Governance of collaborative housing: Towards an urban commons?

A Berlin case study.
Volume I

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Thesis presented in
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science
in Sustainable Territorial Development

Academic year 2021-2022

STeDe SUSTAINABLE TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT · UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA · UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE · UCDB ·

Acknowledgments

Summary

In the face of skyrocketing rent prices threatening to exclude (especially low income) residents' from Berlin's (and many other) inner-city neighbourhoods, the housing commons have been increasingly perceived as a source of hope for urban citizens and movements concerned with guaranteeing residents' right to housing and more broadly to a resident-oriented city. Parallelly, citizens and local authorities' interest in collaborative housing has seen a resurgence in the past two decades. but scholars have attracted attention to their tendency to be exclusive. This thesis examines the impact of state governance on the development of CH as a housing commons. It finds that state resource provision can support the production of CH that is more inclusive and contributes to commoning the city, the increasing requirements upon which access to resources are made conditional, which stems from the Senate's focus on professional actors, heightens the barriers for small groups to participate in the creation of the CH commons. This is problematic for the self-governance and inclusivity of the CH commons. Moreover, the increasingly tight austerity politics in which CH is embedded diminishes its chances of upscaling.

Résumé

Face à la montée en flèche des prix des loyers qui menace d'exclure les résidents (en particulier ceux à faibles revenus) des quartiers centraux de Berlin (et de nombreux autres), les logements communs sont de plus en plus perçus comme une source d'espoir pour les citoyens et les mouvements urbains soucieux de garantir le droit au logement des résidents et, plus largement, d'une ville axée sur les résidents. Parallèlement, l'intérêt des citoyens et des autorités locales pour le logement collaboratif a connu un regain d'intérêt au cours des deux dernières décennies. Mais les chercheurs ont attiré l'attention sur leur tendance à être exclusifs. Cette thèse examine l'impact de la gouvernance de l'État sur le développement de CH en tant que commune de logement. Elle constate que la fourniture de ressources par l'État peut soutenir la production de CH qui est plus inclusive et contribue à la mise en commun de la ville, les exigences croissantes auxquelles l'accès aux ressources est subordonné, qui découlent de l'accent mis par le Sénat sur les acteurs professionnels, augmentent les obstacles pour les petits groupes à participer à la création des communs CH. Cette situation est problématique pour l'autogouvernance et l'inclusivité du patrimoine commun du CH. De plus, les politiques d'austérité de plus en plus strictes dans lesquelles le CH est intégré diminuent ses chances de monter en puissance.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

In many cities all over the world, exploding housing prices are making headlines (Carrard, 2021). In 2020, on average, more than a third of low-income tenants in the OECD countries are considered overburdened by housing costs[1] (OECD, 2020, p. 3). Even in 'rich Germany', this housing-driven poverty concerns 11,4 million people while big, private housing corporations make big profits (Awan et al., 2019; Ressourcenwende, 2022). This disproportionately urban phenomenon threatens to turn cities and the economic, cultural, educational, and social opportunities they offer, into exclusive realms, thereby deepening social inequalities (Ressourcenwende, 2022). In Berlin, where the population is made up of 85% of renters, appeals to put a halt to the *Mietenwahnsinn*, the rent madness, have been particularly loud in the past years and forced their way up the political agenda (Hall, 2021). Between 2015 and 2020, they had to face average rent increases of 44% (Der Spiegel, 2020). The argument that adequate housing is a human right enshrined in Article 25 of the UDHR and that it should therefore not be commodified is gaining traction and becoming a rallying cry for citizens taking on the streets (Deutsche Wohnen & Co Enteignen, 2021). After decades of austerity politics and the dwarfed public housing they created in many cities, the state proves unable to guarantee that right (OECD, 2020). Consequently, the current situation has sparked renewed attention for the housing commons as alternatives to state and market, such as housing cooperatives. In a city like Berlin that possesses a long tradition of self-governance and community organisation in housing to fill the vacuum left open by the state, such alternatives are more numerous than elsewhere: from cooperatives with roots in the squatter movements to Mietshäuser Syndikat initiatives born after the turn of the 21st century. However, given the scarcity of affordable land in today's Berlin, opportunities for the expansion of such initiatives are poor.

Concurrently, since the beginning of the 21th century, a (renewed) growing interest in self-governed community living has be witnessed in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe, in reaction to the individualisation and ageing of society, changing family structures and the roll-back of the state (Lang et al, 2020). This collaborative housing movement has received increasing attention from municipal authorities based on its promises to empower citizens through self-governance, foster social cohesion at house level through inclusion and at neighbourhood level through the promotion of a solidarity culture. Its long-term affordability and radical potential

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[1] Meaning that they are forced to spend more than 40% of their disposable income on housing.

to politically mobilise its inhabitants and shape urban development are also highlighted as arguments for supporting the movement. As such, it can be seen as part of the debate on commoning housing and the city, centred around social justice, a universal right to housing and of all citizens to shape their environment. However, the CH movement is very heterogeneous. It includes expensive owner-inhabited projects that can be bought for speculative purposes as well as CLT projects whose aim is the stewardship of affordable housing. This conceptual vagueness has led Chiodelli to critique the whole movement on the basis of the exclusive and insular tendency of some of its manifestations (2015).

Despite the unfair character of his critique, he rose an important point by bringing attention to the potentially problematic role of local authorities in their development and calling on its academic examination (2015, p. 2575). Scheller & Thörne highlighted that CH projects with ties to the right to the city movement were most likely to positively contribute to social sustainability (2018). Thus, which types of CH are supported by urban governance matter to the attainment of common good goals. Consequently, this thesis inquires **how the local government governs collaborative housing in Berlin,** and **which consequences it has for the development of collaborative housing commons.** The creation of this conceptual category for collaborative housing projects whose ambitions go beyond community living and self-governance to creating housing commons to the benefit of all is both aimed at developing conceptual clarity and at guiding local authorities in the governance of CH. Through focusing on these research questions, this thesis aims to draws exploratory conclusions on the ways the ways in which Berlin fosters or hinders the development of a form of CH that is most likely to tackle common good objectives such as inclusivity, addressing the needs of its neighbourhood and more broadly of the city.

To reply to these research questions, this thesis first briefly reviews the state of the art on collaborative housing. It provides a broad definition of CH and a short history of CH in German speaking countries and Berlin since 80s, highlighting its ties to commoning movements in housing. Then, it describes its Janus-faced current development, its claims to social justice and its critiques. Second, it develops the concept of collaborative housing commons, which includes only those forms of CH that - on top of strong community relationships and self-governance in the house – promote inclusion, address the needs of their neighbourhood and contribute to the realisation of a city-wide right to affordable housing. Moreover, it describes the ways in which city governments have been shown to support and hamper the developments of this type of CH. Third, it presents the qualitative, explorative research approach at the core of this thesis, as we as the data collection, processing and analysis methods used to reply to its

research question. Fourth, it analyses makes inferences from strategy, policy, and communication documents concerning Berlin's governance of collaborative housing, as well from the rigorous analysis of interviews conducted with state actors, CH activists, and actors involved in the realisation of the Lynarstraße project, a CH project promoted by the city as exemplary. Finally, it summarises those insights regarding good practices and problematic developments in Berlin's governance of CH in the conclusion in an effort to contribute to the development of more social justice in this policy.

Chapter 2 - Literature review

2.1 Collaborative Housing

2.1.1. Definition

Lang et al. as well as Scheller and a growing number of scholars use the umbrella term collaborative housing (CH) to designate a broad range of models of **self-organised and collective housing provision**, including small and large cooperatives, projects of the Mietshäuser Syndikat - MHS, and Community Land Trusts - CLTs, but also private building groups (Lang et al., 2020, p. 10; Scheller, 2020, p. 70). This wide spectrum ranges from "higher quality housing" objects to projects that try to address socio-political issues in the most comprehensive possible way (Holm & Laimer, 2021, p. 4). It encompasses a variety of development and ownership types, from those instigated by a group of future residents who own individual units to those created as rentals by non-profit developers" (Lang et al, 2020).

Figure 1 - Types of collaborative housing in Germany

Types	Ownership	Specialty	Government
Small cooperative	Collective	High share rates	Supported and subsidized
Large cooperative	Collective	Moderate share rates Can act like company and expand	Supported and subsidized
Private building group	Private	Profit-oriented resell option	Supported and subsidized
Mietshäuser Syndikat	Collective Non-profit LLC	No private capital necessary	Supported and subsidized
Squats	Collective No fixed status	Very low rents Only operational costs	Zero-tolerance to toleration

Scheller (2020, p. 70).

These different models share a commitment to participatory planning and design, as well as management of the housing projects by its inhabitants, following non-hierarchical and consensus decision-making principles (Sargisson, 2012). Furthermore, their residents move in with the intention of 'creating a community' (Fromm, 2012), of living more closely together than is usually the case (Rogojanu, 2015, p. 181). For instance, this entails relationships of

mutual help. This communal aspect is expressed spatially by the presence of common facilities, such as community gardens, apartment, kitchen, and/or laundry rooms in addition to separate (but often smaller) 'private' units (Sargisson, 2012).

2.1.2. History in Germany-Switzerland-Austria (GSA): from 1968 to today

1968-90s

Holm and Laimer trace the roots of contemporary CH in GSA back to movements for the development of community, self-organised and -governed living that emerged at the end of the 1980s- beginning of the 1990s (2021, p. 3). This movement was the consequence of earlier experiences with experimental forms of living together and new housing typologies starting in the late 60s, the appropriation of vacant spaces in the 1970s-80s, in interaction with the beginnings of a new cooperative movement (ibid.). Fedrowitz similarly draws a link between contemporary CH and the communes movement of the late 1960 until early 1980s, which gave birth to the first German CH projects (in the form of shared apartments). They had emancipatory ambitions - opposing the social and economic status quo, and were collaboratively managed and based on non-hierarchical, consensus decision–making (2016, p. 10).

Following 'fiscal crisis, recession and austerity politics', the extent of vacancy in Berlin was especially noteworthy and laid the bases for the squatters movement that occupied a large number of houses starting in 1979 (Bernet, 2021, p. 24). This occupation was driven by the idea of the 'right to stay put' in squatted buildings, as old houses were torn down to erect "new owner-occupied apartment buildings to attract capital" and middle-class taxpayers (Scheller, 2020, pp. 63-5). In this context, the squatters understood themselves as *Instandbesetzer* (preservation squatters) whose aim it was to halt the destruction and gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods through demonstrating practically that it made more (economic) sense to renovate the old than destroy it to build anew (Bernet, 2021). During that period, CH became more heterogeneous (Scheller, 2020, p. 63). In Berlin, their efforts were supported after a few years of hesitation by the giving out of grants to small self-help projects in buildings that needed renovation (Bernet, 2021, p. 24). Between 1982 and 2002, the renovation of close to 300 apartment buildings was enabled by this self-help program, before it was discontinued on grounds of the city's indebtedness (p. 27; Droste, 2015, p. 85). The aim of this program was to "socially integrate the radical squats (Droste, 2015, p. 85).

In connection to this squatting movement, the 1980s saw a "renaissance of the cooperative idea" as new cooperatives were founded for the first time since the 1950s, to enable

the legalisation of squatter projects (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 3; Bernet, 2021, p. 31; Scheller, 2020). These new cooperatives did not only strive for democratic self-governance in their CH projects but also for the establishment of an ownership model that would safeguard the housing projects from speculation or de-commodify the housing stock. However, in the absence of incentives for cooperatives to expand beyond one housing project, the public who could benefit from cheap and secure rents in cooperative housing remained limited (Bernet, 2021, p. 32). The end of the 80s also marked the emergence in activist circles in Freiburg of another form of collective, self-organised housing provision: the Mietshäusersyndikat. This intention was to ensure a permanent decommodification of housing as well as solidarity transfers from old to new projects in the network, to make available long term affordable housing to more than a lucky few (ibid.). The first Berlin projects of the network were founded in the 2000s.

21th century CH

This form of provision has seen a resurgence since the early 2000s (Lang et al, 2020, p. 24). It retains a link to the 80s projects but has been influenced by a changing housing context (Rogojanu, 2015). This new context gave rise to two contradictory forces. On the one hand, today, the options for cheap projects in existing buildings have largely disappeared given the inner-city restructuring that has happened in the past decades. Accordingly, initiatives of joint planning and building have increasingly shifted to the area of new construction projects (Holm et al, 2021, p. 230). Additionally, with the emergence of ethical banks, state financial help has decreased in importance in the development of such projects (Bernet, 2021, p. 32). Another trend observed by Rogojanu in Vienna is that, through the professionalisation of the sector, a lot of new projects are initiated to a certain extent in a top-down fashion by architecture and moderation bureaus and harbour a limited communal character (2015). This leads Droste to conclude that in 2015 a majority of CH in Germany was initiated and inhabited by middle-class, owner-occupying building groups (p. 80). Unlike the non-profit cooperative idea, this new form of ownership enables the reselling of flats for a profit (Scheller, 2020, p. 68).

On the other hand, today's demand for CH has been bolstered by increasing pressures on housing in many Central European cities, as the dismantling of social benefits are forcing larger segments of the population to reduce their cost of living, which strengthens the importance of mutual aid (Holm et al, 2021, p. 229-30). In this tight market environment, the demand for non-profit developers or organisations such as the Mietshäuser Syndikat in Germany to permanently withdraw housing from the market and thus from speculation became

increasingly strong. In other words, the primarily social intentions of sharing housing formulated in the 80s are additionally reinforced by moral and economic demands (Schmid, 2021, pp. 171-2). These contradicting trends are observed by Scheller (2020) who notes that despite the trend towards ownership based self-building communities in 21st c. Germany, bottom-up initiatives in Hamburg show that "there is also potential for emancipative politics and to push the boundaries further for affordable and self-maintained forms of housing in the city" (Scheller, 2020, p. 68).

2.1.3. Arguments in support of promoting CH

In Germany, which counts approximately 5000 CH projects, 500 of which in Berlin (Lafond, 2019), municipalities' interest in CH emerged around 2007 (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 2). Scheller and Thörn identify four arguments formulated by the current CH movement regarding their contribution to more socially just cities, which municipalities use to justify their support for it (2018[2]). First, at the house level, CH initiatives' autonomous organisation and emphasis on self-government improves their responsivity to inhabitants' needs as opposed to investors'. In other words, by empowering residents, they bring the focus on use value. Indeed, "the emphasis on use value rather than exchange value is written into the statutes of many cooperatives, associations and, in the case of the Mietshäuser Syndikat, even in the core entity of the capitalist system, a limited liability company (LLC)" (Scheller, 2020, p. 69). Second, many positive examples show that they tend to enhance social cohesion at house level through the inclusion of different generations and migrants as well as social mixity. This is enabled notably thanks to the establishment of solidarity funds and community building efforts within CH projects (Chatterton, 2013, pp. 1663-4; Lang et al, 2020).

Third, the contribution of CH initiatives to social cohesion at neighbourhood level has also been lauded, based on the assertion that their solidarity and sharing culture radiates in their neighbourhood and prompt the development of neighbourly self-help networks (Fromm, 2012; Jarvis, 2011; Rogojanu, 2015). As such, CH is portrayed as an answer to social isolation (Tummers & MacGregor, 2019, p. 70). Fourth, at a broader level, the CH movement also stresses its comparative and long-term affordability, stemming from the cost savings enabled

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[2]The movement's claims to enable more efficient and ecological lifestyles will neither be detailed nor studied in this thesis, as these are less central to the governance of CH debate which is the focus of this thesis. For an overview of the key arguments, see Marckmann, Gram-Hanssen and Christensen (2012).

by sharing resources such as repair equipment as well as mechanisms to prevent increases in the value of housing through consecutive sales (Lang et al, 2020, p. 17; Chatteron, 2013, pp. 1664-6).

