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TESI DI LAUREA

Who Is Against Immigration in Europe?

A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants

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INTRODUCTION

Migration is one of the most important phenomena in the world. Humanity's entire existence is based on it and therefore was and is still nowadays the norm and not the exception to the rule.

Europe has always been a continent loved by immigrants. The immigration flows have never stopped but on the contrary, in the recent years have become more immense and problematic than ever. The problems came in when the types of immigrants that were arriving in Europe start to change. In the past, the individuals that decided to migrate were searching for better condition, better jobs and were mostly permanent residents that wanted to be integrated into the society. Nowadays the major part of immigrants that crosses the borders are refugees and illegal immigrants that rejects the integration and expects to live relying on the welfare of the European States.

Since 2014 the number of these categories of immigrants increased dramatically. Only in 2014 about 283,532 illegal immigrants and refugees coming mostly from Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan crossed the European Union borders. In 2015 the situation became even more dramatic when around 1 million immigrants entered in Europe and asked for asylum to the European States. The biggest part of them choose to ask asylum in countries like Germany, Sweden and Austria that were more open to immigration than the others.
In 2016 the situation has improved slightly compared to previous years due to the EU/Turkey statement, an increased in the border controls and the application of measures implemented by the EU and by the Member States.

Taking in refugees and fighting against illegal immigration is not cheap. Italy in 2015 spent more than $9.7 million a month only to sustain a program to find and rescue migrants' ships. Turkey spent more than $4.5 billion to guarantee the access to immigrants to basic services like health care and education. The cost of taking in migrants is not measured only in dollars but also in anti-immigrants' attitudes that in the last year have risen across the continent.

In Chapter 3 of this work was studied the categories of individuals that were against immigration in 2014, so before the beginning of the real immigration crisis. It was made an empirical analysis of the attitudes of European natives toward immigrants within and across

countries, using an individual-level survey data set. It was controlled for economic and non-economic issues but also for security and cultural issues.

The results of the analysis shows that in 2014, the European society was more open to immigration than it seems to be nowadays. Young individuals, high skilled, male, both religious and non-religious individulas were all more open to new immigration waves. The countries where these positive immigration feelings were mostly present were: Belgium, Germany, France, Norway, Sweden and Poland.

Nowadays the patterns of immigration are shaped both by the government policy which attempt to control immigration flows in the national interest and by the European Union.
At the national level the current trend seem to be for governments to try to manage immigration more efficiently. National policies on immigration involve hard work in: deciding the admission rates for the regular immigrants that are coming from the third countries to seek work, promoting the integration of legally resident third-country nationals and combating illegal immigration by giving sanctions to airlines and other travel operators or to employers of illegal immigrants.
The European Union instead must: decide the conditions for both, the legal entry and residence in Member States and for family reunification, support the measures taken by the Member States to promote integrations, reduce and prevent irregular immigration and conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission of their country of origin nationals.

While the European Union is trying to manage the immigration crisis by increasing the borders controls, increasing the resources available for immigration, reducing the incentives of irregular immigration, developing a common asylum policy and the blue-card system the European countries at a national level are taking measures to control and limit the number of immigrants. Sweden, Austria, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary and France were the first countries that in 2016 adopted radical measures to limit and control for immigration. The only country in Europe that continues with its open-arms policy is Germany that in 2016 took important measures to better integrated the asylum seekers.

CHAPTER 1 – Definition, Classification and History

1.1 Definition of migration

For most people the word *migration* suggests a vision of "brave" movements of whole population over long distances. This term, nowadays, is considered as one of the most important phenomena in the world.

When Arctic Tern (*Sterna paradisaea*)[1] appears in Antarctica, when Monarch Butterfly (*Danaus plexippus*)[2] is observed in Mexico, or when the Dragonflies (*Pantala flavescens*)[3] is sighted in the Maldives, Seychelles, Mozambique and Uganda, people recognize that is occurring a special type of animal movement which forms an essential component of the life history and ecological niche of the organism. This phenomenon is found in all major animal groups including fish, reptile, birds, mammals, insects, amphibians, crustaceans and can be caused by: climate change, local availability of food and mating reasons.

As well as the animals, even the human being feels the need to migrate in new locations. Human migration is like animal migration but it is more difficult to understand the reasons behind it and to study its implications.

So far there is no exact definition of the term "Human migration" but only different points of view about its meaning. In a simply way Human migration can be defined as the movement of people from one place to another with the intention of setting temporarily or permanently in the new location. In this definition, no restriction is made between voluntary or involuntary nature of the act.

Each act of migration must have: an origin, a destination and an intervening set of obstacles like the distance or the difficulty to move.

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[1] Bird that travels 71,000 km per year and flies from Greenland and the Arctic to Antarctica

[2] Flies from Canada to south Mexico.

[3] Insect that travels 14,000 – 18,000 km per year

The International Organization for Migration defines migration as:

> *"The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification".*

In this definition, no restriction is made between external and internal migration or between the nature of the act (voluntary or involuntary).

Nowadays there are different definitions regarding the word "migrant" given by different important associations or organizations like:

a) The UN Refugee Association:

> *"Any person who moves, usually across an international border, to join family members already abroad, to search for a livelihood or for a range of other purposes."*

b) The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):

> *"Any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country."*

c) The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants:

> *"Is a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national".*

d) The European Commission:

> *"A person who leaves from one country or region to settle in another, often in search of a better life"*

These last definitions consider migrants only the voluntary one so for example refugees or other people who are forced to abandon their home are not included in this category.

Until now it can be notice that there is a lot of confusion about the meaning of these two words and no definition between these can be considered as the only one “right”.

There are two fundamental things which distinguish migration from any other phenomenon: *duration and distance* (Kok Pieter, 1999).

The minimum duration of stay to be considered as migration, varies across countries. The United Nations defines immigrants those individuals that move their residence in the host country for one year or more and shorter periods are classified as visits. For twelve countries in the world migrants are considerate only those that decide to establish permanent residence; for eight countries, the duration of the stay to be considerate migrant is three months or more and for nine countries in the world there is no clear criterion to identify migrants.

The distance is not well defined but what matters in this case is the change of community. For example, a person who moves from one home to another in the same neighborhood is not considered a migrant. If we consider a nation as a community, then all international movements will be classified as migration.

The problem with migration is that is hard to understand who the migrants are and how to distinguish them from natives. For example, if we consider hypothetically the natives like all people who have a residence and domicile in a country it will be hard to classify a vagrant which is a person without a domicile, or if we consider native all persons who have citizenship it will be hard to distinguish between those who born there among those who have acquired citizenship in time.

To try to understand what the word migration means first we should try to answer these four questions:

a) Who lives here now?

b) Where did they live - then?

c) Who else lived here then?

d) Where do they live now?

To give an answer to these questions is very difficult because two operations should be done: looking in several places and tracking people forward in time. These two operations are very expensive and require a long period of analysis. (Tilly, 1976)

1.2 Classification of migration

There are so many ways in which migration can be classified. The most important difference is between local or internal migration and international migration. The first one is the movement of individual or families from one area to another within national boundaries, while the international is the movement from one country to another. International migration is the highest. In the middle 1990s about 145 million individuals moved away from their origin countries and in the 2005 the number increased and reached 175 million[4].

International migrants can be classified as legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and refugees. Legal immigrants are those that possess all the required and correct documents to enter in a country. Illegal are those individuals that violate the law of the country and cross the border illegally. Irregular and undocumented immigrants are included in this category.
The International Organization for Migration gives a perfect definition for refugee. A refugee is:

> *"A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."*

Very often the boundary between legality and illegality is easily crossed. A regularization law or an amnesty can transform legal immigrants into illegal virtually overnight. Furthermore, a legal migrant may work in the illegal economy or vice versa an illegal migrant may work without hindrance in the legal economy.
Also the difference between internal and international migration is often blurred and occurs when international borders change or when the national states become less important for migration (Schengenland). This last case is very particular because creates new obstacles for the immigrants coming from outside the European Union and gives a special treatment to immigrants from inside the Union. Significant international frontier shifts affect drastically migration status because turns local migration into international migration and vice versa. Some famous cases of this phenomenon that occurred in Europe are: the breakup of

[4] Population Reference Bureau

Yugoslavia, the former of the Soviet Union or the unification of Germany (Russell King, 2002).

Another important classification of migration is between: voluntary and involuntary. The first one is attributable to the person's will to migrate and can be within one's region, country or beyond.



Figure 1: Distribution of migrants by reasons. (Source: NSS, 2012)

Represents about 90, 20% of total migration and is due to many factors that attract immigrants to the host countries (Das, Haldar, Das Gupta, Sen, 2014). These factors are called "pull factors" and include: booming economy (better job opportunities), favorable immigration laws, improved life style, environment friendly climate, better civic amenities and many others.

An example of this type of migration is Japan who is in a situation of labor absence. Because of this situation, Japan is receiving a record number of legal and illegal immigrants that are destined to fill the low-status, low-paying and dangerous jobs that are rejected by Japanese natives (Ganelli and Miake, 2015). According to the United Nations, Japan would need 17 million immigrants by 2050.

Even though Japan is not offering to migrants the optimal conditions to live, a lot of them coming from the poorest countries in the world, decide to take this opportunity. The main reason for which they take this decision is that their actual conditions are worse than those that Japan is offering.

The involuntary migration is due to the worsening of living conditions like: natural disasters (24%), social political problems (58%), evacuation for development policies (18%) that force people to move. All these factors are called “push factors”.



Figure 2: Distribution of migrants by reasons. (Source: NSS, 2012)

Migrations can be classified also in other ways. For example, if is considering the distance and the duration of the move is possible to classify migration in four types:

1) *Local* - fundamental is the distance which is quite small. The migrant will move within a geographically neighboring market.

2) *Circular* – the distance can be long or short but the important thing is time; the migrant will return to the country of origin after a well-defined interval of time.

3) *Chain* – new immigrants are helped with aid and information by the people at the destination (who are people that have migrate previously)

4) Career – fundamental are both time and distance. The migrant will move far/close for a definitive period in response to work and living opportunities.

Circular and chain migration tend to fight high cost of information regarding employment opportunities so they give way to local and career migration while career and circular migration offer skills that are available only in migrants (Tilly, 1976).

This last classification does not consider the difference between forced and voluntary migration that was considered previously so to distinguish easily among local, circular, chain and career migration is obligatory to know life histories of migrants and intentions and social relations at the time of move.

1.3 History of migration in Europe

Humans have always had the need to migrate. It is thanks to this need that they have spread widely over the face of the earth and have been exposed to the most diversified conditions. The occupation of the earth was reached thanks to two fundamental human forces: the ability to grow demographically and the ability to move in other places. This last one gave humans a fundamental gift: the capability to adapt to changing environmental circumstances (Livi-Bacci, 2012). Furthermore, these forces have started a complex selection process where the individuals that moved in other places started to increase their ability to survive and to adapt to different climate and places. In time, these individuals became stronger that the ones that were left behind.

Charles Darwin sustained that migration from the origins of humanity up to present, has been the key element of social and biological evolution. It is a human characteristic that, in time, has promoted the diffusion, consolidation and growth of humans.

At this point is very important to address the wider question: "Is migration the exception or the norm?" In Europe (and in other developed countries) only a minority of people were born, live their lives, and die in the same community or settlement. Migration, at some point, inevitably takes place. Furthermore, it should be remembered that there are many people and cultures whose existence is based on immigration or on a history of migration. So, are immigrants therefore still "the others" who are different from us? Or all of us are, in some way or another, migrants or the product of migration? (Cohen, 1995: 8) The answers can be found by analyzing the Europeans migration history.

Europe has gone through different stages regarding migration.

Stage one consisted in the migration of non-Europeans in Europe. It started with the first phenomenon of human migration that happened during the Neolithic Revolution. This period is famous for the emergence of agriculture. It began in the Fertile Crescent, 9.000 years ago, and continued until reached the British Isles, 5.000 years ago. New ideas and techniques were implemented first in the Fertile Crescent and then adopted in the British Isles. This happened because agriculture increased human living standards which ended up in a demographic growth. Individuals felt the need to have more space for their agriculture and they decided to move near their villages at the beginning and then more and more distant. This process continued at a rate of roughly 1km per year until reached the British Islands (Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza, 1986).

This period of migration was unique because occurred in areas not very populated so migrants rarely had to get in touch with natives and to compete for resources. Situations as before do not have ever occurred in the history.

Over the last 2000 years there was a population boom which has made almost all areas densely populated. Individuals who decided to abandon their land and migrate had to interact with natives and most of the time these interactions had ended up in conflicts. These conflicts happened because migrants were more developed than natives so they had the strength to impose their lifestyle.

Stage two consisted in the immigration of Europeans in Europe. It started in the modern era. During this period, Europe was characterized by many migratory movements. Most of these movements had the purpose of invasion and settlement. A perfect example is the "Drang nach Osten" which consist in the movement and settlement of Germanic people in Europe. They started to extend their territories after the fall of the Roman Empire until the fourteenth century. Their purpose was to migrate towards the East and settle in those territories that were occupied by Slavs over the previous millennium. The main reason for this movement was the abundance land available and the technological and organizational superiority compared to the native populations. These first migration movements gave very favorable conditions that triggered successive waves of migration. These last ones ended up in a slow process of colonization of Europe by the German people in only three centuries.

Other examples are the movements of the Scandinavian people and the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula which ended in the fifteenth century (Livi-Bacci, 2000). Scandinavians migration was quite different from the previous ones. In the ninth century, Scandinavian people started to migrate first in the heart of the European continent and then in less hospitable lands like Iceland, Shetland and Orkney Islands and in Greenland.
The Reconquista happened for military and political reasons and not for religious. Christians conquered and settled in these lands because they wanted to expel from the Peninsula the Muslim rulers. The Muslim communities were defeated easily because they did not have the organization and power to defend themselves from Christians.
All these historical episodes of migration can be considered as voluntary migration because the decision to migrate was taken by the people and not forced by circumstances.

The slave trade during the colonial period is considerate the largest involuntary mass migration in human history.

Europe was not heavily hit by this forced immigration. The big part of slaves were destined to the American continent.



Figure 3: Destination of Enslaved Africans 1500-1870 (Source: Albert M. Craig, World Civilizations)

Stage three consisted in the immigration of Europeans and non-Europeans in Europe. This stage starts with the end of the slaves' trade period. In this centuries migration to Europe continued and the slaves were replaced by indentured workers (Stalker, 1994). This phenomenon was encouraged both by the need of obtaining the necessary work force and soldiers and the need of having new residents in the uncultivated lands. The need of work force and soldiers during these centuries was so big in many European countries that the governments had to take measures to limit migration. One example of these measures was the Alien Bill that was introduced in England in 1793 with the aim of controlling immigration (Rystad, 1992). Nowadays these kinds of measures are the rule and not the exception.

There are a lot of differences between past immigration and actual immigration and the two most important are related to the types of immigrants and the destination place. There are four main groups in which immigrants can be divided: permanent residents, temporary workers, refugees and illegal immigrants. The past international migrations were characterized by permanent residents while the nowadays are based mostly on the other three remaining groups. This is since laws have changed in time and now immigrants' first need to enter on temporary visas and only later they can gain permanent residence.

The eighteenth and nineteenth century were characterized by migration from richer to poorer countries while current migration waves are the opposite from less developed countries and regions to those highly developed.

Stage four was the migration of Europeans in other non-European countries. It took place between the mid-1800s and World War 1. There was a period of free migration with no controls over population movements because of the expansion of liberalism and the Industrial Revolution. Millions of Europeans moved voluntary, as the process of industrialization and agricultural transformation created surplus in the countryside and generated new work force in the cities (Wells, 1996). Migrants could find work closer to their home or far away in the new world colonies (Americans, Australia and New Zealand). European population started to increase significantly due to a low death rate and a high birth rate and the need to migrate was very high. Estimates show that more than 2 million of Europeans, decided to migrate in North America. The British Isles were the greatest source with 1.75 million individuals, approximately 25000 individuals were from France, 100.000 were from Germany and a few hundred thousand arrived from Spain (Böhning, 1978).

Between the two World Wars migration decreased significantly because of new international immigration controls. After World War one trust in people was vanishing and free movement of individuals with no documents was forbidden. Passport became a good instrument to restrict and control migration at the borders. European countries had a serious problem of unemployment and there was the need to protect domestic workers against foreign competition so migration felt even more.

Stage five consisted in the migration of Europeans and non-European to Europe. It began after 1945 when migration started to increase again thanks to the application of measures of relatively liberal immigration. The Cold War was also a fundamental component because many people wanted to pass the Iron Curtain and to migrate from East Germany to West and from Eastern Europe to Western Europe to search better conditions. Migration was favored also by the high demand of labor force especially in the industrialized Western European countries which often resulted in the employment of foreign workers. Germany's economy in those years started to recover quickly and the demand for labor could no longer be satisfied domestically. The German government applied the guest-worker policies which consist in the acceptance and employment of immigrants as long as there were jobs for them. Once the economy was fully recovered all these individuals were obliged to return to the country of

origin. Germany had no colonies and the only way to obtain migrant labor was to enter in bilateral guest worker agreements with other countries. This policy appeared to work until 1970 when the number of immigrants started to increase even when the economy was slowing and in 1973 Germany decided to issue a migration stop. Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, United Kingdom and France adopted variants of this guest-worker policy and all decided to stop it in 1973 and to reduce labor migration (Rendall, 2004).

The problem with this policy was that the governments started to give citizenships to all migrants that came from colonies. Colonial migrants entered in the European countries as citizens, and as such claimed a right to family reunification. In adding young men in the 1950s and 1960s, European states committed themselves to admitting wives, children and sometimes grandparents later. At the same time, in the medium-term migrants almost always have a higher birth rate than the natives and because of both, for every nation in Europe, there was the creation of multicultural, multilingual societies.

In 1973 with the oil crisis European countries entered a deep recession which caused unemployment and a dramatic reduction of immigration. The years from 1973 to 1985 were characterized by rigorous immigration control. Labor force immigration has ended in all countries in Europe, except for some illegal aliens and a certain number of seasonal workers.

The period after 1985 was characterized by an intensification of migratory movements of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers coming from the Third World, especially from Asia. The intensification of migration happened because of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the transportation costs. Between 1989 and 1992 the total applications of asylum seekers doubled, from 320.000 to 695.000 (Randan Hansen, 2000) and until the end of the decade it reached 455.000.

In Europe the role of borders and frontiers begins to be even more interesting from the 2000s. The removal of frontiers within the European Union facilitated the mobility across the states of the Union and created the condition for new dynamics of movement.
There was a rise in cross-border shuttle migration across the eastern frontier of the EU and a sharp increase in the “phenomenon” of illegal or irregular migration. More than 500.000 foreigners entered in Europe clandestinely only in the first years of 2000s.

The main reasons for this phenomenon were: a strong push factors that operated from the countries of origin and a harsh regimes of immigration control imposed by West European

states, including more rigid mechanistic processing of asylum-seekers claims for refugee status and stricter criteria (Russell King, 2002).

In 2002 the most important destination country for intra-European migration was Germany with over 344.000 immigrants. The main sources of migrants to Germany were: Poland, Russian Federation, Turkey, Italy, Romania and France. The second biggest actor in European migration was the United Kingdom, with nearly 105.000 immigrants only from other European countries. The biggest population inflow was from Australia, France, Germany and the United States. The third actor was Spain with more than 489,000 immigrants in 2002. Only 153,000 migrants (32% of total) were originated from European countries, while the other 68% came mainly from Latin American and North African countries. Globally, the most important source countries of migrants to Spain were Ecuador, Argentina and Romania.

In 2014 illegal immigration increased dramatically in comparison with the previous years. Following the Central Mediterranean, Western Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean routes, about 283,532 immigrants entered illegally in the European Union. Half of them had come from Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan. In figure 4 are summarized the total number of illegal immigrants that arrived in Europe from 2009 to 2014.



Figure 4: percentage of illegal immigrants in Europe in 2014 (Source: European Parliament Research Service)

In 2014 it was registered also the highest number of asylum applications (620.000) since 1992. The main countries of origin of asylum seekers, were Syria (20%), Afghanistan (7%), Kosovo (6%), Eritrea (6%) and Serbia (5%) and the states that received around two thirds of the EU's asylum applications were Germany, Sweden, Italy and France.



Figure 5: Annual number of asylum applications received by EU-28 countries, Norway and Switzerland, 1985 to 2015 (Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Eurostat data, June 22, 2016)

In 2015 the number of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants surged to a new record. More than 1 million immigrants entered in Europe. The 58% were adult males over 18 years of age, 17% were adult females over 18 years of age, and 25% were minor males and minor females under 18 years of age.



Map 1: Migrants detected to enter EU illegally in 2014-2015 (Source: Frontex)

Most of them choose to travel by land and Map1 puts in evidence that the principals' routes of illegal entries were Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes.
Additionally, in 2015 the highest number of first time applicants was registered in Germany, 35% of total applications in EU (441,800 applicants) followed by Hungary 14% (174,400 applicants), Sweden 12% (156,100 applicants), Austria 7% (85,500 applicants), Italy 7% (83,200 applicants) and France 6% (70,600 applicants). Compared with the population number the highest number of immigrants that crossed the borders to asked asylum was in Hungary (1800 refugees per 100.000 residents), Sweden (1600 refugees per 100.000 residents), Austria (1000 refugees per 100.000 residents) and Germany (only 587 applications for every 100.000 residents).

The main sources of immigration in 2015 were: Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The conflict in Syria is still the main driver of migration in Europe. The second driver is the ongoing violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo that is leading people to look for new lives elsewhere.



Figure 6: Top 10 origins of people that applied for asylum in EU in 2015 (in Thousands) (Source: Eurostat)

In these last two years' tensions in the EU have been rising because of the disproportionate burden faced by some countries, particularly the countries where the majority of migrants have been arriving: Greece, Italy and Hungary. The EU requires that asylum petition be processed by the country in which migrants first arrive. Because of this legislation countries near the principal migration routes like Hungary, Italy and Greece find themselves more affected by these last migration waves than the richer northern countries.

Taking in refugees is not cheap; Italy in 2015 spent more than $9.7 million a month only to sustain a program to find and rescue migrants' ships. Turkey spent more than $4.5 billion to guarantee the access to immigrants to basic services like health care and education. The cost of taking in migrants is not measured only in dollars but also in anti-immigrants' attitudes that in the last year have risen across the continent. The increase of these sentiments has pushed right parties to the political forefront and gave them a larger role in the countries' politics in the years to come. If high-unemployment persists in Europe, immigration policy will continue to be driven by the rising in anti-immigration sentiments.

In 2016 the number of illegal migrants and asylum seekers reaching Europe, fell sharply in almost all the routes. The biggest part of immigrants that arrived were coming from Syria (23%), Afghanistan (12%) and Nigeria (10%).



Figure 7: Main countries of origin in 2016 (Source: The UN Refugee agency)

From the total number of immigrants only the 3% (34,215) came by land to Bulgaria and Greece. All the rest came by sea to Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Malta. The majority arrived by sea in Greece (816,752) and Italy (150,317)

In 2016 compared to 2015 the number of illegal immigrants detected only on Greece's islands dropped by 79% in large part due to the Eu/Turkey statement. This statement, from March 2016 lead to an increase in the border controls by Turkish authorities and to readmission of immigrants from Greece to Turkey.

The drop in the number of migrants in the Western Balkans route, from 764.000 in 2015 to 123.000 in 2016, is due to both, an increase in the border controls and a range of measures implemented by the EU and countries.

In the other routes like the Western African there were detected only 580 illegal immigrants whereas in the Western Mediterranean the number reached 1.800. Only in the Central Mediterranean routes the number of illegal immigrants' detected increase by one-fifth arriving to 181.000. This increase was caused by a strong migratory pressure from the African continent.



Map 2: Main migratory routes in 2016 - The data presented refer to detections of illegal border-crossing rather than the number of persons, as the same person may cross the external border several times. (Source: Frontex)

In total, in 2016, the number of estimated detections of illegal border crossing was 503 700.

The number of asylum seekers in Eu-28 in the first six months increase by 17% with respect to the previous year but in the following months the number decrease by -15%. The total number of asylum applicants in 2016 were 370 700 and the major part of them 358 300 (97 %) were first time applicants.



Figure 7: First time asylum applicants, EU-28 (Source: Eurostat)

In conclusion, by looking at Europe's history it can be observed that big waves of immigration have always existed but they've never been as immense and problematic as in the recent years. The measures that were applied to control for immigration and the European native's opinion before this massive movements will be analyzed in the following Chapters of this work.

CHAPTER 2 – Migration Policies and Public Opinion

2.1 European migration policies

From the conclusions of the previous Chapter it can be said that Europe has always been a continent loved by immigrants. The immigration flows have never stopped and in the last years we have seen that increased more and more. The European Union and its Member states have had to take a variety of measures to deal with this phenomenon that nowadays had become more problematic and immense than ever.

The patterns of immigration are shaped by the government policy which attempt to control immigration flows in the national interest. The Governments, on the one hand must encourage immigrants to come because they represent a valuable labor force for the country, on the other hand must dissuade them because they bring social and political problems. The same dilemma is valid for the refugee's. Governments would accept them as a response to a humanitarian impulse, but would also limit their entrance because of economic reasons and social stability.

The Governments of the receiving countries must respond to pressure from both interest groups, the one in favor of immigration and the others in favor of stricter controls. The perfect example of this two groups can be found in the labor market: employers are in favor of immigration because gives them a large pool of potential employees whether employees are anti-immigration because immigrants who are prepared to accept lower wages would increase the level of competition. Only during times of economic expansions, like the Germany's guest work policies, both employers and employees were in favor of immigration (Hollifield 1992).

Western European governments, since the 1970s, have applied many laws to reduce or manage immigration and refugee flows. These laws have not yielded the desired result but have only made things worse by increasing the number of illegal immigrants and damaging genuine refugees. Later, new measure for the restriction of illegal immigration were adopted. This new measures have driven immigrants and refugees to use more dangerous routes to enter in Europe like the use of services of smuggling or trafficking networks. These restrictive migration policies have also increased the tension between natives and immigrants and have reduced the supply of workers to many sectors in need of labor (Boswell, 2003).

Given the law impact of traditional migration control policies, west European States have looked for alternatives. They start to address migration management dilemmas through

cooperation with migrant-sending countries and the 'transit' countries through which migrants and refugees travel.

From the mid-80s the countries of the EU became more concern about their common external frontier and started to develop a common policy on non-EU immigrants. This process pass through different stages summarized in the following *Table 0.*

One of the most important stage is the Schengen Convention in 1990, which moved the EU closer to a borderless union and to common policies on asylum and immigration. The border controls between EU countries have been removed while the external frontiers have been strengthened.

