

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA

DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE POLITICHE, GIURIDICHE
E STUDI INTERNAZIONALI

Corso di laurea *Triennale* in Scienze Politiche, Relazioni Internazionali
e Diritti Umani



OPERATION “BROTHER SAM” AND THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
1964 COUP D’ÉTAT IN BRAZIL

Relatore: Prof. GIULIA BENTIVOGLIO

Laureando: RICCARDO DE POLI
matricola N. 2004734

A.A. 2022/2023

*A Florianópolis,
Ilha da Magia*

INDEX

INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1 – BRAZIL FROM THE FIRST REPUBLIC TO THE GOULART PRESIDENCY.....	4
Premise.....	4
1.1 History of events from the first Republic to the 1964 coup d'état.....	5
1.1.1 Socioeconomic conditions on the eve of the First Republic	6
1.2 The First Republic	8
1.3 The Vargas Era	12
1.4 From 1945 to the Goulart's presidency	14
CHAPTER 2 – THE UNITED STATES'S INVOLVEMENT IN BRAZIL	18
2.1 Regional subsystem.....	18
2.1.1 The South American regional subsystem.....	21
2.1.2 Brazil within the South American subsystem	24
2.2 Foreign policy of the United States in South America.....	26
2.2.1 The Monroe Doctrine and Brazil	27
2.2.2 The “Good Neighbor” policy	30
2.2.3 The impact of World War II on Inter-American relations in the Western Hemisphere.....	31
2.3 Brazilian Foreign Policy before the 1964 coup d'état.....	33
CHAPTER 3 – THE 1964 COUP D'ÉTAT AND OPERATION “BROTHER SAM”	38
3.1 How did the coup come about?	38
3.1.1 Political scene.....	38
3.1.2 Military scene.....	45
3.2 The 1964 coup d'état in Brazil.....	48
3.3 How did the Operation “Brother Sam” come about?	51
3.4 Operation “Brother Sam”	54
CHAPTER 4 – THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT AND OPERATION “BROTHER SAM”.....	58
4.1 The military regime	58
4.1.1 The road towards democratization: Geisel and Figueiredo.....	64
4.2 Foreign policy of the military regime.....	68
4.3 The United States in Brazil after Operation “Brother Sam”	71
4.4 Human Rights and the military regime	75

<i>CONCLUSION</i>	78
<i>BIBLIOGRAPHY</i>	81
<i>SITOGRAPHY</i>	82

ABSTRACT

The thesis describes the 1964 coup d'état in Brazil analyzing its causes and consequences. It focuses then, on the role and the influence that the United States had in this event as well as on the strategies which they adopted to influence the course of events, particularly it focusses on the so-called "Operation Brother Sam".

ABSTRACT IN ITALIANO

La tesi descrive il colpo di Stato in Brasile del 1964 analizzandone le cause e le conseguenze. Si concentra poi sul ruolo e l'influenza che hanno avuto gli Stati Uniti in questo avvenimento nonché sulle strategie da loro adottate per influenzarne l'andamento, in modo particolare viene descritta la cosiddetta "Operazione Brother Sam".

INTRODUCTION

During the tumultuous decades of the 1960s and 1970s, numerous South American nations experienced coup d'états that ushered in military rule, leading to the establishment of repressive and authoritarian dictatorships. Throughout the tenure of these regimes, political dissidents endured brutal tactics, including torture, forced disappearances and killings. Despite differences in the specific attributed and operational methods of these dictatorships, they covertly collaborated under what they secretly referred to as the “*Condor Plan*”. The “*Condor Plan*”, also known as “*Operation Condor*”, was a secret coalition formed among the military governments of Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay. Its primary goal was to fight against leftist forces in South America by facilitating the unrestricted movement of military forces across these nations’ borders, enabling persecution, torture and even assassination of political dissidents during the era of authoritarian dictatorships. This alliance also had tacit support from the United States, which although not directly involved, was aware of its existence. In fact, the CIA supplied a sophisticated communication system known as “*Condortel*” to enhance the coordination and communications within this cover alliance.¹

It is evident that the United States always held strategic interests in this region of the world, a sentiment often underscored by the principles outlined in the Monroe Doctrine. My thesis examines the 1964 coup d'état in Brazil, offering an in-depth exploration of its origins and consequences. This study places particular emphasis on Operation “*Brother Sam*” and the involvement of the United States in these pivotal events. It is a dual perspective analysis, delving into both the Brazilian and American viewpoints.

To understand the Brazilian perspective, I draw from a wide array of sources, including books and materials covering Brazil’s political history, domestic and foreign policies and its international relations, with a specific focus on its interactions with the United States. For insights into the United States’ perspective, I leveraged different source materials such as books on U.S. foreign relations and policies, particularly in the context of Latin

¹ Rossi M., A regra de sangue da Operação Condor, a aliança mortífera das ditaduras do Cone Sul, El País, March 30, 2019.

Available on the website https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/03/29/politica/1553895462_193096.html consulted on September 2023.

America and their historical “Monroe Doctrine”. Additionally, I relied on diplomatic documents from various U.S. administrations, particularly when examining specific aspects like Operation “*Brother Sam*”.

By conducting this dual perspective analysis, my thesis aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 1964 coup in Brazil, shedding light on both the motivations and actions of the Brazilian government and the role played by the United States in this critical juncture of Latin American history.

The first chapter lays the background for a comprehensive understanding of the political landscape in Brazil. Beginning with the nation’s transition from monarchy to republic, it traces the pivotal moments that marked this transformation. Subsequently, it delves into the era referred to as the “First Republic”, providing insights into the prevailing socio-economic conditions leading up to this period. Furthermore, this thesis will explore the tenure of Getulio Vargas, a pivotal figure in Brazilian politics, and the developments which unfolded from his deposition in 1945. This period forms a crucial backdrop for comprehending the events that culminated in the election of João Goulart as President on September 7, 1961.

Furthermore, in the second chapter I delve into the intricate web of United States’ involvement in Latin America, with a specific focus on its role within Brazil. To set the stage for this analysis, the opening paragraphs elucidates the concept of a regional subsystem, placing particular emphasis on the South American regional subsystem and Brazil’s pivotal position within it.

Subsequently, the chapter unfolds in a logical progression. The second paragraph explores the contours of United States foreign policy in South America while the third shifts the lens to Brazil, delving into its foreign policy in the lead-up to the coup d’état.

The third and the fourth chapters talk more specific about the causes and the consequences of the coup d’état, the role of the United States in it and focuses on the so-called Operation “*Brother Sam*”. In facts, chapter three can be divided into two distinct halves. The initial section of this chapter, provides a comprehensive account of the events leading up to the tragic 1964 coup d’état and then an analysis of the mechanics and circumstances surrounding the cup itself, shedding light on the various actors and factors that played pivotal roles.

The second half of Chapter 3 is dedicated to an exploration of Operation “*Brother Sam*”.

Here, my work delves into the origins and development of this operation, elucidating the motivations and objectives that guided its planning and execution.

Moreover, the fourth chapter is dedicated to unraveling the multifaceted consequences of the coup d'état in Brazil. It starts from the immediate aftermath of the coup, tracing the political landscape as it evolved over the years and ultimately culminating in the process of democratization. Within this chapter, I will also shed light on the military regime's foreign policy and the evolving perceptions of Brazil by the United States post Operation "*Brother Sam*". While my primary focus remained on political and diplomatic aspects, in the last paragraph of the chapter I will open a window onto the human rights abuses that occurred during this tumultuous period.

Even if the main reason why I decided to delve deeply into this subject is strictly personal, while pursuing my academic career at the University of Padua, I had the opportunity to attend the course "History of International Relations", a subject that particularly captured my curiosity. However, I noted that the course did not cover the intricate history of Brazil so I saw my thesis as the perfect opportunity to explore the lesser-known aspects of Brazilian history.

CHAPTER 1 – BRAZIL FROM THE FIRST REPUBLIC TO THE GOULART PRESIDENCY

Premise

Pedro II emperor of Brazil was the second as well as the last emperor of Brazil. He was crowned on July 18, 1841, after being entrusted to a Council of Regency due to his minor age.

His reign was very troubled because of the many internal conflicts of federalist nature, such as the one of Rio Grande do Sul.

Another important insurrectionary motion occurred during the reign of Pedro II when the conservative party succeeded the liberal one, but unlike the previous one this was easily repressed.

Moreover, the worst dispute was the one against Paraguay which lasted about five years, fought between 1865 and 1870 and then won by Brazil thanks to its alliance with Argentina and Uruguay.

After these conflicts, the reign of Pedro II faced several years of calm that allowed him to increase his popularity. It can be said that the liberal address given by him to the Brazilian institutions had procured him many sympathies. On the flip side, certain biases against his policies were exploited by the Republicans, who had formed an alliance with the military to weaken Pedro II's regime. The anti-slavery law, for instance, positioned him as being in opposition to not only the "*fazendeiros*"² (large landowners) but also smaller farmers. This contributed to the burgeoning development of Republican ideals.

As a result, Deodoro da Fonseca, helped by the military, prepared a revolutionary motion which then broke out on November 15, 1889. Pedro II was then forced to abdicate and exiled with his family in Europe.

² Fazendeiros: owners of a "fazenda". The term "fazenda" means "farm"; in this case we refer to a "*fazenda*" when talking about a special way to cultivate coffee in Brazil which was widespread in the country during the second half of 1800.

1.1 History of events from the first Republic to the 1964 coup d'état

In 1889, Brazil underwent a significant transformation as the monarchy was overthrown, leading to the proclamation of the Republic and the establishment of a provisional government. This tenuous period continued until 1891, when the first republican Constitution was officially promulgated. Subsequently, this pivotal moment saw the inaugural elections for the first formally elected Brazilian President. Afterwards, between 1893 and 1895 the Country has faced a severe Civil War, known in history as “*The Federalist Revolution*”, which affected southern Brazil and particularly Rio Grande do Sul.

As the Federalist Revolution ended, the new century began and brought with it the First World War which made Brazil declare war on Germany in 1917. However, as soon as the war ended, in the years between 1924 and 1927 São Paulo and other Brazilian states were hit by the Rebellion.

As a result of many years of political, economic, and social instability, in 1930 the Country went through a revolution which caused the ousting of Washington Luis, since that moment formal President of Brazil; then, in order to stabilize the situation Getúlio Dornelles Vargas led a provisional government.

Two years later another important event in Brazil's history occurred, this was the Constitutionalist counterrevolution in São Paulo, to be followed in 1934 by the second Republican constitution that confirmed Vargas as elected President of Brazil by the Congress.

Next, in 1937 a coup d'état was led by Vargas who then became a dictator and proclaimed the “*Estado Novo*” with the third Republican constitution.

Few years later, in 1942 Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy due to the Second World War which was affecting Europe since 1939.

At the end of World War Two, in 1945, the “*Estado Novo*” has been overthrown by the Military and so Vargas ousted; a year later the fourth Republican Constitution was promulgated and in 1950 Vargas was reelected President by popular vote.

Afterwards, in 1954 an interim presidency was established with military consent after Vargas committed suicide because of the will of the army to overthrow him.

Two years later Juscelino Kubitschek was inaugurated as president of the Brazilian Republic and then in 1960 Brasilia became the new federal district as well as the new capital city of Brazil.

By this time Brazilian history was about to change, the coup d'état of 1964 was approaching; in 1961 President Jânio Quadros was inaugurated but immediately after he resigned, so, after a constitutional amendment which introduced a parliamentary government, João Goulart came to power. Just two years later, in 1963 a National plebiscite abolished the parliamentary system and finally, in 1964 Goulart was deposed by the military revolt and Marshal Castelo Branco was therefore elected President by the Congress.

1.1.1 Socioeconomic conditions on the eve of the First Republic

When the Brazilian empire ended, only the 11% of the Brazilian population lived in big cities with more than 10000 inhabitants, moreover it is important to mention that in those years the industrial sector represented only 10% of the Gross Domestic Production (GPD). The socioeconomic situation in Brazil when the empire collapsed was not so different from the one of a decade earlier, but certainly the country had undergone a significant transformation both social and economic since the heyday of the monarchy in the 1850s. Brazil was essentially an agrarian country because urbanization and industrialization were starting to gain “popularity” only in those years.

The populations started to increase, Brazilian citizens shifted from 11.75 million in 1880 to 14.3 million, with more than two-fifths of the populations living in the declining regions in the northeastern part of the country.

“Rio de Janeiro, which had reached 275000 inhabitants by 1872, now had nearly doubled to 523000; Salvador had risen from 129000 to 174000 in the same period, thus preserving its status as the country’s second city. Although São Paulo had only increased from 31000 to 65000 over these years, it was about to begin its explosive growth, reaching 240000 by the turn of the century and 580000 by 1920”.³

Another significant phenomenon in Brazilian history was the influx of immigration, particularly from Europe. The numbers surged from 55,000 in 1887 to an astonishing

³ Schneider, Ronald M., Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil. Westview Press, 1991, p. 69.

132,000 in 1888. Despite a brief slowdown in immigration in 1889 and 1890, the country experienced a remarkable peak in 1891 with a record 215,000 immigrants arriving. This immigration wave had far-reaching effects as these newcomers filled the labor demands of the coffee producing regions. Furthermore, this period witnessed a small increase in the enrollment of children in schools. Until 1878, this rate remained stagnant at 10%, but during the First Republic, it rose to 14%. However, these developments did not translate into significantly improved literacy rates. Males had a literacy rate of 19%, while females had slightly over 10% literacy, indicating the need for further educational progress.

Moreover, between 1886 and 1894 the industrial revolution started in Brazil, so it began when, on one hand there was the monarchy that was about to end and, on the other hand, there was the Republic which was about to replace the monarchy; “imports of industrial machinery in 1888 – 1889 had already risen 37 percent in 1890 and exploded by 70 percent the following year”⁴. Besides that, the republican government continued also to develop railroads, as a matter of this in 1864 there were only 300 miles of railroads and by a decade later this data more than doubled. Then by 1885, railroads covered over 3800 miles and, by the end of the century, this number was doubled again, covering 6900 miles and again, with the overcome of the new century the country could count on almost 10000 miles of railroads.

Regarding the socioeconomic situation, another important thing to mention is the law enacted in 1888 which permitted banks to issue paper money although this led to inflation and stock market speculation due to the optimistic idea that the Republic would have brought with itself an era of limitless growth and wealth. On the other hand, the first finance minister, Ruy Barbosa⁵, who in theory was in favor of free trade, implemented a degree of protectionism. Meanwhile the law of 1888 was making its effects “with banks emitting so much currency that the money supply almost doubled in 1890 and expanded again by just over 50 percent the next year”⁶. During the first seven years of the Republic, the transition stage, Brazil saw nine finance ministers succeed each other and each one of those had different ideas and points of view. So, due to this situation of doubtfulness the

⁴ Ivi, p. 69.

⁵ Together with Prudente de Morais he was part of the Constituent Assembly of the “*Republica Velha*”.

⁶ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p. 70.

government always changed its focus, many times it abandoned the basic goal of balanced budget and monetary and exchange stability in advantage of military expenses.

1.2 The First Republic

We refer to the First Republic or “*República Velha*” when we talk about the Brazilian history of the years between 1889 and 1930. The transition from a Monarchy to a Republic started with military nature but a few years later this was followed by the transfer of power to civilians so, nowadays, we can affirm that there are some similarities between this first military president and the generals that came to power later with the military coup d’état in the 1960s.

In order to understand better the situation of Brazil during those years I think it’s important to mention Thomas Skidmore, an American historian and scholar who specialized in Brazilian history. In 1967, when the Country was facing the military regime, he published his major work *Politics in Brazil: 1930-64, an experiment in democracy*.

Furthermore, in another of his books, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*, he affirmed

“The lack of political support for the reformers’ prime targets – slavery, the crown, the established Church – misled liberals into thinking that their victory over these enemies would bring the fundamental transformation which liberalism assumed to be the prerequisite for national progress”.⁷

From 1889 to 1894 the government was led by military officers, the country’s center of gravity moved from the northeast to the center-south, so Minas Gerais became soon the dominant region of Brazil occupying a close-up position and maintaining its status of most populous state at 3.12 million in 1890. Although the Monarchy had been overflown, this first experience of Republic figured out to be even more complex than the monarchical years. In facts, the deposition of the emperor cleared the way for many different urban middle-class elements who took leading positions behind military vanguard,

⁷ Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. VIII.

“power was assumed by a heterogeneous group of men, who by their formation and economic, social, and cultural relations found themselves umbilically tied to the urban middle classes, among which the military constituted if not the numerically most important sector, at least the strongest and most homogeneous, and who, in addition, possessed weapons”.⁸

The ”*Republica Velha*” counted thirteen different Presidents. Firstly it has been established a “provisional government” led by Deodoro da Fonseca who was in charge first as “chief of the provisional government” and then elected President on the 25th February 1891. However, his presidency did not lasted long in facts, in November of the same year he resigned in order to avoid a violent revolt against him.

After Deodoro’s resignation, until the 1930 revolution, other twelve Presidents succeeded in the Brazilian presidency. Floriano Peixoto, who led Brazil from 1891 to 1894, Prudente de Moraes, who remained in charge between 1894 and 1898, Campos Salles, who was then replaced in 1902 by Rodrigues Alves. Alfonso Pena, who came to power in 1906 and then left his place in 1909 to Nilo Peçanha that remained the Brazilian President for less than one year. In 1910 he was replaced by Hermes da Fonseca who, in 1914 was substituted by Venceslau Brás who led Brazil during the years of the First World War. Moreover, in 1918 was Delfim Moreira who guided the country but in 1919 he was succeeded by Epitácio Pessoa, the 11th President of the Brazilian Republic. The last two President of the “*Republica Velha*” were Artur Bernardes, who was the leader of Brazil between 1922 and 1926, and Washington Luís, who, in 1930 left his place after the Revolution.

