


UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA

DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE POLITICHE, GIURIDICHE E
STUDI INTERNAZIONALI

UNIwersytet Jagiellónski w Krakowie

Wydział Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych

JOINT MASTER IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL STUDIES



The performance of BRICS on the global political-economic scenario:

Analyzing Brazil participation from 2010 to 2020

Relatore: Prof. dr hab. Zdzisław Mach

Co-Relatore: Prof. dr hab. Matteo Bassoli

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Z Mach', written over a horizontal line.

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Padova - Kraków

A.A. 2021/2022


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Nil est in homine bona mente melivs

Abstract

The present research aims to analyze the performance of BRICS in the global political-economic scenario, highlighting the performance of Brazil in the period 2010 to 2020. With this aim in mind, we pay special attention to different Brazilian governmental and political party changes. Initiating from the end of Luis Inácio's government at 2010, followed by two mandates of Dilma Rousseff from 2011 to 2016, afterwards the interim government of Michel Temer from 2016 to 2018 and by last the Jair Bolsonaro from 2019 to 2020 (with special attention to the last one, the contemporary government). Our research is justified by Brazil's potential to be a leading participant in the BRICS at many levels of this international cooperation. In this regard, the gap our research purpose to analyze is the positioning of Brazil towards BRICS in the 11 years we propose to investigate whether Brazil was a key member of BRICS during this period. In our research, we observe the key points of mentioned changes within the listed governments and analyze their reflection and influence on the global political-economic scenario. Further paying attention to how it reflected on the group, by investigating the image the group builds globally. The present research will be a bibliographic case study based on qualitative methods of research, composed of an introduction, two chapters and a conclusion.

Key Words: BRICS; Brazil; Global South;



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I am eternally thankful to my family. My beloved mother Zuleide Justo who always gave wings to my dreams and the courage to move on. My brave father Ademilson Lins that taught me to never give up in the face of fear. My always little princess Jullyana Lins, love you 3000. My sidekick brother João Ricardo, I will always be one-step ahead. My grandmother Josefá Justo, the sweet strawberry of my life. You are my sediment stone.

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João Marcos Justo Lins

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Introduction

The aftermath of the Cold War has brought to the limelight the efforts of assembling the work that the League of Nations tried to build, a multilateral cooperation body of state nations. Leading into The United Nations some years later, which on the other hand, managed to set in stone a new step for cooperation among nations. As those institutions were being formed and started shaping the new international order they became very important actors in the international political system and relatively very robust and bureaucratic bodies.

In earlier 2000, the Global order was at a very peculiar moment in the development of international system organization, where the shape of a new configuration was taking place. The multipolar was a new asymmetric allocation of power than the ones already known, unipolar or bipolar power configurations. As we start to enter an era where power was becoming more asymmetric, and more actors were gaining power and prominence, the multipolar era of the international organization of power starts to build itself.

The balance of power started to gain a more complex conjecture as new actors were stepping up to the field, with their own characteristics and peculiarities, demands, and priorities to add to the global agenda. In order the balance multiple actors in the same field of play, new institutions were being created and shaped towards the construction of international organizations, associations, and foundations between the political actors to regulate the system in order to mitigate conflict and work towards goals together.

Under this international conjecture, more dynamism was added to the global scenario forcing some of the political frameworks to re-arrange in order to fit new demands expectations, and participation in political and economic global life, some of the smaller voices started to express themselves and look for new manners to stand up for a more democratic international system.

Although there are many ways to analyze what international organizations are through the many lenses the field of international relations and political sciences offer, may it be general theories or any other International relations theory.¹ They take into account the nature, functions, power structure, or composition of the organizations to classify them.²

¹ The general theories are a starting point for the understanding of International organizations, there are many other theories e.g. constructivism, rationalism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism etc.

² In chapter 1, section 3.1 we will further apply those concepts on classify BRICS by the theoretical international organizations lenses.

In regards to theories of international organizations, each one has a divergent approach and perspective on international organization. By general theories, we assume the classic theories Realism and Liberalism. “Realism is a theory that claims to explain the *reality* of international politics. It emphasises the constraints on politics that result from humankind’s egoistic nature and the absence of a central authority above the state.” (ANTUNES, Sandrina; CAMISÃO, Isabel, 2018). Therefore, on Realism is expected that its members to use the international organizations in favor of their national interests. “Liberalism contains a variety of concepts and arguments about how institutions, behaviours and economic connections contain and mitigate the violent power of states.” (MEISER, Jeffrey W, 2017). Therefore, Liberalism is perceived as a mean for promoting international stability and global welfare.

What we understand that an international organization is “a body that promotes voluntary cooperation and coordination between or among its members.” (McCormick, John; 1999.p.10) International organizations are important tools for the cooperation and development of the international community. They bring advantages in mitigating conflicts, fostering economic and facilitating dialogues among nations, and working under agendas that would lead members to satisfaction of their interests to an extent all the parties agree. In this research, we would like to highlight the fact that International Organizations changed the status quo of the international community framework.

As for, the balance of power and its allocation in the international system, it may also vary depending on the approach chosen it can be unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. In this research, we decided to use the neo-realist theory’s perspective where “they suggest that incentives and constraints derived from an international system organised by the structural rule of anarchy drive state behavior” (MEIBAUER, Gustav, 2021).

In our research we understand the international community as under a Uni-multipolar³ world, meaning there is one hegemonic power and the other multiply actors divide and balance the power on the other side as no state country is totally equal to the United States, and it is in this gap that BRICS is also working out. The international organizations are the framework to set the countries away from the bipolar world that tends to generate more conflicts and wars.

³ By definition of Samuel P. Huntington, Albert J. Weatherhead III in 1st of July 1998: A unipolar world is one in which a single state acting unilaterally with little or no cooperation from other states can effectively resolve major international issues, and no other state or combination of states has the power to prevent it from doing so. (Samuel P. Huntington, Albert J. Weatherhead III)

In the words of Indu Bhushan, on an article to the Asian Development blog⁴, the monetary and financial framework of institutions are cumbersome, slow and restrictive. The main stream that deals with the world economy needs more responsive and agile institutions. The bureaucracy that Low Income Countries must undertake to access those funds and the several criteria's they extensively must submit it too much demanding and time consuming. Furthermore, these in force frameworks of institutions have their closed group to coordinate and control the world economy. Although they lack proper representativity and the voice of some key actors in the economy were not being heard. Thus, this lack of voice is where the BRICS is born.

There are two key notions in understanding the *The performance of BRICS on the global political-economic scenario: Analyzing Brazil participation from 2010 to 2020* (1) The influence of Brazil on the development and actuation of BRICS; and (2) the influence of BRICS on the development and actuation of Brazil.

“BRICS is an important grouping bringing together the major emerging economies from the world, comprising 41% of the world population*, having 24% of the world GDP* and over 16% share in the world trade*. * Based on World Bank data (2019)” (BRICS India, 2021). The federative republic of Brazil is one of the BRICS' founding members, being also a strong stimulator of the formation of the group.

The aim of our research is to understand *The performance of BRICS in the global political-economic scenario: Analyzing Brazil participation from 2010 to 2020* using a qualitative study method. We chose the qualitative study method because it allows us to understand the background of BRICS as a group, its purpose, and goals, as well as investigating Brazil's insertion and participation and interests in the group.

The main research question in our research is: Was Brazil a key member of BRICS from 2010 to 2020? Our alternate research question based on chapter I is how was the performance in the global political-economic scenario. The spatially chosen for our research is from 2010 to 2020⁵. In our research, we will focus on Brazil and other regions and countries in the world depending on the need of the research.

⁴ The BRICS Bank — An Idea Whose Time Has Come – Indu Bhushan, Asian Development Blog: <https://blogs.adb.org/blog/brics-bank-idea-whose-time-has-come>

⁵ For background and foundation of BRICS and further information on chapter I, we will need to refer to times before our spatially.

Our research is divided into two chapters, complemented by an introduction, conclusions and bibliography. Therefore, chapter one is responsible for the overview of the entire BRICS, Understanding how they are the front head of the global south on challenging the settlement of the world's power system contemporary structure. Including a short, debrief on the rising of BRICS, its implementation and challenges, as well as a summary of the members plus, their summits, covering from non-official meetings to key points on BRICS Ascension, as well as a brief discussion over how to classify the BRICS grouping.

The chapter I is subdivided into 6 subchapters, first the Foundations of BRICS, followed by the Membership, the subsequent chapter is responsible for the Purpose of the BRICS, afterwards the Implementations and Challenges of BRICS, each one having a subchapter and we end with the chapter's conclusion. As for the foundation, it will consistence on the historic background that lead to BRICS raising. In regards to the membership will be provided a background of the members and a summary for their meetings on the period of 2009 to 2020. Into the Implementations and challenges, we will discuss some of BRICS notorious initiatives. In the chapter's conclusion, our ending remarks on the general profile of BRICS as an entity.

Meanwhile, chapter two will be covering the performance of BRICS on the global political-economic scenario: Analyzing Brazil's participation from 2010 to 2020. Where, we will look after the governmental changes of Brazil, to understand if this member was a key member of the grouping and the important moments of its participation in the BRICS in this timeframe of eleven years. Furthermore, understanding the strong points and challenges Brazil has gone through it all the changes during the period and the opportunities they had as well as the one still open for development.

This chapter will consist of 6 chapters, in which 5 of them will be related to an specific timeframe that correspond to a particular political moment and for the 4 different government included in the timeframe chosen for our research. The last chapter will bring the chapter's conclusion, where it will be discussed the key findings of the chapter. The last research section is the Conclusion it is dedicated to answering our research questions, providing recommendations for further research and closing remarks.

Chapter I:

OVERVIEW OF BRICS: GLOBAL SOUTH CHALLENGING THE WORLD'S POWER SYSTEM

This chapter is subdivided into 6 parts, it will cover the Foundations of BRICS, followed by the Membership, their Purposes, Implementations, and Challenges. The goal of this chapter is to understand what kind of entity is the BRICS, their ascension, their position and performance in the global scenario, their legal apparatus, and the agenda there are carrying on to the global stage.

1. Foundation

The foundation of BRICS comes out of the context, having an initial quote of the word BRIC, in 2001 with the publication of Goldman Sachs' Global Economic paper 66, published on the 30th of November under the name: Building a Better Global Economic BRICs. A prospective study about the emerging market economies and showing four projections of scenarios, and with a forecast to the near future of 10 years' time to be surpassing the G7 economies.

Although the projections were not talking about something new, in accord to Oliver Stuenkel, these countries quoted in the BRIC projection were already being studied a long time ago under the different names:

“Terms such as “monster countries,” “whale countries,” “pivotal states,” and the “big ten” were coined in the 1990s, all-pointing out that the rise of countries with large territories and significant economic potential would, in the long term, profoundly alter the global distribution of power”. (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.4)

Despite that, the real initial pinpoint is Jim O'Neil coined the acronym BRICs with no possible idea of the political turnout of this moment, as Goldman Sachs was more an economic projection other the political one. Therefore, as expected of every projection you have the marginal positive or negative for more or less, than what has been foreseen, although so many expectations were put on these countries, there was no idea that they could eventually, a few years ahead, form a group, causing some international repercussion.

Initially, Goldman Sachs projection on the first paper was not only about the country that composes BRICs, but it had a goal to evaluate the eleven most potential countries among the emerging markets with the capacity to challenge or even exceed the G7 and shake up the

scenario of global economic order. From the first paper, four scenarios, with different settings of evaluation, are drawn and they all lead to one assumption:

“As can be seen in the four alternatives, all result in China’s relative standing in the world GDP league tables considerably stronger than today. In all four alternatives, the position of Brazil moves closer to that of Italy, whilst Russia (currently included in the G8 annual summit) remains eleventh in all except current GDP in US\$ converted at current PPP⁶ levels.” (GOLDMAN SACHS, 2001, p.8)

As stated at the beginning of this chapter and also on the first quoted paper of Goldman Sachs after the events of September 2001, it was a propitious moment to start thinking about reformulating the world economic leading group, instead of letting those emerging markets always aside or just as spectators of the policy and decision making processes.

Moreover, still on the same article one very important question was made for the political future of BRICS, “Would BRICS want to be in it?” referring to the economic groups G5/G7, and just after the question a provision that could explain the initial spark that gave rise to BRICS as the grouping we know now.

“Clearly, the four countries under consideration are very different economically, socially and politically, and incorporating all four of them into a G7 style club might not be straightforward, (although the existing G20 meetings are arguably an extended club version of this proposal) and as we have discussed already, the case based on economic criteria is strongest for China, and less for the others.” (GOLDMAN SACHS, 2001, p.10)

In 2003, the G8 summit in France has invited Brazil, India, and South Africa, as observers, the ex-Brazilian president Luis Inácio da Silva (Lula), on-time expressed his discontentment on not having a seat and a voice in such an important forum of global order: “What is the use of being invited for dessert at the banquet of the powerful?” - “We do not want to participate only to eat the dessert; we want to eat the main course, dessert and then coffee.” (AMERICA’S QUARTERLY, 2013). Such discontentment has brought together the three countries, on the same convergence point of frustration and dissatisfaction, therefore creating a dialogue forum called IBSA⁷, to work towards a fair and equitable global order.

⁶ Meaning Purchase Parity Power

⁷ IBSA is a unique Forum which brings together India, Brazil and South Africa, three large democracies and major economies from three different continents, facing similar challenges.

The ex-president Lula was not the only one on commenting over food metaphors their discontentment with the world's main economic stream. The G7⁸ with addition of Russia, also known as G8, started after some critics, invited Brazil, India, China, South Africa, and Mexico to the Outreaches meetings G8+5.

Maria Edileuza Fonteneles Reis⁹, Brazilian *Sherpa* on BRICS, also states in the same tone as, over the countries invite to G8+5 outreaches meeting “to have a coffee” remarking that by coffee she stresses: “importante notar que esse “tomar o café” significava ser informado das decisões adotadas – os cinco países do *outreach* não participavam do debate sobre os rumos da economia mundial.”¹⁰ Adding even further:

“When this reality became so embarrassing than unsustainable, these countries jointly with Mexico, started to be invitade to “have a coffee” after the G8’s banquet, on the so called “Outreach G8+5” innitiated in Gleneagles (Scotland), during the the British presidency of G8 (2005). Maybe not to configurate an incorporation of this five countries to the G8.”¹¹ (FONTENELE REIS, Maria Edileuza, 2013)

The initiative was not well received by the five countries as it created this unbearable feeling of discontentment rather than silencing the critics on why those countries had bigger economies than some members did and were still left outcastes of voice over the decision-

All three countries are developing, pluralistic, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nations. The grouping was formalized and named the IBSA Dialogue Forum when the Foreign Ministers of the three countries met in Brasilia on 6 June 2003 and issued the Brasilia Declaration. Definition on IBSA main page: <https://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/>

⁸ G7 is formed by: Canada, France, Italy, Germany, United States, Japan and United Kingdom.

⁹ Embaixadora, Subsecretária-Geral Política II do Ministério das Relações Exteriores e *sherpa* do Brasil nos BRICS e no IBAS

¹⁰ In translation by the author: It is important to note that this “to have a coffee” means to be informed over the course of decisions taken – the five countries of the outreach do not participated on the debates over the course for world economy.

¹¹ In translation by the author: Quando essa realidade tornava-se tão constrangedora quanto insustentável, esses Estados, juntamente com o México passaram a ser convidados a “tomar o café” após o banquete do G8, no chamado processo de “*outreach* G8+5, iniciado em Gleneagles (Escócia), durante a presidência britânica do G8 (2005). Talvez para não configurar uma incorporação desses cinco países ao G8...

making. In this context of lack of voice in decision-making, no ad equated representativity, and weak legitimacy of international institutions to the emerging economies, there was a void, a gap, which the forming of BRICS step in to make a change.

Although, BRICS is not the first initiative of the five member countries to find an alternative to the western way of Global Governance. As mentioned above the IBSA forum, was one by India, Brazil, and South Africa; The BASICs relates to Brazil, South Africa, India, and China without Russia; and the RICs accounted for annual ministers meeting by Russia, India, and China.

Despite the success of those aforementioned initiatives, they did not hold as much visibility as BRICS. Therefore, what made BRICS different from the previously mentioned initiatives? Oliver Stuenkel (2015 p. 9) has two general arguments in that sense, (1) the 2008 financial crisis that hit the developed countries and the emergent countries having relative economic stability (2) their cooperation beyond financial and economic reasons, what he calls the spill over cooperation effect.

2. Membership

This section will focus on making a short background on the BRICS' membership. Therefore, it will consist of a small overview of BRICS participants, their characteristics, capabilities, peculiarities, associations and international organizations they are part of, and well their interests in the BRICS. In this sense creating a base for a better understanding of what has brought consensus among those countries to converge and find common ground to converge into BRICS. Following the disposition of the acronym BRICS, therefore starting on Brazil and ending on South Africa.

In this short overview of the members, we will put together information we judge important to the understanding of each particular member's background. Data about population, religion, cultural traits, language, economy, political structure, international associations or organizations they take part, as well as any information needed to provide a better context of who are the BRICS members.

2.1 Brazil - The Country of The Future

Brazil, the Federative Republic of Brasil¹², is constituted of 26 provincial states + 1 Federal District. In territorial matters, it is the biggest country in South America with a total area of 8.55m sq km. The country's population is 213,993,441¹³ people with a net migration of 106,000¹⁴ and it has an annual growth of 0.7¹⁵ with a life expectancy of 76 years¹⁶. The Federative Republic of Brazil works under the framework of a vibrant young democratic system reformed after a period of military dictatorship that started in 1964 and lasted until 1985 in the world's contemporary period of Cold War, holding presidential elections after every 4 years.

The official languages are Brazilian Portuguese and Brazilian Portuguese Sign Language. The main religion is Christianity. The current leader is President Jair Messias Bolsonaro (to the date of this writing). In the Economy, the current GDP in US Dollars is 1.61 trillion with an annual growth of 4.6%¹⁷, and the poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) 1.7 (% of population)¹⁸. A very multicultural country.

“Brazil, with five regional trade agreements (RTAs) covering 47 countries, has been actively promoting and participating in the Latin American integration process.” (BRICS Think Tanks Council, 2017 p.84). Brazil is a country notorious for its strong diplomacy and for good relations with its neighbors and all worldwide countries. Brazil, outside of the BRICS sphere is a member of MERCOSUL: The Southern Common Market¹⁹, UNASUL: Union of South America Nations²⁰, IBSA, Organization of the American State²¹ and others.

¹² The name is on Brazilian Portuguese, therefore República Federativa do Brasil.

¹³ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

¹⁴ Data from 2017, Source: World Bank.

¹⁵ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

¹⁶ Data from 2020, Source: World Bank

¹⁷ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

¹⁸ Data from 2020, Source: World Bank

¹⁹The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) is a process of regional integration initially formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, to which Venezuela* and Bolivia have recently joined, the latter in the process of joining. For more information vide official website: <https://www.mercosur.int/>

²⁰ Topic to be further discussed on Chapter II section 5. For more information vide official website: <http://antigo.mme.gov.br/pt/web/guest/assuntos-internacionais/unasul>

²¹ For more information vide official website: <https://www.oas.org/>

In the words of Paulo Roberto Almeida (2009) Brazil is

“a typical colonial creation, with a slow constitution of a well-succeeded economy, in the framework of a weak and precocious state formation. Brazil had a unified state before having an integrated economy. The state was the inductor element of an industrial economic formation, quite modern to the standards of the “peripheral” countries. (ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto 2009, p.2).²²

Further, he adds that it is a pacific country in its foreign relations since the Paraguay war in the ‘30s, being very proud of its Regional Peace, “marked by the absence of real external threats, which defines Brazil in its geopolitical singularity and it must be considered a positive “asset” in its process of regional and international insertion.” (ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto 2009, p.2).²³ Although, not in contrast with its domestic level, this peace is controversial, due to the high rates of corruption, poverty, and violent crimes. “Brazil is characterized by high economic disparity; therefore, social tensions and underdevelopment remain internal problems in the country itself.” (MORAZÁN, Pedro; KNOKE, Irene; KNOBLAUCH, Doris; SCHÄFER, Thobias, 2012, p.11).

