 1965 turned out successful for the political system. The situation seemed peaceful between the Unionists and the Nationalists. In 1965 during a television program conducted by James Boyce (UTV), John Hume, one of the moderate leaders of the CRM at the time, spoke on behalf of the nationalist community of Derry and stated that the Catholic politicians should have accepted the constitutional system as it was designed for a peaceful cause, the unity and autonomy of Northern Ireland. Reformists proposed a conciliated work between Nationalists and Unionists, acknowledging the legitimacy of the Unionist tradition and pursuing the Nationalist minority grievances through institutional channels. Actually, following the activist Denis Haughey’s discourse:

‘There was growing disillusionment with traditional Nationalist politics, the old Nationalist party was never a political party in the real sense of the word and its achievements were zero, it had failed in any real sense to challenge or to effect any change to the established order here.’

Faction’s internal struggles menaced also the stability of the O’Neill government. In fact, the Prime Minister could have easily been compared to de Gaulle as the elderly, military statesman appeared to be bypassed by the events in the initial stages, confirmed by his tendency to rely on brute force to quell the opening signs of trouble. In September 1966, a dozen UUP back-benchers, organised by Desmond Boal, challenged the legitimacy of the Prime Minister signing a petition against his policy and
his “inability to unite the Unionist party”. In particular, western and border Unionist elites were opposed to O’Neill’s modernism. Pressuring O’Neill into conceding fundamental resources was the main strategy at this stage even for CMR activists.

The advent of CRM marches was conceived as a threat by many Unionists since some of them preferred to deny that the Irish-Catholic minority was treated unfairly in Northern Ireland (de Fazio, 2017; Rose, 1971). In the Ulster Loyalist political culture Unionist hegemony was central to the defence of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland (Bosi, 2008). Any reforms to this kind of power were interpreted as the destruction of the State and subsequent unification with the Republic of Ireland. Following the protests of 1968, Nationalists redefined a daily personal commitment to collective action mobilisation under the banners of social justice, progress, and equality themes, capable of challenging the perceived second-class citizenship status of themselves, and Catholics in general, in the socio-political context of the 1960s. However, citing Deborah Lavin (1968), Lecturer at the Queen’s University in Belfast, the growing discussion about political devolution added reason for concern about the Stormont system, and the Constitutional Commission promised in the Queen’s Speech to examine the whole Irish question has been construed in Westminster as an instrument of legitimate inquiry, but at Stormont as a possible threat to local independence.

All the events that happened in the post-war period until the mid-1960s disoriented the Unionists and favoured the later Loyalist counter-movement’s mobilisation. The majority of the unionist community had an obvious interest in maintaining a status quo that provided them with both material and symbolic rewards, but they needed a leader capable of interpreting and ensuring their fears. Reverend Ian Paisley entered the scenario and promoted an ultra-Protestant Loyalist political agenda, suitable for that category of the unionist community which was part of the working class. Their vote was particularly strong for populist,
classless, or non-middle-class politicians such as Ian Paisley, (Moore and Sanders, 2002) and he knew his power. His policy was not only directed against the Irish Catholics but even against the unionist government and its timid attempts to modernise and secularise Northern Ireland (de Fazio, 2017). His populist propaganda received massive TV coverage. Yet, the loyalist population turned against establishment politicians and professional politicians in general. In Stormont, the reaction of O’Neill consisted of a condemnation of the Paisleyite groups as a fascist organisation, covered under the cloak of religion. Contemporarily, any attempt by Westminster to destroy the Union would mean civil war (Mulholland, 2007). Standing on behalf of Protestant Unionism, Ian Paisley won the seat formerly held by Terence O’Neill in April 1970.

From 1972, ‘terrorism’ was defined in successive pieces of Emergency Legislation (Wahidin, 2016). Yet, the vast majority of armed robberies were not political in nature. As a result of the Gardiner Report (1975), government policy shifted: prisoners were to be treated as regular criminals, rather than politically motivated offenders. In 1971, Great Britain introduced internment without trial. The UK’s extra-judicial power hence detained suspected terrorists without charge, and most of the time, they were innocent. Margaret Thatcher reiterated:

‘There is no such thing as political murder, political bombing or political violence. There is only criminal murder, criminal bombing and criminal violence. We will not compromise on this. There will be no political status’. (The Times, 6 March 1981)

The British government wanted to pass the Conflict as a law and order issue rather than a war and reforms were thus introduced to standardise the Northern Irish prison system with that of the rest of the UK (Wahidin, 2016). Doing so, the official discourse shifted from Northern Ireland being a military war to a matter of criminal conduct (Pickering and Third, 2003). The label “special category status” came into practice in June 1972 and
prisoners could finally wear their own clothes and receive food parcels and other concessions since their offences became connected with the civil disturbances. Furthermore, the cases of seven Northern Ireland prisoners brought before the European Commission of Human Rights and then the European Court of Human Rights resulted in decisions in 1975 and 1977 that helped to publicise the brutality of British interrogation procedures (McClung Lee, 1981). The Commission indeed retained that those practices corresponded to torture and that the techniques used during personal interviews were inhuman and degrading. In 1976, "special status" for political prisoners was arbitrarily rescinded (Bloom, 2011).

On 21 August 1971, a convention was assembled in Monaghan. Invitations had been sent to a broad spectrum of elected officials from the nine counties of Ulster, but representation was extremely patchy. The suspension of Stormont in 1972, announced by British Prime Minister Heath, and its replacement by a system of "direct rule" from Westminster opened opportunities for progressives in Northern Ireland to call for the implementation of reforms previously blocked by the local parliament (Roulston, 1989). Attempts for a political compromise were made through the Sunningdale Agreement (1974), which was even opposed by the Ulster Workers Council strike, and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985). Indeed, between 1974 and 1975 there were indirect negotiations with Wilson’s government and again between 1990 and 1996 with Major’s. Meanwhile, during its active period, Stormont has always performed badly in negotiations with terrorism and mass violence and was unsuccessful in its attempts. By late 1975 Britain had even abandoned the Irish cause. While police ‘primacy’ in the province’s security was restored in 1975, early in 1976 the Special Air Service was deployed in South Armagh. In 1976 the British government formed the Fair Employment Agency, a statutory body charged with examining the
occupational structure of the province and making recommendations for a more equitable allocation of jobs (Kelley and McAllister, 1984).

Mary Meyer (1998) argues that there was very little space for women to participate in the Unionist/Loyalist political project, while there was much more space for women to participate in the Nationalist/Republican political project. In the context of the broader struggle for an end to British imperialism in Northern Ireland, it was organised a new party under the spoils of republicanism, led entirely by women. Feminist republicanism, in which those who recognised as both republican and feminists participated, has failed (O'Keefe, 2017). It is usually situated within a social movement context to reveal the tensions and tribulations that plagued wider feminist organising during the war. Republican feminism has been shaped over time by four key factors: a historical connection between feminism and Irish nationalism, feminist politicisation around prison struggles, and marginalisation of republican women by both the Republican movement and the broader women’s movement. Republican feminists identify with the kind of radical politics characterised by Marxist/socialist tendencies rooted in the material realities of working-class women. They were active in naming and resisting state violence and also in challenging violence against women in the community. Women Against Imperialism (WAI) was formed in 1978 from a series of divisions in the broader women’s movement in the six counties. It was made up of working-class women from Republican communities in Belfast and Derry who wished to organise against the violence of the British state and to simultaneously challenge inequality on several fronts. The Fall’s Women Centre was a vital support and resource for women in Republican West Belfast. It opened its doors in 1981 and sought to provide a safe space for women in the community to be able to debate all issues, including abortion, domestic violence, and poverty. Sinn Féin had also a Women’s Department which became operational in 1980. Its purpose was to ensure women had a political
voice within the party and introduce women-friendly structures in addition to raising key concerns for women. Based on a series of informal conversations about the future of women in Irish nationalism, “Clár na mBan” (Irish for ‘Women’s Agenda for Peace’) was officially formed in 1994 in the wake of the ongoing Hume-Adams talks. It was committed to ensuring that the voices of working-class women were heard.

3-Opposition from terrorist groups

The groups who took their Unionist loyalty to the most violent extremes were loyalist paramilitary organisations, of which the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and their subgroups, are the most significant (Moore and Sanders, 2002). These Loyalists groups tended to keep a distance from the European quasi-fascists because most European right-wing groups were distinctly Catholic (Mulholland, 2007).

Before the 1920 formal establishment of the Northern Ireland province, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) furnished paramilitary thrusts to the Oranges. In 1966 it reorganised and then acquired some of the loyalists from the Ulster Special Constabulary or “B” Special. They aimed at distinguishing themselves from the loyalists who manifested against the Civil Rights demonstrators, and through their membership to the “B” Special forces they became entitled to have arms and ammunition without license (McClung Lee, 1981). They officially announced their restructuring through the Belfast press, declaring war against the IRA and its splinter groups. Data from the period showed that there were more than 8000 part-time “B” Specials in 1969, of which a great majority was undoubtedly Protestant. The volunteers exploded a bomb at a 240-foot radio mast on Mongary Hill, in the Republic of Ireland. In 1970 the group was dismantled again and replaced with the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). This change was introduced to replace the “B-Specials” but this armed organisation was not under the local RUC control, but
rather the British. In other words, UDR was a locally recruited regiment of the British Army (Connolly, 1990). However, paramilitaries infiltrated and they were again functioning inside and outside the legal establishment (McClung Lee, 1981). In 1971, fifteen Catholic civilians were killed when Loyalist paramilitaries exploded a bomb at The Tramore Bar, better known as McGurk’s Bar, in North Queen Street, north Belfast. Loyalist paramilitaries were believed to be acting in concert with - and with the approval of - loyalist and unionist politicians to fight the IRA and defend the Union (Moore and Sanders, 2002), which turned out to be true. In fact, Bill Craig, the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs under O’Neill’s governance, founded the Ulster Vanguard pressure group and used inflammatory statements, which could have hyped the paramilitary organisations to take up armed struggle. The paramilitary groups have always misunderstood the politicians’ speeches as a direct appeal to use violence. Actually, if found guilty, they were arrested too.

The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was formed in 1971. Both had close ties with more open voluntary bodies and with governmental agencies (McClung, 1981). Anyways, UDA tried to work openly in protection of loyalist areas, complaining that the “enemies” of the Faith and Freedom were determined to destroy the state of Northern Ireland. On the 30 of June 1972, UDA militants began to organise their own “no-go” areas. When loyalist paramilitaries were incarcerated for their violent acts, they felt a disenchantment with politicians and eventually put forward some proposals, like “Beyond the religious divide” (1979) and “Common Sense” (1981), in which they aimed at creating an independent Ulster, with a written Constitution and a Bill of rights to safeguard minorities. This swift change in mindset led to the formation of the basis for policies by the United Democratic Party at the Northern Ireland Forum. Compromise turned out to be a possible solution for paramilitaries. Nonetheless, we record some exceptions, as the basic premises of Ulster loyalism were only likely to change as a result of factors external to Northern Ireland.
(Moore and Sanders, 2002). For Ulster loyalists, in contrast to the Ulster British, the Englishman is as much “the other” as the Irish nationalists, but the Roman Catholic Church remained the primary enemy.

4-Provisional IRA

The Irish Republican Army’s ideology comes from the French Revolution and from an attempt by Irishmen to wrest control of the island from England in the 1790s. IRA’s first name is Óglaigh na hÉireann and its etymology indicates a “volunteer of Ireland”. Traditionally born as the idea of the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), also known as the Fenians, the conspirational group organised military training to mobilise its members in the launching of the insurrection of Easter 1916, in which the Republic was proclaimed in arms but put down by British forces (O’Leary, 2005). Nevertheless, at the end of the 1960s, IRA was unprepared for the assault on Catholics by Protestant mobs. This situation brought a discussion and reorganisation of the group. It is argued that the “old” IRA, compared to the Provisional IRA, possessed a democratic mandate and avoided causing civilian casualties (Hanley, 2013). The IRA split in 1969 between an “Official” (OIRA) and a much more militant “Provisional” (or Provo) faction. Soon afterward, also a Provisional Sinn Féin was created. The separation was influenced by the increasingly arcane Marxist theory of the Provos, which rendered them abstract from the volatility of gut Republican politics. For instance, they were Catholic “fundamentalists” but what really characterised their violent vein was the ‘self-styled socialist attitude’ (O’Leary, 2005). The Official IRA only sought to manoeuvre the organisation to end political abstentionism and justified its aggressive past as a necessity. On the contrary, Provisionals were more nationalist and did not want to build a political liberation front to end the military struggle (ibid.), they opted for violence in the here and now. However, the Provisional IRA was not a new organisation as it consisted of people who had been deemed to be spoken
for by intellectuals who were not speaking for them (O’Brien, 1977). For instance, a Derry priest commented:

‘The IRA obviously came into existence because of the stupidity of Unionist officials and the British army. There’s a great danger of creating myths about the Provos, what they achieved and how principled they were. They created a myth that they were defenders of the people. That’s a lot of bunkum. The people defended them. The IRA has no right to talk about how they kept the British army at bay. It was the people who kept the British army at bay.’ (Van Voris, 1975)

Indeed, the core belief of the extremist militants has always been to gain complete independence from Ireland through physical force. Furthermore, in 1975, another split occurred among the Officials which led to the formation of a new organisation, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). From roughly 1979 to 1987, the Provisionals were in a competition they could not afford to lose with the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a small but ruthless organisation not without some support in certain Catholic working-class areas in Belfast and Derry.

Between 1921 and 1962, the IRA maintained itself and engaged in a civil war and two other unsuccessful military campaigns aimed at reuniting the island. Nonetheless, by the early 1960s, the group was relatively inactive. In the 1970s, there was competition for supremacy in Catholic working-class areas, which reinforced the Provisionals’ combat orientation and started their guerrilla campaign. They wanted to differentiate from the official “National Liberation Front”, which was the name attributed to the OIRA by Provos. They aimed at freeing Northern Ireland by methods strongly condemned by the great majority both of the population of Northern Ireland and all Ireland, as well as of the United Kingdom (O’Brien, 1977). They labelled themselves as “Defenderists”,
suggesting a lineage with the XIX century clandestine agrarian Catholic nativist militia who defended their co-religionists from Protestant settler vigilantes (O’Leary, 2005). Many Northern Unionists, and many English people too, thought IRA wanted Northern Ireland to be handed over to the Dublin Government, but this was only partly true. Dublin was seen as a vassal government of Great Britain. What the Provisionals pursued was hence an “Eire Nua”, a New Ireland.

Right after their new establishment in the 1970s, the Provisionals declared war against the British Army. Rioting was more of a transitional stage in Irish Republican strategy. They adopted petrol bombs that were gradually replaced by shots from the crowd and nail bombs, then the bombing of “economic targets”, and finally full-scale gun battles. Nonetheless, by 1968, the IRA had moved to a position such that they had little in the way of weapons (Connolly, 1990). Indeed, during the loyalist attacks on the Catholic ghettos in August 1969, IRA was seen by many residents as not defending their areas. Moreover, anonymous graffiti on Belfast walls were teasing them spelling “IRA = I Ran Away”. Between 1970 and 1971, the Provisional IRA rapidly surpassed the Officials in militancy and recruitment among the Catholic youth. They frequently used boys aged 14 to 16 years to carry out serious acts of terrorism. Such youth have been known to shoot with the intent to kill and to plant lethal explosives (McClung Lee, 1981). On 27 June 1970, members of the IRA took up sniping positions on the grounds of St Matthew’s Catholic Church and engaged in a prolonged gun battle with the Loyalists at the Major Gun Battle in Belfast, the most significant IRA operation to date. In February 1971 the Provisional IRA killed the first British soldier (de Fazio, 2020) and on September 1971, they demanded the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic to permit free elections to establish a regional parliament for the Province of Ulster. Under their goal of Eire Nua, IRA and Sinn Féin promoted the creation of another local parliament to oppose Stormont. As this request
was ignored, the Provos switched from attempting to establish a legitimate revolutionary assembly to agitating for direct IRA involvement in all-party negotiations. However, in 1972 OIRA announced that it was calling a ceasefire. The Provisionals began a "bilateral truce" at midnight as a prelude to secret talks with the British Government. Indeed, Gerry Adams, future Sinn Féin leader who had been released from detention for the purpose, was part of a delegation that went to London for talks with the British Government. The IRA delegation held direct talks with William Whitelaw, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and other Northern Ireland Office ministers in the Chelsea home of Mr Paul Channon, then Minister of State for the North. The talks failed and the truce actually lasted only from the 26 of June to the 9 of July 1972.

