UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA

DIPARTIMENTO DI FILOSOFIA, SOCIOLOGIA, PEDAGOGIA E PSICOLOGIA APPLICATA

CORSO DI LAUREA IN SCIENZE FILOSOFICHE

Seeing Pink Elephants:
A phenomenological assessment of the debate concerning visual hallucinations between philosophy of mind and psychiatry

Relatore:
Ch.mo Prof. Andrea ALTOBRANDO

Laureanda:
Laura OPPI
Matricola n. 2039804

ANNO ACCADEMICO 2022/2023

Ich habe mein Leben lang die Realität gesucht

E. Husserl

TABLE OF CONTENT

Introduction

1. INTRODUCTION

The challenge that illusions and hallucinations raise is so crucial that it directly affects numerous questions for every theory of perception in psychiatry, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind, including the nature of perceptual experience, and how we perceive the external world. As soon as we hear someone talking about 'hallucinations' we think we know exactly what they are talking about. In ordinary everyday language, the first things that usually come to our mind when we hear the word “hallucination” are probably related to mental disorders, drugs, or hallucinogens, up to what we are used to seeing in film and cultural representations. Although the phenomenology of hallucinations is considerably more complicated than that, we tend to conceive of them as being in a scenario similar to the one in ‘The Matrix’.

It happens almost spontaneously and immediately: we think we know what it would be like to have a hallucination, even though in fact we have probably never experienced one. This is because when we think about hallucinations, we usually rely on our “naïve apprehension” and intuitive understanding of what they might look like. Even if the idea of hallucinations appears to work, this “naivety” can serve as a starting point for phenomenology to help us clarify what we are talking about when we talk about hallucinations.

Hallucinations are a universal phenomenon widely found, and, depending on their nature, they can be traced back to research areas ranging from religious[1], artistic[2], cultural, or anthropological considerations to rigorous psychiatric classifications within medicine. Although almost always singular and unpredictable, the hallucinatory content is often influenced by a number of factors, such as gender or the environment from which the subject comes.

Such confusion that we find in everyday language is mirrored in a lack of clarification and a proliferation of terms in contemporary debates that analyze hallucinations as a part of what is known as the 'Problem of Perception'. The purpose of this master's thesis is to clarify the understanding of hallucinations in many of the opposing positions in the panorama of contemporary philosophy of mind by arguing that perceptions and hallucinations are mental events of different kinds in some respects.

Furthermore, since hallucinations and perceptions are often referred to as *subjectively distinguishable* or *indistinguishable*, I would like to deepen the role of the subject as well. When we say that in a hallucinatory state it is not subjectively possible to distinguish between perception and hallucination, what does that 'subjectively' mean? In what situation is it possible to distinguish or not *subjectively*? There are many ways in which it can be expressed. One thing would be to say that the subject is not able to understand through introspection alone if he is perceiving or hallucinating something, since he can also have difficulties reflecting on the content of what he is experiencing. This is why the other purpose of this master's thesis is to determine whether the subject who

[1] For more about religious hallucinations see: Bhavsar, V., & Bhugra, D. (2008); Mohr, S., & Pfeifer, S. (2009); Suhail, K., & Ghauri, S. (2010); Gearing, R. E., Alonzo, D., Smolak, A., McHugh, K., Harmon, S., & Baldwin, S. (2011); Reed, P., & Clarke, N. (2014).

[2] Such as the one that originated the Munch's famous 'scream'. To quote what he said: «I was walking along the road with two of my friends. Then the sun set. The sky suddenly turned into blood, and I felt something akin to a touch of melancholy. I stood still, leaned against the railing, dead tired. Above the blue-black fjord and city hung clouds of dripping, rippling blood. My friends went on and again I stood, frightened with an open wound in my breast. A great scream pierced through nature» (Heller 1972, p. 109).

experiences hallucinations and perceptions can distinguish between the two and whether it is possible to assert that the subject can *in principle* not distinguish hallucinations and perceptions.

Due to constraints of space and time, I haven't specifically addressed the issues regarding the role of beliefs and of the cognitive–phenomenological assessment of hallucinations. However, although often dismissed from contemporary debates, they remain a topic of considerable importance to be explored in future discussions or analyses.

The first chapter will be an introduction to the terms in use in the debate and which I will take up in my thesis. The first three parts, namely veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations, refer to core definitions that grounds and that I will take for granted in the development of this thesis. I have nuanced the definition of hallucination according to almost every existing contemporary usage in an attempt both to clarify the state of the art in this regard and to begin to highlight the complexity of the phenomenon. Despite the various nuances, in this thesis I will mainly refer to philosophical hallucinations, psychiatric hallucinations, unmasked hallucinations, and memory-based hallucinations.

In the second chapter I will focus on hallucinations' understanding in the current philosophical debate in philosophy of mind. The discussions in philosophy as well as the advancement of new scientific techniques to investigate the nature of hallucinations have both contributed to the hallucinations' growing importance. I will examine how various advocates of the Common Kind Conception (CKC), such as sense-data theorists, advocates of advertising and representation, as well as some advocates of disjunctivism, address the case of hallucinations. Very roughly, it is possible to say that the conjunctivist and the disjunctivist positions disagree with respect to defining the nature of hallucinatory and perceptual experience. As the first chapter underlines, on the one hand, disjunctivism denies and, on the other, conjunctivism endorses that hallucinations and veridical perceptions can be experiences of the same fundamental kind. What they both seem to agree on is that the subject is unable to distinguish between a veridical perception and a hallucination.

Since the first chapter's presentation of conjunctivism and disjunctivism is a theoretical construction that relies on empirical phenomena, the psychiatric analysis of hallucinations in the Third Chapter will help us better understand their nature. The examination of the evolution of the

hallucinatory symptom in psychiatry serves two purposes: on the one hand, I think it's important to demonstrate the phenomenon's empirical foundation; on the other hand, I want to call attention to the fact that there is not a clear description that can effectively capture the intricacy of the hallucinatory experience. Therefore, I will consider how the term "hallucination" was incorporated into the psychiatric medical vocabulary after contextualizing and problematizing hallucinations within the current discussion.

Given the fact that the psychiatric field does not seem to offer any particularly satisfactory or complete answer regarding the understanding of hallucinations, starting from some of Husserl's writings, in the Fourth chapter I will analyze the essential characteristics and the overall structure of perception, imagination, and memory, focusing in particular on the distinction between sensations and phantasmata and on the role played by the Auffassung. More specifically, the Husserlian position and the interpretations put forth by Hopp (2008) and Williford (2013) will provide us with useful resources to comprehend why the Auffassung's role in helping define hallucinations from a phenomenological perspective is so essential. The phenomenological approach exposed in the third chapter will be crucial to deepen the difference between hallucinations and veridical perceptions and bring out the role of subjectivity within perception to explain, as a result, what happens within a hallucinatory process. It will also help us to better determine whether it is really possible to admit that the subject in principle cannot distinguish between hallucinations and veridical perceptions.

In the Fifth Chapter, I will start from the husserlian phenomenological analysis and apply it to the highly debated problem presented in the Second Chapter, i.e., the one underlying the conjunctivist and disjunctivist positions, through some cases of real psychiatric hallucinations. I will stand with a disjunctivist position, arguing that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are not experiences of the same fundamental kind and that if hallucinations and veridical perceptions are to share something, that something might be at most sensory data. I will mainly focus on the case of hallucinations not recognized by the subject as such, on 'unmasked' hallucinations, and on the case of the so-called "illusions on the verge of hallucinations". The analysis of these different types of hallucinations will help us enlighten the main proposal of this thesis, that is to show that the subject is always conscious of more than what he is actually given and how the content of perceptual experience is always surplus to sensory data.