Next to these arguments, some authors emphasise the radical challenge which CH projects can represent to the existing system at the scale of the city. This potential stems first from the model function they can play, among others for public and non-profit housing (Holm et al, 2021, p. 230). Second, their politically mobilising power on both their inhabitants, their neighbourhood and wider city, is also put forward (Sargisson, 2012). In this way, CH can prompt "rethinking of the way urban space is used, planned and integrated" (2013, p. 1668). This radical potential is most likely to be fulfilled when CH projects are linked to urban activism against gentrification, for access to affordable housing and the right to the city, through the organisation of activities open to outsiders and demonstrating that other housing models are possible (Thörn et al, 2020). Such links exist most often in cities/neighbourhoods that have a history of housing activism, such as Berlin (ibid., p. 205).

2.1.4. Critiques of CH

Despite this overwhelmingly positive picture painted of CH by its proponents, be it its inhabitants or (at least rhetorically) supportive politicians, a substantial strand of the literature on CH stresses the lack of evidence that such projects actually realise their potential and the need for more criticality in the research analysing CH. In other words, it argues that municipal support for CH, which is on the rise, is based not on the demonstrated positive impacts of CH for society at large, but on a convincing, dazzling self-portrait and should therefore be discontinued (Chiodelli, 2015) or at least questioned (Droste, 2015, p. 80). Not only do they question its alleged benefits to society, they also highlight pitfalls associated with CH.

First, the claim that it enhances social mixity and inclusivity is criticised in studies that show that inhabitants in CH projects are often homogenous in terms of their origins, as well as their income and education levels. This is a natural consequence not only of their coming together around shared values, such as social and environmental justice (Chatterton, 2013, p. 1665; Chiodelli, 2015), but also of the time and skills, or cultural and social capital, required from CH members (Lang et al, 2020; Scheller & Thörn, 2018, p. 17). Second, studies expose that, contrary to the above-mentioned assertion that CH generates social cohesion beyond its walls, the increased social cohesion among CH inhabitants comes at the cost of broader societal advantages: not only does openness to the neighbourhood appear to be "more declared than practised" (Chiodelli, 2015, p. 2573), members' social involvement outside of the house's

community also seems to decrease (Kehl & Then, 2013, p. 54, in Scheller & Thörn, 2018, p. 16). Moreover, CH has also been accused of causing gentrification in the neighbourhoods in which it is established (Droste, 2015, p. 82; Thörn et al, 2020, pp. 210-11). Third, the allegated long-term affordability of CH is also dismissed, at least in the case of newly built housing (Chatterton, 2013, p. 1664; Thörn et al, 2020, p. 210), not least because common spaces are costly, which in turn harms social mixity (Chiodelli, 2015, p. 2568). Finally, critiques highlight that CH is not inherently radical in that its ambitions are not always to challenge the status quo but are increasingly limited to offering social benefits and targeted to the middle-class (Thörn et al, 2020, pp. 210-11). Moreover, given the obstacle which rising land values represent to its upscaling in many cities of the Global North, "only pockets of co-housing can provide marginal alternatives to dominant forms of housing" (p. 210). Along the same line, Sargisson regards CH not as a radical alternative but as an expression of "piecemal utopianism" whose aim is to "improve the world one neighbourhood at a time" (Sargisson, 2012, p. 51).

Thus, CH covers a wide array of self-organised and collective housing types in which residents democratically govern their dwelling and share a sense of community (and communal facilities). In GSA, this housing model has strong ties with the development of community and self-organised living in the 80s-90s in squatted houses with emancipatory visions. Since the early 2000s, it has re-emerged in 2 key forms: a professionalised, owner-oriented one, and as a grassroots, non-speculative one. Regardless of this dichotomy, CH has attracted political interest in Germany for its potential to better meet residents' needs and to enhance social cohesion at both house and neighbourhood level. Its broader contribution to the city has also been lauded based on its potential for long-term affordability and on the catalyst it can represent for re-inventing housing and urbanism through its model function and mobilising force, especially in contexts of prevalent housing activism. However, its ability to fulfil these promises is an issue of debate in the literature. This thesis claims that the potential of CH is only realised in cases where it has ambitions to commonise the city and is supported in these efforts by appropriate urban governance. The next section describes what such ambitions entail.

2.2. Urban and housing commons

2.2.1. Definition

In the last decades, the body of academic research on the urban commons has grown and the concept was embraced by an increasing number of urban movements. These movements,

disappointed in both state and market as a consequence of political and financial crises, turned to the commons as an alternative way of managing local tangible and intangible resources (Kip et al., 2015, pp. 9-10). At the most basic level, the urban commons are thus defined as those urban resources that are collectively managed by urban residents instead of state or market actors (Lamarca, 2015, p. 167; Susser & Tonnelat, 2013, p. 108). This means that the rules governing their use are (to a great extent) negotiated by its users who share and manage them (Rogojanu, 2015, p. 178). This section breaks this definition in its three constitutive elements characteristic of commons arrangements (Kip et al, 2015): 1) common *resources*, 2) which are (re)produced through *commoning practices*, 3) by a *community* of commoners (with a shared vision). For each of these features, the specificities and complexities of the housing commons are outlined.

Common resources

In the literature, collectively managed common resources are overwhelmingly presented as alternatives to state or market dominated resources, which are regarded as failing to prioritise common good (Bollier & Helfrich, 2019; Kratzwald, 2015; Opazo Ortiz, 2015; Rogojanu, 2015; Susser & Tonnelat, 2013; Tummers and MacGregor, 2019, p. 63). Indeed, so the argument goes, market forces drive the commodification of resources and produce negative externalities to society, such as social exclusion in the case of housing, to the benefit of capital owners (Berge & van Laerhoven, 2011). At the same time, governments tend to favour the status quo and are vulnerable to the influence of powerful interests (Berge & van Laerhoven, 2011; Bollier & Helfrich, 2019). On the contrary, common resources "cannot be monopolised, alienated or capitalised by anybody, be it a person or institution" (Vidal, 2019, p. 453). Accordingly, scholars who have defined housing as a common resource have done so on the basis that affordable housing is a basic need and resource enshrined in Article 25 of the UDHR. Accordingly, it belongs to each individual in society and "should not be traded but collectively controlled" (Aernouts & Ryckewaert, 2019, p. 94; Balmer & Bernet, 2015, p. 179; Bruun, 2015).

Commoning

Because these resources are threatened by market and state actors, commoning practices have been emphasised as crucial to the production and reproduction of urban, and thus also housing commons, to counter appropriation pressures. They are needed because state and market actors have colluded to enclose them in the past through privatisation and commodification (Bruun,

2015, p. 156; Harvey, 2012, in Pithouse, 2014, p. 134; Kratzwald, 2015, p. 31). Lamarca emphasises that governments promote a neoliberal agenda resulting in the expansion of urban space devoted to capital accumulation at the expense of urban space that "creates non-commodified means of reproduction" (or use value) and challenges capitalism (2015, p. 168). In other words, the creation and preservation of the commons are challenged by the current power arrangement (Kratzwald, 2015, p. 38). This definitely applies to housing commons, as the right to housing is increasingly threatened by market actors (e.g. for-profit construction firms, landlords and commercial banks) who seek to gain maximum control over the housing stock through its commodification and privatisation (Nonini, 2017, p. 28). Moreover, in the past decades, the privatisation of massive segments of public housing seems to designate the state as the market's accomplice (Aernouts & Ryckewaert, 2019, p. 97).

Against the backdrop of hostile power structures, commoning - the collective (re)appropriation, creation and reproduction of urban space as commons - is crucial to the continued existence of commons (Kratzwald, 2015, p. 31; Aernouts & Ryckewaert, 2019, p. 97; Susser & Tonnelat, 2013, p. 108; Tummers & MacGregor, 2019, p. 63). Commoning is enabled by the collective organisation of a community around a shared vision (Bollier & Helfrich, 2019). For the emergence of housing commons as well, given the scarcity of affordable land and further unfavourable conditions, collective organisation is a crucial source of social power (Bunce, 2015, p. 139). Their creation and continued existence depends on a vision shared by commoners that the city must be commonised, resting on the idea that 1) citizens have a right to shape their environment and more broadly urban development, and 2) that the city must be organised in a more egalitarian way.

First, contrary to market and state forces, commoning efforts aim to safeguard the use values (things of utility) instead of exchange (market) value of essential urban resources for collective use (Aernouts & Ryckewaert, 2019, p. 97; Nonini, 2017, p. 25). This leads Bollier to claim that "to talk about the commons is to say that citizens (or user communities) are the primary stakeholders, over and above investors" (2007, p. 29, as cited in Susser & Tonnelat, 2013, p. 108). Considerations of citizens as crucial stakeholders implies the right of citizens to participate in shaping urban life (Kratzwald, 2015, p. 31). Thus, urban dwellers' commoning efforts are targeted at several levels: they do not only claim their right to design their lives and environments (e.g. right to housing and to a neighbourhood that meet their needs), but also the citizen right to shape urban life through the definition of "public space and the possibilities for its use in new ways" (p. 32). The urban commons open such possibilities by creating public platforms in which citizens can deliberate on urban issues and needs and develop solutions

autonomously from market and state, and in a democratic way (Müller, 2015, p. 148). From this perspective, housing commons open discussions on the question of housing and represent a forum for citizens to redefine how it should be organised or which functions it should meet.

Second, commoners should strive for social justice, aiming to enable "an equitable life in the city" for all residents, meaning that all, including marginal groups, get to design the city, including housing (Bruun, 2015; Kratzwald, 2015, p. 31). More specifically, housing commons should "participate in broader efforts to make access to a housing commons a universal right" (Nonini, 2017, p. 35). Indeed, commoning is practised with a view to the public interest, which implies a right for the public "'not to be excluded' from the use of the commons" (Bloomey, 2008, p. 320, cited in Aernout & Ryckewaert, 2019, p. 97).

In this continuous process of commoning, (re)production depends on "mechanisms of regulation preventing monopolistic appropriation and overexploitation" of common resources by both state and market (Aernouts & Ryckewaert, 2019, p. 97; Bruun, 2015, p. 158; Susser & Tonnelat, 2013, p. 108; Tummers & MacGregor, 2019, p. 63). While erecting safeguards against the state primarily takes the form of embracing a non-state status (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022; Vidal, 2019), protecting the commons from market interests and thus from the use of land and property rights for practices of speculation and capital accumulation, has taken many forms (Bunce, 2015, p. 140; Vidal, 2019). Safeguards have been developed by a variety of models in a diversity of context, be it the CLT, the MHS or the cooperative[3], such as the separation of land and building ownership in the case of the CLT or the requirement of a ⅔ majority vote for the sale of a cooperative apartment back on the market. These practices have been referred to as (partial) decommodification of housing (Balmer & Bernet, 2019; Ferrari & Vidal, 2021). Another crucial commoning mechanism is the establishment and curation of democratic organisation structures for collective decision-making and management. Taking the case of housing cooperatives as example, the organisation of residents in work parties and the one member one vote principle in general assemblies to elect the executive committee both ensure the reproduction of a housing commons by contributing to a sense of 'egalitarian togetherness'

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[3] All models are not equally effective in preventing commodification, and their effectiveness depends on the context. For example, collective organisation in limited liability companies maintains a greater focus on the individual, and so represents worse conditions for commoning than small cooperatives organised around the principle of "everything belongs to all, but no one individually". (Helfrich, Knaffl & Meretz, 2021, p. 50). However, these mechanisms are never absolute safeguards, as even cooperatives can be dissolved provided that ⅔ of its members vote in favour of dissolution.

at the level of the housing community, which is a crucial source of social power as already posited (Bruun, 2015, p. 163).

Community

Based on the social justice and equalitarian ambitions at the core of the urban commons vision, all citizens have a "right *not to be excluded*" from the commons' uses and benefits (Bruun, 2015, p. 160). Accordingly, the inclusivity or open access to common resources is a defining feature of the urban commons, in contrast to earlier conceptions of the commons (primary natural resources) as depending on management by a clearly defined group of people (Bruun, 2015, p. 160; Ostrom, 1990; Susser & Tonnelat, 2013, p. 112). This ambition seems irreconcilable with the rivalrous nature of some urban resources, such as roads or housing, whose use by one person reduces "what is left for others to use" (Kornberger & Borch, 2015, p. 5). Indeed, the inclusion of new users is limited as "people's homes cannot be everyone's property at the same time" (Bruun, 2015, p. 168; Nonini, 2017, p. 25). However, Komberger & Borch highlight the way in which a more abstract type of commons, the 'urban atmosphere' - that is the "subjective experience of urban reality that is shared by its people" - sees its value rise through its use and sharing (Böhme, 2014, p. 58, in Kornberger & Borch, 2015, p. 10). This value increase is what Parker & Schmidt refer to as the co-production of values, a form of positive/network effect they attribute to the urban commons (2017). Nonini underlines that, given their focus on use value, rivalrous commons like CH projects enable non-rivalrous commons, such as a culture-friendly atmosphere which is preserved by its residents and made available to outsiders (Nonini, 2017, p. 25). In this way, they contribute to the broader "re-appropriation of the city for its use value" (p. 35). Bunce stresses for instance how CLTs contribute to the effort to establish housing as an universal right by raising awareness about common land stewardship, which constitutes an immaterial commons next to material, decommodified, self-organised housing (2015, p. 136). More generally, CH projects organising events such as educational opportunities, open to the public create non-rivalrous commons. This leads Bruun to insist that "the people sharing a commons (...) must not be seen as a kind of corporation with absolute ownership of a clearly bounded resource" (2015, p. 162). They "can be 'owned' in different ways and by more than one singular owner, such as the public, (...) and local communities of commoners at the same time" (p. 161).

The complex issue of community was analysed in the case of housing cooperatives and CLTs, which are both organised around collective ownership. In contrast to definitions of urban commons which exclude (even collective) property claims, it is formally owned by a clearly

defined community of users (Balmer & Bernet, 2015, p. 179). However, cooperative residents have been conceptualised as 'stewards or caretakers' of the housing commons (Bruun, 2015, p. 168). They do not only have a right to use it but also the moral duty to manage it as well as protect it from commodification, thereby safeguarding its reproduction. As such, they "have several 'owners' and groups of users and beneficiaries" (ibid., p. 167). On the one hand, cooperative members currently 'use' and take care of their living space and ensure the conditions for its reproduction perdure. They exclude outsiders and established rules for collective management by cooperative members (Bruun, 2015, p. 160). On the other hand, all citizens who have a right to an affordable cooperative flat benefit from this stewardship (p. 167). In conceptualising Community Land Trusts as housing commons, Bunce has similarly qualified collective, non-profit, decommodified housing provision as a form of long-term stewardship of land in which "land is understood as common heritage not as a form of individual rights over land" and the users' community commit to safeguarding the non-profit and use orientation of land they are stewarding (2015, p. 138). Moreover, Aernouts and Ryckewaert show that beyond commoning at the project level, cooperatives can also engage in further commoning by expanding their housing stock and in this way, give more citizens a chance to become cooperative tenants (2019, p. 103).

To summarise, the conceptualisation of housing as an urban commons that should be collectively controlled by urban residents stems from an understanding of affordable housing as a universal right. In the face of the government's failure to guarantee it and the markets' (largely successful) attempts to appropriate it, which have among others resulted in the scarcity of affordable land in today's urban contexts, collectively organised communities have undertaken efforts to (re)appropriate, create and reproduce housing as a commons. These commoning efforts have been motivated by the ambition to realise a shared democratic and egalitarian vision of urban development and housing, one in which all citizens get to shape their environment and access affordable housing. Beyond a non-state status and mechanisms of partial decommodification, the realisation of this vision depends on collective organisation based on democratic self governance (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022). Despite the rivalrous nature of housing, housing commons contribute to the realisation of this vision of a more inclusive and democratic housing and city-making beyond their walls through the creation of a people-centred urban atmosphere, stewardship of affordable housing and expansive efforts.