Britain discussed with the IRA but Whitelaw dismissed the meeting as a “non-event”. Moreover, it was already established that the UK would have not accepted the IRA proposals, but still involving the IRA in a kind of negotiation was contemplated as the right manner to reach a conflict resolution. The British government declared then a commitment to a political reconciliation of the communities ‘whether the extremists on either side like it or not’ (Mulholland, 2007). By this time, in March 1972, the Provisionals bombed out much of Belfast and Derry. During the afternoon of “Bloody Friday,” IRA planted and exploded 22 bombs which, in the space of 75 minutes, killed 9 people and seriously injured approximately 130 others. The British Government was forced to implement “Operation Motorman”, the biggest British military operation since the 1956 Suez crisis, as well as to prorogue the Northern Ireland government at Stormont and institute direct rule from London. During the Truce, the Provos did not waste time and attempted to put the structure of Eire Nua into practice, fostering local self-help initiatives particularly in West Belfast: drinking clubs, “Black Taxis” running fixed routes, and “cooperatives”. The problem was that such a mixing of politics and economic activity bled insensibly into extortion and gangsterism parasitic on the community (Mulholland, 2007).
The increase in Provisional violence is often wrongly attributed to the Bloody Sunday (1972), but in reality, this occurred already after internment (1971), which occurred overnight (Van Voris, 1975). Neither the increased deprivation in the form of unemployment was related to the change in the level of violent protest in Derry. However, it is true that some kinds of repression shifted generally following the rise in political violence. Before the split in August 1969, there were only forty members in the city of Belfast and there was only one battalion. In 1969 there were three PIRA battalions and something like one thousand and nine hundred volunteers, people who have done basic weapons training and things like that.

Bernadette Devlin, MP for Mid Ulster from 1969 to 1974, serving after a short term in jail, believed:

‘The people who are responsible are the governments, are the systems. The Provisionals are a reaction to it. In that sense they are reactionaries, but they are fighting in their own way.’ (Van Voris, 1975)

Compared with the loyalists, the Republican capacity for political violence remained robust (Mulholland, 2007). Indeed, the Provos became a very proficient killing machine in the late 1970s and 1980s. There was increasing attention paid to “high profile” targets, such as the British ambassador to Ireland, Christopher Ewart Biggs, murdered in Dublin in 1976. In formal terms, the new IRA consisted of the Executive, elected by the General Army Convention. Then the Executive elected the Army Council members. The General Headquarters of the IRA staff is organised functionally into offices and its related operations are divided into areas. However, of necessity, the IRA has been extensively decentralised (O’Leary, 2005). Later, between 1976-1977, the IRA started restructuring itself into cellular Active Service Units (ASUs), which were suitable for a “Long War” but not sudden escalation. In fact, this system was
characterised more by a cell structure rather than a traditional military hierarchy (Sapone, 2001). Each Unit intended to be specialised in a field, like sniping, bombing or executions (O’Leary, 2005). A “stock” of 300-500 volunteers is estimated as regards these ASUs. Yet, the Glover Report counted circa 900, adding reserves and auxiliaries, in the period after 1976. Nevertheless, the prison population was exceeding the number of volunteers during that time. The Irish have spent decades waiting for opportunities to deploy a secret army, seeking toleration and support from their constituency to such an extent that they seldom focus analytically on the factual enemy. The first Irish priority was definitely to wage war (Bell, 1994). In August 1979, PIRA planted a bomb aboard the fishing boat of Lord Mountbatten in Mullaghmore, Ireland, and assassinated the Naval Army officer and member of the Royal family. The 1979 Provisional IRA Christmas message was rough:

‘1979 has seen us perfect some of our attacks against the enemy and we have dealt them several deadly blows […] in the determined way we military roared back at them in contradiction to their propaganda…. The Republican Army cannot be stopped!’

Provisionals were trained in secret locations in Ireland and the conflict in the 1980s was primarily covert. Once the Provisionals extended their campaign to Britain, the British government had to call for a cease-fire. Official ceasefires were held in 1972, between 1974 and 1976, and the last one in 1981 in concomitance with the Hunger Strikes. The latter truce was in particular declared by PIRA so that the deaths of the hunger strikers would not be overshadowed by other military actions (Sapone, 2001). By the mid- to late 1980s, IRA operations in urban areas were little more than harassment. The ambition remained to create “liberated zones” across the countryside. Yet, in the summer of 1982, practically the entire Derry IRA was arrested. British police continued the systematic abuse of suspects to ensure convictions by confession (Mulholland, 2007). According to Fortnight, a Northern Irish newsmagazine, the
Provisional IRA’s strategy, ‘whether deliberate or accidental, was to provoke confrontations with the security forces... and then base its recruitment on the repressive measures adopted by the Army as a result’ (McClung Lee, 1981).

According to many, like Charles Townshend (2002), the Provisional IRA emerged as a communal defence force in 1970 and can be plausibly portrayed as a national liberation front with a sideline in terrorism, rather than as a terrorist organisation. Those who created the Provisionals saw their job also as rebuilding a movement along traditional and authentically Irish lines. Yet, if around the world national liberation movements were exciting the sympathy and support of student radicals, the new IRA seemed to take distance from these other struggles (Cox, 2018). Moreover, on the other hand, many politicians and even the Irish populace accused the new IRA of desperately trying to fool the Irish people into believing that they were fighting the same fight and had the same moral authority as the official IRA (Hanley, 2013). Much of the carnage in Ulster over the summer of 1972 was caused by IRA bombs and the increasing street violence associated with Northern issues in the Republic, contributing to this decline in sympathy. In 1973 Official Sinn Féin won just 1.14 per cent, and Aontacht Éireann 0.91 per cent of the vote in the Republic's general election, while in the local election the Provisional Sinn Féin party won twenty-six seats on local government bodies. People were tired after ten years of violence, which by the late 1970s seemed to be primarily the responsibility of the IRA, in contrast to the 1968-72 period, when nationalists were seen as the victims of violence (Hanley, 2013). Anyways, according to the report on attitudes conducted by Davis and Sinnott, 1979, over 40 per cent of the asked population was sympathetic to the motives behind IRA’s struggle, conversely to what mass media tried to convey. In general, tolerance for aspects of the IRA's campaign ebbed and flowed depending on events in the North. The H-Block hunger strikes of the 1980s were the first
occasion after 1972 where substantial numbers of people, beyond Republican ranks, took to the streets in the Republic.

The prisoners’ claim for political recognition, hence not being treated as prisoners of war, comprehended the right to wear their own clothes, the permission not to do prison work, the right of free association, access to education and recreation activities, and the restoration of lost remission. There were three strategic models of prisoner management: reactive containment from 1969 to 1975; criminalisation from 1976 to 1981; and then some managerial strategies. In 1976, with the end of Special Category Status only for people convicted after that date, prisoners asked PIRA to kill prison officers. This “prison protest” lasted five years and began with the “blanket protest” by Kieran Nugent. Convicted prisoners refused to wear prison clothes and rather stayed naked or wrapped in a blanket. In 1978, other prisoners refused to leave their cells to take showers because of prison officers’ violent acts. They gave rise to the “dirty protest” since they did not leave their cells so started smearing their excrement on the walls. They promoted the “Five Demands”, which consisted of basic conditions for political prisoners. The assault that provoked the Dirty Protest was seen as a political act of discipline involving punishment and as a humiliating assertion of male dominance (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008). Finally, they committed to the “hunger protests”, refusing even food. At this point, they hoped that the British government would have conceded human rights, but it did not maintain the promise and prisoners took over the hunger strikes again in 1981. This protracted protest served to embarrass the British authorities since it showed the whole world that the Republican movement was indeed a political and popular force. Eventually, it resulted in the starvation to deaths of ten prisoners. The IRA’s response to British intransigence over the Hunger Strikes came on 12 October 1984, when it bombed the Conservative Party conference in Brighton, England, in an attempt to assassinate Margaret Thatcher and senior members of the government.
The Provisional IRA was rife with informers and people who were working with the British security services, MI5, or the RUC. A few years earlier, a high-ranking informer on the IRAS command council had provided the information that saved Prince Charles and Princess Diana from an assassination attempt at London’s Dominion Theatre in 1983. Another informer had alerted the authorities of Farrell, McCann, and Savage’s mission in Gibraltar. Listening devices, phone taps, hidden cameras, motion detectors, and technologies allowed interception of communication traffic and played critical roles for both PIRA and British Army. For instance, since the PIRA tried to maintain a record of its activities in notebooks and electronic media, they compromise secrecy (O’Leary, 2005).

The Irish Republican Army possessed many associated organisations whose depth of affiliation, support, and subordination changed over time (Bloom et al., 2012). One of these was Cumann na mBan, which was affiliated during the War of Independence (1919–1921), becoming “an army of women” and, by 1921, establishing over 800 branches (Wahidin, 2016). During Easter Rising 1916 women were largely deployed in medical aid, procuring rations, as dispatch couriers, in scouting or intelligence operations, or transferring arms, but some also engaged in direct combat roles. The IRA Commandant Brennan noted that during the Civil War, the IRA flying columns would have collapsed without Cumann na mBan. In Autumn 1968, the General Army Convention of the IRA decided to accept women as members of its organisation. Consequently, while recruiting a significant number of young, active recruits, the organisation was still led by staunch Republican women who continued the orthodox tradition (Reinisch, 2016). The PIRA recruited young girls to carry timed devices, hidden under their clothing, into shops and hoped that, because of their youth, they would receive only cursory examinations by security staff (Bloom et al., 2012). A military structure
and military titles were introduced in the women’s section between 1971 and 1972.

5-Women

Feminism has been rooted with Irish nationalism from the beginning of the conflict (O’Keefe, 2017). Cumann na mBan was divided between members who were inspired by the British suffragette movement and believed that they could combine the struggle for Irish freedom with women’s rights in terms of both social and economic power and others who believed that women’s social and economic rights took second place to the struggle for independence (Wahidin, 2016). In October 1922, the Catholic Church excommunicated Cumann na mBan members and all other militant Republicans. The Church officials show that although the women were very religious, they despised the Church’s attempts to control their behaviour by refusing them Communion and confession. From the beginning of the Conflict in 1969, women began to organise themselves to provide support structures within their communities. For instance, they invented an alarm signal, by rattling dustbin lids, to alert members of the community that the British Army was patrolling particular areas. Katie Thompson was the first woman to be shot dead while rattling a bin lid in 1971. Women began patrolling the streets in units through this method and they got the names of Hen Patrols (Bloom, 2011), in contrast to the Duck Patrols, aka the British soldiers. Thus women became the not-so-secret weapon of the PIRA: they shielded fugitive gunmen when troops swooped into the Catholic ghettos, then began carrying weapons and taking part in armed encounters against British soldiers. However, even the peaceful garbage-can lid system became a target of the Conflict. By the late 1960s, as the tensions and conflicts in Northern Ireland heightened, many women had already become disillusioned with their subsidiary role and the strict parameters set by Cumann na mBan. In fact, as even academic Moloney (2003) argues, in the early 1970s Cumann na mBan acted as the ‘P|IRA
equivalent of being stuck in the kitchen and the bedroom’. The greater involvement of women in the PIRA led to Cumann na mBan being absorbed into the broad organisation. By joining or being co-opted into the IRA they were far more likely to engage in front-line activities. However, many women specifically joined PIRA instead and were far more likely to engage in violent activities than their Cumann na mBan comrades (Bloom et al., 2012).

Their involvement was prominent during the early 1970s. As a separate organisation, Cumann na mBan had its own women’s leadership, structure, and rules. Although they and the IRA were fighting a common cause, tensions arose from being a separate organisation that nevertheless shared some common activities.

‘I had a rifle and I was standing in the Suffolk Road, near Andersontwon. There was another girl with me and three fellows, but I was the only one with a gun.’ (Geraldine Crawford in MacDonald, 1991)

Still, albeit owning a different manifesto and structure, they were ipso facto members of the PIRA. They acted as Cumann na mBan members under the guidance of the IRA Army Council (Reinisch, 2016). Category A included women who focused on political and legal work such as selling papers and collecting money for prisoners’ dependents funds. Category B women did the same activities outlined in Category A plus additional clandestine work such as the transportation of arms, ammunition, explosives, and bombs hidden or produced in the Republic, which were later couriered to the North. Finally, Category C included women who were actively involved in open warfare in the North. According to Wahidin (2016), many women disillusioned by the gender stereotypes and traditional mindset of Cumann na mBan gave them reasons for leaving and joining the Army. Yet, in the 1970s the dominant masculinity was defined through the image of the “gunmen”, associated with violent
organisations (Schraut and Weinhauser, 2014). The impetus for women to be allowed into the IRA as full members has apparently stemmed from pressure from young women themselves in the late 1960s. At this point, the IRA leadership was tasked by the women themselves, and sympathetic men in the movement, to fulfil the actual need to have some military-trained women (Ward, 1989).

‘If I was either going to go to prison or die in the struggle then I wanted it to be in the IRA because you could quite easily, even as a Cumann na mBan person, be shifting a weapon from A to B down your trousers. You’re going to do 10 years if you got caught. So I just didn’t want to be moving the weapon from A to B. What I wanted to do was to use the weapon and then move it to B, on my own and be a very proactive Volunteer’

In this context, the leadership changed its mind for several reasons, but the most important one is that they recognised the necessity of some military-trained women in the groups as more young men were interned or died in combat, and there was a strategic need to have more fighters. As women became highly trained in the use of modern weapons, making explosives and moving weaponry to areas that needed protection, and rarely breaking under interrogation, they had to battle more against sexism and discrimination in the organisation rather than the British Army. At the same time, as women became more politicised and highly trained in combat, they also became confident in viewing themselves as equals. Once within the IRA women took on key roles like bomb-making and training but their work in combat was not reflected in the organisational structure of the Army (O’Keefe, 2017). As a matter of fact, several female activists engaged in bombings of various scales and many died in premature explosions in the early years of the Conflict (Bloom et al., 2012). Successfully operations were carried out instead by the Price sisters, involved with the bombing of the Old Bailey in 1973; Martina Anderson, who caused the explosion at a furniture store in 1981; and by
Margaret McKearney, whom Scotland Yard dubbed as the most dangerous woman terrorist in Britain following a series of bombings and gun attacks in London, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, and Southampton. Up to 1977 and before the reorganisation of the IRA, the women in the movement were given greater responsibility for playing a variety of roles from being a member of IRA’s General Headquarters; Army Council, officers, officers in command, battalion officers, and so on. However, the exclusion women felt led them eventually to publicly call on the leadership to rectify their marginalisation (Falls Women’s Centre, 1995; Clár na mBan, 1994)

In the interviews conducted by Theresa O’Keefe (2017), a previous IRA member declared:

‘I joined gCailní na hÉireann, the junior wing of the IRA, when I was thirteen. Unconsciously I became more politically aware. At sixteen I joined the army.’

Finally, when the Provisional IRA disbanded the women’s group, women volunteers merged directly into the armed organisation. The breakdown of the home front - war front boundary seemed to be significant in resulting in increased numbers of female combatants (Alison, 2004).

As the number of women active in the PIRA increased, the number of imprisoned also grew (Bloom, 2011). Hundreds of young girls were dragged out of their homes in the middle of the night and interrogated. Once arrested, the women were forced to sign confessions that were often fabricated, even though a great number of women incarcerated were not involved in PIRA. From 1969 to 1976, over 236 women were politically motivated prisoners, meaning that they were militants of the Irish Struggle. The female internees were held at the only women’s prison in Northern Ireland: Armagh Prison. In 1973, Liz McKee, a 19-year-old woman from Belfast, became the first woman to be interned under the Special Powers Act, followed by a young woman who was barely 18 at the
time (Aretxaga, 1997). The vast majority of women prisoners had been charged with “terrorist-type” offences, although they considered themselves to be political prisoners (Wahidin, 2016). Women arrested had to prove their innocence and since most of these Republican females refused to recognise the legitimacy of the British court, their conviction rate rose to 94 percent (Bloom, 2011). Some of the women joined the brief hunger strike in 1980 but were refused permission by the IRA leadership to take part in the 1981-82 fast. Furthermore, women who showed solidarity with their male comrades through the “Dirty Protest” and eventually the hunger strikes gained very scarce public attention.