The First Republic is known in history for being dominated by the oligarchs, small groups that where for the majority associated to agriculture and livestock farming which had a lot of power over the Brazilian politics and economics. To keep the oligarchs under control were developed some techniques known as “*mandonismo*”, “*coronelismo*” and “*clientelismo*”. “*Mandonismo*” is a very controversial word in facts, it is the name given to the control that some people have over other people just because they are richer and financially stronger so, during the “*Republica Velha*” the big landowners exerted influence over the poorer local population. “*Coronelismo*” refer to the practice in which the colonel, big landowner, exerted his power over the local population to ensure the

⁸ Schneider, Ronald M., Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil. Westview Press, 1991, p. 71.

necessary votes needed to satisfy oligarchs' interests by distributing public authorities or just by intimidation, coercion and harassment. "*Clientelismo*" instead, is an exchange of favors between two actors deeply unequal, the colonel is not needed because every superior entity who do a favor to an inferior one in expecting a benefit in exchange is practicing "*clientelismo*". We can affirm that "the rural patriarchal society had produced an authoritarian paternalism that provided a continuing basis for patrimonial politics".⁹ Furthermore, it is important to mention also the most famous phenomenon of the Old Republic, these are the "*politica do café com leite*" and the "*politica dos governadores*". Both of these mechanisms helped the oligarchs to become even stronger because these politics gave them more political power. The "*politica do café com leite*" is one of the most known concepts of this period, it refers to the agreement between the São Paulo and the Minas Gerais oligarchs which was about the choice of the Presidents. This agreement stated that the oligarchs of these two States had to alternate each other the Brazilian presidency. On the other hand, there was the "*politica dos governadores*" that was created for the first time during the government of Campos Sales, its actions were responsible of the enforcement of an alliance between the executive and legislative power during the whole "*Republica Velha*". The Federal Government gave its support to the strongest oligarchy of each State in order to face the local disputes and issues and, in exchange, the oligarchs had to elect deputies and made them to follow the executive's programs. The colonel was a key entity because he had to help the deputies to obtain votes and he had to use his power to force the electors to vote for the desired candidate.

During the First Republic, the country had to deal with a lot of revolts which were caused by the disrespect of fundamental social and human rights, this made many people to aim to a better life condition. The first revolt that broke out in Brazil has been the "*Guerra de Canudos*" which represented one of the main conflicts that marked this particular period of Brazilian history. This civilian war was fought between November 1896 and October 1897 in Bahia, the "*Canudos*"¹⁰ communities started to represent a threat for the dominant classes such as the church, the landowners, and the regional and national

⁹ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p. 78.

¹⁰ Canudos is a municipality in the northeast region of Bahia. It was the background for many violent clashes between the peasants and the republican police during the 1890s.

governments which in the end won sending thousands of men and cannons and killed almost 25,000 people.

Another important revolt is known as the Navy Revolt, or “*Revolta da Armada*”. This revolt, wanted by the Navy, broke out in 1891 and finished in 1894 when the Navy was defeated. Shortly before the 1930 revolution, which represented the end of the First Republic, another important revolt broke out in the Rio de Janeiro area, this is known as the “*Revolt of Fort Copacabana*”. It was commanded by Captain Euclides Hermes da Fonseca and it is known to be one of the first manifestations of the “*tenentista*” movement. The revolt broke out in 1922 during the campaign for the succession to the government of President Epitácio Pessoa because the population felt bad for the behaviors of the conservatives and the oligarchs. So, some militaries organized revolts aiming to conquer the “*Catete Palace*” and made Hermes da Fonseca new provisional President of Brazil. The most serious center of this manifestation was Fort Copacabana. By the end of the event only 18 of them remained because of the attacks led by the government against them but only two of the “18 do Forte” remained alive.

By the late 1920s due to the lack of flexibility and inability to modernize of the governments of the First Republic the Brazilian political system was facing a crisis similar to the one of the mid-1880s. Moreover, the failure of the numerous revolts caused an empowerment of the oligarchs and demonstrated that the middle class could not aim to break through power without the military so, “this crucial military role would in very large part be the essence of the 1930 Revolution” ¹¹. The end of the First Republic is directly bound with the presidential elections of 1930 in which the Paulist and the oligarchs of Minas Gerais broke their agreement and so the “*politica do café com leite*” ended. The Minas Gerais’ oligarchs allied with other oligarchies and wanted Getúlio Vargas as President, but they were defeated by Washington Luís. After the defeat, Vargas and his followers rebelled using the assassination of Vargas’ vice-president, João Pessoa, as a justification. This was then named the 1930 Revolution which ended with the overthrowing of President Washington Luís and the following month Getúlio Vargas would have become the provisional Brazilian President and so started his fifteen years long presidency which is known in history as “The Vargas Era”.

¹¹ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.106.

1.3 The Vargas Era

Vargas took official power a month after the revolution, on November 3, giving birth to the “Second Republic” which lasted from 1930 to 1937, followed then by the “Third Republic” or “*Estado Novo*” from 1937 to 1946.

With the 1930 Revolution, President Washington Luís was deposed and so, the oath of the neo-elected Júlio Prestes was blocked because the votes were cheated from his followers. During the Vargas Era it is possible to distinguish three different historical periods. The first period is known as the “provisional government” era, the second is known as the “Constitution Interlude” period and the third is known as the “*Estado Novo*” which marks the end of the Vargas Era.

At the beginning, during the “provisional government”, which was in charge from the 1930 Revolution until 1934, there were some problems of consolidation because the oligarchs were against him due to his proximity to Mussolini and fascism in Italy. Furthermore, many of the politicians that were still associated with the ousted government were arrested and also stripped of their rights, both fundamental and political. Anyway, in 1932 the country was about to go through a bloody civil war; “on May 23 a mob spearheaded by Democratic Party students burned the Revolutionary Legion’s headquarters in São Paulo”.¹² This revolt movement was born because Vargas was ruling by decree and there wasn’t a real Constitution so, for the majority of the population, this was source of resentment. The 1932 civil war, in fact, aimed to force Getúlio Vargas and his government to adopt a new Constitution. Indeed, this revolt represented the largest and the most violent armed conflict in Latin American history, in fact, “Paulistas learned from this bitter and costly experience not to place themselves again in such an exposed position, a rule that would govern their conduct in subsequent crises”.¹³

Then, after Paulista revolution’s end, the period known as “Constitutional Interlude” started. Shortly after the end of hostilities, the Brazilian government started to work on a new Constitution draft, this draft was then finished by May 1933 by a special commission under the chairmanship of Foreign Minister Afrânio de Melo Franco. Moreover, in May 1933, pivotal elections were held for the National Constituent Assembly. These elections

¹² Ivi, p. 123.

¹³ Ivi, p. 125.

are noteworthy in history due to the significant participation of numerous newly-formed political parties. The Constitution was then promulgated on July 16, 1934, and, although it was a little different from the government's proposal, Vargas accepted it either way while he was focusing on the presidential elections to a four-year term. The day after, Vargas was chosen as constitutional President by a comfortable margin of 175 votes to 59 for Borges de Medeiros. So, after the Constitution was promulgated and started to have effects, Vargas began to rule together with the new legislature democratically elected. "The legal transition from dictator to constitutional president meant that Vargas, who had been following essentially centrist course since coming to office, would need to pay even greater attention to the claims of organized political groups".¹⁴

The third period of the Vargas Era is known as "*Estado Novo*" which began in 1937 when Vargas, helped by the military and the church, which had a crucial role, imposed a new totalitarian constitution with a coup, closed the legislature and started to lead the Country as a dictator.

"The Church, politically mobilized, also represented a relevant role in the legitimization of the coup, to the extent in which it supported the government measures against communism, giving needed backing to its fight in aspects of social life over which it exercised, at the time, extreme influence. What the church received in return for its decisive collaboration wasn't little: in the first place, aid to religious schools in detriment to lay education, and, in second place, the insertion of important Catholic cadres in official institutions, as well as the attention of important ministries, like Education, to its principal political demands. With respect to the entrepreneurial sectors, this period saw the emergence of new leaders such as Roberto Simonsen and Euvaldo Lodi. These new leaders collaborated with the industrialization policy initiated by the government after 1937 and defended the protectionism indispensable to national economic development, coming to have places on the technical councils involved in redirecting the Brazilian economy".¹⁵

"The year 1937 was the most momentous for Brazil since 1930, although the profound changes that took place were far from those most Brazilians or foreign observers expected"¹⁶. We can say that during those years Vargas' actions were accepted by the majority of the population even though some of these people only accepted for resignation. Regarding that, it then became evident that World War Two permitted to

¹⁴Ivi, p. 129.

¹⁵ Camargo, Aspásia, *O Golpe Silencioso as Origens da República Corporativa*, Rio Fundo, Ed., 1989, p. 253.

¹⁶ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p. 135.

Vargas to obtain more consents because it allowed him to channel military energies into the war effort and this made him gain popularity in the name of the national security and defense but then, when the war ended the population was pushing towards a democratization of the country so Vargas wasn't able anymore to maintain his power and was deposed with a coup to its government by the Army on the 29th October 1945.

1.4 From 1945 to the Goulart's presidency

Even though Vargas was forced to leave his place in the Brazilian government, in 1945 the electorate was newly in favor of him. The 1945 elections were approaching and Vargas, on November 28, approved Eurico Gaspar Dutra as a candidate even though this decision disappointed the Communists. His rival was Eduardo Gomes, who, on the other hand, focused his campaign on “the resurgence of liberal constitutionalist sentiment, the desire of many middle-class elements for a change in the holders of political office, and the votes of the fragmented opposition groups at the state level”.¹⁷

Then, on December 2, Dutra officially won the elections defeating Gomes and finally took office on January 31, 1946, as President of the “New republic”. During his presidency, Dutra managed to keep his authoritarian tendencies in check, “appearing generally not to be too far from a Brazilian version of Dwight D. Eisenhower”.¹⁸

Furthermore, the Old Constitution remained in effect and in the meantime, Brazil was working on a new Constitutional document which was promulgated in 1946. On February 8, the Congress chose Fernando de Mello Viana as presiding officer and then from March 15 to May 27 the Grand Commission worked on producing a draft under the direction of Senator Nereu Ramos. The document was created to slow down the executive's powers and to guarantee the preservation of federalism. Then, shortly after the promulgation of the Constitution, Ramos was elected as the new vice-president of Brazil.

Afterwards, in 1950 Vargas won for his last time the Presidential elections and on January 31, 1951, he took office, beginning his presidency in a strange, but pretty positive, economic situation even though it didn't lasted long. During this second “Vargas era”, Brazil went through a lot. During 1951 began to work a Joint Brazil-United States

¹⁷ Ivi, p. 159.

¹⁸ Ivi, p. 160.

Economic Development Commission while the Truman ¹⁹ administration was willing to give assistance in order to support development programs. By the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952, the Brazilian Finance Minister Horácio Lafer came up with a five-years plan which included the creation of the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE) that was useful as a “training” place for young economists who then would have played a crucial role in the next Brazilian administrations. In the meantime, Vargas, completely different from Dutra’s government which always wanted to open the petroleum field to foreign investment, called for a mixed capital corporation to manage Brazilian oil resources submitting a bill to the Congress. Then, in 1953, deeply wanted by Vargas, the Petrobrás was founded, “a government-controlled oil company with a monopoly on drilling but no exclusive rights in the refining, distribution, or petrochemical fields”. ²⁰

Furthermore, Vargas’ problems increased when the United States’ administration changed and put some stringent clauses on the aids to help Brazil’s development. As a consequence they made a step back from the Joint Economic Development Commission. The socioeconomic situation on the eve of the end of the second Vargas presidency was so compromised that the pressure on Vargas became too much, for this reason in 1954 he committed suicide to avoid the humiliation of being deposed for the second time; “at seventy-one, he felt too old to be demoralized and no longer with any reason to fear death”. ²¹

Even though Vargas was dead, he was still “present” in the Brazilian political scene because of the tensions between the ones that were pro-Vargas and the ones anti-Vargas. So, considering that background, the administration led by Café Filho assumed a role which can be defined as “caretaker”. Moreover, during Café Filho presidency, Brazil was preparing itself to the legislative and partial gubernatorial elections and also, a year after, the country would have gone through the presidential elections in which won Juscelino Kubitschek who then became officially President in January 1956.

Kubitschek’s goal was putting Brazil on the path towards development promising “Fifty years’ progress in five” thanks to his “Program of Goals” (*Programa de Metas*) which set

¹⁹ Harry S. Truman: Lamar, 8 May 1884 – Kansas City, 26 December 1972; was a United States’ military and politician; President of the United States of America from 1945 to 1953.

²⁰ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p. 177.

²¹ Ivi, p. 181.

some targets that had to be achieved. One of his goals was to build a new capital city in the heart of the Country in order to promote the development of the internal areas of Brazil, so in 1960 the new capital city was inaugurated and named Brasilia. Even though he gave priority to the economy rather than to social welfare actions, his presidency had a positive impact on the economy but mostly on short term because, while the industries were growing fast, the inflation and the costs of living were getting higher and higher so his successors had to make a lot of hard political decisions that he could avoid.

In order to achieve all his goals, Kubitschek was hoping on winning the presidential elections for the second time, but the events didn't go as he hoped, mostly because even though he built a solid base for Brazilian development, during the first three years his administration was bad.

Unfortunately, Kubitschek's heritage was quickly destroyed, mainly because of three tragedies that affected the Country during the following years. These events were the Jânio Quadros presidency that was pretty short lasting only from January 1961 to August of the same year, the Goulart government and lastly, the 1964 coup d'état.

The Quadros' presidency revealed to be pretty destabilizing for Brazil due to the fact that he started to get closer to the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara and, even if his scopes were only economical, this sort of approach to the communism caused the "panic" within the Country. Shortly after, a crisis affected Brazil and it was close to evolve into a civil war. It began on August 18, when Lacerda, at that time Governor of Guanabara, had to confer with the President. This meeting did not go well and a few days later he revealed that the Justice Minister Oscar Pedroso d'Horta told to him that the President was willing to close the Congress and introduce some hard institutional reforms. President Quadros was claiming that, in order to govern Brazil as he wanted, he would need powers similar to the ones that had Charles De Gaulle when he wanted to turn the old and decadent French Fourth Republic into the new and renovated Fifth Republic. His plans to reach this goal did not go as he hoped due to Lacerda's denunciation. Consequently, he had to find a different strategy, he was hoping that with his resignation from the presidency, his vice-president Goulart, would become the next President of Brazil even if he was aware that for the military and the most conservative elements would have not accepted Goulart's presidency. On August 25 Quadros declared his intention to resign

leaving the Country in a terrible situation so his resignation letter appeared as fuel on the fire.

“Yet even by the 27th and 28th (August 1961), while Lacerda and associates were plotting a way to keep Goulart from office and the vice-President was slowly returning from China by way of Paris, the situation was changing as a result of developments in Rio Grande do Sul, where Governor Brizola announced his intentions to use force to guarantee legality, which he defined as including the right of his brother-in-law, Goulart, to the presidency”.²²

Then, on September 7, João Belchior Marques Goulart became President making a parliamentary experiment begin the day after his took office with a Council of Ministers headed by Tancredo Neves approved by the Chamber by a vote of 259 to 22 with 7 abstentions.

²² Ivi, p. 205.

CHAPTER 2 – THE UNITED STATES’ INVOLVEMENT IN BRAZIL

2.1 Regional subsystem

An international subsystem can be delineated as a distinct subgroup within the whole international system. In essence it can be affirmed that it is a component of a larger “container” that, at the same time, keeps its own characteristics.

The concept of subsystem has been used in different ways during the years, for example

“when Kenneth waltz refers to subsystems he means the nation-state. Similarly, in his celebrated level-of-analysis essay, J. David Singer uses the notion of subsystem to refer to the domestic level – the choice would then be selecting between the international system and the national sub-system as a referent for analysis. For Morton Kaplan, subsystems can be either national actors or supranational actors such as the United Nations. Thomas Robinson analyzed the Communist System as a subsystem of the larger international system. One aspect of Niklas Luhmann’s Modern Systems Theory is the notion that subsystems in the international systems are functionally differentiated. Thus, functional subsystems would include politics, law, the economy and science”.²³

In international relations, the delineation of boundaries for international subsystems is useful to facilitate the comprehension of international politics. To achieve this, it is important to transcend the conventional dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy, thereby directing our focus toward the broader global system.

Furthermore, a regional subsystemic approach is considered as systemic and not reductionist despite its emphasis on the regional system rather than on the global framework. In other words, it does not concentrate on the internal sources of foreign policy but, on the contrary, it wants to make the “foreign sources of foreign policy”²⁴ stand out.

Moreover, it is also important to analyze another matter which is the distinction between the formulation of foreign policy, a process intricately tied to domestic politics, and the

²³ Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., *The Absent Empire: The United States and the South American Regional Subsystem*, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, p. 52.

²⁴ *Ivi*, p. 54.

outcomes of foreign policy, which, in order to be totally understood, must be referred to the systemic processes. Notably, Harold and Margaret Sprout demonstrated that “for any political undertaking, it is important to differentiate between decisions and operational results, in other words, to distinguish between what is undertaken and what is accomplished”²⁵. In this context, the regional subsystem explained by the Sprouts takes on a distinct focal point. Rather than focusing only on the analysis of foreign policy decisions, the approach wants to concentrate on what is or what could be achieved. For example, the Sprouts’ thesis will not explain why the United States intervened in Chile during the 1970s but, on the contrary, it will try to clear up how the dynamics of the regional subsystem contributed to the results of this initiative.

“In general terms, this means that the absentness thesis proposed here is demonstrated not in terms of thoughtful decision-making processes by US statesmen, but in terms of the particular dynamics of the South American regional subsystem and its interaction with the United States”.²⁶

The establishment of a regional subsystem hinges upon two fundamental variables which are geographical proximity and patterns of interaction. However, these are not the only ways to delimit a region, such determination often rests on the specific objectives of the researcher. It is important to draw a clear distinction between the two terms “*regional subsystem*” and “*region*”, in facts, a region does not inherently translate into a regional subsystem. Therefore, the terms may intersect but remain conceptually separate, encapsulating nuances that must be carefully distinguished in the analysis; in order to understand the difference, here is an example,

“while the existence of Latin America as a region is justified from the point of view of other disciplines, within the field of International relations the view of a North and a South American subsystem is far more useful. The failure to make this distinction has led to recurrent errors of analysis, judgment and policies. This is especially true when it comes to US foreign policy towards the hemisphere. In particular it obscures fundamental differences between US foreign policy toward South American and the rest of Latin America. Additionally, it prevents a more sophisticated understanding of the role of Brazil, which has historically felt uncomfortable being labeled as Latin American”.²⁷

²⁵ Ivi, p. 54.

²⁶ Ivi, p. 55.

²⁷ Ivi, p. 57.

Normally, limiting a regional subsystem only according to factors such as geographical proximity and patterns of interactions does not foresee a minimum number of states.