2.2.2. Critique of the commons: Failing to live up to its ideals

Just like in the case of CH, the 'uncritical celebration' of the urban commons literature has been deplored (Pithouse, 2014, p. 131). The most recurrent critique formulated against practical examples of urban commons is probably, like for CH, that of insularity. It leads to an exacerbation of inequalities as state and market download social responsibilities to exclusive groups of citizens (Parker & Schmidt, 2017; Pithouse, 2014, p. 134). This critique is given weight by the example of housing cooperatives which in many cases do not expand to make their affordable flats and cooperative living "accessible to outsiders" (Bruun, 2015, p. 167). Additionally, they are subject to "nespotism & other self-exclusionary practices" which threaten the ideal of a city-wide right to the commons (ibid., p. 168). Ferreri and Vidal summarise these critiques of insularity and nepotism in the case of cooperative housing by stating that "cooperative housing can be held as commons between members, but exclusively vis-a-vis the outside world" (2022, p. 8). Moreover, for Foster, a community who has been granted the right to manage a public space as a commons is less prone to solidarity with urban residents outside of their community, such as through tax-paying to support citywide provision of these services and goods to other communities (2011, p. 125).

This critique of insularity and exclusion is exacerbated by the challenge posed by upscaling the urban commons to the extent that they would represent a substantive opportunity for developing inclusive and qualitative life in the city, as "adequate communication and mutual regulation by participants" can bloom only in tight groups (Parker & Schmidt, 2017). A further unintended contribution of urban commons initiatives to growing inequalities is their potential of leading to gentrification (Foster, 2011, p. 119). The difficulty for the state to monitor and hold urban commons initiatives accountable to their common-good orientation enhances the significance of these critiques (Foster, 2011). Before exploring the relationship between the commons and the state, this thesis first delineates under which conditions CH qualifies as a commons and explains the relevance of this conceptual lens for the study of the governance of CH.

2.3. Collaborative housing commons

Lang et al identified a number of studies which regarded CH as an instance of urban commons for the potential it holds to "lead(ing) to a democratic, non-hierarchical organisation of housing beyond state and market, which addresses the needs of all its residents" (2020, p. 22). Chatterton, for example, qualifies cohousing as a "transformative practice of urban

commoning" for the local, niche challenge it offers to the capitalist order through de-commercialising housing (2016, p. 411). Pickerill makes the same claim regarding 'eco-communities', based on the observation that through the "sharing, interaction, and mutual support", they enable the creation of a mobilising place, a transcendence of individualism as well as a housing model based on use instead of exchange value (2015, pp. 2-3). These claims, however, are often based on single case studies (Tummers & MacGregor, 2019, p. 75).

In contrast, Rogojanu justifies her conceptualisation of initiatives of self-organised, communal building and living in Vienna by the fact that they are often assimilated to other commons projects, even if they do not necessarily see themselves as part of the commons discussion (2015, pp. 180-1). For her, they represent a complex form of commons, which can be associated with the above-mentioned notion of multi-level ownership. While the building- and living-space within the four walls of the housing project are (often collectively) owned and used by a closed group following a commonly agreed set of rules (p. 181), she stresses that a lot of Viennese CH initiatives additionally generate a social resource for public benefit through integrating marginalised people and organising different events and educational activities supposed to radiate in the neighbourhood (pp. 181-2). This common-good orientation is crucial to a conceptualisation of CH as commons. Helfrich, Meretz and Knaffl insist that an intentional community can claim to engage in commoning only if they consciously consider needs (i.e. use value), not only of their members but also of other people and society at large (i.e. social justice and inclusive aims) (2021, p. 45). To achieve these goals, aspiring CH projects should, among others, involve inclusive and cooperative decision-making as well as a decommodification of land and housing (p. 46).

In cases where it does not challenge 'existing property regimes', CH is nothing more than a pragmatic utopian phenomenon bringing together citizens sharing "a common vision of the good life" and living and mobilising their efforts towards its realisation (Sargisson, 2012; Helfrich, Meretz & Knaffl, 2021). That explains why Ferreri & Vidal (2022) assess the concept of 'collaborative housing' as a "problematic reference point for the study of housing commons" in light of the inclusion of commodified forms of housing in its definition, despite this commodification being "at the root of the contemporary 'housing question'" (p. 7). For instance, the ownership orientation of a substantial part of the CH movement in Berlin has been decried as a culprit for gentrification in the city (Holms, 2010). Thörn et al. concur with the significantly higher potential of decommodified forms of CH to contribute to a more socially sustainable city and address the contemporary urban crises when compared with speculative, owner-occupied projects (2020, p. 206).

However, as Bruun has shown, decommodification alone does not make a commons as it does not guard against insularity (2015). In other words, even if collective ownership limits the exclusionary effects of property (Helfrich, Meretz & Knaffl, 2021, p. 50), it does not ensure that the CH project engages in commoning efforts to the benefit of all inhabitants of the city beyond its own residents, that is contributes to a "just city" (Droste, 2015, p. 80). Both elements are thus crucial to any conceptualisation of CH as being engaged in commoning the city. Thus, this thesis defines CH commons as those forms of CH (i.e. housing collectively organised by an intentional community) that are non-state, (partially) decommodified, and strive to contribute to a more socially-just city, meaning that it is inclusive at house level, addresses the needs of its neighbourhood and all citizens of the city, notably through expansive strategies.

Table 1 - Comparing collaborative housing, housing commons and collaborative housing commons

	CH	Housing commons	CH commons
Defining features	**Intentional community** = relationships of mutual help (immaterial), common spaces and facilities (material) **Self-governance** = collective organisation, participatory design and management, based on democratic decision-making.	**Self-governance** = collective organisation, participatory design and management, based on democratic decision-making. **Non-state status =** the state does not own the apartments **Decommodification of housing** Safeguards against speculation and capital accumulation. **Social justice orientation** a. *House level*: inclusive (affordability, social mixity, inclusion of marginalised groups) b. *Neighbourhood level*: addresses the needs of the neighbourhood c. *City level:* addresses the needs of all residents	**Intentional community** = relationships of mutual help (immaterial), common spaces and facilities (material) **Self-governance** = collective organisation, participatory design and management, based on democratic decision-making. **Non-state status** = the state does not own the apartments **Decommodification of housing** Safeguards against speculation and capital accumulation. **Social justice orientation** a. *House level*: inclusive (affordability, social mixity, inclusion of marginalised groups) b. *Neighbourhood level*: addresses the needs of the neighbourhood c. *City level:* addresses the needs of all residents
Includes	Collectively owned projects (cooperatives, MHS, CLTs,...) Individually owned units (private building groups)	Collectively owned projects (cooperatives, MHS, CLTs,...)	Collectively owned projects (cooperatives, MHS, CLTs,...)

	Rental projects (municipal housing associations) 'Gated communities'		
Excludes	Projects with weak relationships between residents Developer, top-down projects without resident participation	Developer, top-down projects without resident participation Rental projects (municipal housing associations, profit-oriented landlords) Individually-owned units (private building groups) 'Gated communities'	Projects with weak relationships between residents Rental projects (municipal housing associations, profit-oriented landlords) Developer, top-down projects without resident participation Individually-owned units (private building groups) 'Gated communities'

Jonniaux (2022), based on the above literature review.

Figure 2 - Defining features of the collaborative housing commons.

Jonniaux (2022). Based on the literature review above.

Although they arguably do not represent a majority of existing CH projects, the previous paragraphs showed that they have the greatest potential to lead to a more socially just city and contribute to solving the crises highlighted in the introduction. Defining this ideal category which addresses the critiques formulated against CH (such as their homogeneity, insularity, and role in gentrification) is an interesting starting point to analyse state governance of CH. That is because the realisation of the commons is closely tied to state governance (Thörn et al, 2020). For instance, the decommodification of housing is "conditioned by housing legislation, housing policies and predominant forms of housing provision in the respective national contexts" (p. 206). Thus, this thesis now turns to the instruments used by the state in governing CH and how they both enable and disable its commoning.

2.4. State governance of the CH commons

2.4.1. The necessity for embedded autonomy

As already mentioned, CH's potential to contribute to the common good has been questioned on the basis of its tendential limited inclusivity, as it tends to be rather homogeneous, its openness to the neighbourhood has been debated, and its lack of affordability has been underlined. Further, doubts regarding its scalability and related chances to prompt the radical change to which it makes claims, have been voiced. Finally, the risk of them driving gentrification has been highlighted. More generally, initiatives understanding themselves as urban commons have been criticised for their limited success in realising their ideals.

The existence of such ambivalence regarding their claims to the common good has led scholars to call for an embedded autonomy of the commons (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022). Such appeals conceiving of state support as a crucial enabler of the commons, have been opposed by critiques of state intervention. Opazo Ortiz depicts it as an attack on the concept of self-governance at the heart of the commons (2015, p. 117), while Castillo Ulloa's analysis of the case of Paso Ancho positions the state as a defender of the status quo, with disabling effects on the commons, notably through negating petitions, forbidding gatherings and the use of jargon (2015). These critiques shed light on the disabling effect the state can have on the CH commons, to which this thesis comes back later in this section.

However, in today's urban context, the housing commons cannot be studied in isolation from the state, they can only be "imperfectly (...) enacted 'in-against-and-beyond'" the state, for

their commoning practices intersect with state responsibilities vis-à-vis the housing sector, including social and housing policy-making and urban planning (regulations, standards, allocation of land and resources) (Bruun, 2015, p. 159; Bunce, 2015, p. 140; Ferreri & Vidal, 2022, p. 4). This is especially the case since the current shortage of affordable housing brought "housing back onto the agenda as a common good, whose access has to be regulated to some extent by the state" (Tummers & MacGregor, 2019, p. 70).

As already highlighted, CH does not escape this rule, and has received increasing attention from municipalities in the last years, for the reasons laid out in section 2.1.3 and as a low-cost means of revitalising and upgrading urban districts (Rogojanu, 2015). Thus, although state intervention happens at different levels of governance and policy making (2021; Dellenbaug et al, 2015, p. 16), this thesis focuses exclusively on municipal governance. These interactions with the state, such as the receipt of funding, are necessary to achieve commoning objectives and do not preclude a degree of autonomy (Bunce, 2015, p. 140). This section first exposes 2 rationales in the literature for the necessity of state governance before addressing the disabling effect it can have, and finally the question of autonomy.

State governance of the housing commons is deemed necessary based on two main considerations: the need for 1) an arbitrator to ensure the common interest prevails and 2) a resource and coordination provider in the face of the hostility of the neoliberal city to commons arrangement, given its scale but also market interests' prevalence. Regarding the first consideration, it is argued that the state can and should limit both the exclusivity and insularity of (CH) commons initiatives and their market- or commoners' appropriations (Aernouts & Ryckewaert, 2019, pp. 100-1; Bruun, 2015, p. 157, p. 168; Droste, 2015, p. 89; Helfrich, Meretz & Knaffl, 2021, p. 50; Parker & Schmidt, 2017, Pithouse, 2014, p. 142). In this way, the state can ensure CH commons live up to their social justice claim. This can be achieved by embedding them in "wider redistributive processes" (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022, p. 5). An instance of the state's ability to act as an arbitrator of the common interest was observed by Aernouts and Ryckewaert in the case of Belgian cooperative housing. In that case, state intervention played a positive role in "securing control and use over housing for those groups that are most in need" (2019, p. 107).

However, not all cities take their role as guardians of the common good equally seriously. In supporting CH, some cities (e.g. Hamburg) have placed stronger emphasis on the disciplinary side of governance, making their support conditional on a common good orientation (e.g. stricter selection process for the allocation of land, detailed regulations concerning the recruitment of members), than others which decided not to govern too much

(e.g. Gothenburg) (Scheller & Thörn, 2018, p. 17). In line with Hamburg's example, two main options exist for municipalities that do take this role seriously: supporting commoning of CH through the conditional provision of resources and through regulation. They can do so at different stages of the process, namely its production (e.g. land, financial and technical resources allocation), management (financial allocations, regulating access) and reproduction (regulation of commodification) (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022).

Considering the hostile context the city represents for commoning, state enabling through the provision of resources and coordination is deemed crucial to CH and the commons' scalability and prolonged viability (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012; Aernouts & Ryckwaerts, 2019, p. 106; Chatterton, 2013; p. 1669; Foster, 2011, p. 91; Parker & Schmidt, 2017). Many authors observe that the state is most often needed to supply the financial, spatial and other (e.g. running water for urban gardens) resources needed for cooperative behaviour (Berge & van Laerhover, 2011; Foster, 2011; Kratzwald, 2015, p. 38; Parker & Schmidt, 2017; Pithouse, 2014, p. 142; Rogojanu, 2015). Indeed, Scheller stresses that historical developments have shown that the provision of legal and financial support as well as affordable land is a decisive factor for the "development of CH towards collaboration, mutual help and solidarity" rather than the neoliberal atomisation of society into isolated individuals (2020, p. 69).

2.4.2. Enabling governance instruments

Out of these resources needed for (CH) commons production, public land is often acknowledged as the most important (Castillo Ulloa, 2015, p. 140; Susser & Tonnelat, 2013, p. 109; p. 112). In Hamburg and Freiburg, 20% of municipal land is dedicated to CH projects (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 7; Scheller & Thörn, 2018). Tübingen designated an entire area for CH projects (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 7). In Viennese new urban development areas, plots of land are reserved for building groups (Rogojanu, 2015). Droste points to the use of (more or less flexible) criteria for land allocation as a common tool to ensure CH projects support the common good. In Vienna, the introduction of criteria such as "social sustainability" and "community-promoting character" in regular developer competitions in 2009 has given CH commons projects good chances of success (Rogojanu, 2015, p. 185).

Hamburg has adopted a disciplinary approach to governance and uses land allocation as a leverage to ensure the common good orientation of the projects. It allocates land to groups based on criteria including a social concept, an ecology & energy concept (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 7; Scheller & Thörne, 2018). It also emphasises social mixing by promoting the

integration of housing with commercial enterprises and, more importantly, of groups with varying income levels (Scheller & Thörne, 2018, p. 9). This programme "focuses on middle-class applicants charged with incorporating other underprivileged 'focus groups' directly in the self-build groups" (p. 17). This focus is reflected in the fact that "interested groups can become owners of their housing starting at a 10% capital share, which in light of the above discussion might represent a higher risk of speculation as leasing land (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 7). Beyond rent stability, the alternative of lease of public land, such as through hereditary leasehold structures and CLTs, has the additional advantage of reducing the "initial financial burdens on (CH) projects" (Droste, 2015, p. 84). Next to that, Hamburg has also taken steps to integrate CH in the municipal housing stock, "letting blocks of flats to cohousing coops, reducing rents in exchange for handling over maintenance responsibilities through a model of self-government" to enhance inclusivity of such projects (Scheller & Thörne, 2018, p. 9).

Additionally, measures enabling access to finance and economic resources are significant determining factors for the affordability (and thus inclusivity) and ability to scale up CH projects at production and management stage (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022, p. 9; Parker & Johansson, 2012, p. 21). This can take the form of subsidies enabling CH projects to "include social or cultural facilities that also serve the wider neighbourhood" (Droste, 2015, p. 83). At the stage of management, the state can play a crucial role in improving accessibility of CH by subsidising low income residents and renovation works to safeguard affordability (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022, pp. 14-15). More structurally, cities can promote partly decommodified forms of ownership instead of self-ownership, such as non-speculative cooperatives, non-profit housing associations, holding leasehold rights or collaboration with public housing, to bolster CH's inclusivity to lower-income individuals, long term (Droste, 2015; Scheller & Thörne, 2018). Hamburg, for example, offers construction subsidies and grants for monthly rent proportional to households' incomes for cooperative members. Next to that, loans to finance personal cooperative shares have been introduced by the city's public development bank to facilitate access to cooperative membership by low-income households and thereby the realisation of more inclusive CH projects, at scales (Scheller & Thörne, 2018, p. 9). Through creating these and other mechanisms to favour (partly) decommodified forms of housing, the state can contribute to the maintenance of housing commons over time (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022, p. 15).

Finally, technical support and knowledge are other important resources provided to CH projects by municipalities at production stage (Ferreri & Vidal, 2022, p. 9; Parker & Johansson, 2012, p. 21). This is in line with the CH literature which stresses that the complexity inherent in CH projects, notably in relation to the legal aspects, calls for state support (Ache &

Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 9). According to Ache and Fedrowitz, given their difficult fiscal situation, most German municipalities primarily support CH through communication and information activities. These include web pages, regular newsletters, information packages, and handbooks, but also roundtables, market places, exhibitions and the building of data bases on projects" (2012, p. 8). Such efforts have been undertaken primarily by state funded support structures established in some German states and municipalities, such as Aachen, Hamburg, NRW and Berlin (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012, p. 8; Droste, 2015, p. 183).