Sinn Féin vice-president and leading Cumann na mBan member Máire Drumm, who was shot dead by Loyalists in 1976. She was castigated while alive for her militant speeches (Ward and McGivern, 1980). Her funeral provided a renewed opportunity for vitriol as she was dubbed "Granny of hate" and a "Provisional IRA Godmother". To describe a male activist thus would appear the height of absurdity and irrelevance – what is being attacked is not a person’s marital status but their political beliefs. The British military claimed that their troops were reluctant to fire upon women, even when faced with female snipers, although this was not true as the subsequent events in Gibraltar demonstrated. Indeed, the women were competing also against the men on their own side.

Mairéad Farrell is probably the most popular female Provisional. She had an incredible ability to mobilising others into the movement and her image was strategically used for propaganda purposes; hence she became a member of PIRA’s General Headquarters (GHQ). Feeling that the Catholic community was constantly under siege, she had started as a young girl, throwing rocks at British soldiers and banging garbage bin lids to warn the PIRA that British troops were on their way. She acted as a lookout and weapons carrier when she was a teenager and then graduated to active service, throwing petrol bombs and planting one of the Conway Hotel bombs when she was 19. She was captured on this
occasion, on April 5, 1976. In front of the court, she resigned to recognise the institution, as her comrades used to do, giving evidence that she was a PIRA member. She rather said: ‘I've always believed we had a legitimate right to take up arms and defend our country and ourselves against British occupation’ (Aretxaga 1997). The same year, Great Britain revoked the special status for political contestants of Irish Republicans. Therefore, women sentenced after March 1, 1976, were denied the privileges granted to women sentenced a day earlier (Bloom, 2011). While in prison, Farrell engaged in the blanket, no wash, and hunger protests. She was sentenced to 14 years for causing three explosions, possession of three bombs and a Colt 45, and being a member of an illegal terrorist organisation. Farrell was the first female convicted after the political status of PIRA members was revoked. She led the women in a 13-month-long campaign of passive resistance by refusing to bathe or use the lavatories, which the British termed “the Dirty Protest”. In 1980 the women of Armagh were subjected to beatings and solitary confinement for 24 hours a day for several weeks. The crisis allegedly started when the guards insisted on finding and destroying all the pieces of black clothing in the women’s cells. The black clothing symbolised the women’s membership in the PIRA and the women would wear these outfits to commemorate lost colleagues or in support of their male counterparts at Long Kesh during marches outside. The British security services did not try to prevent another attack and kill the most famous female operative in the PIRA. They went through great efforts to circumvent any legal obstacles to execute her rather than capture her alive (Bloom, 2011).

‘I am oppressed as a woman, and I’m also oppressed as an Irish person. We can only end our oppression as women if we end the oppression of our nation as a whole. I hope I am still alive when the British are driven out. Then, the struggle begins anew’ (Radikal, 1992)
Most PIRA women did not consider themselves feminists and resented the formal Irish feminist movement that argued that women’s rights came first, before revolution, independence, or freedom from Britain (Bloom et al., 2012). Even Alison (2004) argued that a connection between paramilitary experience and a commitment to women’s rights is much less clearcut in the case of the IRA. In my opinion, this feeling was true as much as Provisional women were treated equally to men but this does not mean that she did not share the feminist thought. As she stated in the previously reported sentences, the national cause came before women’s question but feminism could have easily stood together with the revolution. In 1988, Farrell was killed under disputed circumstances by the SAS in Gibraltar alongside fellow PIRA Volunteers Sean Savage and Danny McCann.

Many female IRA members abandoned the radical side and turned to political feminist Republicanism. Bernadette Devlin McAliskey is easily recognisable as a feminist actor within the wider Republican movement, being both the co-founder of PD and in the 1970s MP of Northern Ireland to Westminster. She is also an example of the internationalisation of the Northern Ireland struggle, as she popularised the politics of former Black Panther Angela Davis when she visited her in prison.

6-Conclusions

Northern Ireland’s population was approximately 1.5 million in the period of the Troubles and from this statistic Hayes and McAllister (2001) recorded tragic numbers: one in seven of the population had a direct experience of violence, one in five had a family member killed or injured and one in four was caught up in an explosion. People supported IRA violence because they felt social commitment to their community and kin, as well as because they experienced state repression in the first person. They also hoped that violence would have produced a social change and injustice impinged on their national identities. The female Catholic body
becomes a site in which gendered norms operated, were subverted, and used to heighten feelings of sexual vulnerability and, in some cases, led to actual sexual violence (Wahidin, 2016). It became a tool of and for torture. However, the experience of state violence can be considered also a “moral shock” for some respondents insofar as it forced many women to engage in politics of resistance for the first time in their lives (O’Keefe, 2017). Gendered state violence can be understood as having “domesticated” the war: it sought to delegitimise women’s political activism and circumscribe the struggle to an internal state matter (Pickering and Third, 2003).

Many scholars and stakeholders, Britain’s governance as well, acknowledged that the IRA could not be credibly slotted into any revolutionary international, communist, or otherwise (Mulholland, 2007). The combined efforts of both Ireland and the United Kingdom, it has been suggested, first helped isolate the Republican threat through the instrument of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and then drew Republican leaders in from the cold through a series of carefully designed accords whose ultimate purpose was to undermine the case for violence by implying that there might be another, non-violent way of achieving their goal (Cox, 2018). As Sapone (2000) states, the British willingness to enter into negotiations with the Provisional IRA resulted partially from the end of the Cold War, which changed the strategic map of Europe. Nonetheless, the Provisionals survived the efforts of five UK Prime Ministers to crush it, namely Harold Wilson, Edward Heath, James Callaghan, Margaret Thatcher, and John Major (O’Leary, 2005). Yet, since Gerry Adams and the others have risen to power in the Republican movement during the 1980s, Republican ideology has shifted from the primacy of the armed struggle to an increased focus on the political process. As O’Keefe (2017) already pointed out, Republican feminist politics are, for the most part, hidden from view and the contributions of
this form of feminist resistance are in danger of being written out of history despite the saturation of scholarship on the Troubles.

Albeit the national struggle in Northern Ireland has not been solved yet, on 31 August 1994, the Provisional IRA declared a cessation of military operations. In the end, in 1998, Sinn Féin opted to support the Belfast Agreement too. April 1998 marked the signature of Ireland, Great Britain, and the parties of Northern Ireland of the Good Friday Agreement, supposed to end the violence and the ethno-separatist conflict which have been in action since the 1960s.
CHAPTER VII - Women in the Palestine Liberation Organisation

1- Social layout

Over the last years, the Arab world has been the theatre for the rise of thriving civil rights movements, which were often the key players in large-scale demonstrations that opposed firmly established regimes (Manduchi, 2015). According to Heradstveit (1972), there is a mandatory polarisation among people in the Middle East: on one side, the “minimalists” seek a negotiated settlement with the State of Israel, and would be content with an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the June War; on the other side, the “maximalists” reject negotiations and claim that a military struggle is the only solution. Their objective is to abolish the State of Israel in its present form and create a new Palestinian State in the area. Most of the guerrillas are maximalist in scope and the Palestinian ones were no less. Yet, the Palestinian struggle has been dominated by secular nationalism, embodied within the PLO and Al-Fatah; and in more recent days by the Islamism of Hamas (Khan, 2008). The 1948 Palestinian Diaspora, known as “Al-Nakba” (catastrophe), resulted from the Israeli conquest of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, in which Palestinians suffered the full effects of a classical colonial Occupation, involving further rounds of displacement (Moore-Gilbert, 2013). The displacement had a hard economic impact on the peasants. Due to the Israeli appropriation of lands, the peasant class was transformed into a proletarian workforce for the Israeli labour market (Kuttab, 1993). The uniqueness of the Palestinian "working class" meant that PLO activists often viewed the migrant workers, who were earning a wage in Israel, as traitors and consequently left-wing groups did not organise unions among this sector of Palestinian workers until the late 1970s. The labour movement of Palestine, which is in general an important forum for any leftist organisation, was organised in village communities. The emergence of these Palestinian leftist parties appeared especially after the Six Days War, resulting from the regression of Arab
nationalism in the wake of the Arab defeat, and overcoming the impasse. The Palestinian Liberation Movement arose exactly in 1967 (Kawar, 1993). 1967 was in particular the watershed for Arab nationalism, a defeat symbolising its ultimate political failure in confronting Zionism (Khan, 2008). Arab socialists and communists often had to incorporate Arab nationalism into their discourses as seen with George Habbash, the General Secretary of the Marxist Leninist PFLP. Nevertheless, Arab nationalism was the first political experience for many Palestinians but was the key to increasing activism among the Palestinian population. Nationalism combined with a high level of education among the protestants led to a significant radical shift to the left in mass mobilisation and the rise of Marxism across the Middle East, as seen with the communist National Liberation Front in the South of Yemen, and also the emergence of a very vibrant and diverse leftist movement in the South of Lebanon which would play an important role during the civil war, and finally the emergence of the Palestinian PFLP. Yet, the Arab revolutionary left in its different contexts was able to define itself as something new and distinct from Arab nationalism, Nasserism and Ba’athism (Khan, 2008). According to Antonius (1980), the Israelis had three psychological aims, which were the reason for mass protests. The first was to turn the Palestinians away from nationalist work, the second to make them into docile second-class citizens and the third to Zionise them mentally. Finally, a democratic change at the structural and ideological level prompted the creation of new organisations which mobilised Palestinians under broad categories and sectors such as youth, workers, women and students (Kuttab, 1993).

As Lisa Taraki (1990) claimed: ‘The emergence of the mass organisations and the expansion of the universities during this period were the most significant developments’. Similarly to the other organisations, the student movements arose in response to the Zionist settler-colonial project and were linked to the nationalist struggle. Throughout the
1950s, Palestinian students at universities, specifically in Cairo, Damascus and Beirut, established student associations to raise awareness of the Palestinian cause and operate within and outside their campuses to mobilise the youth for the liberation struggle. As Palestinian students acquired political skills and leadership competences, they constituted an incubator for individual and collective revolutionary capacities and laid the foundations for further Palestinian collective organisations (Meari and Abu Duhou, 2020). In 1959 was indeed formed the first Palestinian general union, the General Union of Palestine Students (GUPS), in Cairo. Yasser Arafat, a Palestinian student leader in Cairo, was among the ones who initiated this student collective. He probably worked in consultation with Hajj Amin al-Husseini and both were probably supported and assisted by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of Hassan al-Bana. After an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian President came down heavily upon this Brotherhood. The group’s leaders of the plot were executed, the rank and file were jailed and the organisation was declared illegal. Husseini left for Iraq in search of an alternative political patronage and Arafat moved to Kuwait. In the same period of Arafat’s GUPS, a parallel Palestinian liberation movement was taking shape in Beirut where George Habbash, Nayef Hawatmeh and other Palestinian exiles founded the Harakat al-Quamiyyun al-Arab (Arab National Movement, ANM). ANM soon established branches in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, and Bahrein whereas in Egypt, it found a great ally in Nasser and pledged its support to his Arab policies. Elsewhere, many GUPS activists, particularly from the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Al-Fatah) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) engaged in vibrant university activism in Arab, Eastern European and Western countries (Meari and Abu Duhou, 2020). They eventually supported Palestinian youth’s studies, especially the incoming students from occupied Palestine who benefitted from scholarships offered by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries throughout the 1970s and
1980s. Moreover, thanks to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) support many could enrol in the new Palestinian universities, which emerged in the 1970s. Poor youth started joining higher education and hence influencing the diversification of the student movement. From the 1950s onwards, there was a myriad of Third World national liberation movements, all inspired by socialism. Palestinians could take into consideration the examples of the Cuban and the Algerian revolution, as it happened in every other student organisation in the world. The militants in particular argued that revolutionary warfare was a historically proven and tested means that would bring success against Israel (O’Neill, 1978). Indeed, military training was systematic and set up by commandos who had had experience in Cuba, Vietnam, or China (Heradstveit, 1972). Moreover, George Habbash clearly stated in a post-datum interview that he was inspired by the Vietnamese struggles and the teachings of Ho Chi Minh. In this talk, he also addressed an issue which could have been upraised in various organisations as he claimed that he did not see any contradiction in being a socialist and an Arab nationalist at the same time (Khan, 2008).

Armed struggle was accepted as an option, along the same lines as Viet-Congs fought the American invaders. When eventually GUPS called on its student members, thousands of its members moved to Lebanon and resisted the invasion of Israel in 1982. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the student movement in Palestinian universities was one of the various emerging popular mass organisations which constituted a front of semi-legal organisations to the clandestine political fractions of the PLO in the 1967-occupied parts of Palestine. After the 1967 War, new leftist organisations appeared on campus or were even re-energised by the War. Several students had been arrested for terrorist activities and some of the most prominent ones, at the release time, influenced even more the institution building promoting mobilisation. Activist Ghassan 'Ali al-Masri, who was released in 1979, was then elected to the al-Najah
University Student Council a year later. 'Adnan Damiri and Ahmad al-Diq became Fatah student activists at Bir Zeit University and Ahmad Jabr Sulayman, who was imprisoned several times for terrorist activity as a member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) later became an activist at Bethlehem University. These students soon dominated youth fronts such as the first Shabiba Committees in West Bank villages, refugee camps, and urban neighbourhoods in 1980-81 and were also prevalent in student wings such as the Youth Student Movement (Harakat al-Shabiba al-Tullabiyya) (Frisch, 2012). Nonetheless, albeit the student movement in Palestinian universities emerged in opposition to the occupation as part of the national liberation movement, student activists later engaged in union struggles and promoted students’ interests and demands like in any other student movement. The Bir Zeit University, located in the West Bank, was the main hub of the protests. Here students tried to “nationalise” the cafeteria, taking it under their control. Moreover, even at the University of Beirut the students were highly politicised in the Palestinian question. In October 1970, Newsweek magazine labelled the school “Guerrilla U” because politics was directly tied to the Palestine guerrilla movement (Anderson, 2008). Even more, most of the recruiting for rebel organisations passed from the student hangout called Feisal’s Restaurant, right in front of the university. When conflicts erupted between the Palestinian fedayeen and the Lebanese government in April 1969, protests broke out all over Beirut, forcing the Lebanese government to declare a curfew (ibid.). Broadly speaking, some differences existed among the students based on nationality and religion, but common was the increasing support for a military solution to the Palestinian problem. Indeed, a considerable number of Christians supported the Palestinians (Hussain, 1973) and Palestinian Christians like George Habbash and Nayet Hawatmeh have been fedayeen leaders. While 86 per cent of Palestinian students indicated that they were dissatisfied with the dominant political conditions, only 71 per cent of other Arabs did so
Therefore, the Palestinian students showed a particular inclination toward political alienation and leftist radicalism. Meanwhile, by 1976, the mayoral élite from the OT, who was allied with the locally centred Palestinian Communist Organisation, had effectively decreased the content of their goals by now seeking parity within the PLO, though they might still have concealed aspiration to eventually replace the PLO’s diaspora focus (Frisch, 2012). After the 1982 crushing of PLO military capability in Lebanon, the organisation, and especially Fatah, responded through a reassessment by creating a middle command. To contrast also the popular organisations created by the municipal urban élite, the focus was placed on the mobilisation of the growing number of students, women’s groups and the shabiba (youth groups) (Cobban, 1990).

The Palestine Arabs gradually realised that the first problem for the Palestinian fida’yat (freedom fighters) was to break the resistance of the Arab governments (Heradstveit, 1972). During the 1980s and early 1990s, the leadership of the different political parties was replaced by the cadres of the 1950s - 1960s student movement involved in student union activism and struggle in all universities. At the end of the XX century, Ambassador Laila Shahid became a leading member of the Political Department, the diplomatic service of the PLO. The rise of a middle command in the universities represented a change in terms of age, modus operandi, and sociological background relative to the mayoral “fedayeen” leadership in the National Guidance Committee (NGC), which was created in 1978 in opposition to the peace process of Camp David that eventually yielded the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement (Frisch, 2012). In 1980 Israel froze the election of municipal councils and create the Civil Administration, a military unit responsible for implementing Israel’s civilian policy in the occupied West Bank. The NGC was officially outlawed in 1982 after a series of dismissals, administrative arrests, and deportations of its members. However, the contribution of old student
protesters also played a vital role during the Intifada. The (first) Intifada of 1987 represented the major and concrete Palestinian mass mobilisation and the culmination of more than 20 years of resistance and organisation against the Israeli occupation (Kuttab, 1993). It was an extension of the Palestinian revolution, focused against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza. On this occasion, as a consequence of the student’s involvement in the protests, the Israeli governor closed all universities. Successively, the PFLP decided to dissolve the party’s student organisation and join the rural popular organisations or build such organisations. Yet, the first Intifada marked a shift in the nationalist ideology. Indeed, according to many accounts from activists close to the PLO leadership, the events of 1982 were also decisive in changing their attitudes toward the liberation struggle (Cobban, 1990). Independence, rather than the return of Palestine refugees to their lands, was advocated.