Finally, the Sixth Chapter will focus on the relationship of hallucinations with imagination and memory. The goal of this chapter is primarily to consider possible research directions of these relationships. After elaborating on the sense in which imagination can be discussed in hallucinations, I will move on to address memory and memory errors. I will introduce the discussion on memory and the cases of 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' remembering, I will focus both on the 'successful' remembering of hallucinations and on the 'unsuccessful' remembering of veridical perceptions, namely objectless memory experiences (i.e., those experiences in which the subject does not remember what he is trying to remember), misremembering, and confabulation.

Finally, after describing confabulations as they are understood in the contemporary debate, I will try to understand whether it is possible to consider them phenomenologically similar to hallucinations and, therefore, seek a definition of confabulation as 'hallucination in the past' that considers them related to memory, rather than imagination.

FIRST CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCING THE TERMS IN USE

Hallucinations have long drawn interest and have been widely debated in psychiatry, psychopathology, and philosophy of mind. Especially over the past few years, the topic of hallucinations has become increasingly important as a result of both the philosophical debate concerning representationalism and disjunctivism and the development of new scientific methods to study their nature. The goal of the First Chapter is to provide a terminological clarification on how I will refer to Perceptions and misperceptions, namely illusions, and Hallucinations.

1.1 VERIDICAL PERCEPTIONS

When we see, we usually undergo veridical visual perceptions as experiences in which the object is present and perceived. The mechanism of a veridical perception can be described as follows: when there is a pink elephant that can be perceived by the subject and he sees the pink elephant, then he is having a veridical perception of the pink elephant. From the point of view of the natural sciences, the mechanism is that I see it as a result of sensory inputs that the retina processes into electrical impulses that travel through the optic nerve, chiasm, optic tract, and thalamus to the cortex and allow vision. Once these stimuli have reached the cortex, I finally see the pink elephant.

Perceptual experiences thought of as something appearing to someone in a certain way usually also have some *Phenomenal Character*. The Phenomenal Character is usually understood as 'what-it-is-like' to have that experience.[3] The status of *what-it's-like* has actually been a contentious

[3] I will refer to the work of Nagel even if the first occurrence of the expression 'what it is like' is to be found in the work of Sprigge and Montefiore's (1971).

topic in recent decades in philosophy of mind.[4] As Nagel originally puts it, the famous example of 'what-it's-like to be a bat' is introduced to explain what-it's-like *being* experientially something (such as a bat). He clearly specifies that he does not intend to question how a human might imagine himself to be a bat, but only «what it is like for a bat to be a bat» (Nagel 1973, p 439). This is because, even if we can study how a bat works, i.e. what its ways of orienting in space and its internal physiological functionings are, we can never really have access to what it feels like to be a bat, not even through imagination or introspection, since our physical and physiological constitution, and in particular our sensory apparatus, are profoundly different from those of a bat and «[o]ur own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited» (Nagel 1973, p. 439).[5]

1.2 ILLUSIONS

Visual or optical illusions are experiences in which the object is present but some of its properties are misperceived by the subject. A.D. Smith (2002) provides a clear definition of illusions as «any perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other than it really is» (A.D. Smith 2002, p. 23). This means that when there is a pink elephant and the subject sees a purple elephant, then he is having an illusion of a purple elephant. Among the cases of illusions, we can consider the afterimages.

1.2.1. Afterimages

Afterimages can be considered as a peculiar kind of illusional experience caused by a stimulus previously seen. As Johnston states, to 'afterimage' is «to be aware of an uninstantiated sensible profile. Or more exactly, considering the special case of "veridical" after-imaging, to after-image is to

[4] See also Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982, 1986), Shoemaker (1996), Strawson (1994).

[5] Recently, it seems that the notion has then been subjected to a certain semantic twist that leads it from indicating 'what it would feel like to be something' to 'what it would feel like to experience something'. For example, as we will see in 2.3, according to Mendelovici's account we are discussing Phenomenal Character when we consider «the specific 'what-it's-like,' or felt, quality of a phenomenal state or experience» (Mendelovici 2018, p. 84). Phenomenal character can be found, for example, in «the experience of pain, the experience of red, and the feeling of déjà vu[, which] have what we might call "pain-ish" "red-ish," and "déjà vu-ish" phenomenal characters, respectively» (Mendelovici 2018, p. 84).

be aware of a sensible profile without being aware of anything instantiating it in the scene before the eye» (Johnston 2004, p.183). Thus, in the case of afterimages we end up with sensory data that do not refer only to the present and sensory contents that have a different temporality than the object. Two types of afterimages can happen: the positive afterimages that «are the same colour as the previously seen stimulus» (Macpherson 2017a) and the negative afterimages that «exhibit inverted lightness levels, or colours complementary to, those of the stimulus and are usually brought on by prolonged viewing of a stimulus. They are best seen against a brightly light background. They occur (as least in part) because some cells (cones) on the retina do not respond to the present stimulation because they have been desensitised by looking at a previous stimulus» (Thomson and Macpherson 2017). [6]

1.3 HALLUCINATIONS

Hallucinations differ significantly from all previous cases of misperception. Hallucinations are experiences in which the object is not present, but the subject has perceptual-like experiences of that object: when there is no pink elephant to be perceived but the subject has a perceptual-like experience of a pink elephant that he believes to be a veridical perception. From this definition we can distinguish a number of more specific cases of hallucinations. Here I list the main ones I will refer to.

1.3.1. *Grief* hallucinations

The definition of bereavement hallucination offers an in-depth look at the emotional and psychological complexity of loss and involves an analysis of the underlying dynamics of bereavement.[7] According to Ratcliffe, they can be defined as follows:

[6] See also Thompson, P. (1880); Addams, R. (1834); Barlow, H.B., Hill, R.M. (1963); Gregory, R.L. (1981); Mather, G., Verstraten, F., Anstis, S. (1998).

[7] Of particular interest I think is Augustine's description of grief in *Confessions*, IV following the loss of a friend, which is quoted by Fuchs at the beginning of his article on the phenomenology of grief (Fuchs 2017, p. 44): «[m]y heart was utterly darkened by this sorrow and everywhere I looked I saw death. My native place was a torture room to me and my father's house a strange unhappiness. And all the things I had done with him – now that he was gone – became a frightful torment. My eyes sought him everywhere, but they did not see him; and I hated all places because he was not in them, because they could not say to me, 'Look, he is

> «a perceptual or perception-like experience of someone who has died, usually a partner, family member, or close friend. Such experiences are sometimes described in terms of specific sensory modalities: one might see, hear, or feel the touch of the deceased. However, the most common form of experience is a non-specific sense or feeling of presence» (Ratcliffe 2020, p. 601).[8]

In exploring the definition, several elements arise that are worthy of further consideration. In this precise context, the term 'hallucination' is not necessarily linked to a psychiatric pathology, but rather to an intense subjective and emotional experience that also affects our everyday experience, turning pain into a form of lasting emotional presence. Also, the meaning in which we use the term 'presence' when we speak of 'feeling the presence of the deceased' changes. It is not a physical presence, in the flesh, but a 'feeling' or 'sense' based on the relatedness or the connection with that particular person.

There is still a lack of a comprehensive phenomenological account of the nature and apprehension of 'feelings' capable of accounting for their role in experience and other characteristics, i.e., their connection to sensations (bodily and otherwise), their development over time and through intersubjective relationships and interpersonal events. A specific type of feeling that needs to be explored is that of the so-called 'feeling of presence'. Can we perceive an absence?

---

coming,' as they did when he was alive and absent. I became a hard riddle to myself, and I asked my soul why she was so downcast and why this disquieted me so sorely. But she did not know how to answer me».