In regards to Brazilian interest on BRICS, outside of the scope of an alternative global order, reforming the current economic framework and strengthening the Global South which are collective goals, in terms of interests outside the collective we can highlight that:

“As Brazil intends to project and consolidate itself as a recognised global actor, it has actively promoted and resorted to these coalitions not only for their instrumental value in helping the country forge its international identity but also for their potential for bringing about desired systemic changes that favour a less uneven pattern of power

²² Translation made by the author, the original reads: “O Brasil, finalmente, é uma típica criação colonial, com a lenta constituição de uma economia bem sucedida, no quadro de uma construção estatal mais precoce. O Brasil teve um Estado unificado antes de ter uma economia integrada. O Estado foi o elemento indutor da construção de uma economia industrial, bastante moderna para os padrões dos países “periféricos”.

²³ Translation made by the author, the original reads: “ausência de reais ameaças externas definem o Brasil em sua singularidade geopolítica e deve ser considerado com um “ativo” positivo no seu processo de inserção regional e internacional.”

distribution and help overcome the enduring political and economic asymmetries that have characterised international politics and the world economy in the last decades.” (COSTA VAZ, Alcides, 2011 p.63)

The Brazilian intention to become a Global Player finds on BRICS one strong platform to achieve the big players’ scenario. Therefore, BRICS provides voice and spotlight participation to this point of Brazilian interests and

“if seen from this perspective, it becomes relatively easy to understand the strong political appeal that these coalitions have had for Brazilian foreign policy in recent years, as they have allowed Brazil to deal actively with different issues such as multilateral trade negotiations, incremental south-south relations, development assistance, global governance and the reform of international regimes and political institutions, without bearing the costs of necessarily having to bring its own region together as a pre-condition to play globally. In other words, they directly contribute to sheltering its condition of a rising global actor from the burdens of its unclaimed but resisted regional leadership.” (COSTA VAZ, Alcides, 2011 p.65)

The Regional Leadership of Brazil in South America is debatable, despite Brazilian continental size, its neighbors do not agree on Brazil being the leader of South America, and the BRICS platform could provide an strengthening on this positioning for Brazil, not only in the South America but also in the emerging economies of the Global South.

However, independent journalists and civil society activists risk harassment and violent attack, and the government has struggled to address high rates of violent crime and disproportionate violence against and economic exclusion of minorities. Corruption is endemic at top levels, contributing to widespread disillusionment with traditional political parties. Societal discrimination and violence against LGBT+ people remain serious problems.

These above-mentioned bring downsides to the Brazilian domestic political level. These social issues and disparities keep the country away from reaching the development foreseen by Jim O’Neil’s economic perspective 2001 studies.

2.2 Russia: The Father in Room

Russian Federation is Semi-presidential system, a Constitutional republic. Today, in Russia there is both democracy and authoritarianism. In territorial matters, it is the biggest country in the globe with an area of 17 million sq km (6.6 million sq miles). Its current leader is Vladimir Putin. The major language is Russian and the major religions are Christianity and Islam. The country's population 143,446,060²⁴ people with a net migration of 912,279²⁵ and it has an annual growth of -0.4²⁶ with a life expectancy of 71 years²⁷. In the Economy, the current GDP in US Dollars is 1.78 trillion²⁸ with an annual growth of 4.8%²⁹, and the poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) 0.0 (% of population)³⁰.

In words of Paulo Roberto Almeida (2009) Russia:

is ancient, endowed with cultural traditions that identify it as a cultural unit since the Middle Ages, when barbarian displacements gave rise to a Slavic nation in the process of homogenization, on the way to a national formation, which came into existence when Peter the Great, submitted the feudal authorities and consolidated its power over an indefinite territory, in the form of an incipient state, based on the concept of imperial absolutism. This State extended throughout the 18th to 20th centuries, until reaching the maximum of its extension and power already under the domination of the Soviet "tsars". The "Soviet empire" represented a paradox in the trajectory of "great" Russia, since it gave it the national security to which that State always aspired, at the same time that it created an irrational economic system, which determined its structural crisis and resounding collapse."³¹
(ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto 2009, p.2).

²⁴ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

²⁵ Data from 2017, Source: World Bank.

²⁶ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

²⁷ Data from 2020, Source: World Bank

²⁸ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

²⁹ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

³⁰ Data from 2020, Source: World Bank

³¹ Translation made by the author, the original reads: "é antiga, dotada de tradições culturais que a identificam como unidade cultural desde a Idade Média, quando deslocamentos de bárbaros deram origem a uma nação eslava em processo de homogeneização, a caminho de uma formação nacional, que passou a existir quando Pedro, o Grande, submeteu as autoridades feudais e consolidou seu poder sobre um território indefinido, sob a forma de um Estado incipiente, baseado no conceito de absolutismo imperial. Esse Estado se estendeu ao longo dos

In contrast to the other members of BRICS (Brazil, India and South Africa) Russia's political regime is far away from a democratic regime. It could be defined as

“Power in Russia's authoritarian political system is concentrated in the hands of President Vladimir Putin. With loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions, the Kremlin is able to manipulate elections and suppress genuine dissent. Rampant corruption facilitates shifting links among state officials and organized crime groups.” (Freedom House, 2022).

Therefore, in the light of what is expressed by Dorozhkin Yuri Nikolaevich (2016) Russia “has not yet completed the transition from totalitarianism to democracy.” Due to “the pressure of authoritarian tendencies that arose in the 90s of the 20th century and have not lost their relevance at the present time.” (Дорожкин Юрий Николаевич, 2016).

Moreover, Dorozhkin Yuri Nikolaevich (2016) point to signs of authoritarianism in Russia: the irremovability of power in the presence of elections and opposition; personalistic, leadership political regime. The lack of real equality of political forces, checks and balances in the system of state power, the "verticalization" of power, its concentration in the hands of one person at all levels; minimization of the role of the opposition. The government does not allow the political opposition to become a real political force, seeks to integrate it or suppress it. As well as the existence of a privileged party, its monopoly and power; limited and controlled - de jure and de facto - pluralism of political thinking and behavior. (Дорожкин Юрий Николаевич, 2016).

On the BRICS level, Russia sees a new way to be back on the main stream of power and global governance and on creating an institution that can be as relevant as the current existing western forums, associations and institutions e.g. NATO, EU, G7 and others. Although, despite the alternative global governance card, BRICS is also very important to Russia economic development, attaching leadership legitimacy status among the emerging markets economies and on intra-BRICS relations due to all its historic background and Nuclear power.

séculos XVIII a XX, até atingir o máximo de sua extensão e poderio já sob o domínio dos “czares” soviéticos. O “império soviético” representou um paradoxo na trajetória da “grande” Rússia, posto que lhe deu a segurança nacional a que sempre aspirou aquele Estado, ao mesmo tempo em que criou um sistema econômico irracional, o que determinou sua crise estrutural e derrocada estrondosa.”

2.3 India: The Next Giant

India, भारत; *Bharat Ganrajya* or simply, the Republic of India, “it consists of twenty-nine states and seven union territories and the New Capital Territory of Delhi.” (STEPHEN. Becky, 2016). It is separated from mainland Asia by the Himalayas. The Country is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal in the east, the Arabian Sea in the west, and the Indian Ocean to the south. It has an area 3.3 Million sq. km. India is one of the oldest civilizations in the world with a kaleidoscopic variety and rich cultural heritage. It has achieved all-round socio-economic progress since its Independence. India has become self-sufficient in agricultural production and is now one of the top industrialised countries in the world and one of the few nations to have gone into outer space to conquer nature for the benefit of the people. (National Portal of India, 2022).³²

Its current leader is President Ram Nath Kovind. The country’s population 1.39 billion³³ people with a net migration of -2,663,434³⁴ and it has an annual growth of 1.0³⁵ with a life expectancy of 70 years³⁶. In the Economy, the current GDP in US Dollars is 3.17 trillion³⁷ with an annual growth of 8.9%³⁸, and the poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) 22.5 (% of population)³⁹.

“India is the second oldest “continuous” civilization in the world, with quotation marks for the diversity of cultures and ethnicities. There is no cultural unity, and its “political” history only seems to make sense on the basis of the temporary “unity” introduced by foreign invasions, especially the Mongol Empire, followed by the domination of an English trading company, later converted into British supremacy over peoples. very different from each other. Modern India is an “invention” of the British Empire.” (ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto 2009, p.2).⁴⁰

³² For Further Information visit the portal on: <https://www.india.gov.in/>

³³ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

³⁴ Data from 2017, Source: World Bank.

³⁵ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

³⁶ Data from 2020, Source: World Bank

³⁷ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

³⁸ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

³⁹ Data from 2029, Source: World Bank

⁴⁰ Translation made by the author, the original reads: A Índia é a segunda civilização “contínua” mais antiga do mundo, valendo as aspás pela diversidade de culturas e etnias. Não há propriamente unidade cultural e sua história “política” só parece fazer sentido com base na

Since the first report of Goldman Sachs, India is quoted to be the country that has the potential to achieve the most inside the BRICS, in economic matters surpassing G7 economics and population surpassing China's number and becoming the most populated country.

“While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized.” (Freedom House, 2022).

India is a multilevel complexity player on the BRICS, and despite the challenges face through the membership time, it is one of the member that kept growing even if a slow pace and has much more to grow.

“Within BRICS, India is by far the leading receiver of ODA which amounted to USD 2.5 billion in 2009 (Walz/Ramachandran 2010: 7). On the other hand, India is meeting the challenge of being a political heavyweight by supporting LICs worldwide, but especially in its neighbourhood. Between 2005 and 2008, the main recipients of India's aid programmes were Bhutan (36 % in 2009/ including hydropower projects), Bangladesh and Nepal as well as Sri Lanka, Myanmar and the Maldives (Katti et al: 2009: 2).” (On MORAZÁN, Pedro; KNOKE, Irene; KNOBLAUCH, Doris; SCHÄFER, Tobias, 2012. p.13).

Therefore, India will have to deal in the long future with the challenge of being in the top global players, and BRICS appears a platform for that to happen given it in regional leadership level or global level if the pace is kept, India will be the next world Giant player.

“unidade” temporária introduzida por invasões estrangeiras, em especial o Império mongol, seguido pela dominação de uma companhia de comércio inglesa, depois convertida em supremacia britânica sobre povos muitodistintos entre si. A Índia moderna é uma “invenção” do Império britânico.

2.4 China: An Ancient Master

China, 中华人民共和国 or simply The People's Republic of China, founded in 1949, has in territorial matters, it is the country with the highest number of people in the globe. in the globe with an area of 9.6 million sq km (3.7 million sq miles) the main languages are Mandarin and Chinese and the main religions are the Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Taoism.

Its current leader is President Xi Jinping. The country's population 1.41 billion⁴¹ people with a net migration of -1,741,996⁴² and it has an annual growth of 0.1⁴³ with a life expectancy of 77 years⁴⁴. In the Economy, the current GDP in US Dollars is 17.73 trillion⁴⁵ with an annual growth of 8.1%⁴⁶, and the poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) 0.1 (% of population)⁴⁷.

In words of Paulo Roberto Almeida (2009) China:

It is the oldest continuous civilization in history, not exactly for political linearity, but for cultural continuity. Your story contemporary is, however, tragic, made of economic decay, political instability, military humiliation and social setbacks expressed in a deep degradation of the fabric social, when Mao Zedong's economic follies led the country to a hecatomb human development, creating a demographic "gap" of tens of millions of people. (ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto 2009, p.2).⁴⁸

"The government system of China is that of a communist state since 1949, run by the ruling political party, the Communist Party of China (CPC), the biggest party in the country. Chief of state is the President, the top leader of China, head of the party, and the commander-in-chief of the military, he also represents China in foreign relations." (Nations Online, 2022).

⁴¹ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

⁴² Data from 2017, Source: World Bank.

⁴³ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

⁴⁴ Data from 2020, Source: World Bank

⁴⁵ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

⁴⁶ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

⁴⁷ Data from 2029, Source: World Bank

⁴⁸ Translation made by the author, the original reads: Trata-se da mais antiga civilização contínua da história, não exatamente pela linearidade política, mas sim pela continuidade cultural. Sua história contemporânea é, no entanto, trágica, feita de decadência econômica, instabilidade política, humilhação militar e retrocessos sociais expressos em uma degradação profunda do tecidosocial, quando as loucuras econômicas de Mao Tsé-tung levaram o país a uma hecatombes humana, criando uma "lacuna" demográfica de dezenas de milhões de pessoas.

The Chinese political framework of a hybrid capitalist lion in the global scenario and of a certain level of dictatorship on the domestic level constitutes a point that is severely criticized about the BRICS formation, as it poses on the former super power (Russia) and at China, a political regime that is dissonant from the other intra-BRICS democracies, Brazil, India and South Africa.

China current poses the biggest wallet and the stronger voice among BRICS members, and that may cause so positives and negatives reparations inside and outside the group as whereas the BRICS is a legit platform or its just a Chinese political play to serve its own goals. More on this regard will be discussed further in the section 5 of this chapter when it comes to the BRICS challenges, on what are their agenda intra-BRICS and globally as well and how that is pointed as a threat to other BRICS members as some authors may suggest.

2.5 South Africa: The Leaders of Tomorrow

South Africa, also known as Suid-Afrika, Mzantsi Afrika, Ningizimu Afrika or Simply Republic of South Africa is the country that covers an area of 1,221,000 km². South Africa has 11 official languages. Often called "the Rainbow Nation," South Africa is one of Africa's most ethnically diverse countries. The most spoken first languages are Zulu, Xhosa and Afrikaans. The most important religions in South Africa are various branches of Christianity.

Its current leader is President Cyril Ramaphosa. The country's population 60,041,996 million⁴⁹ people with a net migration of 727,026⁵⁰ and it has an annual growth of 1.2⁵¹ with a life expectancy of 64 years⁵². In the Economy, the current GDP in US Dollars is 419.95 billion⁵³ with an annual growth of 4.9%⁵⁴, and the poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) 18.7 (% of population)⁵⁵.

South Africa is a constitutional democracy with a three-tier system of government, a legislature, an executive and an independent judiciary. The President is both head of state and head of government. The lower house of parliament, the National Assembly, consists of 400 members and is elected every five years. (Nations Online, 2022).⁵⁶

South Africa's addition to BRICS does not account much to BRICS on financial terms but to account to representativity of African Continent inside BRICS, and global legitimacy to BRICS englobing almost all regions of the world. Providing South Africa not only access to funds but a platform to achieve regional leadership, further extends four helping partners to support their accession to the United Nation Security Council.

When the inclusion of South Africa happened, "O'Neill interrupted his Christmas holidays of 2011 to write a note to several investors expressing his astonishment at the incorporation. There are lots of other growth economies that have more justification to be added to the BRIC club than South Africa." (Palacios Jiménez ,Alejandro Jesús, 2019 p.4)

⁴⁹ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

⁵⁰ Data from 2017, Source: World Bank.

⁵¹ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

⁵² Data from 2020, Source: World Bank

⁵³ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank

⁵⁴ Data from 2021, Source: World Bank.

⁵⁵ Data from 2029, Source: World Bank

⁵⁶ More information about South Africa on:

https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/south_africa.htm

3. Purpose

The present section has the intention to understand the “Unicorn”⁵⁷ in the room, why he is in the room and what is he doing inside the room to begin with, further the specific “biology” of this “thing” called BRICS. Therefore, understanding its *Raison d'état*⁵⁸, its *modus operandi*⁵⁹, as well as trying to classify it under the theories of International Organizations to understand better the BRICS essence. From economic study acronym to a dialog grouping to a platform of cooperation, what is there for the future of BRICS, or did they already achieve much more than they could with all their limitations.

In a short article named “*Why BRICS Matters*”, Oliver Stuenkel (2012) states that “most observers overlook the great progress BRICS has already made since its first meeting in Russia in 2009. Each year, the BRICS summits have become more productive even as the scope of issues discussed has continuously expanded.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2012 p.2).

BRICS has now a better and stricter cooperation in many levels. This coordination brings them far beyond the initial status but also, far behind of the provisions of Jim O’Neil in a sense, they achieve a lot that was outside of the economic scope but at the same time to financial-economic potential did not lived up to the hype that was generated around them.

The may summit along the existing of intra-BRICS cooperation has led to many unexpected implementations but also challenges. In this research we will summarize all the meetings on the range of our spatially scope 2010 to 2020 (including 2009 year of first BRICS Summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia).

As well as analyzing the theoretical overview on BRICS creation, where we can apply some lenses of international relations on the attempt to classify BRICS. Further, we will investigate the legal overview on BRICS including their inner functions, concluding this section with Constructional overview for BRICS and few remarks on what may come next for intra-BRICS cooperation.

⁵⁷ Used by Renato G. Flôres Jr when stating: I often say that the BRICS are the Unicorn – that creature from medieval legend – or, in other words, it is a being (an animal) so rare and unknown that when it appears, nobody will realize what it is. For now, this is how I prefer to characterize the group. *On the Book BRICS Studies and Documents BRICS : studies and documents* page 139.

⁵⁸ Raison d'état from the French language means: reason of state

⁵⁹ Modus Operandi from Latin means: Mode of operation

3.1. Theoretical overview on the creation of BRICS

Under this section we will investigate the *raison d'état* of BRICS existing what is their aim and what they achieved further from this aim. In this sense comparing different reasons from different authors about the sole reason of the BRICS existing and if it is going to stay around longer.

The BRICs grouping thus did not turn into a household name because of its conceptual novelty, but rather because it powerfully symbolized a narrative that seemed distant in the 1990s but appeared to make sense in the mid-2000s: a momentous shift of power was taking place away from the United States and Europe towards emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil. (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.5)

The BRICS acronym has achieved almost a “mythological” status with the change from just a perspective study into a political framework. Moreover, change aggregated a meaning of change of the global scenario to the acronym. The initial spark for a change, some would say. On the other hand, some would say that “BRICS claims notwithstanding, the organisation has produced mediocre results so far, more so of its own making than because of external factors—it has lost much of its original burnish. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.1)”

The enthusiasm over BRICS has lost a lot of its burnish fire over the years, when the group started not live up to the economic standards they were point to have potential to achieve. Despite being a long shot making a perspective scenario for 50 years ahead of time, accounting for the positive and enlargement of those countries' economies without account for downsides and social challenges along the way and further more important the complexity of each member on their domestic issues is to be overly exaggerated to assume there would be no setbacks.

By their own admission, the existing global order deprives them of an adequate “voice and representation” and hence comprehensive reform is imperative. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.). That is the main sole goal of BRICS formation. In order to achieve that goal BRICS transformed the dialogue platform into something else, our “Unicorn” in the room. Therefore, to understand this goal and how BRICS is going to achieve it, we need to understand what BRICS is.

In order to do this, we will make use of the International Organizations lenses, which can bring us around to understand what BRICS is from a theoretical perspective. For that observing its nature, functions, power structure, and composition. Following the Manual of International Organizations by Ricardo Steinfus (2012), we will initiate on the nature, we take into consideration the purposes, activities, and results on the observed platform. For nature, there are two ways to delimitate it, political purposes or technical cooperation.

BRICS as already mentioned here was born with a financial acronym of a prospective study and became a political dialogue grouping after the realization of how much power and influence they could join forces, but even though, being political will not exclude the fact that the technical cooperation they developed along the many BRICS summits.

In regards the classification due to its functions, depends on the need of the constitutive act that joins the group together, as well as the instruments used to achieve their objectives. In this sense, when it comes BRICS, they do not have a charter or a constitutive act that formalizes them as international concertation organizations.