From 1921, when the first women’s association was founded in Jerusalem, until 1969 when the Resistance organisations gained power in the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Palestinian women had never had the backing of a national or governmental authority nor had they faced the responsibilities that this backing inevitably entails. The early 1920s viewed even a large demonstration organised by hundreds of women in Jerusalem to demand that Britain cancel the Balfour Declaration and restrict Jewish immigration (Kuttab, 1993). Then, in the mandate era, gender joined race, religion and class as a means of perpetuating conflict as well as legitimising and transforming power arrangements that would determine who won and who lost Palestine (Moore-Gilbert, 2013). With the destruction of the agrarian infrastructure and the confiscation of Palestinian lands by Israel, Palestinian women were compelled to seek roles in the labour market and to improve their skills through education (Awwad, 1993). Many women started joining universities, but the majority was still coming from the élite class.
Moreover, women initially organised under charitable activities. They were mainly providing volunteering in traditionally female sectors, like education, hence being teachers, and health, being nurses. Nonetheless, women gained slowly their organisation and space even inside student movements. Yet, the marginalisation of the female question reflected the low representation of females in the students’ councils, but the leftist parties in general and the leftist student blocs, in particular, enabled relatively more female participation. During the 1969 Palestinian Congress in Cairo, there were proposals for the redistribution of delegates that comprised also three representatives from the students and two from women’s groups (Heradstveit, 1972). Maha Nassar was the first female student who headed the voluntary work committee of Bir Zeit’s student council from 1973 to 1974. Moreover, since 1969 Palestinian women have been represented by the General Union of Palestinian Women (al-Ittihad al-'Am lil-Mara al-Filastiniya), an official section of the PLO, whose executive members represented the various political organisations that make up the PLO (Antonius, 1979).

During the Intifada, street activists rebelled against the authority of the PLO, and women rebelled against their traditional place in a patriarchal society (Hiltermann, 1991). Now than in the past, women were more eager to join, because they want to address problems in their real lives. On March 8, 1988, the banners and slogans called for women’s liberation, for an independent state with the PLO as its leadership, for an end to the occupation, and an end to Israeli brutality. Yet, according to Islah Jad, lecturer at the Bir Zeit University, women's role in the popular committees became an extension of what it traditionally had been in society: teaching and rendering services without ever going beyond that (Hiltermann, 1991). The 1987 intifada, therefore, was a culmination of these two forces as the vanguard of the rebellion rather than armed groups which had been more dominant since 1967 (Khan, 2008). In the 1987 Intifada, Palestinian women marched in the streets, schoolgirls
threw stones at soldiers, older women carried baskets of stones on their heads to supply younger demonstrators, whereas other women argued and tussled with the authorities to win the release of an arrested boy. They also organised underground classes when the schools were closed, monitored their neighbourhoods to ensure that all families were getting adequate nutrition, developed small-scale economic projects, and worked with the various committees that had been formed to establish health clinics. First volunteering women did lay a foundation for the subsequent women’s activism. In fact, women of the earlier generation, particularly those who formed organisations to support the refugees in 1948, provided the training ground for many of the leaders of the later Palestinian women’s movement. Their activism, which was initially spurred by nationalism and class consciousness, ultimately fomented a nascent feminist consciousness (Gluck, 2008). Yet, the Palestinian women’s movement grew up within the confines of the national movement (Jamal, 2001). Moreover, even without being involved in the mass mobilisation, women were always made participants, to a certain extent. When a man was arrested, his wife or his mother or sisters were often detained with him and held for questioning (Antonius, 1980). Yet, women were imprisoned under inhumane conditions and were tortured and humiliated, way more than men (Kuttab, 1993). In 1976, thirty-three thousand men and women were detained, of whom only 8000... were charged because the police follow a policy of indiscriminate mass arrest. 1978 marked the year of the formation of the Working Women’s Committee and 1980 of the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC), which was viewed by other local activists as the most resistant to embracing feminism. It was founded on the spur of the national movement then gathering force as high school and college students turned their activism to mobilising other sectors of the population. A number of the founders were graduates of Bir Zeit University. Many had clashed with the Israeli army in demonstrations in the early and mid-1970s, and their activism was fuelled by a growing realisation that Israel
was not going to relinquish the occupied territories voluntarily, and that the existing local institutions were ill-equipped to cope with a prolonged military occupation. Furthermore, almost all of the older generation, including President Issam Abdel Hadi, lived outside the base country, and therefore the effective daily leadership of the Union was held by a small core from among the younger generation (Kawar, 1993). Still, the first sign of substantive acknowledgement by the Resistance leadership came in 1980, when the number of Women's Union seats in the Palestine National Council was increased to twelve. After the Intifada, PLFP became also more willing to espouse feminism openly and to be self-critical of the way they had privileged the nationalist struggle. The uprising thus led to the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership that began organising demonstrations, strikes, and other acts of resistance to the occupation (Massad, 1995). Palestinian independence is seen as the ultimate birth of the Intifada's pregnancy (ibid.), taking distance from the PLO’s wish to bring all the Palestinian refugees back to their homelands. It has also retained a catalyst for group initiatives on the social, cultural, and economic levels. It set itself inside the process of national liberation struggle, which unites various groups and classes of society. In November 1988, the Palestine Declaration of Independence described women as being "the guardians of [their] survival and lives, the guardian of [their] perennial flame".

2- International terrorism

Frustrated by the failure of the Arab armies in 1967 and unable to wage guerrilla warfare in Israel, Palestinian extremists launched a global campaign of terrorism against Israel and its supporters (Jenkins, 1986). Transnational terrorism can be dated around 1971 and 1973 and cannot be better explained than with Palestinian terrorist movements. The outbreak of hijackings, skyjackings, assassinations and letter bombings shocked the world and was way more widespread than the armed struggle of the previous period. The involvement of foreign agents and supply in
the Palestinian struggle is clear and the literature available presents yet wide information about the internationality of the conflict. In 1965, Shukairy, the first Chairman of the PLO, led the first organisation delegation to China where it was accorded a *de facto* diplomatic recognition and was permitted to open an office. Later, the fedayeen received Chinese arms through PLO’s Damascus office (Hussain, 1973) and, in July 1971, a consignment of Chinese arms intended for the PLA, including 200 tanks, thousands of machine guns, and millions of rounds of ammunition, was seized by the Syrian army at the port of Latakia. Additional evidence of an international exchange of ideas and pooling of weapons and information among terrorist groups emerges from an event which happened in May 1972. At the time, three members of Japan’s United Red Army Group, hired by the PFLP, took weapons out of suitcases and opened fire in the Tel Aviv airport, killing 26 persons and wounding 80 (Wolf, 1973). To stir up the waters, Al-Ahram, a popular Egyptian journal, immediately commented favourably on the PFLP’s suicide squad operation with three participating Japanese revolutionaries (Hussain, 1973). However, information exchange was available on both sides. In February 1973 Israeli commandos raided al-Fatah and PFLP bases in the Nahr al-Baddawi refugee camp, in northern Lebanon, reportedly using maps and diagrams supplied by agents in Europe (O’Neill, 1978). In addition, international groups were suspected of receiving training at Palestinian camps in the Occupied Territories, like the United States Weathermen, the Irish Republican Army, Turkey’s Dev Gene group and possibly some members of Nicaragua’s Sandinista guerrilla movement. The Soviet Union was mentioned as giving scholarships to Palestinian youth and even more, Arafat clandestinely visited Moscow in the late 1960s, as an incognito member of Nasser’s delegation. The formal visit and diplomatic recognition of Palestine by the Soviet Union came in 1970. Nonetheless, the PLO forged ties also with the US government, in particular in 1975-76, when it helped the US
embassy in Lebanon in evacuating its citizens and secured safe passage for their movement across the Green Line.

We have to cite transnational cases while dealing with Palestine Liberation Movements because the organisations formed at the universities were all totally committed to fighting against British occupation as well as they were absorbed into the Palestinian cause. As a matter of fact, the social movements that shook Palestinians’ lives took place, especially in other countries. Furthermore, Palestine is still not a recognised state nor has a defined territory. Hussain (1973) sustained that every Arab regime has given verbal support to the Palestinian cause and every Arab regime has used that cause to further its domestic political prospects and to out-maneuvre neighbouring regimes in the Byzantine game of intra-Arab politics.

In Egypt, the Young Muslim Association (al-ṣubbān al-muslimīn) was founded in 1927 in the surroundings of al-Ahzar. From this rally, the more famous Muslim Brotherhood Association was created the following year. In the same period, another rather less influential group within the universities was born, the so-called "Green Shirts" (al-qumsān al-hadrā’), the first political organisation guided by students or young graduates. The “Green Shirts” were also organised into aggressive paramilitary squads. In response to this, the Wafd party formed its own "Blue Shirts", leading to numerous incidents between the two groups and beyond universities. Originally, the only differences between the male and female students of the Brotherhood and the other students were to be found in their traditional dress and observation of ostentatious ritual practices inside the university. The spread of Islamic groups within the universities was also the result of a condescending passivity on the part of the authorities, which saw them as a means to tackle the secular and nationalist groups who, in their opinion, represented a greater danger. In 1948 the Brothers were accused of the fatal attack on the chief of police Selim Zaki, causing the ordered dissolution of the Association and the
arrest of many members and supporters. Then, al-Hasan al-Bannā, the founder and Supreme Leader of the movement, was in turn eliminated in mysterious circumstances. Despite these violent events, student organisations never ceased to exist and eventually took on a far more conciliatory role which was closer to the regime. Furthermore, due to the Soviet influence on Egypt, the spread of communist ideology was particularly successful in some universities, such as Alexandria’s Faculty of Science, which became known as the "Red Faculty". Many incidents have occurred in Egypt from the 1940s to the 1960s but the Brotherhood had always been active. Albeit the Egyptian government had restricted the activities of Arafat and al-Husseini after the Suez War (Hussain, 1973), it took the lead in setting up the PLO in 1964. It consequently permitted the PLO radio, "Voice of Palestine", to broadcast its programmes from Cairo. However, the guerrilla was not allowed to operate of its own free will in Egypt (Heradstveit, 1972). Still, this did not mean that armed incursions were disapproved, they were on the contrary widely welcomed outside the Egyptian borders. With the growing strength of the guerrilla groups, Nasser felt impelled to declare publicly that he fully supported them and that he would have given all possible help. In 1967-1968 there was a strong reawakening of the student protests. Strikes and actions were admitted only if related to the Palestinian cause. Although the students seemed to play an extremely dynamic role in the university’s social and political life, they were completely under the thumb of the regime. Egypt supported the liberation of the Israel Occupied Territories (OT) but did not grant freedom to its citizens. In fact, students were only allowed to take part in regime approved organisations and associations, under the constant supervision of teachers or other students working undercover for the authorities. Nasser’s strategy during the Six Days War, namely to blitzkrieg Israel in order to finish the Zionist entity in a short time, did not work. The militarily decisive Israeli victory of 1967 brought up a political inconclusiveness (Khalidi, 1973). The defeat in the Six Day War was a catalyst for the discontent and dissent
that had been repressed for such a long time, among Palestinians as well as every other Egyptian part of society. Crowds of students - the "children of the Revolution" - took to the streets in February 1968, but they were also sided by the working class. Actually, only after the Battle of al-Karameh, which viewed Israel against PLO and the Jordanian forces and provoked a huge number of casualties, Nasser began to support the fedayeen and allowed even al-Fatah to establish its radio, "Voice of al-Assifa", in Cairo on May 11, 1968. Yet, Al-Fatah indirectly criticised Nasser and denounced the US peace initiatives. The "Voice of al-Assifa" broadcasted songs, one of which said, "Don't forsake me lover", and the other song by a famous Egyptian singer, Mohammed Abdel Wahhab, saying "I did not sell you for gold, but you sold me for nothing" (Hussain, 1973). The student community of Egypt supported even more the Palestine struggle, which now opposed the traditional Arab governances too. For instance, they agitated and demanded the release of the four members of Black September who had assassinated the Jordanian Premier, Wasfi Tei. Furthermore, a strong Palestinian-Egyptian student movement demanded a total confrontation with Zionism and imperialism. After the civil war in Jordan and the Rogers plan of 25 June 1970, Egypt changed its position and came out openly against the guerrilla. The Rogers plan was indeed promoted by the US government in 1969 and consisted principally of the Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory occupied in the war. Furthermore, the nationalist feeling and idea of the Arab unit were suddenly and unexpectedly dead by 1970. The legacy of Abdel Nasser that the momentum of his ideas would survive his death for several years did not materialise among Egyptians (Omar, 1992).

If we exclude the occupied territories of Israel, most Palestine Arabs lived in Jordan (Heradstveit, 1972) and hence Palestinian guerrilla played mostly in Jordan areas. On the other hand, the Bedouins were a minority group and did not share the Palestine Arabs' feelings towards Israel. The emirs, the Bedouin chiefs and the senior officers, who constituted the
privileged class in Jordan, felt that the emergence of the Palestinians as the major political factor in their country was a threat to them. They pressured the King to take action against the Palestinians but King Hussein preferred to stay neutral, pursuing a wavering policy where he partly complied with the demands of the guerrilla and partly tried to stop them. There are no doubts that he was against the Palestine Arabs but as Egypt supported their cause and at the same time protected the Kingdom of Jordan, King Hussein could not contradict this important ally and sponsor. For other motives, Al-Fatah did not plan to overthrow King Hussein. They were aware of the efficiency of the Bedouin army and feared a military showdown (Heradstveit, 1972). Nevertheless, the King was a symbol of suppression, a representative of the old feudal system in the eyes of the revolutionary guerrillas. In 1967 we can account for the creation of the first Resistance movement in Jordan (Antonius, 1979). Then, in 1970 a civil war broke out between the Jordanian army and PLO guerrillas, culminating in the PLO's expulsion from Jordan in 1971 (Massad, 1995).

In Lebanon, Palestine Arabs were a minority. However, the PLO's Lebanon period witnessed the longest and freest access to the Palestinian community in the diaspora, eventually opening great opportunities for women's participation in the Palestinian Liberation Movement (Kawar, 1993). Half of the Lebanese population was Christian, while the other half was Muslim. In general, Muslims were in the majority, but nobody aimed at compromising that established balance set in the 1960s. The Christian groups were far more Western-orientated than the Muslims and were not interested in fighting Israel, whereas the Muslims sympathised with the struggle of the Palestinians. Al-Fatah particularly liked the setting of the Lebanese state because it showed that Christians and Muslims could live in peace together (Heradstveit, 1972). Yet, the Lebanese political parties were divided on the issue of the presence of the fedayeen and their freedom to operate against Israel from the Lebanese borders. In November
1968, a group of students demonstrated in Lebanon in support of the fedayeen. This was opposed by a counter-demonstration organised by other students backed by the rightist Falangist Party. The political crisis grew more serious when Israel attacked Beirut International Airport on December 28, 1968. The protests were claiming the government especially for not providing adequate security. Armed rightist civilian groups in the 1970s started handling the affairs regarding freedom of action themselves and fired on the guerrilla. The same year, the leader of one of the Christian parties in Lebanon discussed the distribution of Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries. He held that Lebanon, which is poor and covers only 10000 km2, had relatively speaking the highest percentage of refugees of all the Arab countries. In 1969, the Resistance movement opened up camps in the country (Antonius, 1979), raising issues of camps uprisings and integration within the Lebanese population. Due to the civil war of 1982, the crushing of the PLO’s military establishment in Lebanon by the Israelis brought to their historical homeland the vast majority of Palestinian exiles (Cobban, 1990).