[8] See among others also Rees (1971); Bennett and Bennett (2000); Steffen and Coyle (2011; 2012); Keen et al. (2013); Castelnovo et al. (2015); Fuchs (2018). Ratcliffe (2020) suggests that the subjects having bereavement hallucinations might be affected in ways that are uniquely associated with the particular person that the subject is grieving, something that involves what he calls the 'experience of possibilities' related to that person. Moreover, Lewis's perspective in *Grief Observed* (1996) can also be valuable as it presents a first-person account of the pain following the loss of his wife. This pain unfolds as a dual loss: that of the death of his wife and the realization that he can no longer remember her despite a strong 'sense of presence' that had followed her death. As he writes: «And suddenly at the very moment when, so far, I mourned H. least, I remembered her best. Indeed, it was something (almost) better than memory; an instantaneous, unanswerable impression. To say it was like a meeting would be going too far. Yet there was that in it which tempts one to use those words. It was as if the lifting of the sorrow removed a barrier» (Lewis 1996, p.39). I think from Lewis' words, it clearly emerges that this is not a 'typical' psychiatric hallucination, but a specific phenomenon tied to the personal experience of loss and the attempt to hold onto the memory of his wife as much as possible.

There are various positions on this issue that mostly regard the experience of the 'false senses of presence' associated with mental diseases. To name a few, Dokic (2010) refers to the "sense of presence" mostly as the product of independent causal mechanisms and by reference to relevant pathological cases of recognition. According to Matthen (2005), it is associated with perception but not with imagination: «[i]n normal visual perception, however, the scene is not simply imaged, but seems to present the perceiver's own surroundings as so. I will refer to this as a 'feeling of presence'» (Matthen 2005, pp. 305). While according to Ratcliffe (2021) it is related to both hallucinatory experiences (and specifically grief hallucinations) and 'sensed presence' experiences without hallucinations where it seems possible to sense someone in a way that does not depend on sensory contents. Furthermore, to quote Sacks (2012):

> «[a] powerfully persuasive form of hallucination, not explicitly sensory at all, is the feeling of the "presence" of someone or something nearby, a presence that may be felt as malevolent or benign. The sense of conviction that someone is there can be irresistible at such times» (2012, p. 168).

Also, one of his patients often explicitly reported a 'feeling of presence':

> «Ed W. often describes a persistent feeling of a 'presence'—something or someone he never actually sees—on his right. [...] The sense of someone there is so strong that [Professor R.] sometimes wheels round to look, though there is never anyone to be seen» (2012, p. 81).

Some subjects may present persistent feelings of a presence as something or someone that is 'there' and that they never actually see: it appears as present but is a mere *semblance* that is not compatible with what is actually present. Also, often in hallucinations there seems to be a very peculiar and distinct emotional state that precedes the occurrence of a presence.[9]

It is possible to consider phantom limbs as situations analogous to bereavement hallucinations. Even in the literature, mourning is often referred to as amputation or learning to live without a limb. This comparison is highlighted well by Ratcliffe (2019) who quotes Merleau-Ponty (2012) to argue

[9] For more about feelings of presence: Arzy, S., Seeck, M., Ortigue, S., Spinelli, L., & Blanke, O. (2006); Arzy, S. (2013); Alderson-Day, B., Moseley, P., Mitrenga, K., Moffatt, J., Lee, R., Foxwell, J., . . . Fernyhough, C. (2023)

that phantom limbs and felt presence experiences share a common structure. According to Merleau-Ponty:

> «[t]he amputee senses his leg, as I can sense vividly the existence of a friend who is, nevertheless, not here before my eyes. He has not lost his leg because he continues to allow for it, just as Proust can certainly recognize the death of his grandmother without yet losing her to the extent that he keeps her on the horizon of his life. The phantom arm is not a representation of the arm, but rather the ambivalent presence of an arm» (2012, p. 83).

The essential difference with psychiatric hallucinations is that phantom limbs can be controlled, i.e., they can be moved voluntarily, they are capable of action, they can be 'dressed' (e.g., following the amputation of an arm, it is possible to hallucinate it with a watch) whereas psychiatric visual hallucinations usually proceed autonomously, outside the control of the subject.[10]

1.3.2. *Hypnagogic* hallucinations

«[t]his usually occurs at the moment when my head hits the pillow at night; my eyes close and ... I see imagery» (Sacks 2013, p. 159). In 1848 Alfred Maury refers to this kind of images or quasi-hallucinations appearing just before sleep as 'hypnagogic hallucinations', later expanded by Francis Galton in 1883. This kind of hallucination is very different from the more strictly 'psychiatric' ones. Firstly, they have a very complex phenomenology: although they are involuntary and uncontrollable, they are not perceived as real, are seen with eyes closed or in the dark and are not projected into outer space. They can be very similar to geometric hallucinations and present rapidly changing colours. Often, these kinds of hallucinations involve seeing faces, even unfamiliar ones, but usually do not involve feeling someone as physically present in one's room. Perhaps their most peculiar character, however, is precisely that of being a kind of 'show' that unfolds before the eyes of the subject who is hallucinating and allows free rein to his imaginative potential.[11]

---

[10] See also James, W. (1887); Henderson, W. R., & Smyth, G. E. (1948); Simmel, M. L. (1958); Mitchell, S. W. (1970); Parkes, C. M. (1975); Ramachandran, V. S., & Hirstein, W. (1998); Brugger, P. (2008); Valentine, C. (2008).

[11] For more about Hypnagogic hallucinations see also Maury, A. (1848); Galton, F. (1883); Leaning, F. E. (1925); Sperling, O. E. (1957); Liddon, S. C. (1967); Schneck, J. M. (1968); McDONALD, C. A. R. R. I. C. K. (1971); Mavromatis, A. (1987); D'Agostino, A., & Limosani, I. (2016). It is worth to quote that also Nabokov (2012) describes an episode of hypnagogic hallucinations: «[a]s far back as I remember ... I have

1.3.3. *Hypnopompic* hallucinations

The term "hypnopompic pictures" was introduced in 1903 by F. W. H. Myers to describe «the persistence of some dream-image into the first moments of waking», namely «a figure which has formed part of a dream continues to be seen as a hallucination for some moments after waking» (1903, p. 125). The definition has later been developed by Leaning (1924) to include those things seen «on waking suddenly» and «not having any marked connection with dreams» (1924, p. 353).[12] Hypnopompic hallucinations, i.e., those that occur upon waking, have a different character and are much less common than hypnagogic hallucinations. In contrast to hypnagogic hallucinations, hypnopompic hallucinations appear as a psychiatric hallucination, often occur with open eyes, and feel real.[13] They often frighten the person suffering from them as they present disturbing images that seem ready to 'attack' him. Although they are quite rare, Sacks has collected some of them (2013). The hallucinations of Mr. Fish, his patient, lasted his entire life, from eight to eighty years, and, as we can read from his account, are extremely accurate, vivid, and real. He writes: «I wake from a calm sleep and perhaps a fairly normal dream with a shock, and there before me is a creature that even Hollywood couldn't create. The hallucinations fade in about ten seconds, and I can move when I

been subject to mild hallucinations.... Just before falling asleep, I often become aware of a kind of one-sided conversation going on in an adjacent section of my mind, quite independently from the actual trend of my thoughts. It is a neutral, detached, anonymous voice, which I catch saying words of no importance to me whatever—an English or a Russian sentence, not even addressed to me, and so trivial that I hardly dare give samples.... This silly phenomenon seems to be the auditory counterpart of certain praedormitary visions, which I also know well.... They come and go, without the drowsy observer's participation, but are essentially different from dream pictures for he is still master of his senses. They are often grotesque. I am pestered by roguish profiles, by some coarse-featured and florid dwarf with a swelling nostril or ear. At times, however, my photisms take on a rather soothing flou quality, and then I see— projected, as it were, upon the inside of the eyelid—gray figures walking between beehives, or small black parrots gradually vanishing among mountain snows, or a mauve remoteness melting beyond moving masts».

[12] A brief overview of the development of the phenomena could be found in the works of Myers, F. W., Gurney, E., & Podmore, F. (1886); Myers, F. W. H. (1903); Leaning, F. E. (1924); Ortega, D. F. (1984).