Within the framework established earlier, three main characteristics must be taken in consideration. Firstly, a regional subsystem is a constituent part of a larger international system, effectively rendering the international system as the overarching framework enveloping the regional subsystem. Secondly, a regional subsystem can only be individuated by examining historical interactions. In essence, a researcher must look at a very long period of time to understand those patterns. In this context, Michael Wallace said: “nations may enter into relationships with one another in so many different ways and interact by such a wide variety of means at so many different levels, that no single measure, however comprehensive, can claim to be completely adequate”.²⁸

The third characteristic is geographical proximity. Geographical closeness holds particular significance due to its influence on the dynamics of interactions. Notably, the distance introduces complexities making interactions more intricate and increasing the costs of trade and conflicts. Mouritzen in fact, suggested that “even a perfectly interconnected international system does not overrule the fact that one is primarily connected to one’s neighbors”.²⁹ In essence, these characteristics underscore the nuanced nature of a regional subsystem’s definition and identification, intricately interwoven with the broader international landscape and demanding a meticulous analysis of historical interactions.

To conclude and to understand even better what a regional subsystem is, it is essential to mention the most common misunderstandings. The first misconception arises from a tendency to equate a regional subsystem with the process of regional integration. This misunderstanding is mostly due to the fact that, when the theories of the regional subsystems started to develop, the literature of the regional integration was already well developed. This led to an amalgamation of the two concepts, creating challenges in maintaining a clear distinction between them.

The second misconception is associated with the fact that we often look for factors different from geography and patterns of interaction. In such instances the notion of a shared culture or historical affinities plays a crucial role in fostering this

²⁸ Ivi, p. 59.

²⁹ Ivi, pp. 59-60.

misunderstanding. For example, if we consider Latin America as a regional subsystem for their culture, we must prove that Mexico and Brazil are better grouped up than Mexico and the United States. In this case if we consider the culture as main factor, the first group is the one that make more sense, however, if we consider geography and the patterns of interaction as the main variables there is no denying that the United States and Mexico should be grouped up together within the North American subsystem.

In conclusion, it can be affirmed that patterns of interaction and geographical proximity are the primary determinant factors which stand as the bedrock upon which the definition and scope of a regional subsystem are established.

2.1.1 The South American regional subsystem

As we understood above, a regional subsystem is essentially composed by two variables which are geography and patterns of interactions. Given that, analyzing the so-called Western Hemisphere we can find a North and a South American regional subsystem, each defined also by their patterns of conflicts and cooperation which also distinguish the South American regional subsystem from Latin America³⁰. While the notion of Latin America is predominantly built upon cultural affinities, it is in international relations that a more pragmatic approach prevails, favoring the differentiation between the North and the South regional subsystem. For this reason, if we consider geographical proximity, the concept of Latin America would not exist because it is evident that some cities of North and South America are way further than the same cities of North America and other cities in other continents, such as New York and Paris.

Consequently, if cultural similarities are established as the paramount criterion for determining global regions, it would necessitate the reclassification of other regions beyond the Americas.

“If it is assumed to be, for example, religion and language, then it makes as much sense to disassociate the United States from Mexico as it males disassociating France

³⁰ South America is a continent and is one of the two Americas, while Latin America is an area characterized by cultural similarities which extend to the whole South America and some countries of North America.

from England, Egypt from Israel, and India from Pakistan locating them in different regional subsystems”.³¹

Nevertheless, almost nobody would suggest doing such a thing, in fact

“the implicit reason why it would not be helpful to do so is exactly because France and England, Egypt and Israel, and India and Pakistan are proximate and interacting states and this is what really matters when analyzing their international relations”.³²

On the other hand, some experts say that, while Latin America might not align with geographical proximity as a defining criterion, it could find better alignment with the concept of patterns of interaction.³³ In international relations our assessment encompasses a broad spectrum of diplomatic, political, social, cultural, economic and personal interactions and all of these can manifest as either cooperative or conflictual. We refer to conflictual interactions when talking about wars, blockades and embargoes. Instead, we refer to cooperative interactions when speaking of trade, investments and aids. It is noteworthy that neighboring states tend to have a higher degree of interactions, thereby reinforcing the significance of geographical proximity as a contributing variable.³⁴

So, to determine whether Latin America aligns with the criterion of patterns of interactions, it becomes imperative to consider three key variables; these are wars and armed conflicts, trade and regional organizations.

A war can be defined as military hostilities fought between the armed forces of two or more countries, on the other hand, an armed conflict can be determined as a militarized interstate dispute and “a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual use of military force”³⁵. Notably, when an armed conflict culminates with over a thousand fatalities, it assumes the classification of a war.

Regarding the trade, we could start by analyzing the individual countries and evaluate the percentage of their imports and exports in relation to each American subsystem. This

³¹ Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., *The Absent Empire: The United States and the South American Regional Subsystem*, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, p. 89.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 89.

³³ *Ivi*, p. 89.

³⁴ *Ivi*, p. 90.

³⁵ *Ivi*, p. 93.

analysis often underscores a prevailing trend of heightened trade concentration within each subsystem, thereby underscoring the absence of a distinct Latin American trade pattern.

Third thing, a classic way to measure the regional integration is the membership in regional organizations. Alongside an analysis of the number of regional organizations within regional subsystems, would be important also an analysis on their actual effects and quality.

Studies revealed that we can't talk about pattern of conflicts and pattern of trade in Latin America because the conflicts which we refer to as inter-Latin American are not exactly that. They are instead inter-South American, inter-Caribbean or inter-Central American. Moreover, even if demonstrating that there isn't an inter-Latin American pattern of trade is way more difficult, experts in international relations agreed that this research would make evident the presence of two different subsystems in America which would not be Latin and North America but, instead, South and North American.³⁶

Of notable relevance in this field is Jeffrey Schott, who observed that the trade profiles of Western Hemisphere's nations markedly diverge based on their position relative to the equator. In facts, the northernmost countries are more dependent on the United States and on the other hand, the southernmost countries are more dependent on Brazil and Argentina.

“A growing concentration of commercial relations around two main centers: in the northern part of the hemisphere, Canada, Mexico, and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean are coalescing around the United States, which acts as the central magnet. A similar situation is developing in South America around the Brazil-Argentina axis”.³⁷

The separation of the South American subsystem and the North American subsystem can be demonstrated also in political terms. In this context it is important to mention the Organization of American States and the first Pan-American Conference of 1889. Notably, it was only after that year the conferences were inter-American including most

³⁶ On topic see: Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., *The Absent Empire: The United States and the South American Regional Subsystem*, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, chapter 4.

³⁷ Mace and Bélanger, *The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 244.

of Latin America and the United States. Before 1889, the conferences were mostly Hispano-American excluding both the United States and Brazil, yielding limited outcomes. In 1888 Argentina and Uruguay called for a “South American Congress of International Private Law” in Montevideo, attended also by Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Brazil and Perú. This congress exclusively welcomed South American countries mainly because they were afraid of some sort of supremacy by the countries of North and Central America. Argentina justified this exclusion on the basis of “their close bonds of political and commercial interests and even of neighborliness. The other states of North and Central America wither would not come or would come late, and perhaps one of them would assume a disturbing role of supremacy”.³⁸

In conclusion, even if it is possible to find two different patterns of interaction in the area referred as Latin America, it makes almost no-sense to think about the existence of a Latin American subsystem since it is “separated not only by the Panama Canal, but it is actually divided by divergent interests, economic links, and conflicting geopolitical factors”.³⁹

2.1.2 Brazil within the South American subsystem

The states within a regional subsystem have an incentive to reduce the opportunities for external penetrations and threats as well as their focus on maintaining the integrity of their subsystem. As a regional subsystem evolves, the participating countries tend to focus on their own regional interests rather than on global ones. Consequently, these states instinctively pursue actions deemed effective in shielding themselves from external influences. Simultaneously, they adopt strategies that will help them to maintain their influence within the regional subsystem.

On the other hand, the foreign relations that the components of a regional subsystem keep with the external powers can represent an obstacle for their “wall” against external influences. However, when these relations are well devised, they hold the potential to establish conditions conducive to curtailing the likelihood of external penetration. Furthermore, it is imperative to acknowledge that the dynamics of smaller countries

³⁸ Thomas Francis McGann, *Argentina, the United States, and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914*, Harvard Historical Studies v. 70 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 78.

³⁹ Moniz Bandeira, *O Brasil como potência regional e a importância estratégica da América do Sul na sua política exterior*, Revista Espaço Acadêmico, no. 91 (2008), p.18.

within the regional subsystem warrant consideration. Positioned in a relatively weaker position within the regional subsystem, these nations tend to get closer to outside powers in order to gain strength though, in most cases, they gain very little or even nothing given their limited capacity to withstand the pressures exerted upon them.⁴⁰

What written above helps to understand which is the role of Brazil in the South American subsystem. Owing to its strategically advantageous geographic location, Brazil has historically wielded considerable influence, drawing substantial benefits from upholding stability within the subsystem.

Furthermore, Brazil manipulated the subsystemic landscape, notably in its relationship with the United States. Functioning as a “subhegemonic state”⁴¹ or a “hegemonic stabilizer”⁴², Brazil has effectively curtailed the advantages of subsystemic shifts. This approach not only mitigates the prospects of external influence, particularly from the United States, but also positions Brazil as a regional force adept at maintaining stability.

“No U.S. intercession, but Brazilian power diplomacy seems most responsible for preventing the outbreak of violence in the region. If this is true, there may exist some basis for beginning to think of South American relations in terms of a regional balance of power (in which Brazil plays the role of balancer) rather than in the more conventional framework of North American hegemony”.⁴³

Secondly, Brazil adopted measures to prompt other states to participate in the subsystem avoiding to play a “subhegemonic” role. This way to influence the scenery, which was used in a prominent way after the eighties, assumes significance not only as a restrained method to assert hegemonic dominance, but also as a calculated and deliberate choice by Brazilian policymakers.

⁴⁰ Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., *The Absent Empire: The United States and the South American Regional Subsystem*, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, p. 118.

⁴¹ *Ivi*, p. 119.

⁴² *Ivi*, p. 119.

⁴³ Gorman, *Present Threats to Peace in South America: The Territorial Dimensions of Conflict*, in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 1979 p. 53.

2.2 Foreign policy of the United States in South America

Indeed, a comprehensive analysis of the United States' foreign policy in South America should start from 1823, marked by the very first pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine. During the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the Western Hemisphere was not the center of international affairs, moreover in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth, North, Central and South America played a secondary role in the conflicts that unfolded among European nations.

Then, when the very end of the nineteenth century was approaching, the United States started to play a very influential role in international relations. Their ascendancy would culminate in the first half of the twentieth century, propelling the nation to the pinnacle of power by 1945 and solidifying its status as one of the Great Powers ⁴⁴.

Furthermore, the United States also established a preeminent role in South America in two major ways. Firstly, they were comfortable using the military force in order to be predominant over South and Central American countries; secondly, the United States attained economic supremacy across the Western Hemisphere, driven by substantial investments which gave to American companies the property over almost all the resources of South America.

Amidst these developments, the United States occasionally found itself needing to justify its actions, often invoking altruistic principles. Noteworthy instances of this can be found looking at Wilson's and Roosevelt's administrations. In the 1930s, shortly after Roosevelt declared the "Good Neighbor" policy ⁴⁵, Washington was not convinced to intervene military, so the government looked to other solutions rather than the "gunboat diplomacy"⁴⁶ to maintain its dominance.

⁴⁴ The countries that were held capable of shared responsibility for the management of the international order by virtue of their military and economic influence.

⁴⁵ Diplomatic policy introduced by Roosevelt in 1933; was designed to encourage friendly relations and mutual defense within the countries of Western Hemisphere after decades of American military interventionism.

⁴⁶ Foreign policy supported by the use or threat of military force.

2.2.1 The Monroe Doctrine and Brazil

The Monroe Doctrine was announced for the first time by President James Monroe in the occasion of a speech to the Congress in December 1823 and it represents one of the strongest and probably the strongest doctrine in history. In this occasion President Monroe declared that

“the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers and that if they attempted to do so, this would be interpreted as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States”.⁴⁷

The Monroe Doctrine can be considered as a unilateral declaration which aimed to establish a clear demarcation between Europe and the Americas. This doctrine is distinguishably divisible into three distinct components, each serving a specific purpose. Firstly, is stated that countries of the Western Hemisphere were no longer open for colonization by European powers. This declaration served as a resolute stance against further European expansion into the Americas. Secondly, aimed to underline the difference between the European political systems and the Western Hemisphere. While at that time Europe was predominantly characterized by monarchical rule, the Americas predominantly adhered to democratic republics. Lastly, the doctrine emphasized that, in return, the United States would not intervene in European affairs. This element delineated a mutual understanding wherein the United States abstained from involvement in Europe while concurrently expecting non-interference from European powers within the Western Hemisphere.

Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine, while yielding limited tangible outcomes, paradoxically turned into a rationale for North American intervention in the matters of its southern neighbors. Consequently, it was criticized by some Central and South Americans, as they perceived it as a guise for a modern iteration of North American colonialism. In this context Brazil could be considered as a strong ally of the United States

⁴⁷ Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., *The Absent Empire: The United States and the South American Regional Subsystem*, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, p. 122.

thanks to its help in their actions in the Caribbean and again, Brazil's position gained power when Chile lost its power and Argentina adopted a strong anti-US foreign policy. In this scenery, the separation between North and South American regional subsystem became distinctly apparent. Furthermore, Brazil emerged as a key player, being the first South American country to be interested in the Monroe Doctrine. Mere months after, Brazil asked for an alliance with the United States that on the other hand declined this request and instead offered a limited commercial treaty. Despite the absence of a formal military alliance between Brazil and the United States, it remains undeniable that Brazil exhibited the most favorable disposition towards the U.S. foreign policy and the Monroe Doctrine within South America. Notably, the interpretation of the Doctrine given by Brazil was pretty similar to the one given by Theodore Roosevelt. According to the Brazilians' opinion, the intervention of the United States in the North American half of the Western Hemisphere did not represent a menace to its national interests. On the contrary, Brazil saw an opportunity to amplify its influence within South America. This perspective laid the foundation for the so-called "Unwritten alliance" between Brazil and the United States. While on one hand Brazil was focusing on the "collectivist nature" of the Doctrine, on the other hand the other Latin American countries were focusing on its unilateralist aspects.

The position of Brazil in this matter reflected its view of South and North America as two different systems with different interests and operational logics.

"For example, when the United States intervened in Cuba in 1902, Brazil adopted a sympathetic attitude, but when the United States seemed to support Bolivia in a dispute with Brazil in the same year, the Brazilian government reacted by ordering the closure of the Amazon River to foreign shipping, which irritated the United States".⁴⁸

Moreover, the Brazilian approach to the Monroe Doctrine was appreciated across the United States and numerous influential newspapers dedicated coverage to this matter. For example, "*The Washington Star*" featured an article spotlighting Root's tour in South America. Within this piece, it was asserted that the United States harbored intentions of forging an informal alliance with Brazil. This alliance, as envisioned, would serve the

⁴⁸ Ivi, p. 146.

purpose of entrusting Brazil with the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine's policy within South America.

Subsequently, Brazil recognized the importance of cultivating peace and order in South America, prompting the formulation of a pact among the region's three most influential nations which were Brazil, Argentina and Chile. This pact, coined the ABC treaty, had the goal to "establish a moral policing by the large South American republics with a purpose similar to Roosevelt's in North America, that is the maintenance of stable and responsible governments".⁴⁹

Furthermore, it was clear the initial thrust of the ABC treaty aimed to establish a shared hegemonic authority among its signatories within South America. However, as events unfolded, on May 25, 1915, Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed a formal treaty more limited than the original one. This revised treaty aimed to facilitate the solution of conflicts among the three countries.

Then, due to changes occurred in the first decades of the twentieth century, only Brazil kept its crucial role in US foreign policy in South America. The first change emerged from the decline of Chile's influence. Once a prominent power within the hemisphere, Chile experienced a gradual weakening of its position due to internal turmoil and the ascendance of the other two nations within the ABC pact. These developments progressively made its role became weaker and weaker. The second important change centered around Argentina which, during the First World War, remained neutral as Chile and Mexico but then, after the war, Argentina's governmental position underwent a transformation, adopting an adversarial stance towards the United States. Notably, during the Second World War, the Argentine issue remained a source of preoccupation for the United States to the point that the Secretary of State Cordell Hull referred to Argentina as a "*bad neighbor*".⁵⁰

As a result, Brazil ascended to the foremost position in South America, solidifying its leadership role. This elevation was notably facilitated by its collaborative efforts with the United States, a partnership that bore tangible rewards and gestures of goodwill. Notably, during World War II, Brazil's alliance with the United States translated into substantial

⁴⁹ Ivi, p. 148.

⁵⁰ Refer to: Hull, Cordell, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Macmillan, 1948.

benefits and aid. This assistance proved instrumental in enabling Brazil to surpass Argentina and emerge as the preeminent military power within South America.

2.2.2 The “Good Neighbor” policy

Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office in 1933 and his presidency extended until the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945. His presidency marked a turning point in United States – South American relations.

From the onset of his presidency, Roosevelt consistently declared that he was willing to improve the relationships between the countries of South America and the United States. His overarching goal was to put the basis for a relationship of cooperation and trade rather than military force to maintain stability in the Western Hemisphere.

Before Roosevelt’s took office, the administrations of the 1920s were worried about the negative impact of their policies towards South America since these policies had inadvertently cast the United States as an imperialistic power in the eyes of many countries in the southern hemisphere, fueling anti-Americanism sentiments across Latin and South America.

Consequently, it was clear that the military intervention of the United States in South America was creating more problems than it solved and actually they started to look with concern to the Japanese, that were gaining power like never before and to the Nazi Germany in Europe that was starting to threaten peace and order. For these reasons Americans felt the need to secure their interests in the Western Hemisphere by supporting local men.

Therefore, in 1933, at the moment of his election, Roosevelt declared that he was willing to follow

“the policy of the Good Neighbor – the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others, the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreement in and with a world of neighbors”.⁵¹

⁵¹ Best, Anthony, et al. *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. 3. ed, Routledge, 2015, p. 156.

One example of how far the “Good Neighbor” policy came, is the compromise reached between the United States and Mexico concerning the oil matter. In 1938 Lazaro Cardena, at the time Mexican President, nationalized all the resources of the country, including the oil even if some American companies had interests in it. Instead of using military force, the government of the United States started a long cycle of negotiations with Mexico and finally, in 1941 they reached an agreement which provided that the United States would recognize the right to control its own mineral resources, including oil, to Mexico and that Mexico would pay a sort of refund to the Americans who had interests in Mexican oil.