The next step on classifying BRICS, leads us to evaluate the structure or power. This classification takes into consideration the power structure, the voting and the decision-making framework. This will take into account that it must be clear the way that decisions are made and how power is shared among the members. In order to share the decision power, there are the frameworks of Unanimity and Consensus or Majority. BRICS has no clear position on power structure as their hold to the principle that the sovereignty of the member comes first, so we exclude the majority and unanimity as we exclude the voting from their framework and we get the consensus.

As for the composition, the criteria are the contiguity or proximity or the selection according to common objective interests. On the contiguity and proximity matter, three BRICS countries share borders while the other two are on different continents. Although the selection of interest do not account the geographic criteria, but for the sole common objective, for BRICS is to promote and foster South-South cooperation and the reform of Global Governance. Even though the objective broadly includes the global South it can not be included in the universal character of an international organization, as it is a “closed” grouping that extends its goals to the “universal” level, as again not every country is an emerging economic or Global South. Therefore, what is BRICS, they are all over the house and at the same time nowhere to be found or understood with our current tools.

“Ten years into the founding of the grouping, the time seems right to further elaborate a theory of international organisation having BRICS’s unique approaches/context in mind.” (BRICS Think Tanks Council, 2017 p.84). By the long time BRICS is around already, our “Unicorn” needs a unique approaches to its unique biology.

This new theory could focus not only at BRICS but on the other acronyms and platforms that aroused after the BRICS, under the scope of a movement for the independence of the Global South from the North Stream. Therefore “such a theory should be centred on new paradigms of global security maintenance and political governance reflecting the common principles and interests not only of BRICS member countries, but also of a broad variety of stakeholders. This is a major task for the expert community. (BRICS Think Tanks Council, 2017 p.84)

3.2 Legal overview on the inner functions of BRICS

This section will cover the legal overview and the inner functions of BRICS. Including the formalities, and agreements of the intra-BRICS relations, its function and the evolution of these functions as well as their reason to exist. On doing so, we will summarize the BRICS summits from 2009 to 2020 to a better understanding of the evolution of the BRICS cooperation and the development they achieved in every summit and afterwards the summits. This summaries will be in the annexes of this research. Paying special attention to the implantations and challenges that came on their paths through the years and using this information to build up subchapters 4 and 5.

“As a group, BRICS has an informal character. There is no charter, it does not work with a fixed secretariat nor does it have any funds to finance its activities. Ultimately, what sustains the mechanism is the political will of its members. However, BRICS have a degree of institutionalization which is defined as the five countries intensify their interaction.” (Learn About BRICS, IPEA, 2006?).

The lack of formalization of BRICS, that is harshly criticized by the western authors, put BRICS on a level of optional commitment to the platform, mean that there are no coercion force impelling them to be together and to follow rules and constraints. In this sense, if the cooperation keeps on going is because the parts involved are willing to have close relations. The platform is an optional, an alternative, therefore the sovereignty and the national interests will prevail over a conjoin decision that one of them opposes or do not agree.

Holding that in mind, this configuration may not be as weak and impossible to happen, the many years that BRICS cooperation exists can prove that. On the other hand, we can not disagree that it has downsides, and seems conventional till the extent all of them have interest and the interest are no longer in the table it is doomed to cease cooperation, and that may happen at any unknown moment.

The Timeline of BRICS Summits

The BRICS has its birth after being not satisfied on just participating in important multilateral events as spectators, where the decision-making of the global political-economic course of the international community was happening, until 2006 when BRICS was just an acronym of potential economies for the future.

“É importante registrar que o nascimento dessa entidade não se dá por recomendação de Ministros das Finanças, mas a partir da iniciativa de dois experientes e brilhantes diplomatas, especialistas em relações internacionais: o então Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Embaixador Celso Amorim, e o Chanceler da Rússia, Embaixador Sergey Lavrov.”⁶⁰ (FONTENELE REIS, Maria Edileuza, 2013)

Strongly Remarked by Stuenkel that it was a Russian initiative:

“Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim—long-term friends who had served together as diplomats in New York in the mid-1990s—decided to organize an informal meeting for the foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia, India, and China at the Brazilian mission to the United Nations in New York. While the lunch took place at the Brazilian mission, it can be seen as a Russian initiative.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.11)

Although, China and India, did not really see the addition of Brazil will all positive gains and was a bit reticent with it⁶¹.

“Yet Russia’s initiative to organize a BRICs meeting was initially met with skepticism from the Indian and Chinese side. What, both wondered, could Brazil, a country far removed from the intricate

⁶⁰ “It is important to register that the birth of this entity does not come from recommendation of the finances ministers, but from the initiative of two expert and brilliant diplomats, specialists in international relations: the so on time Miinister of International Relations of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Amorim, and Russias Chanceler, Ambassador Sergey Lavrov.”

⁶¹ Topic to be discussed further in chapter 2

security issues in Asia, contribute to the debate? Doubts about Brazil's place among the BRICs were by no means restricted to China and India." (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.10)

"That changed at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, of the four countries, organized on the sidelines of the 61st General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23rd, 2006."(Learn About BRICS, IPEA).⁶² This meeting was the first initiative that would, later on, lead to the creation of BRICS at their first official summit 3 years later in Yekaterinburg, Russia.

⁶² Learn About BRICS – 6th BRICS Academic Forum – IPEA:
<https://www.ipea.gov.br/forumbrics/en/learn-about-brics.html#:~:text=As%20a%20group%2C%20BRICS%20has,political%20will%20of%20its%20members.>

3.3. Constructional overview of BRICS

This subchapter of our research is responsible for the BRICS Structure taking in consideration their governing bodies in each of the BRICS member countries as well as their interconnectedness. Acknowledging the previous subchapters and the brief classification made over the BRICS platform as whole.

“They seem to pursue individual geostrategic and economic policies even at the cost of stated objectives. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.79).” As mentioned before the sovereignty of members plays higher importance than the commitment to the platform, which can play positive or negative roles in the cohesion and coherence of BRICS, showing that their national interest comes first and BRICS may be a utilitarian tool of the members. This lack of rules and norms may plan as a great relief of “bourdons” to non-totally democratic regimes such as Russia and China, and they seem to be pretty comfortable with this structural setting until the present days. The “BRICS merely looms like a pendulum swinging from one point to the other conveying a lack of convergence among members.” (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.78)

The very idea of BRICS is problematic and could potentially render the organisation redundant. Not all five members are equally committed to changing the global order. Brazil, India and South Africa are interested in reforming the United Nations Security Council, each being desirous of a permanent berth and all three also seek a redistribution of power. Russia and China show no enthusiasm about reforms, are already permanent members and prefer the status-quo as they are among its beneficiaries. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.77)

The BRICS discourse and shape gets out of line and out of shape due to the amount of freedom of the platform and the commitment of the member seen as merely focusing in their own gains, not in the mutual projection they proclaim, not even the standards set for them to reach. “Although BRICS as an organisation does discuss reforms to reflect changing global realities, Russia and China in reality are two of the biggest obstacles to such reforms. BRICS members also do not agree on the nature of a prospective new global order. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.77).”

Not only the structure of the North Global Governance poses then a challenge to the BRICS, as wells as their neighborhoods disputes and not strength of the member to really position themselves as regional leaders. Furthermore, their own inefficacy to build and structure in coherent frame, what they are develop the goals they want to pursue more firmly. Therefore, we see that BRICS itself is a challenge for themselves, until there is no solution to

their structural coherence, “with such problems in their respective neighbourhoods, will BRICS members pull together for a better joint standing in the world? It is difficult to see how BRICS could overcome afflicting philosophical and structural complexities. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.77)

“Gatherings of BRICS members have become commonplace at think tank convenings, business councils, parliamentary forums, environmental meetings, and ministerial-level engagements. Yet concrete policy proposals have been much slower in coming. (Stronski, Paul; Sokolsky Richard, 2020, p.19).” The BRICS expanded the forum to summits to many initiatives, to few bodies, to the people-to-people movements and events to get closer to civil society and the commonplaces for BRICS dialogs and cooperation but it is still a vague idea when it comes to structuring, the most formal body they have is the New Development Bank.

4. Implementation

In this subchapter, we will talk about the conjoint activities on the BRICS that consists on successful accomplishments of their intra-BRICS cooperation. As well as commenting on how those initiatives contributes to the strengthening of intra-BRICS relations to the cohesion of the platform. Moreover understanding the level of engagement all the summits has brought to BRICS and how this can make the bound of their unity stronger by time those implementations reaches the full desired potential for what they were conceived.

After the summary of all meetings, the amount of implementations we encountered with is very extensive, in this sense, our research selects the ones we understand that are more notorious among many initiatives at the analyzed period. As a sample for these successful implementations, we chose to start with the one the reverberated the most in the Global Scenario, The BRICS New Development Bank plus the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

Following that, comes the financial cooperation Mechanisms the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, plus the BRICS Banking Forum and BRICS Business Council, and the ongoing plans for a BRICS Energy Union proposed by Russia.

Afterwards, we discuss on big play of the BRICS that brings the platform to the society level of interaction the People-to-people Exchanges: where we will highlight the BRICS University Network and The Academic Forum; the BRICS Film Festivals; the BRICS Youth Expert Society (BRICS YES); the BRICS E-commerce Working Group and the BRICS Women Business Alliance (WBA).

Concluding with the academic and statistic sphere where we present the BRICS Think Thank Council (BRICS BTTC); the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication; the BRICS National Institutes of Statistics.

4.1. From Outcast to New Hope: the BRICS New Development Bank + Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA)

Despite the BRICS member countries having an international charter and therefore making it hard to make the classification of its nature, they are managing to form and maintain some intuitional bodies together. For example, The New Development Bank, by means of the Agreement on The New Development Bank, was done and signed in Fortaleza-Brazil, on the 15th of July 2014. The aforementioned document is constituted of nine chapters, disposing of fifty articles and two attachments. The headquarters of the NDB (New Development Bank) is located in Shanghai, with an initial capital of a 100 billion USD, and with voting power equal to the member shares in the capital stock of the bank, with open membership to United Nations member and to borrowing and non-borrowing member as well.

As stated in the preface of the New Development Bank agreement, the member countries are “...CONVINCED that the establishment of such a Bank would reflect the close relations among the BRICS countries while providing a powerful instrument for increasing their economic cooperation...” Meaning the strengthening of the member countries but also opening the door to an economic and financial alternative to the existing bodies of the financial-economic system. They are aware of the same paragraph by stating they are “...MINDFUL of a context where emerging market economies and developing countries continue to face significant financing constraints to address infrastructure gaps and sustainable development needs...” (Agreement on the New Development Bank, 2014).

Therefore, not only a step forward in the cohesion of the group, by creating another more official bond but also point to a new economic alternative solution not only for the members but also to contribute to the development of other emerging markets from the global south and making possible a new route for global governance.

Although some authors may state that the core reason for this new bank to be created is to counter and face directly the Western institution, the bodies created after Bretton Woods, The World Bank and the FMI.

“It is no coincidence that this new institutionalisation takes place in form of an International Financial Institution (IFI). The past years have been marked by a disappointment of the emerging economies with the existing IFIs and, in particular, with the Bretton Woods Institutions”

(World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund). (Schablitzki, Jan, 2014, p.5).

In general this non-western lined baking initiative is not something brand new BRICS is creating, but they add some strength to this structure framework because of the population, possibilities of change they carry under the BRICS acronym and moreover, having China on their side, which per se is already challenging the Euro-Dollar dominance over the financial-economic markets. “However, it will only constitute an alternative or an added value to the current global supply of 17 multilateral development banks and additional national development banks” (Reisen 2013 as cited in Schablitzki, Jan, 2014, p.7)⁶³

“if the BRICS and consequently the NDB are willing to build up a real alternative to the current development paradigm, including an actual contribution to sustainability, this must not only include the South-South principles of development partnership, but must also avoid the ‘traditional’ lenders’ past mistakes.” (Schablitzki, Jan, 2014, p.12)

Somehow, the BRICS New Development Bank is already trying to avoid the traditional lender’s framework on loans. Starting with the extensive list of criteria of the Bretton woods system to conceive money. BRICS criteria are far less bureaucratic and far from the democratic alignment, opening the scope to other states that may not really comply or fit in those criteria. However, that could also present a weakness if this range is too loosen, when it comes to inadimplance of the pays back, and that BRICS cannot really create new rules for banking but working on the current lines one less restrained and strict. The

“Experiences from each of the BRICS nations show that development finance by the NDB will likely be free of political conditionality. Thus, the NDB will certainly be more attractive for developing countries in the South, which are dissatisfied with the interventionist governance of the World Bank and the RDBs.” (Schablitzki, Jan, 2014, p.11).

This freedom of political conditionality would allow some emergent countries that did not have the possibility to access to Bretton Woods institutions money, and that is positive on BRICS favor on fostering the South-South cooperation and strengthening their respective regions, the Global South Framework or even other possible future BRICS partners.

⁶³ Reisen original work is in German Language.

In Regards the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), “The CRA is a framework for the provision of support through liquidity and precautionary instruments in response to actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures.” (Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, 2014, article 1°). The initial total committed resources of the CRA shall be one hundred billion dollars of the United States of America (USD 100 billion), with individual commitments as follows: i. China – USD 41 billion ii. Brazil – USD 18 billion iii. Russia – USD 18 billion iv. India – USD 18 billion v. South Africa – USD 5 billion. (Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, 2014, article 2°).

This initiative constitutes a step forward on the bonding of the platform, in case of emergencies to access the funds, and the participation of the members in it is in parity to the level of their economies and agreed on the treat aforementioned, the amount for contribution and for the maximum access to each member, being it as following the article 5° b): i. China shall have a multiplier of 0.5; ii. Brazil shall have a multiplier of 1; iii. Russia shall have a multiplier of 1 iv; India shall have a multiplier of 1; v. South Africa shall have a multiplier of 2. (Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, 2014).

4.2 Cooperation Mechanisms Cooperation Mechanisms: Interbank Cooperation Mechanism+ BRICS Business Council

In regards the BRICS cooperation mechanisms, this subchapter will briefly elaborate on the BRICS Interbank Cooperation, the BRICS Business Council and at last the BRICS Energy Union. This part will be focused on the economic initiatives. Starting by the the BRICS Inter-Bank Cooperation Mechanism, “one the main purposes of cooperation is to set up a scheme designed to provide financing and banking services for future investment projects that could be beneficial for the economic development of the BRICS countries.” (VEB.RF, 2015). Being the first step of approximation of BRICS banks before their common New Development Bank, had the goal to stimulate economical relations among BRICS countries. By interconnection their nationals development banks.

“The participants of the BRICS interbank cooperation mechanism are the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), State Corporation «Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)» (Russian Federation), Export-Import Bank of India, China Development Bank Corporation, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).” (VEB.RF, 2015).

The BRICS Business Council “was established during the Fifth BRICS Summit held on 26th - 27th March 2013 in Durban, South Africa. The objective of creating the council was to constitute a platform which will:

- (i) Promote and strengthen business, trade and investment ties amongst the business communities of the five BRICS countries;
- (ii) Ensure that there is regular dialogue between the business communities of the BRICS nations and the Governments of the BRICS countries; and
- (iii) Identify problems and bottlenecks to ensure greater economic, trade and investment ties amongst the BRICS countries and recommend solutions accordingly.”(BRICS BUSINESS COUNCIL).

The BRICS Business Council is constituted of:

“Nine working groups in the areas of Infrastructure, Manufacturing, Financial Services, Energy & Green Economy, Skills Development, Agribusiness, Deregulation, Regional Aviation and Digital Economy

have been formed under the aegis of the BRICS Business Council. The main objectives of these Working Groups are to facilitate interaction amongst businesses with a view to better understand the market opportunities and build synergies based on their respective competitive strengths and to promote industrial development and job creation.”(BRICS BUSINESS COUNCIL).

4.3 BRICS People-to-people Exchanges:

This subchapter will elaborate on the BRICS field of advantage to maintain inter-connectivity among the intra-BRICS cooperation, approaching the social sphere, in this way bringing the BRICS people together and attempting to build a BRICS sense of belonging through the People-to-people exchanges. In this regards generating cultural and social engagement among the BRICS citizens.

In the lining up of the many initiatives, on the field of arts, culture, sports, and more, our research chooses to highlight the following: the BRICS University Network plus the Academic Forum; the BRICS Film Festivals; the BRICS Youth Expert Society – BRICS YES and at last the BRICS Women Business Alliance (WBA).

The BRICS University Network and the Academic Forum, before all, are the ones responsible to put the BRICS relations forward by investigating, elaborating studies and research on evaluating BRICS relations and foreseeing new areas to extend the cooperation of the platform.

“The BRICS Network University (BRICS NU) is a network of the BRICS member countries' higher education institutions engaged in cooperation and joining the BRICS NU (hereinafter BRICS NU participants). BRICS NU is an educational project aimed at developing, preferentially, bilateral/multilateral short-term joint training, master's and PhD programmes along with joint research projects in various knowledge fields according to common standarts and quality criteria, given recognition of the learning outcomes by BRICS NU participants as per national criteria.” (BRICS Network University).

The main activities of the BRICS NU are: (i)Offering in conformity with own laws Masters and PhD. programmes; short-term training and modular courses; (ii) Development and implementation of joint research projects, innovative activity within the frames of educational programmes; (ii) Organization of the academic mobility if students, the university faculty and staff of the BRICS NU participants. (BRICS Network University). Remarking that this one of BRICS initiatives that may help on the build up a most feasible and structured formal Organization of BRICS platform into something more robust in the future.

In regard the BRICS Academic Forum was established in 2009, in the first meeting of BRICS countries' academic experts, held in Yekaterinburg, Russia. (BRICS India, 2021)

“The BRICS Academic Forum (BAF) is a platform for deliberations and discussions among the leading academic institutions of BRICS countries. The forum strengthens dialogue amongst the academic communities and proposes ideas and solutions on the numerous social, environmental and educational issues.” (BRICS India, 2021).

Highlight what Oliver Stuenkel (2015) point out that “Great ideas about the future of BRICS cooperation may indeed appear in individual papers, but they are unlikely to make it into the final declaration for lack of consensus. (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015).”

Those papers are written by researchers and thinkers of the 5 member countries and support BRICS at their summits to decide on the future of the cooperation as well as define new areas for cooperation. Among those ideas that may not arrive to the final documents, they might come in handy to the next phases of the BRICS platform process of development whenever the members reach a consensus over their needs. As a matter of example of some of those ideas has led later on into the BRICS Youth Forum which would later become the BRICS Youth Expert Society or Simple BRICS YES.

Advancing to the BRICS Film Festival, constituted by movies produced by BRICS members, the Festival:

“was first organised by India in New Delhi from 2-6 September 2016, wherein twenty films (4 each from BRICS countries) were screened. On the closing day, an international jury comprising the eminent personalities with cinematic excellence of the BRICS countries presented awards in five categories, Best Film - Thithi (India); Best Actor Male - Thabo Rametsi (South Africa); Best Actor Female - Yulia Pereslid (Russia); Best Director - Hua Jianqi (China); and Best Jury - Phillipe Barcinski (South Africa).” (BRICS India, 2021).

The “BRICS Film Festival is a popular event among cinema lovers and the public in general, and acts as an important platform for promoting films of BRICS countries.” (BRICS India, 2021). Further than that, the festival is one of the many actions to join the BRICS civil society together, promoting better integration among BRICs nationals, true the love and passion for the beautiful art of movies.

At last, the BRICS Women Business Alliance (WBA), is the Business network for female females in BRICS countries, aiming to promote Women's entrepreneurship, the inclusion of Women's Businesses and the promotion of value global chain of the BRICS countries Women.

“The initiative of establishing the BRICS Women's Business Alliance (WBA) was proposed at the First International Women's Congress of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS member states on July 4, 2017. In the framework of the Russian BRICS Chairmanship, the Inaugural Meeting of the BRICS WBA took place on July 20, 2020.” (BRICS WBA).