[13] To further explore the comparison between hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations see Ohayon, M. M., Priest, R. G., Caulet, M., & Guilleminault, C. (1996); Sherwood, S. J. (2002; 2012); Waters, F., Blom, J. D., Dang-Vu, T. T., Cheyne, A. J., Alderson-Day, B., Woodruff, P., & Collerton, D. (2016).

have them. In fact, I usually jump about a foot into the air and scream.... The hallucinations are becoming worse—now about four a night—I am now becoming terrified of going to bed» (2013, p. 167).[14]

1.3.4. *Induced* hallucinations

Hallucinations can be pharmacologically induced or caused by hallucinogens. Psychedelics, often known as hallucinogens, are psychoactive drugs that profoundly affect perception, emotions, and a variety of cognitive functions. They don't cause dependency or addiction and are regarded as physically harmless. All of these types of pharmacologically active chemicals share the trait of altering consciousness, frequently in unpredictable ways. High dosages may result in delirium, hallucinations, a loss of touch with reality, and in rare circumstances, death.[15]

[14] «The following are some examples of what I see: A huge figure of an angel standing over me next to a figure of death in black. A rotting corpse lying next to me. A huge crocodile at my throat. A dead baby on the floor covered in blood. Hideous faces laughing at me. Giant spiders—very frequent. Huge hand over my face. Also, one on the floor five feet across. Drifting spider webs. Birds and insects flying into my face. Two faces looking at me from under a rock. Image of myself—only looking older—standing by the bed in a suit. Two rats eating a potato. A mass of different colored flags descending onto me. Ugly-looking primitive man lying on floor covered in tufts of orange hair. Shards of glass falling on me. Two wire lobster pots. Dots of red, increasing to thousands like spattered blood. Masses of logs falling on me» (2013, pp. 167, 168). Elyn S.'s hypnopompic images are particularly interesting, on the other hand, because they concern that 'feeling' or 'sense' of presence that is usually characteristic of the so-called 'bereavement' or 'grief' hallucinations. She writes: «[t]he most typical one would involve me sitting up in bed and seeing a person—often an old lady—staring at me at some distance from the foot of my bed. (I imagine that such hallucinations are thought to be ghosts by some people—but not by me.) Other examples are seeing a foot-wide spider crawling up my wall; seeing fireworks; and seeing a little devil at the foot of my bed riding a bicycle in place» (Sacks 2013, p. 168). For 'sensed presence' in hypnopompic hallucinations see Cheyne, J. A. (2001).

[15] See also Nichols, D. E. (2004) and Bouso, J. C., Ona, G., Kohek, M., Dos Santos, R. G., Hallak, J. E., Alcázar-Córcoles, M. Á., & Obiols-Llandrich, J. (2023). See Hofmann, A., & Schultes, R. E. (1979) for hallucinations voluntarily sought out with psychedelic substances and Perry, E.K. and Laws, V. (2010) and Pitt, D. (2004).

1.3.5. *Memory-based* hallucinations

The subject has a hallucinatory experience whose content consists of something that happened in the past, usually a traumatic event, and which resurfaces in the present with the character of the present.[16]

1.3.6. *Multimodal* hallucinations

Hallucinations can occur in more than one modality, even if not simultaneously. While 'unimodal' hallucinations can occur in only one modality, 'multimodal' hallucinations are characterized as hallucinations experienced by a person in two or more sensory modalities. As Chesterman defines them: «[H]allucinations occurring simultaneously in more than one modality that are experienced as emanating from a single source» (Chesterman 1994, p. 275).[17] The question is also addressed by Dennett who refers to hallucinations as 'multi-modal' and 'vivid' and opposes them to what he calls 'strong hallucinations'.[18] According to this proposal, multi-modal and vivid hallucinations are peculiar because they are described as being detailed fantasies that go far beyond the technological abilities to reproduce a stimuli.

1.3.7. *Partial* hallucinations

Partial hallucinations are cases of hallucinations where not every object experienced is hallucinated. Although philosophers usually tend to consider hallucinations that occupy the totality of the visual field, those that do occur generally occupy only part of it. Thus, in partial hallucinations hallucinated and perceived objects coexist. For example, the subject can be able to veridically perceive the room he is in while hallucinating a pink elephant in front of him. As suggested by Genone, we can define

---

[16] See Waters et al. (2006).

[17] See also Lim, A., Hoek, H. W., Deen, M. L., Blom, J. D., Bruggeman, R., Cahn, W., ... & Wiersma, D. (2016).

[18] «By a strong hallucination I mean a hallucination of an apparently concrete and persisting three-dimensional object in the real world- as contrasted to flashes, geometric distortions, auras, afterimages, fleeting phantom-limb experiences, and other anomalous sensations. A strong hallucination would be, say, a ghost that talked back, that permitted you to touch it, that resisted with a sense of solidity, that cast a shadow, that was visible from any angle so that you might walk around it and see what it looked like» (Dennett 1993, p. 7).

a partial hallucination as «the hallucination of one or more non-existent objects in an otherwise normally perceived scene (a partial hallucination); and second, the hallucination of an entire scene, such that the subject's experience bears no relation to her actual environment (a total hallucination)» (Genone 2014, p. 360).

1.3.8. *Philosophical* hallucinations

In philosophy, hallucinations are hypothetical experiences usually subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. They can be broader and more enduring than psychiatric hallucinations, to the point where they encompass the experience of the world as a whole. It is necessary to go back to the first of Descartes' Metaphysical Meditations (2006) to find an example of how philosophical reasoning can coexist, integrate, and progress through experiences that can be traced back to the field of hallucinatory phenomena. After realizing that many of the things he believed to be true were actually false, Descartes acknowledged that he had received almost all of them through the senses, and that the senses are often wrong too:

> «[b]ut perhaps, even though the senses do sometimes deceive us when it is a question of very small and distant things, still there are many other matters concerning which one simply cannot doubt, even though they are derived from the very same senses» (Descartes 2006, p. 10).[19]

At this point, in analyzing what can be doubted, Descartes introduces the mental experiment of the so-called evil genius (or demon), a fictional character who could have fooled him that what he always thought of as perceptions of reality were in fact hallucinations:

[19] «[B]ut perhaps, even though the senses do sometimes deceive us when it is a question of very small and distant things, still there are many other matters concerning which one simply cannot doubt, even though they are derived from the very same senses: for example, that I am sitting here next to the fire, wearing my winter dressing gown, that I am holding this sheet of paper in my hands, and the like. But on what grounds could one deny that these hands and this entire body are mine? Unless perhaps I were to liken myself to the insane, whose brains are impaired by such an unrelenting vapor of black bile that they steadfastly insist that they are kings when they are utter paupers, or that they are arrayed in purple robes when they are naked, or that they have heads made of clay, or that they are gourds, or that they are made of glass. But such people are mad, and I would appear no less mad, were I to take their behavior as an example for myself» (Descartes 2006, p. 10).

> «[a]ccordingly, I will suppose not a supremely good God, the source of truth, but rather an evil genius, supremely powerful and clever, who has directed his entire effort at deceiving me» (Descartes 2006, p. 12).[20]

This is perhaps the first and most famous case of a metaphysical experiment in which the philosophical hallucination plays a fundamental role in the development of reasoning, and in which appears the need to distinguish perceiving from thinking or believing that one is perceiving something. It is also possible to say that philosophers usually think of hallucinations as perfect hallucinations.[21]

In addition to Descartes' classical experiment, there is now also a neuroscientific literature that tries to explain the possibility of perfect hallucinations starting from the mechanism of vision. Namely, if the process leading to accurate perception is initiated by artificially stimulating a point from the retina to the cortex, such as the optic nerve, we will experience a stimulus without an object and perceive something, such as light radiation. According to these experiments, the subjective perception would not vary depending on whether it was caused by a real sensory stimulus or a perfect hallucination. Some neuroimaging studies carried out on people who suffered from hallucinations revealed that the area of cortex responsible for visual perception, i.e. the V1 cortex, and the higher

[20] «Accordingly, I will suppose not a supremely good God, the source of truth, but rather an evil genius, supremely powerful and clever, who has directed his entire effort at deceiving me. I will regard the heavens, the air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things as nothing but the bedeviling hoaxes of my dreams, with which he lays snares for my credulity. I will regard myself as not having hands, or eyes, or flesh, or blood, or any senses, but as nevertheless falsely believing that I possess all these things. I will remain resolute and steadfast in this meditation, and even if it is not within my power to know anything true, it certainly is within my power to take care resolutely to withhold my assent to what is false, lest this deceiver, however powerful, however clever he may be, have any effect on me» (Descartes 2006, p. 12).