Regarding coordination, several authors stress the positive relationship between scale of the urban commons and necessity for state involvement (Foster, 2011, p. 64; Kip, 2015, p. 46; Parker & Sargisson, 2012; Pithouse, 2014, p. 134). According to them, in the face of the scale and complexity of cities, state provision of institutional structures as well as norm activation and coordination is crucial for urban commoning to succeed (Foster, 2011, p. 90). In this coordination process, Scheller and Thörn have underlined the importance of mediation between the myriad of actors active in the field of CH (2018, p. 16). To support upscaling, municipalities can also play a significant role in facilitating "knowledge transfers between projects and with the wider public" (Droste, 2015, p. 83).

2.4.3. Disabling governance instruments

Finally, some authors also warn against ambiguities existing in the state-commons relationship. Kip et al underline the contradiction between governments' facilitation of commons initiatives such as urban gardening and the concomitant undermining effect of the austerity politics they conduct, which are responsible for the enclosure, that is the exploitation and control of the commons already mentioned above (2015, p. 19). For example, cooperative housing has been threatened by government decisions of enforcing neoliberal reforms in Denmark (Bruun, 2015, p. 164) and Amsterdam (Nonini, 2017, p. 34). Another instance of fragilising impact of state policies on the CH commons is the Danish state's implementation of a "right-to-buy" scheme as well as the reduction of its financial commitments towards the Common Housing sector. These measures opened the sector to piecemeal privatisation in the future, strain on solidarity and forced efficiency-maximising measures such as professionalisation, which contradicts the idea of self-governance at the core of the commons (Vidal, 2019).

State intervention can also pose other threats to the self-organisation and autonomy of housing commons, which Scheller warned against (2020). For example, state-led inclusion in CH projects of people who are not fully committed to commoning has altered its essential

participation processes (Aernouts & Ryckewaert, 2019, p. 101). However, instances of housing commons resistance to preserve its self-governed/participatory nature have been observed, such as in the conversion of a social housing company into a cooperative, in the preservation of their cooperative impregnated vocabulary and in the establishment of new devices to preserve local participation where it was threatened (p. 103). An additional disabling consequence of state governance of the commons is the increasing requirements they have to fulfil, which excludes groups who do not have the necessary time, skills and/or expertise (Helfrich, Knaffl & Meretz, p. 46). Indeed, state support comes with autonomy restrictions including vis-à-vis occupancy and rental price, specific requirements in terms of equipment (barrier-free access), maximum construction costs, energy and heat consumption or construction (use of timber frame, passive house) (Holms et al, 2021, pp. 235-236). These add to more general legal conditions and minimum standards (regarding fire safety, building physics, sound insulation or energy efficiency) which need to be met to obtain the right to build.

Figure 3 - Municipal governance of CH commons - Instruments

Jonniaux (2022). Based on Ferreri & Vidal (2022).

In conclusion, in today's (German) urban context, the development of CH is closely tied to municipal governance. Some scholars describe this embeddedness as an opportunity for the state to address critiques formulated against the commons and CH by guaranteeing they contribute to a more socially just housing and city. The extent to which the cities studied in the literature pursue this role varies: while some have a more disciplinary approach of CH, others have a rather liberal take on it, intervening little in the direction in which it develops. The literature suggests that state involvement through provision of land, financial and knowledge resources as well as coordination is necessary to enable and upscale commoning practices within CH. Depending on the state's position on the disciplinary-liberal spectrum and the corresponding instruments it uses (or does not use), it can either foster or hamper commoning in CH, and thus its potential to offer a solution to today's housing crisis. Thus, leases of public lands and subsidies to low income residents and decommodified forms of housing contribute to the inclusivity, long term affordability and upscaling of CH. Technical support is also crucial to inclusivity in such a complex field. Norm activation and the provision of institutional structures allowing for mediation between actors and knowledge transfers are other important instruments for the inclusivity and upscaling of CH. However, the historical hindrance the state has represented to the commons through its imposition of austerity politics cannot be ignored, just like its potential to harm the commons' autonomy and self-governance through promulgating high requirements. This potential exists even when these requirements stem from a common good orientation, which indicates the existence of a trade-off between embeddedness and autonomy. After a few words about the methods used in this thesis, a closer look will be taken at how a given state approach to CH and the corresponding instruments impact the develpment of commoning in the field and thus its contribution to social justice. To that end, attention will focus on the relation between state governance and the development of intentional community, self governance, decommodification, a non-state status within CH, as well inclusivity and the predominance of use value, both at CH project, neighbourhood, and city level.

Chapter 3 - Methods

3.1 Research approach

Given this thesis' focus on commoning practices, which are per definition socially constructed and thus conducive to subjective interpretation, its research question is answered following a qualitative approach to research (Hesse & Leavy, 2011). Accordingly, the conceptualisation of collaborative housing as a commons to be constantly reproduced detailed in the previous chapter guided both collection and analysis of primary data (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). In turn, the data collected helped refine this conceptualisation through a process of back and forth between theory generation and case analysis (Hesse & Leavy, 2011; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Moreover, it is inscribed in a critical research paradigm, meaning that it looks at the "transformation of current structures, relationships, and conditions that shape and constrain the development of social practices in organisations and communities, through examining them within their historical, social, cultural and political contexts" (Fossey et al, 2002, p. 720). Based on an analysis of these transformative processes, it derives policy recommendations aimed at contributing to this transformation (Fossey et al, 2002, p. 720). To that end and as the consequences of state governance for commoning in collaborative housing have been little theoretised, this thesis proposes an exploratory analysis of the case of Berlin in the past 10 years, which should inform further research and theory-making.

3.2 Case studies

This thesis is concerned with an in-depth understanding of one case study (Berlin between around 2010 and 2021) and one sub-case study (the Lynarstraße project, whose planning efforts started in 2016 and has been inhabited since 2018).

Berlin's housing activism history and the related tradition of CH forms in the city make it an especially rich case in which to observe communing practices in collaborative housing. This history has set the bases for its "large stock of alternative and innovative housing actors" (Droste, 2015, p. 88) and resulted in a high number of projects in the city: today more than 500 (LaFond, 2019). It is especially interesting considering Thörn & Scheller's observation, derived from a cross-sectional analysis of different European cities, that a close relationship between CH and urban activism positively impact its radical potential (2020), of which commoning the city is one expression. Additionally, as Müller pointed out, since the 60s-70s, following citizen mobilisation against big urban plans, there is a culture of citizen participation in urban planning

processes in Berlin (2015, p. 150). Accordingly, it can be expected that its government is already well acquainted with citizens' claims to self-governance and its governance instrumets relatively oriented towards collaborative forms of housing and commoning practices. This makes it an interesting case study for the impact of governance on CH commoning. In this thesis, references to 'Berlin' as a governing actor correspond to the Senate of the state (Land) of Berlin, its administrators and the organisations it has mandated to represent it. It excludes district-level actors. Although they do have a role in urban development on their territory, their diverse context and political orientations prevents any general analysis of their governance at the level of Berlin. Moreover, their role did not emerge as significant from the interviews conducted in the framework of this thesis. Thus, this study examines Senate governance of CH and its impact on commoning between 2010 and 2021, as it allows to contextualise its current governance approach and instruments.

The selection of the Lynarstraße project as a sub-case study was the result of a preliminary analysis of Berlin-based CH projects with considerable commoning ambitions. Interviews with 6 Berlin projects, including the Lynarstraße, was performed in the context of this thesis' author's co-writing of a book untitled "Social-Ecological Cooperative Housing" as part of her internship at id 22 - an institute researching and promoting (social, ecological, decommodified forms of) CH in Berlin. These interviews and discussions with the book's co-authors (one of them involved in the Berlin alternative housing scene since the 90s) revealed the project's particularly intense commoning ambitions and its support from the Senate up to this day. Consequently, it was chosen to understand how these two peculiarities relate to one another.

3.3 Data collection

To develop a detailed understanding of Berlin's key governance instruments and approach of CH and its relationship to commoning practices at city and project level, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with a diversity of actors. The enabled the exploration of this under-researched topic and to reconstruct relatively underground/behind the scenes processes. Five of them were with actors involved in the Lynarstraße project. Among those, 2 were conducted with an employee of the cooperative that built and owns the house. As project manager and resident in the house, he was a key informant on the relationship between state governance and the project as well as commoning practices within the project and beyond (L1a, L1b). Another interview was with a representative of the general planner of the projects, who knew a lot about

requirements for CH (L2). Another was conducted with a social organisation that occupies one of the spaces on the ground floor of the project (L4) as well as the person responsible for the participatory processes in the project (L3). Two interviews were conducted with state actors (S1, S2). And two final interviews allowed me to ask questions to activists in the scene of CH and/or housing commons (A1, A2). All but one were conducted in July 2022. They lasted between 15 minutes and 1:30:00. The interview guides and transcripts can be found in the second volume of this thesis, which can be accessed upon request to the author of this thesis[4]. Access to these interviewees was facilitated by contacts made through the author's internship at id22 (L1a, L1b, S1, S2, A2), her supervisor (A1), or Ostseeplatz's website (L2, L3, L4).

Table 2 - List of interviewees

Code	Role of the interviewee in the Lynarstraße project/CH in Berlin	Contact	Date of the interview	Length
L1a L1b	Project Manager of the Lynarstraße project (since 2018). Staff of the Ostseeplatz cooperative, the developer of the Lynarstraße project.	Internship	09.02.22 22.07.22	~45:00 ~1:10:00
L2	Construction manager of the Lynarstraße Projekt. Staff of the planning and architecture bureau hired by the Ostseeplatz.	Am Ostseeplatz's website	20.07.2022	~50:00
L3	Moderator of the participation processes and relation point between the management of the project (architects, cooperative) and the residents (before 2018).	Am Ostseeplatz's website	26.07.22	~50:00
L4	Employee of the Diakonie Mitte Station, a social service provider renting a space on the ground floor of the Lynarstraße project and in charge of a shared apartment for people with dementia in the project.	Am Ostseeplatz's website	22.07.22	~15:00
S1	Civil servant at the Department of urban development, construction and housing of the Berlin Senate. Followed the Lynarstraße project from the start. Involved in the SIWA program and in charge of cooperatives' promotion in Berlin.	Internship	22.07.22	~50:00

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[4] Contact: chloe.jonniaux@hotmail.com

S2	Employee of STATTBAU, the support centre mandated by the Senate for CH in Berlin.	Am Ostseeplatz's website	14.07.22	~45:00
A1	Founding member of the Ostseeplatz & former Member of the Supervising Board.

Project developer for small cooperatives and building groups (BG) in Berlin since the 1990s. | Thesis supervisor | 21.07.22 | ~1:30:00 |
| A2 | Employee at Immovilien (a federal network advocating for common-good oriented housing) and volunteer at the MHS's advisory centre for new projects in Berlin-Brandenburg. | Am Ostseeplatz's website | 29.07.22 | ~45:00 |

Jonniaux (2022).

Interviewees were promised that their identity would not be disclosed in order to enhance the chances of receiving honest answers and observations. The same questions were asked to several interviewees to minimize the problem of non-objectivity highlighted by Berry (2002, p. 680). Additionally, interview findings were when possible triangulated with official information and documents published on the Senate's and STATTBAU's websites. Finally, a podcast episode released by the Mietshäuser Syndikat on their failure to make more projects available to Berliners since 2013, was superficially analysed to balance the focus of my case study on a rather institutionalised actor (a cooperative) and a 'successful' one (2021).

3.4 Data processing and analysis

Given this thesis' focus on commoning practices, which are per definition socially constructed and thus conducive to subjective interpretation, its research question is answered following a qualitative approach to research (Hesse & Leavy, 2011). Accordingly, the conceptualisation of collaborative housing as a commons to be constantly reproduced detailed in the previous chapter guided both collection and analysis of primary data (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). In turn, the data collected helped refine this conceptualisation through a process of back and forth between theory generation and case analysis (Hesse & Leavy, 2011; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Moreover, it is inscribed in a critical research paradigm, meaning that it looks at the "transformation of current structures, relationships, and conditions that shape and constrain the development of social practices in organisations and communities" (Fossey et al, 2002, p. 720). Based on an analysis of these transformative processes, it highlights good and problematic

practices for the development of CH commons, with the aim of contributing to a positive transformation (Fossey et al, 2002, p. 720). To that end and as the consequences of state governance for commoning in collaborative housing have been little theoretised, this thesis proposes an exploratory analysis of the case of Berlin in the past 10 years, which should inform further research and theory-making, as well as policy-making.

Then, the official websites/policies/documents mentioned by the interviewees were analysed to develop a deeper understanding of the instruments, priorities and strategies of the Senate in housing, as well as its perception of and approach to CH. These findings were then connected to segments from all interviews and analysed in terms of their potential to enhance or hamper commoning in CH, based on the conceptual framework clearly defined above to ensure conceptual validity (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006).

3.5 Limitations

This thesis focuses on a model project that is not representative of the CH scene at large but rather exceptional, as statements by some interviewees have made clear. To generalise the observations presented in this thesis, the role of state governance in commoning of more CH projects would have to be analysed, for example of projects that failed or of projects by non-professional actors. The conceptual framework developed in this thesis would be applicable to such further research.

Chapter 4 - Results & Analysis

4.1 Development of CH in Berlin and current context

In line with the previously reviewed literature, several interviewees linked the current Berlin CH scene to its origins in the communes and the 80s, and emphasised its intertwined relationship to the squatter movement (S2[5], A1, L1, L1a). Thus, in Berlin the CH movement is strongly related to housing activism, which Thörn et al depict as an important factor in determining its social justice orientation (2020, p. 225).

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[5] For example: "It all plays together: Berlin's urban development, the history, why so many initiatives have developed here since the 1980s and since the municipalities. Certain forms are the building groups, others are the cooperative and cluster living in the form and the processes you are investigating in Lynarstraße, that is also another development"(S2).

Additionally, the important role played by the state in its development was also stressed in the interviews[6]. S2 referred to the self-help program aimed at pacifying squatter groups that spanned the 80s, 90s and the first years of the 21th c. as key to the consolidation of communal forms of living and doing housing (A1, S2) in Berlin. At that time, many small cooperatives were founded that are still champions of CH today (S2). Reinforced by the sale of considerable segments of the Senate's housing stock to cooperatives between 2000-2002, this paved the way for the establishment of cooperatives as an important non-profit actor in the scene (A1). This wave of CH was relatively heterogeneous (Scheller, 2020).

With the discontinuation of the program in 2002 and the sale of a massive share of its housing stock to for-profit actors to replenish the city's accounts (a key instance of austerity politics), a new form of CH took off, namely 'Baugemeinschaften' (building communities of groups), which were ownership-oriented and essentially the reserve of well-off citizens (S2, A1). Parallely, to a smaller extent, it is in that period between 2005 and 2012 that most of the Mietshäuser Syndikat projects (partly decommodified) in Berlin were founded and provided a larger diversity of people with CH (A2). Following the emergence of these new forms of CH in the city, in 2008, the Senate Department for Urban Development and Housing mandated STATTBAU to establish the Network Agency GenerationenWohnen (Generations housing) to serve as a counselling centre for intergenerational and community housing in Berlin. Since then, 132 CH projects (3500 units) were realised in Berlin, which represents less than 3% of new apartments built in that period (Statista, 2022; STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 9). Moreover, the development of CH in Berlin has taken a toll in the last years as booming prices made it virtually impossible for small, non-profit and non-professional actors to access land on the market (A1; A2; S2; NBMSI, 2021).