The Initiative has five areas of activity, the Innovative Development, Healthcare, Food and environmental safety, Inclusive Economy and Creative Industries and Tourism. Divided into 5 national chapter, each one corresponding to one member of BRICS, Brazilians, Russians, Indians, and South Africa Women who have found their own businesses, are CEOs, or aiming to enter the international market.

4.4 The Academic and Statistic Cooperation:

The BRICS Think Tanks Council, or BTTC refers to “the bond between BRICS countries by declaring our mutual intention to cooperation in research, knowledge sharing, capacity building and policy advice.” (Declaration on Establishment of the BRICS Think Tanks Council, 2013). The Council is comprised by Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA – Brasil); National Committee for BRICS Research (NRC – Russia); Observer Research Foundation (ORF – India); China Center for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS – China) and Human Science Research Council (HSRC – South Africa).

There are many studies and documents about BRICS that are performed by them. Furthermore, they work aside with the 5 BRICS National Institutes of Statistics on the production of the BRICS annual Joint Statistic Publications. Together, they hold direct influence on BRICS’ decisions on the next areas of cooperation to follow and on the recommendations to be followed. The idea for the BRICS Think Tanks Council comes directly out of the BRICS Forum from 2009 and now constitutes one of the most important BRICS bodies.

5. Challenges: Unity in Diversity or Diversely disunited?

Aforementioned in this research, one of the main challenges for BRICS is its coordination, and how there are and will tackle their discrepancies and divergences to achieve a strong unity in their diversity. What if they will remain diversely disunited and in line with the unit's goals leading them to failure of the platform, losing its power and influence to be a catalyst for a more democratic world order, and crumbling from the inside, because they were not capable of coordinate 5 members and aspired to be the leaders of the Global South. "These discrepancies underline the fact that the current status and future ambitions of the BRICS on the international scene vary significantly among and across the five countries." (GROSS, Eva, 2013 p.3).

There are huge abyss between Russia – China and Brazil, India South Africa. Politically, economically and historically. From their structure to their formation, they normally would not be able to agree or coordinate in any field.

"Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council – Russia very much an 'old' great power with a post- imperial perception and legacy, and China simultaneously an established and an emerging power, both a developing and a financially rich country that, by all expectations, is going to play a pivotal role in world affairs in the years to come." (GROSS, Eva, 2013 p.3)

Russia and China seem to be the financial paternal figures of the platform and that may seem that they are providing money to achieve their own means with the projection BRICS give in terms of giant numbers and statistics. Their reasons to use the BRICS platform always raise the critical theory of international relations posed by Robert Cox, that an idea is serving someone to a purpose and a mean, leading us to question those big potencies means.

When it comes to the less "experienced" and more democratic freedom members, "by contrast, Brazil, India and now also South Africa see and use the BRICS framework as a means to foster their individual ambitions to great/regional power status and legitimise, albeit indirectly, their own individual bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC on behalf of their respective continents." (GROSS, Eva, 2013 p.3)

Brazil, India and South Africa make part of other different platforms together because they are 'three large pluralistic, multicultural and multiracial societies from three continents as a purely South-South grouping of like-minded countries, committed to inclusive sustainable

development, in pursuit of the well-being for their peoples and those of the developing world'. (GROSS, Eva, 2013 p.4)

Despite the disparity in their backgrounds, formation, history as a nation, political conjectures, the BRICS are managing to make their cooperation grow stronger and resist the proof of time, "although often diluted by convergence on the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs." (GROSS, Eva, 2013 p.3). Serving as a consultative and cooperation platform focusing on what they can agree more than on what they can disagree on, and preserving their national interests by not creating or forming any kind of formal commitment to the group.

Therefore, there is unity, there are divergences and sometimes disunity but their differences are to be seen as a strength, as they had many reasons to not function well. Although they may slow down the power of the platform it did not stagnate them and seems that will not stop them even if they face some periods of inactivity before and if they have to face more in the future.

5.1 The Chinese Global Agenda

This subchapter's aim is to talk in specific of a common challenge that China imposes to the other BRICS members. "China radiates a fear psychosis rather than friendly feelings" (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.). Backing China on surpassing the United States on economic and power matters is one thing that the BRICS platform may do by tackle the core of reshaping the Global Governance. This may bring a doubt that in the future China might be an unstoppable power, and the BRICS could had been just a tool to achieve it.

Although that is a valid concert, this is not the only one. It is the bigger picture of the member's concerns or might be the point western authors critic the most as a weak spot, the Chinese personal Global Agenda, and its national interests.

"It is feared that should China replace the US as the global hegemon, it could become the most immediate security threat to Russia. The relationship thus remains one-sided and before long Beijing may start acting as a kingmaker if not the king. It is this realisation perhaps that better explains Moscow's moves to engage Asian states like Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.)"

China becoming the next world's lead can provide two outcomes to the BRICS. In the first instance positive benefits, on the second hand they can represent a treat to national markets. Attar Rabbani expresses that it already raises concerns in South Africa. These

"Concerns have also been growing in South Africa with regard to its relations with China. Cheap Chinese imports have already forced the closure of several textile mills, besides creating a huge trade imbalance. Due to the onslaught of these goods, public protests broke out in several parts of the country. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.)"

The China–Russia partnership is also a marriage of convenience rather than a philosophical commitment to collective endeavours. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.) On the next subchapter we will explore more this Sino-Russo border conflicts, but there are the main power on BRICS and until the platform is convenient for both and serves their national interests this marriage will last. Until now their need each other to maximize their influence on the international community, if the time they don't really need each other might arrive, the situation may change and the possibilities of a cession on BRICS may appear.

Attar Rabbani further reinforces that Russia is not the only one concerned about China, when he poses that South Africa sees its "towns and cities in these countries are flooded with cheap Chinese goods. Local manufacturers fear social "fads" of buying low-cost Chinese goods

at the expense of homemade quality products. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.). These concerns do not stop on South Africa, even “India has imposed antidumping duties on a number of Chinese imports to cushion its small businesses. Moreover, China has garnered large profits from intra-south trade operations with others lagging behind.” (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.).

For Brazil is no different, “a growing economic nationalism in Brazil, Russia and India has sprung from the fear of one economy undermining the other. Friction between China and Brazil has worsened despite bilateral trade growing” (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.). Even further with the critics and strong approach to China of the current President Jair Bolsonaro with the right-wing government treat China with hardship statements.

However, those concerns being raised , it does not dimes that

“without China, the BRICS are a toothless tiger. Not only is China the second largest economy worldwide in terms of total GDP but also one of the fastest growing, having 8-12 % real growth rates for eleven consecutive years now. Not surprisingly, today China is also the biggest and most influential actor among BRICS concerning international development cooperation.” (MORAZÁN, Pedro; KNOKE, Irene; KNOBLAUCH, Doris; SCHÄFER, Thobias, 2012, p.13).

The presence of China in BRICS is per se a game changer for the good or for the bad. China’s powerful presence in the world cannot be denied, and their domestic agenda will undoubtedly after the Global Agenda somehow, “according to the white paper on China’s foreign aid, by the end of 2009 a total of 161 countries and 30 organizations benefited from Chinese aid.” (MORAZÁN, Pedro; KNOKE, Irene; KNOBLAUCH, Doris; SCHÄFER, Thobias, 2012, p.13). Therefore, uncertain, concerns, challenges, and possibilities about their positioning in BRICS will be a constant for a state with that level of engagement and Global interests.

“It will be important to observe whether in the near future the cooperation path undertaken by the BRICS component countries can consolidate or even include some new emerging countries, revitalizing also other cooperation instruments such as, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or if the policy of each country individual will prevail, or if China, which to date has shown a more marked

dynamism, will acquire a leading role and leadership vis-à-vis other countries.” (ZUCCA, Fabrizio, 2016, p.86).⁶⁴

According to Fabrizio Zucca, There are very few doubts that China is the main leader of BRICS, but their Realpolitik is a bit hard to prevent when they have this dualism on attacking internationally and defending on domestic levels. Therefore, their position is hard to read on when they are posing a conflicting threat or just a defensive move. “By adopting this behavior, China does not want to give the image of itself as a revisionist country acting solely for its specific interest, but that of a moderate country that within a collective framework can contribute to reform of the international governance system without challenging its status” (ZUCCA, Fabrizio, 2016, p.90).⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Traslate by the author, orginal reads: “Sarà importante osservare se nel prossimo futuro il percorso di cooperazione intrapreso dai paesi componenti i BRICS potrà consolidarsi o addirittura includere alcuni nuovi paesi emergenti, rivitalizzando anche altri strumenti di cooperazione come, ad esempio, la Shanghai Cooperation Organisation oppure se prevarrà la politica di ogni singolo paese o se la Cina, che ad oggi ha dimostrato un dinamismo più marcato, acquisirà un molo di primo piano e di leadership nei confronti degli altri paese.”

⁶⁵ Translated by the author, Original reads: Adottando questo comportamento la Cina non vuole dare l'immagine di sé come un paese revisionista che agisce unicamente per il suo interesse specifico, ma quella di un paese moderato che all'interno di un framework collettivo può contribuire alla riforma del sistema di governance internazionale senza per questo sfidarne lo status (ZUCCA, Fabrizio, 2016, p.90).

5.2 Between War and Peace: Border Conflicts

One of the most criticized points on BRICS is their internal divergences. Although this can also be seen as a brilliant thing to link under the same platform adversaries countries who do not have perfect bilateral international relations. That is the case for two of the BRICS members. Therefore, this subchapter is to discuss a bit over China-India relations.

“Known as adversary powers both at bilateral and multilateral levels, China and India have different perceptions and computations with regard to BRICS. The leaderships of the two countries have raised similar and identical concerns at all BRICS meetings, but in different tones and ways.” (PANDA, Jagannath P, 2012, p. 180). Old enemies with conflicts over border having to cooperate, might be a starting path to peaceful harmony or the rise of even more conflicts between them, and that posed a risk for the intra-BRICS relations to blow up from the inside out.

“The complexity of China's and India's rise as Asian and global powers and their complex bilateral relations are a matter of grave concern not only for the sustainability of BRICS, but also to the vision and dialogue of a multipolar world order.” (PANDA, Jagannath P, 2012, p. 176).

“China’s statements that India and China are not threats to each other should be reassuring, but its repeated aggressive moves do not give India much confidence that China means what it says. This lack of confidence in China and the resulting suspicion are only likely to grow given the Chinese adversarial behavior on the ground.” (PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN, rajeswari, The Diplomat, 2022).

Therefore, one of the biggest challenges of BRICS is also a Global threat level. If it becomes unsustainable inside the intra-BRICS, it become also an international community challenge. The possessions of nuclear weapons intensify the risks as the tensions comes and goes throw time.

5.3 United Nations Security Council and the Russian-Crimea situation

Inside the BRICS framework, two of the member possess veto power at the United Nations Security Council, and three of them are still on the campaign to get there. Throughout, all the documents of the BRICS summits, China and Russia expressed support for the accession of Brazil, India, and South Africa to the Security Council, but that is just it, and the status quo remains the same, not more than support statements were done in this sense.

Even though it is part of the very Global North model of governance BRICS stands to fight, Russia and China seem to not do any effort beyond what is convenient to them, when they could do more for the power of the platform. In the same sense, none of the documents expresses anything clear about the Russian-Crimea situation, and the BRICS members avoid any kind of positioning on the subject over the summits.

The joint declarations quote all the Global problems that are happening around the globe and are important to the international community, but this particular one seems a topic that they avoid discussing over the summits, showing that the sovereignty of the countries inside the platform can also hide the dust under the carper at its own convenience. Removing hard topics out of the way, may help the platform not having internal conflicts but presenting to the external, a lack of coherence.

5.4 New Joiners ahead?

This part of the subchapter elaborates on the BRICS being the first of a “letters Soup”. As more of the same is showing up in the international scenario after them e.g. Next11, MINTS, PIGS, CIVETS, and others. Therefore, this part of the research would focus on BRICS expansion and these new initiatives popping up in every corner of our international “soup”. After the BRICS there were other attempts to achieve the same “mythological” status and enjoy the momentum of the Global South governance discourse BRICS initiated, some of these got some strength some were not as happy. That started a big soup of letters popping up from every financial and economic study groups and organizations. Some authors may state this as an attempt to be the next BRICS or to oppose BRICS. However, our research prefers to see a contribution and expansion of the Global South Governance movement.

In the next paragraphs, our research will provide a very short brief on viewing on new acronyms after BRICS, and in a quick way presenting their main idea. Starting by the Next Eleven (N11), “As laid out in our Global Economics Paper No. 153, the N-11 include Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam.” (LAWSON, Sandra; HEACOCK, David, STUPNYTSKA, Anna, 2007, p.161). Those were the countries appointed to be the next BRICS, or in somehow emergent countries that also desire to set free of their western dependence and could lead another platform or help BRICS.

“While the N-11 may not have the same transformative impact on the world economy that the BRICs may realise, they nonetheless present interesting growth stories, and several countries in this group could rival the G7 in time.” LAWSON, Sandra; HEACOCK, David, STUPNYTSKA, Anna, 2007, p. 161).

Talking about The MINT’S, it “refers to the economies of Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey. This acronym was devised by Fidelity Investments in 2011, and popularized in 2013 by Jim O’Neill, the former chief economist of Goldman Sachs. MINT countries were grouped together based the following characteristics: Large populations (primarily under 30 years of age, Demonstration of rapid economic growth; Developing middle class and Entrepreneurialism.” (Library of Congress).

“The Eurozone crisis gave us a new country acronym, the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) to add to the alphabet soup. The term PIGS (or sometimes PIIGS, including Italy) seemed to capture something about countries that were at the epicentre of the European financial crisis.”(LSE, 2014).

The next initiative is the CIVETS, thought to be the next “tigers economies”, “it is an investing acronym for the countries Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, which in the late 2000s were widely regarded as the next emerging market economies that would rise quickly during the coming decades. The acronym CIVETS was coined in 2009 at the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in London.” (BLESSING, Elizabeth, 2022).

BRICS started a movement of change, and it inspires other initiatives to also follow this trend chain of changes, and to look for new opportunities out the western sphere the cast the emergent economies aside for a long time. However, some of them did not gain much momentum from their inspiration on BRICS, may be it because of artificial built up of characteristics contrast that did not really exist or a lack of political capabilities to create and maintain a coherent discourse and minimal cohesion of the groups.

Therefore, our research understands that those new initiatives could have the potential to add to the framework BRICS initiated, there should not exist the sense of one nullify the other but cooperation of these platforms. Eventually “the BRICS platform could become a hub in international law, while the idea of multi-hub system with issue-specific leadership of each of BRICS states should be developed further. (BRICS Think Tank Council, 2017, p.69). The idea of having a multi-hub of platforms, if the other initiatives succeed can also contrast with the idea of BRICS enlarging or even the other platform enhancing too.

The BRICS enlarging is one of the most debated ideas, in academic, financial and economic studies, forums , and journalistic pieces. Everyone wonder what will be the next step for BRICS platform, even the BRICS itself. The report: *Realizing the BRICS long-term goals: Road-maps and pathways* from BRICS Thinks Tanks Council from 2017, presents ideas for the future if BRICS. “In the area of capacity and institutional building of BRICS, the following steps can be taken over the next five to six years: • Introduce other nations into the group as permanent observers or partners for dialogue (suggested list of countries would include Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, Turkey, Iran, Nigeria, Egypt).” (BRICS Think Tanks Council, 2017, p. 84)

At times before this 2017 study, BRICS was not open to the idea of enlargement, seeing that as a non-needed step. Even after some studies suggested that South Africa was not the best addition to the platform, and that there were better candidates for that position. Some of those above quoted countries had appeared before, as better fits for BRIC. Although the platform has not showing that they were not ready (or even willing) to enlargement after South Africa. There are already potential candidates on the status of observers or partners of BRICS platform, and they may be in hopes of holding a position aim for an eventual future BRICS enlargement.

6. Chapter's Conclusion

The conjecture for the BRICS rising at 2008 were somehow perfect timing to aggregate deep value in the 4 letters acronym, Almost like a warning message “**Be Ready International Systems we are Coming Straight to a New Governance model**”.

BRICS no doubt intends to shape global governance through better coordination and its nations do have some converging geopolitical interests. (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.) However, in doing so they will have to coordinate in a more effective way their national goals with the intra- BRICS, as well as delimitating or generating a new framework to rely on, when it comes to clearly define its nature, purposes and power structure. The lack of a charter has strong advantages when it comes to no commitments and no strings attached can be a positive direction to changes in the Global Governance. In the other hand could also turn on a road walking backwards where everybody is participating in a club that play for its national interest only, and may dimes what has already accomplished by the International Organizations.

“The major challenge for BRICS has always been, and continues to be, the articulation of a common vision. Without the ability to find a common denominator, there is little reason to organize yearly summits to debate global issues. From the very beginning, critics of the BRICS outfit have argued that such a vision was an impossible dream.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2012 p.1).

The “dream” is not as impossible as some would think about; it might be in some ways impractical and not well coordinated enough to achieve the standards it proposed to live for. Although the primase for sovereignty over formal commitment might trick the mind of intellectual of International Relations and its Organizations, but this striver for a common denominator did not stop BRICS on the run of 13 years so far.

It is very unlike that BRICS will became a formal structured International Organization like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treat Organization or any other in the same level or similar. However it may adapt some of the characteristic of those Organizations, it is not stated that they want to became a reflection of those intuitions in the Global South.

“Rather than turning into a “NATO of the South” or a European Union – type grouping, BRICS is perhaps more interested in less rigid models like those of the G7 or the Organisation for European Economic

Cooperation (OECD). At the same time, given its unique history and geographic characteristics, BRICS will have to chart its own path.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2012 p.2).

Our “Unicorn” in the room will have two possible outcomes then, find or creating (like it already) its own path and International Organizations theory class, but further more than that a consistent and effective framework to operate under it.

“Internal differences in some areas do not reduce the utility of the BRICS concept as a whole. Quite to the contrary, different points of views, a commitment to free debate and a willingness to learn from each other are key reasons why BRICS’s continued existence makes a great deal of sense. Even as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, the global debate remains dangerously one-sided and centered on Western points of view.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2012 p.2).

In the periods where BRICS are less active, it may seem that they are getting weaker and weaker and that the platform of cooperation will cease to exist. Even though, “so far, the BRICS has failed to emerge as a major actor on the world stage when it comes to a wide array of global and regional challenges.” (Stronski, Paul; Sokolsky Richard, 2020, p.19)

Although in contrast to that some authors may say that “Still, despite all these caveats, the BRICS have (sort of) stood the test of time. While not all four BRIC economies have grown at the expected rate, in actual policy and institutional terms the BRICS grouping has endured and expanded its ambitions, even if the results have yet to be gauged (and monitored)” (GROSS, Eva, 2013 p.4).

“The US in particular may continue to dominate world affairs for some time, given its still towering financial and military muscle, which could force BRICS to adjust to existing geostrategic equations rather than oppose them. Whether BRICS really rivals the G-7 by 2032 is a question only the future can answer but as things stands today, it seems that member states may part ways sooner rather than later.” (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.79).

“In retrospect, expectations about the speed of change were certainly somewhat exaggerated, largely because many analysts presented long-term predictions based on extrapolations on the unusually high growth rates in the emerging world at the time.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.5). The initial studies for BRICS foresaw a 50 years analysis of change, it did not even predict or not even could that those countries would constitute a

platform, and so early then the initial provision are already expecting exaggerated results from the platform without accounting for their domestic challenges and the unpredictable global challenge of 2019.

“The BRICS as the world’s largest economic zone is undoubtedly destined to play a significant role in world economics and politics in the years to come but its influence will not manifest any time soon even as member states individually continue to rise in the international power hierarchy by increasing their gross domestic products, military clout and diplomatic influence.” (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.79).