[21] The definition of 'perfect hallucinations' is from Martin (2004), but they are also known as 'true hallucinations' (Fish, 2008), 'philosophers' hallucinations' (Robinson, 2013).

order visual areas are both metabolically active during hallucinations.[22] The activation of that sensory area would therefore seem to be sufficient to produce a perfect hallucination that would be similar to a veridical experience, given that the visual cortex "lights up" in a perception as in a hallucination.[23] I will deal with this topic more extensively in section 2.1.1.

1.3.9. Phosphenes

If we close our eyes and apply a gentle pressure to the eyelids, we are likely to "see" bright flashes and abstract geometric visual patterns combined with pixels and lights.[24] They are called phosphenes and can also be thought of as "closed-eyes hallucinations" or "geometric hallucinations", although they have nothing to do with external reality. An example of a particularly persistent geometric hallucination is included by Sacks in Hallucinations (2013). A lady suffering from macular degeneration describes her hallucinations in the first two years of the disease as follows:

> «a big blob of light circling around and then vanishing, followed by a colored flag in sharp focus...it looked exactly like the British flag. Where it came from, I do not know...For the last few months, I have been seeing hexagons, often hexagons in pink. At first there were also tangled lines inside the hexagons, and other little balls of color, yellow, pink, lavender, and blue. Now

[22] As also shown by Crick and Koch (1995; 1998) about 'The V1 Hypothesis'. Among the studies that aimed to image brain activity during visual hallucinations some did not find any V1 activation or showed it but only on an individual level. See Silbersweig DA, Stern E, Frith C, et al. (1995); Oertel V, Rotarska-Jagiela A, van de Ven VG, Haenschel C, Maurer K, Linden DEJ (2013); Jardri R, Thomas P, Delmaire C, Delion P, Pins D. (2013); Ommen, M. M., van Laar, T., Renken, R., Cornelissen, F. W., & Bruggeman, R. (2023). Or at least, we could say that 'simple' hallucinations such as shapes or colors are those that originate from V1 while 'complex' ones are those that are related to the activity in the visual regions of a higher order. See Ffytche DH, Howard RJ, Brammer MJ, David A, Woodruff P, Williams S.(1998); Santhouse a. M, Howard RJ, Ffytche DH (2000); Ffytche DH, Blom JD, Catani M. (2010); Rogawski MA. (2008).

[23] For more about perfect hallucinations see Robinson (1994); Smith (2002); Johnston (2004). Also, Raleigh (2014) for an account of a perfect hallucination as a relational and constitutively environmental experience. Other variations of mental experiments can be found in Putnam (1981), Davidson (1986), and Chalmers (2005).

[24] There are additional potential medical conditions that may contribute to closed-eye hallucinations such as hyponatremia, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and Lidocaine.

there are only black hexagons looking for all the world like bathroom tiles» (Sacks 2013, p. 16).
[25]

1.3.10. *Psychiatric* hallucinations

Sticking to the definition provided by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V):

> «[h]allucinations are perception-like experiences that occur without an external stimulus. They are vivid and clear, with the full force and impact of normal perceptions, and not under voluntary control. They may occur in any sensory modality, but auditory hallucinations are the most common in schizophrenia and related disorders. Auditory hallucinations are usually experienced as voices, whether familiar or unfamiliar, that are perceived as distinct from the individual's own thoughts. The hallucinations must occur in the context of a clear sensorium; those that occur while falling asleep (hypnagogic) or waking up (hypnopompic) are considered to be within the range of normal experience. Hallucinations may be a normal part of religious experience in certain cultural contexts» (American Psychiatric Association 2013, pp. 87, 88).

The DSM-5 not only defines but also lists the following sub-types of hallucinations: auditory, gustatory, olfactory, somatic, tactile, visual.[26]

1.3.11. *Sensory* and *non-sensory* hallucinations

According to Dokic (2016) hallucinations can be both sensory and non-sensory. While the sensory hallucinations are the 'traditional' ones (visual, auditory, tactile, etc.), the non-sensory hallucinations can be cognitive or affective, each respectively relating to cases of delusions and feelings of presence in Parkinson's disease.

1.3.12. *Unmasked* hallucinations

Unmasked hallucinations are hallucinations can be recognized as such by the subject not only retrospectively (i.e., once the subject stops having them) but also in the moment in which he is experiencing them. As we will see in chapter five, this possibility is considered by Husserl, but is also

[25] On hallucinations related to Macular Degeneration see also Mogk, L. G., & Mogk, M. (2003).

[26] Further explanations on the role of hallucinations in psychiatry will be given in 2.1.

developed by contemporary interpreters. For example, according to Staiti (2015), hallucinations are marked as such by the actual future unmasking, whereas, for Smith (2008), hallucinations are said to belong to an unharmonious system of possible experiences in which we have only the possibility of the unmasking.

A lot of problems arise with respect to the mechanisms underlying the unmasking: what makes a hallucination "unmasked"? Is believing that it is a hallucination a sufficient condition? Such a belief might be grounded on the experience itself or on independent premises (e.g., the subject knows that he has taken a hallucinatory drug, or that he has been suffering from hallucinations for years, so he may how to 'unmask' them).

1.3.13. *Veridical* hallucinations

A veridical hallucination is an experience that exactly mirrors the scene in front of the person who is hallucinating. It is considered hallucinatory because it does not entail any causal relationship with the environment. Macpherson and Batty (2016) suggest the possibility of a subject undergoing a hallucination caused by the "hallucination machine". In this situation, the subject is blinded and connected to the machine which causes him to hallucinate a pink elephant.

What the subject does not know is that there is an actual elephant covered in pink paint in front of him. This is a special case where the subject is hallucinating an object (elephant) with certain properties (pinkness) without seeing the matching object. This view leads to a slightly different account of hallucinations, where «you have an experience as of an object and its properties but there is no object, and there are no properties that you perceive in virtue of having that experience» (Macpherson, Batty 2016, p. 268).[27]

[27] Also, Alston about this proposal: «[w]henever we have ... [a] visual hallucination, in which the hallucinatory object(s) is (are) embedded in a veridically perceived setting, the visually hallucinated object(s) will appear to be located somewhere in front of the perceiver. Since there will always be something physical in that region, that something can be taken as what looks to the perceiver to be radically other than what it is» (Alston 1999, p. 191).

1.3.14. 'Illusions on the verge of hallucinations'

This is a liminal case between imagination and hallucination that will further be analyzed in the fifth chapter. This type of experience is taken up by one of the psychiatric cases presented by Sacks in Hallucinations (2012). One of Sacks' patients claimed to have illusions 'on the verge' of hallucinations:

> «Ed W., a designer, started to get visual hallucinations after he had been on L-dopa and dopamine agonists for several years. He realized that they were hallucinations and regarded them largely with curiosity and amusement; nevertheless, one of his physicians declared him "psychotic"—an upsetting misdiagnosis. *He often feels himself "on the verge" of hallucination, and he may be pushed over the threshold at night, or if he is tired or bored*. When we had lunch one day, he was having all sorts of what he calls "illusions." My blue pullover, draped over a chair, became a fierce chimerical animal with an elephant-like head, long blue teeth, and a hint of wings. A bowl of noodles on the table became "a human brain" (though this did not affect his appetite for them). He saw "letters, like teletype" on my lips; they formed "words"—words he could not read. They did not coincide with the words I was speaking. He says that such illusions are "made up" on the spot, instantaneously and without conscious volition. He cannot control or stop them, short of closing his eyes. They are sometimes friendly, sometimes frightening. For the most part, he ignores them» (Sacks 2012, pp. 66-67).[28]

The phenomenology of Illusions on the verge of hallucinations will be deepened in 5.2.