In spite of the marginal share CH represents and this increasingly difficult context, analysing which direction it takes is relevant given that a study conducted by STATTBAU in 2021 revealed that 64% of Berliners (as much as those interested in conventional housing!) who are planning on moving into a new rental apartment in Berlin in the next few years are interested in a large household (conventional apartments coupled with community spaces), and 33% would consider moving into a cluster apartment (small apartments with only a kitchenette and

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[6] "In this CH topic, (...)public support (for the housing sector) is really necessary. That was proven historically in the cooperative movement. Upscaling is not possible without public support" (A2).

a bathroom 'clustered' around community spaces). Additionally, 60% of those who do not plan to move would co-finance neighbourhood infrastructures (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021). Moreover, in the context of the 16 new neighbourhoods planned in Berlin for the next years to address population growth in the city, the state secretary for housing portrayed the integration of housing groups in new constructions as an important building stone for the activation of lively neighbourhoods in newly planned city districts, which is a key point of the Berlin Strategy updated in 2021 (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 5). Moreover, the 2021 Berlin Strategy mentions as a goal for Berlin for the first time the sufficient realisation of community housing for people in need of care (Stattbau & SenBW, 2021, p. 8). This represents an interesting new context in which to observe how the city of Berlin is governing CH and what the implications for its development as a commons are.

4.2 Urban governance of CH and impact on commoning

This section reviews the ways in which the state of Berlin supports and hinders the development of CH commons. First, its impact on commoning is scrutinized in the context of its function as a provider of land, finances, as well as technical support and knowledge. Then, its efforts to activate norms and establish institutional structures to support the development of CH are equally evaluated in terms of their consequences for commoning in CH. Finally, the complexity of requirements as well as austerity politics imposed by state governance are analysed to draw conclusions on their disabling impact on the CH commons.

4.2.1 Berlin as a resource provider

4.2.1.1 Land

Concept procedure (Konzeptverfahren)

One of the key measures that the Senate of Berlin has taken to tackle the growing scarcity of affordable land in the city was to announce (in 2013) and launch (in 2015) a new real estate policy (neue Liegenschaftspolitik), which entails new ways of managing public land. Its goal would no longer be to help the city pay its debt through selling municipal property to the highest bidder but to foster a sustainable urban development by allocating land to developers proposing project concepts with the highest potential to benefit the common good, for example through their focus on multi-generational living, social mixing, and/or sustainability (BIM, 2022; Senatsverwaltung für Finanz, 2022). According to this new policy, Berlin leases land instead

of selling it, by granting developers heritable building rights for 90 years[7], which withdraws land from speculation (BIM, 2016; S2). The concept procedures for housing plots are especially targeted to social institutions, cooperatives, and cooperatively organised groups who propose to provide public services for the city. This is according to this principle that land is allocated in the development of Berlin's new urban districts, such as the Schumacher Quartier, where plots are specifically reserved for CH (SenSBW & STATTBAU, 2019, p. 9; S2, A1). Moreover, in those new districts, cooperatives are offered 25% (SenSBW, 2022b).

The quality of concepts is evaluated based on several criteria, including its urban-architectural character (e.g. quality of open spaces, integration into the neighbourhood), ecological value (e.g. energy efficiency, climate adaptation), low rent (weights for 10% of the final decision) and use (housing subsidies, offers for social mixing or target groups, community orientation, self-organisation and participation) (BIM, 2016, p. 7; SenSBW, 2022a). A usual additional condition is that 30% of the project's surface should be dedicated to subsidised housing or social associations (soziale Träger) (BIM, 2016). Given its immeasurability and the scarcity of state-owned land still available, there is no specific criterion for CH (S1, A2). This evaluation is carried out by the BIM (the real estate service provider for the state of Berlin), several Senate departments (finance, urban development & housing, and research and technology), as well as the district in which the plot is located.

On the one hand, even in the absence of specific criterion for CH, such a model based on land leases and a qualitative assessment of projects following their common good orientation seems to give good chances to CH commons projects, just like is the case in Vienne (Rogojanu, 2015). Land leases to non-profit actors do not only ensure the partial decommodification of housing and thus their long-term affordability, they also bring down the upfront costs for groups acquiring the plot, therefore fostering inclusivity in the house project. The criteria for low rents and social mixing have the same effect. Furthermore, criteria such as community orientation and self-organisation favour CH projects, while the importance given to integration in the neighbourhood guarantees openness at a higher scale. This represents, just like in Hamburg, a disciplinary approach to CH governance.

On the other hand, several interviewees and activists in the Mietshäuser Syndikat Network in Berlin have stressed the complexity of the processes, which renders them hardly accessible to

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[7] Given the far time horizon of such contracts and the autonomy they grant developers, projects built on leased land are considered to be non-state.

smaller, non-professional groups. An employee from STATTBAU deplores that even though the Senate is aiming to open those procedures to all, even groups who do not yet have a legal form, its efforts "to ensure they are safe and good for groups and comply with public procurement law" currently makes them highly complicated (S2). In the same vein, a podcast produced by the Mietshäuser Syndikat Network in Berlin blamed the elaborate and unpredictable nature of these procedures as one of the key sources of failure for their small, self-governed, non-speculative projects (2021). Indeed, according to the podcast, the evaluation of the projects is based on the ability of projects to produce tables and numbers as well as seal pre-contracts with banks to demonstrate their viability, which often requires hiring experts.

This is reinforced by the fact that these procedures concern a limited quantity of plots, whose quality is often poor. As the interviewed civil servant recognises they have "only few state-owned plots over, and they are being tendered now" (S1). This does not only imply that these plots are highly disputed. It also raises questions as to what will happen once all public plots have been leased and thus reveals the bleak potential of this strategy to activate a commoning of the city at large. Moreover, an interviewee working as a counsellor at the Mietshäuser Syndikat Berlin stressed that most of the good public plots have already been tendered (to the city housing associations in priority) and that since 2013, the plots have become increasingly scarcer and smaller (A2). This, in turn, enhances the level of expertise required to develop land (Helfrich, Knaffl, Meretz, 2021, p. 46). This represents a hindrance to the development of CH commons as these high requirements exclude groups who lack time and expertise (ibid.).

Integration in communal housing stock

Another instrument used by local governments to support CH discussed in the literature is its integration in the communal housing stock. The option is especially interesting in Berlin where the state-owned housing companies are set to expand their stock and have been designated by the Senate as significant actors in the building of new neighbourhoods (Stattbau & SenSBW, 2021, p. 8). This dedication arose in 2014 from a resolve to reverse the decision made by the city in the past to privatise its housing stock. In some of these municipal housing neighbourhoods, plots were leased to cooperatives and other developers based on concept procedures, to ensure social mixity at neighbourhood level (Stattbau & SenSBW, 2021, p. 12). This breaks with the tradition of segregation in social housing against which the project manager of the Lynarstraße project warned (L1b).

Other measures that support the integration of CH in communal housing is its allocation of "relatively generous subsidies to community spaces in upcoming social housing" (S1) as well as STATTBAU's extensive efforts to activate norms, mediate and create institutional structures to incentivise municipal housing associations to take on CH in their stock (which will be detailed below). However, the government has no power to impose it on the municipal housing associations (S2). Additionally, despite claims that these persuasive efforts have started bearing fruits (S2), other interviews revealed the difficulties encountered by the Berlin Senate in convincing the SOHC to built CH projects as they are used to setting up more conventionals buildings and CH "falls a little of the grid", "outside of their regular business" not the least because "their core task is to relatively quickly create affordable housing (S1, also L2). This represents a limitation on the upscaling potential of CH commons, and thus to their inclusivity at city level.

Where these efforts have been successful, restrictions on residents' autonomy and self-governance, which are core elements of the CH commons, have been noted. Indeed, although communal housing associations have conducted comprehensive participatory processes in model projects, one of their representatives has underlined that they would no longer involve residents in the planning phase (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 37). Another pioneer project illustrates the obstacle communal housing associations can represent to the residents' wish for additional community room (p. 39). More generally, given the history of privatisation of the communal housing stock, the state status of such CH projects poses a threat to their LT existence as commons.

4.2.1.2 Finances

The Senate subsidises CH and its commoning potential with different financial instruments. A key tool which applies to all new constructions in Berlin is the granting of interest-free loans to developers who agree to rent 30% or more[8] of their newly built units to residents entitled to subsidised housing and respect the conditions (in terms of size, height of rents, tenant status...) that are tied to it. This loan has to be reimbursed within 30 years, in some cases only to 75% (Böttcher, 2020). Such interest-free loans can be granted to all developers regardless of their intention to set up CH. However, to encourage CH (S1), since 2019, in cases where the individual unit of a resident entitled to subsidies is smaller than what is allowed (40m² for one

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[8] This is a mandatory minimum quota for new constructions in Berlin, with exceptions (S2).

person), the difference in area can be used to fund common areas[9] (STATTBAU & Wohnbund, 2019, p. 54). Moreover, community spaces can further be promoted by extending the maximal subsidy-eligible area by 10% per housing unit. In other words, in this case, an extra $3m^2$ of common spaces could be financially supported. Additionally, one-off grants for innovative and experimental construction can be claimed in the case of CH projects (max 6000 € per subsidised unit)(p. 52).

Another source of finances which the interviewed civil servant referred to as CH promotion is the Senate's funding for cooperative housing (S1[10]; SenSBW, 2022b). Although he recognised that not all cooperatives can equally be qualified as CH as this thesis understands it, they represent important partners in their capacity as pioneers of CH in the city. Next to the above mentioned support, cooperatives expanding their stock through new constructions can receive interest-free loans for 10% of their total costs and their members' cooperative shares are also subsidised by Berlin's investment bank for people who are entitled to housing subsidies (for a maximum of 50,000€).

A third financial support instrument for CH mentioned by the Senate's civil servant is Berlin's promotion of community housing for social institutions, i.e. service providers in child and youth welfare, social welfare, care, women's protection or in health programmes,... (STATTBAU & Wohnbund, 2019, pp. 53-4). They receive extra support (500 000€ per CH project, often cluster apartments) given the urgent needs these institutions express for more space (including given the ageing population in Germany) and their special situation given that their residents 1) really need community living 2) generally have limited to no earnings (S1).

Finally, a special support program launched in 2015, the SIWA, was mentioned by the interviewed civil servant as a flagship (the first!) program for CH in Berlin. As part of this program, the Senate granted a total of 30 million to projects tasked with developing exemplary solutions for the construction of innovative and affordable multi-storey housing (SenSBW, 2015). The condition was that the project developers grant a share of the apartments to holders of subsidised housing entitlement certificates for a rental price of initially €6.50/m² over a period of 20 years. The selection criteria included construction materials and techniques, efficient land-use, cost savings, as well as cross-generational concepts, participation and openness to the neighbourhood. The project call was open to all private and municipal project

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[9] Thus, if this resident's private apartment does not exceed a surface of $30m^2$ (which is the average in CH projects analysed in id22, 2022), 10 m² of community spaces can be funded by the public interest-free loan.

[10] "Those are the instruments with which CH, especially cooperative housing is supported".

developers, including housing associations and cooperatives, building groups, social organisations and private builders. However, out of the 10 selected model projects, 6 were projects within state owned housing associations, 2 of them by cooperatives and 2 were architect-led projects in collaboration with land foundations.

This resolve of the local government to offer more subsidised housing and to financially support common spaces, even in cases where the total financed area (private + collective spaces) exceeds by 10% the normal surface limit eligible for funding positively impacts the affordability and thus inclusivity of CH commons (L1b). Additionally, given the strong ties between cooperatives and CH in Berlin[11] and in combination with its more direct support for CH, Berlin's funding of cooperative expansion favours the upscaling of a partly decommodified form of CH, and thus its inclusivity at city level. Moreover, subsidies for cooperative membership shares enhance its inclusivity at house level (L1b[12]). However, this positive impact on commoning is correlated to the significance of funding, which this thesis returns to when discussing the consequences of austerity politics.

4.2.1.3 Technical support and knowledge

The complexity inherent in planning CH highlighted in the theoretical part of this thesis can be reinforced and mitigated by the way the state, in this case municipal authorities, govern it. In Berlin, since 2008, STATTBAU is mandated by the Senate to offer free advice and connect interested individuals/groups to each other and to actors of the housing industry as well as help them find a plot of land (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 7; S2). Through the Netzwerkagentur, they also support the development and implementation of project ideas.

Key instruments to that end are the regular publications they issue, that usually entail a contextualisation in the Berlin context, a step-by-step guide on how to plan a project and a presentation of model case projects. In the past 10 years, 4 such brochures were released, with different thematic focuses and target audiences. The first one, published in 2012 (and re-edited in 2015), was intended for "everyone who is interested in a housing project (STATTBAU, 2015, p. 11). Beyond examples of successful CH projects in Berlin, it contained guidelines on how to choose the ownership form, an overview of the different steps of the process, a list of experts

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[11] This is a result of CH's history in Berlin, and can be observed today for example in the status of cooperatives as pioneers of cluster apartments in the city (and elsewhere) (STATTBAU & Wohnbund, 2019).

[12] "There, too, we have the opportunity to offer housing to people who perhaps don't have a loan or so much money on the side".

to reach out to as a building group. The 2016 brochure 'Berliners build social neighbourhoods' introduced the topic of CH for rent and its specificities in terms of planning and organisation (how can a group convince partners such as state-owned housing associations and cooperatives to collaborate), as well as rental contracts. It also pointed to further events organised by STATTBAU to inspire and guide interested groups, or help them organise themselves in a group (pp. 73-89). Three years later, in 2019, it produced another brochure with a focus on community living in clusters (STATTBAU & Wohnbund, 2019). Given the novel nature of clusters, a lot of organisational, legal or contractual questions were open and had to be dealt with, such as how do you organise a cluster? Do you rent it to an association or individual rental contracts?(S2). Thus, in addition to highlighting 4 pioneer projects in Berlin, the brochure contains a practical guide for the planning, construction and organisation of cluster housing. It exposed different cluster variants, different conciliable ownership and organisation forms, different rental models, key components of the planning process (including participation), the points that deserve attention in designing cluster apartments, the existing funding that can be claimed and even how to organise living together. Finally, the latest brochure released in 2021 is entirely dedicated to community projects for rent and primarily addresses "the professional community - housing construction companies, cooperatives and project developers who will shape Berlin to a special degree in the coming years" (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 51).

In addition to these brochures, they also provide free first advice to interested groups and individuals as well as potential cooperation partners for CH projects and building communities (such as state-owned and private housing companies and housing cooperatives) (STATTBAU, 2022). Beyond this first advice, they direct interested parties to further CH experts through providing them with a pool of experts from which CH initiatives can choose their partners (ibid.). Next to that, they regularly organise events, such as guided tours of existing CH projects (both online on their youtube channel and live) or Friday cafes aimed at disseminating information about CH and enabling exchanges between interested parties, such as most recently on the topic of communal living the neighbourhoods being built in Berlin. Finally, some other events are reserved to specialists. In the past few years, key themes of such specialist salons were cluster apartments in 2018 and CH for rent in 2022.

Dissemination of information, through brochures, events or initial advice is crucial to making CH more inclusive (at house level) and to ensure its self-governance, as it to some extent contributes to building lay people's confidence that they can organise their own self-organised, user-oriented project. At the same time, in the past few years, these communication efforts seem to have been increasingly targeted at big, professional actors, which raises

concerns for self-governance and inclusivity of CH. Moreover, despite it being a key instrument of municipalities given its low cost (Ache & Fedrowitz, 2012), focusing efforts on building up understanding does not suffice in the current context of land scarcity and increasing complexity, as the MHS podcast made clear (2021). Unsurprisingly, if part of an austerity policy strategy, such efforts are bound to fail to support the production of CH commons.

4.2.2 Berlin as a coordinator

4.2.2.1. Norm activation

Although STATTBAU is bound to neutrality in its counselling function, meaning that they do not attempt to influence e.g. the ownership form taken by a given project (S2; STATTBAU, 2022), their activities do not merely have informative ends. Their efforts are also targeted at activating norms that promote CH while aligning with Berlin's political objectives, which shapes the orientation of CH in Berlin. Thus, STATTBAU's brochures and events aim to upscale CH, among others through convincing certain actors to jump on board. As an interviewee put it "we hope that through the good examples displayed in our brochures and the regular working group meetings we organise with housing companies (...) as well as through other events, an awareness is going to emerge and push big companies to support the theme" (S2). This highlights the crucial role of exemplary, or model CH projects in Berlin's strategy and their communication by STATTBAU through its brochures and events over the ten past years. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs, these are examined to identify the norms activated by the city (and their evolution), before these norms impact on commoning of CH is reviewed.