It is true that all the significant positives aspects of the BRICS were taking in to consideration for those studies, maybe there was just a gap not accounted for on their domestic peculiarities. Such as corruption, poverty and inequality on society and many other factors that could slow down this process in the race to pass the faster “western cars” that are longer time in this race.

Although some can say that “their current foreign policy behaviour and strategy does indicate that BRICS is really weak, an ad-hoc and time-serving phenomenon in the larger power politics. (P. PANDA, Jagannath, 2012 p.181). “The ‘club’ may or may not last – in its present or another formation – but it is a wake-up call for the EU to deepen its bilateral relations with individual BRICS and possibly reconsider its own position in the emerging system of global governance.” (GROSS, Eva, 2013 p.2)

It is possible that “BRICS could become a distant memory if growth figures decline across the spectrum.” (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.) After all, they have already done, one thing is true: “the BRICS platform now forms part of the landscape of global governance.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.9), and it won’t settle just for repercussion and fading away, it won’t be in the speed foreseen, but the came to stay, until when, that’s what we have to wait. Even if “BRICS is thus poised to confront a moment of truth—either it adapts, develops and evolves or remains a footnote in the history of international politics.” (RABBANI, Attar, 2017 p.79). They have already built a way towards a new model of governance more inclusive to the Global South, which is not a simple task to accomplish in 10 years as some analysts expect to happen, changing a whole framework of the system. If O’Neill is right, BRICS still have 28 years to do so.

CHAPTER II:
THE GLOBAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF BRICS:
ANALYZING BRAZIL PARTICIPATION FROM 2010 TO 2020

In our research, we will deconstruct the influence of Brazil in BRICS from 2010 to 2020 using a qualitative study method. The interconnectedness of Brazil's interior politics and foreign politics reflecting on the development of BRICS. The Chapter will consist in six subchapters, being 5 of the periods of time and four different Brazilian governments at this range. The division of the following subchapters follows the key political figure and their respective political parties through the interconnectedness of interior and foreign policy of Brazil faced with the international obligations demanded from BRICS.

The first one being 2010, with the Presidency of Luís Inácio "Lula" da Silva; the second from 2011 to 2014 and after 2014 to 2016, undertaking the two governments of Dilma Rousseff until her Impeachment. Afterwards the 2017 provisory government of Michel Temer (Rousseff's Vice President) and, at last the on-going government of President Jair Messias Bolsonaro 2018 until 2020 (half of his mandate). The last part of this section will be the chapter's conclusion.

The Brazilian PEI - Independent Foreign Policy (or as reads in Portuguese: Política Externa Independente), became something no government of Brazil can be indifferent towards it, or you follow in line with it or you move way from its goals.

"The so-called Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) was implemented during the governments of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, from 1961 to 1964. PEI represented an important change in the conduct of Brazil's foreign affairs: opening up to Eastern European countries and of Africa, in addition to the effective engagement in the issues of the so-called Third World countries, configured a new modality of international insertion of the country, whose landmarks extended for decades in the elaboration of the foreign policy of Brazil." (BARROS NUNES, Aurimar Jacobino de, 1999).

Therefore, in this sense after Quadros and Goulart's government, no other government could be indifferent to the Independent Foreign Policy, they either follow it or ignore it completely. The Independent Foreign Policy poses a landmark to Brazilian Foreign policy, on

the sense that it can be analyzed straight away under the light of, following the PEI or distancing from it.

The BRICS platform can be seen as a movement of the Independent Foreign Policy, as it brings Brazilian political alignment away from the Western-European mainstream powers of international relations and moves Brazil to relations with more emergent markets economies. Keeping that in mind, from every time period and its main political actor, our research will use the precepts of the Independent Foreign Policy to enhance our analyzes of how close or far from the PEI they presented themselves using the BRICS as parameters to the relations North-South.

The subchapters structure will consist on the briefly introducing the head of state on the observed time frame, understanding who is this leader how did he/she came into power, the political party, elections and election promises and their official political standpoint of Brazil towards BRICS during the time period of his/her mandate. As well as analyzing how they positioned Brazil towards BRICS, taking in account the advantages, disadvantages, incidents, scandals, support levels and any other key point that helps our research to better understand each government's interests on BRICS. In this way, helping us to assemble the necessary understanding to achieve an answer to our research question, on whether "Was Brazil a key member of BRICS during the time frame of 2010 to 2020". The Chapter's conclusion will assemble the most important remarks about the "B" on BRICS.

“...the consensus with the BRICS can be used as an analytical framework to outline points of approximation and departure in the international alignment with the group and, from that, the methodology used could contribute to the perception of variations and/or continuities in Brazilian multilateral behavior.” (Holleben, Raquel de, 2021).⁶⁶

In this sense, the focus of these subchapters is to understand beyond the Brazilian performance, but also the benefits and burdens of being in a BRICS member to each government. The challenges and opportunities the conjecture and their approach to the BRICS platform has brought or not Brazil as well as understanding key moments where Brazil could have step up or down in being more decisive towards intra-BRICS cooperation development.

⁶⁶ Translated by the author, original reads: o consenso com o BRICS pode ser utilizado como um referencial analítico para delinear pontos de aproximação e afastamento no alinhamento internacional com o grupo e, a partir disso, a metodologia empregada pôde contribuir para a percepção de variações e/ou continuidades no comportamento multilateral brasileiro.

2.1 Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva – The Beginning

The Presidency of Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva contains the beginning of the BRICS. His first mandate from marks from was from 2003 to 2006 and the second from 2007 to 2011. For our research the initial years of this government does not make into our spatially scope, as it is very much tied with the creation of BRICS of which much is include in the chapter one of this work.

Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva, President number 35^o of the Federative Republic of Brasil, affiliate to the Worker’s Party (Partido do Trabalhador – PT), a Brazilian left-wing party. Born in very humble family in Garanhuns⁶⁷ in 1945, a metallurgical worker, syndicalist and afterward President of his nation.

“It is no exaggeration to say that during the two terms of the President Lula a qualitative leap has taken place in Brazilian foreign policy. At general orientation and in the determination and intensity with which its objectives were persecuted, our diplomacy resumed its emphasis on autonomy and pluralism.” (DANTAS, San Tiago. 2011 p. 283).⁶⁸

His second mandate is marked by distancing Brazil’s foreign policy from the Western-European axis, and reaching for more cooperation with the emerging economies. Together with his minister of international affairs, Celso Amorim, they play key roles on the articulation of the BRICS formation and external image, but

“interestingly enough, neither Lula nor Amorim successfully convinced Brazilian commentators of the importance of the grouping. In 2008, the BRICs played virtually no role in Brazil’s domestic debate, and was by most seen as a misguided project to align Brazil with Asian powers.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.20).

⁶⁷ Same hometown as the author. The exact place where he was born is now emancipated and constitute a new city called Caetés.

⁶⁸ Translated by the author, original reads: Não é exagerado dizer que durante os dois mandatos do Presidente Lula um salto qualitativo tenha ocorrido na política externa brasileira. Na orientação geral e na determinação e intensidade com que seus objetivos foram perseguidos, nossa diplomacia retomou sua ênfase em autonomia e pluralismo.

The Brazilian domestic view on BRICS did not reach the same level of Prestige then the international one. Although the Brazilian figure posed key roles on articulating BRICS image and discourse internationally, they failed on the domestic level. Over the fallacy, that Brazil is selling itself to Asian countries. “Throughout the Lula da Silva government, it was possible to perceive a very high convergence of Brazil with the BRICS (an average of 94%), and a strong divergence from the North American position.” (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p.33)⁶⁹

“At the same time similar approaches, typical for "the third world", were accompanied by the concept of “constructive nationalism”, whose meaning consisted in the fact that the time had come for Brazil to “learn to be a great power” (ASTÁKHOVA, Elena V; ASTÁKHOV, Evgueny M, 2019 p.10). Brazil under the presidency of Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva wanted to play a bigger global role, as aspired to reach the Global Player level, and let it clear that it intended to be among the great powers.

The main principles of Lula government is highlight by San Tiago Dantas (2011) when states that:

“Defending the system's normative integrity and political diversity international level, as well as the cause of social progress as the ultimate meaning of diplomatic action, form the lines of force of the pluralist tradition of Brazilian foreign policy. Seen from this perspective, active foreign policy and haughty government of Lula can be understood in the broader of Brazilian republican diplomacy. (DANTAS, San Tiago. 2011 p. 283-284).⁷⁰

In light of this, the BRICS played a great role in favor of these Brazilian interests, not only would lead the country away from the Western-European dependence but opening a great opportunity to insert Brazil into the global bigger picture. Allowing Brazil not to align its policy

⁶⁹ Translated by the author, original reads: “ao longo do Governo Lula da Silva, pôde-se perceber uma altíssima convergência do Brasil com o BRICS (uma média de 94%), e uma forte divergenciada posição norte-americana.”

⁷⁰ Translated by the author, the original reads: “A defesa da integridade normativa e diversidade política do sistema internacional, bem como a causa do progresso social como sentido último da ação diplomática, conformam as linhas de força da tradição pluralista da política externa brasileira. Vista por essa perspectiva, a política externa ativa e altiva do Governo Lula pode ser compreendida no panorama mais amplo da diplomacia republicana brasileira.”

to the mainstream of governance power moreover, providing the possibility of positioning itself as a regional leader in South America.

The conjecture moment of Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva mandates, and his diplomatic corps articulation found the best scenario possible to boost their way on to the international spotlights. The Subprime crisis affecting the great economic powers of the world, and the Global South movement under the BRICS extra official forums and dialogues ascending, assuming the form of a new institution to rise and promote voice to the non-heard. The window of opportunity was great and that explains a lot of Brazil’s interaction and convergence to BRICS in the initial years, and “yet while Brazil had seemed like the weakest and least adequate member of the grouping, President Lula’s capacity to articulate the BRICS’ position during the crisis in international fora proved to be an important asset.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.20). In this period, which account from around 2005 until 2010, we see one Brazil that was “acting many times as a mediator, from the BRICS Brazil gains international visibility and legitimizes its ability to exercise a political profile in the international community.”⁷¹(GRANGEIRO DE SOUSA, Melissa Rejane, 2014 p7). We perceived a Brazil engaged with BRICS on the extent of becoming one of the main pillars of the platform, and activity campaigning for the unity of the platform as it would also project them even stronger in the international scenario. Moreover, “many officials pointed to the Brazilian president and his foreign ministers’ adroitness and ability to build a common BRICs narrative.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.20).

By far it looks like the skyrocketing moment for the emergent markets, the great economies unstable and the emergent marketing rising, and the BRICS countries were not really being affected by the crisis of 2008 and showing some strength, the road of “Golden BRICS” shinning bright as the BRICS discourse gained power and traction on a global level. Although the way to “Oz’s lands” was longer than expected and there was not enough “Golden” on BRICS when 2011 arrives with the change of Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva presidency to his political party companion Dilma Rousseff.

⁷¹ Translated by the author, original reads: Atuando muitas vezes como mediador, a partir dos BRICS o Brasil ganha visibilidade internacional e legitima sua habilidade de exercer um perfil político na comunidade internacional.

2.2. Dilma Rousseff (2010 – 2014): The new hope

Dilma Rousseff, the first female president of Brazilian nation. Marking a New Hope for Brazilian governance and the expectations that the way of making politics would be different for the better, a lot was expected from her taking this challenging task on the shoulders. Her presidential campaign had strong points on the discourse of having the first woman in charge of the country, but also because it was backup by the previous president Lula. Her government was a direct continuity of the Worker's party left wing government.

Her victory was not easy, but the worker's party manage to give continuity to the eight years of Lula. Followed by more four years of Dilma and consequently her re-election for more four, abruptly interrupted after her Coup D'état/Impeachment⁷², her first mandate turned out to be composed more of challenges than the hopes that were built around it.

It is clear that Rousseff's government somehow sought to continue Lula's foreign policies, however, despite the partisan connection, it is clear that the two rulers have wide-ranging differences in the way they conduct this policy. While Lula had a much more active attitude, her successor was already much more restrained, impersonal, immediate and less active. (ARAÚJO RIBEIRO, Antônia De Jesus, 2017?).⁷³

The promises of more progress on the Global level of more Brazilian insertion as a global player soon become one of the weak spots of her mandate. Her Government soon started to be criticized as a puppet government for the ex-president Lula, and her Independent foreign policy started to move a bit away from the BRICS. Soon “at the dawn of Dilma's government, approximation projects with the United States, in the expectation of economic dividends and with the objective of reversing the adverse climate prevailing in the last years of the mandate

⁷²This poses a very controversial topic to be discussed in the next subchapter.

⁷³ Translated by the author, original reads: É notório que o governo de Rousseff buscou de uma certa forma dar continuidade às políticas externas de Lula, porém, apesar da ligação partidária, percebe-se que os dois governantes possuem escancaradas divergência na forma de conduzir essa política. Enquanto Lula possuía uma atitude bem mais ativa, a sua sucessora já era bem mais contida, impessoal, imediatista e menos ativa.

from Lula.”(NETO, Walter Antonio Desiderá, 2018, p.30)⁷⁴.

Moreover, the Western-European axis were recovering from the subprime crisis, and the opening BRICS had before started to be filled again, posing a stronger challenge for the BRICS platform performance. As the curtains seemed to start closing for BRICS as the space, where they could occupy in as an alternative to the current economic framework started to dim, the Independent Foreign Policies of Dilma. Two key points get the interest for the United States to shift tone in relations with Brazil, they were the energetic power with Brazilian ethanol and the pre-salt. Later on, “these two signs of new paths for Dilma's foreign policy proved illusory. In both cases, the PEB lines were divergent those first signs, with concrete damage to the development and country image.” (NETO, Walter Antonio Desiderá, 2018, p.30).⁷⁵

This United States interest sooner cooled off after the Cyber Attacks scandals and her hard position towards it:

“The president demanded an apology and a commitment that the NSA would stop such practice, similar to the way used by President Obama to address Germany – where there were also acts of espionage – and that of his chancellor. In the absence of such a gesture, it was announced that relations between Brazil and the United States would remain distant.” (NETO, Walter Antonio Desiderá, 2018, p.31).⁷⁶

Her government is most remembered by stagnation and “this pattern – in which foreign policy issues are almost assigned always a secondary role – it is linked to two management

⁷⁴ Translated by the author, original read: “no alvorecer do governo Dilma, projetos de aproximação com os Estados Unidos, na expectativa de dividendos econômicos e com o objetivo de reverter o clima adverso prevalecente nos últimos anos do mandato de Lula.”

⁷⁵ Translated by the author, original reads: Essas duas sinalizações de novos caminhos para a política externa de Dilma se demonstraram ilusórias. Em ambos os casos, as linhas da PEB foram divergentes daqueles primeiros sinais, com prejuízos concretos para o desenvolvimento e a imagem do país.

⁷⁶ Translated by the author, original reads: A presidente exigiu um pedido de desculpas e o compromisso de que a NSA interromperia tal prática, de forma similar à utilizada pelo presidente Obama para tratar da Alemanha – onde também ocorreram atos de espionagem – e de sua chanceler. Na ausência de tal gesto, anunciou-se que as relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos se manteriam distantes.

characteristics (and personality) of President Dilma: the lack of interest in foreign policy and the lack of empathy with Itamaraty.” (NETO, Walter Antonio Desiderá, 2018, p.31).⁷⁷

Although on intra-BRICS sense, the last year of her government remarks the BRICS platform coming back to the spotlight of the international community with the raise of the BRICS New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement. Thus, bringing back some fresh New hope to the BRICS platform of continuity on pursuing the task of building the a parallel alternative to global governance.

⁷⁷ Translated by the author, original reads: Esse padrão – em que aos temas de política externa são atribuídos quase sempre um papel secundário – está vinculado a duas características da gestão (e da personalidade) da presidente Dilma: o desinteresse pela política externa e a falta de empatia com o Itamaraty.

2.3. Dilma Rousseff (2014 – 2016): The Beginning of the end?

The boost BRICS got on the global scenario around the subprime crisis, was almost equal in terms of velocity of recovery from the Westerns countries as for the BRICS slow progress due to their own domestic crisis and the non-convergence in some topics and we may also say a lack on the commitment to the platform.

“Brazil symbolizes this best. It has grown at very low rates in 2011–2014, and since then Brazil’s performance can no longer be compared to that of the past decade. (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.20)”. Not only the low growth but also the cold involvement to the platform in comparison to the previous presidency before 2011.

According to Cornetet (2014), As quoted in ARAÚJO RIBEIRO, 2017?, “President Dilma made about 30% less international travel than Lula in his first term and 50% less than that president's second term.”⁷⁸ Still in this sense, ARAÚJO RIBEIRO quotes Lessa (2015) “makes it clear that presidential trips are an interesting measure in terms of valuation given the importance of foreign policy in her government.”⁷⁹ Showing the Importance given to the external relations of both governments, showing a clear lack of interest on behalf of Dilma’s government to external commitments, doing the opposite of Lula on inserting Brazil into the global scenario, this was slowly fading Brazilian participation.

However, the Global political and economic conjecture was not on her favor to Brazilian insertion as a global player and mediator, as some of the contemporary conflicts on the time, topics that limits Brazil’s interaction in security matters, the Arab Spring, the insurgence of the Islamic States terrorist group (ISIS), Gaza conflict and many others. Those were points to make Dilma’s external policy focus on a re-approximation to the United States and a focus on South American Relations rather than keep trying to play on the international level.

⁷⁸ Translated by the author, original reads: Segundo Cornetet (2014), a presidente Dilma realizou cerca de 30% de viagens internacionais a me-nos que o Lula no primeiro mandato e 50% a menos que o segundo mandato desse presidente.

⁷⁹ Translated by the author, original reads: Lessa (2015) deixa claro que as viagens presidenciais são uma medida interessante no que tange à valoração dada a importância da política externa em seu governo. Aplicando esse conceito no governo Rousseff, percebe-se um pretencioso desinteresse por parte da governante, o que Lessa (2015) conclui que quanto mais lento o funcionamento da política externa, mais letos serão os resultados.

Another point that ARAÚJO RIBEIRO, 2017? Raises is that “according to the Rio Branco Institute, between 2003 and 2010, there was a significant increase in vacancies for the Brazilian diplomatic corps during the Lula government, and a very low growth during the Dilma government.” (ARAÚJO RIBEIRO, Antônia De Jesus, 2017?).⁸⁰ Her non-interest in foreign policies affairs is also highlighted by former Ambassador Rubens Ricupero (2014) when he states (reminding that those comment made on bases of Ambassadors waiting for months for the credentials delivery to the president):

“I find it very difficult to have a change in foreign policy, because Dilma has no interest in the area. It's not just diplomacy in capital letters, but it doesn't even get ambassadors to hand over their diplomatic credentials. It is an attitude of absolute disregard that she gives to the entire diplomatic area.” (VEJA,2014).

Despite this disparity with Lula over a lower intensity on the treatment of the president Dilma with her Minister of International Affairs, and a more institutional rather than a personal commitment to this area. Her government was able to main the principal lines of the Worker party was of governing, even if the focus on the BRICS was not the same as before.

However, the birth of the New Development Bank was great and maybe the highest point of government when the subject is the intra-BRICS cooperation and Dilma’s apathetic external policy, marked by the indecision on what side of the Independent Foreign Policy she was going to play on. She could not manage the balance of working on two fronts she ends up “over the wall” not delimitating her position and focusing on the domestic level more than the Global.

Despite her first mandate being marked by corruption scandals, economic stagnation, poor education levels, unsustainable domestic crisis, and one of the biggest protests in Brazilian history (2013), she manages to get re-elected one year later. However, the discontentment with her government was on high rates, domestically and internationally.