Object	Correspondent 'Illusion'
My blue pullover, draped over a chair	A fierce chimerical animal with an elephant-like head, long blue teeth, and a hint of wings
A bowl of noodles on the table	"A human brain"
Sacks talking	"Letters, like teletype" on his lips; they formed "words"—words Ed W. could not read

[28] The emphasis is mine.

SECOND CHAPTER

2. THE UNDERSTANDING OF HALLUCINATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

In the following chapter I will analyze how some of the proponents of the Common Kind Conception (CKC), i.e., sense-data theorists, adverbialists and representationalists and some proponents of the Disjunctivism approach the case of hallucination. After outlining the main characteristics of and objections to each position, I will briefly outline some of the recent theories that have emerged in the contemporary analytical debate that account for a strong form of internalism. Finally, I will make a brief review of the current literature that seeks to understand whether Husserl and his phenomenological statements could better support the conjunctivist or disjunctivist view.

In light of the terminological explanation in the previous chapter, we may thus say that a subject perceives something veridically if he undergoes perceptual experiences in which the object exists, is present and mind independent. This position supports a form of Direct Realism in which the subject is acquainted with a particular worldly object and its properties. However, sometimes it can happen that our visual experiences are not correct and reliable: this is the case with misperceptions such as illusions and, more specifically, hallucinations in which we seem to see something that does not exist and we attribute it certain properties that, in fact, it does not have. Whether it is possible to ever perceive the physical world directly is a problem that is often referred to in terms of the 'The Problem of Perception'. The challenge that illusions and hallucinations raise is so crucial that it directly affects numerous questions in psychiatry, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind, including the nature of perceptual experience, and how we perceive the external world. I will now proceed to introduce and explain how the conjunctivist and disjunctivist positions differ in addressing the Problem of Perception.

2.1. COMMON KIND CONCEPTION

As far as it concerns the problem of the nature of hallucinatory experiences and their difference from veridical perceptions, the conjunctivists endorse the CKC. The CKC answers the question «are these truthful, illusory and hallucinatory experiences basically the same, do they form a common kind?» arguing that they have the same identical nature and that «veridical, illusory and hallucinatory (as) experiences of an F are basically the same; they form *a common kind*» (Crane & French 2021, p. 9). Also, Macpherson (2013) shows how «[C]ommon-kind theorists hold that states of the same mental type can occur in perception and hallucination» (Macpherson F. & Dimitris P. 2013, p. 10). To state that veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences of a pink elephant are fundamentally the same and share the same nature is one of the most challenging assumptions of the CKC.[29] I think that the two primary arguments adduced in favor of CKC can be summarized as follows:

1. Endorsing the Common Kind Assumption (CKA). As pointed out by Martin (2004), one of the main assumptions of the CKC is the CKA, that is: «whatever kind of mental event occurs when one is veridically perceiving some scene, such as the street scene outside my window, that kind of event can occur whether or not one is perceiving» (Martin 2004, p.40) and «whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating» (Martin 2006, p.4). The CKA seems to be a plausible explanation for supposing that the veridical and hallucinatory experiences defined as 'causally matching' are of the same type and is well supported by the Causal Argument proposed by Robinson (1985)[30].

2. The fact that a subject can undergo hallucinatory and veridical perceptual experiences and not be able to subjectively distinguish them.

[29] Rejecting the CKC is central to the disjunctivist position that I will present in section 1.2. For further discussion regarding the conjunctivist and disjunctivist debate see Crane (2006), Johnston (2004), Martin (2004, 2006), and Pautz (2010).

[30] The Causal Argument will be developed in 1.3.3

Therefore, veridical perceptions and hallucinations may involve exactly the same neural activity and that they are of the same essential mental kind.

As Crane and French point out, it is actually possible to apply CKC to veridical perceptions and hallucinatory experiences since «from a *phenomenological* point of view, hallucinations too seem as though they are direct presentations of ordinary objects: from the *subject's perspective* a hallucination as of an F cannot be distinguished from a veridical experience of an F. This is why it seems so plausible to think of them as fundamentally the same» (Crane and French 2021, p. 17). However, this seems to be particularly problematic and the disjunctivist response to The Problem of Perception focuses on rejecting this hypothesis.

2.1.1 'Perfect' Hallucinations

The idea that philosophers have of hallucination is typically that of a perfect hallucination which would seem to provide a strong endorsement for conjunctivist claims that perceptions and hallucinations are indistinguishable a priori, that they belong to the same category of mental states and that the same kind of experience that one has when one is veridically perceiving a pink elephant can be had when one is hallucinating it. According to these experiments, there would be an actual possibility of stimulating certain areas of the brain in order to induce or recreate the vision of something (even though there is no real object) that should have the same phenomenal properties as a veridical perception.[31]

What usually follows is that a veridical perceptual experience and an experience caused by stimulating the brain in the way it would be stimulated if it were subjected to a perception could be experiences of the same mental type with respect to what they represent and *what-it's-like* for the subject that undergoes them. Summing up, those who support the hypothesis of perfect hallucinations want us to consider them as situations in which an artificial machine (or stimulus) led

[31]According to Farkas (2006; 2013) that hallucinations and veridical perceptions have the same Phenomenal Properties means that they share certain properties that determine some of their characteristics: for example, if two experiences involve both the appearance of something pink, they share the phenomenal property of the pinkness. This is opposed, for example, by Hilary Putnam who argues that there is no specific property shared between a veridical perception and its corresponding hallucination (Putnam 1999, p. 128).

the subject to have an inner visual experience of a pink elephant that does not involve any 'pink elephant' as an object and in which everything seems to be exactly as if there were a real pink elephant in front of the subject.

There are several variants of this experiment. For example, if we analyze the mental experiments typically considered in philosophy, we have the example of a single subject in two possible worlds of twin subjects, or the version of the brains in a vat or the Cartesian evil genius. In these scenarios, the perfect hallucination is considered as a possible cause of a visual experience "internal" to the subject that does not involve objects and in which things appear to the subject exactly as if he had an object in front of him. For this reason, the subject does not distinguish the two experiences.

One of the reasons why it is problematic to refer to a 'perfect hallucination' is that its very Cartesian origins propose it as a purely metaphysical and not physical hypothesis: it is unprovable that this world and a phenomenally identical situation can happen. Giving too much credit to the metaphysical hypothesis or to a scenario like the one proposed by a mental experiment such as 'The Matrix', can lead us to think that, from a phenomenological point of view, it may actually be possible to find ourselves in a situation where everything we see is produced by a series of stimuli in the brain. Furthermore, there are a number of variable elements that must be considered in order for the perfect hallucination to respect the exact framework of a veridical perception: when we open our eyes, we do not immediately become perceptually aware of everything around us. The way in which the object appears is not only the result of a direct relationship with the subject, but is also conditioned, for example, from the impact of the environment on the visual system, is usually extended temporally, is intersubjective and changes depending on the change of focus of attention.