The Dublin Convention brought a change to the asylum seekers condition. After 1997 the asylum seekers had to apply in the first EU country in which they land. This rule is still applied today and it brings a lot of problems to the European countries situated near the principal immigration routes.

In 2001, during the meeting of the Council at Laeken the EU members decided to adopt a closer cooperation to protect external frontiers and reject the proposal to create a common European border guarded by EU border guards. European Governments preferred to adopt national policies to supranational ones.

TABLE 0 – MIGRATION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Year	Event	Outcome
1958	Treaty of Rome	Born the European Economic Community. It was established that citizens of member countries could travel to other member countries to search for work.
1985	Schengen Accords	Agreement to remove all border controls and to strengthen the common external frontier. Originally signed by six countries in 1985. The current signatories are: Austria, Belgium, Czech

		Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
1993	Treaty on EU	The "Maastricht treaty" extended cooperation to political activities, including foreign policy. This treaty lifted the remaining restrictions on migration from Spain and Portugal to other EU countries
1997	Dublin Convention	Harmonize policy by requiring asylum seekers to apply in the first EU country, they enter.
1999	Treaty of Amsterdam	Placed issues relating to immigration and asylum under the jurisdiction of the EC and incorporated the Schengen Accords into the EU.
1999	European Council meeting in Tampere	Established the need for a common European policy on asylum and immigration and asked the European Commission to draw up proposals on asylum, refugees, and immigration.
2000	Nice Treaty	Charter of Fundamental Rights that says that non-EU nationals with residence or work permits should eventually have the same freedom of movement as EU nationals.
2008		Principles with concrete actions for their implementation, based on which the common

	Brussels - A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools	European immigration policy will be formulated.
2009	Lisbon Treaty	Immigration policies must be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including the financial implications, among all the Member States.
2011	The 'Global Approach to Migration and Mobility'	Established in the field of migration, the general framework for EU's relations with third countries.
2014	Strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice" for the period 2014-2020	These guidelines are concentrate on the need to adopt a universal approach to migration that should protect the regular migration and should fight irregular migration.
2015	European Agenda on Migration	Instant measures to solve the immigration crisis in the Mediterranean and measures to be taken in the next years to manage immigration more effectively.
2016	Communication of the European Commission entitled: "Towards a reform of the Common European asylum system and enhancing legal avenues to Europe".	Contains the guidelines of the Commission that are concentrated on four elements: the revision of the Blue Card Directive, the development of a new model for regular immigration, the attraction of new innovative entrepreneurs to EU and the strengthening of the cooperation with the countries of origin.

The European Union and its Member States wanted to create a balanced approach to deal with regular immigration and to fight the irregular immigration. The EU's aim was to establish a

uniform level of rights and obligations for regular immigrants, similar with the one for EU citizens. In 2008 the European Union decided to write down the principles for the implementation of a common immigration policy. This policy had to be transparent, clear, and fair and had to promote legal immigration. Its fundamental principles had to be: solidarity, security, mutual trust, transparence, responsibility and share effort between the EU and its countries. Immigration had to be considered as an integral part of the EU's external policy and the collaboration on all aspects of migration had to be promoted also in all partnerships with non-EU countries. For the implementation of these policy in practice, the European Union had, first to define clear rules for the entrance and the residence of immigrants, then provide them the necessary information about their rights and obligations and finally had to work towards a flexible Europe-wide visa policy. [5]

In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty established the solidarity principle. Through this principle, it was made clear that the EU had to share competence with Member States regarding the decision of the numbers of immigrants to allow in the countries and the measures to adopt to reach a complete integration. This treaty established also that the immigration policies would try to stimulate progress, of all sectors and within all skills level, and would try to focus on the need-based assessment of EU labor markets.[6]

In 2011 was adopted the "Global Approach to Migration and Mobility" which established in the field of migration, the general framework for EU's relations with third countries. The framework defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with other non-EU countries. The Global Approach main instruments are the "mobility partnerships" and the "Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility" (CAMM). Both offer a political framework for comprehensive, dialogue and cooperation with partner countries and incorporate a set of measures like the measures on circular migration or the measures to fight irregular immigration. There are only two important differences between the two instruments. The first difference stays in the fact "Mobility partnerships" includes also the negotiation of visa facilitation and the readmission agreement, while the CAMM don't. The second difference

[5] Source: Nicholas Van Hear, Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, THE MIGRATIONDEVELOPMENT NEXUS, International Organization for Migration, 2003

[6] Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017)

stays in their applications: “Mobility partnerships” is applied mostly to neighborhood countries whereas CAMM is applied to the other third countries.

In 2014 the European Council defined the “Strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice for the period 2014-2020”. These guidelines are concentrate on the need to adopt a universal approach to migration that should protect the regular migration and should fight irregular migration.

In 2015 was published “the European Agenda on Migration” that proposed instant measures to solve the immigration crisis in the Mediterranean and measures to be taken in the next years to manage immigration more effectively. The immediate measures were: the increase in resources available to both Frontex’s operations, Triton and Poseidon, the adoption of a temporary system for the distribution of asylum-seekers and the creation of a relocation program for the expatriate people who require international protection in Europe. These fast measures were adopted on September 2015 by the European Council.
These long-term measures are mostly concentrate on reducing the incentives of irregular immigration, dismantling the smuggling networks, combating the trafficking in migrants, establishing a new policy on regular immigration, saving lives and securing the external borders, developing a common asylum policy and revising the blue-card system. [7]

In 2016 the European Commission, based on 2015 Agenda, published its guidelines in a communication entitled: “Towards a reform of the Common European asylum system and enhancing legal avenues to Europe”. These guidelines are concentrate on four elements: the revision of the Blue Card Directive, the development of a new model for regular immigration, the attraction of new innovative entrepreneurs to EU and the strengthening of the cooperation with the countries of origin. [8]

To deal with the recent immigration crisis many European directives on immigration and asylum have been adopted. The directives were applied to the three principal problems: regular immigration, irregular immigration and integration of immigrants.

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[7] Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017)

[8] Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017)

Regular immigration: was not possible to adopt a general rule that could cover all labor immigration, so it was decided to adopt a sectorial legislation divided by category of immigrants to establish EU immigration policy.

1) Directive 2009/50/EC: was implemented in 2014 and had the purpose to create the EU blue card. This card enables third country qualified workers to find qualified employment in all Member States.
2) The Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU): the first report on its implementation is due by December 2016. This directive has the purpose to create a common set of rights to be granted to regular immigrants.
3) Directive 2014/36/EU: was adopted in 2014 and has the objective to regulate the conditions regarding the entry, the residence and the rights of third-country seasonal workers. The period of stay in EU is different in each Member State but in all goes around five and nine months
4) Directive 2014/66/EU: was adopted in 2014 and has the objective to regulate the entry and residence of third-country workers in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer.
5) Directive 2016/801/EU: was adopted in 2016 and its target is the regulation of the entry of third-country nationals for studying or research reasons. [9]

Irregular immigration:

1) The "Return Directive" (2008/115/EC): was implemented in 2014 and laid down standards and procedures to return to their original country the irregular immigrants.
2) Directive 2009/52/EC: was implemented in 2014 ad contains sanctions and measures to be applied in all Member States against employers who employ illegal third country national's residents.

[9] Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017)

3) In 2016 was signed an agreement between Turkey and EU that included plans for the repatriation to Turkey of all irregular immigrants that arrived in Greece from March 2016.

4) Other measures to be concluded are the measures of cooperation to fight the trafficking in human beings. [10]

Immigrants' integrations:

1) Directive 2003/86/EC: adopted to set up the rules for the right to family reunification. In 2014 the Commission published a communication that contained the guidelines for the Member States on how to apply this directive.

2) European Agenda for the Integration of Third-country Nationals was adopted only in 2011. Since 2011 other two instruments have been created to deal with the same issue: The European integration forum that in 2015 was transformed into "The European Migration forum" and "the European Website on integration".

3) In 2016 the European Commission adopted a policy with practical steps to help 20 million non-EU nationals legally resident in EU Member States to integrate. [11]

[10] Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2017)

[11] Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017)

2.2.1 National polices on immigration

At the national level the current trend seem to be for governments to try to manage immigration more efficiently. National policies on immigration involve hard work in: deciding the admission rates for the regular immigrants that are coming from the third countries to seek work, promoting the integration of legally resident third-country nationals and combating illegal immigration by giving sanctions to airlines and other travel operators or to employers of illegal immigrants. The European Union instead must: decide the conditions for both, the legal entry and residence in Member States and for family reunification, support the measures taken by the Member States to promote integrations, reduce and prevent irregular immigration and conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission of their country of origin nationals. [12]

The following are some measures that were taken by individual countries to control the currently immigration crisis:

1) 2016 - Sweden[13]: adopted a new law to limit the asylum seekers' possibilities to be granted residence permits (only for three years) and being reunited with their families. Family reunification will be given only: if is given the refugee status and a residence permit for three years, if both partners have more than 21 years and have lived together before moving to Sweden and if the refugee is able to maintain himself and his family members that want to move to Sweden.

2) 2016 - Austria: adopted new laws to restrict the right of asylum (in 2016 only 37.500 individuals could apply for asylum). These new laws were adopted in response to the migrant crisis and allows Austria's government to declare a state emergency over migration and to turn away immigrants at the border (Christa Pongratz-Lippitt, The Guardian).

[12] Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2017)

[13] Source: Swedish Migration Agency

3) 2016 - Great Britain: after Brexit, the UK introduced the Immigration Act 2016, that will sanction all illegal workers and employers that will give work to illegal individuals, prevent illegal migrants from accessing housing, driving license and bank accounts and new measure to enforce immigration law and to remove all illegal immigrants. The new legislation applies stricter immigration rules also for working people. People coming from outside the European Union that have been working in the UK for more than five years and earn less than £35,000 a year, will be shipped off back to the country of origin (Broomfield, The Independent).

4) 2016 – France[14] : adopted a new law that will affect both foreign going to France and that are already living in France. The new law introduces the "multiannual residence permit", in which are nowadays included the EU Blue card holders and the intra-company transferees, also to other categories of foreigners like the seasonal workers. The new residence permit category is called "passport talent" and it will be given only to high qualified workers, researchers, local representatives of a company established in France, foreigners investor that want to create a company in France, foreigners employed in France who hold a French Mater degree and intra company transferees hired in France. This residence permit is valid only for four years.

5) 2016 – Hungary: in October, held a referendum related to the European Union's migrant relocation plans. The referendum was initiated by the government which spent at least $ 36 million for its realization. The turnover was only 43%, below to the required quota for a referendum to be considered valid under the Hungarian law. The 98% of the total voters had chosen to refuse to allow the EU to force the country to accept more refugees (Lyman, The New York Times).

6) 2016 – Italy: new laws regarding citizenship and migration legislation. Italy updated its legislation in accordance with the EU Directives on international protection. Applicants for international protection are divided in refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Both groups from now on will have an extended residence

[14] Source: The French law resource

permits, new rights for family reunification and better access to social assistance, housing education and healthcare services. [15]

7) 2016 – Greece: Eu/Turkey statement that allows Greek Government to send back to Turkey all the asylum seekers who use illegal routes from to reach the Greek island form Turkey. Turkey received about $6.6 billions from the EU to help the immigrants there. The number of illegal immigrants decreased dramatically (Chan, The New York Times).

8) 2016 – Germany: is the only continues in Europe that continue its policy of open-arms.
Angela Merkel during the annual summer press conference in Berlin on July 28 said:

"We are doing everything humanly possible to ensure security in Germany, Anxiety and fear cannot guide our political decisions."[16]

In 2016, Germany implemented new measures to facilitate the integration of immigrants into society and into the workforce. These new measures provide the cut of the support for the asylum seekers that will reject the mandatory integration measures such as language classes, cultural basics and lessons in German law. (Oltermann, The Guardian). The suspension for three years of the law that required employers to give preference to German and EU job applicants over asylum seekers. Other measure include the addition on the list of safe countries of: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

[15] Source: European Commission

[16] Source: Gatestone Institute – Internatinal Policy Council

2.2 Public opinion

Since 2015 the Western society has come across a shift in politics. The leftist multiculturalism and the globalization process have been turned down by the outcome of the Brexit vote and the U.S. Presidential election. The post-Financial Crisis decade has hit Europe with the sovereign debt crisis, the migrant crisis, and is culminating now in a loss of faith in the European project and a return to strong nationalism.

With the beginning of the 2015's migrant crisis, the nationalist right-wing movements and the so called "populist" movements are getting more and more popular among voters. Especially in countries such as Austria and Hungary, where religious beliefs still have a very relevant cultural grasp on the population. But also in more religious diverse and secular countries such Germany and France, the "xenophobic" and nationalistic sentiment is increasing (Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Migration policy institute, 2016).
Also some more aspects of the problem need to be addressed to build a full picture: the mainstream media coverage, the far-right fringe, and the geo-political situation in the Middle East.

The media coverage has been focusing on the "dramatic impact" of the phenomenon, reporting and covering the most extreme stories about the migrant situation such as the tragic deaths occurred during the migrations, and the personal struggles of real families or war refugees caught up the stream of economic and welfare migrants. The humanitarianistic approach of the media summed itself up with a similar feeling in some part of the population. Movement such as the feminists, the LGTB community and part of the leftist voters, have been in support of welcoming anyone in the mixed influx in violation of national immigration laws. The media approach on reporting the phenomenon however diverge with the data and the daily experiences that people in Europe had to face. As a matter of fact, "no-go zones" in European countries such as France, Sweden, and now Germany are growing in numbers. These areas are actually becoming ghettos for the migrants, where the national law is no longer enforced. Actual crime rates have been increasing dramatically after the open border policies, with Oslo becoming the rape capital of Europe.

These various "progressive" policies about immigration have had a serious impact on the public opinion. The most significant being the "Merkel's invitation" of migrants to the west, that still represents the apparent trigger of the migrant influxes (The Guardian 2016).

The media coverage, together with the evolution of the internet and telecommunications, created room for alternative media and social networks, which became a source of information perceived as more direct and complete. The downside being that alternative media and social networks are less professional in reporting news, and not as objective as professional news should be in principle. Such aspect might cause a misinterpretation in actual data with the result of blowing the problem out of proportion and creating resonance chambers that the population might use not to get objectively informed, but rather to vent up frustration and find confirmation for their fears and worries.

The far-right borders come in the picture as a political backlash to the European left. From an economic perspective, the last decade kept on the globalist trend of overall growth with raising inequalities inside nation states (Jay Mazur, 2000), especially in the west where the income of the middle class has been shrinking in the past decade. Many reasons can be pointed to explain the trend: from the externalization of west industry to the developing countries, which took jobs and incomes away from the west; to the austerity measures that many European countries had to follow, especially in southern Europe, that lead to a raise in fiscal pressure.

In light of this data, the repercussion on votes, and the need for nationalism and conservatism politics comes as no surprise. Moreover, in these times of economic strife, multiculturalism, integration, tolerance and open border policies are seen more as a threat, if not a main cause, for the economic well-being of the middle class.

It's not illogic to assume that cultural and political crisis and economic difficulties, go hand in hand, and since the response of the moderate right Europe is not perceived as impactful or effective by the population, the extreme fringes become a possible choice. This particular situation however, can find justification in what has become known in politics as "populism", namely the attitude of a politician to pursue policies that are perceived as "demanded" by the voters. The term has been used in politics and debates as an accusation between political parties. However, from a pure logic perspective making such accusation upon another politician must imply that the one in charge knows how to act in the best interest of the population, regardless of their own opinion. An argument could be made to show that it is true in practice, but it is in principle a violation of the democratic system.

This whole anti-democratic position of the European left, lead movements such Le Pen's in France, and the Brexit's one in Britain to gain more and more popularity, by simply promising to do, as a government, what part of the population demands.

The geopolitical situation in the Middle East is the last aspect of the problem. It also is the more obscure and complex, and the one upon which both the government and the European population have less power and leverage. The war in Syria and the whole geopolitical situation features as main actors, the local countries and factions, the United States government and the Russian Federation. On one hand the political and economic interests of the US government in the region caused all-out wars in some countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, and helped cause more upraising and instability in other ones such as: Syria and Pakistan. The Russian Federation also participated in the competition for regional resources and political influence with the forced annexation of Crimea, which gave the country a more direct access on the region, and by directly aiding the Syrian government against the local rebel faction.
As a result, Turkey became both a gateway to Europe for the migrant influx and a player in the complex political situation. The Ankara's government didn't hesitate to use its role as a "gate for migrants" to gain leverage on the European Union.

In conclusion, migrant fluxes and unregulated immigration caused by regional instability in the middle east, and used as a political tool, both by the European left and the involved governments, in a biased and non-objective media coverage with a "chamber of resonance" effect, can only lead to the failed multiculturalism and poor integration that the population of Europe are witnessing across the continent.

CHAPTER 3 – Empirical analysis

3.1 Database Description

The purpose of this analysis consists in studying what were the opinions of the European natives on immigration before these two last big waves of immigration had hit Europe.

The information needed was taken from the data set "ESS7-2014 Edition" realized by the European Social Survey on 26 May 2016.
For each individual, this data set contains socio-economic and demographic information and a variety of opinions on topics such as immigration, patriotism and political affiliation.
The variables useful for this study were 30 and the total observations were 33.900.

The most important variable from the entire data set is "Born in country". It was used to divide native answers from the total answers.

Native is defined as a person who was born in a specific place or associated with a place by birth, whether resident there or not.

In this case, to separate native answers from immigrants' answers, only the "Yes" answers to the question "Were you born in country?" were considered.

The original database collects answers from 21 European countries. The countries are: Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, Belgium, France, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Spain, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovenia, Israel and Ireland.
Israel is the only country that was eliminated from the original data set because is not part of Europe so was not considered useful for the study.

In Table1 are evidenced the density of responses for each country. Germany is the country with the highest number of responses followed by Lithuania with 2175 responses, Czech Republic with more than 2100 responses, Ireland with a total of 2075 responses and Finland with more than 1980 responses.

TABLE 1 – Density of responses for each country

Country	*Freq.*	*Percent*	*Cum.*
AT	*1,584*	*4.67*	*4.67*
BE	*1,542*	*4.55*	*9.22*
CH	*1,139*	*3.36*	*12.58*
CZ	*2,102*	*6.20*	*18.78*
DE	*2,745*	*8.10*	*26.88*
DK	*1,382*	*4.08*	*30.96*
EE	*1,649*	*4.86*	*35.82*
ES	*1,756*	*5.18*	*41.00*
FI	*1,987*	*5.86*	*46.86*
FR	*1,694*	*5.00*	*51.86*
GB	*1,950*	*5.75*	*57.61*
HU	*1,671*	*4.93*	*62.54*
IE	*2,075*	*6.12*	*68.66*
LT	*2,175*	*6.42*	*75.08*
NL	*1,736*	*5.12*	*80.20*
NO	*1,267*	*3.74*	*83.94*
PL	*1,598*	*4.71*	*88.65*
PT	*1,170*	*3.45*	*92.10*
SE	*1,554*	*4.58*	*96.68*
SI	*1,124*	*3.32*	*100.00*
Total	*33,900*	*100.00*	

The demographic and socio-economic variables examined were: age, gender, religion, citizenship, education and employment.



Graph 1: Density of the age of respondents

The data set is composed by 47% male and 53% female with an age between 14 and 104 years old. The average age of the respondents is around 50 which means that most people that responded to the questionnaire were adults and old people between 30 and 70 years old. There was a small section of individuals (0.17% for age and 0.06 for gender) that gave NA responses which were coded as missing values for both variables.

The 46% of the total individuals that answered to the questionnaire were Atheist, 34% were Roman Catholic, 15% were Protestants and the rest 0.4% were Eastern Orthodox or Jewish or Islamic or Other religions. Also in this case the 0.97% of the total answers were “Refusal” or NA which were coded as missing values.



Graph 2 – Distribution of religion across the population

Citizenship is a variable that must be analyze carefully because the European countries have no single way to give citizenship to migrants. Many of them use the "ius sanguinis" criteria which mean that persons can have the citizenship of the country only if they have one straight relative which already hold it. Citizenship can be acquired also with marriage or with long residence in that country. The U.S is the only state that follows the "ius soli" criteria which mean that you can have the citizenship of the country if you were born there. The European

countries follow these criteria too, but with some restrictions, for example Spain gives citizenship if and only if one person and one of his straight relatives were born there.

TABLE 2 – Distribution of citizenship across the sample

Citizenship	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
AT	1	0.00	0.00
BA	2	0.01	0.01
BE	1	0.00	0.01
CA	1	0.00	0.01
CH	1	0.00	0.02
Citizens	33,595	99.45	99.47
DE	8	0.02	99.49
DK	2	0.01	99.50
DZ	1	0.00	99.50
ES	7	0.02	99.52
FI	2	0.01	99.53
FR	3	0.01	99.54
GB	2	0.01	99.54
GR	2	0.01	99.55
HR	8	0.02	99.57
IE	1	0.00	99.58
IO	1	0.00	99.58
IS	1	0.00	99.58
IT	30	0.09	99.67
LT	1	0.00	99.67
MA	3	0.01	99.68
MK	2	0.01	99.69
MX	1	0.00	99.69
NL	4	0.01	99.70
NO	4	0.01	99.72
PL	1	0.00	99.72
PT	9	0.03	99.75
RO	1	0.00	99.75
RS	3	0.01	99.76
RU	64	0.19	99.95
SK	1	0.00	99.95
TH	1	0.00	99.95
TR	13	0.04	99.99
UA	1	0.00	99.99
XK	2	0.01	100.00
Total	33,780	100.00	

It can be concluded, from the analysis of the variable “Citizenship”, that 99, 4% of individual that participated to the study possessed the citizenship of the country where the questionnaire was applied.

The other citizenships that individuals possessed are more than 20, European and non-European. The major European ones, different from the ones where the questionnaire was applied were Russian, Italian, Croatian, Spanish whereas the non-European were Turkish, Mexican and Canadian.
The variable citizenship was finally transformed into a dummy because for this study it counts only the impact that the characteristic of being citizen of one country has on the pro-immigration attitudes.

The first socio-economic variable education was recoded. The original education variable used the UNESCO's ISCED classification (International Standard Classification of Education).
To make the analysis simpler, this variable was recoded into a more basically system of education with only 4 levels: primary, secondary, tertiary and others. Primary education was not modified and remained ISCED 1. At the secondary level of education was assigned ISCED 2, ISCED 3a and ISCED 3b and ISCED 4 and at the tertiary level of education was assigned ISCED V1 and ISCED V2.



Graph3: Education Level distribution across the sample

Graph3 summarize the distribution of the education level across the sample and it can be notice that most the respondents have completed the secondary level of education (67, 7), and only a small percentage stopped at the primary (10.2%). Tertiary education was completed by 21% of the sample population and the other types of education were concluded only by 0.26% of the rest of the population.

The last socio-economic variable, in Graph 4, illustrates the main working relation of each responded in the sample. The 90% of the respondents were “employee” or “self-employed”, 1, 7% were “working for own family business” and only 7, 9% were “unemployed”.

For the variable “education” there was a 0.20% of the population that gave NA responses, while for the variable “employment” the population increased to 0.35%.



Graph4: Employment relation distribution across sample

The other variables of the data set cover a variety of opinions on topics such as immigration, characteristics that immigrants should possess, patriotism and political affiliation which can be categorized in 4 macro groups:

Group 1 incorporates two variables fundamental for the study. Through the first variable is possible to comprehend whether the feeling of immigrants’ refusal comes from the strong feeling of nationalism or from other reasons. Through the second variable is possible to

realize how this feeling is reflected in the political choices of each state. These peculiarities will be analyzed in the next section of this work with the econometrics models.

The feeling of nationalism can be quantified for each respondent through the question "How close do you feel to your country?"
A small percentage of respondents (0.60%) gave NA responses that were coded as missing values. The other possible answers were: "1 - very close", "2 - close", "3 - not very close" and "4 - not close at all".

TABLE 3– Distribution of nationalism feelings across the sample

Feel close to country	Frequencies	Percentage
Very close	**17,342**	51.45
Close	**13,482**	40.00
Not very close	2,503	7.43
Not close at all	377	1.12
Total	**33,704**	**100**

Table 3 contains the specific answers for all the categories. More than half of the population felt very close to their country, 40% of them felt close to their country, and only a small percentage felt not very close or not close at all.
To get a more radical result the original variable was transformed into a dummy where 1 stands for "feel very close" and 0 stands for "feel not close at all". The sub-category "close" was added to "feel very close" and the other sub-category "not very close" was added to "not close at all".

From a short analysis appears that 91% of the individuals from the sample felt very close to their country and were very nationalists, while only a small percentage of them did not care at all about their country. At this level of analysis, it cannot be prove that this is one of the principal causes of immigrants' refusal but it can be affirmed with certainty that is a big contribute in the stimulation of this feeling.

To understand why certain economic decisions like the reduction of immigrants are taken is important to know the composition of the government of one country. The government reflects citizens' political choices during the elections. To appreciate these political choices, it was asked responses to specify their political alignment. The possible responses were reported in the form of grades from 0 to 10 where 0 represent the left and 10 represent the right.

The 10.55% of the sample population gave NA responses that were coded as missing values. Most the answers are located in the grades from 1 to 5 and the mean of the total answer is 5 which indicates that the majority of the population would place themselves between left and right.

TABLE 4– Frequencies of the answers of politics affiliations

Placement on left- right scale	*Freq.*	*Percent*
0 - Left	1,050	3.46
1	680	2.24
2	1,728	5.70
3	3,240	10.69
4	3,051	10.06
5	9,935	32.77
6	3,168	10.45
7	3,332	10.99
8	2,461	8.12
9	717	2.36
10 - Right	958	3.16
Total	30,320	100.00

To get a more drastic result also in this case the original variable was transformed into a dummy where 1 stands for affiliation with “extreme right parties” and 0 stands for affiliation with the “left parties”. The sub-categories “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7” were added to “left” while the others sub-categories “8 and 9” were added to “right”.
From the analysis of the variable it seemed that the majority, 86% of the population, placed themselves into the left parties while only 13% choose the extreme right.

Group 2 embodies four variables that describe four important characteristics that immigrants should have according to natives. These characteristics are: be white, have a good education qualification, have the necessary work skill and have Christian backgrounds.
The possible responses have been reported in the form of grades from 0 to 10 where 0 stands for "Extremely unimportant" and 10 stands for "Extremely important".

For each of the three variables a small percentage (1.3% for good education, 1.8% for Christian background and 1.4% for be white and 1.07% for needed working skills) of population gave NA responses that were coded as missing values.