3- Political Layout

According to Hussain (1973), the Six Days War produced two winners: the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Israelis occupied not only the rest of Palestine - the West Bank, Gaza and the old city of Jerusalem - but also Egyptian and Syrian territories. On the contrary, the Palestinians regained their national identity after having been mere refugees for many years, meaning that they would have finally begun to combat for their it. This shift would have been not possible without the guerrilla-armed struggle. Other Arab Nationalists similarly thought that by restoring the lost part – Palestine – the Arab nation would have become a whole again. In addition, citing Omar (1992), they saw the impact of the 1967 defeat in their socio-political structure and called for a radical transformation of Arab society which would have reflected the voice of Arab masses of peasants, workers, and have-nots, e.g. the radical factions of the
Palestinian resistance movement. Considering Mapai, the Israeli Labour Party, Prime Minister Golda Meir (1969-74), it was during her administration that large-scale Israeli settlement began in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, disregarding the Fourth Geneva Convention forbidding the transfer of the conqueror's population to territories acquired in war. On March 21, 1968, the Palestinian *fedayeen* (those who sacrifice) fought the glorious battle of al-Karameh and inflicted heavy casualties on the technologically superior Israeli army, uplifting the morale of all Arab masses. The fedayeen advocated a “Vietnam-type people's war” - long, arduous and protracted (Hussain, 1973). Supporting the fedayeen was considered to be the right tactic to win over the Palestinians and their sympathisers. This strategy was used also by stakeholders, namely by King Hussein. Syria and Iraq appeared to favour the fedayeen but their actions proved that they also considered the fedayeen a danger to the existing order. On September 27, 1970, a Cairo agreement was signed between the fedayeen and Hussein.

The Arab regimes did not bother about the Palestinian cause till 1964. When Israel wanted to divert the Jordan River's water, the Arab League suddenly took interest in the Palestinian entity and decided to set up the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The leader of this new organisation was Ahmed Shukeiry. The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was consequently built up, but it was attached, thus dependent, to various Arab armies. For instance, the constraints on fedayeen activity were aggravated by the ambivalent position where, though technically the Palestine Liberation Army is under the PLO, in practice it was connected to the Syrian and the Egyptian armies. Therefore, the PLA could not act of its own will, even though its parent organisation, the PLO, underwent a thorough transformation from the 1967 War. Later on, the PLO'S leadership was taken over by al-Fatah and other independent guerilla groups.
In September 1970 there was a 10-day bloody battle between the Palestinians and the Jordanian army. The Bedouin army massacred Palestinian men, women and children. Food supply to the refugee camps was halted. PLA units along with Syrian army contingents moved into north Jordan but they did not get any air cover from the Syrian air force. Assad, the President of Syria, was in fact against Syrian intervention in Jordan, pressured by the Soviet Union which aimed at avoiding the US intervention in the civil war. The PLO was defeated. By July 1971, all the fedayeen bases were totally wiped out and the guerillas went underground (Hussain, 1973).

Lebanese Premier Yafi resigned in 1969 and was replaced by Rashid Karame. The Tripartite Alliance, comprising three pro-Western, Christian parties - the National Liberal Party, the Falangist Party and the National Bloc Party - opposed the fedayeen presence in Lebanon. The leftist parties like the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Communist Party, the Baath Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement supported the Palestinian revolutionaries. After the 1967 War, the Falangist Party led by Pierre Geilmayel wanted the "internationalisation of Lebanon's neutrality" so as ‘to make the country a Switzerland of the Middle East’ (Hussain, 1973). Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the PSP and the Left alliance, was against this proposal as he wanted Lebanon to follow a policy of confrontation with Israel, and the acceptance of three points: military conscription, preparation of the Lebanese for a "popular war", and non-interference in fedayeen activities from Lebanon. Premier Karame outlined the policies of the new cabinet: introduction of conscription, fortification and arming of border villages, support for the Palestine question by every possible means, coordination with other Arab states, and adherence to the Arab League and Arab summit resolutions. The fedayeen presence in Lebanon has accelerated the discord between the generally pro-West Christians, represented by the Tripartite Alliance, and the Muslims, who largely wanted Lebanon to follow the Arab line. Christians constituted 80 per
cent of the weak Lebanese army - only 15,000 men, as many as the total number of guerillas in al-Fatah (Hussain, 1973). The 1958 Lebanese crisis occurred as a result of President Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower doctrine to confront communism in the Middle East and Chamoun's desire to continue as President for the second time. He was also responsible for the landing of US Marines in Lebanon. The Falangist Party maintains a secret private army of its own to terrorise the Muslims and this was pressed into service against the Palestinian revolutionaries. Moreover, according to Hussain (1973), half of the Lebanese population supported the fedayeen guerrilla. Yet, every cease-fire gave birth to a new confrontation since the ideas of the fedayeen and the regime were completely antagonistic. The Lebanese question was whether it should have supported the Palestinian cause or should it have followed in the footsteps of Hussein of Jordan. On November 3, 1969, the fedayeen and the Lebanese government signed an agreement in Cairo, in which the presence and activities carried out by the PLO would have been tolerated and regulated by local authorities. As a matter of fact, Palestinians never faced expulsion from Lebanon but as a result of civil war, economic discrimination, and the "camp wars" between the Shiite Amal organisation and Palestinian factions in the 1980s, the number of Palestinians declined drastically through the years, as well as the ability to bolster the PLO's activities (Frisch, 2012).

In Syria, the left-wing wanted a popular war against Israel. It set up al-Sa’iqa, a fedayeen organisation under its control. The left group of the Baathists allowed the fedayeen to get military training in Syrian military training schools. The underlying reasons for Syrian support to the fedayeen was that the left-wing regime there wanted to build up the image of Syria as a revolutionary state (Hussain, 1973). Egypt and Jordan had accepted the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, but Syria had rejected it and declared that a popular war of liberation was the only path to extinguish the Zionist state of Israel. However, the
Syrians did not help the fedayeen in September 1970 when they were confronting the Jordanian army. PLA contingents attached to the Syrian army crossed the border and stood beside the fedayeen in northern Jordan. The Soviet Union was reported to have sent an urgent message stating that continued Syrian involvement would bring about a general war all over the Middle East (Hussain, 1973). Hafez Assad led a coup and ousted President Attasi’s left wing from power in November 1970. After Assad took over as President restrictions were imposed on the fedayeen.

Iraq’s ruling Baath Party had set up its own fedayeen organisation, known as the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). There were even other Palestine Liberation organisations since the fedayeen were deeply involved in politicising the students and the people in Iraq. However, soon the Iraqi government began seeing the fedayeen as a threat to national security. Al Nida, Beirut’s communist daily, published on April 17, 1969, the text of a note submitted by the Iraqi government to the fedayeen, stating that the fedayeen organisations had ignored the Iraq government’s instructions in matters relating to their presence in the territory (Hussain, 1973). The fedayeen were asked to coordinate with the ALF. They were also requested not to go into the cities and to move to Al Rutba, an Iraqi post close to the Jordanian border where they could have trained. Iraq wanted the situation under its control. The Iraqis believed that the acceptance of the American-sponsored peace initiative, the Rogers Plan, had tarnished Arab prestige. Iraq and Algeria boycotted the Arab Conference at Tripoli, Libya, which discussed the split in the Arab camp over the Rogers Plan and the question of peaceful settlement in the Middle East. All this was propaganda. Indeed, Algeria proposed together with Syria the idea of a popular war for national liberation (Heradstveit, 1972). Though in August 1970 the Iraqi government was clamouring for the Palestinian cause, in September Iraq’s 12,000 troops, stationed in Jordan since the 1967 War, were a silent spectator to the crack-down on the fedayeen by Hussein’s army. Nonetheless, Iraqi troops did not
intervene and were ridiculed for this. It became clear that Iraq's rejection of the US peace plan was to erode Nasser's dominant position in the Arab world. The Baathist groups, in Syria as well, have used the fedayeen as a tool in their intra-Arab policies to embarrass Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. On the other side, Shi'ite militias have targeted Palestinians as being both Sunnis and former beneficiaries and supporters of Saddam Hussein's Baath regime to instil hate toward the PLO's militants among the Iraqi population (Frisch, 2012). Many Palestinians moved to the Iraq-Syrian border or flew to Brazil.

Therefore, two peace agreements were signed in Egypt between the fedayeen and respectively the Lebanese government and later the Jordan kingdom. There was tremendous pressure from the Egyptians on Sadat to go to war against Israel, but another war against Israel would have proved the ineffectiveness of the Arab regimes in the eyes of the Arab people (Hussain, 1973). Actually, all these regimes were afraid of the presence of the fedayeen because there was a possibility that they may have become a state within a state (Hussain, 1973). The countries were hence likely to turn against the fedayeen the moment they found that the Palestinian revolutionaries did not serve their interests in intra-Arab policies, promoting the disunity among guerrillas. Other Arab countries, like Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia, financed the fedayeen organisations but were relatively committed to the fedayeen struggle, as they are geographically distant. In particular, Saudi Arabia and Ghaddafi’s Libya did not like the Marxist elements among the fedayeen and branded them as atheists. Others had opposing issues, such as the left-wing critics that the leadership of Fatah and the PLO adopting the policy of temporising with “reactionary” Arab states had produced a sad state of affairs (O’Neill, 1978).

From March 1969 to the cease-fire of August 1970 we can speak about a “War of Attrition” between Egypt and Israel, which contended the lost Sinai region and the accessibility to the Suez Canal. The launch of
Egyptian offensives against Israel resulted ineffective and the campaign can be retained unsuccessful. However, this last example of war serves to view the radical change in Egypt’s leadership and tactics, which occurred after Nasser’s sudden death in 1970. Anwar al-Sadat became President of Egypt. In 1973 he led the national army against Israel during the Yom Kippur War, which can be defined as a “limited war”. In fact, the objectives of the new President of Egypt were to restore Arab self-confidence after the 1967 War, to shatter the Israel myth of invincibility and to influence US foreign policy toward the Middle East. In 1977 Sadat took a historical decision and visited Jerusalem as the first Arab leader ever. ‘You want to live with us in this part of the world’ were the premises told to Begin, President of Israel. With this peace proposal, Sadat wanted indeed to pass as the most relevant leader in the Middle East and to instil its supremacy. It is also true that past attempts to translate the Arab nationalist idea into reality had always failed (Omar, 1992). Moreover, this agreement would have constituted a separate one, only between Egypt and Israel. Nonetheless, in between the negotiations, there was a stall. Consequently, Egypt encountered much opposition from the other Arab countries. A month after the visit, heads of state from Libya, Syria, and Algeria and representatives of the PLO met at the Tripoli Conference to manifest their hostility to Sadat’s peace initiative toward Israel. In 1978 were signed the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in the White House under the surveillance of US President Carter. The agreement, which excluded the Soviet Union from the peace process, was an important step toward Arab recognition of Israel but was unsuccessful in addressing the Palestinian issue, thus the root of the conflict. For this reason, even many Islamists from the Brotherhood and leftist movements criticised the peace accords. Actually, it did only pose an end to the War of Attrition between the two countries but left unsolved the Palestinian question. Sadat would be assassinated by a terrorist from an Egyptian Jihadi group in 1981, who claimed to take vengeance for the peace agreement.
4- The various terrorist organisations

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) worked as an umbrella organisation, which comprehended a series of different groups fighting the same struggle. Al-Fatah, the Syrian-sponsored Al-Sa'iq, and the Marxist Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) tended to stress political organisation and guerrilla attacks (O'Neill, 1978). On the contrary, the PFLP and the PFLP-General Command indicated their belief in the utility of terrorism. PFLP, in particular, carried its attacks outside the occupied areas (OT) and Israel to other Arab states and even Europe. Yet, as the Israeli counterinsurgency efforts along the borders became more effective, it became more difficult and costly to carry out guerrilla raids.

El Sa'iq was also a guerrilla organisation which sprang up after the June War. It is Syrian-dominated and rests on the Baath ideology which, among other things, aims to unite all Arabs into one nation. El Sa'iq has distinguished itself by serving Syrian interests in Lebanon. In the attempts to unify the guerrilla El Sa'iq has joined Al-Fatah and supports its leftist faction. Yet, Sa'iq agreed also much more with the Popular Front ideologies.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was led by George Habbash, who had a Christian background and was a communist. For these reasons, he did not cherish the same religious and social values as the Muslim Arafat (Heradstveit, 1972). It was a broad anti-religious movement that put great emphasis on the Pan-Arabic elements that unite people. In Egypt, the organisation was illegal, whereas Al-Fatah had an office in Cairo. On the contrary, Iraq supported the organisation. In fact, the organisation had joined the Baathist government in the 1960s in Iraq, even though developed differences soon after that on ideological and political grounds. Yet, the PFLP was considered more dangerous because it was Marxist and had extreme methods. It emerged out of the
disintegration of the ANM in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Founded George Habbash was a student inspired by the rhetoric of Gamal Abdel Nasser and supported him during the 1967 Six-Day War (Khan, 2008). This organisation was mainly part of the dramatic shift to the left in the political outlook of the Palestinian movement from 1967-82 and the rise of guerrilla groups post-1967 after the Arab defeat. Its tactics include spectacular operations like sky-jackings, selective violence in urban areas, and so on. Since the text of the US initiative referred only to the cease-fire on the Egyptian front, on the ground that it was Egypt which had cancelled the unlimited cease-fire reached on the 3rd of June 1967, the PFLP hijacked a PanAm jumbo jet to Cairo in September 1970 to try and foil the Egyptian initiative. From this group, the PFLP-General Command was a splinter of the PFLP and was believed to be supported by Libya.

The DFLP began life as the PDFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) a Maoist breakaway faction from the PFLP led by another ex-ANM leader Nayaf Hawatmeh. DFLP also adopted armed struggle and was most famous for the 1974 Ma'alot attack on a Jewish high school on the Israeli border with the South of Lebanon. It was one of the four constituent parties in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Hasso, 1998). Membership in the DFLP was obviously illegal in Israel and the occupied territories. Until 1975, the DFLP focused its mobilisation activities outside of the territories, primarily in Jordan and Lebanon. As a result of the civil war in Jordan in 1969-70, the organisation became particularly concerned with mobilising a wider segment of the population. Violent political actions, whether undertaken individually or in groups, were difficult to win and costly, as indicated by the Gaza experience in the early years of the Israeli occupation (Hasso, 1998). In addition, because of its danger, violence usually engaged only the young people most intensely committed to the national struggle and willing to risk their lives (and for women, reputations). The PFWAC was
created against the wishes of many DFLP men in 1978. They wanted to recruit more women directly into the DFLP rather than creating a separatist women’s organisation. Yet, in attempting to recruit these immobilised women into PFWAC, DFLP women realised that they could not ignore their gender problems, thus transforming the women’s nationalist organisation into a grassroots nationalist feminist organisation (Hasso, 1998).

Al-Fatah (Victory) was formed clandestinely in 1958 in Kuwait by Arafat. It was the biggest among the resistance groups. Then its members attended the Palestine National Congress in May 1964, which officially formed the PLO, and the organisation became overt. It engaged the Israelis in hit-and-run attacks even before the 1967 war. In fact, Fatah carried out its first attacks under the name Al-Assifa (the Storm). However, the battle of al-Karameh in Jordan on May 21, 1968, in which the Fatah took on the regular contingent of the Israeli army, became its introduction to the world and attracted large numbers of Palestinian youth to its fold. It is a popular movement that was completely Palestinian without being directly connected to any specific Arab country or political party. Yet, religion is the core element. Al-Fatah stated that the ultimate goal of the struggle for freedom is the establishment of a Palestinian State, independent and democratic for all religious denominations (Heradstveit, 1972). This liberation would have been possible only through the armed revolutionary struggle, which eventually established its credibility. Nonetheless, the organisation had a broader purpose, which was part of the global struggle for the liberation of all peoples from imperialism. Its strategy is based on popular resistance, both military and political. Yet, many people within the guerrilla considered their main objective to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan (Heradstveit, 1972). Concerning the Jews and their status once Fatah would have defeated Israel, they would have been treated as a religious minority. During the Palestinian Congress in 1969, the majority of present people agreed in
allowing Jews religious and cultural rights, but not political, in the future Palestinian state. In setting out to unite all factions within the Palestinian guerrilla and avoid making the question of political ideology a matter of controversy, Al-Fatah created an image of itself as a national movement without a specific social message (ibid.). A greater aim from the socio-political sphere was that of the Revolution, in which the overthrowing of all present Arab regimes would have made way for seeking more equality between the various social groups, e.g. socialism (ibid.). It is said that 80 per cent of the members of Al-Fatah have been to university. Moreover, the organisation offered scholarships to Palestine Arabs to study abroad, supported soldiers’ families and even paid its militants. Yasser Arafat was labelled not as a leader, but rather a spokesperson because nobody was considered more important than others in the group. A major shift occurred once the organisation decided to work independently from its cooperates and launched its first guerilla action on January 1, 1965. In addition, in 1965 it was only Syria that accepted Al-Fatah’s activities, while Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon worked against them. In fact, immediately after these operations, a pro-United Arab Republic paper branded al-Fatah as a group of terrorists. It also charged that the new group had launched its attack inside Israel with the knowledge of the Israeli authorities to provide an excuse for Israel to launch an aggression on the Arab countries.