Thus, there are a series of elements of the environment that must change in relation to the percipient body to respect the complex structure of a veridical perception and recreate something perfectly indistinguishable from a veridical perception. In this sense, Dennett's proposal is particularly useful in offering a counter argument. In *Consciousness Explained* (1993), Dennett explains how the reproduction of a sensory stimulus hypothesized by this type of mental experiments is actually very problematic. To respect the structure of veridical perception and, therefore, to be

truly perfectly indistinguishable from it, it would be necessary to reproduce the exact amount of information that comes from the real world. In doing so, the brain would be immersed in an environment exactly identical to the real world and we would basically end up with a duplicate of our world. As he explains:

> «[T]he problem of calculating the proper feedback, generating or composing it, and then presenting it to you in real time is going to be computationally intractable on even the fastest computer, and if the evil scientists decide to solve the real-time problem by pre-calculating and "caning" all the possible responses for playback, they will just trade one insoluble problem for another: there are too many possibilities to store. In short, our evil scientists will be swamped by combinatorial explosions as soon as they give any genuine exploratory powers in this imaginary world» (Dennett 1993, p. 5).

2.1.2 Representationalism

One of the most widespread positions that endorses the CKC is that of representationalism. According to the Representationalist view, perceptual experiences are determined by a subject representing the world as being a certain way and his perceptual experiences consist of perceptual states that represent the world. For example, according to the representationalist view, when a subject has a veridical perception of a pink elephant, his experience fundamentally consists in visually representing that there's a pink elephant before the subject's eyes.

In the *Common-Kind Representationalist* view the phenomenal character of experience is partially independent from what one's experience represents. Another version of representationalism is S*trong Representationalism.* According to Strong Representationalism, we cannot discriminate between hallucinations and perceptions in respect of their Phenomenal Character which is considered to be identical to the representational content of experience. As Dokic & Martin (2012) show, some Representationalists argue that representational contents fully constitute the Phenomenal Character of perceptual states[32] and that Phenomenal Character is completely exhausted by the fact that something (e.g., a pink elephant) is visually represented. In virtue of the fact that hallucinations «share their representational content with perceptions» (Dokic & Martin 2012, p. 535), representationalism would explain why they are phenomenally identical to perceptions

[32] On this matter see Byrne (2001) and Tye (2020)

and why they seem to produce the same subjective experience in the subject experiencing them (Dokic & Martin 2012, p. 535).

2.1.3 Sense-Data Theory

The sense-data theory and common-kind representationalism are similar for they both endorse the CKC and agree that when a subject has a perceptual experience the world is represented. Unlike Common-Kind Representationalism, the Sense-Data[33] theory implies being aware of nonphysical, inner, mental objects or sense-data[34]. For example, according to the sense-data view, if a subject has a sensory experience of a pink elephant, then there is something which is presented to him as pink. This happens because things appearing any way at all to the subject consists in the fact that you are directly presented with a sense-datum.

To define sense-data unambiguously can be very difficult. Moore first developed the concept of sense-data to provide a neutral description for whatever is the immediate object of our awareness and hence to be neutral on the problem of the external world. When introducing the term "sense data", he writes: «[b]y sense-data I understand a class of entities of which we are very often directly conscious, and with many of which we are extremely familiar» (Moore 1909–10, p. 57)[35].

---

[33] For the introduction of the term 'sense-datum' see Moore (1905) and Russell (1997). For a defense of sense-data see also Jackson (1977), O'Shaughn (1980), Foster (1986), and Robinson (1994).

[34] This is just the way in which the notion of sense data is usually referred to in the contemporary debate to contrast naïve direct realism. In fact, the notion of sense-data is much more complex than what I have expressed here. Not all sense data theorists would agree with the definition of sense data as "nonphysical, inner, mental", as we will see with Russell. See Hatfield, G. (2021) for a proper account of the historical evolution of the notion of Sense data.

[35] «They include the colours, of all sorts of different shades, which I actually see when I look about me; the sounds which I actually hear; the peculiar sort of entity of which I am directly conscious when I feel the pain of a toothache, and which I call "the pain"; and many others which I need not enumerate. But I wish also to include among them those entities called "images", of which I am directly conscious when I dream and often also when awake; which resemble the former in respect of the fact that they are colours, sounds, etc.; but which seem, as a rule, like rather faint copies of the colours, sounds, etc., actually seen or heard, and which, whether fainter or not, differ from them in respect of the fact that we should not say we actually saw or heard them, and the fact that they are not, in the strictest sense of the words, "given by the senses". All these entities I propose to call sense-data. And in their case, there is, of course, no question whether there are such entities.

In 1912 in The Problems of Philosophy Russell initially refers to "sense data" as «the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on» (Russell 1912, p.12). Later, in The Relation of Sense Data to Physics (1914), Russell changes his conception of sense data with respect to material objects. Material objects are no longer inferred entities, their existence need not be established, and they become, in this way, logical constructions from sense data. In the course of this development, Russell also introduces the notions of sense data belonging to other persons and «the 'sensiblia' which would appear from places where there happen to be no minds, and which I suppose to be real although they are no one's data» (Russell 1914, p. 116). To be more precise, Russell calls sensibilia «those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind» (Russell 1914, p.110). He also revises his conception of sense-data which, while existing only when present to the mind, are non-mental (Russell 1914, p. 110).[36]

According to Robinson (Robinson 1994, pp. 1, 2), a sense-datum must meet the following five conditions:

1. «It is something of which we are aware.
2. It is non-physical.
3. Its occurrence is logically private to a single subject.
4. It actually possesses standard sensible qualities, for example, shape, colour, loudness, 'feel' of various sorts.
5. It possesses no intrinsic intentionality; that is, though it may suggest to the mind through habit other things 'beyond' it, in itself it possesses only sensible qualities which do not refer beyond themselves» [37]

The entities meant certainly are, whether or not they be rightly described as "sensations", "sense-presentations", "sense-data", etc. Here the only question can be, whether they are "mental"» (Moore 1909–10, p. 57).

[36] The idea that sense data are non-mental entities was embraced by a large number of other theorists, see among others Price (1932) and Broad (1923).

[37] These are just some of the main definitions of "sense data". For a more precise historical account from their introduction to the mid twentieth century and recent argument for and against them, see Hatfield (2021).

To better emphasize the connection between sense data and conjunctivism, we can refer to the work of Ayer (1940) and, in particular, his Argument from illusion. In The foundations of empirical knowledge, he argued for the existence of sense data as a matter of linguistic convention. As he writes in the first chapter introducing the argument from illusion:

> «Why may we not say that we are directly aware of material things? The answer is provided by what is known as the argument from illusion. This argument, as it is ordinarily stated, is based on the fact that material things may present different appearances to different observers, or to the same observer in different conditions, and that the character of these appearances is to some extent causally determined by the state of the conditions and the observer. For instance, it is remarked that a coin which looks circular from one point of view may look elliptical from another, or that a stick which normally appears straight looks bent when it is seen in water, or that to people who take drugs such as mescal, things appear to change their colours. The familiar cases of mirror images, and double vision, and complete hallucinations, such as the mirage, provide further examples» (Ayer 1940, p. 3)

According to Ayer, the object we are directly aware of when we are perceiving something is not a material thing, but rather sense data, which should not necessarily be defined as mental states,[38] but as «similar in character to what he would be experiencing if he were seeing a real oasis, but are delusive in the sense that the material thing which they appear to present is not actually there» (Ayer 1940, p. 4). This relationship is expressed in what Ayer calls sense data language according to which what is said with respect to material objects is to be understood as referring to real sense data. Among the various examples he brings in the first chapter, although they are mainly illusions and not hallucinations, nevertheless it becomes clear that delusive experiences are both qualitatively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions and often believed to be veridical as well39.The bottom line is that it is extremely difficult for a subject to be able to tell the difference between the two and, accordingly:

---

38 «If anything is established by this, it can be only that there are some cases in which the character of our perceptions makes it necessary for us to say that what we are directly experiencing is not a material thing but a sense-datum» (Ayer 1940, p. 4).

[39] «(...) conversely, there are cases in which experiences that are actually verdical are believed to be delusive, as when we see something so strange or unexpected that we say to ourselves that we must be dreaming» (Ayer 1940, p. 7).