TABLE 5: Characteristics that immigrants should possess, according to natives (all grades)

	Good educational qualifications		***Christian Background***		***Be whine***		***Possess the work skill needed in country***	
	Frequency	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
0 - Extremely unimportant	1,588	4.75	10,739	32.25	15,474	46.30	1,820	5.43
1	591	1.77	2,190	6.58	2,583	7.73	566	1.69
2	1,221	3.65	2,997	9.00	2,754	8.24	1,073	3.20
3	1,756	5.25	2,710	8.14	2,129	6.37	1,290	3.85
4	1,763	5.27	2,000	6.01	1,483	4.44	1,349	4.02
5	5,325	15.91	4,656	13.98	3,525	10.55	4,021	11.99
6	3,783	11.30	1,817	5.46	1,302	3.90	3,297	9.83
7	5,429	16.22	1,995	5.99	1,303	3.90	5,206	15.52
8	5,917	17.68	1,895	5.69	1,181	3.53	6,464	19.27
9	2,446	7.31	911	2.74	576	1.72	3,299	9.84
10 – Extremely important	3,647	10.90	1,387	4.17	1,114	3.33	5,152	15.36
Total	33,466	100	33.297	100	33,424	100	33,537	100

Before transforming the variables into dummies is important to highlight the original responses of the individuals of the sample. In *Table 5* are summarized all these answers. For both the variables "good educational qualifications" and "work skills needed in country", the majority of the responses are above the 5th grade and the means are both around 6 whereas

for both the variables “Christian Background” and “be white” is the contrary and both means are around 2.5-3 grade.

To see a more specific effect all the variables were transformed into dummies where 1 stands for “Extremely important” and 0 stands for “Extremely unimportant”. The sub-categories “2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7”, for all the three variables, were added to “Extremely unimportant” while the others sub-categories “8 and 9” were added to “Extremely important”.

TABLE 6: Characteristics that immigrants should possess, according to natives (only extremely important and unimportant)

	Good educational qualifications		***Christian Background***		***Be whine***		***Possess the work skill needed in country***	
	Frequency	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Extremely unimportant	21,456	**64.11**	29,104	**87.41**	30,553	**91.41**	18,622	**55.53**
Extremely important	12,010	35.89	4,193	12.59	2,871	8.59	14,915	44.47
Total	33,466	100	33.297	100	33,424	100	33,537	100

The analysis of these three variables as dummies shows the same results as before. Natives in deciding whether to accept immigrants did not consider important both, skin color (91.40%) and religion (87.40%). The characteristics that mattered for natives was a “good educational qualification” (36%) and “work skill needed in country” (44.4%). More than half of the natives that considered education and work skills fundamental were originally from Germany, Lithuania, Austria, Great Britain and Estonia.

Group 3 contains variables that describe the impact of migration on the native lives.
The most important impact is the economic one and can be observed by looking at the answers of the questions: “immigration bad/good for country's economy?”, “immigrants take out more than they put in or less in taxes and services?” and “immigrants take/create jobs?” The NA responses for the first variable were 3.33%, for the second variable were 5.19% and for the third variable were 3.19%.

In the original database, all these questions have as answers a scale of grades from 0 to 10 where 0 stands for “negative effect” and 10 stands for “positive effect”.

TABLE 7a – Economic attitudes toward immigrants

Immigration bad/good for country's economy	***Freq.***	***Percent***
0 – Bad for the economy	2,040	6.23
1	1,236	3.77
2	2,498	7.62
3	**3,389**	10.34
4	**3,227**	9.85
5	**7,998**	24.41
6	**3,715**	11.34
7	**4,169**	12.72
8	2,926	8.93
9	772	2.36
10 – Good for the economy	799	2.44
Total	32,769	100

TABLE 7b – Economic attitudes toward immigrants

Immigrants take out more services than they put with takes	***Freq.***	***Percent***
0 – Generally take out more	2,006	6.24
1	1,361	4.23
2	2,900	9.02
3	**4,120**	12.82
4	**3,805**	11.84
5	**10,193**	31.71
6	2,769	8.62
7	2,602	8.10
8	1,579	4.91
9	369	1.15
10 – Generally put in more	437	1.36
Total	32,141	100

TABLE 7c – Economic attitudes toward immigrants

Immigrants take/ create new jobs	*Freq.*	*Percent*
0 – Take jobs away	2,224	6.78
1	1,219	3.71
2	2,245	6.84
3	3,164	9.64
4	3,096	9.43
5	**10,319**	31.44
6	**3,527**	10.75
7	**3,533**	10.76
8	2,249	6.85
9	612	1.86
10 – Create new jobs	633	1.93
Total	32,821	100

For the three variables “bad for the economy”, “Take out more” and “Take jobs away” the responses are all concentrated between 0 and 8 and the grade with the major answers is the 5^{th}.

The non-economic impact is highlighted through the questions: “Immigrants make country better/worse place to live?”, “country’s cultural life is undermined/enriched by migrants?” and “crime problems are worse/better with migrants?”

All these variables have a certain percentage of NA responses. For the variable “worse place to live” the NA responses were 3.50%, for “worse crime” the NA responses were 4.80% and for “undermined cultural life” the NA responses were 3%.

For both variables “worse place to live” and “worse crime” the biggest concentration of answers are on the grades from 0 to 7 whereas for the variable “undermined cultural life” the answers are more equally distributed on all grades. Also for these variables the grade with the major answers is the 5^{th}.

TABLE 8a – Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants

Immigrants make country worse/better place to live	***Freq.***	***Percent***
0 – Worse place to live	1,495	4.57
1	975	2.98
2	2,131	6.51
3	3,129	9.56
4	**3,458**	10.57
5	**10,224**	31.24
6	**3,453**	10.55
7	**3,581**	10.94
8	2,607	7.97
9	828	2.53
10 – Better place to live	845	2.58
Total	32,726	100

TABLE 8b – Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants

Immigrants make country's Crime problems better/worse	***Freq.***	***Percent***
0 – Worse crime problems	2,877	8.92
1	1,995	6.18
2	4,073	12.62
3	**5,603**	17.37
4	**4,747**	14.71
5	**9,381**	29.07
6	1,448	4.49
7	1,139	3.53
8	652	2.02
9	211	0.65
10 – Better crime problems	139	0.43
Total	32,265	100

TABLE 8c – Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants

Immigrants undermined/enriched Country's cultural life	*Freq.*	*Percent*
0 – Cultural life undermined	1,358	4.13
1	886	2.69
2	1,879	5.72
3	2,728	8.30
4	2,815	8.56
5	**6,719**	20.44
6	**3,740**	11.38
7	**4,935**	15.01
8	**4,317**	13.13
9	1,665	5.06
10 – Cultural life enriched	1,836	5.58
Total	32,878	100

For this study is fundamental to get a precise answer of only "bad" or "good", "worse place" or "better place", "undermined cultural life" or "enriched cultural life", "positive effect" or "negative effect". To achieve this goal all these variables were first recombine in only two specific answers. The sub-categories 1 and 2 for all the variables, were added to "0 - negative effect" while the others sub-categories "3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9" were added to "10- positive effect".

TABLE 9 – Summary of Economic and Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants

	Economic attitudes						***Non-Economic attitudes***					
	Immigration bad/good country's economy		**Immigrants take out more than they put**		**Immigrants take/ create new jobs**		**Worse/Better place to live**		**Worse/ Better crime problems**		**Enriched/Undermined cultural life**	
	Freq.	**Perc.**	**Freq.**	**Perc.**	**Freq.**	**Perc.**	**Freq.**	**Perc.**	**Freq.**	**Perc.**	**Freq.**	**Perc.**
Extreme Negative effect	5,774	17.62	6,267	19.50	5,688	17.33	4,601	14.06	8,945	27.72	4,123	12.54
Positive effect	26,995	**82.38**	25,874	**80.50**	27,133	**82.67**	28,125	**85.94**	23,320	**72.28**	28,755	**87.46**
Total	32,769	100	32,141	100	32,821	100	32,726	100	32,265	100	32,878	100

From a simple analysis of the answers of all these questions is easy to see that natives considered immigrants quite problematic from both, economic and non-economic points of view. The 17.6% of them thought that immigration was bad for the economy. The main reasons that led natives to have this thought stays in the fact that they are convinced that immigrants take their jobs away (19.5%) and pay on average fewer taxes and use more services than them (17.3%).

From a non-economic point of view the situation is similar: 14.6% of respondents felt that immigrants make their country a worse place to live because they undermine country culture's life (12.54%) and make their country crime problems worse (27.7%).

The next step was to convert all the variables into dummies. If the values of the dummy variables were 1 it meant that immigration, from an economic and non-economic point of view was considered "negative" otherwise if the values were 0, immigration was considered "positive".

Group 4 embodies nine variables that express native opinions about the entrance of immigrants. The specific questions made to the individuals were: "would you allow unskilled laborers from poorer European and non-European countries?", "would you allow professional from poorer European and non-European countries?", "would you allow many/few migrants of different or same race/ethnic group as majority?", "would you allow many/few migrants from poorer countries from outside and inside Europe?" and "would you allow many/few Muslims to your country?"

All these questions in the original database have 7 possible answers: "1-Allow many to come and live here", "2-allow some", "3-allow a few", "4-allow none", "5-refuse to answer", "6-don't know" and "NA". For all the variables, the last 3 answers (refuse, don't know and NA) were coded as missing values.
For the variables "allow many/few migrants of different or same race/ethnic group from majority?" the NA responses on average were 2.45%, for the variable "allow many/few Muslims" the NA responses were 3.60%, and for the variables "allow many/few immigrants from poor non-European countries" the total NA responses for each one were 2.80%. The only variable with a higher number of NA responses (8.60%) was "allow many/few migrants from EU countries". This is because this question was not field by the respondents from the

Czech Republic. The reason behind this choice was not specified by the authors of the questionnaire.

The four variables “allow professionals or unskilled labors from European and non-European countries” had on average 0.70% of NA responses that were coded as missing values.
The authors of this questionnaire decided to ask randomly to people only one of these four questions because they wanted to use these variables for another experiment. As a consequence of this decision all these variables have only 25% of information full field. The 75% of information that is missing was coded as missing values.

	Allow immigrant from poor Eu	Allow immigrants from poor non_Eu	Allow immigrant of same race/ethnic group	Allow immigrants of diff race/ethnic group	Allow Muslims	Allow professional workers from Eu	Allow professional workers from non_Eu	Allow unskilled workers form Eu	Allow unskilled workers form non_Eu
Allow many	4,353	3,779	7,220	4,577	3,895	1,920	1,534	801	601
Allow some	**12,767**	**11,535**	**15,793**	**13,805**	**10,875**	**3,698**	**3,610**	**2,743**	2,051
Allow a few	**9,847**	**11,419**	**7,775**	**10,562**	**9,819**	**1,952**	**2,228**	**2,829**	**2,823**
Allow none	4,007	6,214	2,289	4,127	8,082	644	885	2.020	**2,597**
Total	**30,974**	**32,947**	**33,077**	**33,071**	**32,671**	**8,214**	**8,257**	**8,393**	**8,054**

TABLE 10 – Summary of frequencies of attitudes toward immigrants

In Table 10 are summarized all native’s answers to all the questions regarding the entrance of specific immigrants. Most natives would allow some or few immigrants of almost all types of immigrants, except for the unskilled workers coming from non-European countries. For this last specific case, the majority of natives would prefer to allow none or only a few of them into their country.

The essential thing for this study is to have simple and specific answers at these questions like “Yes - allow many immigrants” or “No - allow none”. To get this result was important first to transform the four answers of each variable in only two answers. The answers "allow some" were added to "allow many" while the answers "allow few" were added to "allow none".
The next step was to convert all the variables into dummies. If the variables had value 1 it implied that natives “would allow many immigrants” otherwise they “would not allow any immigrant”.

A poor analysis of the data shows that natives were emphasizing the anti-immigration sentiments. These sentiments were less strong for the European immigrants and stronger for the non-European immigrants. *Graph 5* illustrates that more than half of individuals preferred to allow many immigrants coming from poor European countries rather than non-European countries.



Graph 5: distribution across the sample of anti-immigration sentiments

The situation changes if we begin to specify the type of immigrant. Skilled or professional immigrants coming from European and non-European countries were more welcomed than the unskilled ones (68% for European immigrants and 62% for non-European immigrants). Is important to specify that also in this case the European unskilled and professional immigrants were more accepted than the non-European ones.

Being of the same race or belong to the same ethnic group as the majority seemed not to be important for European natives. Graph 7 evidence that more than 60% of individuals of the sample would allow to their country individuals that have their same race or belong to their same ethnic group.

The percentage of admission for immigrants that have different race/ethnic group was also high even if was smaller than 14 percentage points than the previous one.



Graph 6: anti-immigration sentiment with respect to unskilled or professional workers from European and non-European countries



Graph 7: anti-immigration sentiments with respect to individuals of same or different race/ethnic group as majority



Graph 8: distribution across the sample of anti-Muslims immigration

Considering the episodes of terrorism in the world and especially in Europe in the last years it is important to examine also the anti-Muslims sentiments.
By looking at the answers of the individuals is important to mention that in 2014 more than half of respondents were against Muslim immigration in their country. These feelings of rejection have grown over the past two years because of various terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe.

In the following Chapter it will be analyze the impact of demographic, economic, non-economic, economic and non-economic attitudes variables, on the pro-immigration attitudes.

3.2 Results of empirical analysis:

3.2.1 Economic and non-Economic Determinants of Individual preferences toward immigrants

Who was against immigration in 2014? In which countries? Were the attitudes toward immigrants influenced only by economic considerations, or were driven also by non-economic issues? Were people concerned about security and cultural issues?
In these Sections, will try to answer to all these questions through an empirical analysis of the attitudes toward immigrants within and across countries. It will be investigated both economic and non-economic determinants.

Economic and non-economic factors shape individual preferences over immigration policy. Among the demographic and socio-economic determinants, the three most important are age, the main working condition and the level of education of the respondents. The results of this analysis will put in evidence if there is a relation between these three aspects and the acceptance of immigrants.

The variation in attitudes toward immigrants depend also on the differences in individual perceptions of the economy-wide benefits and cost of immigration. This is given by the fiscal impact of immigration on the welfare state and by the impact of immigration on the level of employment. In the receiving countries immigrants, will belong to the bottom of the income distribution or to the top depending on their education level and on their skills. If they are professional workers and have high education level, they probably will belong to the top of the income distribution and will contribute to taxes. They will have a positive impact on country's economy. If instead, they are unskilled and have a low educational level they will be the beneficiaries of costly welfare programs and the impact on country's economy will be negative. In both cases, they will search for a job and will have a negative effect on the level of native's employment. This study will bring light on the relation between these two factors and the variation in attitudes of natives toward immigrants in Section 3.2.2

Non-economic factors affect as well native's opinion on immigration. They include: national identity, cultural considerations and security of the country. National identity if is strong will have a negative effect on the immigration opinions whereas if it is weak the effect will be positive. Xenophobic feelings also influence the votes in the political elections. Xenophobic

people will tend to vote for the right parties while the others for the left parties. Such non-economic determinants and their impact on the preference of immigrants to allow will be considered and analyzed in this Section.

At this point is important to ask ourselves if is right to use the word “xenophobia” instead of “racism”. The US prefer to use the term “racism” because of their own particular history. Europe have less experience with the charge black-white dynamics and anti-racism activism that America knows well. Moreover the Europeans, especially the Germans are allergic to term “racism” because of the Holocaust, so they are more open to use the term “xenophobia”.

To test for the impact of economic and non-economic variables on pro-immigration attitudes was used the method of Multivariate Linear Regression Model.

The dependent variables *y* used were: “allow many immigrants from poor European countries”, “allow many immigrants from poor non-European countries”, “allow many immigrants of same race or ethnic group as the majority”, “allow many immigrants of different race or ethnic group as the majority”, “allow many Muslims”, “allow many professional workers from European countries”, “allow many professional workers from non-European countries”, “allow many unskilled workers from European countries” and “Allow many unskilled workers from non-European countries”.

The independent variables used for this part of analysis were: age,age^2, gender, citizenship, country, education, employment, political affiliation with extreme right, nationalism feelings and religion.

The first step of the analysis was to study only the demographic impact on the pro-immigration attitudes. The results are illustrated in Table 11 in the Appendix Section.

The second step was to analyze the impact of both demographic and socio-economic determinants on the acceptance of immigrants. In Table 12 are highlighted the results of this second analysis.

In the third step the analysis has focused on demographic economic and non-economic determinants. It was important to investigate also the correlation patterns between attitudes toward immigrants and individual answers to question about both economic and non-economic issues.

The models that were considerate to put in evidence these aspects were:

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{age} + \beta_2 \text{age}^2 + \beta_3 \text{male} + \beta_4 \text{citizen} + \beta_5 \text{ i.country} + \beta_6 \text{ i.education} + \beta_7 \text{i.employment} + \beta_8 \text{political affiliation with extreme right} + \beta_9 \text{nationalist} + \beta_{10} \text{ i.religion}$$

TABLE 13a - Multivariate Linear regression models

VARIABLES	AM_Eu	AM_nonEu	AM_same_reg	AM_diff_reg	AM_Musl	AM_prof Eu	AM_prof -nonEu	AM_unsk Eu	AM_unsk -nonEu
Age	-0.00326***	-0.000149	-0.00235***	-0.00205**	-0.00379***	-0.00367**	-0.00630***	0.00305*	0.000567
	(0.000870)	(0.000852)	(0.000784)	(0.000838)	(0.000826)	(0.00159)	(0.00163)	(0.00171)	(0.00167)
age2	1.11e-05	-2.25e-05***	1.31e-05*	-1.17e-07	8.11e-06	3.16e-05**	4.12e-05**	-2.09e-05	-2.10e-05
	(8.52e-06)	(8.36e-06)	(7.69e-06)	(8.22e-06)	(8.10e-06)	(1.56e-05)	(1.60e-05)	(1.67e-05)	(1.65e-05)
Male	-0.00161	-0.00873	0.00358	0.000383	0.0118**	0.0297***	0.00765	0.0122	0.0101
	(0.00567)	(0.00548)	(0.00505)	(0.00540)	(0.00530)	(0.0102)	(0.0107)	(0.0109)	(0.0107)
Citizens	-0.0402	-0.0110	-0.0615*	-0.0265	-0.00155	-0.0739	-0.112	0.00764	-0.0127
	(0.0387)	(0.0384)	(0.0355)	(0.0380)	(0.0372)	(0.0796)	(0.0777)	(0.0710)	(0.0733)
EDUCATION: Primary education	-0.0881***	-0.0905***	-0.142***	-0.128***	-0.134***	-0.131***	-0.111***	-0.0960***	-0.0674***
	(0.0107)	(0.0107)	(0.00979)	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.0196)	(0.0207)	(0.0212)	(0.0208)
Tertiary educ	0.168***	0.168***	0.143***	0.176***	0.202***	0.158***	0.153***	0.183***	0.162***
	(0.00681)	(0.00665)	(0.00613)	(0.00656)	(0.00644)	(0.0124)	(0.0129)	(0.0133)	(0.0130)
Other	-0.0338	-0.0861	-0.0319	-0.0457	0.00205	0.0704	0.103	-0.100	-0.0211
	(0.0551)	(0.0553)	(0.0507)	(0.0542)	(0.0537)	(0.0996)	(0.107)	(0.124)	(0.103)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION Self-employed	0.0104	0.0164*	0.0161*	0.0107	0.0101	0.0127	0.0257	0.0283	0.00715
	(0.00918)	(0.00892)	(0.00823)	(0.00881)	(0.00864)	(0.0168)	(0.0175)	(0.0182)	(0.0167)
Working for own family business	-0.0315	-0.0151	0.00573	-0.0573***	-0.0112	-0.0207	0.0476	0.0445	-0.0376
	(0.0213)	(0.0210)	(0.0193)	(0.0206)	(0.0203)	(0.0388)	(0.0388)	(0.0430)	(0.0421)
Unemployed	0.0299**	0.0311**	0.0242**	0.0332***	0.0245**	0.0286	0.00110	0.0507**	0.000707
	(0.0129)	(0.0123)	(0.0113)	(0.0121)	(0.0119)	(0.0230)	(0.0237)	(0.0245)	(0.0243)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1

Table 13a reports only the results for the demographic and economic determinants.
The estimates for age and age^2 are both statistically significant in the models: "allow many immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority" and "allow professional workers from European and non- European countries". In these last models age has a negative impact on pro-immigration attitude whereas age^2 has a positive impact. The two signs indicate that young natives in 2014, preferred restrictive immigration policies while old natives preferred

the expansionary immigration policies.
In the models “allow many immigrants from poor European countries”, “allow many Muslims” and “allow many immigrants of different race/ethnic group as the majority” the estimates for age are all negative while the estimates for age^2 are non-significant. The negative correlation of age with the pro-immigration attitudes indicate that young natives would not accept the entry of these three categories of immigrants. Old natives instead, were against the immigration policies that would allow the entrance of many immigrants from poor non-European countries. The immigration of unskilled workers from European countries was accepted only by the young people whereas the immigration of unskilled workers from non-European countries had no impact on both young and old natives.

The gender effect was strong in the model “allow many professional workers from European countries” and less strong in the model “allow many Muslims”. Both estimates are positive and indicate that men on average would have accepted more Muslims (0.0118, significant at the 5% level) and professional workers from Europe (0.0297, significant at 1% level) than women.

Being citizen of the country had a negative impact only on the acceptance of “immigrants of same race/ethnic group as the majority” (-0.0615, significant at 10% level). In all the other modes, the variable citizenship had no significant impact on the pro-immigration attitude.

The most robust findings in the previous models, is a significant and positive impact of education on the acceptance of immigrants. The variable “Education” is treated as a dummy variable in all models. It was studied in the previous Chapter that more than 60% of the responded completed at least the secondary education. For this reason it was decided to consider the “secondary level of education” as the reference group. The study reveals the fact that Education had a significant impact on the feelings of xenophobia. Natives with only the primary education were more intolerant and xenophobic to immigrants than the ones with the secondary education. All the estimates for primary education are statistically significant at 1% level, and are negatively correlated with the pro-immigration attitudes.
Natives with a higher education than the secondary seemed to be more open to new immigration waves. The estimates in the tertiary education case are statistically significant at 1% level and positively correlated with the pro-immigration attitude.

The main working condition indicates the main work carried out by natives during their life. In the previous Chapter it was said that 80% of the respondents were employee during the

collection period of the data. For this reason the category employee was chosen as the reference category.

The results from the analysis of the data evidence that self-employed were more tolerant than employees to the entrance of non-European immigrants and to immigrants with same race/ethnic group. Similar situation was for the unemployed case. These last ones would have allow in their country also immigrants from poor-European countries, Muslims, immigrants with difference race/ethnic group, professional workers and unskilled coming only from European countries. The percentage of natives that work for their own family businesses seemed to be more intolerant to the immigration of individuals that belong to different race/ethnic group.

TABLE 13b - Multivariate Linear regression models

VARIABLES	AM_Eu	AM_nonEu	AM_same_reg	AM_diff_reg	AM_Musl	AM_profEu	AM_prof-nonEu	AM_unskEu	AM_unsk-nonEu
political affiliation with extreme right	-0.108***	-0.112***	-0.0489***	-0.105***	-0.113***	-0.0700***	-0.0589***	-0.0541***	-0.0926***
	(0.00829)	(0.00800)	(0.00736)	(0.00788)	(0.00774)	(0.0150)	(0.0153)	(0.0157)	(0.0160)
Nationalist	-0.00215	-0.0251**	0.0326***	-0.00635	0.000289	0.0151	0.0199	-0.0387*	-0.0183
	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.00949)	(0.0102)	(0.00997)	(0.0189)	(0.0205)	(0.0210)	(0.0196)
RELIGION: Protestant	0.0127	0.0110	0.0127	0.0150	0.0201**	0.0224	0.00658	-0.0345*	0.0140
	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.00953)	(0.0102)	(0.0100)	(0.0193)	(0.0200)	(0.0207)	(0.0202)
Eastern Orthodox	-0.0948***	-0.0993***	0.0130	-0.0415	-0.0439	0.114*	-0.0153	-0.175***	0.0183
	(0.0306)	(0.0302)	(0.0279)	(0.0299)	(0.0292)	(0.0633)	(0.0553)	(0.0614)	(0.0566)
Other Christian denomination	0.132***	0.127***	0.0580**	0.115***	0.104***	-0.0438	-0.0599	0.0314	0.126**
	(0.0300)	(0.0289)	(0.0266)	(0.0286)	(0.0278)	(0.0544)	(0.0612)	(0.0538)	(0.0560)
Jewish	0.0485	0.0194	-0.0142	0.0547	0.163*	0.199	0.0255	0.0174	0.258
	(0.0988)	(0.0964)	(0.0890)	(0.0952)	(0.0951)	(0.215)	(0.170)	(0.189)	(0.182)
Islamic	0.0550	0.0994***	0.0632*	0.152***	0.291***	0.0122	0.166**	0.115*	0.152**
	(0.0355)	(0.0355)	(0.0325)	(0.0348)	(0.0342)	(0.0659)	(0.0661)	(0.0682)	(0.0724)
Eastern religions	0.138**	0.133**	0.0845	0.192***	0.182***	0.135	0.236*	0.172*	0.226**
	(0.0574)	(0.0560)	(0.0517)	(0.0557)	(0.0537)	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.102)	(0.0938)
Other non-Christian religions	0.144**	0.177***	0.0984*	0.101*	0.129**	0.00692	0.0523	-0.0381	0.178*
	(0.0592)	(0.0568)	(0.0528)	(0.0565)	(0.0548)	(0.130)	(0.0991)	(0.120)	(0.100)
Atheist	0.0250***	0.0299***	-0.000212	0.0246***	0.0363***	0.00197	0.00345	-0.0113	0.0465***
	(0.00782)	(0.00758)	(0.00698)	(0.00747)	(0.00733)	(0.0142)	(0.0148)	(0.0152)	(0.0146)
Constant	0.621***	0.507***	0.764***	0.595***	0.560***	0.793***	0.829***	0.260***	0.292***
	(0.0459)	(0.0455)	(0.0420)	(0.0449)	(0.0441)	(0.0915)	(0.0912)	(0.0859)	(0.0868)
Observations	27,456	29,208	29,308	29,304	28,993	7,307	7,317	7,372	7,165
R-squared	0.131	0.149	0.120	0.155	0.207	0.127	0.129	0.141	0.123

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1

Affiliation with more conservative political parties is for all the models statistically significant at the 1% level and negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences. Natives who had affiliation with the extreme right parties would have allowed less immigrants than those that had affiliation with the left parties. In the last two years right parties started to become more powerful and to have a higher influence in the political decision in many European and non-European countries.