During his presidency, even when facing economic problems and World War II, Roosevelt always remained focused on his “Good Neighbor” policy. This commitment remained resolute, as exemplified by the actions of his Secretary of State Cordell Hull that, during the Montevideo Conference ⁵² in late 1933, declared that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another”⁵³.

And again, in 1933, Roosevelt declared that “the define policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention”. ⁵⁴

In sum, the “Good Neighbor” policy stated by Roosevelt represented an attempt to abandon the interventionist approaches that characterized the 1910s and the 1920s. Instead, the policy aimed to foster a climate of cooperation, representing a pivotal shift in the annals of inter-American relations.

2.2.3 The impact of World War II on Inter-American relations in the Western Hemisphere

On 7 December 1941 Japan attacked the American military base “*Pearl Harbor*” in Hawaii, thus the United States entered the Second World War and, from that moment on, the matter was about which side the Latin and South American countries would join.

Months before, in 1940, when Germany invaded the Netherlands and France, the Western Hemisphere was concerned about the fate of French and Dutch Caribbean colonies. So as

⁵² During the Montevideo Conference Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State announced formally the so-called “Good Neighbor” policy.

⁵³ Good Neighbor Policy, 1933, Milestones: 1921-1936, Office of the Historian. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/good-neighbor#:~:text=President%20Franklin%20Delano%20Roosevelt%20took,maintain%20stability%20in%20the%20hemisphere> consulted in August 2023.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

to prevent Germany from invading those territories Washington invoked the very first principle of the Monroe Doctrine informing the Germans that the United States would not allow any transfer of territory from one European country to another. Then, in July 1940 the Act of Havana was ratified and stated that “the American republics would occupy any territory which was in danger of being transferred from one external power to another”⁵⁵. Notably, Germany acceded to this principle on the condition that the United States would abstain from intervening in European affairs. Nevertheless, the Americans ignored this “*trade-off*” casting a shadow of shame over the nation’s future foreign policy makers. This incongruity was caused by the fact that the United States, while demanding non-intervention in the Americas, did not uphold the same principle requested by Germany. However, during the Second World War, the United States were able to exercise a fundamental role as the “arsenal of democracy”⁵⁶ and as one of the three most powerful countries in the whole world. This ascendancy had a notable effect, compelling, in a distinctive manner, other Western Hemisphere countries to function as resource hubs to fuel the war efforts of the Allies.

When the war ended, we can say that the first step made towards a military alliance in the Western Hemisphere, was the “*Act of Chapultepec*”, signed at the beginning of 1945 at the Pan-American conference in Chapultepec (Mexico), which stated that “any attack on any American state was an attack on them all”⁵⁷. Later that year all the Latin American countries took part in the creation of the United Nations in San Francisco.

At the beginning, when the UN was created, it had very strong powers over regional matters, but this represented a big issue for the American dominance over the Western Hemisphere. This prospect would imply that even powers such as the Soviet Union, could wield veto power over the actions of the United States. Then, after many negotiations the regionalist got their wish. Although not explicitly stated, the United States could continue to exercise their influence over Latin America and the Western Hemisphere thanks to the articles 51, 52, 53, 54 of the UN Charter.

⁵⁵ Best, Anthony, et al. *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. 3. ed, Routledge, 2015, p. 160.

⁵⁶ *Ivi*, p. 160.

⁵⁷ *Ivi*, p.161.

Furthermore, in 1947, the American republics, guided by the United States, ratified the Rio Treaty⁵⁸. This treaty not only solidified a regional alliance but also served as a robust template for other alliances crafted by the United States during the Cold War era.

In conclusion it can be said that, at the end of the Second World War, in 1945, the United States emerged as leading power in the Western Hemisphere mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the wartime disruption made trade for the Latin Americans and countries beyond the United States virtually impossible, consolidating American economic dominance in the region. Secondly, American supremacy in the region remained unchallenged due to the fact that the countries that could have represented a threat were destroyed or severely weakened by the war.

2.3 Brazilian Foreign Policy before the 1964 coup d'état

In the aftermath of the Second World War and even more by the end of the Cold War, Brazil's foreign policy concentrated on their contribution to economic development and modernization. Under the leadership of Rio Branco as Minister of Foreign Affairs, between 1902 and 1912, Brazilian foreign policies were strongly remodeled following the American lines; consequently, while the United Kingdom retained its role as a crucial supplier to the South American nation until the outbreak of the First World War, the United States ascended as the leading purchaser of Brazilian exports.

Following Rio Branco's suggestions, the United States then remained the principal diplomatic partner of Brazil until the 1950s but, contrary to conventional perception, during those years Rio Branco's vision did not entail an unconditional subservience to the policies made by the Americans. Instead, he believed that the relationship between Brazil and Washington could and would help promoting Brazilian national interests.

However, the background of this relation had different aspects and it was characterized by evident disparities, as evidenced by the illustration provided below.

⁵⁸ The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was signed on 2 September 1947, declared that an attack or a menace against a signatory nation will be considered as an attack against all.

Tabella 2.1

<i>Year</i>	<i>Trade with U.S. as a share of Brazilian world trade</i>		<i>Trade with Brazil as share of U.S. world trade</i>	
	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>
1940	39.9	45.3	2.8	4.0
1945	47.5	48.8	2.2	7.5
1950	52.8	33.6	3.6	8.1
1955	44.5	20.9	1.8	5.6
1960	45.4	31.7	2.3	3.9
1965	32.1	31.1	1.2	2.4
1970	24.5	29.5	2.0	1.7
1975	15.4	24.9	3.2	1.4
1980	17.4	18.5	2.1	1.4
1985	27.1	19.5	1.3	1.9
1990	24.6	19.8	1.1	1.5
1995	18.9	21.1	2.0	1.2
1998	19.4	23.6	2.2	1.1

Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), *Estatística Histórica do Brasil, Séries Estatísticas Retrospectivas*, vol. 3, Séries Econômicas, Demográficas e Sociais, 1550 to 1985 (Rio de Janeiro, 1987), pp. 524-25; U.S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1975), pp. 903, 905; International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics*.

Moreover, during the 1930s, a period marked by severe economic depression and political revolutions under Vargas' government, the pro-American stance in Brazil's foreign policy witnessed a gradual wane and so the once robust pro-American policies exhibited signs of fragility. Even if he successfully repressed totalitarian movements within the country, his own "*Estado Novo*" was inspired by the Italian fascist model. Despite the strained nature of Brazil's relations with the United States, Vargas always declared that "Brazil was joined with the other American republics in collective defense against extracontinental threats"⁵⁹.

Speaking of Brazilian-American relations it is important to say that during World War I, Brazil adhered to American neutrality while maintaining a sympathetic disposition

⁵⁹ Gordon, Lincoln. *Brazil's Second Chance: En Route Toward the First World*. Brookings institution press, 2001, p. 198.

towards the Allied powers. Brazil's formal declaration of war against Germany occurred only in 1917 after a German assault on some Brazilian vessels. On the other hand, the landscape of the Second World War introduced a far more intricate dynamic. With Germany's sweeping control over much of the European continent and mounting American pressure for intervention, Brazil found itself at a crossroads. Vargas tried to remain neutral even in this situation but then, external pressures prompted Brazil to acquiesce to American demands for military bases. This situation led to a negotiation, wherein Vargas sought reciprocal concessions in the form of military equipment and support for the construction of the "*Volta Redonda*"⁶⁰ industrial complex. Subsequent to the Japanese assault on the United States' naval base at Pearl Harbor, a significant pivot in Brazil's foreign policy occurred. This transformation materialized through the severing of diplomatic ties with Germany, Italy and Japan at the Inter-American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1942, serving as a resolute demonstration of Brazil's solidarity with the United States.

In August of the same year Brazil declared war on Germany. This decision was prompted by a series of German naval attacks on Brazilian vessels, which collectively constituted a catalyst for Brazil's involvement in the conflict, so the country cooperated providing war materials to the Allies and denying those materials to the Axis powers. Furthermore, Brazil decided to send troops in Europe which then arrived in Italy in July 1944. While it was clear that Brazil's military involvement would hold limited impact on the larger armed conflict, this decision carried profound political significance.

"The Brazilian Expeditionary force was thus the core of a political project intended to strengthen the Brazilian armed forces and to give Brazil a position of preeminence in Latin America and substantial importance in the world as a special ally of the United States".⁶¹

After World War Two Brazil had high expectations regarding its position in the postwar global landscape. However, these aspirations were quickly disappointed, as the Marshall Plan in Europe, the United States divided economic aids to Latin America as a whole and not only in Brazil. This development was particularly disheartening for

⁶⁰ "*Volta Redonda*" is the home of the first Brazilian steel mill founded in 1941 by President Vargas.

⁶¹ Gordon, Lincoln. *Brazil's Second Chance: En Route Toward the First World*. Brookings institution press, 2001, p. 200.

Brazil, given its active participation in the European theater. In addition, after the war, the United States preferred to have collective arrangements with all Latin America instead of bilateral agreements with Brazil. The disheartening contrast between Brazilian expectations and the actual course of events after the Second World War showed the intricate interplay between international diplomacy, regional dynamics and the complexities of post-conflict recovery.

For these reasons and due to the absence of development aids, Brazil's trajectory in the postwar era took on intricate dimensions. Even though initially Brazil was aligned with the United States and the Western bloc against the Soviet Union as the Cold War emerged, when the Americans asked for Brazilian troops in Korea, the Brazilian government refused. This phase witnessed a gradual deterioration in the diplomatic rapport between the two nations. A turning point materialized in April 1945 when Truman gained the presidency of the United States. His administration made positive moves towards a joint Brazil-United States Economic Commission which mission centered on assessing Brazil's needs for the country's development projects which then would be financed by the World Bank or the U.S. Export-Import Bank. However, after the Commission completed its work, in 1953 Eisenhower became President of the United States. This transition brought new dynamics as President Eisenhower, driven by concerns regarding the nationalist undertones of Vargas' presidency in Brazil, opposed to financing Brazil's development projects, disappointing again their expectations. In 1954 Vargas committed suicide forcing Brazilian statesmen to postpone a change in foreign policy. His successors João Café Filho and Juscelino Kubitschek agreed on foreign private investments opening to American industries the participation in Kubitschek's "*Fifty Years in Five*".

After 1958, a period characterized by Brazil's grappling with a slowdown in its growth rate, escalating inflation and the resurgence of nationalist sentiments, the diplomatic landscape aligned with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America "which coined the terminology of center and periphery and urged collective action by poorer nations to secure economic concessions from the richer"⁶². With this background the so-called

⁶² Ivi, p. 202.

“*Operation Pan-American*”⁶³ proposed by Kubitschek, gained terrain. However, in 1959 his political alignment moved towards a more pronounced nationalist ideology which expressed with an outright break with the International Monetary Fund.

Then, important events reverberated across the international stage, impacting on the relations between the United States and Latin America. The assault on Vice President Richard Nixon in Colombia and Fidel Castro gaining power over Cuba, shocked the Americans prompting them to adopt a more opened stance towards Latin American requests for development assistance. Within this context the American administration initiated a paradigm shift, proposing agreements aimed at fostering economic progress and social upliftment in the region. Central to this transformation were the propositions to create the Inter-American Development Bank and the formulation of a pioneering Social Progress Trust Fund.

Furthermore, in 1961 Jânio Quadros became President of Brazil. Under his leadership a profound change was made with the introduction of his “*Independent Foreign Policy*” which introduced some new themes that remained strong for years to come shaping Brazil’s diplomatic trajectory. The most important change was the retirement of Brazilian support to the Portuguese colonialism in Africa which was a long-standing exception to the anticolonialism of Brazil. Moreover, although Brazil declared itself as a Western nation, during those years the government came closer with undeveloped countries, in particular with Africa but also with the “*nonaligned movement*”⁶⁴ and even with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic.

Then, in the latter phase of his presidency Quadros challenged the United States. He conferred to Ernesto Che Guevara, the most important associate of Fidel Castro, the highest diplomatic honor of Brazil.

This “*Independent Foreign Policy*” remained strong during the short Goulart’s presidency even if in 1962 Brazil condemned the Soviet installation of nuclear missile basis in Cuba.

⁶³ Operation Pan-American: An economic development program which aimed to replace the old “Alliance for Progress”.

⁶⁴ The Non-Aligned Movement is a group of countries, mainly developing countries, that during the Cold War did not ally neither with the United States nor with the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 3 – THE 1964 COUP D’ÉTAT AND OPERATION “*BROTHER SAM*”

3.1 How did the coup come about?

Prior to Goulart’s inauguration as President, Brazil went through a tumultuous period of instability. The nation’s primary focus shifted to the question whether Goulart would assume office without resorting to armed conflict. Moreover, with Ranieri Mazilli, a member of the PSD ⁶⁵, as interim President of the country, Sergio Magalhães from the PTB ⁶⁶, took up the mantle of the presiding officer of the Chamber. Simultaneously, Lacerda and his associates were conspiring to prevent Goulart from ascending to presidency. However, the Governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola, made a public announcement that he was determined to exert all his efforts to ensure legality, including Goulart’s right to the presidency.

Furthermore, to avoid the threat of violent internal conflict, a committee within the Chamber of Deputies, formed several weeks before, deliberated on the enactment of a constitutional amendment aimed at establishing a parliamentary system.

This compromise gained momentum due to Goulart’s willingness to embrace it in order to avoid a violent conflict within the country and finally, on September 2, 1961, the Chamber successfully ratified the “*Addictional Act*” twice. Having chosen to accept a parliamentary system and decrease his executive powers, on Brazil’s Independence Day, September 7, 1961, merely two weeks after Quadros’ resignation, João Belchior Marques Goulart assumed the presidency of Brazil.

3.1.1 Political scene

The years between 1961 and 1964 were characterized by some major elements such as ideological radicalization, fragility and instability of political coalitions, fragmentation of power resources and high turnover in key governmental positions.

⁶⁵ PSD: Partido Social Democrático.

⁶⁶ PTB: Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro.

“The 1961-1964 period was truly characterized by the transformation of a reasonably operational political system into one incapable of producing decisions with respect to the most pressing questions of the epoch”.⁶⁷

The compromise, coerced into acceptance by both the military and Goulart, became a source of conflict within the nation, primarily between the Congress and the newly inaugurated President. These conflicts centered on the President’s determination to demonstrate that the new system didn’t work and to orchestrate a return to presidentialism. Furthermore, this already challenging scenario was further aggravated by the escalation of clashes between the Right and Left caused by a polarizing campaign during the legislative elections.

Amidst this backdrop of instability, between September 1961 and the elections of October 1962 the country was steered by a succession of Cabinets.

The forces of the Cabinets were satisfied by their role in the solution of the 1961 crisis, so they decided to collaborate with Goulart’s government. The PSD, in accordance with its position as the foremost national party, held substantial representation within the Cabinet. Goulart’s PTB assumed responsibility for the Foreign Ministry, led by San Thiago Dantas of Minas Gerais, and the Health Ministry was overseen by Eustácio Souto Maior from Pernambuco. Each faction of the UDN⁶⁸ had its own ministerial position.

Goulart’s presidency commenced with a notable focus on foreign policy, particularly concerning the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This agenda reflected Brazil’s commitment to its “Independent Foreign Policy”. A clear embodiment of this dedication occurred at the Inter-American Foreign Ministers’ meeting in January 1962, held in Punta del Este. During this event, Brazilian delegates assertively refused to support the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States, standing in direct contradiction to the arguments advanced by the United States. Concerning Goulart’s domestic policies, initially, he embraced a prudent and balanced approach, effectively securing support from the centrist and even some conservative factions. Yet, he remained deeply attuned to the sentiments of the working class, concerned about potential vulnerability to a leftward challenge from Brizola. For this

⁶⁷ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.207.

⁶⁸ UDN: União Democrática Nacional – National Democratic Union. It represented a conservative and anti-populist stance within Brazilian politics. It was known for its critical stance against perceived authoritarianism, populism, and leftist influence in Brazilian politics.

reason, the President started to adopt a more leftist approach. We can affirm that Goulart's primary goal was to repeal the "*Additional Act*" and reestablish presidentialism recovering full presidential powers. Anyway, Goulart's actions encountered many obstacles, first of all, the anti-Goulart elements of the Democratic Parliamentary Action (ADP), which was "an anti-Communist ideological supraparty bloc that had come into being in early 1962 to counter the Nationalist Parliamentary Front"⁶⁹. Then, through affiliations with the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IBAD), an entity under the leadership of Ivan Hasslocker dedicated to anti-Communist endeavors, and using its network of Popular Democratic Action (ADEP), this movement, with backing from the United States, strategically aimed to counter the rising influence of the emerging National Liberation Front, led by Brizola, as well as the initiatives of Miguel Arraes, the Mayor of Recife, and Francisco Julião, an organizer of Peasants Leagues⁷⁰.

Goulart, still concerned about the military oppositions to his presidency, during his first period as President was able to avoid many conflicts. In order to maintain the situation as stable as possible he used his powers smartly avoiding to introduce any initiative that could be perceived by the military as a menace. Then, once he obtained full presidential powers, his lack of political experience came to light. He dealt with crucial figures of the armed forces in the same way he dealt with Brazil, expecting a certain sense of gratitude for their esteemed positions.

Furthermore, in 1962 the country went through the biennial Military Club elections held in May. Throughout these elections, the nationalist faction faced a setback in their endeavor to regain control.

"As during the 1954 crisis Vargas had faced a Military Club controlled by his enemies, Goulart would feel the weight of the club's increasing hostility during the events leading to his downfall. In this the anti-Goulart officers would have militant and well-organized allies, as the Institute for Social Research and Studies (IPES) was organized by elements of the commercial and industrial classes following the 1961 crisis".⁷¹

⁶⁹ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.209.

⁷⁰ The Peasants Leagues were social and political organizations that emerged to advocate for the rights and interests of rural peasants and agricultural workers.

⁷¹ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.210.

While the São Paulo division of IPES promptly assumed an active role in behind-the-scenes politics, the Rio de Janeiro division chose to operate indirectly due to the greater federal influence and leftist strength there, as well as the very active role played there in the political action field of IBAD.

Soon, by mid 1962 the military started to plot against Goulart presidency with General Olympio Mourão Filho as the first officer to try to organize a coup to overthrow the Goulart's government. Moreover, by June of the same year the Cabinet of Tancredo Neves resigned, leaving the place to San Thiago Dantas, nominated by Goulart to form a new Cabinet. However, the UDN and a majority of the PSD refused to accept the PTB leader as Prime Minister and sent him down to defeat by a 174 to 110 vote.