<u>Theme 1 - Living in community in private dwellings</u>

Back in 2012, before land scarcity became an acute problem in Berlin, the main audience of STATTBAU's brochures were building groups. In its 2012 brochure 'Living in a community: From the idea to the collaborative house' (updated in 2015), STATTBAU displayed 15 project case studies, most of them resident-owned projects completed between 2007 and 2014. Openness to the neighbourhood was not yet a strong norm in the brochure, which described CH as being characterised by "the desire for living as a community in private dwellings, along with ecological construction, communal areas and social cohesion"(STATTBAU, 2015, p. 11).

Theme 2 - Social neighbourhood

The norm that CH projects should be integrated in and offer benefits to their neighbourhood was however already discussed in 2012 at a professional symposium dedicated to the topic of CH's contribution to 'social neighbourhoods' (STATTBAU, 2012). It was brought further in 2014 by a competition for new cooperative constructions on the theme of 'Generational living - living in community' which rewarded a cooperative for its exemplary character, which was driven by its openness to the neighbourhood and contribution to an integrated city district (SenSBW, 2014). In 2016, CH projects' openness to and contribution to the neighbourhoods was the theme of a brochure by STATTBAU entitled 'Berliners build social neighbourhoods', which can be regarded as activating it as a norm. The brochure highlighted some state services that could be assumed by CH citizens (2016, p. 10; p. 76[13]). The goal of affordable housing was also formulated for CH (p. 11). Along the same line, at the end of 2018, a competition launched by the Senate rewarded projects that successfully contributed to strengthening community in and revitalising their neighbourhood with a one-off grant for the development of their community spaces (SenSBW & STATTBAU, 2019, p. 7; p. 17). Finally, this norm was also highlighted in STATTBAU's 2019 brochure on cluster apartments and its 2021 brochure on CH for rent (STATTBAU & Wohnbund, 2019, p. 6; STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 8; p. 12). Key strategies for CH projects' openness to the neighbourhood are the integration of social service providers and the presence of public rooms on the ground floor of the building (STATTBAU & Wohnbund, 2019).

Theme 3 - CH for rent with coops and SOHC to foster social mixing

The interview conducted with an employee from STATTBAU revealed 2 of its key interrelated themes in the last years, which are also politically supported in Berlin politics, are: 1) cooperative construction and CH for rent and 2) inclusion of people with low income (S2). Starting in 2010 but especially in the past 3-4 years, Berlin's focus has shifted away from ownership-oriented to rental-oriented CH against the background of the increasing scarce

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[13] "A lot of tasks can be trusted in voluntary hands. In times of tight communal budgets and increasing costs for accommodation, care and neighbourhood development, CH projects can represent an important contribution to the activation of neighbourly self-help and citizen engagement, as well as the stabilisation of neighbourhoods, and therefore also relieve the communes and housing firms" (STATTBAU, 2016, p. 10).

availability of affordable housing room (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 7; p. 12; p. 14; S2[14]). It aims to give "people with low incomes the possibility to take part in CH" (S2).

This attention to rental CH can already be noticed in STATTBAU's 2016 Brochure Berliners build social neighbourhoods. For the first time, the majority of model projects highlighted in the brochure were not (partly) resident-owned (only 4 were) but models offering safeguards from the market. This represents a deliberate shift away from ownership-oriented, increasingly professional building communities (p. 44). Housing associations and cooperatives are designated as key actors in the coming years (p. 7; p. 76), and arguments are presented to convince them to take up the theme of CH for rent and people wishing to live in community to consider a partnership with them (pp. 77-9).

This focus on public housing associations and cooperatives can also be found in STATTBAU's 2019 brochure on cluster apartments, in which they are designated as especially important actors to "rethink and integrate more CH concepts into their new housing construction"(p. 74). The shift of attention to rental housing is visible in their exclusive display of examples that are rental projects (p. 9). In this context, special attention is also paid to the advantages of including residents' participation in the planning phase and on ways to achieve inclusivity in such projects, no matter the ownership model (p. 43; pp. 48-9).

Finally, STATTBAU's most recent brochure (December 2021), entitled Community housing for rent: A concept for rental to groups in Berlin, openly aims to lift the CH theme out of the field of ownership (ibid., p. 5). It points to state owned housing associations as key targets of the brochure given "their political mission of developing social neighbourhoods" and significant involvement in the development of Berlin's new city districts (Stattbau & SenSBW, 2021, p. 7). Here again, they insist on their support for a planning culture based on resident participation (such as in the Lynarstraße project), although it is recognised that opportunities for participation might be limited (p. 42). Such collaborations make CH available to people with lower incomes or who cannot easily access bank loans (e.g. retired people) (A1).

The spread of this norm has so far achieved limited success as "only" 10 rental CH projects have been completed so far (S2). However, the interviewee from STATTBAU stressed that a point of awareness has been reached both within cooperatives and SOHC that implementing CH is doable and also advantageous, partly also thanks to the institutional

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[14] "And because of the escalation here in Berlin, the price increase and the housing shortage, it is important that low-income earners and especially single parents have a particularly hard time in the housing market in Berlin, but also old people who are not creditworthy. If they want to live together, they should be allowed to participate. That is important".

structures set up by STATTBAU, which will be described in the next section (S2). Nevertheless, this positive picture was to some extent tempered by statements by other interviewees on the hesitation of SOHA (S1, L2, see above) to build CH, and cooperatives' reluctance to expand their stock (A2, S2). STATTBAU's representative recognised that efforts must be pursued to convince big, traditional cooperatives (which are also as a rule more conservative) to build CH and include participatory processes in their planning (S2). For an interviewee active on the cooperative scene in Berlin, however, this is unlikely to happen as traditional cooperatives, which have the largest stock, are reluctant to work with hereditary land rights given their critical perspective on the state, and with exploding building costs, the risk is currently too high (A2).

Theme 4 - Cluster apartments

A fourth theme pioneered by cooperatives but which was taken on by STATTBAU and the Senate around 2018 is that of cluster apartments. It has been promoted over other forms of CH by the city, notably in a dedicated brochure, on the following grounds. First, given the greater restriction of private space it fosters in comparison with most CH forms in Berlin, it also enables a more efficient use of space and therefore affordable housing (STATTBAU & Wohnbund, 2019, p. 6; pp. 19-20). Moreover, as already mentioned, this restrained use of space creates a surplus that can be transferred to community spaces in the framework of subsidised housing (p. 8). However, the kitchenette and bathroom present in all individual units ensure a good balance between private and common life, which is more appealing to most citizens than shared apartments. Additionally, a key element of cluster apartments is that they are built to allow for flexibility and adaptation by the next residents (S2). For these reasons, cluster apartments are considered as particularly innovative by the Senate, which justifies why they were also supported as part of the SIWA programme (S1[15]).

Summing it up: betting on the power of examples

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[15] "'(Communal living) still has something innovative about it because most people live in their own flats and, for example, the topic of cluster flats is something that has increasingly come up here in Berlin in recent years. There is a difference between living in a cooperative and somehow going to the neighbourhood meeting place on the ground floor. Or in a cluster flat, where I only have one room for myself and then simply share the rest with everyone else".

Thus, STATTBAU and through it, the Senate, extensively rely on model projects to activate norms for CH in Berlin. The promotion of projects as examples to follow happens not only in brochures, but also in urban development model projects such as the SIWA, whose aim is to develop experience to be replicated in standard procedures and to build up the trust of actors like Berlin's promotional bank (A1, S1). The norms propagated today echo to a large extent the vision of CH commons: intentional community, resident participation, inclusion and mixity of residents (much more so than in 2012), openness to the neighbourhood, scaling up ambitions, and increasingly decommodification of housing. However, the emphasis put by S2 on STATTBAU's efforts to convince big actors to engage with CH through the diffusion of positive examples suggests it is a key element of Berlin's upscaling strategy, which supports a qualification of the city's approach to promoting CH as rather liberal. This liberal perspective will be further examined in section 4.2.4 of this chapter, as a disabling factor of the commons.

4.2.2.2. Institutional structures

Another crucial role of Stattbau is to build formal or informal, punctual or durable institutional structures to connect the different actors in the CH field. For example, STATTBAU runs several local 'Wohntische', which are regular meeting places for people interested in CH and whose purpose it is to act as a catalyst for the creation of new projects (S2). It also organises experience exchanges between CH projects, such as on their neighbourhood facilities (SenSBW & STATTBAU, 2019, p. 34). In the past, they have also invited banks, financial institutes and foundations to take part in discussions on the topic of financing CH as part of a working group, to build their willingness to lend to projects (S2[16]).

Today, one function that STATTBAU sees as central to its work is the mediation between prospective CH residents and the housing industry, housing associations and private owners (Stattbau & SenSW, 2021, p. 9). Most recently, in the framework of their efforts to build partnerships with municipal housing associations described above, they successfully connected 6 groups of people interested in CH to land-owned housing associations (the GESOBAU, DEGEBO and GEWOBAG, STADT UND LAND), which agreed to offer one of their apartments to groups, to build community spaces for them and to organise some extent of participatory processes to give them a voice in the development of the apartment (S2; A1;

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[16] "At that time there weren't so many... it wasn't so clear at the banks what building groups are or can do. So there was another working group with the financial institutions, with banks, with foundations".

examples in the brochures). To systematise these efforts, they founded a working group called 'CH for rent' in 2019, composed of representatives of state housing companies, representatives of politics and administration, as well as engaged citizens defending the interests of Berlin's residents who strive to live in community. In several meetings and workshops, the different problems and challenges facing the realisation of community living forms for rent were identified. The cooperatives were invited to share their experience with the representatives of SOHA, to convince them of the feasibility of CH for rent (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021, p. 9; S2[17]). The outcome of these efforts was the elaboration of a process that systematised the experiences made by single projects on questions such as legal forms, how to involve inhabitants in the project and rental contract rules, to facilitate the integration of rental CH projects in new construction projects (p. 14). Moreover, to convince big actors such as municipal housing associations to offer CH, STATTBAU proposed to take over some tasks along this process, such as the mediation between the landlords and groups, the pre-selection of groups and using its network to avoid vacancy in such CH (STATTBAU & SenSBW, 2021; S2).

Such efforts are significant for the development of CH commons as they give big, professional actors a key role in their production. For instance, the outcome of the working group is a substantially top-down process, in which construction companies choose the groups that move in. This has implications for self-governance and, in cases where these actors are municipal housing associations, independence from the state, which are both crucial to the creation and reproduction of true commons. At the same time, given the scarcity of affordable land, it has imposed itself as the only available option to realise CH's social justice orientation (S2).

4.2.3 Increasing requirements

The observation of concept procedures' complexity reflects a broader trend in Berlin's governance of CH, one of increasingly high requirements which harm non-professional actors's ability to access land and establish a CH initiative independently. These hard-to-meet requirements arise from the fact that professionalisation is expected by the Senate (S2). Professionals are indeed perceived by the senate as key allies in meeting its primary goals of

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[17] "When they hear from another housing association: "Yes, you can do it and yes, it is compatible with renting and it's not so complicated if you have someone else to support you". They believe it. When *we* say that, they don't believe us".

building cheap housing, quickly and at scale. Beyond concept procedures, this expectation is also palpable in subsidy schemes' requirements. Indeed, different interviewees emphasised that the Senate's funding schemes are ill-suited to cluster apartments, and more even to the mixing of residents with and without entitlement to housing subsidies. For example, their standard specification for a housing unit is not automatically concialiable with cluster apartments (S1[18]; A2[19]). Experts in the field, such as specialised architects, who have been in business for years "know how to get the maximum funding while integrating communal living in a way that corresponds to the senate's antiquated idea of floor plans" (A2). Against this background, for groups with little experience or insufficient financial resources to hire a project planner or an architect, "the requirements are so high that it has become difficult (...) to participate" (S2). The relevance of this exclusion is exacerbated by the current context of skyrocketing building prices, which increased the reliance of CH projects on state support.

Moreover, this expectation of professionalisation coupled to the Senate's political promise to build cheap, quickly and at scales to address the current housing crisis in Berlin implies that the groups cannot keep up with the required speed in the field of housing (A2[20]; S2[21]). This issue of irreconcilable rhythms between the senate and groups can also be observed in the way the call for projects for SIWA program was conducted. An interview with the Senate's administration revealed that the call was made last-minute, which only gave a chance to developers who already had a concrete, ready project in the pipeline (S1[22]). Moreover, the temporalities of the Senate's budget were presented as practically inconciliable with non professional projects' rhythm: "It is unusual to say "So we give you this money, come back in two years with a nice project and we'll see what you realised on the basis of this program". (...) Normally one cannot freeze some amount of money for 2-3 years and then give it away" (S1).

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[18] "cluster apartments are not automatically conciliable with the funding model, it depends how they are designed"(S1)

[19] they have their standard specifications for housing units and how they have to fund them, and there must be so and so many bathrooms"(A2)

[20] "the rhythm is simply not conciliable with the groups anymore"(A2)

[21] "Berlin is faced by a pressing need to build enormous social housing, notably because of bad past decisions. And this war for land as well as this professionalisation which the Berlin state expects, for example when concept procedures are tendered, it accelerated everything"(S2)

[22] "only the developers who had a really concrete project in mind could apply. That was a bit last minute, the whole thing"(S1)

Thus, the Senate's business-like approach to CH - focused on efficiency and scale - has potentially exclusionary effects and restraints self-governance and community-building of its residents, both of which are time-consuming processes but crucial to the (re)production of CH commons (Helfrich, Knaffl & Meretz, 2019, p. 47). This is in contrast to alternative, more dialogue-oriented governance styles which can for instance be witnessed in Tübingen (S2).

4.2.4 Austerity politics and liberal perspective

The interviews made it clear that although the Senate recognises the potential of CH, it does not rank high in its list of priorities regarding housing, which is topped by the quick, cheap and large-scale construction of new buildings to meet the high demand for affordable housing in the city. The low priority granted to CH by the Senate is first palpable in its civil servant's characterisation of the SIWA simultaneously as a building block of the Senate's support for CH and as "nothing big" (S1). Further, it is obvious in his explanation of the absence of programs specifically dedicated to supporting CH before the SIWA on the grounds that "for 10-15 years, there was no money in Berlin that could generously be distributed. The situation only changed in the past 10 years with better economic development and population growth in the city. That's how we had tax surpluses we could use". This consideration of CH as a cherry on the cake, which the state can only afford supporting when tax surpluses naturally occur is confirmed by S1's statement that the SIWA program would not be repeated as it was generated by tax surpluses which the pandemic put an end to. CH is thought of as something "that could receive more attention if there was more money for it". Moreover, it is associated with "a dot on the i" which the municipal housing associations often do not implement because they focus on their core task of offering cheap housing (S1).

Thus, this cherry on the cake is contrasted to *"the realisation of cheap housing, which is the one, the overarching goal"* (S1). This priority given to "constructing new housing to meet the demand" and to do so cheaply and quickly is also underlined by an employee at a housing cooperative (L1). Another interviewee working in an organisation with the purpose of educating on the cooperative movement, reported the visit of a German MP sitting in the commission for housing, stressing that

> *"all he thought about was "how to build at scales?". The quality of individual small projects is irrelevant to federal politics. The only solutions that matter to federal politics*

are those that can generate 10 000 apartments. And in Berlin, it's actually pretty much the same thing" (A2).

According to her, this need for scales explains the Senate's appeals to organised, professional actors with equity such as old cooperatives: they are the only actors that can construct big blocks, provide numbers (A2[23]).

The consequent timid state support for CH is emphasised by STATTBAU's employee in the following words

> *"though support for CH has been expressed in the coalition agreements of the two last ruling governments of the city and the city supports the counselling centre, there were years when there was no concept procedure, or there was no special funding dedicated specifically to it or community rooms"* (S2).