The variable nationalist quantifies the extent of individual attachment to the nation. The results from the regressions are consistent with the intuition that individuals who feel close to their country's identity are more likely to be anti-immigration. Only in the models "allow many immigrants from poor non-European countries", "allow immigrants with same race/ethnic group as majority" and "allow many unskilled workers from European countries" the estimates are statistically significant. In all the other models feeling very close to your country has no impact on the entrance of new immigrants.
The estimates in the two models "allow many immigrants from poor non-European countries" and "allow many unskilled workers from European countries" are significant at 5% and 10% level and both have a negative impact on the pro-immigration attitude. The only estimate that is significant at the 1% level and is positive is the model "allow many immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority". This may suggest that whether an individual belonged to the dominant ethnic group in the society did not have a negative influence on the pro-immigration attitudes.

The religion of natives has an important impact on the feelings of xenophobia. The variable religion was treated as a dummy variable and the Catholics group was taken as the reference group.
In the first model "allow many immigrants from poor European countries" only the estimates of Eastern orthodox, other Christina denominations, Eastern religions, other non-Christian religions and atheist are significant. Eastern orthodox estimate is the only one that is negatively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes. It is significant al 1% level and reveals the fact that Orthodox were more anti-immigrants than Catholics. The estimates of other Christina denominations, and Atheists are significant at 1% level while the estimates of Eastern religions and other non-Christian religions are significant at 5% level. All four estimates are posited and indicate that these four religions on average were less xenophobic than the Catholicism.

In the second model “allow many immigrants from poor non-European countries” the situation is almost identical to the previous one. The only difference is the estimate of Islamic religion that becomes significant at 1% level and positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes.

In the third model “allow immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority” only the estimates of Other Christians denomination, other non-Christian religions and Islamic are significant. The first one is significant at the 1% level while the reaming two are significant at the 10% level. All three estimates are positive and show that these three religions were more open to immigration then the Catholic.

The forth model “allow many immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority” and the fifth model “allow many Muslims” are very similar to each other. In both models the estimates for Other Christian denomination, Islamic, Eastern religions and atheists are positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The differences between these two models are: the different level of significance of other non-Christian religions, and the presence of a positive effect of Protestants and Jewish only in the “allow many Muslims” model.
To recap: Protestants and Jewish were more open only to Muslims migration than Catholics, Other Christian denominations, Other non-Christian religions, Islamic, Eastern religions and atheists were open to both type of immigrants.

In the sixth model “allow many professional workers from European countries” only the estimate of Eastern orthodox is positive and significant at 10% level. In this case Eastern orthodox were more tolerant to professional workers immigration than Catholics.

In the seventh model “allow many professional workers from non-European countries” the only significant estimates were: Islamic and Eastern religions. The Islamic religion and the Eastern religions seemed to be to be much more tolerant of the entry of new professional workers than the Catholics.

The unskilled workers from European countries were welcome by the Islamic religions and Eastern religions but were unwelcomed by the Protestants and Eastern Orthodoxies whereas the unskilled workers from non-European countries were welcomed by almost all the regions excluded Protestant, Orthodox and Jewish.

In conclusion, if are considered both, economic and non-economic aspects the xenophobia feelings was present in the young natives but not in the old natives. Young natives were intolerant to the entry of immigrants from poor European countries but very tolerant to the entry of European unskilled workers.

The gender effect was strong and significant in the two models "allow many Muslims" and "allow many European professional workers". In this case, xenophobia feelings were less present in men than in women.

Being citizen of the country had a negative impact only on the acceptance of "immigrants of same race/ethnic group as the majority"

The two variables that were very significant and produced a strong impact were education and the affiliation with a more conservative political party. The first one was significant for both primary and tertiary level of education in all models. The primary education is negative and specifies that people with a lower level of education than the secondary were more xenophobic. Natives instead, with a level of education higher than the secondary were more open to new waves of immigrants. The second variable is significant and negative and indicates that being in contact with a conservative political party has made people more xenophobic.

The impact of religion is also important and significant. This study in putting in evidence the fact that Protestants and Eastern Orthodoxies with respect to Catholics were more close to new waves of immigration whereas all the other religions were more open.

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3.2.2 Economic and Non-Economic determinants and Economic and non-Economic attitudes of Individual preferences toward immigrants

This last section is dedicated to the analysis of economic and non-economic determinants with economic and non-economic attitudes toward immigrants included. At this point was fundamental to test also for the economic and non-economic issues like security worries, cultural and national-identity because they had a large effect on immigration opinions.

The models that will be used in this Section, to make these analyses were:

$$
\begin{aligned}
y = \alpha + \ & \beta_1 age + \ \beta_2 age^2 + \beta_3 male + \beta_4 citizen + \beta_5 \ i.country \\
& + \beta_6 \ i.education + \beta_7 i.employment \\
& + \beta_8 political \ affiliation \ with \ extreme \ right \\
& + \beta_9 nationalist + \beta_{10} \ i.religion \ + \beta_{11} \ bad \ for \ the \ economy \\
& + \beta_{12} \ Take \ out \ more + \beta_{13} \ Take \ jobs \ away \\
& + \beta_{14} \ Extremely \ important \ education \\
& + \beta_{15} \ Extremely \ important \ christian \ backgroud \\
& + \beta_{16} \ Extremly \ important \ be \ white \\
& + \beta_{17} \ Crime \ problems \ worse + \beta_{18} \ Worse \ place \ to \ live \\
& + \beta_{19} \ Cultural \ life \ undermined
\end{aligned}
$$

In *Table 15* are summarized the results of the Multivariate linear regression models on immigration preferences, whose focus is on the social-economic, non-economic background and economic and non-economic attitudes toward immigrants.

The results for age and age2 are different to the one in the previous Section. Old people were more favored than the young people to immigration restrictions especially in the case of immigrants coming from poor non-European countries and unskilled workers. Young people instead, were more open to the immigration of unskilled workers and people coming from non-European countries, but less open to the immigration of Muslims and professional workers coming from non-European countries. Both young and old natives seemed to be indifferent in the case of immigration by people from poor European countries, people that have different race/ethnic group as majority and professional workers from European countries.

Gender again, is a key non-economic factor that affects immigration opinion. The estimates in the models "allow many Muslims" and "allow many professional workers from European countries" are positive and significant at 1% level while in the model "allow many unskilled workers from European countries" is significant only at 5% level. The results evidence that men compared to women were less xenophobic regarding the immigration of Muslims (0.0203) and workers, both professional (0.0303) and unskilled (0.0251), coming from European countries.

TABLE 15a – Multivariate Linear regression models (with all variables)

VARIABLES	AM_Eu	AM_nonEu	AM_same_reg	AM_diff_reg	AM_Musl	AM_profEu	AM_prof-nonEu	AM_unskEu	AM_unsk-nonEu
Age of respondent	-0.00139	0.00192**	-0.00141*	-2.88e-05	-0.00171**	-0.00245	-0.00366**	0.00507***	0.00307*
	(0.000871)	(0.000860)	(0.000783)	(0.000834)	(0.000832)	(0.00160)	(0.00168)	(0.00176)	(0.00172)
age2	8.37e-07	-3.50e-05***	1.09e-05	-1.13e-05	-3.36e-06	2.43e-05	2.27e-05	-3.26e-05*	-3.93e-05**
	(8.60e-06)	(8.51e-06)	(7.75e-06)	(8.25e-06)	(8.24e-06)	(1.58e-05)	(1.67e-05)	(1.74e-05)	(1.71e-05)
Male	0.000945	-0.00316	0.00690	0.00317	0.0203***	0.0303***	0.0125	0.0251**	0.0111
	(0.00559)	(0.00546)	(0.00497)	(0.00530)	(0.00528)	(0.0102)	(0.0107)	(0.0111)	(0.0110)
Citizens	-0.0265	0.00146	-0.0739**	-0.0356	0.0139	-0.0647	-0.137*	-0.0702	0.0530
	(0.0375)	(0.0377)	(0.0345)	(0.0367)	(0.0367)	(0.0780)	(0.0786)	(0.0719)	(0.0725)
EDUCATION: Primary education	-0.0371***	-0.0504***	-0.0985***	-0.0826***	-0.0922***	-0.0934***	-0.0674***	-0.0672***	-0.0433**
	(0.0107)	(0.0108)	(0.00983)	(0.0105)	(0.0104)	(0.0199)	(0.0213)	(0.0221)	(0.0217)
Tertiary educ	0.102***	0.108***	0.0816***	0.107***	0.143***	0.104***	0.103***	0.140***	0.116***
	(0.00674)	(0.00665)	(0.00605)	(0.00644)	(0.00643)	(0.0124)	(0.0130)	(0.0135)	(0.0134)
Other	-0.0873	-0.122**	-0.0898*	-0.113**	-0.0886*	-0.00740	0.0598	-0.185	0.0239
	(0.0548)	(0.0556)	(0.0503)	(0.0535)	(0.0536)	(0.0994)	(0.111)	(0.124)	(0.109)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION: Self-employed	0.00436	0.0124	0.0124	0.00510	0.00885	0.0154	0.0231	0.0193	-0.000520
	(0.00905)	(0.00891)	(0.00811)	(0.00864)	(0.00861)	(0.0168)	(0.0176)	(0.0185)	(0.0171)
Working for own family business	-0.0314	-0.0151	0.00989	-0.0554***	0.000652	-0.00188	0.0398	0.111**	-0.0202
	(0.0212)	(0.0211)	(0.0192)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0385)	(0.0389)	(0.0457)	(0.0435)
Unemployed	0.0201	0.0248**	0.0209*	0.0246**	0.0178	0.00863	0.0154	0.0370	0.00317
	(0.0129)	(0.0125)	(0.0114)	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	(0.0233)	(0.0245)	(0.0253)	(0.0253)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Being citizen of the country, also in these cases, had a negative impact on the acceptance of "immigrants of same race/ethnic group as the majority" (-0.0739, significant at 1% level) and "professional workers from non-European countries" (-0.137, significant at 10% level). In all the other modes, the variable citizenship had no significant impact on the pro-immigration attitude.

The impact of education on pro-immigration attitudes is similar the one evidenced in the previous models in the previous Section. Also in these models the variable "Education" was treated as a dummy variable with the "secondary level of education" as the reference group. The study reveals the fact natives with only the primary education were more intolerant to immigrants and xenophobic than the ones with the secondary education. All the estimates for primary education are statistically significant at 1% level, and are negatively correlated with the pro-immigration attitudes. Natives with a higher education than the secondary were more open to new immigration waves. The estimates in the tertiary education case are statistically significant at 1% level and positively correlated with the pro-immigration attitude.
Finally, natives that have other educations than the primary, secondary or tertiary were more intolerant than those that have completed the secondary, to immigrants from poor non-European countries (-0.122, significant at 5% level), immigrants with same (-0.0898, significant at 10% level) or different (-0.113, significant at 5%level) race/ethnic group as majority and to Muslims (-0.0886, significant at 10% level).

The main working condition also in these cases indicates the main work carried out by natives during their life. The employee is still the reference category.
The results from the analysis of the data evidence that the unemployed natives were more tolerant than the employee, to the entrance of immigrants from poor non-European countries (0.0248, significant at 5% level) and to immigrants with same (0.0209, significant at 10% level) and different (0.0246, significant at 5% level) race/ethnic group as the majority.
The percentage of natives that work for their own family businesses seemed to be more intolerant to the immigration of individuals that belong to different race/ethnic group (-0.0554, significant at 1% level).

Affiliation with more conservative political parties had a big effect on immigration preferences. The estimates for the models "allow many immigrants from poor European and non-European countries", "allow many Muslims", "allow many immigrants with different race/ethnic group as the majority" and "allow many unskilled from non-European countries" are significant at the 1% level and are negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences. This means that any connections with the extreme right parties made native be more xenophobic especially with respect to immigrants coming from poor European (-0.0500) and non-European (-0.0580) countries, Muslims (-0.0602), people with different race/ethnic group (-0.0475) and unskilled workers (-0.0449) from non-European countries.

For all the other models being in contact with the extreme right parties had no impact on pro-immigration attitudes

The attachment of each native to their nation is quantify through the variable nationalist. Only in the models "allow many immigrants from poor European and non-European countries" and "allow many immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority" the estimates of nationalist is significant at 1% level. In the models "allow many Muslims "and "allow many unskilled from European countries" the estimates are significant at 5% level while in the model "allow many unskilled from non-European countries" the estimate is significant at 10% level. In a few words this is indicating that natives that felt more close to their country (nationalist) tend to allow less immigrants from poor European (-0.0304) and non-European (-0.0482) countries, Muslims (-0.0224), immigrants with different race/ethnic group (-0.0348) and unskilled worker coming from European (-0.0537) and non-European (-0.0363) countries. For all the other models being nationalist had no impact on pro-immigration attitudes

TABLE 15b – Multivariate Linear regression models (with all variables)

VARIABLES	AM_Eu	AM_nonEu	AM_same_reg	AM_diff_reg	AM_Musl	AM_profEu	AM_prof-nonEu	AM_unskEu	AM_unsk-nonEu
political affiliation with extreme right	-0.0500***	-0.0580***	-0.00538	-0.0475***	-0.0602***	-0.0199	-0.0102	-0.00346	-0.0449***
	(0.00827)	(0.00805)	(0.00733)	(0.00780)	(0.00778)	(0.0151)	(0.0156)	(0.0161)	(0.0166)
Nationalist	-0.0304***	-0.0482***	0.00365	-0.0348***	-0.0224**	-0.0140	-0.00973	-0.0534**	-0.0363*
	(0.0103)	(0.0102)	(0.00928)	(0.00988)	(0.00986)	(0.0188)	(0.0204)	(0.0211)	(0.0198)
RELIGION: Protestant	0.000672	-0.000233	0.00249	0.00662	0.00762	0.0182	0.00119	-0.0377*	0.00571
	(0.0102)	(0.0102)	(0.00929)	(0.00988)	(0.00986)	(0.0191)	(0.0199)	(0.0208)	(0.0205)
Eastern Orthodox	-0.119***	-0.130***	-0.0440	-0.0811***	-0.0647**	0.0892	-0.00160	-0.274***	-0.0276
	(0.0319)	(0.0318)	(0.0290)	(0.0309)	(0.0308)	(0.0699)	(0.0591)	(0.0652)	(0.0603)
Other Christian denomination	0.121***	0.113***	0.0559**	0.105***	0.0928***	-0.0483	-0.0531	0.0179	0.0998*
	(0.0301)	(0.0294)	(0.0269)	(0.0286)	(0.0284)	(0.0553)	(0.0620)	(0.0564)	(0.0592)
Jewish	0.0385	0.00663	0.0309	0.0741	0.179*	0.172	0.141	-0.0454	0.285
	(0.0990)	(0.0997)	(0.0909)	(0.0968)	(0.0962)	(0.235)	(0.174)	(0.198)	(0.193)
Islamic	-0.0177	0.0260	0.00688	0.0811**	0.222***	-0.0129	0.105	0.0471	0.133*
	(0.0341)	(0.0344)	(0.0312)	(0.0332)	(0.0332)	(0.0639)	(0.0647)	(0.0669)	(0.0738)
Eastern religions	0.0922*	0.0917*	0.0506	0.160***	0.147***	0.0980	0.210*	0.129	0.210**
	(0.0539)	(0.0535)	(0.0488)	(0.0523)	(0.0512)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.100)	(0.0927)
Other non-Christian religions	0.149***	0.185***	0.106**	0.111**	0.125**	0.0273	0.00891	-0.0240	0.125
	(0.0570)	(0.0556)	(0.0510)	(0.0543)	(0.0536)	(0.129)	(0.0986)	(0.119)	(0.0996)
Atheist	0.0216***	0.0213***	-0.00445	0.0184**	0.0275***	0.00478	0.00644	-0.0174	0.0432***
	(0.00773)	(0.00758)	(0.00690)	(0.00734)	(0.00732)	(0.0142)	(0.0149)	(0.0154)	(0.0150)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Religion has a significant impact on the feelings of xenophobia. Protestants were more xenophobic than Catholics, with respect to unskilled workers coming from European countries (-0.0377, significant at 10% level) and were indifferent for all the other categories of immigrants.

Orthodoxies were more intolerant than Catholics to the immigration of European (-0.119) and non-European (-0.130) individuals, Muslims (-0.0647), European unskilled workers (-0.274) and individuals with different race/ethnic group (-0.0811)

Jewish were less xenophobic than Catholics, only with respect to Muslims (0.179, significant at 10% level) and indifferent with respect to all the other categories.

The other Christian denominations were more tolerant than the Catholic religion to the entrance of European (0.121, significant at 1% level) and non-European (0.113, significant at 1%level) immigrants, Muslims (0.0928, significant at 1% level), immigrants with same (0.0559, significant at 5% level) and different (0.105, significant at 1% level) race/ethnic group as majority and non-European unskilled workers (0.0998, significant at 10% level).

Islamic religion compared to the Catholic would accept many immigrants of different race/ethnic group (0.0811, significant at 5% level), many Muslims (0.222, significant at 1% level) and many non-European unskilled workers (0.133, significant at 10%level).

Natives that had other Eastern religions, like Buddhism, tended to be less discriminatory than Catholics especially for the immigrants coming from poor European (0.0922, significant at 10%level) and non-European (0.0917, significant at 10%level) countries, immigrants with different race/ethnic group (0.160, significant at 1% level), Muslims (0.147, significant at 1% level), non-European unskilled workers (0.210, significant at 5% level) and professional workers from non-European countries (0.210, significant at 10% level).

Also atheist and other non-Christian religions compared to Christians were more open to new immigration waves. They both would accepted more immigrants from poor European and non-European countries, Muslims and immigrants with different race/ethnic group as the majority. The differences between the two categories are two. The first one is that individuals with other non-Christian religions were positive also to the immigration of the individuals with same race/ethnic group while atheist seemed to be indifferent. The second difference is that atheist were positive with respect to the entrance of non-European unskilled workers while individuals that believe in other non-Christian religions were indifferent.

TABLE 15c – Multivariate Linear regression models (with all variables)

VARIABLES	AM_Eu	AM_nonEu	AM_same_reg	AM_diff_reg	AM_Musl	AM_profEu	AM_prof-nonEu	AM_unskEu	AM_unsk-nonEu
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES: Bad for the economy	-0.159***	-0.141***	-0.149***	-0.143***	-0.103***	-0.0923***	-0.112***	-0.0452***	-0.0789***
	(0.00978)	(0.00943)	(0.00860)	(0.00915)	(0.00913)	(0.0176)	(0.0186)	(0.0192)	(0.0189)
Generally take out more	-0.0764***	-0.0830***	-0.0635***	-0.0808***	-0.0907***	-0.0658***	-0.105***	-0.0904***	-0.0491***
	(0.00887)	(0.00858)	(0.00781)	(0.00831)	(0.00829)	(0.0160)	(0.0169)	(0.0176)	(0.0169)
Take jobs away	-0.0528***	-0.0282***	-0.0818***	-0.0637***	-0.0286***	-0.129***	-0.0662***	-0.0843***	-0.0117
	(0.00958)	(0.00914)	(0.00833)	(0.00887)	(0.00885)	(0.0170)	(0.0179)	(0.0190)	(0.0180)
Extremely important educ	-0.0424***	-0.0350***	-0.0125**	-0.0303***	-0.0276***	0.0114	-0.00349	-0.0570***	-0.0403***
	(0.00666)	(0.00649)	(0.00591)	(0.00630)	(0.00628)	(0.0121)	(0.0129)	(0.0132)	(0.0129)
Extremely important work skills	-0.0885***	-0.109***	-0.0340***	-0.0750***	-0.0960***	-0.0171	-0.0253**	-0.123***	-0.116***
	(0.00660)	(0.00643)	(0.00585)	(0.00623)	(0.00621)	(0.0120)	(0.0127)	(0.0131)	(0.0127)
NON-ECONOIMC ATTITUDES:									
Extremely important Christian background	-0.00848	-0.0366***	-0.0357***	-0.0646***	-0.0732***	-0.0518***	-0.0411**	0.00613	-0.00878
	(0.0103)	(0.00980)	(0.00893)	(0.00950)	(0.00946)	(0.0184)	(0.0195)	(0.0194)	(0.0196)
Extremely important be white	-0.0691***	-0.0320***	-0.0807***	-0.0590***	-0.0348***	-0.0729***	-0.109***	0.0148	0.00903
	(0.0126)	(0.0117)	(0.0107)	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0223)	(0.0232)	(0.0229)	(0.0237)
Crime problems made worse	-0.0818***	-0.0896***	-0.0391***	-0.0911***	-0.122***	-0.0505***	-0.0654***	-0.0729***	-0.104***
	(0.00739)	(0.00721)	(0.00657)	(0.00699)	(0.00698)	(0.0133)	(0.0145)	(0.0146)	(0.0143)
Worse place to live	-0.109***	-0.0822***	-0.121***	-0.114***	-0.0833***	-0.107***	-0.0870***	-0.0112	-0.0702***
	(0.0110)	(0.0106)	(0.00965)	(0.0103)	(0.0102)	(0.0198)	(0.0210)	(0.0216)	(0.0210)
Cultural life undermined	-0.0918***	-0.0735***	-0.0812***	-0.0900***	-0.0633***	-0.0216	-0.0585***	-0.0791***	-0.0432**
	(0.0110)	(0.0106)	(0.00963)	(0.0103)	(0.0102)	(0.0199)	(0.0209)	(0.0212)	(0.0211)
Constant	0.799***	0.672***	0.921***	0.778***	0.719***	0.916***	0.962***	0.493***	0.357***
	(0.0450)	(0.0451)	(0.0411)	(0.0438)	(0.0437)	(0.0905)	(0.0928)	(0.0875)	(0.0869)
Observations	24,536	26,061	26,082	26,085	25,924	6,546	6,505	6,558	6,392
R-squared	0.243	0.249	0.232	0.275	0.300	0.214	0.215	0.216	0.193

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The variation in attitudes toward immigrants depended also on the impact of their entrance on the private and economic life of each native. This impact can be summarized in the variables: Bad for the economy, generally take out more and Take jobs away. From the descriptive analysis of each variable was evidence the fact that natives considered immigrants quite problematic from both, economic and non-economic points of view. The 17.6% of them think that immigration was bad for the economy. The main reasons that led natives to have this thought stayed in the fact that they believed that immigrants took their jobs away (19.5%) and paid on average fewer taxes and use more services than them (17.3%). From a non-economic point of view the situation was similar: 14.6% of respondents felt that immigrants make their

country a worse place to live because they undermined country cultural life (12.54%) and made their country crime problems worse (27.7%).

In *Table 15c* is summarized the impact of these variables on the pro-immigration attitudes.

In all the nine models the estimates of the variable "bad for the economy" is significant at 1% level and is negatively correlated with the pro-immigration opinions. A responded who agreed strongly with the statement that immigration was bad for the country's economy was more likely to not support a raise in immigration.

The estimates of the variable "take jobs away" in all the models are negative and very strong correlated (at 1% level) with the pro-immigration opinions, except for the estimate in the model "allow many unskilled workers from outside Europe" that had no impact on the feelings of xenophobia. This suggest that natives that agreed with the statement that immigrants took their jobs away were not supported another increase in the level of immigration.

The pro-immigration attitude toward immigrants is given also by the perception of the economy-wide benefits and cost of immigration through the impact on the welfare state. All the estimate in the models are negatively correlated with the pro-immigration attitudes and significant at the 1% level, The results in *Table 15c* evidence that respondents that believed that immigrants used more health and welfare services than the ones they have paid for with taxes, were not favorable to a raise in immigration.

Cultural issues are related to the intrinsic side effect of immigration: the meeting of people. The integration of immigrants in the destination society may feed cultural worries, driven by the belief that the values and traditions that characterize the receiving country's society are threatened by the arrival of the foreigners. This worries are captured by the high values of the variable "Cultural life undermined". In *Table 15c*, is evidence the fact that if an individual either agreed or strongly agreed with the claim that immigrants made the country less open to new ideas and cultures would be more likely to not support a raise in immigration. Similarly, a respondent who either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that immigrants made the country a worse place to live would be more likely to not support a raise in immigration.

The estimates of the variable "crime problems made worse" are significant at 1% level and negative in all models. This result evidence the fact that if a respondent agreed with the claim

that immigrants raise crime rates, the probability that he agreed with another increase in immigration was low

The next four variables that were considered in this study were “Extremely important good educational qualifications”, “Extremely important work skills”, “Extremely important Christian backgrounds “and “Extremely important be white”. These variables stress the importance that the natives gave to the good educational qualification, to work skills, to religion and to the skin color in deciding whether to accept immigrants. The fact of considering “having good educational qualification”, “having the needed work skills”, “having Christian background” and “having white skin” extremely important, increased the anti-immigration feelings. Almost all the estimates are negatively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes and are significant at 1% level. The exceptions are the estimate of “extremely important good educational qualifications” in the model “allow many professional workers from European and non-European countries” that are non-significant, the estimates of “Extremely important be white” in the models “allow many unskilled from European and non-European countries” that are both non-significant, the estimates of “extremely important Christian background” in the models “allow many unskilled workers form European and non-European countries” that are non-significant and the estimates of “extremely important work skills” in the model “allow professional workers from Europe” that is non significant.

The measure of goodness of fit is given by the R^2 measures. The percentage of the total variance explained by the preferred specifications (including the dummy variables) is approximately 24% for the model “allow many immigrants from poor European countries”, 25% for “allow many from poor non-European countries”, 23% for “allow immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority” while 27% “of different race/ethnic group”, and 30% for the model “allow many Muslims”.
The four last models have only around 6000 observations, and their R^2 is 21% for the model “allow many professional workers form Europe”, and is 21% for the model of “unskilled workers from Europe”. Whereas for the workers coming from outside Europe the R^2 is 21% for “allow many professional workers” and 19% for “allow many unskilled workers”.

In conclusion young people were more open to unskilled workers from European and non-European countries and to immigrants from poor non-European countries but less open to the immigration of Muslims and non-European professional workers. Old natives instead were less open to the immigration of people from poor non-European countries and unskilled

workers Both young and old natives seemed to be indifferent in the case of immigration by people from poor European countries, people that had different race/ethnic group as majority and professional workers from European countries.

Gender evidence that men compared to women were less xenophobic regarding the immigration of Muslims and workers, both professional and unskilled coming from European countries.

Being citizen of the country had a negative impact only on the acceptance of "immigrants of same race/ethnic group as the majority" and "professional workers from non-European countries".

The study reveals the fact natives with only the primary education were more intolerant to immigrants and xenophobic than the ones with the secondary education. Natives with a higher education than the secondary seemed to be more open to new immigration waves. Natives that have other educations than the primary, secondary or tertiary were more intolerant than those that have completed the secondary, to immigrants from poor non-European countries, immigrants with same or different race/ethnic group as majority and to Muslims.

From the study of main working condition variable is important to say that unemployed natives were more tolerant than the employee, to the entrance of immigrants from poor non-European countries and to immigrants with same and different race/ethnic group as the majority. The natives that worked for their own family businesses seemed to be more intolerant to the immigration of individuals that belong to different race/ethnic group.