5- Palestine Liberation Organisation

Described as a superstructure for the guerrilla where most of the important organisations have a seat (Heradstveit, 1972), the Palestine Liberation Organisation, PLO, had provided Al-Fatah with a structure. It was formed during the third and fourth conferences of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) between 1963 and 1964 (Khan, 2008), but in 1969 the structure of the organisation was taken over by the armed Palestinian groups that implemented more militant activities (Rubenberg, 1983). The PLO, at this stage, was almost an adjunct of the Arab states
and its will was subordinated to the wishes of Nasser in Egypt, Aref in Iraq and King Hussein in Jordan. Shortly thereafter, a military component was arranged, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Nonetheless, this armed personnel was attached to the various Arab armies, and its activities were closely controlled by the Arab governments. The National Council, the main political PLO institution, consisted of the representatives of the armed groups - being the majority -, mass organisations and trade unions, representatives of Palestinian communities in the Diaspora and independent people, as well as personalities expelled by the Israeli occupation authorities and scientists and intellectuals of international reputation (ibid.). The regional committees were divided into three offices: a political office, an information office, and a military office. Under the regional committee, there were three kinds of local committees: a refugee committee, a university committee and a workers' committee; each of which had its own cells. In addition, the representatives at the National Council were directly elected by their respective constituencies.

In the wake of the 1967 Israeli occupation of the remainder of Palestine – and further Palestinians’ relocation, Palestinian guerrilla groups intensified their military attacks on Israel and their ideological attacks on Arab governments (Massad, 1995). What caused disorder in this umbrella organisation was the disagreement on guerrilla methods. During the Palestine National Congress of 1964, the “Palestine National Charter” was revised. Article 9 of this document inscribed:

‘The armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine; it is therefore, a strategy and not a tactic. The Palestinian People confirm their absolute determination and unbendable will to continue the armed struggle and march towards the armed popular revolution for the liberation of, and the return to, their homeland as well as for their right to a normal life and in determining their destiny with sovereignty over their land’
However, Fatah members were disillusioned to see that the PLO under Shukeiry, the first Chairman, did not believe in revolutionary violence. Successively, in December 1968 Al-Fatah appealed for a unification of all Palestinian resistance movements, not only at the top level but also throughout the ranks. Since Fatah did not accept the vague alliance prompted by Egypt through the first settings of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the country eventually took a step back and gave full control to Al-Fatah. In 1969, Yasir Arafat replaced Shukeiry as the leader of PLO. Egyptian President Nasser recognised on 21 January 1969 the amalgamation of the guerrilla groups and admitted that they were right to reject the Resolution of 22 November 1967 (Heradstveit, 1972), concerning the achievement of a peaceful and accepted settlement in the Middle East. This development finally coincided with other changes in the social and economic fortunes of the Palestinian bourgeoisie in the diaspora (Massad, 1995).

The PLO faced the first crisis in Lebanon where, following an Israeli raid on the Beirut international airport in December 1968, the Falangists raised a hue and cry for the ouster of the Palestinians and a fresh assertion of Lebanon's national identity and neutrality. The progressive Socialist Party, led by Kamal Jumblatt, countered it by giving a call for asserting Lebanon's Arab identity and support for the Palestinians. A virtual civil war was finally brought to an end in November 1969 when Nasser solved the situation through a secret agreement between Yasser Arafat and Colonel Emile Bastani, the Lebanese army chief. Nevertheless, when events turned against the Palestinian guerrillas after the Black September of 1970, the public faith in the escalation of the armed struggle was kept, but traditional Arab fatalism emerged (Bell, 1994). Black September corresponds to the Jordanian Civil War of 1970 between the Hashemites and the PLO militants. The fedayeen peacefully settled in Jordan but they disregarded local laws, regulations and even attempted to assassinate King Hussein twice, hence leading to violent clashes with
the Jordanian Army. On 17 September 1970, the Jordanian Army was instructed to surround the cities of Amman and Irbid, shooting down the refugee camps where the fedayeen were staying. The Syrian Army thus intervened in favour of the Palestinian guerrillas but their interference was repelled. Once again Nasser brought about a truce between Arafat and King Hussein. Anyways, the episode gave rise to an extremely violent, top-secret terrorist group calling itself by that name, Black September (Dhanani, 1982). The attraction of terror, which at least offered prominence if not power, proved irresistible even for the conventional in Fatah. ‘The Palestinians can assuage anxiety by exacting visible vengeance: the Zionists, their friends, the West, must suffer as they do.’ By 1974, the Palestinian bourgeoisie, backing Arafat's liberal Fatah, was successful in enlisting the support of the Arab League to recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (Massad, 1995). In the same year, Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly on behalf of the Palestinian people, eliciting worldwide recognition of the Palestinian struggle and targeting the aggressive colonial methods of the Israeli forces.

The Black September organisation is considered responsible for the tragedy at the Munich Olympics of 1972, in which 17 Israeli athletes were taken hostage and then killed. This group strived to focus attention on the plight of the Arab refugees and to remind the international community that its spectacular acts of terrorism would have continued without end until justice for the Palestinian community is obtained. On March 21, 1968, the movement became a force with which to be reckoned, as it moved to counter an Israeli armoured column bent upon the destruction of a Fatah command post in the Jordanian village of Karameh. Nevertheless, it was with the suppression of the guerrilla movement in Jordan that we can attribute the rise of the Black September organisation. Politically, they had tried to accelerate tensions to a point which would cause the United States or the Soviet Union to
pressure Israel into a settlement (Wolf, 1973). Operationally, they involved small numbers of men who came together only for the planning and execution of operations. Yet, they paid much more attention to the psychological sphere, impacting the population with terror. This basic point has not been overlooked by Israel, the only nation prepared to take on the terrorists at gunpoint (ibid.). Apparently, Israel tried to reverse the basic strategy of terror and use it against the terrorists themselves as evidenced by the clear message that a hostage is no protection for a terrorist. The first indication of the Black September existence was its statement of July 1971, saying that it would launch a scorched earth policy against the Jordanian regime of King Hussein. Then, in November 1971, four of its members assassinated the Jordanian Premier, Wasfi Tal, on the steps of a Cairo hotel. The Premier was regarded by Palestinians as a pro-Western Arab interested in negotiating with Israel. In addition, the Jordan authorities had been the target following the outcomes of 17 September 1970. Evidence of the movement’s ability to conduct operations outside the Middle East appeared in early 1972 when it claimed responsibility for the murder of five Jordanians living in West Germany accused of spying for Israel, an attempt on the life of Jordan’s ambassador to London, the sabotaging of a factory in West Germany that made electric generators for the Israeli Air Force and the destruction of an oil refinery complex at Trieste, Italy, that processed oil for "pro-Zionist" interests. European and Israeli counterintelligence identified Black September as an élite arm of Fatah’s secret service, sponsored by the mentioned group. As a matter of fact, Fatah rejected the transnational evolution of terrorism but threatened by defections and convulsed by internecine power struggles, it turned to sponsor the Black September. The 1972 Munich massacres also led to major air strikes against fedayeen bases and naval installations in Lebanon and Syria. The seizure and murder of American diplomats in March 1973 at the Saudi Embassy in Sudan was considered an intolerable affront by both Riyadh and Khartoum. Consequently, the Saudis too condemned the fedayeen and
threatened to withhold badly needed financial aid (O’Neill, 1978). The movement supposedly consisted of four main operating units that are variously responsible for Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. The quality of the Black September terrorists was acknowledged to exceed that of the average guerrilla group. Indeed, they were dedicated and willing to die if necessary, most of them were born in refugee camps and attended Middle Eastern or European universities. The Black September personnel probably received tactical training in Jordan during the 1970s before King Hussein’s crackdown.

After Black September, many of the organisations under the PLO were dependent on the Palestinian Diaspora in Lebanon, replacing the Jordan hub. Hence Lebanon became the base for the PLO and all Palestinian military operations until 1982 and the US invasion of the country. During the Lebanese Civil War, radical leftist movements were dominant in leading the resistance against Israeli occupation and Israeli-backed Maronite forces through the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a front which included the Organisation of Communist Action (OACL) and their close relationship with the PFLP and DFLP (Khan, 2008). After this period, the PLO was expelled from Lebanon, subsequently, the PFLP and DFLP lost their bases of support in Southern Lebanon and furthermore, the political focus became less upon Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria and more on those living in occupied territories.

In the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the front-line states tightened their binds on the PLO as they were brought into the Kissinger shuttle solution. After the Syrian-Israeli disengagement in 1975, Syria reportedly prohibited the PLO from launching attacks on the Golan Heights and then Syrians intervened in the Lebanese civil war to cut the PLO down to size. On the other hand, the non-frontline states, namely Iraq, Algeria and Libya, have maintained smooth relations with the organisation and some of them eventually joined the Tripoli Conference once Egypt turned its shoulders against the Palestinian cause. From the
external incident of Entebbe skyjacking in 1976, fedayeen terrorism increasingly took the form of attacks in Israel by units penetrating by land or sea from Syria and Lebanon (O'Neill, 1978). In the same year, 1976, the municipal elections in the West Bank catapulted "nationalist" anti-Jordanian and anti-Israeli mayors into power (Frisch, 2012). However, instead of concentrating on the territories and pouring resources into cadres eager to fight, students and shopkeepers willing to protest, and an elected local nationalist élite, the PLO responded with its attempt at state-building in war-ravaged, ethnically torn, and politically penetrated Lebanon. No focus was put on territorialisation, signalling a wrong strategy in the PLO actions. The creation of the para-state in Lebanon took a military turn with the transformation of guerrilla units into conventional army formations. Yet, other para-states in foreign countries were not conceived. Before 1982 and what was effectively the PLO's military expulsion from Lebanon, communal counter-mobilisation by newly politicised communities in Lebanon, primarily among the Shiites, was already constraining Palestinian political action (ibid.). The PLO leaders were forced to depart to Tunis. Indeed, the failure not to take into account the territorialisation problem led to a withering of the diaspora.

The 1987 Intifada showed the PLO as a declining force, while new organisations from the extreme right were emerging. For instance, Hamas was organised in concomitance with the uprising and was led by an Islamist ideology, strictly connected to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, Islamists increased their popularity and influence in both Gaza and the West Bank (Cobban, 1990), following the example of the Iranian revolution. However, by supporting the idea of a Palestinian state within a state, thus the occupied areas, as a step toward the liberation of "all of Palestine," the Islamic Jihad was much closer, politically, to ultra-nationalists within
the PLO constellation, such as the PFLP, than it was to the traditional Brotherhood position (ibid.).

In 1974 after Arafat’s speech, the UN general assembly, in its resolution 3210, decided that it considered the Palestinian people to be the principal party to the question of Palestine and the PLO as its representative. The PLO has been maintaining a permanent observer role within the United Nations. Yet, the notion of a mini-state divided the resistance into two camps: the “pragmatists” who supported the idea (Fatah, the PDFLP, Sa’iqa) and the "rejectionists" who were adamantly opposed (the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front, and the Popular Struggle Front) (O’Neill, 1978). In Europe, PLO won its first informal recognition from France during a meeting between Arafat and Jean Sauvagnargue, the French foreign minister, in October 1974. Even the countries in the Socialist bloc accorded recognition to the PLO. Eventually, in March 1977, the US came the closest to accepting the PLO, when Carter stated that the Palestinians were entitled to a “national home”. Consequently, Arafat sent two of his distinguished colleagues on a widely publicised tour of the United States.

6- Women

The aspirations of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), as an exilic movement, to territorialise its power base produced patterns of power relations that situated women’s interests as the lowest priority of the Palestine national movement (Jamal, 2001). Palestinian women in the PLO had to bear the burden of being "mothers of the nation.” In Palestinian literature, the mother has always been the symbol and played the role of the land: strong and protective. The son leaves and returns, she is there, the recurring protection; and it is a fact that the Palestinian woman dies very young. As such women were encouraged to concentrate on grassroots activity leaving the main battlefield- military or political - to "real soldiers." For instance, Issam Abdel-Hadi, President of the
Women’s Union, told that ‘in 1964 when the PLO was established, [they] were chosen to be delegates to the Palestine National Council (al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini), not as women but as national figures’ (Antonius, 1980). The Palestinians used to be much more advanced in their own country and women were independent and freer than women in Syria or Egypt or Iraq, but after 1948 it changed (Antonius, 1979).

‘In August 1965, at the suggestion of the PLO, we held a conference and invited representatives from all over Palestine to create an organisation to represent and mobilise Palestinian women, and to work for the liberation of Palestine. This was the beginning of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW). Our constitution was based on the PLO National Charter and our headquarters were in Jerusalem until early 1967.’ (Issam Abdel-Hadi in Antonius, 1980)

The proportion of female freedom fighters inside the PLO’s militias was rather small, but there were early role models such as Fatma Bernawi, Aisha Odeh, and Leila Khaled (Kawar, 1993). According to David Heradstveit (1972), women were encouraged to take an active part. The motivation for joining the guerrilla was not solely to liberate Palestine or to overthrow reactionary Arab governments, the guerrilla offered a great community feeling which one did not find else. A common resistance slogan was ‘woman must carry a gun’ (Antonius, 1979). However, among Palestinians there has never been a broadly-based grassroots movement for women’s rights and the major efforts have been devoted to political or national ends. The emancipation of women can be redeemed as an accidental consequence of their determination to carry out some political action, such as a demonstration, which entailed a flouting of conventional mores (ibid.). Women began to participate, publicly, in every crisis, from the Wahdat camp in the 1970 Amman battles to the Israeli invasion in South Lebanon in 1982. In the interviews conducted by Soraya Antonius (1979), Palestinian women ages range from 22 to 65, and their backgrounds from birth in exile and life in a refugee camp to
the upper reaches of pre-1948 Palestinian society. All but two have a university education. The turning point into definitive political participation was signed overnight. Once women left their families and slept even for just one night away from their homes. On various occasions, leaders vigorously praised the camp women's contributions during the 1987-89 siege of the camps. As one leader has said, women were the major factor in building and defending the Palestinian camps (Kawar, 1993). Many women joined the Resistance groups because they actually wanted to fight. The GUPW had however a lack of supplies, primitive weapons, snipers, and terrorised the civilian population.

Mona Saudi, in the storytelling of Soraya Antonius (1979), described her time before joining the Resistance. She travelled to Europe and lately affirmed:

‘I had never been involved or interested in politics until May 1968 in Paris when I saw how a popular movement starts - and ends. […] So I began to think it over and I thought that a revolution should be permanent, a continuous process, and that one should be in one's own country, on one's own earth, and that it was senseless for a foreigner to be involved in a Parisian movement. So in 1968 I returned to Jordan.’

The refugee woman was more liberated than the middle-class Amman woman - she really worked for the Resistance. In the camps, women learnt how to maintain and handle weapons and usually received first-aid training. Yet, in the end, the men were dead and the women had to bear arms. Many women worked as teachers and at the same time volunteered for the resistance groups. The PLO arranged with the Libyan government to send teachers to Libya but there was no interest in their problem (Antonius, 1979).

The poet Mai Sayigh (Antonius, 1979) claimed:
Men don't understand the women's problem: not a single political party has handled it properly or even understood its seriousness the parties don't even have a women's section. [...] The PLO Charter talks of the equality of men and women and the elevation of woman's role in the revolution. Elevation! Even the word (tarqia) is wrong and suggests that they're going to teach her to play the piano or do watercolours or something equally "elevating"!