This profiles the above mentioned subsidies for CH as modest. This recourse to austerity politics vis-à-vis CH was justified by S1 with liberal arguments, which are fuelled by a lack of awareness of the extent of the demand for CH in Berlin and a blind trust in market forces' ability to recognise and willingness to meet demand. Apparently unaware of the above-mentioned survey conducted by STATTBAU in 2021, which exposed the interest of ⅓ of Berliners considering moving in an apartment for rent in cluster apartments, S1 asserted that "most people are okay with having their own apartment" and "maybe not everyone wants to live in a cluster apartment (...) At the end of the day, it's a matter of taste!" (S1). Assuming the liberal ideology underpinning his statement, he added that market players, such as private developers or cooperatives, not the senate, "are the ones who know what the demand is". As a result, he concluded that CH is supported, but not prescribed by the Senate. Such an approach is also visible in S1's recognition that the SIWA program did not enable actors upon disclosure of the call of projects, "to say 'okay, that's the program and to be selected we are going to plan a project'. It wasn't like that".

This half-hearted support of the Senate for CH obviously hinders its production and reproduction as a commons, as it limits state provision of land and financial resources crucial

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[23] "The Senate wants to get the old cooperative to build a new one. That makes total sense from the Senate's point of view. Because they are the financial guarantors that the building projects can be created and financed. They have the organisational history, they have the administrative structure (...). That's why they want to work with existing cooperatives, because only they can potentially afford to build larger blocks. So, so to speak, numbers yes"(A2)

to their emergence as a community and self-governed, non-state and decommodified, social justice oriented alternative to conventional housing. In other words, in today's urban context, by failing to provide affordable land to enable upscaling or appropriate economic support to include low income residents and provide neighbourhood services, the state threatens the capacity of CH to be (re)produced as commons.

4.3 Case study - The Lynarstraße Project

4.3.1 A few words about the project

The house project "Living in community in Wedding" in the Lynarstraße was initiated by 'am Ostseeplatz', a small housing and building cooperative (L2). Since 2018, around 200 tenants spread in 98 units call it their home. Key characteristics of the project are its location right next to the urban railroad tracks in the gentrifying neighbourhood of Wedding, the use of wood as primary building material and the promotion of community living through the organisation of most of its housing units in clusters, meaning that residents live in limited individual surfaces to the benefit of larger shared spaces. The project is especially interesting to analyse in the context of this study as it was selected as a model project to be emulated as part of the 'Experimental multi-story housing in Berlin' program (SIWA), which was qualified as a key program for CH support in Berlin. Consequently, the city subsidised 46 out of the project's 98 housing units, which makes it an interesting case to look at the role of financial resource allocation in the realisation of CH commons. More generally, it was designated as a flagship project by the city, used as a best-practice example in study and official visits by representatives of the Senate as well as STATTBAU's brochures (S1[24]; S2[25]; L2). This points to the project as illustrative of (a building brick of) the vision of the city for CH.

4.3.2 Defining the project as a CH commons

To determine whether at least some of Berlin's flagships projects correspond to CH commons and to get a better understanding of how this conceptual ideal can be translated and contrasted to a concrete CH case, this section analyses the Lynarstraße project along CH commons' 5 defining criteria. The first element of the CH commons, intentional community, is visible architecturally at the level of the clusters which gives rise to automatic exchanges with the neighbours (L1a), as well as more broadly at the project level through the organisation of

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[24] "when I have study groups there or people from other countries who want to see building projects (...) then (the project manager of the Lynarstraße) comes and tells us something.(...) we exchange ideas when I have to show examples of best practice"(S1)

[25] "great projects like the Lynarstraße are too rare!"(S2)

community activities (a flea market), regular meetings in working groups related to different topics of common interest (such as the garden) and the practice of sharing (e.g. a music room, a cargo bike). The impetus for community building was given by the cooperative through the organisation of a series of events early on in the project, such as a barbecue, where interested people and groups could get to know each other and decide who they would live with in a cluster (L2[26], L1a[27]).

The second feature of the CH commons, namely self-governance, is also present through the participation opportunities presented to the future residents during planning (referred to as one of the key characteristics of the project by its project manager), although it is limited by the important decisional power of the leadership of the Ostseeplatz cooperative. The cooperative's members and the project's future residents could shape the project in many ways. These efforts of the cooperative to bring *use value* central stage started before the start of the project, when it ran a survey among its members, inquiring about their interests (L1b). They were most intensive during the co-design of the floor plans by the future residents, who could choose how their apartments would be set up, with whom and where they move in (L3). They continued after completion, through the appointment of an employee of the cooperative as mediator between the cooperative's leadership and the residents (L1a) and the cooperative's agreement to let residents propose a succession in the case of units getting free, instead of imposing the next person on the cooperative's waiting list[28] (L1b). Nevertheless, all but one interviewee involved in the project (L1a, L1b, L2, L3) also stressed the crucial role of the leadership of the cooperative in deciding which direction the house project would take. The project manager highlights that although the cooperative attempts to meet the needs of its members, it is not their only consideration as the demand from non-members for housing is so significant that they will find new residents for their future projects (L1b). As a consequence, in this case, decisions regarding materials used and the building of cluster apartments were reached by the leadership (L2, L1b). Accordingly, one of the interviewees stated

> "95% was predefined. There was not much margin for the future residents. You know the menu, you can choose the toppings, the sauce and so on. You can of course decide

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[26] "Before the planning really started, as far as 1.5 years before (...) a barbecue was organised (...) so that people could get to know each other (...) and through recurring meetings, the different flats, which then found each other more and more, met. And in that way they networked" (L2)

[27] "This pull, when you come to this house, to automatically become part of this movement (...) is really a thing that was made possible by the project development" (L1a)

[28] "The cooperative says yes or no, but in 90% of the cases he says yes. So it's the cluster that suggests the person" (L1b)

who you sit with. But you cannot determine whether it will be vegetarian or vegan. That's on the chef" (L3).

For example, the leadership imposed the mixing of people with and without WBS (certificate of eligibility for subsidised housing) in the clusters. This, however, arose almost naturally and only had to be controlled more extensively by the cooperative for approximately 20% of the clusters (L2).

The third and fourth factors of CH commons, that is non-state status and decommodification, are primarily addressed by the ownership form of the project. It is owned by a cooperative, which has been characterised as an institutional basis for the housing commons (Nonini, 2017, p. 34). Importantly, the option for the residents to buy their unit and thus potentially sell it back on the market was ruled out from its statutes by unanimous vote in the members assembly in 2017, which constitutes a safeguard against speculation and capital accumulation from housing (L1a). One of the founding members of the cooperative however noted the weakness of this safeguard given the existence of court cases which ruled against the legal basis for such moves (A1)[29].

The final and crucial aspect of social justice orientation of the CH commons is equally embodied by the Lynarstraße project in different ways at house, neighbourhood, and city level. Regarding the house level, substantial efforts were made (and paid off!) to bolster inclusivity in the project. This is reflected by the house manager's contention that "in the house, all are integrated, all are full members of the cooperative regardless of their status, their psychiatric illnesses or refugee status" (L1a). These efforts first targeted affordability and social mixing. Affordability/Low rents were described as a key aim of the project, to lower the economic barriers, even for those units that are not subsidised by the Senate (the average rent in the house is 8,5€/m^2), thereby offering housing to all social classes (L1a, L1b). As already mentioned, embedding social mixing into the clusters was a non-negotiable condition set by the leadership of the cooperative, by requiring approximately 50% of the residents to be entitled to subsidies, thereby avoiding segregation or "social cases clusters" (L1a, L1b). Thanks to this, the house includes people who would usually not have access to CH projects[30] (L1a). An evocative example for this is the inclusion of a previously homeless person in one of the clusters (L2).

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[29] This buying option was enshrined in the statutes of the cooperatives because it was founded at a time when the Senate of Berlin supported ownership-oriented cooperatives. This is a departure from the original cooperative idea, of which collective ownership is a cornerstone (A1).

[30] "Here in the house, you won't find the typical clientele that one would expect in such a community project. There are simply milieus who are explicitly looking for something like this and explicitly want a commune-like life, but the people who live in the house are generally not people who want to live in a commune"(L1a)

Then, beyond economic inclusivity, the project also explicitly opened its doors to residents belonging to usually marginalised groups in the context of housing, namely people with special needs and with migration backgrounds (with psychiatric conditions). A collaboration with social associations like the Lebenshilfe and Xenion and a resolve to avoid segregation resulted in these groups being represented in different clusters (L3). Where a tendency to homogeneity can be observed is in the age of the inhabitants of one cluster (L1a). The project also partly addresses the critique of exclusivity formulated against cooperatives that they only cater to the needs of their members. In this case, even though the interests of the cooperative's members received attention, notably through giving priority to those higher up on the waiting list, the project equally translate the cooperative's resolve to serve the public interest, which is obvious in the fact that non-members were informed about the project, invited to apply and ultimately included in the project (L1a[31], L3[32]). This inclusive and common-good orientation can in large part be traced back to the progressive culture in the supervisory board. This culture is fostered by the presence of of different actors from the social field in the board, such as Xenion, whose mission is not to represent the interests of the cooperative's members, but the social values of the cooperatives and the interests of those people whose voice would otherwise not be heard, such as refugees with psychological illnesses (L1b).

Regarding the neighbourhood level, the project manager stressed openness to the neighbourhood as a key aim of the project (L1b). This manifests itself in different ways. First, the needs of the neighbourhood were considered and materialised in the project. These were determined by asking neighbourhood associations and social organisations what kind of installations would serve the neighbourhood. The result of their inquiry was that a kindergarten, an apartment for people with dementia, a Diakonie Station, and a kitchen for homeless people offering some room for a versatile artistic atelier would fulfil that objective (L1b, L2). Today, these installations, be it the kindergarten or the shared apartment for people with dementia are of course meant for the residents of the neighbourhood. An employee from the Diakonie station describes themselves as a local service provider in the neighbourhood, in that they offer care services and represent a connection point to GPs and other health services (L4). Accordingly, these ground floor spaces are meant to "invite people to enter the building", which is an aim which an architectural bureau could not achieve (L1b, L4). This invitation is reinforced by the

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[31] "The project is a mixture of a cooperative approach, i.e. member-oriented, and at the same time opening the focus to the public" (L1a)

[32] "The balance between open participatory and close-shop, cooperative interest had to be maintained, that was the challenge... The kick-off event was public, you could get on the waiting list (...) but you were at the very back of the waiting list... if everyone said yes, you wouldn't have got into the project at all" (L3)

project's architectural openness to the neighbourhood: "we did not want to have a closed-off inner court that keeps the neighbourhood out. The court can be walked in and be owned by the neighbourhood. That happens very much" (L1b). Another facet of the project's openness to the neighbourhood is the care its planners took to communicate transparently on their plans to ensure the neighbours understood what was going on, through reassuring them on the fact they would not build expensive, owner-occupied flats and inviting them to visits of the construction site (L2). Finally, the neighbourhood is also invited to events, such as the topping out ceremony that played out on the street (L2). Nevertheless, despite these efforts, the planner of the project sketches the potentially gentrifying consequences of the project stemming from the demonstration it made that plots in the vicinity of the railway tracks were exploitable (L2). He describes how the street, which used to be a no-go area hosting drugs trafficking, was upgraded since the finalisation of the project:

> "The drugs square no longer exists. There you now have a new building, and here, in the middle, another one is being built. It also looks much more welcoming from the train (...) The plots neighbouring the project have found investors and are being constructed. If the project did not exist, no other buildings would have appeared here, you can see it from the questions we receive from the neighbours regarding how we dealt with the constraint of the closeness to the railway tracks for example (L2).

Lastly, at city level, the cooperative's expansive strategy as well as its resolve to plan projects that not only address the needs of its members but also meet the demand of other (future) citizens echoes core ambitions of housing commons, that is commoning the city. Indeed, am Ostseeplatz has a political agenda to make affordable, needs-oriented housing affordable to more people. To this end, although *"the cooperative could say: we invest all the money that comes into our pockets, our shrinking debts to reduce the rents. Instead, we decide to stabilise the rents and use our profits to offer more cheap housing through making more projects"* (L1b). As noted by an interviewee, this expansive strategy is driven by the leadership of the cooperative rather than the result of self-governance as *"if you asked a cooperative member, there is no doubt that they'd have no interest in new construction projects in Gartenfeld. Why would they do? They already have a roof over their head"* (A1). The key role of the leadership of the cooperatives in this strategy is acknowledged by the house's project manager, who recognises that it *"really depends on the composition of the management as well as the supervisory board"* (L1a). The mission of the supervisory board is not to defend individual interests but those of the common goods. It is reflected in its heterogeneous composition (experts from the construction field, social actors, squatters), meant to ensure a level of

objectivity in the decisions taken (L1b). At the same time, the cooperative's membership is supportive of its strategy, as demonstrated by their unanimous decision to renounce the possibility of buying their own apartment (L1b).

Am Ostseeplatz is building two further CH projects open to the neighbourhoods and with low rents (L1b). In planning these two projects, they include both their experience with the Lynarstraße house and the feedback of its residents. They decided to reproduce participatory processes but in a limited form for the sake of efficiency, asking future residents to choose from already designed floor plans, for example (L1b). In addition, they will include the house residents' preference for reduced private units and more expansive community spaces (L1b). A further consideration in the cooperative's planning of new projects is the inclusion of future residents' needs. This was achieved, in the project at hand, through building adaptable apartments that can be easily modified by their future inhabitants, based on the awareness that *"this house will be there for the next 100 years"* and should be able to meet evolving needs (L1b). Thus, it seems that the cooperative perceives its residents as stewards of affordable housing. Finally, to support the larger-scale development of CH commons, they also actively promote knowledge exchange with other project developers and politicians, who were also invited to visit the construction site (L2).

Thus, the Lynarstraße project evokes a concrete example of CH commons. Its residents form a largely self-governed intentional community, to a large extent thanks to the time and efforts invested at early stages of the project to form the clusters and deliberate on the floor plans. This seems to lend support to Helfrich, Meretz & Knaffl's insistence on the cruciality of (time-)intensive efforts to include everyone's needs in the project to foster identification with it (2019, p. 47). It is worth noting that in the case of CH projects developed by professionalized cooperatives, self-governance can be multi-layered. In other words, the residents' ability to take decisions regarding their home may be constrained by the cooperative's final say on the development of the project, which is a lever for the consideration of neighbourhood and broader society's interests in its design. Moreover, through its non-state status and partly decommodified form, it is to some extent protected from both market and state. Finally, the project achieved high levels of inclusivity at house level, substantial addresses the needs of the neighbourhood and of all present and future city residents through the inclusion of civil society actors in the supervisory board, an expansive strategy by the cooperative adaptable architecture. This expansive strategy is another form of constrain on the self-governance by the members of the cooperative which is 'imposed' to the benefit of common good and to some extent supported by a progressive membership. An interesting development observed in the case of the

Lynarstraße is that, despite the many services it renders to its neighbourhood, its contribution to upgrading it has already driven the apparition of investors in the neighbourhood.

4.3.3. Berlin's role in the development of the Lynarstr. Project as a CH commons

This thesis now turns to the factors that enabled the development of the Lynarstraße project as a practical case of CH commons, how it surmounted obstacles, and the role played by the state in this process. The interest the cooperative took in CH was described by L1 as pretty much disconnected from city governance. It was primarily driven by the many requests received by the cooperative and its close relationship to the squatter's scene (L1a[33], L1b[34]). Another factor mentioned by L1 was the previous experience of the president of the board of directors with cluster apartments in the context of another cooperative project (L1b) as well as the low rents they could achieve through high space efficiency (L1a, L1b). Although the project manager acknowledged that a last (but non-essential) impetus was given by the SIWA program[35], he suggested that even in its absence, the cooperative would have bought the plot and found another way to bring their idea to life (L1b). Thus, they hopped on the CH scene following the Senate's liberal expectations. The same can be said about the cooperative's commoning intentions. That was highlighted by S1, who praised the Ostseeplatz: *"it's an exemplary actor! (...) They did it on their own initiative. They planned a heterogeneous house from the very beginning, with a large diversity of residents and social organisations"* (S1). The important role of the cooperative's leadership, which was already outlined, was also stressed by STATTBAU's employee: *"you simply have the right people in the decision-making positions on the directors' board. They have a mission, they want to build socially just housing, and to realise it they are willing to take more time by involving their members in planning and to work with housing subsidies"* (S2).