The connections with the extreme right parties made native be more xenophobic especially with respect to immigrants coming from poor European and non-European countries, Muslims, people with different race/ethnic group and unskilled workers from non-European countries.

The nationalism feeling tended to increase the level of intolerance with respect to immigrants from poor European and non-European countries, Muslims, immigrants with different race/ethnic group and unskilled worker coming from European and non-European countries.

The impact of religion show that only Protestants and Orthodoxies were more xenophobic than Catholics. All the other religions compared to the Catholic were more open to new immigration waves.

The results in *Table 15c* suggest that if an individual agreed with the claims that immigrants had a negative impact on the country's economy, took jobs away, paid less taxes than the benefits that used, made the country less open to new ideas and cultures and made the country a worse place to live, was more likely to not support a raise in immigration.

The last variables considered were: "Extremely important good educational qualifications", "Extremely important work skills", "Extremely important Christian backgrounds" and "Extremely important be white". The fact of considering "having good educational qualification", "having the needed working skills", "having Christian background" and "having white skin" extremely important, increased the anti-immigration feelings.

In the next section, it will be answered to the question: Does the correlation between individual socio-economic characteristics and immigration preferences vary across countries?

3.2.3 Does the correlation between individual socio-economic characteristics and immigration preferences vary across countries?

As a result of the persistent migration crisis and Islamist terror attacks, a growing anti-immigrant sentiment as well as islamophobia have taken hold in Europe.
In some countries the refugee crisis sparked an outpouring of solidarity and many local volunteers together with central authorities were committed to making the newcomers arriving in their towns feel welcome. In other countries, however, the opposite happened and restrictive border policies combined with a toxic rhetoric have created an openly hostile environment for refugees and migrants. These anti-immigrant feelings are not distributed in an equal way across the countries. In this section it will be studied where these feelings were stronger before the beginning of the immigration crisis.

There were taking into account the following countries: Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, Belgium, France, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Spain, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovenia and Ireland.
Austria, nowadays is situated in the middle between the countries that are very positive to immigration like Germany, and those that are very contrary to new immigration waves like Hungary. For this reason Austria was chosen as the reference group.

The results in *Table 16* show that the other European countries considered, in comparison with Austria were less xenophobic to immigrants coming from other poor European countries, immigrants with same and different/race and ethnic group as the majority, unskilled workers coming from European and non-European countries and professional workers coming from outside Europe.

More in detail the results indicate that Belgian natives in comparison with Austrian were more tolerant to immigrants coming from other poor European countries (0.0705, significant at 1% level), immigrants with same (0.0309, significant at 1% level) and different (0.0451, significant at 1% level) race/ethnic group and non-European unskilled workers (0.0732, significant at 5% level) but less tolerant to European professional works (-0.0612, significant at 10% level). For all the other categories of immigrants Belgian natives were indifferent.

The Swiss natives in comparison with Austrian natives were extremely tolerant to immigrants of all categories except for the non-European unskilled workers to which were indifferent. In detail Swiss natives in comparison with Austrian natives, on average, would allow 0.0403

(significant at 5% level) more immigrants from poor European countries, 0.0745 (significant at 1% level) more immigrants from poor European countries 0.110 more immigrants with same and 0.0541 more with different race/ethnic group (both significant at 1% level), 0.0360 more Muslims, 0.0896 more European professional workers (significant at 5% level) and 0.0963 more non-European professional workers and 0.204 more European unskilled workers (both significant at 1% level).

Switzerland's situation is almost identical to the one of Germany, Sweden and Slovenia. The difference with Germany and Sweden is that both were positive also on the entrance of non-European unskilled workers whereas Switzerland was indifferent. The estimates of both countries in all the models are significant at 1% level and positive which specify that both countries, in comparison with Austria were more tolerant to immigration from all the categories of immigrants.

The difference between Switzerland and Slovenia stays in the fact that this last one was indifferent to the entrance of European professional workers while Switzerland was totally positive. The estimates for Slovenia are all significant at 1% level, excluded the one in the model “allow many Europeans” and “allow many Muslims” that are significant at 5% level, and “allow non-European professional workers” that is significant only at 10% level. In a few words Slovenian natives were more open than Austrian natives to the immigration of all types of individuals excluded the European professional workers and non-European unskilled workers to which are indifferent.

France and Norway in comparison with Austria, were also very open to new waves of immigration. All types of immigrants excluded the non-European ones, were very welcome to France. The most wanted categories of immigrants were the non-European professional workers (0.191), European unskilled workers (0.188), the non-European unskilled workers (0.154), the European professional workers (0.132) and Muslims (0.131). Norway is very similar to France. The only exceptions are that European immigration was seen positive while the immigration of European professional workers was not considered important.

In 2014 the countries that compared to Austria were really against all type of immigrates were Czech Republic and Hungary. Almost all the estimates of both are significant at 1% level and negatively correlated with the pro-immigration attitudes.

TABLE 16 – Multivariate Linear regression models (Variation across countries only for the models with all the variables included)

COUNTRIES	AM nonEu	AM Eu	AM same reg	AM diff reg	AM MusL	AM prof Eu	AM prof-nonEu	AM unsk Eu	AM unsk-nonEu
AUSTRIA									
BE	0.0274	0.0705***	0.0309**	0.0451***	0.0108	-0.0612*	0.0417	0.0219	0.0732**
	(0.0171)	(0.0170)	(0.0156)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0318)	(0.0330)	(0.0352)	(0.0346)
CH	0.0403**	0.0745***	0.110***	0.0541***	0.0360**	0.0896**	0.0963***	0.204***	0.0520
	(0.0189)	(0.0188)	(0.0172)	(0.0183)	(0.0183)	(0.0352)	(0.0371)	(0.0385)	(0.0382)
CZ	-0.161***		-0.217***	-0.197***	-0.315***	-0.231***	-0.110***	-0.153***	-0.0589*
	(0.0173)		(0.0157)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0325)	(0.0336)	(0.0350)	(0.0345)
DE	0.114***	0.124***	0.142***	0.156***	0.146***	0.134***	0.207***	0.159***	0.0959***
	(0.0157)	(0.0156)	(0.0142)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0293)	(0.0306)	(0.0317)	(0.0315)
DK	-0.0756***	-0.00377	0.101***	0.0311*	-0.0143	0.000537	0.0818**	0.0994***	0.0309
	(0.0186)	(0.0185)	(0.0169)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0341)	(0.0362)	(0.0380)	(0.0376)
EE	-0.177***	-0.0689***	0.0213	-0.0514***	-0.220***	-0.0729*	-0.132***	0.105***	-0.109***
	(0.0191)	(0.0190)	(0.0174)	(0.0185)	(0.0185)	(0.0378)	(0.0362)	(0.0367)	(0.0414)
ES	0.0518***	0.0223	-0.0479***	0.0444***	-0.0487***	-0.129***	-0.0387	-0.149***	0.00169
	(0.0177)	(0.0176)	(0.0161)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0326)	(0.0348)	(0.0364)	(0.0352)
FI	-0.168***	-0.144***	-0.0819***	-0.106***	-0.166***	-0.0463	-0.0873***	-0.186***	-0.173***
	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0157)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0319)	(0.0335)	(0.0355)	(0.0347)
FR	0.0163	0.0640***	0.0491***	0.0642***	0.131***	0.132***	0.191***	0.188***	0.154***
	(0.0169)	(0.0168)	(0.0154)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)	(0.0317)	(0.0334)	(0.0339)	(0.0341)
GB	-0.0512***	-0.0219	-0.0446***	0.0351**	0.0714***	0.0228	0.141***	-0.0280	-0.0155
	(0.0174)	(0.0173)	(0.0158)	(0.0168)	(0.0168)	(0.0323)	(0.0339)	(0.0357)	(0.0345)
HU	-0.308***	-0.299***	-0.137***	-0.265***	-0.336***	-0.304***	-0.257***	-0.292***	-0.209***
	(0.0186)	(0.0184)	(0.0168)	(0.0179)	(0.0180)	(0.0345)	(0.0365)	(0.0374)	(0.0375)
IE	-0.0370**	-0.00299	-0.0807***	0.00736	-0.0452***	-0.0233	-0.0792**	-0.0303	-0.0440
	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	(0.0155)	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0313)	(0.0332)	(0.0346)	(0.0345)
LT	-0.112***	-0.0692***	-0.0241	0.0223	-0.214***	-0.117***	-0.0861**	-0.0444	-0.0388
	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0170)	(0.0182)	(0.0182)	(0.0348)	(0.0375)	(0.0383)	(0.0373)
NL	-0.0151	-0.0207	-0.0137	0.0849***	-0.0171	-0.0998***	-0.0163	-0.130***	-0.0805**
	(0.0173)	(0.0172)	(0.0158)	(0.0168)	(0.0168)	(0.0327)	(0.0335)	(0.0354)	(0.0346)
NO	0.119***	0.130***	0.0691***	0.142***	0.0889***	0.0570	0.0668*	0.152***	0.0782**
	(0.0188)	(0.0187)	(0.0171)	(0.0182)	(0.0181)	(0.0348)	(0.0367)	(0.0387)	(0.0371)
PL	0.0313	0.105***	-0.0103	0.0378**	-0.177***	0.000726	0.0604	0.0569	0.0207
	(0.0192)	(0.0191)	(0.0174)	(0.0186)	(0.0185)	(0.0353)	(0.0387)	(0.0391)	(0.0379)
PT	0.0526***	0.0808***	0.00558	0.0641***	-0.0342*	-0.0178	0.133***	0.0125	0.117***
	(0.0197)	(0.0195)	(0.0179)	(0.0191)	(0.0190)	(0.0360)	(0.0383)	(0.0404)	(0.0400)
SE	0.297***	0.249***	0.166***	0.287***	0.223***	0.0738**	0.155***	0.202***	0.322***
	(0.0183)	(0.0182)	(0.0166)	(0.0177)	(0.0177)	(0.0337)	(0.0353)	(0.0379)	(0.0370)
SI	0.0460**	0.106***	0.0694***	0.112***	0.0497**	0.0489	0.0765*	0.147***	-0.0667
	(0.0212)	(0.0210)	(0.0192)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0397)	(0.0421)	(0.0431)	(0.0417)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finland, Great Britain, Ireland and Lithuania were mostly more xenophobic than Austria. All four countries were against the immigration of individuals from poor non-European countries, Muslims and non-European professional workers. Both Finland and Lithuania were also against the immigration of individuals from poor European countries. Finland in addition was against the immigration of individuals of same and different race ethnic group, and unskilled workers both from European and non-European countries. Lithuania instead was only against the immigration of European professional workers. Great Britain, excluded the previous categories was also intolerant to the immigrants of same and different race/ethnic group.

The European immigrants, with respect to Austria, were more welcomed to Norway (0.105, significant at 1%), Poland (0.105, significant at 1%) and Portugal (0.0808, significant at 1%) but were not very good received in Estonia.

The non-European immigrants instead with respect to Austria were unwelcomed in Denmark (-0.0756) and Estonia (-0.177) but welcomed in Spain (0.0518), Norway (0.119) and Portugal (0.0526).

Belong to the same race/ethnic group was more important and had a positive impact on pro-immigration attitudes in Denmark and Norway but had a negative impact in Spain. On the contrary belong to a minority in terms of race and ethnic group had a negative impact on pro-immigration attitudes in Estonian while in Denmark, Spain, Norway, Portugal, Poland and the Netherlands had a very positive impact.

Muslims in comparison with Austria are were welcomed in Spain (-0.0487), Estonia (-0.220), Poland (-0.177) and Portugal (-0.0342).

Compared to Austria European professional workers were not very good received in Estonia (-0.0729), Spain (0.129) and the Netherlands (-0.0998) while the non-European professional workers were more welcomed in Denmark, Norway and Portugal but unwelcomed in Estonia than in Austria.

The situation is very similar also for the European and non-European unskilled workers. Both were more welcomed in Norway than in Austria. The European ones were welcomed also in Denmark, Estonia and the Netherlands while unwelcomed in Spain. Whereas the non-European ones were welcomed also in Portugal but very unwelcome in Estonia and the Netherlands.

In conclusion, the countries that in 2014 were more open than Austria to new waves of immigration were: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Portugal. Moreover the countries that were totally contrary to accept new immigrants were: Czech Republic, Hungary, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and in part the Netherlands.

CONCLUSIONS

The European society in 2014 was much more open and trustworthy with respect to immigration than the current one. The analysis results specifies that in 2014, for the majority of natives, it did not matter if the immigrants were unskilled or professional workers, Muslim or Christian, European or non-European. They were open mostly to any type of immigration. In the specific case, the young natives were definitely more open to new waves of immigration than the old ones. These last ones were intolerant especially to the unskilled workers. Men on average were more tolerant than women in particularly to Muslims immigration and to European workers immigration. Natives with a higher education compared to the ones with a lower education were less xenophobic with respect to any category of immigrants. Natives that were working for their family business and natives that where unemployed for most of their life, were much more open to immigrants than the employees. Religious natives in general were more tolerant to immigrants than the Catholics. Compared to the Catholic religion only Protestant and Orthodox religions were more xenophobic.

The individuals that agreed with the claims that immigrants had a negative impact on the country's economy, took jobs away, paid less taxes than the benefits that used, made the country less open to new ideas and cultures and made the country a worse place to live, were more likely to not support a raise in immigration. The percentage of native that agreed with all these claims was not very high so the major part of the population thought that immigration had a positive effect on both aspect, economic and non-economic.

The countries that in 2014 were more open to new waves of immigration were Belgium, Germany, France and Sweden.

The final conclusions, derived from analyzing the data provided by the European Social Survey shows that even before the migrant crisis hit Europe the countries that were already implementing "open-border" immigration policies had already presented signs of social unrest and general aversion to those policies. As a matter of fact this very same countries were the ones that close their borders after the events of 2015.

However, the interpretation behind these policies remains confusionary, the German Chancellor herself declared before the migrant crisis "that multiculturalism has failed". Also

many European countries already had data on immigration outcome and integration that should have pointed towards that same results. The one analyzed in this work are in line with the aforementioned tendency. The data that will be available in the future, which will cover the peak of the migrant crisis, will most certainly confirm this tendency.

From an objective prospective the European integration of the migrants that came in the period analyzed is not successful. The current economic state of the European continent is a negative factor is a negative factor for integration. The costs that many European countries had to endure as aftermath of both the financial crisis, the Sovereign debt crisis and the previous strife needed to conform with the Maastricht parameters did not put the European nations, especially those in the south and the east in a favorable position for the integration of such divers and massive inflow of migrants.

As a result the immigration policy became a major factor in undermining the validity and efficacy of the European Union project in the eyes of the population of Europe.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 11 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic variables

VARIABLES	AM_Eu	AM_nonEu	AM_same_reg	AM_diff reg	AM_Musl	AM_prof Eu	AM_prof-nonEu	AM_unsk Eu	AM_unsk -nonEu
Age	-7.52e-05	0.00254***	0.00159**	0.00168**	0.000585	0.000500	-0.00170	0.00553***	0.00398***
	(0.000742)	(0.000720)	(0.000671)	(0.000713)	(0.000705)	(0.00137)	(0.00139)	(0.00143)	(0.00141)
age2	-3.10e-05***	-5.99e-05***	-3.66e-05***	-4.94e-05***	-4.77e-05***	-1.98e-05	-1.28e-05	-5.62e-05***	-6.39e-05***
	(7.33e-06)	(7.14e-06)	(6.65e-06)	(7.06e-06)	(6.99e-06)	(1.35e-05)	(1.38e-05)	(1.42e-05)	(1.40e-05)
Male	-0.00746	-0.0147***	-0.00241	-0.00471	0.00714	0.0165*	0.00696	0.0101	0.00826
	(0.00540)	(0.00520)	(0.00486)	(0.00516)	(0.00509)	(0.00984)	(0.0102)	(0.0103)	(0.0101)
Citizens	0.0161	0.0248	-0.0155	0.00677	0.0248	-0.00260	-0.0437	0.0943	-0.00219
	(0.0358)	(0.0353)	(0.0329)	(0.0350)	(0.0345)	(0.0757)	(0.0667)	(0.0652)	(0.0682)
Constant	0.536***	0.433***	0.694***	0.524***	0.495***	0.673***	0.707***	0.120	0.239***
	(0.0410)	(0.0404)	(0.0377)	(0.0401)	(0.0395)	(0.0840)	(0.0775)	(0.0755)	(0.0782)
Observations	30,822	32,757	32,889	32,881	32,478	8,191	8,197	8,317	8,023
R-squared	0.100	0.117	0.092	0.120	0.160	0.092	0.104	0.108	0.089

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1

TABLE 12 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic and socio-economic variables

VARIABLES	AM_Eu	AM_nonEu	AM_same_reg	AM_diff_reg	AM_Musl	AM_profEu	AM_prof-nonEu	AM_unskEu	AM_unsk-nonEu
Age	-0.00338***	-0.000745	-0.00248***	-0.00224***	-0.00384***	-0.00339**	-0.00580***	0.00282*	0.000813
	(0.000819)	(0.000799)	(0.000743)	(0.000789)	(0.000776)	(0.00152)	(0.00155)	(0.00159)	(0.00156)
age2	9.41e-06	-2.00e-05**	1.25e-05*	-1.52e-06	5.71e-06	2.72e-05*	3.42e-05**	-2.08e-05	-2.63e-05*
	(8.05e-06)	(7.87e-06)	(7.31e-06)	(7.76e-06)	(7.64e-06)	(1.49e-05)	(1.52e-05)	(1.56e-05)	(1.53e-05)
Male	-0.00207	-0.0102**	0.000821	0.000244	0.0125**	0.0224**	0.0109	0.0132	0.0127
	(0.00539)	(0.00520)	(0.00484)	(0.00514)	(0.00504)	(0.00981)	(0.0102)	(0.0103)	(0.0101)
Citizens	0.00206	0.00115	-0.0277	-0.0163	0.00509	-0.0220	-0.0624	0.0758	-0.0105
	(0.0356)	(0.0352)	(0.0329)	(0.0349)	(0.0341)	(0.0746)	(0.0681)	(0.0644)	(0.0682)
EDUCATION: Primary education	-0.0838***	-0.0822***	-0.136***	-0.120***	-0.122***	-0.112***	-0.101***	-0.0856***	-0.0715***
	(0.00992)	(0.00985)	(0.00914)	(0.00972)	(0.00956)	(0.0185)	(0.0192)	(0.0195)	(0.0191)
Tertiary educ	0.169***	0.168***	0.146***	0.175***	0.199***	0.160***	0.156***	0.180***	0.160***
	(0.00662)	(0.00645)	(0.00601)	(0.00638)	(0.00625)	(0.0122)	(0.0126)	(0.0128)	(0.0126)
Other	-0.0371	-0.0825	-0.0361	-0.0603	-0.00304	0.0147	0.140	-0.136	-0.0290
	(0.0508)	(0.0508)	(0.0471)	(0.0500)	(0.0493)	(0.0887)	(0.105)	(0.116)	(0.0938)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION: Self-employed	0.00506	0.0111	0.0115	0.00632	0.00341	0.00257	0.0102	0.0233	0.00366
	(0.00883)	(0.00854)	(0.00796)	(0.00847)	(0.00829)	(0.0164)	(0.0169)	(0.0173)	(0.0159)
Working for own family business	-0.0276	-0.0169	0.00391	-0.0577***	-0.0187	-0.0148	0.0309	0.0102	-0.0523
	(0.0204)	(0.0201)	(0.0186)	(0.0198)	(0.0194)	(0.0382)	(0.0375)	(0.0402)	(0.0395)
Unemployed	0.0226**	0.0257**	0.0138	0.0251**	0.0177*	0.0148	-0.00448	0.0452**	0.0142
	(0.0115)	(0.0110)	(0.0102)	(0.0109)	(0.0107)	(0.0208)	(0.0214)	(0.0216)	(0.0217)
Constant	0.580***	0.488***	0.757***	0.589***	0.564***	0.738***	0.777***	0.154**	0.277***
	(0.0419)	(0.0413)	(0.0385)	(0.0409)	(0.0400)	(0.0845)	(0.0806)	(0.0773)	(0.0799)
Observations	30,646	32,557	32,686	32,676	32,273	8,135	8,137	8,273	7,989
R-squared	0.123	0.138	0.116	0.146	0.192	0.117	0.124	0.133	0.110

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1

TABLE 13 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic socio-economic and non-economic variables

VARIABLES	**AM_Eu**	**AM_nonEu**	**AM_same_reg**	**AM_diff_reg**	**AM_Musl**	**AM_profEu**	**AM_prof-nonEu**	**AM_unskEu**	**AM_unsk-nonEu**
Age	-0.00326***	-0.000149	-0.00235***	-0.00205**	-0.00379***	-0.00367**	-0.00630***	0.00305*	0.000567
	(0.000870)	(0.000852)	(0.000784)	(0.000838)	(0.000826)	(0.00159)	(0.00163)	(0.00171)	(0.00167)
age2	1.11e-05	-2.25e-05***	1.31e-05*	-1.17e-07	8.11e-06	3.16e-05**	4.12e-05**	-2.09e-05	-2.10e-05
	(8.52e-06)	(8.36e-06)	(7.69e-06)	(8.22e-06)	(8.10e-06)	(1.56e-05)	(1.60e-05)	(1.67e-05)	(1.65e-05)
Male	-0.00161	-0.00873	0.00358	0.000383	0.0118**	0.0297***	0.00765	0.0122	0.0101
	(0.00567)	(0.00548)	(0.00505)	(0.00540)	(0.00530)	(0.0102)	(0.0107)	(0.0109)	(0.0107)
Citizens	-0.0402	-0.0110	-0.0615*	-0.0265	-0.00155	-0.0739	-0.112	0.00764	-0.0127
	(0.0387)	(0.0384)	(0.0355)	(0.0380)	(0.0372)	(0.0796)	(0.0777)	(0.0710)	(0.0733)
EDUCATION: Primary education	-0.0881***	-0.0905***	-0.142***	-0.128***	-0.134***	-0.131***	-0.111***	-0.0960***	-0.0674***
	(0.0107)	(0.0107)	(0.00979)	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.0196)	(0.0207)	(0.0212)	(0.0208)
Tertiary educ	0.168***	0.168***	0.143***	0.176***	0.202***	0.158***	0.153***	0.183***	0.162***
	(0.00681)	(0.00665)	(0.00613)	(0.00656)	(0.00644)	(0.0124)	(0.0129)	(0.0133)	(0.0130)
Other	-0.0338	-0.0861	-0.0319	-0.0457	0.00205	0.0704	0.103	-0.100	-0.0211
	(0.0551)	(0.0553)	(0.0507)	(0.0542)	(0.0537)	(0.0996)	(0.107)	(0.124)	(0.103)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION Self-employed	0.0104	0.0164*	0.0161*	0.0107	0.0101	0.0127	0.0257	0.0283	0.00715
	(0.00918)	(0.00892)	(0.00823)	(0.00881)	(0.00864)	(0.0168)	(0.0175)	(0.0182)	(0.0167)
Working for own family business	-0.0315	-0.0151	0.00573	-0.0573***	-0.0112	-0.0207	0.0476	0.0445	-0.0376
	(0.0213)	(0.0210)	(0.0193)	(0.0206)	(0.0203)	(0.0388)	(0.0388)	(0.0430)	(0.0421)
Unemployed	0.0299**	0.0311**	0.0242**	0.0332***	0.0245**	0.0286	0.00110	0.0507**	0.000707
	(0.0129)	(0.0123)	(0.0113)	(0.0121)	(0.0119)	(0.0230)	(0.0237)	(0.0245)	(0.0243)
political affiliation with extreme right	-0.108***	-0.112***	-0.0489***	-0.105***	-0.113***	-0.0700***	-0.0589***	-0.0541***	-0.0926***
	(0.00829)	(0.00800)	(0.00736)	(0.00788)	(0.00774)	(0.0150)	(0.0153)	(0.0157)	(0.0160)
Very close to country	-0.00215	-0.0251**	0.0326***	-0.00635	0.000289	0.0151	0.0199	-0.0387*	-0.0183
	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.00949)	(0.0102)	(0.00997)	(0.0189)	(0.0205)	(0.0210)	(0.0196)
RELIGION: Protestant	0.0127	0.0110	0.0127	0.0150	0.0201**	0.0224	0.00658	-0.0345*	0.0140
	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.00953)	(0.0102)	(0.0100)	(0.0193)	(0.0200)	(0.0207)	(0.0202)
Eastern Orthodox	-0.0948***	-0.0993***	0.0130	-0.0415	-0.0439	0.114*	-0.0153	-0.175***	0.0183
	(0.0306)	(0.0302)	(0.0279)	(0.0299)	(0.0292)	(0.0633)	(0.0553)	(0.0614)	(0.0566)
Other Christian denomination	0.132***	0.127***	0.0580**	0.115***	0.104***	-0.0438	-0.0599	0.0314	0.126**
	(0.0300)	(0.0289)	(0.0266)	(0.0286)	(0.0278)	(0.0544)	(0.0612)	(0.0538)	(0.0560)
Jewish	0.0485	0.0194	-0.0142	0.0547	0.163*	0.199	0.0255	0.0174	0.258
	(0.0988)	(0.0964)	(0.0890)	(0.0952)	(0.0951)	(0.215)	(0.170)	(0.189)	(0.182)
Islamic	0.0550	0.0994***	0.0632*	0.152***	0.291***	0.0122	0.166**	0.115*	0.152**
	(0.0355)	(0.0355)	(0.0325)	(0.0348)	(0.0342)	(0.0659)	(0.0661)	(0.0682)	(0.0724)
Eastern religions	0.138**	0.133**	0.0845	0.192***	0.182***	0.135	0.236*	0.172*	0.226**
	(0.0574)	(0.0560)	(0.0517)	(0.0557)	(0.0537)	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.102)	(0.0938)
Other non-Christian religions	0.144**	0.177***	0.0984*	0.101*	0.129**	0.00692	0.0523	-0.0381	0.178*
	(0.0592)	(0.0568)	(0.0528)	(0.0565)	(0.0548)	(0.130)	(0.0991)	(0.120)	(0.100)
Atheist	0.0250***	0.0299***	-0.000212	0.0246***	0.0363***	0.00197	0.00345	-0.0113	0.0465***
	(0.00782)	(0.00758)	(0.00698)	(0.00747)	(0.00733)	(0.0142)	(0.0148)	(0.0152)	(0.0146)
Constant	0.621***	0.507***	0.764***	0.595***	0.560***	0.793***	0.829***	0.260***	0.292***
	(0.0459)	(0.0455)	(0.0420)	(0.0449)	(0.0441)	(0.0915)	(0.0912)	(0.0859)	(0.0868)
Observations	27,456	29,208	29,308	29,304	28,993	7,307	7,317	7,372	7,165
R-squared	0.131	0.149	0.120	0.155	0.207	0.127	0.129	0.141	0.123