“With the country already experiencing a protracted student strike, a major proportion of the labor movement poised to walk off the job, and the metropolitan regions suffering from serious shortages of basic food supplies, the political situation was serious and deteriorating daily as a result of the government vacuum”.⁷²

As a consequence, while the PSD was expecting that Goulart would be thwarted by their actions, on July 2, 1962, the Brazilian President caught the opposition off guard by suddenly appointing an influential figure from the PSD in São Paulo, Auro de Moura Andrade, as the Senate President. Disappointed by Goulart's behavior, Andrade soon resigned in the occasion of a general strike within the country on July 5. Moreover, on July 8, 1962, Goulart put forth a fresh nomination, suggesting Brochado da Rocha as the new President of the Senate. His endorsement, with a Chamber vote of 215 to 58 signified the demise of the belief that the Prime Minister embodied the representation of the Congress.

Slightly pushing the boundaries of the Constitution by addressing, through a law albeit of a unique nature, issues that technically should have been addressed through a constitutional amendment, the architects of Complementary Act No. 2 dated September 16, established provisions for a restricted and temporary transfer of powers. Additionally, they laid the groundwork for a referendum on the parliamentary system, scheduled to take place on January 6, 1963.

⁷² Ivi, p. 211.

In October of the same year, Brazil witnessed another round of elections in which Brochado's Cabinet failed to instill confidence. Notably, General Néelson de Melo was appointed to the War Ministry and, as events unfolded, he eventually aligned with the anti-Goulart forces, creating a rift with the President. The situation grew increasingly unstable, prompting unfortunately exacerbated the already precarious state.

The elections campaign was marked by intense heat, characterized by heightened tensions between the Left and Right factions, each hurling heavy accusations at the other.

“Climaxing the most extensive, expensive, and bitterly contested campaign in the nation's history, the balloting would have a decisive impact upon the course of events leading to the 1964 Revolution”.⁷³

By that point, Brizola solidified his standing within the Left faction by achieving an unprecedented record in votes through polling for a federal deputy candidate. He then moved his political base to Guanabara⁷⁴ when 269.000 Carioca⁷⁵ voters casted their ballots for him. Sustaining a PTB-PSD coalition offered the possibility of a reasonably robust congressional base for the administration. However, Goulart needed to delicately navigate between the persistent calls for reforms emanating from the dominant faction of the PTB and the fundamental conservatism of the PSD's agrarian-centered nucleus.

We can affirm that in the immediate, the elections helped Goulart to strengthen his position. However, he was not satisfied by this and sought to secure the allegiance of sergeants and warrant officers by offering them certain incentives such as salary raise, enabling their candidacy in elections, and streamlining their path to homeownership. In exchange he wanted their support for a return to a presidential system.

Furthermore, “the early months of 1963 were the highwater mark of the Goulart government and the lowest point for the fortunes of the military conspirators”.⁷⁶

On January 6, 1963, the plebiscite took place and favored a return to presidentialism with 9.5 million votes in favor and only 2 million opposed. However, in this context Goulart miscalculated his position. When he started to push for new policies which were in

⁷³ Ivi, p. 213.

⁷⁴ The State comprising the city of Rio de Janeiro.

⁷⁵ Residents of the city of Rio de Janeiro.

⁷⁶ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.215.

contrast with the established power structure instead of just promoting a return to the traditional governmental system, his opposition began to raise rapidly. Goulart initially attempted the path of conciliation, but it became clear that this approach was unworkable. His reforms, aimed at fostering economic development and financial stabilization, faced substantial criticism from both businessmen and labor groups. Notably, the Right vehemently opposed his agrarian reform initiatives. During this phase, moderate labor leaders began advocating for the abandonment of the “U.S. imposed” austerity program. This marked a pivotal moment as Goulart’s stance shifted towards a more left-leaning direction. Then, during 1963 the dissension within the government between radicals and moderates became acute mainly due to an accident which involved the Labor Minister João Pinheiro Neto. He denounced an IMF’s “economic dictatorship” over Brazil and accused Roberto Campos and Octávio de Bulhões, two conservative members of the government of being chief agents of the IMF ⁷⁷.

Another significant test for Presidential strength materialized during the biennial elections of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI). Seizing the opportunity presented by the mid-1962 Cabinet crisis, the CNTI and other unions capitalized on the situation to push for an end to conciliatory measures and instead advocate for a united push towards fundamental reforms. Goulart, apprehensive about alienating his original support base, opted to enact policies aligned with those formulated by his Cabinet.

Within this context, a pivotal keystone of Goulart’s presidency was the “*Furtado Plan*”. This initiative, later formalized as the “*Plano Trienal*” represented Goulart’s attempt to demonstrate his commitment to the goals of the Alliance for Progress and fulfill Brazil’s international obligations, particularly to the United States. Additionally, in February 1963, the Nationalist Parliamentary Front underwent a reorganization, incorporating newly elected deputies who advocated for an independent foreign policy and comprehensive structural reforms.

However, under mounting political pressures, Goulart eventually chose to abandon the “*Plano Trienal*”. The balance sheet for 1963 revealed a decline in per capita GDP and a staggering 80 percent increase in the cost of living. Despite the setback of the “*Furtado Plan*”, Goulart remained steadfast in his determination to steer Brazil towards a trajectory of growth. Yet, achieving this goal necessitated a series of fundamental reforms, which,

⁷⁷ IMF – International Monetary Fund.

in turn, stirred concerns among extremists from both the Right and the Left. These factions were apprehensive about the potential shifts in power that these proposed reforms might entail.

“The radical viewed essentially moderate measure as inadequate or designed as palliatives to deaden the revolutionary impulses of the Brazilian people, while the reactionaries saw the same proposals as dangerous wedges that would led to more drastic changes that would upset the social order and shift political power perilously far to the Left”.⁷⁸

The opposition persistent in portraying the President as aligned with Brizola and other PTB radicals who supported “Communistic” measures. However, these radicals were primarily aiming to draw Goulart further to the Left, envisioning a transformation of his administration into a nationalist and popular regime.

Moreover, to secure the backing of the PTB, Goulart made a calculated move to distance himself from figures like Dantas and Furtado. This maneuver came as the internal power dynamics within the PTB tilted in favor of the radical faction, which was veering towards an outright rejection of the existing order. As a French journalist said, Goulart “was a man who had an appetite to live well, the instinct for power, but few ideas and even less education”⁷⁹. In the judicious view of Jaguaribe

“President Goulart, party leader by no statesman, excellent tactician but poor strategist, gifted with keen political intuition but bereft of practical knowhow, showed himself incapable of controlling events and reconciling short-term advantages – which he was always adroit in securing – with the longer-term interests of his Government, which he was prone to sacrifice to the expediency of the moment”.⁸⁰

Then, by mid-1963 Brizola had Goulart on his hands and this made the President, worried about Brizola capturing the leadership of organized labor, move leftward. Due to this situation, the opposition though that Goulart was responsible for Brizola’s revolutionary declarations, but, instead, he had almost no influence over him.

⁷⁸ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.p. 218-219.

⁷⁹ J. J. Faust, *A Revolução Devora Seus Presidentes*, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Saga, 1965, p. 54.

⁸⁰ Hélio Jaguaribe, *Brazilian Nationalism and the Dynamics of Its Political Development*, *Studies in Comparative International Development* 2, 4, 1966, p. 65.

3.1.2 Military scene

Not only did the political scene deteriorate, but the military situation also took a turn for the worse by the end of 1963. An agitation brewing within the military ranks erupted into a full-fledged rebellion, highlighting the gravity of the erosion of military discipline. The issue of whether noncommissioned officers should be eligible to run for elective office had been unresolved for nearly a year. However, on the morning of September 12, 1963, following the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the electoral tribunal's ruling against such eligibility, a substantial faction of air force and naval noncommissioned officers responded by seizing control of Brasilia.

Furthermore, Castelo Branco ascended to the position of the new army chief of staff and openly criticized the reformist faction, labeling them as "opportunistic reformers" actively working to undermine both the strength of the army and the stability of the nation. Adding to the escalating tension, Second Army commander Pery Constant Beviláqua denounced radical union leaders as "detractors of democracy", pushing the crisis to a more critical stage. Moreover, the departure of one of the president's highest-ranking military supporters dealt a severe blow, amplifying concerns about the government's perceived attempts to erode discipline. These concerns now reverberated not only within the high command but also among junior officers, those most directly engaged with the troops on the ground.

The Goulart's regime by that time was in danger as numerous officers in São Paulo displayed a sympathetic ear to the plans articulated by Cordeiro de Farias and the former Second Army commander and the former war minister Nélon de Melo.

Then, on October 4, 1963, Goulart asked the Congress for the ratification of a thirty-day nationwide state of siege. Nevertheless, the Congress rebuffed this plea, leaving the government deeply disconcerted by this response, consequently eroding the backing of the very groups upon which Goulart aimed to establish his authority. At this juncture, Goulart found himself compelled to reassess his proposition of bestowing upon the Congress the constituent powers to revise the Constitution in favor of sweeping socio-economic reforms.

The reaction of the armed forces was fatal. Castelo Branco censured the war minister for having acted in the name of the army without consulting its upper echelons. Dantas

Ribeiro's status never recovered from this loss of prestige. In fact, he was denounced in public for unilaterally involving the army in a political venture that risked tarnishing its reputation.

The failure of the state of siege was subsequently construed by the opposition and a significant portion of the military as an illustration of Goulart's willingness to traverse great lengths in pursuit of augmented powers.

Furthermore, even though the progressive faction within the Church and moderate figures such as Magalhães Pinto from the UDN aligned with Dantas' objectives, their perspective remained in the minority within their respective organizations.

“It was precisely because the negative Left, under Brizola's irresponsible adventurism, could address to the masses the most revolutionary promises and appeals, that the viable compromise offered by the positive Left was made to look irrelevant, if not distinguish a social treason. Correspondingly, the fallacious appeal, by the Right wing conservatives, to unrestricted advantages for the bourgeoisie, could mislead the national entrepreneurs”.⁸¹

The radical left became stronger, believing that they had successfully pushed Goulart towards a more radical stance. However, they remained unaware that their insistence on socialism and anti-U.S. foreign policy would inadvertently alienate the national bourgeoisie, causing them to shift allegiances from the progressive camp to that of the reactionary forces. Furthermore, the communist factions saw a rise in their influence, skillfully aligning themselves with the growing tide of nationalism. This was manifested through their adept infiltration of key entities such as the PTB and the Brazilian Socialist Party. Additionally, they strategically exerted control over significant portions of organized labor and the burgeoning student movement, further solidifying their ascendancy.

Simultaneously, they built an intricate network of front groups, serving as conduits to wield influence over various other factions within the Left. Even amidst the deepening crisis, the stances of key political leaders were still heavily influenced by their presidential ambitions.

⁸¹ Jaguaribe Hélio, *Political Strategies of National Development in Brazil*, *Studies in Comparative International Development* 3, 27-50, 1967, p. 45.

Kubitschek, in his bid to maintain the integrity of the historical PSD-PTB alliance, endeavored to steer Goulart towards moderation. He also encouraged his followers in the Congress to be more open to the president's appeals for fundamental reforms. On the opposing side, Lacerda, Kubitschek's closest rival, found himself torn between his vehement opposition to Goulart and his desire to safeguard his promising electoral prospects. Within the Left, Arraes, the governor of Pernambuco, emerged as a potential presidential contender, especially given the ineligibility of both Goulart and Brizola. However, he grappled with concerns of a conservative coup before the 1965 elections and apprehensions about efforts to overturn Brizola's ineligibility.

In August 1963 Goulart dissolved the IBAD and the ADEP. However, the controversy surrounding these actions persisted as the radical Left aimed to tarnish the image of organizations like IPES by association, while the Right initiated an investigation into alleged "purchase" of control over UNE⁸² by Brizola. Furthermore, Castelo Branco steadily garnered a significant following, particularly among middle-grade officers who had served during his extended tenure with the command and general staff. Growing increasingly alarmed by the trajectory of the government, Castelo Branco resolved to take up the mantle of military leadership within the conspiracy against the President. Even though Goulart was still the legitimate commander-in-chief of Brazil's armed forces, as long as he refrained from shutting down the Congress, Castelo Branco's subsequent addresses and communications as army chief of staff underscored a mounting sense that Goulart was venturing into perilous territory. By February 1964, the conspirators drafted a document, known as "LEEX" highlighting their primary goal of safeguarding representative democracy. Toward the end of the same month, it became evident that Goulart was increasingly swayed by Brizola's influence. This shift saw him turning away from the counsel of Kubitschek and instead implementing a series of populist measures. At this point, the ranks of the conspirators had swelled considerably, surpassing the government's support.

⁸² UNE – Union of Students.

3.2 The 1964 coup d'état in Brazil

As discussed in the previous paragraph, João Goulart emerged as a leftist leader who proposed a series of reforms that raised concerns among the armed forces and conservative elites.

In the months leading up to the coup d'état, Brazil experienced increasing political and social tensions, marked by a growing polarization between the armed forces, who feared the rise of communism, and Goulart's government, which enjoyed support from trade unions and peasants.

A turning point in the political background occurred on March 13, 1964, when President Goulart, flanked by leaders of various leftist mass organizations, announced a set of transformative policies which exacerbated the already strained relations between the government and its conservative detractors. These included an ambitious agrarian reform plan, the nationalization of private oil refineries and the introduction of urban reform laws that imposed rent controls on vacant apartments.

Further intensifying the situation, on March 18 of the same year, former President Dutra broke his political silence and issued a call for unity in defense of democracy and the Constitution. This move came in response to a wave of protests and movements spreading across the nation, reflecting the growing divisions and anxieties gripping Brazilian society. In addition to the events previously discussed, another crucial moment in the lead-up to the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état occurred when General Castelo Branco circulated a message among army officers in which he denounced Governor Brizola's initiatives as a potential slide toward dictatorship and refuted the notion that adhering to legality necessarily equated to supporting a President veering dangerously close to subversion. Moreover, General Castelo Branco explicitly conveyed that the military would respect the President's authority, but only under the condition that the President adhered to the boundaries set by the law.

While Goulart was on holiday at his ranch, a group of officers from the Association of Sailors and Marines attended a meeting at the Communist-led Bankworkers Union, disregarding a ban imposed by the navy minister. Consequently, the navy minister arrested the defiant officers of the association and, even the leftist admiral Cândido Aragão was replaced as head of the marine corps when he refused to act against the

insubordination. Upon his return from vacation, President Goulart found out that the situation had spiraled out of control. The lack of Goulart's support eventually led to the resignation of the navy minister.

Despite Goulart's convictions, as he leaned further left in his policies, he witnessed what he perceived as the resolution of the military crisis, but this only marked the beginning of the end of his presidency. On the fateful afternoon of March 31, 1964, Goulart's nightmare began when he received news of open revolt in the state of Minas Gerais as a consequence for the President's nationwide broadcaster speech of the preceding day which gave his opponents the opportunity to take decisive action.

The military action lasted less than two days but appeared to be very different within each region of the country.

“In the First Army, sharp divisions and open confrontation as the troops from Minas Gerais marched on Rio de Janeiro; in the Second Army, hesitation while Paulista civilians and troops commanders waited for General Kruel to make up his mind to lead them against legalist forces in Rio de Janeiro; in the Third Army, the divisional commanders leading their troops against the commanding general; and in the Fourth Army, coordinated action by all units under the leadership of its commander”⁸³.

This action ended with a few victims and the success came very quickly. “Respecting the position of their opponents, who were fighting for legality as they saw it, revolutionary forces preferred to outmaneuver and outnegotiate rather than overpower”⁸⁴.

In conjunction with the military action, the support of organized civilian groups played a pivotal role in the events leading up to the coup d'état. Within Brazilian society, a significant majority of the populace opted to align themselves with the military rather than defend President Goulart's regime.

By late afternoon the loyalist troops began withdrawing from positions along the Minas Gerais-Rio de Janeiro border. This retreat allowed the forces commanded by General Mourão Filho and Luís Carlos Guedes to advance toward Brazil's second-largest city. In anticipation of hostilities, Governor Carlos Lacerda, had already mobilized state forces on the 29th well aware of General Castelo Branco's readiness to initiate hostilities.

⁸³ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.235.

⁸⁴ *Ivi*, p. 235.

At this juncture, General Krueel, not desiring a central role the removal of President Goulart, proposed a path for the President to extricate himself from the crisis by severing ties with the radical left. However, Goulart rejected this suggestion, prompting Krueel to immediately order the Second Army to advance on Rio de Janeiro.

Meanwhile, General Adalberto Pereira dos Santos' Sixth Infantry Division posed a significant threat to pro-Goulart forces in Porto Alegre, while the Third Infantry Division, in conjunction with the Second and the Third Cavalry Divisions, secured the interior regions in support of the insurgents before proceeding towards the capital city of Brazil. On April 2, Goulart visited the capital but confronted with a hopeless situation. In response, he made the decision to depart for his ranch near the Uruguayan border entrusting Governor Leonel Brizola with the impossible task of attempting to mount an armed resistance.

As the military action ended, it became evident that their goals had been achieved. While weaknesses and errors on the part of Goulart's administration came to light, it was equally apparent that the revolution was meticulously planned and expertly executed by the plotters. Furthermore, as I will explore in the next paragraph, the military enjoyed substantial support from the United States, which provided them with crucial military supplies.

“As Castelo Branco, Cordeiro de Farias, Adhemar de Queiroz, Nélson de Melo, Mamede and Sizen Sarment had all been on the ticket defeated by that of Estillac Leal in the bitterly contested 1950 Military Club elections, victory was particularly sweet to them”⁸⁵.

When the military regime became reality, it was clear that even if the civilians had participated in the revolution, they expected a return to civilian governance but, instead, the subsequent years saw the military regime consolidate its power.

At that juncture, João Goulart was forcibly removed from the presidency of the country and was succeeded by Ranieri Mazzilli, who remained interim President of the country for the second time for two weeks. Then he was succeeded by General Castelo Branco, who ushered in a military regime and adopted a foreign policy that was notably aligned with that of the United States.

⁸⁵ Ivi, p. 237.

3.3 How did the Operation “*Brother Sam*” come about?

To comprehend the genesis of Operation “*Brother Sam*”, it is imperative to delve into the dynamics of Inter-American relations leading up to the 1964 coup d’état.