Sayigh had risen to leadership when the Movement was centred in Jordan during 1967-1970. She later became the chief executive at the Beirut headquarters and eventually secretary-general of the PLO women’s union.

One reason for Leila Khaled's distaste for Fatah was what she regarded as its sexist refusal to allow women to take combat roles against Israel and its Western backers. By contrast, the PFLP manifesto declared the aim of "freeing women—half of society—from the bondage of decadent habits and customs", and the group was already preparing women for frontline duties when she joined in 1968. According to her, the potential contradictions between nationalism and feminism could have been resolved through the Marxist ideology of the faction she finally joined the PFLP. On the same lines concerning Al-Fatah, Hanan Ashrawi acknowledged the organisation's early efforts to promote greater gender equality. For instance, they set up the General Union of Palestinian Women in 1965 and authorised women-led activist cells after 1967 in Lebanon. However, she was all too aware of the gender limitations of the Fatah and PLO leadership. She found herself having to press an agenda on Palestinian women’s realities on the PLO hierarchy many times. All this suggests, pace Khaled, that the avenues opened up to women by anticolonial struggles have often proved as limited in Palestine as in other "Third World" contexts (Moore-Gilbert, 2013). These women, beyond national identity, were looking for awareness of the need for an autonomous struggle. Indeed, female organisation and mobilisation
processes were not based on the leftist intellectuals but on the Palestinian struggle and politics, as well as on a general progressive outlook toward the woman, which was derived from the democratic ideas that were adopted by the early Arab nationalists (Al Bzour, 2015).

When the PLO was revolutionised in 1967-1968, the Women's Union also began its transformation to the Fateh-dominated umbrella organisation (Kawar, 1993). Furthermore, the Second Congress of the Women's Union, held in Lebanon in 1974, supported the intensifying campaign to mobilise women in some fifteen refugee camps, located mainly around Beirut and in South Lebanon. It signalled the official transfer of the Women's Union leadership from charitable societies to the Resistance. Yet, outside Lebanon, and particularly in Kuwait and Egypt, the Union's charitable character did not change (Kawar, 1993). Most active women were in their late twenties and thirties, Muslim and Christian, urban, almost all graduates of Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus universities, leftists, and oriented toward social change. None lived in refugee camps.

Two of the four Palestinian terrorists who in May 1972 hijacked a Sabena Airlines plane in Brussels and forced it to land at Lod Airport, were women. Until the early 1980s, women in the PFLP had their own training camps in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as separate women’s sections that were counterparts to the existing male ones (Khaled, 1995). Before clerics prohibited their participation, females were involved in perhaps as many as five of the early suicide operations against Israel in Southern Lebanon (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2000). Two of the PFLP hijackers of Sabena Flight 517 from Brussels to Tel Aviv on May 8, 1972, Therese Halsa, 19, and Rima Tannous, 21, had completely different characters. Therese, the daughter of a middle-class Arab family, was a nursing student when she was recruited into Fatah by a fellow student and was well-regarded in the organisation. Rima, an orphan of average intelligence, became the mistress of a doctor who introduced her to drugs and recruited her into Fatah. She became completely dependent on some Fatah members, who
subjected her to physical and psychological abuse (Hudson, 1999). As Sjoberg (2010) claimed, women in the Palestinian resistance movement are often characterised as being manipulated either by family members or family tragedy into joining the movement.

Nevertheless, these details should not be misleading. For example, only 7 per cent of active female terrorists was a suicide bomber. The term martyr, in fact, is not used here to indicate suicide attacks but to underline the death of women who were waging war, in peaceful or violent ways, against the Israeli oppressors. Women martyrs from the West Bank were mostly from villages, whereas in the Gaza Strip, the women martyrs were refugee camp residents. In addition, most women martyrs were either under eighteen years of age when shot in the streets, or above fifty years old when attempting to rescue children being beaten, arrested or tear-gassed in their homes (Kuttab, 1993). However, women’s committees were active in organising various forms of activities to protest the occupation and these varied from marches and sit-ins to militant demonstrations. Women joined the armed groups following their belief that armed activism would lead to concrete results. For those who followed a solidaristic path, resorting to political violence was the result of escalating political conflict, which they deemed to be beyond their normal control. In comparison, those who followed an instrumental path tended to break more with their past when mobilising in armed groups (Sjoberg, 2010). Nonetheless, as the movements for Palestinian liberation were seeking a cultural identity, we can just suppose that many women were rational in undertaking the first path.

The contribution of Soraya Antonius (1980) provided us with much information about women in Resistance, which was gathered through their imprisonment files. The majority of women involved in armed struggle was young, on average in their twenties, and were working as teachers. The teacher Nadia Khayat, 21, was the leader of a Fatah cell responsible for five operations. Also Hala Taher, born in 1948, and
engaged in a Fatah cell; Ataf Yusuf, born in 1957 and involved in the Mahane Yehuda explosion; and Amina Dahbour, 25, responsible for the attack on El Al plane, were teachers. Even foreign women were betrothed in the Palestinian Struggle. Brigit Schultz, born in 1951 and from West Germany, was arrested in Kenya and charged with the attempted hijack of El Al plane. Margareta Heynsbroek, 27 years old from Leiden, the Netherlands, was blocked for carrying messages in invisible ink from Fatah. Finally, Terry Fleener, 23 from the USA, was suspected of being a member of PLO but was released after 19 months in prison after President Carter’s request.

The militarisation of the Intifada of the 1980s provided young pro-Palestinian men with new opportunities to prove their manhood, often in defiance not only of Israeli men’s authority but also of what many perceive as their fathers’ outworn authority (Enloe, 1990). With militarisation, daycare became a national concern even in Israel and went beyond gender affiliations. The Israeli military government indeed did not allow kindergartens in schools and daycare facilities that enabled women to get involved in activities different from caring. Palestinian women remained in the shadows. They were reduced to being the protected or the unprotected. The decline in women’s broad participation was not a coincidence. Still, the absence of a social agenda for the Intifada, as well as the inability of the Palestinian women’s movement in general and the women’s committees to comprehend the dialectic relationship between the national and the social liberation struggles influenced the political settings of the uprising (Kuttab, 1993). However, in 1988 Palestinian women began holding their own marches in the occupied territories to protest against the Israeli government’s "Iron Fist" policy. They defied heavily armed soldiers with chants of "We are people, we are women. Never are we subdued. Never do we feel self-pity". The community’s leadership committee, the Unified National Command of the Intifada, began addressing women’s as well as men’s concerns in its bulletins. The
nature of Israeli military policy compelled Palestinians to develop a new way of organising, with less dependence on outside help and more on small neighbourhood committees, less susceptible to police and military disruption. On the other side, the Intifada let women become active in the women’s committees which were heavily infiltrated by leftists from the DFLP, PFLP and PCP (Khan, 2008). The DFLP developed the reputation of jabhat al niswan (women’s front) because women were dominant in the DFLP from the rank and file to leadership positions. The Intifada closely connected the leadership with the masses and exposed the women’s leadership to the social and economic problems which face the female sector and prevent its continuous participation in the struggle (Kuttab, 1993).

7- Conclusions

Although the experience of guerrilla may have been linked to Marxism, the Nasser-orientated and Soviet-orientated groups were so small that they did not count when we consider the guerrilla as a whole (Heradstveit, 1972). Many Arab rebels, especially Palestinians, aimed to have modern history rewritten so that they could have been triumphant instead of humiliated. It is not just vengeance over the West and the West’s surrogate Israel that the fedayeen of the PLO sought, but a triumph over history (Bell, 1994). ‘The PLO itself was the handmaiden of the Arab states’ (Frisch, 2012). The real issues were the national identity of the Palestinian people, the role of US imperialism in the context of capitalist development of the Middle East as a whole, and the theft of the national wealth which should have gone to development (MERIP reports, 1978). In addition, the period between 1976 and 1981, witnessed a process of democratisation of the national struggle (Kuttab, 1993). The democratic nature of Palestinian national movements was emphasised by the democratic forces within the PLO and opened a new horizon of national awakening and identity consciousness (ibid.). The two driving forces of Arab Nationalism at this time were unity and the objective of liberating
Palestine (Omar, 1992). On the contrary, the Palestinian armed struggle, especially the leftist movements, incurred hard setbacks after the 1960s, beginning with Black September, the fall of Nasser’s nationalism, the war of attrition, the Camp David accords, the invasion of Lebanon, and the exile of PLO to Tunisia: all had resulted in the retardation of the Armed Struggle Movement in general, and the Palestinian Leftist movement as well (Al Bzour, 2015).

The Palestinian National Council (PNC), which is meant to convene every two years, did not meet officially since 1996, giving us evidence of the PLO’s death (Frisch, 2012). The same cannot be said for Right extremist violent groups, like Hamas or Hezbollah. It was between 1982 and 1987 that resident Palestinians, especially in Lebanon, started seriously building up their own community-based challenge to the occupation (Cobban, 1990). Palestinian refugee camps did not constitute an environment for creative new beginnings as they may once have done in the 1950s or during the years 1968-1982, the heyday of the PLO. It then took the institutionalisation of the Intifada to enable the Palestinians and their compatriots in the diaspora to realise the extent of their new empowerment after the 1987 Intifada (ibid.).

Since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and particularly since the outbreak of the Palestinian first Intifada, women found a space for political participation even beyond armed struggle. The Intifada increased an unprecedented consciousness of national identity and women’s rights. Feminists have become noticeably active even in the Israeli peace movement. Furthermore, Israeli feminists explicitly argued that those who support the struggle for equality and self-fulfilment within the Jewish state should be equally sensitive to these struggles in the Palestinian context (Tessler and Warriner, 1997), proving definitely that mass mobilisation, rather than terrorism, was the key to obtain political concessions.
CONCLUSIONS

Women, of the past and the present, who defined themselves as emancipated and who therefore demanded participation in the political realm, used political violence and were part of a violent political movement in extreme cases (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Many feminist organisations in the United States and Western Europe attempted during the 1970 and 1980s to expand the sense of common identity and destiny among women and to politicise that group identification into support for collective action. These consciousness-raising groups attempted to spread group consciousness among women (Wilcox, 1991). Yet, in certain instances, social mobilisation and group consciousness led to a degeneration of political engagement, signed by the participation in armed struggle. ‘People voluntarily kill, or die, for collective causes expressed in words that register their group’s esteem, dignity and honour’ (O’Leary, 2005). Feminists never constituted a voting bloc in Western European countries. The novelty of feminism as an ideology, the novelty of autonomous women’s organising and, perhaps most significantly, the absence of a sizable female working-class precluded any real influence on the politics and positions of the Left organisations (Moghadam, 2018). According to Papadogiannis and Gehrig (2015), reflections on gender and collective actions by Leftist groups were mutually constitutive. As a matter of fact, Left-wing groups opened to feminist ideologies in the 1970s as second-wave feminism spread in Western Europe and beyond. Radical were not just the ideologies and the social movements of the period, but also the political parties. In Italy, the Radical Party condemned the use of violence but it is also true that from the mid-1970s the boundaries between terrorist violence and “desperate” violence was fading. For instance, the Radicals distinguished three types of violence: the one used by Right-wing terrorists, Red Terrorism and the violence of “desperate” people, who experimented in first person the limits of freedom and the anger provoked
by an increasing authoritarian regime, which involved also the Socialists and the Communists (Bonfreschi, 2017). The label “reluctant guerrillas”, coined by Jocelyn Viterna (2006), highlights the necessity of these women in joining the revolutionary movements, as they felt they were left with no other options but to fight back (O’Keefe, 2017). This process of politicisation is commonly recognised by social movement scholars as symptomatic of the lived experience of hardship and oppression around which grievances and mobilisations are based. Besides, the multiple effects of particular political conflicts on women’s lives and struggles shed light on the potential and pitfalls of women’s political mobilisation, which Sharoni (2001) found in Northern Ireland and Palestine. However, in the literature of the 1970s there were three typical gendered patterns to explain female terrorism (Schraut and Weinlauer, 2014): women as individuals unable to participate rationally in politics, women - but not real women - trying to become emancipated through terrorism and women being oppressed by both patriarchy and capitalism and therefore acting as terrorists. ‘Once women have taken the plunge into the unnatural and rejected their prime role of mothers, anything is possible’ (Rolston, 1989). Unfortunately, it is still quite diffused to read these narratives uncovered by Sjoberg and Cantry (2015) regarding terrorist women being vindicative mothers, monsters or whores. Rolston (1989) in commenting on the oversimplification of female terrorists in novels highlights the fictional polarity between mothers and whores that knows only a “black or white” alternative. Furthermore, when violence is committed by females, this appears more terrible and unnatural since women have been traditionally depicted as pacifists. According to Katherine Brown (2017), the number of female participants in terrorist organisations, as well as female violence in general, has increased in recent times. This may be true, but the idea that the female terrorist is particularly dangerous because she fuels the violence of terrorist organisations is appropriately discussed by Pickering and Third (2003) as example of gendered narrative. Nevertheless, we must uncover the
misleading literature that was elaborated in the 1970s – 1980s regarding terrorist organisations in general. In this context, many improvements have been achieved with time, for instance, the discovery of the documents written by Aldo Moro found in via Monte Neveoso helped historians and researchers to implement their studies on Red Brigades. Yet, the field of women and political violence, in particular terrorism, is still wrongly described. Many academics concentrate their writings on a single-side perception of female terrorists, now and as they did in the 1970s. For example, Morgan’s The Demon Lover (1989) and Bloom’s Bombshell (2011) address in my opinion the topic in a superficial way, claiming these terrorist women to be abnormal in their social interactions. The main issue, I recognise, is the neglect of intersectionality, i.e. that women might fight for both equality and a political cause, like nationalism. Leila Khaled said that she represented all Palestinians, not women, as well as Mairéad Farrell sustained that she was oppressed as a woman but also because she was Irish.

It is true that female presence contributed to further recruitment of male militants. As Patrizio Peci (1983) asserted, it was hard to live underground when you are young, you avoid social contacts for secrecy motivations and the majority of your comrades is male. Existing research indicates that female combatants are often perceived as a necessary but temporary aberration in a time of national crisis, rather than as representative of a fundamental societal change in gender roles (Alison, 2004). In addition, women are not easy targets. Police and counterintelligence looked after men whereas women are usually less controlled. For instance, it was just a fortuitous case that somebody noted the bump a Provisional woman was carrying was not of a baby, but a bomb (Bloom, 2011). In addition, Leila Khaled, speaking about her time just before being detained by British police officers:

‘At Amsterdam airport my comrade Patrick [Arguello, a Nicaraguan] and I were stopped by Israeli officers,” she says. “They searched our
bags very thoroughly, but they didn’t find anything in there. Because
the grenades were in my pockets.” (The Guardian, 26 January 2001)

Against their will, terrorist organisations have turned negatively the tide
of elections in their country. The Red Brigades wished to see a
Communist government, but this party gained a lot of support only after
the attempt to build a *compromesso storico* in 1978, which is exactly what
induced many militants to turn to political violence. In Ireland,
establishment politicians were even opposed by populism, represented by
Reverend Ian Paisley. However, every country had a tradition of violence.
In this specific context, Italy before terrorism experienced the Mafia
threat, while Northern Ireland had known the IRA violence from the First
World War and Palestinians during the diaspora provoked by the 1948
creation of the state of Israel and its related consequences. Actually, there
are specific episodes which generated armed struggle over political
marches. As I mentioned before, the historical compromise in Italy made
many extremist communists shift to violence, the internment law of 1971
and the Bloody Sunday of 1972 ensured several militants in the
Provisional IRA and the extension of territories under Israel after the June
War in 1967 did the same with Palestinian Resistance members.