Despite her maintaining the political line of her predecessor, the convergence and trade with BRICS countries increasing, and intra-BRICS cooperation and development of apparatus rising, her foreign policy non-ambitious and slow. There is a convergence between her mandates and Lula’s mandates over the BRICS, although some prestigious achievements were

⁸⁰ Translated by the author, original reads: Segundo o Instituto Rio Branco, ainda entre os anos de 2003 a 2010, houve um representativo aumento das vagas para o corpo diplomático brasileiro durante o Governo Lula, e um baixíssimo crescimento durante o governo Dilma

made at the end of her first mandate and starting of the second. Her Independent Foreign Policy already differs from the past government on the sense that it moves from the discourse of total focus and alignment to the South-South cooperation and adopts a more centered foreign position with feel element turning back to the Western-European axis.

“The consensus among the BRICS during the Dilma Rousseff government then showed a slight increase in convergence: an average of around 79% agreement, compared to 76% during the Lula government. It is worth noting that, with the USA, the agreement was also relatively higher: 19%, compared to 11% verified for the previous period. It is therefore confirmed that Brazil maintained a high convergence of votes with the BRICS countries before the UN until 2015, when Rousseff's last AG as president took place, before the impeachment that removed her from office on August 31, 2016, giving rise to start to the Temer government.” (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p. 42).⁸¹

The years of Dilma's mandate were not easy or favorable years for her, not even to Brazil and even less to Brazilian populations as her popularity and the resurgence of protests and all the scandals that lead to her deposition of mandate before the foreseen end of mandate in 31st of December 2017.

“The opposition forces that fought with her in the 2014 elections, unhappy with the defeat (or successive defeats since the 2002 election), began, on the one hand, a series of questioning in judicial instances, such as the action with the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) to revoke the Dilma-Temer ticket; and, on the other hand, they started to fill the legislative agenda with the so-called “bomb agendas”, bills whose matter can directly impact public accounts, as it makes it difficult to reduce expenditures expected to meet the determined by the fiscal

⁸¹ Translated by the author, original reads: “O consenso entre o BRICS durante o governo Dilma Rousseff apresentou então um leve aumento na convergência: uma média de cerca de 79% de concordância, em relação aos 76% verificados no Governo Lula. Cabe destacar que, com os EUA, a concordância foi também relativamente maior: 19%, em relação aos 11% verificados para o período anterior. Confirma-se portanto que o Brasil manteve uma alta convergência de voto com os países do BRICS perante a ONU até 2015, quando ocorreu a última AG de Rousseff como presidenta, antes do *impeachment* que a destituiu do cargo em 31 de agosto de 2016, dando início ao Governo Temer.”

target.” (FERREIRA DA SILVA, Maurício; BENEVIDES, Silvio César; DA SILVA PASSOS, Ana Quele, 2017 p.2).⁸²

However, the legality of the impeachment did not stop the procedure to remove Dilma from the power and even although many authors can say that it may not had been a legal impeachment as it was missing the “main element that, in fact, would assess the legality of this claim, namely, the undisputed proof of the practice of a crime of responsibility.” (FERREIRA DA SILVA, Maurício; BENEVIDES, Silvio César; DA SILVA PASSOS, Ana Quele, 2017 p.2).⁸³ Therefore it would constitute more of a political *coup d'état*, however nothing was, or can be done to change it, and the power change not only hands, but gender, political party and direction.

The vice president coalition Michel Temer, which was from the a more right-wing view, assumed the power after the population was not satisfied with Dilma’s government and with the long run of the worker’s party in the power, and could not bear anymore with all the corruption scandals. Over what is still contemporaneously could be debatable over being a righteous impeachment or an opposition *coup d'état* on a propitious conjecture of dissatisfaction with the current govern.

⁸² Translated by the author, original reads: As forças de oposição que disputaram com ela as eleições de 2014, inconformadas com a derrota (ou sucessivas derrotas desde o pleito de 2002), encetaram, por um lado, uma série de questionamentos nas instâncias judiciais, a exemplo da ação junto ao Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) para cassar a chapa Dilma-Temer; e, por outro, passaram a preencher a agenda do legislativo com as chamadas “pautas bombas”, projetos de lei cuja matéria pode impactar diretamente as contas públicas, pois dificulta a redução de gastos prevista para cumprir o determinado pela meta fiscal.

⁸³ Translated by the author, original reads: principal elemento que, de fato, aferiria legalidade a esse pleito, a saber, a comprovação incontestada da prática de crime de responsabilidade.

2.4. Michel Temer (2017 to 2019): Is Brazil Back On The Rail, Temer?

The interim president Michel Temer affiliated to Brazilian Democratic Movement got to the power after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, president of his coalition. Promising a “New Brazil” as he takes on the office responsibility of governing the Brazilian country from August 31, 2016 to January 1, 2019.

This promised “New Brazil” arises on scenario that claims for changes after the long run full of scandals of the Worker’s party. With a completely “new” interpretation to the foreign policy of the country. In Dilma’s government, there was already a narrative that goes on the opposite direction of the interpretation of the Brazilian Independent External Policy that was very pursued by Lula, and the Temer mandate goes even further away from the light of the PEI.

“The scenario that emerges in post-impeachment Brazil (2016) distances and clashes with this model of insertion. After all, unlike the PT governments, which ratified the counter-hegemonic character of the BRICS”.⁸⁴ Michel Temer's Foreign Policy chooses a path that is not in tune with the BRICS discourse of opposing the hegemonic mainstream of the North governance.

“Brazil, due to the international political crisis and external political challenges, is decreasing its external political activities and is cautious about antagonising the US, but it still supports the BRICS principles mentioned earlier.” (BRICS Think Tank Council, 2017, p. 71). Although, more than not antagonizing the western powers it started to seek even more for closer relations than Dilma’s mandate. The BRICS was not let aside as a platform, “although a minimization of the BRICS was noted on the country’s agenda, there were no significant changes in the pattern of PEB's international positioning in the UNGA, and the high convergence with the BRICS countries was maintained.” (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p. 72).⁸⁵

⁸⁴Translated by the author, original reads: “o cenário que emerge no Brasil pós-*impeachment* (2016) distancia e destoa desse modelo de inserção. Afinal, diferentemente dos governos petistas, que ratificaram o caráter contra-hegemônico do BRICS”

⁸⁵ Translated by the author, original reads: embora se tenha notado uma minimização do BRICS na agenda externa do país, não houve mudanças significativas no padrão de posicionamento internacional da PEB na AGNU, e a alta convergência com os países do BRICS foi mantida.

“Therefore, the Temer management continued to use the BRICS as a foreign policy instrument to coordinate joint positions in the face of the country's external challenges, although the group was little mentioned. When cited, the coordination via BRICS figured as an indication of the attitude of openness adopted by Brazil. (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p. 56).”

This new administration was run over the motto that they were trying to reform a New Brazilian External Policy, one that was not biased by the left-wing partisan of the worker's party that the population was totally upset about. However, they found out on their way high rates of protectionism of the Big Powers due to recovery from the crisis, and that pushes up Temer administration to assume a more bilateral approach on his foreign policy.

His domestic policy was marked by reforms and repercussions over the privatization of Brazilian institutions, and by the goal of ending the crisis. I did take long for the campaigning “Fora Temer” (Out Temer) to gain power as his obsession for reforms started to get bigger. In an article called Brazil is back on rail (O Brasil Voltou Aos Trilhos) from 2018 Temer states:

“A little over a year and a half ago, I took over the government with the task of facing the most serious economic crisis in our history and its profound social impacts for the country. in the face of this challenge, I proposed the broadest set of structural reforms the last thirty years, having as pillars the fiscal balance, the social responsibility and increased productivity.” (TEMER, Michel, 2018).

A half but turbulent mandate was on his hands, and not easier then the one Dilma faced. He started the structural reforms and acts that were needed in Dilma's government but with a very hard approach that was not well approved on population's eyes. “Michel Temer reached the highest level of rejection recorded by Datafolha: 82% in June 2018, right after the truck drivers crisis. At the end of his term, in December By 2018, that number had dropped considerably: 62% of Brazilians considered their government bad or terrible.” (SILVA VIEIRA, TACIELE, 2019, p.62).⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Translated by the author, original reads: Michel Temer alcançou o maior nível de rejeição registrado pelo Datafolha: 82% em junho de 2018, logo após a crise dos caminhoneiros. Ao final de seu mandato, em dezembro de

“During his presidential term, Temer was present in three Summits of the group, the eighth, held in India, the ninth, held in China and the tenth, held in South Africa. What can be observed in all these moments is that the grouping remained a priority, however, the president sought to dedicate his speeches to more commercial topics.” (SILVA VIEIRA, TACIELE, 2019, p.58)⁸⁷. Despite his foreign policy being oriented to search re-approximation with more “traditional” countries, Temer speech at before Goa Summits reinforces Brazilian commitment to the BRICS platform:

“It is urgent to consolidate international instances more in tune with the nature and scope of contemporary problems. Instances that better reflect our diversity and are thus more legitimate and effective. It is from them that effective solutions will emanate. We see the BRICS, too, as part of our efforts to favor of renewed international governance. And the dialogue of BRICS with partners in the geographic surroundings of its members only gives impetus to these efforts.” (TEMER, Michel, 2018, p.130).⁸⁸

Although this commitment could be questioned, as he moves his foreign policy further away from the Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy, and his approach to BRICS became much more commercial wise since the Goa Summit in 2016:

2018, esse número havia caído consideravelmente: 62% dos brasileiros consideraram o seu governo ruim ou péssimo.

⁸⁷ Translated by the author, original reads: Durante seu período presidencial, Temer esteve presente em três Cúpulas do agrupamento, a oitava, realizada na Índia, a nona, realizada na China e a décima, realizada na África do Sul. O que se observa em todos estes momentos é que o agrupamento se manteve como uma prioridade, todavia, o presidente buscou dedicar seus discursos a temas mais comerciais.

⁸⁸ Translated by the author, original reads: Urge consolidar instâncias internacionais mais afinadas com a natureza e o alcance dos problemas contemporâneos. Instâncias que reflitam melhor nossa diversidade e que sejam, assim, mais legítimas e eficazes. É delas que emanarão soluções efetivas. Vemos o BRICS, também, como parte de nossos esforços em favor de uma governança internacional renovada. E o diálogo do BRICS com parceiros do entorno geográfico de seus membros só faz dar ímpeto a esses esforços.

“As I mentioned in our restricted meeting, Brazil passes per moment of transformations. We are taking actions to recover growth and generate jobs. We are improving our regulatory frameworks, reinforcing legal certainty, creating a favorable environment for new investments. the partnership among the BRICS could foster interaction between our entrepreneurs and create greater integration between our economies.” (TEMER, Michel, 2018, p.133).⁸⁹

For the author, Taciele Silva Vieira (2019), “What can be concluded about this factor, therefore, is that perhaps the administration would not have given so much importance to the grouping if its attempts at rapprochement with the US had yielded satisfactory results.” (SILVA VIEIRA, TACIELE, 2019, p.68.).⁹⁰ There was no section with the BRICS platform, but still less engagement from the part of Brazil’s commitment to the platform it kept almost as same level as Dilma’s mandate, although without any bigger highlight like the BRICS New Development Bank on her time.

Furthermore in Raquel De Holleben (2021),

“the post-impeachment PEB prioritized a closer alignment with the US, more critical of multilateralism and less prone to South-South cooperation. In the Temer government, although a minimization of the BRICS was noted in the country's foreign agenda, there were no significant changes in the pattern of the PEB's international positioning in the UNGA, and the high convergence with the BRICS countries was maintained.” (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p. 79).⁹¹

⁸⁹ Translated by the author, original reads: Como mencionei em nossa reunião restrita, o Brasil passa por momento de transformações. Estamos adotando ações para recuperar o crescimento e gerar empregos. Estamos aprimorando os nossos marcos regulatórios, reforçando a segurança jurídica, criando ambiente propício para novos investimentos. A parceria entre os BRICS poderá fomentar a interação entre nossos empresários e criar maior integração entre nossas economias.

⁹⁰ Translated by the author, original reads: O que se pode concluir a respeito desse fator, portanto, é que talvez a administração não tivesse dado tanto importância ao agrupamento se as suas tentativas de aproximação com os EUA tivessem rendido frutos satisfatórios.

⁹¹ Translated by the author, original reads: a PEB pós-impeachment priorizou um alinhamento mais próximo aos EUA, mais crítico ao multilateralismo e menos propenso à Cooperação-Sul-Sul. No Governo Temer, embora se tenha notado uma minimização do BRICS na agenda externa do país, não houve mudanças significativas no padrão de posicionamento internacional da PEB na AGNU, e a alta convergência com os países do BRICS foi mantida.

In regards comparing Temer's mandate efforts to closer relations with the United States with Dilma's mandate, Temer faced only one small problem, Donald Trump's election in 2017, which would present more difficulties and barriers than opportunities as his foreign policy was looking for.

At last, The Brazilian performance on the Temer period was compared to Dilma's one, more of the same, but without much repercussion, international spotlights, shines nor even proper engagement to the platform, except when it fits the mandate commercial desires. Therefore no great relevance on Brazilian performance at the BRICS platform as achieved either on Temer's mandate.

2.5. Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2018 – 2020): The Tropical Trump: Step forward or step backwards?

Jair Messias Bolsonaro is the 38th Brazilian President (current leader), his mandate started on the 1st of January 2019, and is foreseen to end at 31st of December 2022. Winning his campaign after being stabbed, and his strongest competition went to jail (ex-president Lula) and being removed from the run. The motto of his campaign was “Brasil Acima de tudo, Deus Acima de Todos” (Brazil Above Everything, God Above Everyone, freely translated). Similarities with Make America Great Again might not be just a coincidence.

His discourse over the campaign started quiet and started getting stronger as he started playing on what the people wanted to hear. That was not so hard task to accomplish as the Brazilian nation was craving for a change since Dilma’s impeachment. The change for Temer was not the best scenario, so the quest for another person that would bring the political scenario of Brazil to as far as possible from the Worker’s party memory, was in need and he fit on this space as the new nation’s leader.

“The PEB⁹² consensus with the BRICS, consolidated in the Lula and Rousseff governments and maintained in the Temer government, began to be deconstructed with the rise of the Bolsonaro government: foreign policy for the BRICS gained new contours, showing that the matrix of international insertion of Brazil in Bolsonaro is different from the one in force in the Lula government.” (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p.6)⁹³.

Dr. Renata Albuquerque Ribeiro, explains that it is different because, “firstly, Bolsonaro’s foreign policy is not only similar to Temer’s but faces similar domestic political situations, which is the case in Brazil since 2015. During his two years in government, Temer was moving closer to Western powers, particularly the USA and the European Union (EU).” (BRAZIL’s 2019 - Chairship of BRICS, p.6). If to Temer’s mandate Trump represented a

⁹² Reads Política Externa Brasileira, meaning: Brazil Foreign Policy

⁹³ Translated by the author, original reads: o consenso da PEB com o BRICS consolidado nos Governos Lula e Rousseff e mantido no governo Temer, passou a ser desconstruído com a ascensão do Governo Bolsonaro: a política externa para o BRICS ganhou novos contornos evidenciando que a matriz de inserção internacional do Brasil em Bolsonaro é diferente daquela vigente no Governo Lula

challenge, to Bolsonaro it represented an idol to be emulated, therefore, creating for us the “Tropical Trump” as he almost completely align Brazil’s Foreign policy to the United States.

“Similar to Trump, Bolsonaro makes use of social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook to bring the political debate to the population, an mulnot been a priority to the general population, but the use of social media has brought it to their attention. In addition, Bolsonaro is not personally involved in foreign policy and there are a number of groups that are vying to influence the foreign policy direction.”
(ALBUQUERQUE RIBEIRO, Renata, 2019, p.7)

Emulating even Trump’s worst traits of Governing a country by the Twitter, he tried. Although despite aligning Brazil to the United States and moving almost completely out of the multilateral cooperation Brazil was building since first Lula’s mandate, we state almost here, because he did not part ties with the BRICS platform.

However “the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernesto Araújo, also cited the results of this cooperation, defining the BRICS as a strategic mechanism of the PEB insofar as it contributes to the achievement of “Brazilian development priorities” (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p.66)⁹⁴. Keeping the BRICS relation like Temer’s approach, as his main reason to still be in the platform the commercial and economic domestic benefit rather than the BRICS main goal of re-shaping the Global Governance.

“During the course of his electoral campaign Jair Bolsonaro harshly criticized the trade policy of Pekin. His phrase in the sense that “China does not buy in Brazil. China is buying Brazil” has had great repercussions.” (ASTÁKHOVA, Elena V; ASTÁKHOV, 2019, p. 15).⁹⁵ Not only during the campaign but after too, and the harsh comments over China only came to reduce after Trump end of mandate, finish his Brazilian-American Affairs, made him more careful about the comments and statements about the BRICS partner. “These facts show that Bolsonaro's previous attacks against China, which were aimed at pleasing the US, are

⁹⁴ Translated by the author, original reads: O então Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Ernesto Araújo, citou também os resultados desta cooperação, definindo o BRICS como um mecanismo estratégico da PEB a medida em que contribui para a obtenção das “prioridades brasileiras de desenvolvimento”

⁹⁵ Translated by the author, original reads: En el transcurso de su campaña electoral Jair Bolsonaro criticaba agriamente la política comercial de Pekín. Su frase en el sentido de que “China no compra en Brasil. China está comprando Brasil” ha tenido gran repercusión.

beginning to give way to a more balanced policy that serves real and not ideological interests.” (ASTÁKHOVA, Elena V; ASTÁKHOV, 2019, p.16).⁹⁶

His mandate host the BRICS Summit of 2019, where after the figure of Trump is gone of the gameplay, Bolsonaro’s

“Brazil's approaches towards Russia have not yet acquired defined traits. Jair Bolsonaro has not allowed himself anti-Russian statements even in his election campaign. During the last summit he expressed interest in promoting contacts with Vladimir Putin. Apparently, the Brazilian leadership is willing to study the possibility of collaborating with Russia in different fields. (ASTÁKHOVA, Elena V; ASTÁKHOV, 2019, p.16).⁹⁷

After the figure of Trump being away from the power of the United States and the figure of the new president Joe Biden, putting some breaks to Bolsonaro’s American Dream. The hosting of the BRICS summit and the outcomes it had, constitutes a new the starting point Bolsonaro relations with BRICS, as he “begins to become aware of the need to seek the projection of Brazilian politics outside the framework of the Western Hemisphere. In the environment of the Western Hemisphere.” (ASTÁKHOVA, Elena V; ASTÁKHOV, 2019, p.16).⁹⁸

“It can also be expected that Bolsonaro will clarify another evident thesis: the BRICS opens for Brazil the Asian vector without close the western one at the same time.” (ASTÁKHOVA, Elena V; ASTÁKHOV, 2019, p.18).⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Translated by the author, original reads: Estos hechos evidencian que los ataques anteriores de Bolsonaro contra China que tenían por objetivo agrandar a EE.UU., empiezan a dar paso a una política más equilibrada que sirva a los intereses reales y no ideológicos.

⁹⁷ Translated by the author, original reads: Los enfoques de Brasil hacia Rusia no han adquirido todavía rasgos definidos. Jair Bolsonaro no se ha permitido declaraciones antirrusas ni siquiera en su campaña electoral. Durante la última cumbre manifestó el interés en promover contactos con Vladimir Putin. Al parecer, la dirigencia brasileña está dispuesta a estudiar la posibilidad de la colaboración con Rusia en diferentes campos.

⁹⁸ Translated by the author, original reads: comienza a tomar conciencia de la necesidad de buscar la proyección de la política brasileña fuera del marco del hemisferio occidental. En el entorno del o del hemisferio occidental.

⁹⁹ Translated by the author, original reads: También se puede esperar que para Bolsonaro se aclare otra tesis evidente: el BRICS abre para Brasil el vector asiático sin cerrar a la vez el occidental.