During the Second World War the United States relied on Brazilian airbases and other military installations situated in the northeastern region of the country, however, when World War Two was coming to an end, the waning strategic significance of Brazil for the United States became weaker. As elucidated in the initial chapter of this thesis, when the war ended, President Dutra expected a sort of preferential treatment by the United States given Brazil’s substantial contributions as a reliable wartime ally. Instead, the United States focused on Europe with the so-called “*Marshall Plan*” as the European post-war situation was incongruous with the establishment of an international economy founded upon principles of free trade, open markets and American leadership.

In 1950 a Joint Brazil-United States commission was established, pressing the National Bank for Economic Development, created in 1952, to approved financial aids for development projects in Brazil. However, in the face of President Vargas’ nationalist policies, the BNDE eventually curtailed its support for these projects.

Furthermore, by mid-1950s, the United States implemented a plan which aimed to give military support to the countries of Latin America. This plan made easier for the United States to strengthen diplomatic relations with the military dictatorships that held power in several South American nations.

Moreover, with the establishment of the “Alliance for Progress” on March 13, 1961, President Kennedy embarked on an effort to revitalize Inter-American relations. During his speech announcing the “Alliance for Progress”, Kennedy acknowledged the grandeur of the “Pan-American Operation” concept.

While Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress” achieved some success, Latin America never fully embraced it, often viewing it as yet another program designed to placate Brazil and other Latin American nations. Consequently, it failed to garner widespread support among the populace.

In the case of Brazil, the “Alliance for Progress” was introduced even before its official announcement at the “White House”, during Jânio Quadros’ government in the early 1960s. Then, in early 1961, three Americans – George McGovern, the director of the

“*Food for Peace*” program, along with Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger, who was responsible for writing Kennedy’s speeches – visited Latin America to witness firsthand the contentious situation in the southern countries. During the visit, they gave a pretty good impression to Celso Furtado, the Brazilian economist who organized the visit and saw the “Alliance for Progress” as the Latin American equivalent of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Nonetheless, the United States used this agreement to shape public opinion by endorsing relatively superficial initiatives, such as the modernization and re-equipping of the civilian police forces. Celso Furtado saw this behavior as an attempt to reclaim supremacy over Latin American institutions, in fact he declared:

“It surprised me that the members of the mission (...), who certainly had been extensively advised by CIA agents, did not understand how counterproductive it would be to fill the Northeast with signs of the Alliance for Progress, boasting small façade works (...). The US authorities considered themselves entitled to oppose and overcome the Brazilian authorities (...) in order to achieve their goal of stopping subversion in the hemisphere”⁸⁶.

Despite this challenging start, the “Alliance for Progress” gained favor in the aftermath of the 1964 coup d’état as the military rulers in Brazil aligned themselves with the United States. Furthermore, on October 14, 1960, President Kennedy delivered a speech at the Michigan University, introducing the “*Peace Corps*”, which comprised young Americans participating in overseas programs. This initiative enhanced Kennedy’s image as a creative and reform-minded leader in the United States. However, in Brazil it had not so much appeal.

Kennedy’s perception of Latin America was influenced by the failed attempt to invade Cuba and the intense missile crisis, leading to a somewhat catastrophic outlook. Nevertheless, he gained support from many Latin Americans thanks to his democratic rhetoric, charisma and the contribution of his wife, Jacqueline Kennedy, who delivered numerous speeches in Spanish. Moreover, the government established a consultive group focused on affairs with Latin and South American countries. This group included notable figures as David Rockefeller, Manhattan’s banker, as well as representatives from

⁸⁶ Fico, Carlos. O grande irmão da Operação brother sam aos anos de chumbo: o governo dos estados unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira. Civilização Brasileira, 2008, p. 29 (translation made by me).

Standard Oil and the International Telephone and Telegraph. Their aim was to exert influence over Kennedy's administration.

Then, when President Kennedy was tragically assassinated in November 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency of the United States.

President Johnson's interest in Latin America was not as fervent as Kennedy's, partly due to the various crisis he had to confront during his presidency, including the Panama Canal crisis, the Brazilian coup d'état and the invasion of the Dominican Republic. At that juncture the "Alliance for Progress" seemed fragile, but the President could not afford to give the impression that he would abandon Kennedy's initiative.

Johnson made the decision to appoint a dedicated figure to Latin American matters, selecting Thomas C. Mann, who had previously served as the United States ambassador in Mexico and he co-authored the "*Blue Book*" along with Spruille Braden. Mann assumed the role of coordinator for the "Alliance for Progress", assistant secretary for Inter-American affairs and special assistant to the President for Latin America. Mann shared the belief in the importance of the "Alliance for Progress", but he also held the view that its primary role should be as catalyst for development rather than a primary source of financing. According to Mann, one of President Johnson's errors was to retain the same composition of the government team as Kennedy, making only a few changes, such as appoint Mann himself.

When discussing Latin and South America in the context of Lyndon Johnson's presidency, criticism often centers on the so-called "*Mann Doctrine*" which entailed the United States refraining from questioning the nature of various regimes it economically and militarily supported, even if those regimes were dictatorial or authoritarian, as long as they actively opposed communism. On March 13, 1964, the American Ambassador in Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, watched President Goulart's televised speech. The following day, a journalist from "*The New York Times*" reported that the United States might no longer actively dissuade dictatorships in Latin America. Surprisingly, this information remained unconfirmed by the United States' administration, sparking public outrage and accusations that the President was tacitly endorsing dictatorships in Latin and South America. This perception seemed to be validated when the United States welcomed the new regime established in Brazil after the coup d'état.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Ivi, p. 36.

Moreover, feeling compelled to act in Latin America, Mann convened a gathering on March 18, 1964, which brought together all the ambassadors and individuals engaged in Latin American affairs. Following this conference, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon remained in Washington for a while and engaged in discussions with key officials, including undersecretaries of State and Defense, as well as the director of the CIA and Thomas Mann himself. It became evident that Gordon was transmitting comprehensive and detailed reports and recommendations to his government regarding the situation in Brazil, a move that signified the United States' involvement in the events leading up to the coup d'état.

3.4 Operation “*Brother Sam*”

In 1964, Operation “*Brother Sam*” exemplified a significant American foreign intervention aimed at shaping the political and social landscape of another nation. Specifically, the mission's goal was to support the Brazilian coup d'état of 1964 and prevent the proliferation of communist ideology within the country.

Operation “*Brother Sam*” consisted in a plan aimed to provide equipment to the coup plotters. In 2004 a lot of documents showing President Lyndon Johnson saying that “we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything we need”⁸⁸ in order to support the overthrow of President Goulart.

In a memorandum dated the beginning of 1964, Director of the Office of Brazilian Affairs, Burton, communicated to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mann, that there was no indication of wither the capability or the intent to orchestrate a coup aimed at overthrowing President Goulart. Instead, the document highlighted the perspective that the military could serve as a “restraining force against extremists and undemocratic excesses”⁸⁹. The Colonel from the Attaché's Army was reported to be concerned that Goulart's actions were contributing to a deterioration of the army's

⁸⁸ Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., *The Absent Empire: The United States and the South American Regional Subsystem*, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, p. 164.

⁸⁹ United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico*, Document 181. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d181> (consulted on September 2023).

political stability. Moreover, the memorandum emphasized the military's potential as a powerful political force that could be used to counteract any undemocratic actions by Goulart, with the military expressing sympathy for the goals and policies of the United States. However, in subsequent interactions between the American embassy in Brazil and President Goulart, Washington expressed its growing apprehension regarding the increasing influence of communism within Brazil.

Furthermore, on March 18, 1964, Ambassador Gordon sent a telegram to the Department of State expressing his belief that Goulart was actively seeking dictatorial powers and was collaborating with the Brazilian Communist Party. In addition, he strategically took control over crucial institutions such as Petrobras, the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the trade union leadership oil, railroads, ports, merchant shipping and the newly formed rural workers' associations and other.

Then, on March 19, 1964, Gordon Chase, a member of the National Security Council, addressed President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Bundy, via a memorandum which conveyed Ambassador Gordon's assessment of the deteriorating situation in Brazil, marked by severe economic challenges and a worsening political climate. It casted doubts on President Goulart's leadership, noticing that his immediate priority was to cling to power. The memorandum emphasized that a substantial portion of the population, including the traditionally non-political military, was growing increasingly discontent. Many were calling for Goulart's removal, illuminating the prevailing unrest within Brazil.

Moreover, on March 30, 1964, a telegram from the Department of State to the U.S. embassy in Brazil openly discussed the possibility of U.S. intervention to prevent the rise of a communist regime in Brazil. It mentioned the potential for rapid implementation of financial and economic measures but acknowledged logistical challenges in providing military assistance. The same telegram also emphasized the need to avoid putting the United States government in an embarrassing position if Goulart, Mazzilli, Congressional leaders and the armed forces were to negotiate an accommodation, leaving the United States with an awkward intervention attempt. The day after, on March 31, 1964, at 9 a.m., the American embassy in Brazil sent another telegram to the Department of State, reporting that a revolt against Goulart's government was on the verge of commencing.

The same day, in another telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in Brazil, were explained the measures that would be adopted if necessary.

“1. Dispatch of U.S. Navy tankers bearing POL from Aruba, first tanker expected off Santos between April 8 and 13; following three tankers at one day intervals. 2. Immediate dispatch of naval task force for over exercise off Brazil. Force to consist of aircraft carrier (expected arrive in area by April 10), four destroyers, two destroyer escorts, task force tankers (all expected arrive about four days later). 3. Assemble shipment of about 110 tons ammunition, other light equipment including tear gas for mob control for air lift to São Paulo (Campinas). Lift would be made within 24 to 36 hours upon issuance final orders and would involve 10 cargo planes, 6 tankers and 6 fighters”⁹⁰.

On this occasion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the United States Commander in Chief Southern Command (USCINCSO) jointly approved Contingency Plan 2-61, codenamed Operation “*Brother Sam*” in a telegram. Later that day, during a telephone conversation involving Undersecretary of State Bell, Assistant Secretary of State, for Inter-American Affairs Mann, and President Johnson, the decision was made to initiate a naval task force, albeit without any firm commitment. This marked the commencement of Operation “*Brother Sam*”.

In addition, it is important to mention that the statement made by Johnson that I cited in the first lines of this paragraph “*prepared to do everything we need to do*” was made on March 31, 1964, but Brazil already had a military government on the next days without both a civil war or significant disorder. Preparations for the Operation “*Brother Sam*” began in late March and as declared by Lincoln Gordon “was still ten days’ sailing time away when Goulart abandoned the presidency”⁹¹. In the end we can say that United States planning revealed to be unnecessary, as the coup was a success even without their help and also, it was clear that the Brazilian army leaders were capable to act with or without the United States’ approval.

In subsequent days, as confirmed by an editorial note within the “Office of the Historian” in the “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968” section, Ambassador Gordon

⁹⁰ United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 198. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d181> (consulted on September 2023).

⁹¹ Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., *The Absent Empire: The United States and the South American Regional Subsystem*, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, p. 165.

reported on April 2, 1964, that Army Chief of Staff Castelo Branco affirmed that “democratic forces” gained full control of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. Concurrently, the Brazilian congress decided against conducting a formal vote to establish a new government and, consequently, João Goulart’s replacement as interim President was Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, who held office for two weeks, from April 1, 1964, until April 15, 1964, when Castelo Branco assumed the presidency.

Furthermore, in the summary record of the 526th meeting of the National Security Council with the Congressional leaders, dated April 3, 1964, the President sought an update on the situation in Brazil. Secretary Rusk provided an overview of events, noting that, despite extensive efforts by the United States to persuade Goulart to embrace a program of democratic reforms and the provision of economic aid, he continued to move towards establishing an authoritarian leftist regime. Within the same document, Secretary Rusk emphasized that the uprising in Brazil did not conform to the traditional Latin American “*golpe*”⁹²; instead, it represented a coalition of governors, government officials and military leaders uniting to overthrow Goulart. Notably, at the time of this document, Brazil was under the control of the rebel government, which consolidated its authority over the entire country.

Even if the US ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, always affirmed that the coup plotters did not know anything about the American Operation “*Brother Sam*”, some analysis remarked in the book “*O Grande Irmão: da operação brother sam aos anos de chumbo*” by Carlos Fico, explain that given many US and Brazilian declassified documents, it is clear that the Brazilians were aware of the operation.

Gathering detailed information about Operation “*Brother Sam*” can be challenging, but it is evident that the extent of U.S. involvement in the 1964 coup d’état was far from insignificant. In fact, Operation “*Brother Sam*” marked a pivotal moment in the United States – Brazil relations, defining a significant shift in the dynamics between the two countries.

⁹² Golpe = coup.

CHAPTER 4 – THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COUP D’ÉTAT AND OPERATION “*BROTHER SAM*”

4.1 The military regime

The coup of March-April 1964 signed the beginning of a military dictatorship which lasted until 1985.

Immediately after Goulart’s overthrowing, the situation was very unstable so, in order to stabilize the situation, at this point, almost all leading politicians agreed that a military man could provide a solid regime. On April 11, 1964, Brazil went through elections and elected Castelo Branco as President by 361 to 72 abstentions and 5 votes for other figures.⁹³ The first period of Branco’s presidency was characterized by many “clean-up” operations which aimed to eliminate many individuals still linked to Goulart. The Revolutionary Supreme Command took a decisive action so, the author of the 1937 Constitution, Francisco Campos, and his assistant, Carlos Madeiros da Silva, drafted the so-called “Institutional Act” number 1⁹⁴. This Act made clear the military’s position, in fact, it bypassed the Constitution recognizing to the army the authority to establish a new institutional order. By the way, it was evident that Branco was reluctant to accept the presidency of the country, however, his term, which initially had to finish with the election of 1965, was extended until March 1967.

Anyway, a major issue during the first period of Castelo Branco’s presidency was the emergence of the “*Linha Dura*” faction, or Hardliners, in English, which was an influential group of young officers with radical rightist position. When the President granted discretionary powers through the Institutional Act, their concerns regarding the government’s emphasis on moderation and rationality deepened. On the other hand, there was the “*Sorbonne*”⁹⁵ group which opposed the “*Linha Dura*” faction and held a prominent position within Branco’s government. To withstand the pressure exerted by the Hardliners during the latter half of 1964, President Castelo Branco employed a

⁹³ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.240.

⁹⁴ The Institutional Acts were the laws with which the military regime ruled.

⁹⁵ The Sorbonne Group was a faction of moderate military officers and technocrats associated with Castelo Branco’s government.

strategy focused on resisting this pressure and, when compelled to compromise, responding with reformist initiatives in alternative fields. Therefore, in November, Castelo Branco found himself compelled to concede to the hardliners' demands, resulting in the removal of Goiás Governor Mauro Borges Teixeira.

Furthermore, by the second half of August 1964, the new Program of Government Economic Action (PAEG) was unveiled aimed at establishing the rate of economic growth at 7 percent annually.

At that moment, the priority of the government remained the containment of inflation and this focus was seen as an assumption for preparing the country for a renewed period of growth. It can be asserted that, during a period characterized by adjustment and austerity measure, the GDP growth exhibited a notably positive trend when compared to the late 1980s. Specifically, in 1964, the GDP growth stood at 3.4 percent, followed by 2.4 percent in 1965, a substantial increase to 6.7 percent in 1966 and a continued growth rate of 4.2 percent in 1967.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, the government's aspirations to curb inflation and revive robust economic growth were heavily contingent on foreign financial support, primarily from the U.S.

This circumstance fueled criticisms and indeed sparked protests, with some claiming that the Brazilian economy was being subjected to North American imperialism.

In April 1965, a year after the coup d'état, became effective the basic agrarian reform legislation enacted the preceding November. With this reform the Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform (IBRA) and the National Institute of Agricultural Development (INDA) changed their structure and also, from that moment on, before considering the possibility of redistributing underutilized land, it was necessary to establish clear criteria for determining property sizes and how they were utilized productively. Moreover, in October of the same year, during the presidential elections, a crisis erupted within the country. Radical right-wing factions clamored for President Castelo Branco's removal, but the Ministry of War, Arthur da Costa e Silva, managed to reach a compromise which granted him a reinforcement of his position, becoming the favorite to succeed to the presidency. He assured that the government would take steps to invigorate the revolutionary regime and pledged not to hesitate in implementing a second institutional act if deemed necessary. In fact, when the Congress failed to attain the requisite of the three-fifths majority to

⁹⁶ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p.244.

pass a series of constitutional amendments aimed at bolstering the executive's authority, a second Institutional Act was decreed on October 27th. The AI-2 ⁹⁷ foresaw that the Congress would choose the President and so Castelo Branco remained head of the country.

Then, "by late November a foundation was laid for a two-party system by providing for provisional registration of parties sponsored by at least 120 members of the lower house and a score of senators" ⁹⁸. Two hundred and fifty-four individuals from the former group, along with forty-three from the latter, chose to unite under the banner of the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA), driven wither by strong convictions or sheer convenience. This move effectively compelled opposition factions to merge into a singular entity known as the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) which comprised 21 senators and 150 deputies, encompassing a diverse spectrum of interests and ideologies. This diversity, however, resulted in a notable lack of cohesion within the organization. At that point, ARENA consisted primarily of former UDN members, a significant portion of the PSD and various minority factions. Meanwhile, the MDB included remnants of the old PTB and some PSD elements who found it untenable to coexist within the same organization as their perennial rival, the UDN.

Furthermore, in January 1966, da Costa e Silva launched his presidential candidacy. Subsequently, the President reshaped the Cabinet to align with his vision and openly supported da Costa e Silva as the chosen candidate for the presidency from the ARENA party. Then, on February 5, the AI-3 ⁹⁹ was promulgated, establishing an indirect election system for governors and scheduled the congressional elections on November 15. During the whole 1966, Arthur da Costa e Silva steadily consolidated his position within ARENA and within the country, securing the support of 252 deputies and 40 senators at the election held on October 3, 1966. Although he officially assumed office at the beginning of the following year, this resounding endorsement led to his election as President in October. Meanwhile, Castelo Branco was determined to demonstrate his commitment to governing until the end of this mandate and, to achieve this, he issued the Institutional Act number

⁹⁷ Institutional Act number 2.

⁹⁸ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p. 247.

⁹⁹ Institutional Act number 3.

4 on December 7, calling for a special congressional session during the Christmas holidays aiming to approve a new Constitution.

Then, in March 1967, Arthur da Costa e Silva assumed the presidency in Brazil, marking a critical juncture in the nation's political landscape. His presidency symbolized the culmination of five and a half years of progressively deepening authoritarianism, ultimately leading to the establishment of what would be known as the "National Security State", a highly institutionalized form of authoritarian rule. The key figures within the Costa e Silva's administration included Brigadier General Jayme Portela, who served as the chief military aide, replacing the future President Ernesto Geisel. Moreover, General Médici headed the National Intelligence Service (SNI), while an emerging and influential figure Antônio Delfim Netto, a Paulista economist, assumed a prominent role within the administration. Notably amidst a generally sluggish government apparatus, Netto took the lead in shaping policies and programs.