In social movement theory, repertoires for protest have traditionally been
seen as influenced by a political opportunity structure, consisting of both
a formal, institutional aspect and an informal, cultural one (Tilly, 1978).
Student movements were not so optimistic about the modernisation
plans proposed by governments. They did not believe that such a program
was possible in a political system which was the same from 1945 and
since they gained more attention and engagement than political parties,
they may have been right. Working-class joined the protests initiated by
the students, showing that trade unions were not efficient in addressing
their issues. As New Social Movement Theory explained, the social
concerns were the ones that triggered the youth and the workers but they
were not necessarily deprived people. It was the revenge of the Ordinaries
against a frozen state. Following Muller and Weede (1990), if rational actors perceive a chance to improve their position in life by upward mobility, there is no need for them to take part in rebellious collective action. Then, individual mobility becomes a substitute for collective political action. Yet, peaceful marches turned into violent mass protests. Public violence was tragically effective as the state police could not block them in the short period. In addition, the PLO stated that terror offered more hope than conventional military forces (Rapoport, 2002). Irish women were attracted by IRA for their political ideologies and the Republican ethos, but then in 1969 the majority of recruits joined to fight the British soldiers (Reinisch, 2016). The younger activists focused on military involvement rather than ideological purity and Republican principles, but this eventually brought them to develop progressive feminist views (ibid.). Certainly, the theme of generation is widely discussed in almost all the books and articles on social movements and terrorism. According to Bloom (2011), the new generation of IRA leaders were children of the Belfast and Derry ghettos, counter to the 1916 elite, well-educated IRA members. Whereas in the Palestinian scenario, the new generation experiencing the 1967 Six Days war promoted rebellion against Israeli oppression and the patriarchal family are fused (Sayigh, 1981).

‘When I was small we didn’t even know the word "Palestine," [...] On Independence Day we used to carry the Israeli flag. But now children know; they sing Biladi even though it’s forbidden. This year some of them refused to take part in Independence Day.’ (idib.)

In an interview, Loredana Panebianco in Vite Sospese (1988):

‘Avverto coscientemente la rottura con la storia sociale delle donne del passato, sono consapevole di essere “figlia dei nuovi tempi”.’

I feel consciously the rupture with the social history of the women of the past, I am aware to be “daughter of new times”
In parts of Catholic Europe, like Italy and Belgium, first-wave feminism never gained momentum (Wilcox, 1991). On the contrary, Ireland experienced only this “suffragette” impulse but arrived lately to develop a movement within feminists which advocated for the emancipation of women from their home nests. Some have argued that religious affiliation has been an important limiter of feminism in Europe, although the Italian women’s movement is often described as the largest and most effective in spite of any influence of Catholicism. Indeed, feminist consciousness is most widespread in Italy. Right after the Second World War, Italy developed UDI (Unione Donne Italiane), close to the Communist Party, and CIF (Centro Italiano Femminile), under the Christian Democracy. Nonetheless, it was during the 1970s that radical parties, like FILF (Fronte Italiano di Liberazione Femminile) and MLD (Movimento per la Liberazione della Donna), made feminism a crucial political factor. Criticising the student movement of 1968 and the radical-left parties, a number of Italian feminist groups came to reject what they understood as the vanguardist methods of the (neo-)Marxist left, seeing these as patronising, bestowing power on select groups of people instead of more fundamentally questioning power relations also within social and political movements (Bracke, 2015). Around 1976, at precisely the moment when public opinion and parliamentary debate came close to feminism as a force to be reckoned with, the feminist coalition disintegrated over difficult questions of how to relate to the state, the law, and political parties, without compromising oneself or being co-opted by other actors. Irish women were among the most supportive of general gender equality, equality in politics and increased numbers of women in the legislatures, and of the goal of radically transforming society. After the early feminist movements, other groups reappeared in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. The NIWRM (Northern Ireland Women’s Rights Movement) was created in Belfast, in the same university from which arose the civil rights movement. It developed as an umbrella group, aimed at bringing together Unionist and Nationalist women. Since feminist women are more likely to
favour decreased defence spending and to reject nationalism in favour of a European identity, feminism seems not possible in Northern Ireland. However, facts demonstrated the contrary as the existence and popularity of Cumann na mBan. Even Palestine, which can be situated in a Third World area, had its own feminist movement, albeit constructed under the British Mandate. The AWA (Arab Women’s Association of Palestine) was conceived in 1921 and was the first female-organised political activism in the Middle East. In 1965, the PLO eventually created an official section for Palestinian women, the GUPW (General Union of Palestinian Women). Beyond the logistical and social support during the Resistance in Palestine, these women also sustained armed struggle, proving definitely that feminism and politics can get along with each other. Conversations held by Kawar (1993) with the Palestinian women’s leadership, especially those who resided in Lebanon between 1971 and 1982, indicated that women had developed a profound collective gender identity, which was enhanced by closer exposure to ordinary women’s lives under crisis.

Many female terrorists accused the failure of these mentioned female organisations to effectively change something in their societies – like fundamental rights - as the trigger for political violence. For example, Susanna Ronconi took distance from the feminist movement only because they objected to the use of violence, which on the contrary she approved. ‘Terror is liberty, here and now.’ (O’Brien, 1977). Moreover, terrorist organisations can be said to be way more equal than political parties. They admitted women and apparently, they were at the same level as other male members. Women have achieved equality as perpetrators of terrorist violence (Weinberg and Eubank, 2011). What is contested in the biographies of several terrorists is the fact that they wanted to do more inside their organisation and I suppose this yearning to be the cause of the shift from peaceful militancy to armed struggle. In detail, della Porta (1989) argued that in those years of relative peace and order, there lacked a specific objective while manifesting and striking and
probably this was the problem in Italy between 1968 and in 1977 during the most striking civic protests. Weinberg and Eubank (2011) accentuated that the outbreak of terrorist violence in the Western world during the ‘60s and ‘70s had complex causes. Dealing especially with Irish women, the experiences of state violence passed as peacekeeping measures were the motivation to engage in a politics of resistance, which in turn fostered a “gender awareness” and so a realisation that the violence of the state was gendered. The new body of knowledge I emphasised in this dissertation focuses on three related themes, classified by Grisard (2014) as the relationship between women and political violence, the connections between feminism and left-wing terrorism, and the de/centring of the terrorist perpetrator - the same method of analysis is inscribed in the new social movement approach.

Charles Tilly (1978) derived the repertoires of political violence to previous waves of protest in one country but addressed that forms of action were also adopted and adapted cross-nationally. In past literature, women resulted as being more frequently the partners of already terrorists. Actually, Galvin (1983) suggests that women, being more idealistic than men, may have been more impelled to perpetrate terrorist activities in response to failure in order to achieve revolution or due to an experience of death or injury to a loved one. Appropriately, Donatella della Porta (1989) registered that Italian women were the girlfriends or wives of terrorist organisations members. Even Jacques and Taylor (2013) analysing the conflict in Northern Ireland found that women were more likely to be widowed or divorced compared with their male counterparts. Then, many Palestinian women said that their families respected their actions for the Resistance movement, but most of them had a kin inside (Sayigh, 1983). Yet, while comparing men and women’s turn to political violence, both genres affiliated after a feeling of disappointment and frustration bound to non-violent forms of militancy, namely the protests of social movements during the 1968 wave. As Ted Robert Gurr (1973)
pointed out, discontent is the root cause of violent conflict. Women, therefore, have proven to join political violence for the same reasons as men. Many indeed were previously protesters in the social movements. Often family connections are reported to play a role in shaping engagement in terrorism, particularly in conflicts that have spanned over generations (Jacques and Taylor, 2013). Indeed, the number of activist connections decreases with shorter conflict lengths. This is the case for Northern Ireland and Palestine, which were (and are still) living a decades-long struggle. Women in these two scenarios fought for national identity and liberation from the oppressor. Consequently, Italian women resembled Northern Irish and Palestinians when they joined Partigiani in the Resistance movement during WWII, more than in the studied research period. Nevertheless, all these social movements, which consisted also of terrorist groups, were opposing imperialism. Whereas the colonial issue appears clear in Northern Ireland and Palestine, even Italian terrorists, and especially the Red Brigades, were concerned with a self-determination problem since they craved to dismantle the SIM, Stato imperialista delle multinazionali (Imperialist State of Multinationals).

More interestingly, the majority of terrorist organisations of the 1970s sprung up from Communism, or rather Marxism. Still, whereas many terrorists had a university degree, many among them adopted their own interpretation of socialism (Peci, 1983; O’Leary, 2005). According to Rapoport (2001), "New Left Wave" movements had a Marxist element that affected the usual sources of diaspora support, as in the case of IRA. Intellectuals, being by definition interested in words and ideas, were more likely to be misled about the reality of such movements than ordinary people (O’Brien, 1977). Albeit Palestinian women who participated in the Resistance are labelled as ordinary by Rosemary Sayigh (1981), terrorist women were rather more extra-ordinary because they were educated, usually unmarried and from the élite class. Common in every social movement is the generational divide between older and younger women. The latter could hold a gun with no problem, while the traditional
matriarchs maintained a distinction between female and male roles. Political terrorists were fascinated by that romantic aura ideated in the XVIII century. They felt like alternative heroes, fighting for the best of the whole world, one country at a time. However, Italian Red Brigades started despising the PCI in the mid-1970s since they redeemed the party had changed from Communist to social-democratic (Sartori, 2017). In Ireland, similarly, at the height of the debates which led to the IRA split in 1969, the male IRA Army Council lost control over Cumann na mBan and at the Wolfe Tone Commemoration in Bodenstown 1968, the women’s organisation had refused to march if communist flags were carried (Reinisch, 2016). Evidently, this violent passion can be met in the Italian example, but even among the Irish terrorists who stood for the break of all connections with Britain and ultimately the creation of an “Eire Nua”. Alike Al-Fatah advocated for the liberation of the Occupied Territories as well as for the broader purpose of all population’s freedom from imperialism. At the same time, Marx was also one of the few emergent political scholars and philosophers to sustain the feminine question in the XIX century. Furthermore, human rights abuses by governments have long been seen as a catalyst for more terrorism (Harris and Milton, 2016) and the same logic can be applied to the feminist question. In fact, Northern Ireland’s Struggles began together with the emergence of the Civil Right Movement. Yet, the benefits of women’s rights seemed to occur in the case of domestic terrorism, but not transnational terrorism (ibid.). Despite the 1960s student movements and the female participation in the Resistance, only after the first Intifada a real women emancipation was advanced in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Curiously, the three cases examined represent different stages of public support for political violence. Whereas in Italy only collaborators sympathised with the Red Brigades, in Northern Ireland there were contrasted opinions, namely some people even justified the terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Provisionals inasmuch violence was applied
with the purpose of ending the British colonisation. Then, exceptionally speaking, the PLO’s and its affiliated groups committed acts of violence that frightened the population but the reason behind the armed struggle, e.g. a Palestinian national determination, was understood, even though pro-Israel did not support it. According to Leila Khaled:

‘I had two policewomen with me in my cell, and we were always discussing our cause and our suffering. After I left I sent them books about Palestine; they asked me to.’ (The Guardian, 26 January 2001)

For most of the Western groups involved, there was also an effort to identify with the struggling masses of the Third World (Weinberg and Eubank, 2011). Indeed, when we deal with national liberation movements, some authors prefer to label the activists as “freedom fighters” rather than terrorists. Common to the three examples, a revolutionary armed struggle was pursued and it signed their shift from student and mass mobilisation to political violent organisations. After the arrest of Curcio and Franceschini, the Red Brigades reorganised in 1976 and became even more violent. Against the abstentionist decision taken by the traditional IRA members, a new extremist side of the Republican Party that favoured aggressive actions arose. Finally, in 1969 the Palestine Liberation Organisation passed under the control of Arafat’s group Fatah, which believed that only an armed revolution would have defeated the Israeli forces. As I have already discussed in Chapter Four, there is no common definition of terrorism and the line between terrorist and freedom fighter is feeble.

Moreover, Marta Serafini, journalist for “Corriere della Sera”, argues that feminism has been used by the terrorists only for instrumental reasons. In a propagandistic sense, involving women in terrorist operations resulted more effective on public opinion and governments. Where is the picture of the male guerrilla holding the rifle and a baby?’ (Enloe, 1983) While I agree with her that none of the cited terrorists revenged feminism
and gender equality as a goal of their political violence, I object to the argument that feminism did not count at all. Susanna Ronconi in *Vite Sospese* (1988) told about the conception “the personal is political” and the equality feeling:

‘Una soggettività emergente si emancipa dal gruppo: è un elemento dirompente, ci sono scontri con i maschi dell’organizzazione ma ormai il bisogno di autonomia è un dato di fatto che rompe il contenitore e cerca proprie strade.’

An emergent subjectivity emancipates from the group: it is a disruptive element, there are clashes with the males of the organisation but at this point the need of autonomy is a matter of fact, which breaks the box and looks for own pathways.

‘In the beginning, all women had to prove that we could be equal to men in armed struggle,’ said Khaled. ‘So we wanted to be like men - even in our appearance.’ (The Guardian, 26 January 2001)

Not one of the German female terrorists of the third wave defined herself as a feminist or woman primarily fighting for female emancipation (Schraut and Weinhauer, 2014). Meinhof and others made a conscious decision to abandon feminism around 1973 and adopted a new kind of sexualised "language of Revolution" (Colvin, 2009). Similar terms are used by Papadogiannis and Gehrig (2015) to describe the politicisation of sexuality occurring during the social movements in the 1960s – 1970s. In fact, the subversive use of conventional conceptions of womanhood and femininity were a secret weapon in the struggle (Sharoni, 2001), serving as propaganda but also targeting inappropriately the bodies of female terrorists. Susanna Ronconi retained that the ability to commit violence did not have anything to do with gender. Yet, Barbara Balzerani justified the detachment from feminism presenting the organisation as the main interest of terrorists. In fact, when Susanna Ronconi talked about Margherita (Mara) Cagol and her disaffection from feminism, she
brought up that the female question was not on Mara’s agenda because she had reached a point of no return, in which the armed struggle is the only reason in life, the only possible way to live.

In conclusion, the lack of a gender perspective in the terrorist movements and in their related studies affected also the state’s responses and actions to counter terrorism. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was commonly assumed that terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction would be counterproductive because such an act would be widely condemned (Galvin, 1983). Di Fazio (2017) sustains that social movement scholarship mostly ignored the centrality of movement-countermovement interactions in the development of contentious politics. As Tilly (1978) redeemed, if political opportunities can increase mobilisation, then constraints on political action can dampen it. Yet, collective identities do not necessarily precede mobilisation as some movements seem to attract participants even in the absence of prior identities and networks (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). For instance, greater women’s political engagement was reached after the uprisings and mass mobilisations, in particular in Northern Ireland and Palestine where the feminist question arose after the armed struggle. Furthermore, state repression actually suppresses moderate alternatives, radicalises remaining supporters, and creates the martyrs and myths that militants use to justify their actions (della Porta, 1995). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 accounted for the fundamental changes in the operating structures of European terrorist groups (Galvin, 1983). In reality, revolutionary terrorists were defeated in one country after another. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon eliminated PLO facilities to train terrorist groups, and international counter-terrorist cooperation became increasingly effective (Rapoport, 2002). In addition, sponsoring states toned down their support of terrorist groups. Nonetheless, sometimes even close allies could not cooperate. France refused to extradite PLO, Red Brigade, and ETA suspects to West Germany, Italy, and Spain. Italy
rejected American requests to extradite a Palestinian suspect in the seizure of the Achille Lauro cruise ship in 1984. The US in its turn had refused to extradite some IRA suspects. In 1988 Italy avoided extraditing a Kurd sought by Turkey because Italian law forbids capital punishment and Turkish law does not. Events of this sort will not stop until the laws and interests of separate states are identical. Furthermore, terrorist women and men were treated equally by special forces in the blitz organised by police forces as they simply shoot whoever came in their trajectory. We can cite Mara Cagol, Mairéad Farrell and others but we need also to specify that these women opposed violence. Nonetheless, when the terrorists are captured, a difference arises between female and male terrorists. At least, in the Northern Ireland case, women convicted of the same violence as men are incarcerated for a shorter period. In Alexander and Turkington (2019), through the study of the Profiles of Individual Radicalisation in the United States (PIRUS) dataset, it emerged that American authorities arrested and indicted approximately 73 per cent of men, compared to 66 per cent of women for ideologically motivated crimes. This factor likely adds to the disparity in conviction rates between the genders, as courts convict about 38 per cent of men compared to 29 per cent of women. While this reality can be applied to Ireland, it is more difficult to compare the Palestinian juridical system since penal death was also an option. On the contrary, Italy adopted a particular law, in which those who cooperated with state police and regretted their violent actions assumed the status of pentito and received a discount on the sentence.

I will conclude with a citation by Wahidin (2016):

‘The experiences of women combatants demonstrate that their relative invisibility is a result of ideological constructions of womanhood and manhood in society, rather than a reflection of considered decisions based on objective difficulties in incorporating women in combat roles’
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