It would not be wise from his administration to abandon the BRICS completely, letting space to another emerging market to take his place, if this country being e.g. Argentina or Mexico it would threat Brazil desired position of Regional Leader. Furthermore, even if his government had not as much participations as any of the previous ones, and no highlights as for the moment, only challenges such the pandemic of 2020¹⁰⁰. Brazil still a member, even if its performance could be higher, there still room for greater engagement.

“With the help of BRICS, the tropical giant can achieve one of its most important ambitions - joining the UN Security Council as a permanent member. It cannot do this without the support of China and Russia. The main thing for the new Brazilian leader is not to make mistakes and not to quarrel with its four BRICS partners (...) At the same time, one should not think that Brazil’s priorities in BRICS will remain completely the same” (RAZUMOVSKY, Dmitry, 2019).

“Until this time, Bolsonaro indicated that multilateral partnerships with developing and emerging countries will not be a priority of his government”¹⁰¹ (SILVA VIEIRA, TACIELE, 2019, p.74), and “the Brazilian dilemma is that the current government has chosen to align with Europe and the US while opportunities lie on the other side. If Brazil continues to neglect the new favourable global circumstances, its economic recovery will become even more difficult.” (COSTA LIMA, Marcos; FERREIRA DA SILVA, Joyce Helena and OLIVEIRA, Eduardo, 2018, p.59).

¹⁰⁰ Which we decided not to take in consideration to our research because the covid crisis exceeds the spatially of 2020.

¹⁰¹ Translated by the author, original reads: Até o momento, Bolsonaro indicou que as parcerias multilaterais com países em desenvolvimento e emergentes não serão prioridade de seu governo

6. Chapter's Conclusion

The authors Lima e Castelan (2012), as quoted in Hobbellen (2021) “Brazil was the country that most committed itself to the consolidation of the BRICS.”¹⁰² That is very much one of the reasons that motivated our research. The discourse of BRICS and the Brazilian articulation, got momentum on the global political scenario, and this shining speed of a giant rise in the South Americas and a leader of the Global South has lost itself in the middle of the way and

“each government attributed a different profile and centrality to the BRICS, according to their respective strategic projects of international insertion, the work was based on the hypothesis that, from the Temer government, and especially in the Bolsonaro government, a significant PEB's multilateral distancing from the BRICS - in contrast to a strong engagement that had been seen until then.” (HOLLEBEN, Raquel de, 2021 p. 12).¹⁰³

The downside of BRICS not having binding decisions and no formal charters or normative commitment, and being only based on the interest and will of the countries to cooperate, is that governments changes, and with this change or mandates, priorities and interest may change together. This played a great role in the Brazilian misalignment with the BRICS in few mandates transitions and in particular moments of domestic instability of the country, driving the focus to other concerns and other international partnerships.

Brazil is deeply multilaterally connected to its region and to the international system, committed to many frameworks and international organizations, and “the cost of BRICS membership is low as it does not negatively affect Brazil's other partnerships. (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p. ??). As it does not poses any formal commitment and binding norms to Brazil and does not interfere with its domestic politics, in this sense diming the country's sovereignty

¹⁰² Translated by the author, original reads: “o Brasil foi o país que mais se empenhou na consolidação do BRICS.

¹⁰³ Translated by the author, original reads: “cada governo atribuiu ao BRICS um perfil e uma centralidade diferente, conforme os seus respectivos projetos estratégicos de inserção internacional, o trabalho se sustentou na hipótese de que, a partir do governo Temer, e principalmente no governo Bolsonaro, pôde-se verificar um significativo distanciamento multilateral da PEB em relação ao BRICS - em contraste a um forte engajamento que fora visto até então.”

and putting Brazil in a position of Global power, is equal to saying that “BRICS membership may strengthen Brazil's bargaining power with other actors.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p. ??)

As quoted in Stuenkel (2015) the authors John Lloyd and Alex Turkeltaub, wrote regarding Brazil's BRICs membership, they wrote that “to consider Brazil as one of the pillars of an emerging global order which membership of the BRIC fraternity implies underestimates these risks. (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.10). Those risks come to scene with the Dilma's Brazil era and the non-tolerance of her lack of pulse and political play expertise, moreover the conduct of the worker's party over more than 12 years. Brazilian's pillars for an emerging giant global leader were sold internationally with an intensely strong discourse and later on it really proved out to be a weak risk. “In addition to lower growth, Brazil's forays into the world's top league—marked by Lula's attempt to negotiate with Iran in 2010 and its stint as a non-permanent UN Security Council member—were far from smooth, and his successor Dilma Rousseff seemed much less inclined to engage internationally.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.20).

Brazil has benefited from intra-BRICS cooperation also in the sense of its commerce of commodities, which later has been seen as a threat on the year of Bolsonaro's presidency and his harsh positions towards China. However, he is not the only one worried about China “buying” and flooding their countries of Chinese products, as this research presents on the profile of the countries, that this is also a key concern to South Africa as well.

“Brazil has benefited from strong Chinese demand for its commodities over the past decade; a sharp reduction in Chinese consumption in addition to an inefficient industrial system and poor infrastructure could reverse the current account balance in favor of the export of low-cost Chinese manufactured goods to the country, putting it at risk of deindustrialisation.” ZUCCA, Fabrizio, 2016, p.89).¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Translated by the author, original reads: Il Brasile nel decennio passato ha beneficiato di una forte domanda cinese per le sue commodities; una decisa riduzione del consumo cinese in aggiunta a un sistema industriale inefficiente e a un'infrastruttura carente potrebbe invertire il saldo delle partite correnti a favore dell'export di manufatti cinesi a basso costo nel paese, metendolo a rischio di deindustrializzazione.

Although, “A key factor that shapes Brazil's strategy towards China is, interestingly enough, an utter lack of preparedness and lack of knowledge about China.” STUENKEL, Oliver, 2012). The interest about not only China, but the other BRICS members, their languages, are being a bit more explored by the BRICS’ people-to-people exchange, but on the sides of Brazil, the students that goes on exchange studies to Chinese universities and the domain about the Chinese is not enough even on the diplomatic corps, as highlights Oliver Stuenkel.

Brazil will have a long way to achieve expansion and international and projection, and being a more participative member of BRICS can be an opportunity for that. As this strategy to become a global player on the modes of the Great Players would take too much saturated effort, but on the global governance there is still a chance.

“Brazil sees BRICS as a whole as more important in the context of global governance reform than its relations with other countries/organisations. Brazil’s global governance interests are also better served through multilateral channels at the BRICS level than through bilateral channels within BRICS. These findings support the qualitative analysis in the previous section: BRICS is important for Brazil as a multilateral platform of interstate economic cooperation and global governance reform.” (Zhen Han, Mihaela Papa, 2022 p.1124).

The performance of Brazil in BRICS is partially important and very fluctuating, as the country since 2011 is struggling in a loop whole of domestic problems. The changes of political parties and personas over the command of the country has also contributed into the discontinuity of the BRICS discourse over the BRICS platform.

In the beginning of BRICS Brazil was indeed a key member to the formation of BRICS and their discourse, with its diplomatic corps playing a brilliant role on joint the platform discourse together and advocating for it internationally, and this period gave also Brazil a title of emerging Giant. Although in the next government the New Development Bank put the platform back on game, Brazil performance was way colder than before. In Temer’s mandate the implementation of the people-to-people exchanges was one of the great moves of BRICS, taking the platform out of the rooms of forums and meeting and bringing it to the people’s daily life’s, on games, cinemas, events and so on. Although, Temer’s administration was not able to use it on their behalf to build a better image of BRICS on domestic levels.

The Bolsonaro mandate was the one that drove even further away from the platform, however did not ignore its potential and did not scrap it from his foreign policy, although still Brazil is not a key member of the platform in his mandate. “Over the past 10 years the leadership has changed in almost all the BRICS countries, with Brazil as the recent BRICS member to go through leadership change and yet the bloc has survived these changes. (BRAZIL’s 2019 - Chairship of BRICS). Not only Brazil has changed leadership, and the nature of BRICS as an institution helps it to be alive all these years long without falling apart as long as its members maintain common interests over it.

Conclusions

From the many reasons that motivated this research to be done, the difficulty to classify BRICS as an international institution on the international relations or the small participation of BRICS platform in the global governance issues, and its non-presence in the journals and news. Furthermore, the many critics about the group being slowly dying and the flooding of new acronyms of countries on an international soup of letters in the attempt to reshape the global economy and finance to a more suitable framework system. The one that calls more our attention is the change in the Brazilian engagement with the BRICS platform.

This work has found among the challenges for the crafting, the finding of great articles to compose our study being in Russia and the inability of the author to read in Russian, scraped out of the scope those articles. Although, attempted to find the best out of the languages under domain, Portuguese, English, Spanish Italian and even some polish articles about the BRICS, the last one note made into the final work as did not fit the subject discussed.

All of those reasons divided our research into two chapters, being them the first to the questions raised about the BRICs platform itself and the second on to analyze if the transitions of government and the change of political party from a social liberal left-wing to a more conservative right-wing had effects on the positioning of Brazil towards the BRICS.

What has been called before as an initiative fade to disappear, a marketing campaign or a fallacy to gain some international spotlight has come up to show “irrespective of current growth figures, policymakers in emerging countries seemed to be convinced that the BRICS’ meetings served and continue to serve as a useful vehicle to promote South-South cooperation, which has grown considerably over the past two decades.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.20).

Despite of their presence in the last two decades, the New Development Bank and the many other implementations and initiatives, more there is to come, may it be in the possibility of new members joining in a near future or the speculations of a BRICS common currency. Either way the BRICS Think Tanks Council brings in a study of 2017 (BRICS Think Tank Council, 2017, p.70) what to not expect and what to expect from the future of BRICS plataform, which we highlighted few ones out of them.

On what we cannot expect from BRICS:

- There will not be complete unity of views on all issues of world politics. There will be no dominance and imposition of views within BRICS.
- BRICS will not institutionalise to the level of the European Union or any other such heavy-handed bureaucratic structure.
- BRICS will not be an anti-Western club.
- BRICS will not be a military bloc like NATO.
- BRICS will always have critics and sceptics. The creation of BRICS has already provoked adverse reactions in both Western countries and among the supporters of Westernisation in the BRICS countries.
- BRICS will not achieve adequate representation in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the foreseeable future.

Now on what we can expect from BRICS:

- BRICS countries – despite all the ups and downs they may face – will play an increasing role in the world order of the 21st century.
- BRICS strategic interests will include: working to reform the foundations of the world political and economic order, ensuring independence in policy and upholding the primacy of international law, maintaining the UN's role as guarantor of international security, pressing for UN Security Council reform, cooperating with one another on strengthening their economies, and working to modernise society within BRICS and the Global South.
- BRICS will be the catalyst for a new international architecture, representing as it does a development model which differs from the “Washington consensus”.

As discussed throughout the research, BRICS is not likely to emulate any framework from the Western-European way of economic, political or military management. It the possibilities of the “Unicorn” called BRICS becoming something similar to the European Union or NATO, thus, adding a military character to the platform, or binding decisions and formal commitment is rather low and improbable than impossible. However, this will not stop them to seek another model way from the north patterns of structures.

The same Think Tank study also provides *Optimistic, Pessimistic and Realistic scenarios* for the future of the BRICS. Starting with the *Optimistic scenarios* “see BRICS as a solid political and economic grouping with a coordination mechanism, exerting considerable

influence on the international peace and security system, as well as meeting global challenges from a common, coordinated point of view.” (BRICS Think Tanks Council, 2017, p.72).

As for the *Pessimistic scenarios* “paint BRICS as just a photo-op for its countries’ leaders or a forum for sectoral meetings, which may even disintegrate in the future.” Lastly “a *realistic scenario* should be somewhere in between, laying greater emphasis on economic and social issues as the least contentious ones for a joint BRICS position. (BRICS Think Tanks Council, 2017, p.72). Our research corroborates with the realistic approach, as already stated throughout chapter I, that the BRICS platform is still incoherent and lacks coordination and consensus among the members in many aspects, but we also believe that it will not be disintegrating soon.

The “South-South cooperation had turned into one of emerging powers’ key elements in their attempt to democratize global affairs and reduce the disproportional weight the Global North has had in the global conversation until now.” (STUENKEL, Oliver, 2015 p.21). It is not probable that the platform will cease to exist before achieving the goal of transforming the global governance and equilibrating the field to South emerging markets towards the North.

Even if a little less stronger than on previous decades the BRICS political message is still working in the international scenario and the Global South is still striving to level up the governance at their favor.

Our research is well aware that there are limits but also possibilities for Brazilian performance under the BRICS platform as well as there are limits and possibilities for BRICS cooperation. In the field of limitations, the nuclear topic is remain a challenging step to Brazilian diplomacy and soft-power as it is one of the fields the BRICS misalignment is on rate of 41% with Brazil voting divergently 23 times according to DESIDERA, Neto, 2014 as qtd.in (NUNES FRANCISCON, Isabela, 2014 p. 57). This limits Brazil performance on this sector as it is the only non-nuclear power on the table.

However, it could also bring a different opinion to the BRICS dialogues and summits, as it would pose a divergent view on the argument, understanding that different options is not always a bad thing to have inside a multicultural platform, but it poses a challenge on find consensus. Thus posing something to be overcome by Brazil and the whole platform.

Another field that poses some limitations and possibilities but also tend to misalign the platform is the energetic efficiency, as “for Russia, an international order in which the importance of fossil fuels declines would not be advantageous, since the country has large reserves of these resources, which are relevant in its export agenda.” (NUNES FRANCISCON,

Isabela, 2014 p. 52).¹⁰⁵ Thus generating another interest conflict inside the platform, as Russia would not abandon its energetic sources. Although Brazil is in a good position towards sustainable development which is a key topic on every BRICS Summit.

In the end, the questions that remain to be answered are: will the BRICS be able to move the center of economic and political power until 2050 as O'Neil predicted way back in 2001. Accounting for their challenges and peculiarities, at their own pace, the strength of their cooperation, it will be interesting to follow what BRICS will evolve into. At second, will Brazil achieve a more active, effective and participative role as a key member to the development of BRICS, on the next years to come.

In this sense, helping the platform to reach more cohesion through the means of its prestigious diplomatic power, and not being only a partially static member with no much highlight like Temer's approach to it, half-hearted committing to it like Dilma's mandate or even ignoring BRICS potential like the Bolsonaro's did. Thus, generating an ambiguity being a member of a platform that struggles to create an alternative to the current global governance, and commands his country to align almost totally to the United States in less than half mandate.

We conclude our research with recommendations to further studies of the BRICS global performance, and more intense focus on the development of an international organization theory that helps to further and fully understand the BRICS with less limitations as possible, thus finding our "Unicorn" a proper environment for its development and inclusion on the landscape of the global community. Moreover, adding the need of more studies over in the performance of all the members. The BRICS dream of evolving a century in a decade will still have to keep living on to 2050.

¹⁰⁵ Translated by the author, original reads: Para a Rússia não seria vantajoso uma ordem internacional na qual a importância dos combustíveis fosse declinar, já que o país possui grandes reservas desses recursos, relevantes em sua pauta de exportação.

Annexes - Summits Summaries from 2009 to 2020

In this following part of our research will summarize the BRICS Summits year by year, from 2009 until 2020. This section complements straight to the Chapter I subchapter 3.2. In order to give us a more detailed general scope of the evolving partnership of BRICS through the above-mentioned period. The summaries will focus on key points. Moreover, those key point found on these official documents may shed a light to other subchapters of the present research that we judged is importance to the development of this research. Staring in Yekaterinburg June of 2009 and ending in Moscow November of 2020.

I BRIC Summit - Joint Statement - June 16, 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia

The First BRICS summit was held on July 16th 2009, in Russia and was the first official meeting of the group and where they committed to advance the reform of international financial institutions, implement sustainable development and enhance energy efficiency as well as their cooperation and relations in search for a more democratic multi-polar order. The joint statement of the summit is the first official document of BRICS, where the members agreed:

“upon steps to promote dialogue and cooperation among our countries in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way. The dialogue and cooperation of the BRIC countries is conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” (Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders, 2019).¹⁰⁶

Despite not being the first meeting, but politically a very important one to transform the BRICS from an economic acronym to a political idea and a real group with a lot of possibilities ahead and facing what some authors of the west would call an Impossible Alliance.

¹⁰⁶ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders - 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia:
<https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2009/Yekaterinburg-Declaration-2009.pdf>

II BRIC Summit - Joint Statement - April 16, 2010 Brasilia

The second BRICS summit held on April 16th 2010, took place in Brasilia, Brazil, as the member country volunteered to host the next event. The final statement on the meeting stating the will of the member stressing on efforts to a more inclusive, diverse, representative and effective, G20 and UN bodies, with special attention to the advocacy for support of Brazil and India having in international affairs their aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations. We understand that BRICS was using the potential and size they have to support Brazil and India into a place on the security council of the United Nations. This summit of BRICS was also a place to discuss topics like International Economic and Financial Issues; International Trade; Development; Agriculture; Fight against poverty; Energy; Climate Change; Terrorism; Alliance of Civilizations; Solidarity towards Haiti and International Cooperation(II BRICS – Joint Statement, Brasilia Declaration, 2010).¹⁰⁷

In regards to the international trade, economic and financial issues, the key point is around the potential of emerging markets economies on playing a more active role in growth and prosperity after the 2008 crisis and moreover on the support of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The following topics were discussed on the II BRICS Summit: Development; Agriculture; Fight against poverty; Energy and Climate Change. They stressed the concerns on sustainability, promoting the Millennium Development Goals¹⁰⁸ and tackling the importance of economic and political stability but also giving attention to the most vulnerable groups through cooperation and innovation, and putting efforts to reach more efficient energy resources and building better energy policies.

At last, there are concerns about Terrorism; the Alliance of Civilizations; Solidarity toward Haiti and International Cooperation. The BRICS called for strengthening the fight against terrorism with prevention and repression due to the terrorist attacks that previously occurred in Russia and India before the summit. BRICS invited the nations to make international cooperation stronger, and gather efforts to help rebuild Haiti after the earthquake on January 12th of the same year the summit furthermore the BRICS praised

¹⁰⁷ To see more details information for topics of meeting check the complete statement:
<https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2010/Brasilia-Declaration-2010.pdf>

¹⁰⁸ For further information on the Millennium Development Goals:
<https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

Brazil for hosting the initiative of the United Nations to build mutual understanding around the world called the Alliance of Civilizations.

A remark for this summit is that it was the last one without the presence of South Africa, which joined the group in the December of the same year transforming the quarter into a quintet. (II BRIC Summit - Joint Statement, Brasilia Declaration, 2010).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ II BRIC Summit - Joint Statement – Brasilia Declaration
<https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2010/Brasilia-Declaration-2010.pdf> Vide full document for further details.

III BRICS Summit - Sanya Declaration **- April 14, 2011 Sanya, Hainan**

The Third BRICS summit held in Sanya, China on 14th of April 2011, adopted the theme “Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity”. This summit marked the encounter of BRICS leaders joined in a very important moment to the draft of what would later receive the title of Sanya Declaration, in which the member countries commit to exchange cooperation expertise and to deepen their exchange in many fields.

In the economic, financial and development fields the main focus are again the aspiration of Brazil and India onto the security council and Russia’s ascension to the World Trade Organization, likewise the strengthening of the global economic governance. Moreover, the declaration also proposes to deepen scientific and technology exchange.