Furthermore, on July 18, 1967, the passing of Castelo Branco exacerbated the already precarious political situation. This event will be later defined as "an event that resolved the struggle for the loyalty of ARENA leaders in favor of the President"¹⁰⁰. Using this incident as a pretext, Lacerda, leader of the opposition within the "*Frente Ampla*" or broad front, implemented a strategy within the organization which aimed to exploit the division between Castelistas and the Costa e Silva's administration. This provocative move resulted in Lacerda's banishment from television broadcasts. However, undeterred, he persisted in his campaign against the government through the press and the radio but, a few months later, he faced a similar fate as he was barred from both the press and the radio. The government's actions against Lacerda served as just one example within the broader context of suppression during that era. Throughout Costa e Silva's presidency, a multitude of political activists, academics and artists found themselves subjected to persecution, forced into exile or compelled to lead clandestine lives as a mean of evading the relentless repression imposed by the regime. So, during his tenure, Brazil endured a severe political repression marked by a series of laws which severely restricted civil liberties and political rights, including the outright prohibition of strikes and as previously mentioned, media censorship.

¹⁰⁰ Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*. Westview Press, 1991, p. 253.

The situation escalated to a more oppressive level in December 1968 when Costa e Silva enacted the Institutional Act number 5 (AI-5) which introduced a series of measures designed to suppress political opposition, granting the government unprecedented powers. AI-5, in fact, allowed the government to dissolve legislative bodies, intervene in state affairs without limitations, revoke elected mandates and political rights, suspend constitutional protections regarding civil service tenure and confiscate properties acquired through illicit means. Furthermore, Complementary Act number 38 was decreed, leading to the indefinite closure of the Congress. Later, in January, Institutional Act number 6 (AI-6) further reduced the seats in the Court, leaving it with only eleven members.

“Thus as Brazil entered the third year of Costa e Silva’s administration and the sixth year of the 1964 Revolution, only the faintest traces of representative processes remained. On the economic side the situation was less bleak, as 1967’s 4.2 percent rise in GDP had been followed by one of 9.8 percent in 1968 and inflation was kept to under 25 percent for two consecutive years. But the collective resignation of ARENA leadership and further stiffening of the national security law underlined the continuing retrogression in the political sphere. Moreover, fostering of animosity toward the armed forces by civilians, even in private, was now punishable by the military courts”¹⁰¹.

Furthermore, on August 31, 1969, Arthur da Costa e Silva went through a cardiovascular problem which incapacitated him to govern the country so, the three service ministers formed a Junta to rule within the country temporarily. So, this event symbolized the military’s rejection of the civilian Vice-President assuming the presidential office, making it clear that, for the fourth time since 1964, any semblance of progress toward political normalization was ruthlessly eliminated by the military’s imposition of an even more arbitrary regime than before. Then, on October 7, the Junta, described as a “*College of Cardinals*”¹⁰², officially confirmed the army’s selection of General Médici as President, with Admiral Rademaker serving as Vice-President. His presidency, though shrouded under the guise of the “economic miracle”, would ultimately become the most authoritarian phase of the regime.

General Emílio Garrastazu Médici served as President of Brazil from 1969 to 1974, marking the third and the most authoritarian leadership period within the regime,

¹⁰¹ Ivi, p. 260.

¹⁰² Ivi, p. 261.

characterized by the motto “*Project Brazil: Great Power*”. His administration was underpinned by the pivotal contribution of three key figures, Finance Minister Delfim Netto, Presidential Chief of Staff João Leitão de Abreu and Brigadier General João Figueiredo who served not only as the Chief Military Aide but also held the position of Secretary General of the Security Council. Furthermore, in 1979, Brigadier General João Figueiredo assumed the role of the last President of the military regime, culminating a significant era in Brazilian history.

During his presidency, Médici was resolute in ending armed opposition, leading his government to employ a combination of enhanced intelligence operations, a systematic application of torture and counterinsurgency strategies to eradicate leftist elements. Examining the years of his rule, become clear the numerous instances of violence, torture and human right violations. A crucial example is the case of Mário Alves, the leader of the Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (PCBR), whose elimination occurred in January 1970. It is clear that, the Médici’s administration maintained a semblance of popularity among the Brazilians by effectively concealing the torture and other human rights violations which characterized the regime. Media censorship was a powerful tool in this regard, as it kept the negative aspects hidden from public view while the regime strategically leveraged media outlets to prominently showcase its positive achievements, particularly in the economic sphere, and emphasize its promises regarding social policies. In essence, Medici’s government employed a form of propaganda to shape public perception. Moreover, this period witnessed the emergence of clandestine repressive organizations within the extensive security apparatus, as well as the tacit endorsement of “*death squads*”, particularly in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, by civilian police forces. It can be asserted that, during this regime, the emphasis was solely on achieving results, regardless of the methods employed to attain them.

In addition, Médici perceived the need to further institutionalize the “National Security State”, leading to the creation of the Internal Defense Operational Commands (CODIs) at the military region level and Internal Operations Detachments (DOIs) with the specific mandate to carry out repressive actions against urban subversive elements.

Additionally, it’s essential to highlight the military-technocratic alliance that characterized Médici’s presidency, rooted in a relationship of mutual benefit. The military government found itself in need of proficient economic technocrats to achieve its

economic goals, given its own deficiency in qualifications in this field. Conversely, the technocrats were presented with an opportunity they could not resist – the chance to implement their plans – given Brazil’s historical tendency for governments to prioritize political expediency over economic rationality.

Nonetheless, it is essential to acknowledge the remarkably positive aspect of this era, often referred to as the “economic miracle”, which ignited a sense of national optimism. This economic boom, driven by substantial industrial investments, resulted in astounding GDP growth rates, 10.4 percent in 1970, 11.3 percent in 1971, 12.1 percent in 1972 and a staggering 4.0 percent in 1973 ¹⁰³. However, while the industrial sector boasted a robust growth rate of 12.6 percent between 1968 and 1974, the agricultural sector expanded at a significantly more modest annual rate of 5.3 percent. In fact, on the other hand, a multitude of critics emerged, fueled by the societal contradictions that became increasingly evident.

“Critics stressed extremely inequitable income distribution, the failure of this growth to result in any appreciable improvement in the standard of living for the uneducated urban and rural masses, wasteful expenditures on showy infrastructural projects such as the TransAmazon highway, and neglect of pressing social problems – especially in the fields of health, housing and education” ¹⁰⁴.

Then, on January 15, 1974, General Ernesto Geisel was named to the presidency. His administration, while continuing the authoritarian rule established by previous military leaders, embarked on a historic process of gradual political opening known as “*distensão*”.

4.1.1 The road towards democratization: Geisel and Figueiredo

General Ernesto Geisel assumed the presidency of Brazil in early 1974 and held office until 1979. His tenure was characterized by the formidable challenge of restoring Brazil politically to a level resembling the situation before the enactment of AI-5 and the Médici administration. However, in his pursuit of political stability, Geisel somewhat sidelined

¹⁰³ Ivi, p. 265.

¹⁰⁴ Ibidem, p. 265.

economic growth, leading to the interruption of the “economic miracle” began during Médici’s government.

Notably, many key figures within Geisel’s government had strong ties with Castelo Branco, as exemplified by Geisel’s own service as Chief Military Aide during Branco’s presidency. The two most influential individuals in this administration were General Golbery, who served as the Presidential Chief of Staff, and Mario Henrique Simonsen, who succeeded Delfim Netto as Finance Minister.¹⁰⁵

During the inaugural meeting of his Cabinet, General Ernesto Geisel articulated his vision for a methodical yet assured process of democratic improvement. This vision aimed to foster greater participation from both the “responsible elites” and the broader population in achieving a complete institutionalization of the principles that underpinned the 1964 Revolution. In fact, during his government, he initiated a process of gradual political opening aimed at relaxing the repressive policies of the military regime through a cautious approach to political liberalization and a gradual return to civilian rule. Furthermore, in order to enact the changes he envisioned, General Ernesto Geisel recognized that his foremost imperative was to bolster his presidential authority within the military establishment and emerge as its unequivocal leader. Given the prevailing context, where hardliners held significant influence, his power to enact reforms was constrained. Geisel faced the formidable challenge of rallying support within the armed forces, even for the initial steps towards curtailing the prevailing authoritarianism.

Then, two years before the conclusion of his presidential term, in early 1977, Geisel’s government faced the challenging task of securing ARENA’s victory in the upcoming elections while also ensuring that unwanted candidates would not emerge. Unlike his predecessors, Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva, who lost control over their successors, Geisel was determined to avoid a similar situation.

In January 1978, ARENA selected João Figueiredo to be the next chief executive and, by April, he was officially nominated as the ARENA candidate for the presidency, so it was clear that the situation was in favor of Geisel. Then, despite opposition efforts to disrupt the process, Figueiredo was inaugurated as President of Brazil on March 15, 1979.

When talking about Geisel’s presidency and the road towards a new democracy in Brazil, it’s important to note that, during his presidency, he took significant steps to dismantle

¹⁰⁵ Ivi, p. 268.

the repressive measures of AI-5 and its arbitrary powers. He was able to turn “*distensão*” into “*abertura*”, making a shift towards a more democratic environment. Consequently, it can be asserted that Geisel achieved his goal of fostering relative democracy during his tenure.

“What Geisel had done at the end of his watershed term was to reduce the regime’s reliance upon arbitrary powers by making it far less likely to encounter situations in which the application of such powers might seem necessary”¹⁰⁶.

In 1979, João Baptista Figueiredo assumed the presidency of Brazil, holding office until 1985. He is notably recognized as the last President of the military regime, primarily due to his unwavering commitment to advancing the process of liberalization and democratization initiated by his predecessor, Ernesto Geisel. Figueiredo’s inauguration marked a significant continuity in political policies, a rare occurrence in Brazilian history since 1926.

At the outset of his presidency, many key figures from Geisel’s government retained their positions. For instance, General Golbery continued to serve as the Presidential Chief of Staff, and, while Simonsen shifted to the Planning Minister, the Finance Ministry saw the appointment of Karlos Rischbereit who left his role as President of the Bank of Brazil to fill the vacancy. However, in August 1981, General Golbery resigned, leading to a gradual transformation in the composition of Figueiredo’s government, which began to resemble the key figures from the Médici’s era.

“Although this meant that most of the holdovers from the Geisel administration were gone and that, in terms of personalities, the regime had taken on a profile much like that of the 1969-1974 era, it did not necessarily foreshadow an end to *abertura*”¹⁰⁷.

Additionally, it has to be said that in 1981, Figueiredo had a significant impact within the military establishment by leveraging the stringent military retirement system originally introduced by Castelo Branco. This system aimed to compel senior general officers to retire before reaching the age of sixty-six and it served as a strategic tool, allowing the President to shape the composition of the army’s High Command entirely with officers

¹⁰⁶ Ivi, p. 283.

¹⁰⁷ Ivi, p. 289.

whom he had personally promoted to the four-star rank. Moreover, many of these officers were part of his own class at the academy, solidifying his influence within the military institution.

Furthermore, following the 1982 elections, the Brazilian government publicly announced the severe economic crisis gripping the nation, with the looming threat of insolvency. It became evident that, throughout Figueiredo's presidency, grappling with economic challenges was a constant theme. The interest rates on loans from the United States, for instance, surged significantly. Starting at 7.8 percent in 1977, the prime rate soared to 11.8 percent in 1978 and a staggering 15.3 percent the following year. Then, the interest rates shock was further exacerbated by a critical current account deficit, which ballooned from \$7 billion in 1978 to over \$10.7 billion in 1979 and a staggering \$12.8 billion by 1980.¹⁰⁸ The government implemented various programs aimed at reducing imports and boosting exports, but these measures proved insufficient, especially in the face of rising oil prices and an unmanageable current accounts deficit. At that point, the risk of default grew increasingly pronounced, resulting in a sharp reduction in the flow of new loans and credits to Brazil. Then, in January 1983, the Brazilian government entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after protracted, secretive negotiations. While this agreement provided an immediate relief, it did not offer a long-term solution to the daunting challenge of managing Brazil's suffocating debt burden. Despite being the last military President, Figueiredo faced also challenges to his authority from within the military as some factions were resistant to the transition to civilian rule, so he had to navigate these internal tensions.

To sum up, he adhered to the established timetable for the return to civilian rule, with direct presidential elections scheduled for 1985. He played a pivotal role in overseeing this crucial transition, ensuring that the military stepped aside to allow for a civilian president to assume office.

As the last trimester of 1984 approached, it became evident that a civilian President would assume leadership of the country, with Tancredo Neves emerging as the favored candidate. On January 15, 1985, Tancredo Neves made history becoming the first democratically elected President of Brazil following the end of the military regime. However, before officially assuming office, he fell seriously ill and tragically passed away

¹⁰⁸ Ivi, p. 288.

in April. Consequently, his Vice-President, José Sarney, assumed the presidency and played a pivotal role in stabilizing the country's political institutions while strengthening democracy.

The first civilian government in nearly a generation faced multiple critical tasks, including establishing a functional balance between the executive and legislative branches, revitalizing the extensive state machinery developed since 1964, reforming the political party system without repeating past extreme fragmentation and creating and implementing a new constitutional framework capable of addressing a society characterized by significant social inequalities and substantial developmental needs ¹⁰⁹.

To conclude, it can be affirmed that, despite facing criticism for economic and social crisis, Sarney's administration achieved notable milestones, including the complete elimination of censorship and the promulgation of a new democratic Constitution in 1988.

4.2 Foreign policy of the military regime

After the coup d'état, when the military regime solidified its control over Brazil, it promptly abandoned the country's previous "Independent Foreign Policy". Instead, Brazil aligned itself closely with the United States founding this alliance on America's Cold War fight against communism.

Regarding foreign investments in mineral resources, the new regime implemented a tripartite approach which aimed to distribute ownership among the Brazilian government, Brazilian private investors, and foreign private investors. Additionally, restrictions on profit repatriation were relaxed to attract substantial investments from North American, European and Japanese private sectors. As a result, "Brazil became the world's largest borrower from the World Bank and from the United States through the Alliance for Progress" ¹¹⁰.

In the realm of international politics, the Brazilian military regime actively fostered regional integration in Latin America through the establishment of organizations such as

¹⁰⁹ Ivi, p. 306.

¹¹⁰ Gordon, Lincoln. Brazil's Second Chance : En Route Toward the First World. Brookings institution press, 2001, p. 204.

the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization ¹¹¹, with the primary goal of bolstering Brazil's influence within the region. It was evident that the Brazilian regime aspired to assume a form of regional leadership, which occasionally led to tensions with other Latin American and South American nations. Moreover, Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, and its Foreign Minister presided over the 1964 OAS ¹¹² Conference condemned Cuba for its alleged attempted aggression against Venezuela. A year later, U.S. President Lydon Johnson proposed to the Brazilian government to participate in the "Inter-Americanization" of the military intervention in the Dominican Republic, a proposition accepted by Brazil. However, when invited to join in the Vietnam War, President Castelo Branco declined, emphasizing that any such involvement would necessitate a formal vote in the UN Security Council or General Assembly, a condition which had little chance of being met.

"Some Brazilian diplomatic historians condemn this period as a simple and retrograde subordination to the United States" ¹¹³.

In addition to the United States, Brazil maintained and strengthened relationships with Europe, Japan and several other countries, including South Africa, which was undergoing the Apartheid era. Concurrently, Brazil actively sought to establish shared stances on global economic matters with fellow developing nations. It also pursued trade partnerships and collaborated on infrastructural projects with its South American neighbors, with a notable example being the extensive hydroelectric endeavor alongside Paraguay, at Sete Quedas (or Seven Falls).

As mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter, the Médici administration witnessed the emergence of the so-called "economic miracle". In this context, it can be asserted that the new foreign policy laid a solid foundation for the occurrence of this phenomenon. However, in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Brazil's relationship with the United States began to deteriorate. In Washington, there was growing concern about the hardening stance of the military regime, largely influenced by the implementation of Institutional Act number 5, and the reports of human rights violations and abuses within

¹¹¹ It is the only socio-environmental block of countries dedicated to the Amazon basin with the aim of conserving the environment and the rational use of the Amazon region's natural resources.

¹¹² OAS: Organization of American States.

¹¹³ Gordon, Lincoln. *Brazil's Second Chance : En Route Toward the First World*. Brookings institution press, 2001, p. 204.

the whole country. Additionally, in 1968, the Brazilian government declined to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, citing it as a violation of a fundamental international principle that perpetuated a distinction between acknowledged nuclear weapons states and the rest of the world.

Then, during the “economic miracle”, Brazil witnessed a surge in energy consumption, leading to an increased interest in atomic energy as a potential solution. In 1975, Brazil sought assistance from West Germany, which not only offered power plants and enriched fuel but also would provide technical expertise in reprocessing. In addition, it introduced a new enrichment technology to help Brazil establish an independent fuel cycle without relying on external sources. On the other hand, the United States viewed this development as a threat to global efforts aimed at limiting the proliferation of “dual-use” nuclear technology. Consequently, Washington attempted to persuade Germany to not cooperate with Brazil on this matter, but the German government refused to align with the United States and, as a consequence, “the ground was laid for a deliberate breach in Brazil’s relations with the United States”¹¹⁴. Interestingly, this deterioration in relations contradicted Carter administration’s hopes, which aimed to cultivate a special relationship with Brazil, positioning it as a “regional stabilizer” in Latin America.

Moreover, another incident that contributed to a further deterioration in Brazil – United States relations, although not directly caused by the Brazilian government, was the kidnapping of the American, West German and Swiss ambassadors by leftist armed group. Anyway, on the Brazilian side, the “Linha Dura” faction within the military gained momentum, particularly under President Médici’s leadership. This faction revived nationalist goals, advocating for reduced foreign involvement in mining activities while promoting almost idealized notions of Brazil’s potential in information technology, civilian and military applications of atomic energy and the development of the Amazon region. Interestingly, they formed a somewhat unique alliance with diplomats who were cultivating relationships with other less developed countries, envisioning Brazil as a leader of the Third World.

Furthermore, upon Ernesto Geisel assuming power in 1974, his Foreign Minister, Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, introduced a new framework for Brazilian foreign policy, named “responsible pragmatism”. “It revived many elements of Quadro’s thrust toward

¹¹⁴ Ivi, p. 207.

independence, including separation from American tutelage and special cooperation with third world countries although not with the communist bloc”¹¹⁵.