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1

TABLE 14 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic socio-economic, non-economic variables and economic attitudes variables

VARIABLES	**AM_Eu**	**AM_non Eu**	**AM_same _reg**	**AM_diff _reg**	**AM_Musl**	**AM_prof Eu**	**AM_prof -nonEu**	**AM_unsk Eu**	**AM_unsk-nonEu**
Age	-0.00173**	0.00140*	-0.00166**	-0.000556	-0.00241***	-0.00266*	-0.00496***	0.00439**	0.00248
	(0.000857)	(0.000844)	(0.000774)	(0.000824)	(0.000821)	(0.00159)	(0.00165)	(0.00171)	(0.00169)
age2	9.29e-07	-3.28e-05***	9.89e-06	-1.03e-05	-3.18e-07	2.42e-05	3.22e-05**	-2.98e-05*	-3.62e-05**
	(8.45e-06)	(8.33e-06)	(7.64e-06)	(8.12e-06)	(8.10e-06)	(1.57e-05)	(1.63e-05)	(1.68e-05)	(1.67e-05)
Male	-0.000549	-0.00453	0.00485	0.00155	0.0179***	0.0303***	0.0130	0.0240**	0.0106
	(0.00554)	(0.00539)	(0.00494)	(0.00526)	(0.00523)	(0.0101)	(0.0106)	(0.0109)	(0.0108)
Citizens	-0.0264	-0.00294	-0.0670*	-0.0284	0.0117	-0.103	-0.136*	-0.0240	0.0547
	(0.0374)	(0.0374)	(0.0344)	(0.0366)	(0.0364)	(0.0775)	(0.0768)	(0.0706)	(0.0727)
EDUCATION: Primary education	-0.0498***	-0.0573***	-0.111***	-0.0914***	-0.102***	-0.111***	-0.0791***	-0.0621***	-0.0476**
	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.00971)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)	(0.0196)	(0.0209)	(0.0215)	(0.0212)
Tertiary educ	0.110***	0.116***	0.0904***	0.118***	0.152***	0.112***	0.109***	0.141***	0.121***
	(0.00668)	(0.00656)	(0.00602)	(0.00641)	(0.00637)	(0.0124)	(0.0128)	(0.0133)	(0.0131)
Other	-0.101*	-0.131**	-0.0985**	-0.112**	-0.0631	0.00745	0.0763	-0.176	0.00383
	(0.0542)	(0.0547)	(0.0499)	(0.0531)	(0.0530)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.124)	(0.103)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:									
Self-employed	0.00579	0.0105	0.0106	0.00243	0.00807	0.0110	0.0284	0.0183	0.00503
	(0.00896)	(0.00878)	(0.00805)	(0.00857)	(0.00852)	(0.0167)	(0.0174)	(0.0181)	(0.0169)
Working for own family business	-0.0382*	-0.0205	0.00501	-0.0644***	-0.00911	-0.00219	0.0325	0.104**	-0.0192
	(0.0210)	(0.0208)	(0.0191)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0384)	(0.0382)	(0.0448)	(0.0431)
Unemployed	0.0198	0.0229*	0.0166	0.0243**	0.0182	0.0187	0.00111	0.0429*	0.00590
	(0.0127)	(0.0122)	(0.0112)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)	(0.0230)	(0.0241)	(0.0246)	(0.0245)
political affiliation with extreme right	-0.0621***	-0.0686***	-0.0165**	-0.0605***	-0.0735***	-0.0271*	-0.0277*	-0.0167	-0.0553***
	(0.00816)	(0.00791)	(0.00725)	(0.00772)	(0.00768)	(0.0149)	(0.0153)	(0.0157)	(0.0163)
Nationalist	-0.0198*	-0.0394***	0.0124	-0.0259***	-0.0166*	-0.00640	-0.000913	-0.0457**	-0.0304
	(0.0102)	(0.0101)	(0.00927)	(0.00987)	(0.00981)	(0.0186)	(0.0204)	(0.0208)	(0.0196)
RELIGION: Protestant	-0.00302	-0.00245	0.000475	0.00395	0.00591	0.0176	-0.000386	-0.0403**	0.00221
	(0.0102)	(0.0101)	(0.00928)	(0.00987)	(0.00981)	(0.0191)	(0.0198)	(0.0205)	(0.0202)
Eastern Orthodox	-0.101***	-0.117***	-0.00772	-0.0537*	-0.0548*	0.133**	-0.00463	-0.207***	-0.0406
	(0.0302)	(0.0300)	(0.0275)	(0.0294)	(0.0292)	(0.0632)	(0.0564)	(0.0616)	(0.0576)
Other Christian denomination	0.120***	0.111***	0.0548**	0.104***	0.0966***	-0.0264	-0.0374	0.00837	0.0948
	(0.0298)	(0.0290)	(0.0267)	(0.0283)	(0.0281)	(0.0545)	(0.0614)	(0.0554)	(0.0579)
Jewish	0.0426	0.00501	0.0133	0.0679	0.173*	0.196	0.0719	-0.0292	0.248
	(0.100)	(0.0980)	(0.0900)	(0.0958)	(0.0949)	(0.237)	(0.163)	(0.199)	(0.194)
Islamic	-0.00553	0.0409	0.0105	0.0913***	0.232***	0.00351	0.113*	0.0570	0.129*
	(0.0340)	(0.0342)	(0.0312)	(0.0332)	(0.0331)	(0.0638)	(0.0647)	(0.0657)	(0.0731)
Eastern religions	0.0893*	0.0893*	0.0476	0.155***	0.145***	0.0878	0.205*	0.139	0.220**
	(0.0542)	(0.0535)	(0.0491)	(0.0527)	(0.0515)	(0.119)	(0.116)	(0.0980)	(0.0931)
Other non-Christian religions	0.127**	0.164***	0.0847*	0.103*	0.130**	0.0496	0.0361	-0.0290	0.128
	(0.0567)	(0.0547)	(0.0506)	(0.0538)	(0.0530)	(0.124)	(0.0971)	(0.116)	(0.1000)
Atheist	0.0182**	0.0219***	-0.00328	0.0200***	0.0295***	0.00832	-0.000132	-0.0201	0.0406***
	(0.00763)	(0.00745)	(0.00684)	(0.00727)	(0.00723)	(0.0141)	(0.0148)	(0.0150)	(0.0147)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:									

Bad for the economy	-0.241***	-0.211***	-0.231***	-0.230***	-0.173***	-0.153***	-0.177***	-0.0893***	-0.131***
	(0.00876)	(0.00837)	(0.00768)	(0.00817)	(0.00813)	(0.0157)	(0.0166)	(0.0168)	(0.0167)
Generally take out more	-0.127***	-0.131***	-0.103***	-0.136***	-0.152***	-0.0972***	-0.146***	-0.121***	-0.102***
	(0.00834)	(0.00803)	(0.00737)	(0.00783)	(0.00779)	(0.0151)	(0.0158)	(0.0164)	(0.0158)
Take jobs away	-0.0919***	-0.0632***	-0.116***	-0.111***	-0.0733***	-0.159***	-0.101***	-0.104***	-0.0440**
	(0.00924)	(0.00878)	(0.00805)	(0.00857)	(0.00853)	(0.0164)	(0.0172)	(0.0182)	(0.0172)
Extremely important educ	-0.0528***	-0.0451***	-0.0214***	-0.0445***	-0.0430***	-9.91e-05	-0.0171	-0.0636***	-0.0468***
	(0.00654)	(0.00634)	(0.00582)	(0.00619)	(0.00616)	(0.0119)	(0.0126)	(0.0128)	(0.0125)
Extremely important work skills	-0.101***	-0.123***	-0.0513***	-0.0953***	-0.113***	-0.0283**	-0.0423***	-0.126***	-0.125***
	(0.00643)	(0.00623)	(0.00572)	(0.00608)	(0.00605)	(0.0117)	(0.0124)	(0.0125)	(0.0124)
Constant	0.776***	0.660***	0.899***	0.758***	0.704***	0.927***	0.964***	0.442***	0.345***
	(0.0447)	(0.0445)	(0.0409)	(0.0436)	(0.0433)	(0.0898)	(0.0908)	(0.0856)	(0.0867)
Observations	25,597	27,212	27,253	27,254	27,047	6,823	6,782	6,865	6,678
R-squared	0.226	0.236	0.214	0.255	0.283	0.199	0.201	0.208	0.182

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1

TABLE 15 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic socio-economic, non-economic variables and economic and non-economic attitudes variables

VARIABLES	**AM_Eu**	**AM_nonEu**	**AM_same_reg**	**AM_diff_reg**	**AM_Musl**	**AM_profEu**	**AM_prof-nonEu**	**AM_unskEu**	**AM_unsk-nonEu**
Age of respondent	-0.00139	0.00192**	-0.00141*	-2.88e-05	-0.00171**	-0.00245	-0.00366**	0.00507***	0.00307*
	(0.000871)	(0.000860)	(0.000783)	(0.000834)	(0.000832)	(0.00160)	(0.00168)	(0.00176)	(0.00172)
age2	8.37e-07	-3.50e-05***	1.09e-05	-1.13e-05	-3.36e-06	2.43e-05	2.27e-05	-3.26e-05*	-3.93e-05**
	(8.60e-06)	(8.51e-06)	(7.75e-06)	(8.25e-06)	(8.24e-06)	(1.58e-05)	(1.67e-05)	(1.74e-05)	(1.71e-05)
Male	0.000945	-0.00316	0.00690	0.00317	0.0203***	0.0303***	0.0125	0.0251**	0.0111
	(0.00559)	(0.00546)	(0.00497)	(0.00530)	(0.00528)	(0.0102)	(0.0107)	(0.0111)	(0.0110)
Citizens	-0.0265	0.00146	-0.0739**	-0.0356	0.0139	-0.0647	-0.137*	-0.0702	0.0530
	(0.0375)	(0.0377)	(0.0345)	(0.0367)	(0.0367)	(0.0780)	(0.0786)	(0.0719)	(0.0725)
EDUCATION:									
Primary education	-0.0371***	-0.0504***	-0.0985***	-0.0826***	-0.0922***	-0.0934***	-0.0674***	-0.0672***	-0.0433**
	(0.0107)	(0.0108)	(0.00983)	(0.0105)	(0.0104)	(0.0199)	(0.0213)	(0.0221)	(0.0217)
Tertiary educ	0.102***	0.108***	0.0816***	0.107***	0.143***	0.104***	0.103***	0.140***	0.116***
	(0.00674)	(0.00665)	(0.00605)	(0.00644)	(0.00643)	(0.0124)	(0.0130)	(0.0135)	(0.0134)
Other	-0.0873	-0.122**	-0.0898*	-0.113**	-0.0886*	-0.00740	0.0598	-0.185	0.0239
	(0.0548)	(0.0556)	(0.0503)	(0.0535)	(0.0536)	(0.0994)	(0.111)	(0.124)	(0.109)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:									
Self-employed	0.00436	0.0124	0.0124	0.00510	0.00885	0.0154	0.0231	0.0193	-0.000520
	(0.00905)	(0.00891)	(0.00811)	(0.00864)	(0.00861)	(0.0168)	(0.0176)	(0.0185)	(0.0171)
Working for own family business	-0.0314	-0.0151	0.00989	-0.0554***	0.000652	-0.00188	0.0398	0.111**	-0.0202
	(0.0212)	(0.0211)	(0.0192)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0385)	(0.0389)	(0.0457)	(0.0435)
Unemployed	0.0201	0.0248**	0.0209*	0.0246**	0.0178	0.00863	0.0154	0.0370	0.00317
	(0.0129)	(0.0125)	(0.0114)	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	(0.0233)	(0.0245)	(0.0253)	(0.0253)
political affiliation with extreme right	-0.0500***	-0.0580***	-0.00538	-0.0475***	-0.0602***	-0.0199	-0.0102	-0.00346	-0.0449***
	(0.00827)	(0.00805)	(0.00733)	(0.00780)	(0.00778)	(0.0151)	(0.0156)	(0.0161)	(0.0166)
Nationalist	-0.0304***	-0.0482***	0.00365	-0.0348***	-0.0224**	-0.0140	-0.00973	-0.0534**	-0.0363*
	(0.0103)	(0.0102)	(0.00928)	(0.00988)	(0.00986)	(0.0188)	(0.0204)	(0.0211)	(0.0198)
RELIGION:									
Protestant	0.000672	-0.000233	0.00249	0.00662	0.00762	0.0182	0.00119	-0.0377*	0.00571
	(0.0102)	(0.0102)	(0.00929)	(0.00988)	(0.00986)	(0.0191)	(0.0199)	(0.0208)	(0.0205)
Eastern Orthodox	-0.119***	-0.130***	-0.0440	-0.0811***	-0.0647**	0.0892	-0.00160	-0.274***	-0.0276
	(0.0319)	(0.0318)	(0.0290)	(0.0309)	(0.0308)	(0.0699)	(0.0591)	(0.0652)	(0.0603)
Other Christian denomination	0.121***	0.113***	0.0559**	0.105***	0.0928***	-0.0483	-0.0531	0.0179	0.0998*
	(0.0301)	(0.0294)	(0.0269)	(0.0286)	(0.0284)	(0.0553)	(0.0620)	(0.0564)	(0.0592)
Jewish	0.0385	0.00663	0.0309	0.0741	0.179*	0.172	0.141	-0.0454	0.285
	(0.0990)	(0.0997)	(0.0909)	(0.0968)	(0.0962)	(0.235)	(0.174)	(0.198)	(0.193)
Islamic	-0.0177	0.0260	0.00688	0.0811**	0.222***	-0.0129	0.105	0.0471	0.133*
	(0.0341)	(0.0344)	(0.0312)	(0.0332)	(0.0332)	(0.0639)	(0.0647)	(0.0669)	(0.0738)
Eastern religions	0.0922*	0.0917*	0.0506	0.160***	0.147***	0.0980	0.210*	0.129	0.210**
	(0.0539)	(0.0535)	(0.0488)	(0.0523)	(0.0512)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.100)	(0.0927)
Other non-Christian religions	0.149***	0.185***	0.106**	0.111**	0.125**	0.0273	0.00891	-0.0240	0.125
	(0.0570)	(0.0556)	(0.0510)	(0.0543)	(0.0536)	(0.129)	(0.0986)	(0.119)	(0.0996)
Atheist	0.0216***	0.0213***	-0.00445	0.0184**	0.0275***	0.00478	0.00644	-0.0174	0.0432***
	(0.00773)	(0.00758)	(0.00690)	(0.00734)	(0.00732)	(0.0142)	(0.0149)	(0.0154)	(0.0150)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:									
Bad for the economy	-0.159***	-0.141***	-0.149***	-0.143***	-0.103***	-0.0923***	-0.112***	-0.0452**	-0.0789***
	(0.00978)	(0.00943)	(0.00860)	(0.00915)	(0.00913)	(0.0176)	(0.0186)	(0.0192)	(0.0189)
Generally take out more	-0.0764***	-0.0830***	-0.0635***	-0.0808***	-0.0907***	-0.0658***	-0.105***	-0.0904***	-0.0491***
	(0.00887)	(0.00858)	(0.00781)	(0.00831)	(0.00829)	(0.0160)	(0.0169)	(0.0176)	(0.0169)
Take jobs away	-0.0528***	-0.0282***	-0.0818***	-0.0637***	-0.0286***	-0.129***	-0.0662***	-0.0843***	-0.0117
	(0.00958)	(0.00914)	(0.00833)	(0.00887)	(0.00885)	(0.0170)	(0.0179)	(0.0190)	(0.0180)
Extremely important educ	-0.0424***	-0.0350***	-0.0125**	-0.0303***	-0.0276***	0.0114	-0.00349	-0.0570***	-0.0403***
	(0.00666)	(0.00649)	(0.00591)	(0.00630)	(0.00628)	(0.0121)	(0.0129)	(0.0132)	(0.0129)

Extremely important work skills	-0.0885***	-0.109***	-0.0340***	-0.0750***	-0.0960***	-0.0171	-0.0253**	-0.123***	-0.116***
	(0.00660)	(0.00643)	(0.00585)	(0.00623)	(0.00621)	(0.0120)	(0.0127)	(0.0131)	(0.0127)
NON-ECONOIMC ATTITUDES:									
Extremely important Christian background	-0.00848	-0.0366***	-0.0357***	-0.0646***	-0.0732***	-0.0518***	-0.0411**	0.00613	-0.00878
	(0.0103)	(0.00980)	(0.00893)	(0.00950)	(0.00946)	(0.0184)	(0.0195)	(0.0194)	(0.0196)
Extremely important be white	-0.0691***	-0.0320***	-0.0807***	-0.0590***	-0.0348***	-0.0729***	-0.109***	0.0148	0.00903
	(0.0126)	(0.0117)	(0.0107)	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0223)	(0.0232)	(0.0229)	(0.0237)
Crime problems made worse	-0.0818***	-0.0896***	-0.0391***	-0.0911***	-0.122***	-0.0505***	-0.0654***	-0.0729***	-0.104***
	(0.00739)	(0.00721)	(0.00657)	(0.00699)	(0.00698)	(0.0133)	(0.0145)	(0.0146)	(0.0143)
Worse place to live	-0.109***	-0.0822***	-0.121***	-0.114***	-0.0833***	-0.107***	-0.0870***	-0.0112	-0.0702***
	(0.0110)	(0.0106)	(0.00965)	(0.0103)	(0.0102)	(0.0198)	(0.0210)	(0.0216)	(0.0210)
Cultural life undermined	-0.0918***	-0.0735***	-0.0812***	-0.0900***	-0.0633***	-0.0216	-0.0585***	-0.0791***	-0.0432**
	(0.0110)	(0.0106)	(0.00963)	(0.0103)	(0.0102)	(0.0199)	(0.0209)	(0.0212)	(0.0211)
Constant	0.799***	0.672***	0.921***	0.778***	0.719***	0.916***	0.962***	0.493***	0.357***
	(0.0450)	(0.0451)	(0.0411)	(0.0438)	(0.0437)	(0.0905)	(0.0928)	(0.0875)	(0.0869)
Observations	24,536	26,061	26,082	26,085	25,924	6,546	6,505	6,558	6,392
R-squared	0.243	0.249	0.232	0.275	0.300	0.214	0.215	0.216	0.193

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Original Tables:

Table 17 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS FROM POOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	(1) AM_poor_Eu -demo	(2) AM_poor_Eu -eco	(3) AM_poor_Eu -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_poor_Eu -eco-atti	(5) AM_poor_Eu -Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	-7.52e-05	-0.00338***	-0.00326***	-0.00173**	-0.00139
	(0.000742)	(0.000819)	(0.000870)	(0.000857)	(0.000871)
age2	-3.10e-05***	9.41e-06	1.11e-05	9.29e-07	8.37e-07
	(7.33e-06)	(8.05e-06)	(8.52e-06)	(8.45e-06)	(8.60e-06)
Male	-0.00746	-0.00207	-0.00161	-0.000549	0.000945
	(0.00540)	(0.00539)	(0.00567)	(0.00554)	(0.00559)
Citizens	0.0161	0.00206	-0.0402	-0.0264	-0.0265
	(0.0358)	(0.0356)	(0.0387)	(0.0374)	(0.0375)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.0838***	-0.0881***	-0.0498***	-0.0371***
		(0.00992)	(0.0107)	(0.0106)	(0.0107)
Tertiary educ		0.169***	0.168***	0.110***	0.102***
		(0.00662)	(0.00681)	(0.00668)	(0.00674)
Other		-0.0371	-0.0338	-0.101*	-0.0873
		(0.0508)	(0.0551)	(0.0542)	(0.0548)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:					
Self-employed		0.00506	0.0104	0.00579	0.00436
		(0.00883)	(0.00918)	(0.00896)	(0.00905)
Working for own family business		-0.0276	-0.0315	-0.0382*	-0.0314
		(0.0204)	(0.0213)	(0.0210)	(0.0212)
Unemployed		0.0226**	0.0299**	0.0198	0.0201
		(0.0115)	(0.0129)	(0.0127)	(0.0129)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.108***	-0.0621***	-0.0500***
			(0.00829)	(0.00816)	(0.00827)
Very close to country			-0.00215	-0.0198*	-0.0304***
			(0.0105)	(0.0102)	(0.0103)
RELIGION:					
Protestant			0.0127	-0.00302	0.000672
			(0.0105)	(0.0102)	(0.0102)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.0948***	-0.101***	-0.119***
			(0.0306)	(0.0302)	(0.0319)
Other Christian denomination			0.132***	0.120***	0.121***
			(0.0300)	(0.0298)	(0.0301)
Jewish			0.0485	0.0426	0.0385
			(0.0988)	(0.100)	(0.0990)
Islamic			0.0550	-0.00553	-0.0177
			(0.0355)	(0.0340)	(0.0341)
Eastern religions			0.138**	0.0893*	0.0922*
			(0.0574)	(0.0542)	(0.0539)
Other non-Christian religions			0.144**	0.127**	0.149***
			(0.0592)	(0.0567)	(0.0570)
Atheist			0.0250***	0.0182**	0.0216***
			(0.00782)	(0.00763)	(0.00773)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.241***	-0.159***
				(0.00876)	(0.00978)
Generally take out more				-0.127***	-0.0764***
				(0.00834)	(0.00887)
Take jobs away				-0.0919***	-0.0528***
				(0.00924)	(0.00958)
Extremely important educ				-0.0528***	-0.0424***
				(0.00654)	(0.00666)
Extremely important work skills				-0.101***	-0.0885***
				(0.00643)	(0.00660)
NON-ECONOIMC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.00848
					(0.0103)
Extremely important be white					-0.0691***
					(0.0126)
Crime problems made worse					-0.0818***
					(0.00739)
Worse place to live					-0.109***
					(0.0110)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0918***
					(0.0110)
Constant	0.536***	0.580***	0.621***	0.776***	0.799***
	(0.0410)	(0.0419)	(0.0459)	(0.0447)	(0.0450)
Observations	30,822	30,646	27,456	25,597	24,536
R-squared	0.100	0.123	0.131	0.226	0.243

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 18 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS FROM POOR NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	(1) AM_poor_nonEu -demo	(2) AM_poor_nonEu -eco	(3) AM_poor_nonEu -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_poor_nonEu -eco-atti	(5) AM_poor_nonEu -Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	0.00254***	-0.000745	-0.000149	0.00140*	0.00192**
	(0.000720)	(0.000799)	(0.000852)	(0.000844)	(0.000860)
age2	-5.99e-05***	-2.00e-05**	-2.25e-05***	-3.28e-05***	-3.50e-05***
	(7.14e-06)	(7.87e-06)	(8.36e-06)	(8.33e-06)	(8.51e-06)
Male	-0.0147***	-0.0102**	-0.00873	-0.00453	-0.00316
	(0.00520)	(0.00520)	(0.00548)	(0.00539)	(0.00546)
Citizens	0.0248	0.00115	-0.0110	-0.00294	0.00146
	(0.0353)	(0.0352)	(0.0384)	(0.0374)	(0.0377)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.0822***	-0.0905***	-0.0573***	-0.0504***
		(0.00985)	(0.0107)	(0.0106)	(0.0108)
Tertiary educ		0.168***	0.168***	0.116***	0.108***
		(0.00645)	(0.00665)	(0.00656)	(0.00665)
Other		-0.0825	-0.0861	-0.131**	-0.122**
		(0.0508)	(0.0553)	(0.0547)	(0.0556)
MAIN WORKING CONDITIONS:					
Self-employed		0.0111	0.0164*	0.0105	0.0124
		(0.00854)	(0.00892)	(0.00878)	(0.00891)
Working for own family business		-0.0169	-0.0151	-0.0205	-0.0151
		(0.0201)	(0.0210)	(0.0208)	(0.0211)
Unemployed		0.0257**	0.0311**	0.0229*	0.0248**
		(0.0110)	(0.0123)	(0.0122)	(0.0125)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.112***	-0.0686***	-0.0580***
			(0.00800)	(0.00791)	(0.00805)
Very close to country			-0.0251**	-0.0394***	-0.0482***
			(0.0103)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)
RELIGION:					
Protestant			0.0110	-0.00245	-0.000233
			(0.0103)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.0993***	-0.117***	-0.130***
			(0.0302)	(0.0300)	(0.0318)
Other Christian denomination			0.127***	0.111***	0.113***
			(0.0289)	(0.0290)	(0.0294)
Jewish			0.0194	0.00501	0.00663
			(0.0964)	(0.0980)	(0.0997)
Islamic			0.0994***	0.0409	0.0260
			(0.0355)	(0.0342)	(0.0344)
Eastern religions			0.133**	0.0893*	0.0917*
			(0.0560)	(0.0535)	(0.0535)
Other non-Christian religions			0.177***	0.164***	0.185***
			(0.0568)	(0.0547)	(0.0556)
Atheist			0.0299***	0.0219***	0.0213***
			(0.00758)	(0.00745)	(0.00758)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.211***	-0.141***
				(0.00837)	(0.00943)
Generally take out more				-0.131***	-0.0830***
				(0.00803)	(0.00858)
Take jobs away				-0.0632***	-0.0282***
				(0.00878)	(0.00914)
Extremely important educ				-0.0451***	-0.0350***
				(0.00634)	(0.00649)
Extremely important work skills				-0.123***	-0.109***
				(0.00623)	(0.00643)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.0366***
					(0.00980)
Extremely important be white					-0.0320***
					(0.0117)
Crime problems made worse					-0.0896***
					(0.00721)
Worse place to live					-0.0822***
					(0.0106)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0735***
					(0.0106)
Constant	0.433***	0.488***	0.507***	0.660***	0.672***
	(0.0404)	(0.0413)	(0.0455)	(0.0445)	(0.0451)
Observations	32,757	32,557	29,208	27,212	26,061
R-squared	0.117	0.138	0.149	0.236	0.249

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 19 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS OF SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY

VARIABLES	(1) AM_same_reg -demo	(2) AM_same_reg -eco	(3) AM_same_reg -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_same_reg -eco-atti	(5) AM_same_reg -Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	0.00159**	-0.00248***	-0.00235***	-0.00166**	-0.00141*
	(0.000671)	(0.000743)	(0.000784)	(0.000774)	(0.000783)
age2	-3.66e-05***	1.25e-05*	1.31e-05*	9.89e-06	1.09e-05
	(6.65e-06)	(7.31e-06)	(7.69e-06)	(7.64e-06)	(7.75e-06)
Male	-0.00241	0.000821	0.00358	0.00485	0.00690
	(0.00486)	(0.00484)	(0.00505)	(0.00494)	(0.00497)
Citizens	-0.0155	-0.0277	-0.0615*	-0.0670*	-0.0739**
	(0.0329)	(0.0329)	(0.0355)	(0.0344)	(0.0345)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.136***	-0.142***	-0.111***	-0.0985***
		(0.00914)	(0.00979)	(0.00971)	(0.00983)
Tertiary educ		0.146***	0.143***	0.0904***	0.0816***
		(0.00601)	(0.00613)	(0.00602)	(0.00605)
Other		-0.0361	-0.0319	-0.0985**	-0.0898*
		(0.0471)	(0.0507)	(0.0499)	(0.0503)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:					
Self-employed		0.0115	0.0161*	0.0106	0.0124
		(0.00796)	(0.00823)	(0.00805)	(0.00811)
Working for own family business		0.00391	0.00573	0.00501	0.00989
		(0.0186)	(0.0193)	(0.0191)	(0.0192)
Unemployed		0.0138	0.0242**	0.0166	0.0209*
		(0.0102)	(0.0113)	(0.0112)	(0.0114)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.0489***	-0.0165**	-0.00538
			(0.00736)	(0.00725)	(0.00733)
Very close to country			0.0326***	0.0124	0.00365
			(0.00949)	(0.00927)	(0.00928)
RELIGION:					
Protestant			0.0127	0.000475	0.00249
			(0.00953)	(0.00928)	(0.00929)
Eastern Orthodox			0.0130	-0.00772	-0.0440
			(0.0279)	(0.0275)	(0.0290)
Other Christian denomination			0.0580**	0.0548**	0.0559**
			(0.0266)	(0.0267)	(0.0269)
Jewish			-0.0142	0.0133	0.0309
			(0.0890)	(0.0900)	(0.0909)
Islamic			0.0632*	0.0105	0.00688
			(0.0325)	(0.0312)	(0.0312)
Eastern religions			0.0845	0.0476	0.0506
			(0.0517)	(0.0491)	(0.0488)
Other non-Christian religions			0.0984*	0.0847*	0.106**
			(0.0528)	(0.0506)	(0.0510)
Atheist			-0.000212	-0.00328	-0.00445
			(0.00698)	(0.00684)	(0.00690)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.231***	-0.149***
				(0.00768)	(0.00860)
Generally take out more				-0.103***	-0.0635***
				(0.00737)	(0.00781)
Take jobs away				-0.116***	-0.0818***
				(0.00805)	(0.00833)
Extremely important educ				-0.0214***	-0.0125**
				(0.00582)	(0.00591)
Extremely important work skills				-0.0513***	-0.0340***
				(0.00572)	(0.00585)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.0357***
					(0.00893)
Extremely important be white					-0.0807***
					(0.0107)
Crime problems made worse					-0.0391***
					(0.00657)
Worse place to live					-0.121***
					(0.00965)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0812***
					(0.00963)
Constant	0.694***	0.757***	0.764***	0.899***	0.921***
	(0.0377)	(0.0385)	(0.0420)	(0.0409)	(0.0411)
Observations	32,889	32,686	29,308	27,253	26,082
R-squared	0.092	0.116	0.120	0.214	0.232

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 20– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS OF DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY

VARIABLES	(1) AM_diff_reg -demo	(2) AM_diff_reg -eco	(3) AM_diff_reg -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_diff_reg -eco-atti	(5) AM_diff_reg -Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	0.00168**	-0.00224***	-0.00205**	-0.000556	-2.88e-05
	(0.000713)	(0.000789)	(0.000838)	(0.000824)	(0.000834)
age2	-4.94e-05***	-1.52e-06	-1.17e-07	-1.03e-05	-1.13e-05
	(7.06e-06)	(7.76e-06)	(8.22e-06)	(8.12e-06)	(8.25e-06)
Male	-0.00471	0.000244	0.000383	0.00155	0.00317
	(0.00516)	(0.00514)	(0.00540)	(0.00526)	(0.00530)
Citizens	0.00677	-0.0163	-0.0265	-0.0284	-0.0356
	(0.0350)	(0.0349)	(0.0380)	(0.0366)	(0.0367)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.120***	-0.128***	-0.0914***	-0.0826***
		(0.00972)	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.0105)
Tertiary educ		0.175***	0.176***	0.118***	0.107***
		(0.00638)	(0.00656)	(0.00641)	(0.00644)
Other		-0.0603	-0.0457	-0.112**	-0.113**
		(0.0500)	(0.0542)	(0.0531)	(0.0535)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:					
Self-employed		0.00632	0.0107	0.00243	0.00510
		(0.00847)	(0.00881)	(0.00857)	(0.00864)
Working for own family business		-0.0577***	-0.0573***	-0.0644***	-0.0554***
		(0.0198)	(0.0206)	(0.0203)	(0.0204)
Unemployed		0.0251**	0.0332***	0.0243**	0.0246**
		(0.0109)	(0.0121)	(0.0119)	(0.0121)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.105***	-0.0605***	-0.0475***
			(0.00788)	(0.00772)	(0.00780)
Very close to country			-0.00635	-0.0259***	-0.0348***
			(0.0102)	(0.00987)	(0.00988)
RELIGION:			0.0150	0.00395	0.00662
Protestant					
			(0.0102)	(0.00987)	(0.00988)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.0415	-0.0537*	-0.0811***
			(0.0299)	(0.0294)	(0.0309)
Other Christian denomination			0.115***	0.104***	0.105***
			(0.0286)	(0.0283)	(0.0286)
Jewish			0.0547	0.0679	0.0741
			(0.0952)	(0.0958)	(0.0968)
Islamic			0.152***	0.0913***	0.0811**
			(0.0348)	(0.0332)	(0.0332)
Eastern religions			0.192***	0.155***	0.160***
			(0.0557)	(0.0527)	(0.0523)
Other non-Christian religions			0.101*	0.103*	0.111**
			(0.0565)	(0.0538)	(0.0543)
Atheist			0.0246***	0.0200***	0.0184**
			(0.00747)	(0.00727)	(0.00734)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.230***	-0.143***
				(0.00817)	(0.00915)
Generally take out more				-0.136***	-0.0808***
				(0.00783)	(0.00831)
Take jobs away				-0.111***	-0.0637***
				(0.00857)	(0.00887)
Extremely important educ				-0.0445***	-0.0303***
				(0.00619)	(0.00630)
Extremely important work skills				-0.0953***	-0.0750***
				(0.00608)	(0.00623)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.0646***
					(0.00950)
Extremely important be white					-0.0590***
					(0.0113)
Crime problems made worse					-0.0911***
					(0.00699)
Worse place to live					-0.114***
					(0.0103)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0900***
					(0.0103)
Constant	0.524***	0.589***	0.595***	0.758***	0.778***
	(0.0401)	(0.0409)	(0.0449)	(0.0436)	(0.0438)
Observations	32,881	32,676	29,304	27,254	26,085
R-squared	0.120	0.146	0.155	0.255	0.275

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 21– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY MUSLIMS

VARIABLES	(1) AM_Musl-demo	(2) AM_Musl-eco	(3) AM_Musl-eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_Musl-eco-atti	(5) AM_Musl-Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	0.000585	-0.00384***	-0.00379***	-0.00241***	-0.00171**
	(0.000705)	(0.000776)	(0.000826)	(0.000821)	(0.000832)
age2	-4.77e-05***	5.71e-06	8.11e-06	-3.18e-07	-3.36e-06
	(6.99e-06)	(7.64e-06)	(8.10e-06)	(8.10e-06)	(8.24e-06)
Male	0.00714	0.0125**	0.0118**	0.0179***	0.0203***
	(0.00509)	(0.00504)	(0.00530)	(0.00523)	(0.00528)
Citizens	0.0248	0.00509	-0.00155	0.0117	0.0139
	(0.0345)	(0.0341)	(0.0372)	(0.0364)	(0.0367)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.122***	-0.134***	-0.102***	-0.0922***
		(0.00956)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)	(0.0104)
Tertiary educ		0.199***	0.202***	0.152***	0.143***
		(0.00625)	(0.00644)	(0.00637)	(0.00643)
Other		-0.00304	0.00205	-0.0631	-0.0886*
		(0.0493)	(0.0537)	(0.0530)	(0.0536)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:					
Self-employed		0.00341	0.0101	0.00807	0.00885
		(0.00829)	(0.00864)	(0.00852)	(0.00861)
Working for own family business		-0.0187	-0.0112	-0.00911	0.000652
		(0.0194)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0205)
Unemployed		0.0177*	0.0245**	0.0182	0.0178
		(0.0107)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)	(0.0121)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.113***	-0.0735***	-0.0602***
			(0.00774)	(0.00768)	(0.00778)
Very close to country			0.000289	-0.0166*	-0.0224**
RELIGION:			(0.00997)	(0.00981)	(0.00986)
Protestant			0.0201**	0.00591	0.00762
			(0.0100)	(0.00981)	(0.00986)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.0439	-0.0548*	-0.0647**
			(0.0292)	(0.0292)	(0.0308)
Other Christian denomination			0.104***	0.0966***	0.0928***
			(0.0278)	(0.0281)	(0.0284)
Jewish			0.163*	0.173*	0.179*
			(0.0951)	(0.0949)	(0.0962)
Islamic			0.291***	0.232***	0.222***
			(0.0342)	(0.0331)	(0.0332)
Eastern religions			0.182***	0.145***	0.147***
			(0.0537)	(0.0515)	(0.0512)
Other non-Christian religions			0.129**	0.130**	0.125**
			(0.0548)	(0.0530)	(0.0536)
Atheist			0.0363***	0.0295***	0.0275***
			(0.00733)	(0.00723)	(0.00732)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.173***	-0.103***
				(0.00813)	(0.00913)
Generally take out more				-0.152***	-0.0907***
				(0.00779)	(0.00829)
Take jobs away				-0.0733***	-0.0286***
				(0.00853)	(0.00885)
Extremely important educ				-0.0430***	-0.0276***
				(0.00616)	(0.00628)
Extremely important work skills				-0.113***	-0.0960***
				(0.00605)	(0.00621)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.0732***
					(0.00946)
Extremely important be white					-0.0348***
					(0.0113)
Crime problems made worse					-0.122***
					(0.00698)
Worse place to live					-0.0833***
					(0.0102)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0633***
					(0.0102)
Constant	0.495***	0.564***	0.560***	0.704***	0.719***
	(0.0395)	(0.0400)	(0.0441)	(0.0433)	(0.0437)
Observations	32,478	32,273	28,993	27,047	25,924
R-squared	0.160	0.192	0.207	0.283	0.300

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 22– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	(1) AM_profEu -demo	(2) AM_profEu -eco	(3) AM_profEu -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_profEu -eco-atti	(5) AM_profEu -Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	0.000500	-0.00339**	-0.00367**	-0.00266*	-0.00245
	(0.00137)	(0.00152)	(0.00159)	(0.00159)	(0.00160)
age2	-1.98e-05	2.72e-05*	3.16e-05**	2.42e-05	2.43e-05
	(1.35e-05)	(1.49e-05)	(1.56e-05)	(1.57e-05)	(1.58e-05)
Male	0.0165*	0.0224**	0.0297***	0.0303***	0.0303***
	(0.00984)	(0.00981)	(0.0102)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)
Citizens	-0.00260	-0.0220	-0.0739	-0.103	-0.0647
	(0.0757)	(0.0746)	(0.0796)	(0.0775)	(0.0780)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.112***	-0.131***	-0.111***	-0.0934***
		(0.0185)	(0.0196)	(0.0196)	(0.0199)
Tertiary educ		0.160***	0.158***	0.112***	0.104***
		(0.0122)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)
Other		0.0147	0.0704	0.00745	-0.00740
		(0.0887)	(0.0996)	(0.101)	(0.0994)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:					
Self-employed		0.00257	0.0127	0.0110	0.0154
		(0.0164)	(0.0168)	(0.0167)	(0.0168)
Working for own family business		-0.0148	-0.0207	-0.00219	-0.00188
		(0.0382)	(0.0388)	(0.0384)	(0.0385)
Unemployed		0.0148	0.0286	0.0187	0.00863
		(0.0208)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0233)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.0700***	-0.0271*	-0.0199
			(0.0150)	(0.0149)	(0.0151)
Very close to country			0.0151	-0.00640	-0.0140
			(0.0189)	(0.0186)	(0.0188)
RELIGION:					
Protestant			0.0224	0.0176	0.0182
			(0.0193)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)
Eastern Orthodox			0.114*	0.133**	0.0892
			(0.0633)	(0.0632)	(0.0699)
Other Christian denomination			-0.0438	-0.0264	-0.0483
			(0.0544)	(0.0545)	(0.0553)
Jewish			0.199	0.196	0.172
			(0.215)	(0.237)	(0.235)
Islamic			0.0122	0.00351	-0.0129
			(0.0659)	(0.0638)	(0.0639)
Eastern religions			0.135	0.0878	0.0980
			(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.118)
Other non-Christian religions			0.00692	0.0496	0.0273
			(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.129)
Atheist			0.00197	0.00832	0.00478
			(0.0142)	(0.0141)	(0.0142)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.153***	-0.0923***
				(0.0157)	(0.0176)
Generally take out more				-0.0972***	-0.0658***
				(0.0151)	(0.0160)
Take jobs away				-0.159***	-0.129***
				(0.0164)	(0.0170)
Extremely important educ				-9.91e-05	0.0114
				(0.0119)	(0.0121)
Extremely important work skills				-0.0283**	-0.0171
				(0.0117)	(0.0120)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.0518***
					(0.0184)
Extremely important be white					-0.0729***
					(0.0223)
Crime problems made worse					-0.0505***
					(0.0133)
Worse place to live					-0.107***
					(0.0198)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0216
					(0.0199)
Constant	0.673***	0.738***	0.793***	0.927***	0.916***
	(0.0840)	(0.0845)	(0.0915)	(0.0898)	(0.0905)
Observations	8,191	8,135	7,307	6,823	6,546
R-squared	0.092	0.117	0.127	0.199	0.214

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 23– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	(1) AM_prof-nonEu -demo	(2) AM_prof-nonEu -eco	(3) AM_prof-nonEu -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_prof-nonEu -eco-atti	(5) AM_prof-nonEu -Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	-0.00170	-0.00580***	-0.00630***	-0.00496***	-0.00366**
	(0.00139)	(0.00155)	(0.00163)	(0.00165)	(0.00168)
age2	-1.28e-05	3.42e-05**	4.12e-05**	3.22e-05**	2.27e-05
	(1.38e-05)	(1.52e-05)	(1.60e-05)	(1.63e-05)	(1.67e-05)
Male	0.00696	0.0109	0.00765	0.0130	0.0125
	(0.0102)	(0.0102)	(0.0107)	(0.0106)	(0.0107)
Citizens	-0.0437	-0.0624	-0.112	-0.136*	-0.137*
	(0.0667)	(0.0681)	(0.0777)	(0.0768)	(0.0786)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.101***	-0.111***	-0.0791***	-0.0674***
		(0.0192)	(0.0207)	(0.0209)	(0.0213)
Tertiary educ		0.156***	0.153***	0.109***	0.103***
		(0.0126)	(0.0129)	(0.0128)	(0.0130)
Other		0.140	0.103	0.0763	0.0598
		(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.111)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:					
Self-employed		0.0102	0.0257	0.0284	0.0231
		(0.0169)	(0.0175)	(0.0174)	(0.0176)
Working for own family business		0.0309	0.0476	0.0325	0.0398
		(0.0375)	(0.0388)	(0.0382)	(0.0389)
Unemployed		-0.00448	0.00110	0.00111	0.0154
		(0.0214)	(0.0237)	(0.0241)	(0.0245)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.0589***	-0.0277*	-0.0102
			(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0156)
Very close to country			0.0199	-0.000913	-0.00973
			(0.0205)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)
RELIGION:					
Protestant			0.00658	-0.000386	0.00119
			(0.0200)	(0.0198)	(0.0199)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.0153	-0.00463	-0.00160
			(0.0553)	(0.0564)	(0.0591)
Other Christian denomination			-0.0599	-0.0374	-0.0531
			(0.0612)	(0.0614)	(0.0620)
Jewish			0.0255	0.0719	0.141
			(0.170)	(0.163)	(0.174)
Islamic			0.166**	0.113*	0.105
			(0.0661)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Eastern religions			0.236*	0.205*	0.210*
			(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.115)
Other non-Christian religions			0.0523	0.0361	0.00891
			(0.0991)	(0.0971)	(0.0986)
Atheist			0.00345	-0.000132	0.00644
			(0.0148)	(0.0148)	(0.0149)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.177***	-0.112***
				(0.0166)	(0.0186)
Generally take out more				-0.146***	-0.105***
				(0.0158)	(0.0169)
Take jobs away				-0.101***	-0.0662***
				(0.0172)	(0.0179)
Extremely important educ				-0.0171	-0.00349
				(0.0126)	(0.0129)
Extremely important work skills				-0.0423***	-0.0253**
				(0.0124)	(0.0127)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.0411**
					(0.0195)
Extremely important be white					-0.109***
					(0.0232)
Crime problems made worse					-0.0654***
					(0.0145)
Worse place to live					-0.0870***
					(0.0210)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0585***
					(0.0209)
Constant	0.707***	0.777***	0.829***	0.964***	0.962***
	(0.0775)	(0.0806)	(0.0912)	(0.0908)	(0.0928)
Observations	8,197	8,137	7,317	6,782	6,505
R-squared	0.104	0.124	0.129	0.201	0.215

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 24– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED WORKERS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	(1) AM_unskEu -demo	(2) AM_unskEu -eco	(3) AM_unskEu -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_unskEu -eco-atti	(5) AM_unskEu- Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	0.00553***	0.00282*	0.00305*	0.00439**	0.00507***
	(0.00143)	(0.00159)	(0.00171)	(0.00171)	(0.00176)
age2	-5.62e-05***	-2.08e-05	-2.09e-05	-2.98e-05*	-3.26e-05*
	(1.42e-05)	(1.56e-05)	(1.67e-05)	(1.68e-05)	(1.74e-05)
Male	0.0101	0.0132	0.0122	0.0240**	0.0251**
	(0.0103)	(0.0103)	(0.0109)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)
Citizens	0.0943	0.0758	0.00764	-0.0240	-0.0702
	(0.0652)	(0.0644)	(0.0710)	(0.0706)	(0.0719)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.0856***	-0.0960***	-0.0621***	-0.0672***
		(0.0195)	(0.0212)	(0.0215)	(0.0221)
Tertiary educ		0.180***	0.183***	0.141***	0.140***
		(0.0128)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)	(0.0135)
Other		-0.136	-0.100	-0.176	-0.185
		(0.116)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:					
Self-employed		0.0233	0.0283	0.0183	0.0193
		(0.0173)	(0.0182)	(0.0181)	(0.0185)
Working for own family business		0.0102	0.0445	0.104**	0.111**
		(0.0402)	(0.0430)	(0.0448)	(0.0457)
Unemployed		0.0452**	0.0507**	0.0429*	0.0370
		(0.0216)	(0.0245)	(0.0246)	(0.0253)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.0541***	-0.0167	-0.00346
			(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0161)
Very close to country			-0.0387*	-0.0457**	-0.0534**
RELIGION:			(0.0210)	(0.0208)	(0.0211)
Protestant			-0.0345*	-0.0403**	-0.0377*
			(0.0207)	(0.0205)	(0.0208)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.175***	-0.207***	-0.274***
			(0.0614)	(0.0616)	(0.0652)
Other Christian denomination			0.0314	0.00837	0.0179
			(0.0538)	(0.0554)	(0.0564)
Jewish			0.0174	-0.0292	-0.0454
			(0.189)	(0.199)	(0.198)
Islamic			0.115*	0.0570	0.0471
			(0.0682)	(0.0657)	(0.0669)
Eastern religions			0.172*	0.139	0.129
			(0.102)	(0.0980)	(0.100)
Other non-Christian religions			-0.0381	-0.0290	-0.0240
			(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.119)
Atheist			-0.0113	-0.0201	-0.0174
			(0.0152)	(0.0150)	(0.0154)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.0893***	-0.0452**
				(0.0168)	(0.0192)
Generally take out more				-0.121***	-0.0904***
				(0.0164)	(0.0176)
Take jobs away				-0.104***	-0.0843***
				(0.0182)	(0.0190)
Extremely important educ				-0.0636***	-0.0570***
				(0.0128)	(0.0132)
Extremely important work skills				-0.126***	-0.123***
				(0.0125)	(0.0131)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					0.00613
					(0.0194)
Extremely important be white					0.0148
					(0.0229)
Crime problems made worse					-0.0729***
					(0.0146)
Worse place to live					-0.0112
					(0.0216)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0791***
					(0.0212)
Constant	0.120	0.154**	0.260***	0.442***	0.493***
	(0.0755)	(0.0773)	(0.0859)	(0.0856)	(0.0875)
Observations	8,317	8,273	7,372	6,865	6,558
R-squared	0.108	0.133	0.141	0.208	0.216

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 25 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED WORKERS FROM NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	(1) AM_unsk-nonEu -demo	(2) AM_unsk-nonEu -eco	(3) AM_unsk-nonEu -eco&Non-eco	(4) AM_unsk-nonEu -eco-atti	(5) AM_unsk-nonEu-Non-eco-atti
Age of respondent	0.00398***	0.000813	0.000567	0.00248	0.00307*
	(0.00141)	(0.00156)	(0.00167)	(0.00169)	(0.00172)
age2	-6.39e-05***	-2.63e-05*	-2.10e-05	-3.62e-05**	-3.93e-05**
	(1.40e-05)	(1.53e-05)	(1.65e-05)	(1.67e-05)	(1.71e-05)
Male	0.00826	0.0127	0.0101	0.0106	0.0111
	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0107)	(0.0108)	(0.0110)
Citizens	-0.00219	-0.0105	-0.0127	0.0547	0.0530
	(0.0682)	(0.0682)	(0.0733)	(0.0727)	(0.0725)
EDUCATION:					
Primary education		-0.0715***	-0.0674***	-0.0476**	-0.0433**
		(0.0191)	(0.0208)	(0.0212)	(0.0217)
Tertiary educ		0.160***	0.162***	0.121***	0.116***
		(0.0126)	(0.0130)	(0.0131)	(0.0134)
Other		-0.0290	-0.0211	0.00383	0.0239
		(0.0938)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.109)
EMPLOYMENT:					
Self-employed		0.00366	0.00715	0.00503	-0.000520
		(0.0159)	(0.0167)	(0.0169)	(0.0171)
Working for own family business		-0.0523	-0.0376	-0.0192	-0.0202
		(0.0395)	(0.0421)	(0.0431)	(0.0435)
Unemployed		0.0142	0.000707	0.00590	0.00317
		(0.0217)	(0.0243)	(0.0245)	(0.0253)
political affiliation with extreme right			-0.0926***	-0.0553***	-0.0449***
			(0.0160)	(0.0163)	(0.0166)
Very close to country			-0.0183	-0.0304	-0.0363*
			(0.0196)	(0.0196)	(0.0198)
RELIGION:					
Protestant			0.0140	0.00221	0.00571
			(0.0202)	(0.0202)	(0.0205)
Eastern Orthodox			0.0183	-0.0406	-0.0276
			(0.0566)	(0.0576)	(0.0603)
Other Christian denomination			0.126**	0.0948	0.0998*
			(0.0560)	(0.0579)	(0.0592)
Jewish			0.258	0.248	0.285
			(0.182)	(0.194)	(0.193)
Islamic			0.152**	0.129*	0.133*
			(0.0724)	(0.0731)	(0.0738)
Eastern religions			0.226**	0.220**	0.210**
			(0.0938)	(0.0931)	(0.0927)
Other non-Christian religions			0.178*	0.128	0.125
			(0.100)	(0.1000)	(0.0996)
Atheist			0.0465***	0.0406***	0.0432***
			(0.0146)	(0.0147)	(0.0150)
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Bad for the economy				-0.131***	-0.0789***
				(0.0167)	(0.0189)
Generally take out more				-0.102***	-0.0491***
				(0.0158)	(0.0169)
Take jobs away				-0.0440**	-0.0117
				(0.0172)	(0.0180)
Extremely important educ				-0.0468***	-0.0403***
				(0.0125)	(0.0129)
Extremely important work skills				-0.125***	-0.116***
				(0.0124)	(0.0127)
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:					
Extremely important Christian background					-0.00878
					(0.0196)
Extremely important be white					0.00903
					(0.0237)
Crime problems made worse					-0.104***
					(0.0143)
Worse place to live					-0.0702***
					(0.0210)
Cultural life undermined					-0.0432**
					(0.0211)
Constant	0.239***	0.277***	0.292***	0.345***	0.357***
	(0.0782)	(0.0799)	(0.0868)	(0.0867)	(0.0869)
Observations	8,023	7,989	7,165	6,678	6,392
R-squared	0.089	0.110	0.123	0.182	0.193