In regards to sustainable growth, use of renewable energy resources Millennium Development Goals and climate change, the text is very similar to the previous except for the first appearance of “Nuclear energy will continue to be an important element in future energy mix of BRICS countries” (Sanya Declaration, 2011). BRICS countries once again reiterate their commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals on schedule along with reinforcing the participation of the members in many other conferences meetings and movements towards sustainable development e.g. the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Brazil; Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and multilateral environmental treaties and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

In the end, confident hopes on the mega events set to be held by the member countries e.g. FIFA World Cup Brazil 2014 and Russia 2018), Winter Olympic (Russia 2014) and Paralympics (Russia 2014 and Brazil 2016, Olympic Games (Brazil 2016) and Youth Olympic Games (China 2014).¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ III BRICS Summit - Sanya Declaration – for more information and full document vide: <https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2011/Sanya-Declaration-2011.pdf>

IV BRICS Summit – Delhi Declaration -March 29, 2012 New Delhi

The fourth BRICS summit held in New Delhi on March 29th, 2012, was run under the theme “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity”. The Eurozone instability was one main concern. The meeting took place after the great relevant meeting and conferences quoted to happen on previous summit, e.g. UN Conference on Sustainable Development RIO + 20 hosted in Brazil.

On top of that, it is the first document where BRICS quotes one of the biggest strengths, the group, its representation of 43% of the world’s population, and its presence in 4 continents showing a transcontinental dimension of their power and influence. Stating also that: “The immediate priority at hand is to restore market confidence and get global growth back on track.”(Delhi Declaration, 2012). Furthermore, adding pressure on the G20 in regards to the reforms and the urgent need of adopting what was agreed in the 2010 governance quota before the International Monetary Fund annual meeting.

Another key point of the document is the economic and financial development of the emerging and developing country, where is stressed once again the need and ask for the commitment of the governances over the transformation on the banking system. Likewise, along with these request comes on the following part the idea of a BRICS New Development Bank.

The New Development Bank main aim was: “for mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.” (New Delhi Declaration, 2012). Based on the previous remark we can deduce that this is going to become not only a concern or an idea but, an international system ground-shaking action over the next summit.¹¹¹ The document also expresses their congratulations on the Russian successful achievement in accession to the World Trade Organization.

Exceptionally the document brings and points out the various forms that BRICS grouping are using to deepen their cooperation and intra-relations over the 17 dispositions on the Delhi Action Plan, as well as the New Areas of Cooperation to explore: the Multilateral energy cooperation within BRICS framework; A general academic evaluation

¹¹¹ Those voices not being heard when they were demanding was the initial moment that led to the creation of the New Development Bank two years after Delhi.

and future long-term strategy for BRICS; the BRICS Youth Policy Dialogue and the Cooperation in Population related issues¹¹².

Among the many important meetings of the plan are included: The Meeting of BRICS Foreign Ministers; Meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors; Meeting of financial and fiscal authorities; Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers The Third Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture; the second Meeting of Agriculture Expert Working Group; Meeting of BRICS High Representatives responsible for national security; The Meeting of experts on a new Development Bank; The Consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials on the margins of relevant environment and climate-related.¹¹³

¹¹² IV BRICS Summit – Delhi Declaration – for more information and full document vide:

<https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2012/Delhi-Declaration-2012.pdf>

¹¹³ To see more details about the 17 dispositions for meeting check last pages of Delhi Action Plan

V BRICS Summit - eThekwini Declaration - March 27, 2013 Durban

The Fifth BRICS summit held on March 27th, 2013 in Durban also known as the eThekwini Declaration, happened under the title of “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization”. This was the meeting that conclude the first cycle of the summits going around all the member countries, and setting important major pillars towards institutional intra-BRICS cooperation. This meeting can be considered a mark on the development of the group and a super ambitious step towards BRICS’ purpose of being the representatives of the Global South and the emerging markets and developing countries.

“We aim at progressively developing BRICS into a full-fledged mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics.”(eThekwini Declaration, 2013). This remarking statement shows the level of engagement the members were planning to put in motion, making the summit in a like manner important for the establishment of more BRICS structures, e.g. the BRICS Think Tanks council and business council¹¹⁴.

Additionally, the recognition of the importance of region integration for Africa’s sustainable growth and the BRICS retreat are something to have closer look at from this summit “under the theme, “Unlocking Africa’s potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure”. The Retreat is an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African Continent.”

On top of it, the document ends with important notes on what was fulfilled from the Delhi Action Plan: Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the margins of UNGA; Meeting of National Security Advisors in New Delhi; Meetings of Finance Ministers, and Central Bank Governors in Washington DC and Tokyo; Meeting of Trade Ministers in Puerto Vallarta and Meetings of Health Ministers in New Delhi and Geneva (eThekwini Declaration, 2013). Moreover, it is fundamental to highlight the draft of the eThekwini Action Plan.

The Plan consists of 18 dispositions and 9 new areas for exploring further intra-BRICS cooperation on the dispositions e.g. are: the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors; the Mid-term meeting of Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas; the Meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors;

¹¹⁴ To be discussed in more details under session 1.4

the Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers; the Meeting of BRICS Officials responsible for population; Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Science and Technology and Meeting of BRICS Cooperatives and more.¹¹⁵

In regards the areas for further cooperation are: BRICS Public Diplomacy Forum; BRICS Anti-Corruption Cooperation; BRICS State Owned Companies / State Owned Enterprises; National Agencies Responsible for Drug Control; BRICS virtual secretariat; BRICS Youth Policy Dialogue; Tourism; Energy; Sports and Mega Sporting Events¹¹⁶.

¹¹⁵ To see more details about the 18 other dispositions for meeting check last pages of the eThekwini Declaration

¹¹⁶ V BRICS Summit – eThekwini Declaration – for more information and full document vide: <https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2013/eThekwini-Declaration-2013.pdf>

VI BRICS Summit - Fortaleza Declaration **- July 15, 2014 Fortaleza**

The sixth BRICS summit was held on July 15th, 2014 in the city of Fortaleza, Brazil, is a historic mark in the BRICS timeline as it initiates a new cycle of BRICS's summits. Moreover for the milestone it set with the new implementations and for the international spotlights turn its focus on observe an impossible alliance/odd grouping/Motley Crew or *Chutzpah* gang as some western authors defined them, knocking the door with two feet, and provoking some chances to international political-economic order.

The summit that started the second cycle of intra-BRICS relations happened around the theme "Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions" and in order to address the goal the theme proposes the aim is to tackle the structural gaps and sustainable development needs of the emerging and developing countries performing over the gap were institution like the International Monetary Fund ad the World bank were not being effective. A constant issue on their agenda and summits since Sanya Declaration, became in the Fortaleza summit, one of the most important BRICS implementation, the New Development Bank¹¹⁷.

"With this in mind, we are pleased to announce the signing of the Agreement establishing the New Development Bank (NDB), with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies (Fortaleza Declaration, 2014)."

Besides the institutionalization of the New Development Bank, the summit had also the signing of the Treaty for the establishment of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)¹¹⁸ and it welcomes the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation among BRICS Export Credit and Guarantees Agencies. The Fortaleza Declaration also expresses the group's recall on achieving the World Bank Millennium Development Goals by 2015. On top of that, the member's disappointment and concerns over the implementation of the 2010 International Monetary Fund reforms not happening gives the NDB more legitimacy to act as an alternative to this inertia of IMF.

Among the main concerns of this summit were: Terrorism, Piracy and armed robbery, cybernetic threats, drug problems, corruption, Atomic energy, outer space activities, global

¹¹⁷ The New Development Bank is Discussed in more details on session 1.4

¹¹⁸ The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is Discussed in more details on session 1.4

peace and cooperation, sustainable development, and economic growth and wells as all the important meeting happening in the year. Along with once more plating the spot for India in Brazil as the Security Council this this plus South Africa on the list.

In regards to the Fortaleza Action Plan, the document outlines: the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs / International Relations; the Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors; the Mid-term meeting of BRICS Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas; the Meetings of BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors; the Meetings of BRICS Trade; the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology and Innovation; the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Education; the Meeting of the BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum; the Meeting of Anti-Drug Experts; the Meeting of BRICS Experts on Anti-corruption cooperation and more.¹¹⁹

Additionally to the plan, the document also states the new areas of cooperation to be explored: Mutual recognition of Higher Education Degrees and Diplomas; Labor and Employment, Social Security, Social Inclusion Public Policies; Foreign Policy Planning Dialogue; Insurance and reinsurance; and Seminar of Experts on E-commerce¹²⁰.

¹¹⁹ To see more details about the 23 other dispositions for meeting check last pages of the Fortaleza Declaration

¹²⁰ VI BRICS Summit - Fortaleza Declaration, for more information vide full document of the summit: <https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2014/Fortaleza-Declaration-2014-Brazil.pdf>

VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration

- July 9, 2015 Ufa

The Seventh BRICS summit held on July 9th, 2015 in the city of Ufa, happened under the theme “Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions.” The summit marks the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserves’ entry into force, and once again reiterates the BRICS commitment to cooperation intra-BRICS and globally to the coordination of efforts to respond to emerging challenges, e.g. peace and security, sustainable development poverty, and inequality eradication and climate change.

The Fortaleza Declaration emphasized that 2015 is the mark year of 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (also of the end of World War II). Reaffirm the BRICS countries’ strong commitment to the UN as a universal multilateral organization, and affirm BRICS’ intention to contribute to and safeguard the principles and proposes of the UN Charter. Including once again, the plating (just like all other previous documents) for the aspiration to a greater role of Brazil, India, and South Africa on the United Nations Security Council.

Once again, BRICS shows their disappointment with what they call “prolonged failure” by the United States to ratify the IMF 2010 reform package which in their view causes the credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the International Monetary Fund to be undermined. In this document is presented in a clear manner for the first time insights into a plan for BRICS currencies use in transactions between BRICS countries.

Even more than the previous documents, this one stresses BRICS’ commitment to stop money laundering, corruption, drug problems, piracy, armed robbery at the sea, and prevention of international terrorism. Furthermore, they also commit to peaceful uses of outer space as well as the regulation and security, and governance of the internet and the post-2015 development agenda.

In a period of struggles in the international community, the document contains conflicts and terrorist threats that were happening e.g. Boko Haram actions in Africa, the efforts for peace and conciliation in Mali, terrorism, and extremism in Afghanistan, Gaza strip, and Iraq/Syria Instability. Furthermore, the health threats that were happening and multiplying e.g. HIV, Malaria, Ebola, and novel coronavirus. as well as the groups’ concerns about the migrations issue.

An important topic that we will further discuss about in subchapter 1.4 is openly expressed with BRICS positioning towards it stressed on the 67th disposition of the Ufa Declaration as follows:

We express our readiness to address climate change in a global context and at the national level and to achieve a comprehensive, effective and equitable agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

In Regards to Action Planes, this document doesn't finish with more action plans like the previous ones, but a Toronto's University Research¹²¹ remarks that BRICS were able to accomplish 70% of the commitment made in Fortaleza 2014, maintaining a great rate of compliance to their plans.

¹²¹ 2014 BRICS Fortaleza Summit Compliance Report July 6, 2015:
<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/compliance/2014-fortaleza.html>

VIII BRICS Summit – Goa Declaration - October 15-16, 2016 Goa

The 8th BRICS summit was held on October 15-16th 2016, in the city of Goa, India. The Theme chosen for this summit was “Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions.” The document starts with a positive note over the first set of loans done by the New Development Bank and the BIMSTEC¹²² - BRICS leaders’ summit to explore possibilities of expanding trade and commercial ties and investment cooperation.

Their concerns once again extend to the all-on-going issues of the international community e.g. the Syrian and North Africa conflicts, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the terrorist activities in Afghanistan, and a few other key issues of global life. Furthermore, the document welcomes the adoption of Agenda 2030 for sustainable development, the Sustainable Development goals that take place of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals.

Moreover, there is the presence a soft-power support over the use of Gas as economically efficient and sustainable, that follows in line with Paris Agreement on climate change but is also a strength of one particular member country, Russia. It is also presented new implementations as BRICS Under-17 Football Tournament in Goa on 5-15 October 2016, the BRICS Network University (BRICSNU) and the BRICS University League (BRICSUL) in order to foster higher education collaboration and partnerships across the BRICS countries. In similar manner a new area of cooperation, the BRICS Women Parliamentarians’ emphasizes the commitment to strengthen parliamentary strategic partnerships on all the three dimensions of sustainable development, fostering gender equality and women empowerment (Goa Declaration, 2016).¹²³

¹²² Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic cooperation is Group that comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

¹²³ VIII BRICS Summit – Goa Declaration - for more information vide full document of the summit: <https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2016/Goa-Declaration-2016.pdf>

IX BRICS Summit - Xiamen Declaration
- September 4, 2017 Xiamen

The 9th BRICS summit held on September 4th, 2017 in the city of Xiamen, China, happened under the theme title “BRICS: Stronger Partnership for a Brighter Future”, and this summit document brings in its core an important and different approach than the previous ones, the promotion of people to people exchange.

In Xiamen Declaration the BRICS member countries highlighted the need to expressing their will of making the BRICS partnership closer to their peoples heart. Thus, we understand the public opinion on BRICS from the respective populations of member countries. The BRICS desire to move closer to their public took shape as a question of political pride on being part of the partnership, in which some implementation had as had gained some highlights to the level of people-to-people exchanges e.g. the BRICS U-17 Football tournament in 2016 and the BRICS Games 2017.

The Goa Declaration presents and welcome the first regional office of the New Development Bank, the Africa Regional Center in South Africa and of its official headquarters in Beijing. Further more proposing more integration of the NDB with the World Bank and with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In regards to Peace and Security, Goa Declaration shows Brazil’s proposal on the establishment of a BRICS Intelligence Forum, as wells as reiterate all previous concern with the ongoing state of global security and its issues and in addiction, reaffirming the general approach of the previous summits eThekwni 2013, Fortaleza 2014, Ufa 2105 and Goa 2016 declarations.

In a different manner then the summit of Goa 2016, the Xiamen documents finishes with the Xiamen Action plan and some more structured details then others previous summits: BRICS Cooperation Outcome Documents; Economic Cooperation; People-to-People Exchanges; Senior Officials/Working Groups/Expert Meetings documents and dates; People-to-people Exchanges Events and Other Meetings and last but not least the Proposals to be further explored (Goa Declaration, 2016).¹²⁴

On the Xiamen Action Plan, there are 23 dispositions of events and their key dates and places to happen. On the Economic Cooperation, they are 40 dispositions and 4 documents. As for the People-to-people exchanges, they are 20 initiatives and 2 Memorandum

¹²⁴ IX BRICS Summit - Xiamen Declaration for more information vide full Joint Statement document of the summit: <https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2017/Xiamen-Declaration-2017.pdf>

documents. Finally, the further area to be explored contain 9 additional areas for new intra-BRICS further enhancement of cooperation (Goa Declaration, 2016).¹²⁵

¹²⁵ To see more details about all the documents dispositions for check last pages of the Xiamen Declaration.

X BRICS Summit - JOHANNESBURG DECLARATION
- JULY 25-27, 2018 Johannesburg

The 10th BRICS summit was held on 25-27th July 2018 in the city of Johannesburg; South Africa, which worked under the theme “Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution” and happened on the centenary of Nelson Mandela. Among the main goals of the summit were strengthening of multilateralism, reforming global governance, and addressing common challenges were the key points of the summit, which reiterates all commitments made in all previous summits and vows to reinforce them all, working forward under the 2018 BRICS calendar of events.

This declaration brings the BRICS intention to enhance cooperation and collaboration on the field of Biodiversity, furthermore, frames the potential for cooperation and collaboration in advancing the Oceans Economy among BRICS countries in multiple sectors e.g. transport, tourism, port developments and more.

In Regards to Peace and Security, the documents reaffirms BRICS commitment with collective efforts for peace and includes in the text their concerns over the conflicts in the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian situation, the conflicts in north Africa, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, the diplomatic crisis in Gulf region, the Afghan peace reconciliation process, the conflict in Syria. Furthermore, they commend the African Union’s commitment to the “Silencing of the Guns by 2020” and support efforts to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture.

As for the economic and financial matters the document states happiness with the fruitful results of the New Development Bank (NDB), “on playing a great role in financing for public infrastructure and investment” (Johannesburg Declaration, 2017). Furthermore, Welcomes the establishment of the second regional center of the New Development Bank (NDB), the Americas Regional Office, in São Paulo-Brazil; consolidating presence in one more continent¹²⁶.

As for the Johannesburg Action Plan, it contains all the key Ministerial meetings; the activities under South Africa’s chairmanship 2018; the seniors and sectorial meetings (which

¹²⁶ X BRICS Summit - Johannesburg Declaration for more information vide full Joint Statement document of the summit:
<https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2018/JOHANNESBURG-DECLARATION-2018.pdf>

includes also the people-to-people events). With no new areas for further cooperation being presented on the end of the document. (Johannesburg Declaration, 2017)¹²⁷

¹²⁷ To see more details about all the documents dispositions check last pages of the Johannesburg Declaration.

XI BRICS Summit – Brasília Declaration
- November 14, 2019 Brasília

The 11th BRICS summit was held on 14th November 2019, in the city of Brasília, Brazil. The summit worked under the theme “BRICS: economic growth for an innovative future”. The Brasilia Declaration 2019, start by celebrating the establishment of the BRICS Network (iBRICS); the BRICS Women Business Alliance (WBA) among other initiatives promoted by the 2019 chairship.

In the Brasilia Declaration 2019 there is a claiming to reform the multilateral system not only touches the IMF, World Bank and financial institutions but it also englobes the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, on including greater participation of the Emerging and Developing Countries into the international decision-making.

In regards to economic and financial cooperation, the document celebrates the 5th anniversary of the New Development Bank agreement signing and disposes the plan for the openings of two more regional offices in 2020: one in Russia and one in India. Furthermore, the declaration expressed their expectations on the Board of Governors preparatory works to set the bank ready for expansion of membership.

The total amount of meeting of the 2019 Brazil chairship is 116 meetings of which 2 are leaders meetings; 16 are ministerial meetings; 66 are seniors officials and sectorial meetings (with 3 that happened after the main summit); 29 people-to-people, business, judicial and legislative meetings (Brasilia Declaration, 2019).¹²⁸ The declaration hold no action plans for the next summit.

¹²⁸ XI BRICS Summit – Brasília Declaration for more information vide full Joint Statement document of the summit: <https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2019/Braslia-Declaration-2019.pdf>

XII BRICS Summit - Moscow Declaration -November 17, 2020

The 12th BRICS Summit was held through videoconferences means due to COVID-19 Pandemics on 17th November, 2020, by the chairmanship of Russia. The summit happened under the title “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Shared Security and Innovative Growth”. On the times of a global Pandemic that challenged the complete international community, BRICS maintained momentum and continuity of their partnership and activities. The Moscow Declaration congratulates India on the election of the United Nations for the term 2021-2022 and South Africa’s contribution to the same UN apparatus in 2019-2020 further extends it to Brazil candidacy to a membership of UNSC for the biennium 2022-2023. Furthermore, reiterates all commitments of the group expressed in previous declarations.

On the Financial and Economic levels the documents highlights the creation of the BRICS Payments Task Force (BPTF) and the BRICS Rapid Information Security Channel (BRISC), as well as stressing the recommit to the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. In likely manner, the recommitment to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change and the commitment of the partnership to recover from the COVID-19 implications¹²⁹.

In Regards to the outcomes of BRICS, the Moscow Declaration sums up 31 official documents signed up; 40 people-to-people meetings (divided in two sessions one of 7 and one of 33); 2 Chairmanship Statements by Russia; 4 Sherpas/Sous-Sherpas meetings; 22 Ministerial and Head of agencies meetings; 62 Senior and officials and Sectorial meetings; 15 remaining events to happen after the summit, totalizing an amount of 137 meetings under Russia’s chairmanship of which some of them happened in videoconferences and few in presence (Moscow Declaration, 2020).¹³⁰

¹²⁹ XII BRICS Summit – Moscow Declaration for more information vide full Joint Statement document of the summit: <https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2020/Moscow-Declaration-2020.pdf>

¹³⁰ To see more details about all the documents dispositions check the Annexes of the Moscow Declaration.

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