During this period, Brazil emerged as a leading advocate for extracting more resources from wealthier countries through assertive stances on “North-South” issues and its pursuit of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Concurrently, Minister Silveira nurtured a personal relationship with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and negotiated a bilateral agreement for regular joint foreign policy consultations. However, those arrangements appeared to be more symbolic than substantive and did not endure into the Carter administration in Washington.

4.3 The United States in Brazil after Operation “*Brother Sam*”

Operation “*Brother Sam*” stands as a compelling illustration of the United States’ overt readiness, strategic interest and demonstrated capability to intervene in South American affairs. It is arguable that the U.S. intervention, particularly through its alleged efforts to influence and indoctrinate Brazilian military officers, contributed to the conditions that culminated in the coup.

In a relatively short span of time, the United States found themselves growing increasingly apprehensive about the evolving situation in Brazil. This concern came from the fact that the military regime was progressively adopting a more authoritarian and rigid stance. As written in a Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State dated December 14, 1968, immediately after the proclamation of Institutional Act number 5, this Act symbolized the military’s failure to prove that they were better than the civilians in governance. In essence, it conveyed the understanding of democratic principles but also showcased their incapacity to effectively uphold them. Moreover, in the same document, there is a suggestion for a public statement from high-ranking officials within the U.S. government, expressing deep concern over the regressive trajectory of Brazilian democracy. The rationale behind this proposal is rooted in the belief that such a statement could serve as a catalyst, motivating advocates for democracy within Brazil. Importantly, this declaration should not pinpoint specific individuals or

¹¹⁵ Ivi, p. 205.

groups responsible for the setback, instead, it should opt for a more general and nuanced approach. Here it is a declaration contained in the document.

“These people, while nationalistic and narrow, are fundamentally favorable to the U.S. and can be counted on to side with us wither sentimentally or overtly in any East-West confrontation. It is highly likely they will continue in control of Brazil for a number of years to come. It is from them we must obtain cooperation in enterprises of mutual interest and through them that we must work to help Brazil emerge from the underdevelopment of which their own attitudes are one manifestation”¹¹⁶.

On the flip side, despite harboring profound concerns about the situation, the United States initially refrained from actively intervening in the Brazilian government’s affairs to avoid exacerbating an already precarious situation. This cautious stance can be attributed to the delicate balance the Americans sought to strike, taking into account both the intricate dynamics of the Brazilian military regime and their own strategic interests. Furthermore, it’s essential to recognize that Brazil held significant strategic importance during the Cold War era as a key partner in the U.S. effort to counter the influence of the Soviet Union¹¹⁷.

Furthermore, as stated in the Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, dated December 25, 1968, the United States maintained their enduring strategic interests in Brazil even after the implementation of AI-5. In light of this, they acknowledged the need to adjust their approach and methods of engagement, signaling their willingness to adapt to the evolving circumstances and explore new ways for collaboration with Brazil.

In the same Telegram, the Department of State declared that maybe, the election of Costa e Silva instead of one of others favored by Castelo Branco, represented the misfortune of Brazil. At that moment the country had lost its chance to move ahead, even under strongly guided semi-authoritarian democracy and, according to the Department of State’s view, prospects were not good. In facts, considering the situation of the time, some Brazilian

¹¹⁶ United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 236. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d236> (consulted on September 2023).

¹¹⁷ Fico, Carlos. O grande irmão da Operação brother sam aos anos de chumbo: o governo dos estados unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira. Civilização Brasileira, 2008, chapter 5.

mutation of harsh authoritarian regime, therefore, and possibly some succession of such regimes, appeared to be in offing¹¹⁸.

Additionally, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the United States expressed concerns regarding bilateral agreements between Brazil and Germany in the field of nuclear energy. In a briefing memorandum dated March 22, 1975, jointly authored by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and addressed to the Acting Secretary of State, it was reported that the West German Embassy conveyed their intention to proceed with the export of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to Brazil. This included capabilities for reprocessing and enrichment.

The same memorandum emphasized that, this ongoing issue had significantly complicated the United States' efforts to coordinate their nuclear export policies. In this regard, the United States stated that:

“In discussing this matter with Von Staden, the main point that we wish to convey is our concern that a decision to supply reprocessing and enrichment technology to a non-NPT party, under terms whose details are not yet clear, could preclude multilateral agreements on certain specific constraint which are essential to our mutual non-proliferation objectives. For this reason, we consider it extremely important that no final action be taken until we have had a chance to discuss the matter in more detail in the next week”¹¹⁹.

Then, in a document dated June 20, 1975, which is a Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger acknowledged Brazil's legitimate need for nuclear energy and expressed his desire to ensure that Brazil's agreement with West Germany regarding the acquisition of nuclear material would not negatively impact the overall relationship between the United States and Brazil.

¹¹⁸ United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 241. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d241> (consulted on September 2023).

¹¹⁹ United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973, 1976, Document 110. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d110> (consulted on September 2023).

Simultaneously, the Secretary, expressed his concerns regarding the potential implications for nuclear proliferation resulting from the Brazil-FRG ¹²⁰ agreement ¹²¹.

Additionally, in a memorandum dated July 8, 1975, the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs conveyed his apprehensions to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarding the lack of clarity in the U.S. stance concerning the Brazil-West Germany nuclear energy agreement. In fact, he declared that if the United States would not clarify their position, their stance in the negotiations with nuclear suppliers could be negatively influenced. The Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs also emphasized the importance of reminding RFT officials that, while the United States aimed to manage adverse publicity and maintain smooth diplomatic relations, they communicated their concerns about the transaction at the highest levels. Additionally, the U.S. were mad about any misinterpretation by the press portraying their position as endorsing the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology.

Furthermore, on February 14, 1976, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs forwarded a memorandum to President Ford, discussing potential agreements related to nuclear energy between Brazil and the United States. This memorandum highlighted the comprehensive analysis conducted by the United States concerning the constraints for an agreement on nuclear energy between Brazil and the United States. Notably, these constraints gained significance due to Brazil's non-ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, as I already explained, Brazil had recently inked a pact with West Germany, aiming to acquire uranium enrichment technology and a chemical reprocessing facility for the recovery of plutonium from spent reactor fuel, even if, according to the United States' point of view, this bilateral agreement had the potential to incentivize Argentina to pursue a nuclear weapon development path.

“We have been putting off our negotiations with Brazil (and straining our bilateral relations as a result) for almost two years while trying to devise the substance of a new agreement which would meet our non-proliferation concerns, would hold open the Brazilian market for U.S. reactor and fuel sales, and would have a reasonable chance of being acceptable to Brazil. Now that we have come to an understanding with the other major nuclear exporting countries on common export policies to

¹²⁰ FRG: Federal Republic of Germany.

¹²¹ United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973, 1976, Document 116. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d116> (consulted on September 2023).

reduce proliferation risk, we are in a position to take the next step with Brazil in trying to reach agreement”¹²².

4.4 Human Rights and the military regime

During the military dictatorship in Brazil, between 1964 and 1985, there were widespread and severe human rights violations. The regime relentlessly targeted political dissidents, activists, journalists, students and various other individuals, subjecting them to imprisonment, torture and even extrajudicial killings when perceived as threats to the government. Additionally, the regime imposed stringent media censorship, effectively curbing press freedom and preventing journalists from objectively reporting on political events.

The violations of human rights extended to the suspension of numerous civil rights and constitutional guarantees for the populations. Fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly and association were severely curtailed. Consequently, many individuals had no choice but to escape the country to avoid persecution.

Regrettably, when the dictatorship came to an end, many of those responsible for these human rights violations were neither persecuted nor held accountable for their actions. This was largely due to the existence of the 1979 amnesty law, which was never repealed by any progressive government.¹²³

Furthermore, when discussing human rights violations during the military dictatorship in Brazil, it is crucial to address the significant issue known as the “Condor Plan” or “Operation Condor”. This covert alliance involved the military regimes of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay, working together to eradicate all forms of opposition through a combination of political violence and extrajudicial killings that disregarded national borders.

¹²² United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973, 1976, Document 127. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d127> (consulted on September 2023).

¹²³ Noury R., Brasile, la Commissione per la verità fa luce sui crimini della dittatura, in Corriere della Sera, Le Persone e la Dignità. Available on the website <https://lepersoneeladignita.corriere.it/2014/12/12/brasile-la-commissione-per-la-verita-fa-luce-sui-crimini-della-dittatura/> consulted on September 2023.

In 2011, Amnesty International took a significant step by advocating for the repeal of the amnesty law in Brazil. In an article published by the same organization on August 25, 2011, it was reported that, during the same day, Amnesty International actively engaged with Brazilian authorities, urging them to overturn the law that obstructed investigations against those responsible for the human rights violations describe earlier.

“The Amnesty Law, which came into force on 28 August 1979, allows all those responsible for torture, extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances and rapes committed on large scale during the military regime from 1964 to 1985 to stay away from prosecution”¹²⁴.

Susan Lee, the Director of the Americas at Amnesty International, emphasized that Brazil’s retention of a law that granted impunity for crimes like torture, places the country out of step with other nations in the region that made substantial efforts to confront these issues. In fact, unlike Brazil, other South American countries, including Argentina and Peru, demonstrated their commitment to investigate and process those responsible for similar crimes that occurred during their respective military regimes. These countries took the crucial step of repealing their Amnesty Laws to ensure justice and accountability for past atrocities.

Moreover, international human rights bodies, including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee, have consistently held that amnesties granted for crimes such as tortures, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances are fundamentally incompatible with states’ obligations under international human rights law.

In a significant legal development in 2010, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in the landmark case of *Gomes Lund vs Brazil*, explicitly declared that Brazil’s 1979 Amnesty Law was inconsistent with the country’s international legal commitments. The Court issued clear directives to Brazil, urging it to take all necessary measures to repeal the law. This ruling underscored the imperative for Brazil to align its domestic legislation with its international human rights obligations.

¹²⁴ Amnesty International, Brasile, Amnesty International chiede l’annullamento della Legge d’amnistia, 25 August 2011. Available on the website <https://www.amnesty.it/brasile-amnesty-international-chiede-lannullamento-della-legge-damnistia/> consulted on September 2023, translated by me.

Subsequently, Brazil established a National Truth Commission to investigate and address the human rights violations that took place during the military regime. On December 10, 2014, this commission issued its conclusive report, which included a series of recommendations aimed at addressing the legacy of past atrocities.

The recommendations outlined in the Commission's final report encompassed a range of critical measures including the demilitarization of the military police, enhancements to detention conditions and the alignment of national legislation with International Human Rights Law. This entailed the recognition of crimes against humanity and enforced disappearances within the framework of Brazilian law, demonstrating a commitment to upholding human rights principles in the country ¹²⁵.

¹²⁵ Noury R., Brasile, la Commissione per la verità fa luce sui crimini della dittatura, in Corriere della Sera, Le Persone e la Dignità. Available on the website <https://lepersoneeladignita.corriere.it/2014/12/12/brasil-la-commissione-per-la-verita-fa-luce-sui-crimini-della-dittatura/> consulted on September 2023.

CONCLUSION

“*Brasil: ame-o ou deixe-o*” which means “*Brazil: love it or leave it*”, is a slogan which was first employed as propaganda to endorse the “economic miracle” during President Medici’s tenure.

This thesis was crafted to comprehensively analyze the causes and the consequences of the 1964 coup d’état in Brazil, with a specific focus on the role played by the United States, particularly through Operation “*Brother Sam*”. To achieve this, a dual perspective approach was employed, delving into both the Brazilian and American viewpoints.

First of all, this study reveals that Brazilian political history is marked by intricate complexities and persistent instability. An in-depth examination of the political evolution within this country, starting from the downfall of the Brazilian empire through the convoluted phases of Vargas’ leadership and the tumultuous events that paved the way for Goulart’s presidency, highlights the enduring instability that has consistently characterized the political landscape of this South American nation.

Furthermore, to better comprehend reasons and mechanisms behind U.S. involvement in this particular case, I deemed it essential to dedicate a chapter within this thesis to expound upon the concept of a regional subsystem. Specifically, I put distinct emphasis on the South American subsystem and delved into the foreign relations of the United States with respect to South America. This examination provides a lens through which we can gain insights into pivotal doctrines such as the “Monroe Doctrine” and the “Good Neighbor” policy. Through an examination of the “Monroe Doctrine” and the “Good Neighbor” policy, this thesis seeks to underscore the enduring interests of the United States in Latin America, with a specific focus on Brazil. In fact, Brazil has consistently occupied a pivotal position as a “subhegemonic state” and has exhibited a particularly favorable disposition towards the U.S. foreign policy and the “Monroe Doctrine” within the South American context.

As previously discussed in earlier chapters, the 1964 coup d’état in Brazil emerged as a culmination of various internal governmental challenges, including ideological polarization and frequent turnovers in key governmental positions.

Additionally, President Goulart’s leftward political shift raised significant concerns among both the Brazilian military and the United States. It’s worth noting that throughout

Brazilian history, military regimes have occasionally come to power. For instance, immediately after the end of the monarchy, the first republican government was a military one. However, the regime that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985 undoubtedly stands out as the most rigid and authoritarian in the nation's history.

In examining the United States' involvement in this context, a pivotal element is Operation "*brother Sam*", which serves as a significant illustration of U.S. foreign intervention in the political and social dynamics of another nation. The historical backdrop against which Operation "*Brother Sam*" unfolded is defined by the Cold War and the concept of a "bipolar world". During this period, the United States harbored concerns about the presence of communist forces in Latin America and sought to prevent the emergence of another situation similar to the Cuban one. While the United States prepared for potential military intervention, such a direct action ultimately proved unnecessary, as the success of the coup d'état was facilitated by economic assistance provided by the United States. Specifically, the primary goal of this operation was to bolster the military regime in Brazil, aiming to prevent the spread of communist ideology within the country. Moreover, as demonstrated in the third chapter of this thesis, despite public declarations by Brazilian asserting their unawareness of this operation, numerous declassified diplomatic documents from that period revealed that the coup plotters were indeed cognizant of the United States' position.

Subsequently, in the latter part of this study, I elucidated how this operation marked a turning point in the relations between the two nations. Prior to the coup d'état, the United States was inclined to take measures to keep leftist individuals away from positions of government influence. However, when military presidents like Costa e Silva and Médici began to intensify the authoritarian regime, American officials expressed their concerns. Nevertheless, in order to prevent a further deterioration of the situation, they opted not to directly intervene.

To conclude, this study delves into the critical issue of human rights during the era of the military regime. I chose to address this topic given the nature of my degree course, "*Scienze Politiche, Relazioni Internazionali e Diritti Umani*" (Political Sciences, International Relations and Human Rights), and the second year's course "*Human Rights*" which I had the opportunity to attend.

It is evident that during those years, the Brazilian population witnessed numerous human

rights violations that were obscured by government propaganda and the 1979 Amnesty law, which, in summary, shielded those responsible for these horrible crimes of prosecution. Another crucial aspect to highlight when discussing human rights abuses during the 1964-1985 military regime in Brazil is the “*Condor Plan*”, which provided a framework for the persecution, torture and even killing of political dissidents without the confines of national boundaries.

As demonstrated in this thesis, complete illumination of all human rights violations has yet to be achieved, but significant strides were made between 2010 and 2014 in shedding light on this dark chapter of history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bello, José Maria, et. Al. A History of Modern Brazil: 1889-1964. Stanford University Press, 1966.
- Best, Anthony, et. al. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond, 3 ed, Routledge, 2015.
- Camargo, Aspásia, O Golpe Silencioso as Origens da República Corporativa, Rio Fundo Ed., 1989.
- Fico, Carlos, O Grande Irmão da Operação Brother Sam aos anos de chumbo: o governo dos Estados Unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira, Civilização Brasileira, 2008.
- Gordon, Lincoln, Brazil's Second Chance: En Route Toward the First World, Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
- Gorman, Present Threats to Peace in South America: The Territorial Dimensions of Conflict, 1979.
- Jaguaribe Hélio, Brazilian Nationalism and the Dynamics of its political development, Studies in Comparative International Development 2, 4, 1966.
- Jaguaribe Hélio, Political Strategies of National Development in Brazil, Studies in Comparative International Development 3, 27-50, 1967.
- J.J. Faust, A Revolução Devora Seus Presidentes, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Saga, 1965.
- Mace and Bélanger, The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
- Moniz Bandeira, O Brasil como potência regional e a importância estratégica da América do Sul na sua política exterior, Revista Espaço Acadêmico, no. 91, 2008.
- Poggio Teixeira, Carlos G., The Absent Empire: The United States and the South

American Regional Subsystem, 2011, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University.

- Schneider, Ronald M., *Order and Progress: a political history of Brazil*, Westview Press, 1991.
- Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Thomas Francis McGann, *Argentina, the United States and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914*, *Harvard Historical Studies* v. 70, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

SITOGRAPHY

- Amnesty International, Brasile, Amnesty International chiede l'annullamento della Legge d'amnistia, 25 August 2011. Available on the website <https://www.amnesty.it/brasile-amnesty-international-chiede-lannullamento-della-legge-damnistia/> consulted on September 2023.
- Good Neighbor Policy, 1933, Milestones: 1921-1936, Office of the Historian. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/good-neighbor#:~:text=President%20Franklin%20Delano%20Roosevelt%20took,maintain%20stability%20in%20the%20hemisphere> consulted in August 2023.
- Noury R., Brasile, la Commissione per la verità fa luce sui crimini della dittatura, in *Corriere della Sera*, *Le Persone e la Dignità*. Available on the website <https://lepersoneeladignita.corriere.it/2014/12/12/brasile-la-commissione-per-la-verita-fa-luce-sui-crimini-della-dittatura/> consulted on September 2023.
- Rossi, M., A regra de sangue da Operação Condor, a aliança mortífera das ditaduras do Cone Sul, *El País*, 30 March 2019. Available on the website

https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/03/29/politica/1553895462_193096.html
[consulted on September 2023](#). Consulted on September 2023.

- United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 181. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d181> consulted on September 2023.
- United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 198. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d181> consulted on September 2023.
- United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 236. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d236> consulted on September 2023.
- United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 241. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d241> consulted on September 2023.
- United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973, 1976, Document 110. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d110> consulted on September 2023.
- United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973, 1976, Document 116. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d116> consulted on September 2023.

- United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973, 1976, Document 127. Available on the website <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d127> consulted on September 2023.