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 26 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS FROM POOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	AM_poor_Eu -demo	AM_poor_Eu -eco	AM_poor_Eu -eco&Non-eco	AM_poor_Eu -eco-atti	AM_poor_Eu -Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	0.144***	0.124***	0.114***	0.0898***	0.0705***
	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	(0.0175)	(0.0169)	(0.0170)
CH	0.184***	0.174***	0.173***	0.0878***	0.0745***
	(0.0185)	(0.0184)	(0.0191)	(0.0187)	(0.0188)
DE	0.255***	0.233***	0.214***	0.141***	0.124***
	(0.0151)	(0.0149)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)	(0.0156)
DK	0.0996***	0.0666***	0.0691***	0.0160	-0.00377
	(0.0176)	(0.0174)	(0.0189)	(0.0184)	(0.0185)
EE	0.00602	-0.0309*	-0.0197	-0.0562***	-0.0689***
	(0.0171)	(0.0170)	(0.0190)	(0.0186)	(0.0190)
ES	0.0746***	0.0769***	0.0791***	0.0464***	0.0223
	(0.0168)	(0.0167)	(0.0176)	(0.0173)	(0.0176)
FI	-0.0196	-0.0359**	-0.0411**	-0.118***	-0.144***
	(0.0161)	(0.0159)	(0.0174)	(0.0170)	(0.0172)
FR	0.140***	0.132***	0.128***	0.0889***	0.0640***
	(0.0167)	(0.0165)	(0.0172)	(0.0167)	(0.0168)
GB	0.0255	0.0204	0.00934	-0.00180	-0.0219
	(0.0162)	(0.0161)	(0.0176)	(0.0171)	(0.0173)
HU	-0.286***	-0.292***	-0.292***	-0.289***	-0.299***
	(0.0168)	(0.0167)	(0.0179)	(0.0179)	(0.0184)
IE	0.00627	0.0110	0.0280*	0.0150	-0.00299
	(0.0159)	(0.0159)	(0.0168)	(0.0164)	(0.0169)
LT	-0.00219	-0.0203	-0.0168	-0.0627***	-0.0692***
	(0.0160)	(0.0159)	(0.0176)	(0.0178)	(0.0187)
NL	0.129***	0.103***	0.0862***	0.000257	-0.0207
	(0.0165)	(0.0164)	(0.0174)	(0.0171)	(0.0172)
NO	0.274***	0.236***	0.228***	0.126***	0.130***
	(0.0179)	(0.0178)	(0.0190)	(0.0186)	(0.0187)
PL	0.170***	0.157***	0.190***	0.128***	0.105***
	(0.0170)	(0.0168)	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0191)
PT	0.120***	0.147***	0.160***	0.0941***	0.0808***
	(0.0184)	(0.0186)	(0.0197)	(0.0194)	(0.0195)
SE	0.436***	0.416***	0.408***	0.273***	0.249***
	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	(0.0181)	(0.0180)	(0.0182)
SI	0.142***	0.128***	0.139***	0.127***	0.106***
	(0.0188)	(0.0187)	(0.0204)	(0.0208)	(0.0210)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 27 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS FROM POOR NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	AM_poor_nonEu -demo	AM_poor_nonEu -eco	AM_poor_nonEu -eco&Non-eco	AM_poor_nonEu -eco-atti	AM_poor_nonEu -Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA BE	0.102***	0.0818***	0.0689***	0.0425**	0.0274
	(0.0169)	(0.0168)	(0.0175)	(0.0170)	(0.0171)
CH	0.139***	0.129***	0.128***	0.0482**	0.0403**
	(0.0185)	(0.0183)	(0.0191)	(0.0188)	(0.0189)
CZ	-0.156***	-0.157***	-0.169***	-0.165***	-0.161***
	(0.0159)	(0.0158)	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	(0.0173)
DE	0.241***	0.219***	0.196***	0.126***	0.114***
	(0.0150)	(0.0149)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)	(0.0157)
DK	0.0277	-0.00449	-0.00702	-0.0623***	-0.0756***
	(0.0175)	(0.0173)	(0.0188)	(0.0184)	(0.0186)
EE	-0.0927***	-0.130***	-0.131***	-0.161***	-0.177***
	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	(0.0189)	(0.0186)	(0.0191)
ES	0.109***	0.111***	0.108***	0.0715***	0.0518***
	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0176)	(0.0174)	(0.0177)
FI	-0.0517***	-0.0681***	-0.0721***	-0.149***	-0.168***
	(0.0160)	(0.0159)	(0.0174)	(0.0171)	(0.0172)
FR	0.0973***	0.0891***	0.0821***	0.0369**	0.0163
	(0.0166)	(0.0164)	(0.0171)	(0.0167)	(0.0169)
GB	-0.00123	-0.00590	-0.0229	-0.0320*	-0.0512***
	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0175)	(0.0171)	(0.0174)
HU	-0.283***	-0.289***	-0.292***	-0.296***	-0.308***
	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0179)	(0.0180)	(0.0186)
IE	-0.0252	-0.0219	-0.00359	-0.0207	-0.0370**
	(0.0159)	(0.0158)	(0.0168)	(0.0165)	(0.0170)
LT	-0.0358**	-0.0547***	-0.0558***	-0.105***	-0.112***
	(0.0160)	(0.0158)	(0.0176)	(0.0179)	(0.0187)
NL	0.131***	0.104***	0.0865***	-0.00198	-0.0151
	(0.0165)	(0.0164)	(0.0173)	(0.0171)	(0.0173)
NO	0.259***	0.222***	0.213***	0.109***	0.119***
	(0.0179)	(0.0177)	(0.0190)	(0.0186)	(0.0188)
PL	0.102***	0.0888***	0.112***	0.0469**	0.0313
	(0.0170)	(0.0168)	(0.0181)	(0.0182)	(0.0192)
PT	0.0877***	0.114***	0.124***	0.0614***	0.0526***
	(0.0184)	(0.0186)	(0.0196)	(0.0194)	(0.0197)
SE	0.475***	0.456***	0.446***	0.313***	0.297***
	(0.0170)	(0.0168)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0183)
SI	0.0954***	0.0810***	0.0795***	0.0625***	0.0460**
	(0.0187)	(0.0186)	(0.0204)	(0.0209)	(0.0212)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 28 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS OF SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	AM_same_reg -demo	AM_same_reg -eco	AM_same_reg -eco&Non-eco	AM_same_reg -eco-atti	AM_same_reg -Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	0.0696***	0.0548***	0.0505***	0.0495***	0.0309**
	(0.0158)	(0.0156)	(0.0161)	(0.0156)	(0.0156)
CH	0.200***	0.188***	0.180***	0.124***	0.110***
	(0.0172)	(0.0170)	(0.0175)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)
CZ	-0.247***	-0.249***	-0.253***	-0.224***	-0.217***
	(0.0148)	(0.0147)	(0.0156)	(0.0154)	(0.0157)
DE	0.243***	0.220***	0.208***	0.157***	0.142***
	(0.0140)	(0.0138)	(0.0145)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)
DK	0.177***	0.150***	0.141***	0.118***	0.101***
	(0.0163)	(0.0161)	(0.0173)	(0.0169)	(0.0169)
EE	0.0706***	0.0359**	0.0389**	0.0165	0.0213
	(0.0159)	(0.0157)	(0.0173)	(0.0171)	(0.0174)
ES	-0.0393**	-0.0229	-0.0209	-0.0310*	-0.0479***
	(0.0155)	(0.0155)	(0.0162)	(0.0159)	(0.0161)
FI	-1.53e-05	-0.00950	-0.0188	-0.0622***	-0.0819***
	(0.0149)	(0.0147)	(0.0160)	(0.0156)	(0.0157)
FR	0.0901***	0.0894***	0.0840***	0.0705***	0.0491***
	(0.0155)	(0.0153)	(0.0158)	(0.0154)	(0.0154)
GB	-0.0367**	-0.0319**	-0.0303*	-0.0302*	-0.0446***
	(0.0150)	(0.0149)	(0.0161)	(0.0157)	(0.0158)
HU	-0.134***	-0.142***	-0.148***	-0.125***	-0.137***
	(0.0156)	(0.0154)	(0.0164)	(0.0165)	(0.0168)
IE	-0.0990***	-0.0881***	-0.0741***	-0.0673***	-0.0807***
	(0.0148)	(0.0147)	(0.0155)	(0.0151)	(0.0155)
LT	0.0207	0.00639	0.000377	-0.0241	-0.0241
	(0.0148)	(0.0147)	(0.0162)	(0.0164)	(0.0170)
NL	0.0744***	0.0529***	0.0481***	0.00514	-0.0137
	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0159)	(0.0157)	(0.0158)
NO	0.185***	0.150***	0.134***	0.0716***	0.0691***
	(0.0166)	(0.0165)	(0.0174)	(0.0170)	(0.0171)
PL	0.0256	0.0131	0.0267	-7.28e-05	-0.0103
	(0.0158)	(0.0156)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0174)
PT	-0.00614	0.0428**	0.0479***	0.0159	0.00558
	(0.0171)	(0.0172)	(0.0180)	(0.0178)	(0.0179)
SE	0.296***	0.281***	0.274***	0.185***	0.166***
	(0.0158)	(0.0157)	(0.0166)	(0.0165)	(0.0166)
SI	0.0879***	0.0754***	0.0844***	0.0877***	0.0694***
	(0.0174)	(0.0173)	(0.0187)	(0.0191)	(0.0192)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 29 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS OF DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	AM_diff_reg -demo	AM_diff_reg -eco	AM_diff_reg -eco&Non-eco	AM_diff_reg -eco-atti	AM_diff_reg -Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	0.104***	0.0846***	0.0779***	0.0611***	0.0451***
	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0172)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)
CH	0.147***	0.136***	0.137***	0.0609***	0.0541***
	(0.0183)	(0.0181)	(0.0188)	(0.0183)	(0.0183)
CZ	-0.219***	-0.222***	-0.228***	-0.207***	-0.197***
	(0.0158)	(0.0156)	(0.0167)	(0.0164)	(0.0167)
DE	0.281***	0.256***	0.238***	0.169***	0.156***
	(0.0148)	(0.0147)	(0.0155)	(0.0151)	(0.0152)
DK	0.122***	0.0895***	0.0914***	0.0441**	0.0311*
	(0.0173)	(0.0171)	(0.0185)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)
EE	0.0154	-0.0244	-0.0205	-0.0493***	-0.0514***
	(0.0169)	(0.0167)	(0.0186)	(0.0182)	(0.0185)
ES	0.0679***	0.0791***	0.0836***	0.0622***	0.0444***
	(0.0165)	(0.0164)	(0.0173)	(0.0169)	(0.0172)
FI	-0.000606	-0.0154	-0.0179	-0.0861***	-0.106***
	(0.0158)	(0.0157)	(0.0171)	(0.0166)	(0.0167)
FR	0.130***	0.125***	0.123***	0.0881***	0.0642***
	(0.0165)	(0.0163)	(0.0169)	(0.0163)	(0.0164)
GB	0.0626***	0.0633***	0.0594***	0.0530***	0.0351**
	(0.0159)	(0.0159)	(0.0172)	(0.0167)	(0.0168)
HU	-0.280***	-0.287***	-0.280***	-0.262***	-0.265***
	(0.0166)	(0.0164)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0179)
IE	-0.00771	0.000680	0.0273*	0.0238	0.00736
	(0.0157)	(0.0156)	(0.0166)	(0.0161)	(0.0165)
LT	0.0713***	0.0539***	0.0610***	0.0197	0.0223
	(0.0158)	(0.0156)	(0.0173)	(0.0174)	(0.0182)
NL	0.210***	0.184***	0.173***	0.1000***	0.0849***
	(0.0163)	(0.0162)	(0.0170)	(0.0167)	(0.0168)
NO	0.278***	0.238***	0.229***	0.134***	0.142***
	(0.0177)	(0.0175)	(0.0187)	(0.0181)	(0.0182)
PL	0.0896***	0.0756***	0.102***	0.0500***	0.0378**
	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0178)	(0.0177)	(0.0186)
PT	0.0705***	0.112***	0.124***	0.0720***	0.0641***
	(0.0182)	(0.0183)	(0.0193)	(0.0190)	(0.0191)
SE	0.458***	0.440***	0.435***	0.304***	0.287***
	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0177)	(0.0176)	(0.0177)
SI	0.151***	0.134***	0.140***	0.132***	0.112***
	(0.0185)	(0.0184)	(0.0200)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 30 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY MUSLIMS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	AM_Musl-demo	AM_Musl-eco	AM_Musl-eco&Non-eco	AM_Musl-eco-atti	AM_Musl-Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	0.0904***	0.0675***	0.0570***	0.0297*	0.0108
	(0.0165)	(0.0163)	(0.0169)	(0.0165)	(0.0166)
CH	0.139***	0.125***	0.121***	0.0445**	0.0360**
	(0.0181)	(0.0177)	(0.0185)	(0.0182)	(0.0183)
CZ	-0.299***	-0.303***	-0.320***	-0.314***	-0.315***
	(0.0155)	(0.0153)	(0.0164)	(0.0163)	(0.0167)
DE	0.277***	0.249***	0.232***	0.163***	0.146***
	(0.0146)	(0.0144)	(0.0153)	(0.0150)	(0.0152)
DK	0.103***	0.0641***	0.0589***	0.00483	-0.0143
	(0.0170)	(0.0168)	(0.0182)	(0.0179)	(0.0180)
EE	-0.123***	-0.167***	-0.171***	-0.206***	-0.220***
	(0.0166)	(0.0164)	(0.0182)	(0.0181)	(0.0185)
ES	-0.00523	0.00250	0.00576	-0.0225	-0.0487***
	(0.0164)	(0.0162)	(0.0171)	(0.0169)	(0.0172)
FI	0.0433***	0.0615***	-0.0694***	-0.142***	-0.166***
	(0.0157)	(0.0154)	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0167)
FR	0.222***	0.216***	0.210***	0.164***	0.131***
	(0.0163)	(0.0160)	(0.0166)	(0.0163)	(0.0164)
GB	0.125***	0.122***	0.112***	0.0989***	0.0714***
	(0.0157)	(0.0156)	(0.0169)	(0.0166)	(0.0168)
HU	-0.311***	-0.320***	-0.317***	-0.320***	-0.336***
	(0.0165)	(0.0163)	(0.0174)	(0.0176)	(0.0180)
IE	-0.0352**	-0.0273*	-0.00299	-0.0168	-0.0452***
	(0.0156)	(0.0154)	(0.0163)	(0.0160)	(0.0165)
LT	-0.148***	-0.169***	-0.171***	-0.214***	-0.214***
	(0.0156)	(0.0154)	(0.0171)	(0.0175)	(0.0182)
NL	0.129***	0.0991***	0.0868***	0.00289	-0.0171
	(0.0161)	(0.0158)	(0.0167)	(0.0166)	(0.0168)
NO	0.236***	0.191***	0.180***	0.0792***	0.0889***
	(0.0174)	(0.0171)	(0.0183)	(0.0180)	(0.0181)
PL	-0.109***	-0.125***	-0.0929***	-0.163***	-0.177***
	(0.0166)	(0.0163)	(0.0175)	(0.0177)	(0.0185)
PT	-0.0348*	0.00552	0.0402**	-0.0207	-0.0342*
	(0.0179)	(0.0180)	(0.0190)	(0.0189)	(0.0190)
SE	0.407***	0.386***	0.375***	0.244***	0.223***
	(0.0166)	(0.0163)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0177)
SI	0.108***	0.0934***	0.107***	0.0726***	0.0497**
	(0.0183)	(0.0180)	(0.0197)	(0.0203)	(0.0205)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 31 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	AM_profEu -demo	AM_profEu -eco	AM_profEu -eco&Non-eco	AM_profEu -eco-atti	AM_profEu -Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	-0.0106	-0.0329	-0.0418	-0.0427	-0.0612*
	(0.0320)	(0.0317)	(0.0324)	(0.0317)	(0.0318)
CH	0.191***	0.171***	0.158***	0.0971***	0.0896**
	(0.0350)	(0.0347)	(0.0356)	(0.0352)	(0.0352)
CZ	-0.232***	-0.233***	-0.240***	-0.218***	-0.231***
	(0.0305)	(0.0302)	(0.0319)	(0.0319)	(0.0325)
DE	0.248***	0.225***	0.212***	0.150***	0.134***
	(0.0288)	(0.0284)	(0.0295)	(0.0291)	(0.0293)
DK	0.109***	0.0837***	0.0674*	0.0221	0.000537
	(0.0326)	(0.0323)	(0.0344)	(0.0339)	(0.0341)
EE	0.0161	-0.0188	-0.0358	-0.0876**	-0.0729*
	(0.0349)	(0.0347)	(0.0375)	(0.0371)	(0.0378)
ES	-0.0866***	-0.0789**	-0.0872***	-0.117***	-0.129***
	(0.0313)	(0.0311)	(0.0323)	(0.0321)	(0.0326)
FI	0.0728**	0.0559*	0.0329	-0.0239	-0.0463
	(0.0305)	(0.0302)	(0.0323)	(0.0318)	(0.0319)
FR	0.191***	0.185***	0.185***	0.164***	0.132***
	(0.0317)	(0.0314)	(0.0321)	(0.0315)	(0.0317)
GB	0.0767**	0.0760**	0.0736**	0.0441	0.0228
	(0.0305)	(0.0305)	(0.0326)	(0.0321)	(0.0323)
HU	-0.260***	-0.268***	-0.271***	-0.285***	-0.304***
	(0.0320)	(0.0316)	(0.0334)	(0.0336)	(0.0345)
IE	-0.0342	-0.0286	-0.00530	0.0109	-0.0233
	(0.0301)	(0.0298)	(0.0312)	(0.0307)	(0.0313)
LT	-0.0401	-0.0600**	-0.0831**	-0.120***	-0.117***
	(0.0302)	(0.0299)	(0.0329)	(0.0333)	(0.0348)
NL	-0.0101	-0.0337	-0.0306	-0.0749**	-0.0998***
	(0.0318)	(0.0316)	(0.0328)	(0.0325)	(0.0327)
NO	0.197***	0.155***	0.134***	0.0622*	0.0570
	(0.0338)	(0.0335)	(0.0352)	(0.0346)	(0.0348)
PL	0.0550*	0.0383	0.0558*	0.0313	0.000726
	(0.0318)	(0.0314)	(0.0333)	(0.0337)	(0.0353)
PT	-0.00782	0.0283	0.0299	-0.000797	-0.0178
	(0.0347)	(0.0350)	(0.0362)	(0.0358)	(0.0360)
SE	0.218***	0.198***	0.192***	0.101***	0.0738**
	(0.0319)	(0.0316)	(0.0332)	(0.0334)	(0.0337)
SI	0.0692*	0.0553	0.0574	0.0727*	0.0489
	(0.0356)	(0.0355)	(0.0381)	(0.0394)	(0.0397)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 32 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	AM_prof-nonEu -demo	AM_prof-nonEu -eco	AM_prof-nonEu -eco&Non-eco	AM_prof-nonEu -eco-atti	AM_prof-nonEu -Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	0.105***	0.0860***	0.0775**	0.0641*	0.0417
	(0.0325)	(0.0322)	(0.0334)	(0.0329)	(0.0330)
CH	0.199***	0.194***	0.181***	0.123***	0.0963***
	(0.0357)	(0.0354)	(0.0371)	(0.0368)	(0.0371)
CZ	-0.115***	-0.109***	-0.116***	-0.106***	-0.110***
	(0.0308)	(0.0306)	(0.0329)	(0.0330)	(0.0336)
DE	0.314***	0.295***	0.282***	0.231***	0.207***
	(0.0291)	(0.0289)	(0.0305)	(0.0304)	(0.0306)
DK	0.193***	0.156***	0.152***	0.105***	0.0818**
	(0.0341)	(0.0339)	(0.0365)	(0.0361)	(0.0362)
EE	-0.0736**	-0.104***	-0.0896**	-0.132***	-0.132***
	(0.0322)	(0.0320)	(0.0355)	(0.0354)	(0.0362)
ES	-0.0102	0.00687	0.0154	-0.00639	-0.0387
	(0.0327)	(0.0328)	(0.0343)	(0.0344)	(0.0348)
FI	0.00990	-0.000563	-0.00610	-0.0620*	-0.0873***
	(0.0309)	(0.0307)	(0.0336)	(0.0332)	(0.0335)
FR	0.251***	0.252***	0.253***	0.219***	0.191***
	(0.0325)	(0.0322)	(0.0335)	(0.0332)	(0.0334)
GB	0.177***	0.177***	0.174***	0.170***	0.141***
	(0.0314)	(0.0313)	(0.0341)	(0.0336)	(0.0339)
HU	-0.213***	-0.221***	-0.233***	-0.235***	-0.257***
	(0.0331)	(0.0328)	(0.0351)	(0.0357)	(0.0365)
IE	-0.0923***	-0.0709**	-0.0538*	-0.0697**	-0.0792**
	(0.0308)	(0.0307)	(0.0324)	(0.0321)	(0.0332)
LT	-0.0390	-0.0526*	-0.0677*	-0.0993***	-0.0861**
	(0.0312)	(0.0310)	(0.0346)	(0.0357)	(0.0375)
NL	0.0783**	0.0576*	0.0587*	0.00809	-0.0163
	(0.0317)	(0.0314)	(0.0333)	(0.0332)	(0.0335)
NO	0.192***	0.158***	0.152***	0.0703*	0.0668*
	(0.0348)	(0.0345)	(0.0369)	(0.0366)	(0.0367)
PL	0.0677**	0.0609*	0.0883**	0.0717**	0.0604
	(0.0337)	(0.0334)	(0.0358)	(0.0366)	(0.0387)
PT	0.167***	0.199***	0.215***	0.157***	0.133***
	(0.0353)	(0.0358)	(0.0377)	(0.0380)	(0.0383)
SE	0.290***	0.272***	0.268***	0.181***	0.155***
	(0.0326)	(0.0324)	(0.0347)	(0.0349)	(0.0353)
SI	0.116***	0.102***	0.112***	0.0961**	0.0765*
	(0.0365)	(0.0363)	(0.0396)	(0.0418)	(0.0421)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 33 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED WORKERS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VARIABLES	AM_unskEu -demo	AM_unskEu -eco	AM_unskEu -eco&Non-eco	AM_unskEu -eco-atti	AM_unskEu-Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	0.103***	0.0873***	0.0835**	0.0380	0.0219
	(0.0340)	(0.0336)	(0.0351)	(0.0345)	(0.0352)
CH	0.297***	0.277***	0.287***	0.214***	0.204***
	(0.0367)	(0.0362)	(0.0380)	(0.0378)	(0.0385)
CZ	-0.132***	-0.137***	-0.135***	-0.146***	-0.153***
	(0.0311)	(0.0307)	(0.0335)	(0.0337)	(0.0350)
DE	0.282***	0.254***	0.245***	0.172***	0.159***
	(0.0293)	(0.0290)	(0.0311)	(0.0309)	(0.0317)
DK	0.199***	0.159***	0.185***	0.120***	0.0994***
	(0.0347)	(0.0344)	(0.0375)	(0.0372)	(0.0380)
EE	0.192***	0.146***	0.170***	0.135***	0.105***
	(0.0313)	(0.0311)	(0.0353)	(0.0352)	(0.0367)
ES	-0.0953***	-0.0961***	-0.0994***	-0.126***	-0.149***
	(0.0329)	(0.0329)	(0.0351)	(0.0351)	(0.0364)
FI	-0.0789**	-0.0985***	-0.0775**	-0.160***	-0.186***
	(0.0318)	(0.0315)	(0.0349)	(0.0346)	(0.0355)
FR	0.278***	0.266***	0.267***	0.206***	0.188***
	(0.0325)	(0.0322)	(0.0336)	(0.0332)	(0.0339)
GB	0.00833	-0.000273	0.0131	-0.00582	-0.0280
	(0.0319)	(0.0317)	(0.0351)	(0.0348)	(0.0357)
HU	-0.245***	-0.253***	-0.256***	-0.260***	-0.292***
	(0.0325)	(0.0322)	(0.0350)	(0.0357)	(0.0374)
IE	0.00887	0.000689	0.00200	-0.0107	-0.0303
	(0.0312)	(0.0310)	(0.0336)	(0.0333)	(0.0346)
LT	0.0788**	0.0596*	0.0552	0.00384	-0.0444
	(0.0310)	(0.0307)	(0.0345)	(0.0361)	(0.0383)
NL	0.00764	-0.0212	-0.0172	-0.116***	-0.130***
	(0.0322)	(0.0320)	(0.0343)	(0.0344)	(0.0354)
NO	0.286***	0.241***	0.254***	0.150***	0.152***
	(0.0355)	(0.0352)	(0.0383)	(0.0379)	(0.0387)
PL	0.145***	0.128***	0.136***	0.0602	0.0569
	(0.0335)	(0.0331)	(0.0362)	(0.0368)	(0.0391)
PT	0.0424	0.0744**	0.0968**	0.0252	0.0125
	(0.0362)	(0.0368)	(0.0392)	(0.0394)	(0.0404)
SE	0.360***	0.340***	0.358***	0.227***	0.202***
	(0.0340)	(0.0337)	(0.0366)	(0.0369)	(0.0379)
SI	0.192***	0.175***	0.196***	0.159***	0.147***
	(0.0375)	(0.0373)	(0.0409)	(0.0421)	(0.0431)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10

Table 34 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED WORKERS FROM NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	AM_unsk-nonEu -demo	AM_unsk-nonEu -eco	AM_unsk-nonEu -eco&Non-eco	AM_unsk-nonEu -eco-atti	AM_unsk-nonEu-Non-eco-atti
AUSTRIA					
BE	0.135***	0.123***	0.101***	0.0828**	0.0732**
	(0.0331)	(0.0330)	(0.0344)	(0.0344)	(0.0346)
CH	0.138***	0.138***	0.116***	0.0625*	0.0520
	(0.0365)	(0.0360)	(0.0375)	(0.0379)	(0.0382)
CZ	-0.0550*	-0.0517*	-0.0710**	-0.0518	-0.0589*
	(0.0311)	(0.0308)	(0.0330)	(0.0338)	(0.0345)
DE	0.197***	0.179***	0.155***	0.103***	0.0959***
	(0.0294)	(0.0291)	(0.0309)	(0.0313)	(0.0315)
DK	0.117***	0.0911***	0.0912**	0.0448	0.0309
	(0.0341)	(0.0338)	(0.0371)	(0.0374)	(0.0376)
EE	-0.0109	-0.0343	-0.0755*	-0.0782*	-0.109***
	(0.0355)	(0.0352)	(0.0394)	(0.0406)	(0.0414)
ES	0.0361	0.0407	0.0411	0.0135	0.00169
	(0.0322)	(0.0321)	(0.0340)	(0.0346)	(0.0352)
FI	-0.0682**	-0.0817***	-0.0956***	-0.154***	-0.173***
	(0.0312)	(0.0310)	(0.0340)	(0.0343)	(0.0347)
FR	0.215***	0.209***	0.200***	0.170***	0.154***
	(0.0325)	(0.0321)	(0.0336)	(0.0337)	(0.0341)
GB	0.0251	0.0210	-0.0109	-0.00255	-0.0155
	(0.0312)	(0.0312)	(0.0338)	(0.0341)	(0.0345)
HU	-0.164***	-0.169***	-0.176***	-0.185***	-0.209***
	(0.0331)	(0.0327)	(0.0352)	(0.0366)	(0.0375)
IE	-0.0211	-0.0133	-0.00680	-0.0180	-0.0440
	(0.0314)	(0.0312)	(0.0332)	(0.0336)	(0.0345)
LT	0.0124	0.00197	-0.000381	-0.00915	-0.0388
	(0.0312)	(0.0309)	(0.0345)	(0.0357)	(0.0373)
NL	0.0453	0.0225	-0.00291	-0.0807**	-0.0805**
	(0.0322)	(0.0319)	(0.0337)	(0.0343)	(0.0346)
NO	0.183***	0.157***	0.144***	0.0649*	0.0782**
	(0.0347)	(0.0344)	(0.0367)	(0.0369)	(0.0371)
PL	0.0924***	0.0829**	0.107***	0.0561	0.0207
	(0.0328)	(0.0325)	(0.0352)	(0.0361)	(0.0379)
PT	0.150***	0.172***	0.158***	0.122***	0.117***
	(0.0361)	(0.0364)	(0.0389)	(0.0396)	(0.0400)
SE	0.477***	0.462***	0.451***	0.342***	0.322***
	(0.0337)	(0.0335)	(0.0357)	(0.0365)	(0.0370)
SI	-0.00443	-0.0129	-0.0207	-0.0509	-0.0667
	(0.0364)	(0.0361)	(0.0394)	(0.0412)	(0.0417)

The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10