For the translation of these motives into a CH commons project, many of the hurdles and challenges that presented themselves were surmounted with limited state intervention thanks to the cooperative's experience, professional nature and connections. First, the greatest obstacle in the realisation of CH projects in the past years, that of finding a plot of land, was overcome without state intervention and thus without participation in a concept procedure. The Ostseeplatz cooperative could buy the plot in the Lynarstraße at a low price given its location

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[33] "They said let's realise this now to create a project that addresses all the requests we receive" (L1a)
[34] "Given this demand, we have no doubt regarding the fact that we will find people" (L1b)
[35] "(on top of our existing interest), there was a subsidy from Berlin to build experimental buildings, so we said 'okay, let's just try these clusters'" (L1a)

in very close proximity to the S-Bahn tracks, to an industrial area as well as owing to its shape deemed difficult to build. That is a risk the cooperative could afford to take thanks to its professional expertise and experience. Indeed, with this plot came key difficulties which the cooperative and the planners had to deal with. For instance, to be awarded a building permit, they had to get the Deutsche Bahn's approval, which was conditional on the project guaranteeing a certain level of noise protection (L1, L2).

Second, the cooperative's experience and professional resources also reduced its reliance on the technical support and institutional structures offered by the state. This was emphasised by the project manager's statements that *"the cooperative's board of directors, which envisioned this project, has been doing this job for 20 years"* and *"did not have to be advised by the state"* (L1b). For instance, the size of the clusters and their malleable nature raised questions regarding fire protection, which were resolved by the project planners hired by the cooperative (L1b; L2). Furthermore, they were able to involve the residents in planning their future home by hiring a befriended professional mediator whose role it was to take care of individual cases and questions. That would not have been manageable by the cooperative leadership or the planners/architects as they were overloaded with other responsibilities, dealing with the complicated process of receiving permits, communicating with the bank, and solving issues of funding (L3[36]). The cooperative's network was also exploited when it came to opening discussions with social associations for the ground floor, such as the Diakonie and the Lebenshilfe (L4, L1b). The project's timeline and the absence of any reference to the city-disseminated norms (social neighbourhood, rental/inclusivity, clusters) suggest their limited influence on the project's openness to the neighbourhood, inclusivity, or community-orientation. Quite on the contrary, STATTBAU's advertising of the project in its brochures and inviting the cooperative to share its experience suggests that the Lynarstraße project shaped STATTBAU's norms, such as its promotion of clusters apartments as an especially promising form and its determination of cooperatives as key allies for the development of a common-good oriented CH.

However, the significance of the Senate's support in *enabling* (as opposed to prompting) some of the communing objectives of the project was recognised by both its planner and its manager. L1 highlighted the crucial role of the Senate's subsidies in realising their inclusive

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[36] "the cooperative Am Ostseeplatz and the architects could not even think about these detail questions. (…) They had many issues and actors to deal with, including the city, the bank, the tender, the construction companies, and so even though they wanted to offer this participatory opportunity, they could not communicate with the people who wanted to move in" (L3)

vision for the house project: *"We wanted to create mixity, and we were able to thanks to the SIWA support"* (L1b). Moreover, he underlined that barriers to membership in the cooperative were lowered by the Senate's subsidies for cooperative shares (L1a). However, working with state subsidies to some extent added a layer of complexity to the realisation of the project, which had to be met by a certain level of expertise. In the case of the Lynarstraße project, it was successfully managed by the Ostseeplatz as it is staffed by a professional tasked with examining funding conditions and with designing eligible projects (L1b). Despite this and prior experience with integrating subsidised housing in their projects (L1b), several interviewees underlined the complexity of accessing funding: *"Some of the bureaucracy is hell, especially when it comes to financing, every flat has to be proven exactly and then you have to deliver documents"* (L1b). That prompted a few prospective residents to *"quit the project because they did not believe in the bureaucracy"* (L3). The cooperative's intention to mix residents with and without entitlement to subsidies, which is hindered by funding requirements, further complicated matters and required consulting a tenancy lawyer (L1b). Thus, this seems to support the observation that the city's demanding requirements impose a high level of expertise.

In this case, the hard-to-meet requirements were mitigated by the fact that the project benefitted from a special status as innovative and outspokenly supported by the Senate. As a result, the Senate put much less obstacles in its way as it would in a normal situation (L2[37]). This was confirmed by L1b, who described the cooperative's relationship to the Senate as one of good collaboration. He added that the Senate *"understood what we were doing, and they also tried to find solutions despite high bureaucratic hurdles"* (L1b). However, this relationship from equal to equal was probably facilitated by the fact that the senate and the cooperative speak the same language. Indeed, the cooperative understands itself as *"a businessman with the heart of a left activist, of a squatter"*, conducting *"wacky projects with good commercial management"* that can guarantee the economic security of its projects (L1b). The unique character of both this program (it was discontinued) and the combination of a commoners' heart with businessman's hands defining the cooperative (noted by L1[38]) raises doubts as to the generalisability of such a facilitating attitude of the state to other CH commons projects.

Nevertheless, the cooperative's commoning intentions at the city level through expansion of its stock is clearly supported by Berlin's land policies. Indeed, the two projects it

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[37] L2: The Senate had said "we support it!" and so they did not put too many obstacles in the way.
[38] "I think we're more special in that sense"(L1b)

is currently planning according to the same principles as the Lynarstraße[39] are both located in new urban quarters, where 25% of the stock has been reserved to cooperatives through zoning (SenSBW, 2022b). By doing so, the state Berlin supports the partial decommodification and long-term affordability of housing in the city, which are key aims of the (collaborative) housing commons. However, this expansion seems to be informed more by the experience the Ostseeplatz built in the framework of the Lynarstraße project than the institutionalization of a formalised process for CH for rent (L1).

To conclude on the impact of state governance on communing in the case of the Lynarstraße project, it seems not to have played a significant role in the cooperative's decision to engage in their production. Moreover, the cooperative acquired land and knowledge resources in other ways than through Berlin. However, the availability of a special subsidies program to support innovative construction as well as subsidies for cooperative shares played an important part in fulfilling the inclusivity purpose of the project, although that required massive (professional) efforts on the side of the cooperative. The Senate also explicitly supported the development of the project by restraining from putting any spoke in the cooperative's wheels, which reflects its trust in the cooperative, which is likely derived from its professional character. Despite state funding for and land allocated to the expansion of cooperative and CH housing in the city's new neighbourhoods and the resolve of the cooperative to reproduce the Lynarstraße concept, the inclusivity prospects of the future projects may be threatened by austerity politics, especially palpable in post-COVID Berlin.

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[39] although with less intensive participatory processes and smaller individual spaces to the benefit of common spaces, with possible consequences for self-governance and community within the project (L1b, L3).

Chapter 6: Conclusions

This thesis set out to uncover in which ways city governance supports and hinders commoning in collaborative housing in Berlin. Several exploratory conclusions related to this question could be derived from the analysis of strategy, policy and communication official documents as well as 9 semi-structured interviews with state actors, collaborative housing developers and activists. Through its governance approach to (collaborative) housing and the diverse instruments it uses to achieve its political aims in the field, the state of Berlin impacts the development of CH as a commons in many, sometimes ambivalent ways.

First, Berlin's decommodified and common-good oriented model of land allocation should in theory favour the emergence and preservation of CH commons projects. However, in practice, the complexity of the concept procedure for accessing plots as well as the scarce and poor nature of remaining plots entail high barriers for groups with limited time and expertise. As such, it hampers the emergence of inclusive, self-governed CH projects and tarnishes the prospects of commoning housing more broadly. The city's parallel efforts to incentivise its communal housing associations to include CH projects in their stock have yielded rather timid results so far but will likely yield more fruit in the future. Although this development represents a chance for inclusivity, and to some extent gives self-governance opportunities to the residents, these remain limited and insertion in state housing stock exposes CH projects to potential privatisation.

Second, the Senate's allocation of financial resources to the promotion of common spaces for citizens entitled to housing subsidies, supports the expansion of the non-commodified cooperative housing stock in the city, and lowers the barriers for low income citizens to live in a cooperative apartment positively impacts the affordability and thus inclusivity of CH commons. Moreover, Berlin's funding of the expansion of cooperative stock favours the upscaling of a partly decommodified form of CH, and thus its inclusivity at city level. Additionally, subsidies for cooperative membership shares enhance its inclusivity at house level.

Third, technical support and knowledge sharing is crucial to making CH more inclusive (at house level) and to ensure its self-governance. However, it has a limited impact in a context of land scarcity and increasing complexity. The same can be said about norm activation. The city's strategy of advertising model projects do promote the vision of CH commons: intentional

community, resident participation, inclusion and mixity of residents (much more so than in 2012), openness to the neighbourhood, scaling up ambitions, and increasingly decommodification of housing. However, this is a rather liberal strategy whose effects might be limited if not supported by financial and land provision.

Then, the city's coordination efforts, by giving big, professional actors a key role in the production of the commons, has negative implications for self-governance and, in cases where these actors are municipal housing associations, independence from the state, which are both crucial to the creation and reproduction of true commons. This focus on professional actors, which results in higher requirements for participation in housing production, reveals a business-like approach to CH - focused on efficiency and scale. By imposing time stress on commoning processes, it has potentially exclusionary effects and restraints self-governance and community-building of its residents. This is in contrast to alternative, more dialogue-oriented governance styles which can for instance be witnessed in Tübingen.

Finally, the austerity politics to which CH is subjected hinders its production and reproduction as a commons, as it limits state provision of land and financial resources crucial to their emergence as a community and self-governed, non-state and decommodified, social justice oriented alternative to conventional housing. In other words, in today's urban context, by failing to provide affordable land to enable upscaling or appropriate economic support to include low income residents and provide neighbourhood services, the state threatens the capacity of CH to be (re)produced as commons.

However, the Senate's support for professional actors, such as the Ostseeplatz, can significantly promote the production and expansion of CH commons. This strategy is, however, largely limited by self-initiative from these actors and their support by financial resources, which has been decreased in line with the city's austerity politics.

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Volume II: Interview transcripts

Volume II can be consulted through the author or the supervisor.

Annex

Annex 1 - Example of the outcome of data processing.

Code	*Type*	Description	Example from data
Interest in CH - demand	*Deductive*	The demand received/perceived by the cooperative for CH is described.	"(die Genossenschaft) hat in den letzten Jahre mit Gruppen gearbeitet die diese Gemeinschaftlich gesucht haben und regelmäßig Anfragen gehabt von externen Gruppen, Baugruppen, die die eG gefragt haben ob die eG bereit war neubau zu machen und da wurde sozusagen dieses Thema Cluster-/gemeinschaftliches wohnen wahrgenommen"(L1a)
Intentional community	*Inductive*	Reference to close relationships between the residents of the project.	"Und dann ist es halt wie gesagt immer wiederkehrende treffen haben sich dann die unterschiedlichen Wohnung die sich dann immer mehr und mehr gefunden haben getroffen. Und dass die untereinander auch vernetzt werden" (L2)
Self-governance	*Inductive*	The extent and/or form taken by self-governance, at house or cooperative level, in the design of the project or in the long term, is discussed.	"Gleichzeitig konnte man sich aussuchen Duchen/Badewanne, Farben, mit wem ich mit auf die Etage ziehe, welche Grundrisse möchte ich: ein großes ZImmer oder 2 kleine, wo mach ich die Tür drin? In welchem Ort des Bauwerks wo möchte ich einzihen? Das waren alle MÔglichkeiten die ich mit den besprochen habe" (L3)
Decommodification	*Inductive*	The mechanisms established by the cooperative to safeguard it from market appropriation are discussed.	"die Eigentumsübertragung wurde abgeschafft. Also es gab ein einstimmiges Votum bei der Mitgliederversammlung 2016/17 dass wir uns nicht mehr in Einzel Eigentum aufteilen. Also aus der Satzung raus" (L1a)
Social Justice Orientation - Inclusivity	*Inductive*	The cooperative's resolve not to exclude anyone from its projects (low income, refugees, people with special needs, non-members of the cooperative,…) is expressed.	"wir wollen allen Volksschichten in Berlin eine Wohnung anbieten können. Wir wollen keine Mittelstands Genossenschaft sein."(L1b)
Social Justice Orientation –	*Inductive*	The instruments used by the cooperative to address the	"Die (Gewerbe) wurden mit einer Umfrag im Kiez, um seinen Bedarfen

Neighbourhood's needs		needs of the neighbourhood are highlighted.	festzustellen. Was ist der Bedarf?" (L2)
Social justice orientation - Commoning the city	*Inductive*	The cooperative's resolve to make affordable housing available to all Berliners, is expressed.	"die Gewinne die wir machen, die benutzen wir um weiteren günstige Wohnraum anzubieten"(L1a)
Squatter	*Deductive*	A link is drawn between the cooperative and the squatter scene.	"er hat halt große Kontakte halt auch in die Szene von der Rigaerstraße"(L2)
"Kaufmann"/Prof essional	*In-vivo*	The professionalism and/or business-orientation of the cooperative is stressed.	"die Grundfrage ist: "okay wie sind wir wirtschaftlich abgesichert, wie entsprechen wir die Förderung ... da ist sozusagen die Genese, dh natürlich stößt man auf Probleme aber es ist nicht so "es kommt ein Problem, lösen wir das, sondern nee wir müssen gewisse Dinge sicherstellen wie stellen wir die sicher"(L1b) "Richard ist so einer der Verkaufmänner" (L3)
Experience & network	*Deducutive*	The way the experience and the network of the cooperative and facilitated the success of the project are evoked.	"Der Vorstand der Genossenschaft der das hier projektiert hat, der macht den Job seit 20 Jahren, also der hat viel mit diesem Thema zu tun gehabt, auch mit Stattbau gearbeitet" (L1b)
Top-down	*Deductive*	The importance role of the leadership of the cooperative in decision-making is stressed.	"Also die Planning war natürlich, 95% war einfach definiert. Es gab keine große Spielraum für die Menschen die eingezogen sind. Du kennst das Menu, du kannst die Toppings aussuchen, die Sauce oder so. Du kannst natürlich entscheiden mit wem möchte ich am Tisch sitzen. Aber du kannst jetzt nicht entscheiden ob es vegetarisch oder vegan sein wird. Das enstcheidet der Chef" (L3)
Exceptional	*Deductive*	The exception represented by the cooperative is emphasised.	"das unterscheidet sie auch von den anderen Genossenschaften die zur gleichen Zeit entstanden sind. Die sind überwegend in ihrem Bestand geblieben. Haben wenig dazu gekauft, wenig Entwicklung" (A1)
Challenges - Plot	*Deductive*	The difficulties that arose from the difficult plot of the Lynarstraße are explained.	"es war sozusagen ein schwieriges Gemengelage, weil es ein sehr schmales Grundstück ist und es eine starke Nähe zu den S-Bahn-Gleise und zum Industriegebiet gibt" (L1b).
Relationship to the state - Enabling	*Inductive*	The ways in which state intervention enabled the creation of commons are discussed.	"Die Genossenschaftsanteile sind in dem Bereich die für alle Menschen finanzierbar sind. Also selbst das Amt übernimmt die Genossenschaftsanteile weil es mehr ist wie eine Kaution bei uns"(L1a)

Relationship to the state – Model function	*Deductive*	The model function of the project from the perspective of the state is expressed.	"Lynarstraße als "eines der Vorzeigeprojekte geworden dieses ganzen Programm" (S1)
Relationship to the state – "Own initiative"	*In-vivo*	The spontaneous common good orientation of the cooperative is emphasized.	"die das aus sich aus so machen. Die haben das ganze Haus vom vorder an sehr heterogen geplant mit viel verschieden Bewohner und soziale Träger" (S1)

Jonniaux (2022)

Note: This table is based on the following <u>miro</u> board, where all quotes are classified per theme.