> «The fact is that from the character of a perception considered by itself, that is, apart from its relation to further sense-experience, it is not possible to tell whether it is veridical or delusive. But whether we are entitled to infer from this that what we immediately experience is always a sense-datum remains still to be seen» (Ayer 1940, p. 7)

Ayer accepts these conclusions, whereby in perception the objects of which we are aware are sense-data, but he clearly points out that in fact this thesis is not a particular discovery, but rather a matter of new usage of language.[40]

According to the sense-datum theory as it is intended in the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind, when a subject has a sensory experience, he is presented with something, i.e., a sense datum. As French and Crane highlight «[u]nderstood in this way, a sense-datum is just whatever it is that you are directly presented with that instantiates the sensible qualities which characterise the character of your experience» (Crane and French 2001, p. 18). Sense datum theory endorses the CKC in stating that if a subject has a veridical experience of something appearing pink, it is because he is directly presented with a pink sense datum and the same applies to illusions and hallucinations because these experiences share the same nature.

2.1.4 Adverbialism

Like the Common-Kind Representationalism and the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbialism endorses the CKC. According to the adverbialist view, when a subject has a veridical experience of a pink elephant, this means X is visually sensing pinkly elephantely and that something like pinkness elephantiness is instantiated in the experience itself.

[40] «The philosopher who says that he is seeing a sense-datum in a case where most people would say that they were seeing a material thing is not contradicting the received opinion on any question of fact. He is not putting forward a new hypothesis which could be empirically verified or confuted. What he is doing is simply to recommend a new verbal usage. He is proposing to us that instead of speaking, for example, of seeing a straight stick which looks crooked, or of seeing an oasis when there is no oasis there, we should speak of seeing a sense-datum which really has the quality of being crooked, and which belongs to a straight stick, or of seeing a sense-datum which really has the qualities that are characteristic of the appearance of an oasis, but does not belong to any material thing» (Ayer 1940, p. 7).

In *Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality* (2007), Kriegel provides an account for adverbialism about intentionality by trying to explain what happens when we try to represent Bigfoot. The fact we all know it does not exist in flesh-and-bones but only in our minds does not prevent us from thinking about it. As Kriegel writes: «[T]he adverbial account of intentionality is fairly straightforward. Although the surface grammar of "you are thinking of Bigfoot" casts the thinking as a relation between you and Bigfoot, the sentence can be paraphrased into "you are thinking Bigfootly," or perhaps more naturally, "you are thinking Bigfoot-wise." The latter casts the thinking as a non-relational property of yours» (Kriegel 2007, p. 314). There is a "thinking Bigfootly" for our minds are formed to correspond to an object that, if present, would be called Bigfoot.

Although adverbialism, rejecting almost entirely our ordinary conception of perceptual experience, stands as a response to sense-datum theory, it is not quite clear how much this proposal succeeds in contributing to the discussion regarding the Problem of Perception (Crane and French 2021, p. 27). We can say that adverbialism certainly supports the CKC whereby a veridical experience in which something appears pink consists in the fact that the subject perceives pink, but the same applies to the corresponding illusory and hallucinatory experiences that have the same nature.

2.1.5 Objections to Conjunctivism

Below are some objections specifically concerning sense-data theory, adverbialism and representationalism.

According to Lycan (2019), there are four main objections that can be made to representational theory. They concern respectively the "Objections to the Nonactual'', an objection that problematizes the use of nonactual objects in cases of hallucination or perceptual illusion; the "Unconscious Representation", which arises from the assumption that sensory qualities can only occur consciously and poses the problem of representations that occur unconsciously; the relationship to "Phenomenal Intentionality", whereby if we combine Phenomenal Intentionality and its consideration of "what it's like" properties with representationalism about sensory qualities, "what it's like" properties would be prior to sensory qualities; and "Laws of appearance" concerning the difficulties of representationalism in explaining the existence of certain laws and restrictions that regulate sensory appearances and that cannot be extended to other intentional states.

Various objections have also been raised to sense-data theory. Some can be traced back to Indirect Realism: for example, one problem concerns perceptual access to the objects of experience and the world. The sense-data theory would seem to give rise to a 'veil of perception' between the mind and the world as if the sense-data interposed themselves between the experiencers and the experienced objects.

The validity of the Phenomenal Principle that sense-data theorists endorse can also turn out to be problematic. Starting from Robinson's definition, according to the phenomenal principle «If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality» (Robinson 1994, p. 32). For the sense-data theory the problem arises because from the fact that something (an elephant) appears in some way (pink) to the subject it is claimed that something must exist that is that way and the subject would be directly presented with an appearance that is pink.[41]

With respect to the objections raised to the adverbialist theory, one of the most important problems is the 'many-property problem' proposed by Frank Jackson (1975). Jackson's example starts from the afterimage of a red square and a green circle. Adverbialism usually characterizes this state of mind as perceiving red-ly and square-ly and green-ly and round-ly. According to Jackson, «it will be impossible for the adverbial theorist to distinguish the two very different states of affairs of having a red, square after-image at the same time as having a green, round one, from that of having a green, square after-image at the same time as having a red, round one; because both will have to be accounted the same, namely, as sensing red-ly and round-ly and square-ly and green-ly'» (Jackson 1975, p. 130). The problem is then to figure out how to distinguish the different states of mind and «distinguish the statements: 'I have a red and a square after-image', and 'I have a red, square afterimage'» (Jackson 1975, p. 130).

A further problem is that adverbialism fails to account for the fac' that 'ur experiences have direct objects. This problem is pointed out by Butchvarov who, after listing some of the problems he thinks adverbialism must face, identifies one main phenomenological objection, namely the fact that

[41] These are just some of the main objections that can be made to the sense-data theory. For a more comprehensive overview see Hatfield, G. (2021).

«[T]he adverbial theory is incapable of doing justice to the most obvious and indeed essential phenomenological fact about perceptual consciousness (perhaps all consciousness), namely, its intentionality, its object-directedness» (Butchvarov 1980, p. 272).

2.2 DISJUNCTIVISM

The disjunctivist position needs to account for perceptions and hallucinations while remaining consistent with the commitments of I Realism on veridical perception. One of the Disjunctivist theory's main claims is in rejecting the CKA and stating that perceptual, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences do not share a common nature and involve different mental states according to the disjoint situations.

As Martin argues, disjunctivism «claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering a...hallucination; and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations» (Martin 2004, p. 37). Also, the 'disjunctivist motto' provided by Dokic & Martin is very accurate on this regard: «in a given perceptual event, *EITHER* the subject has a veridical perception and so is directly 'en rapport' with a fragment of the world, *OR* she has a nonveridical perceptual experience (such as a hallucination)» (Dokic & Martin 2012, pp. 535, 536). Therein lies their rejection of the CKA.[42]

[42] Despite rejecting the CKA and that hallucinations and veridical perceptions share the same fundamental kind of mental state, the disjunctivists still admit a certain extent of subjective indistinguishability between a veridical perception of a pink elephant and a hallucination of a pink elephant. In some versions of disjunctivism, it is also argued that the indistinguishability of hallucinations from true perceptions is a constitutive element of the character of hallucinations (Martin, 2004, 2006; Siegel, 2008; Sturgeon, 2008).

Although there are various interpretations of the disjunctivist viewpoint, all of them reject the idea that the same kind of *experience* is common to veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations.[43]

2.2.1 Varieties of Disjunctivism

There are several ways to express the disjunctivist position, I will sum them up and focus on the Negative Epistemic conception. According to Soteriou (2020) it is possible to identify the so-called 'Fundamental Kind Disjunctivism',[44] the 'Distinct Mental Feature' Formulation[45] and the 'No-

[43] As Overgaard writes: «[I]t is important to see that disjunctivism is not the trivial thesis that hallucinations differ from (veridical) perceptions. The conjunctivist would of course agree that the cases are importantly different. What the disjunctivist denies and the conjunctivist affirms is that an experience of the same fundamental kind can be had across the three cases. For the disjunctivist, an experiencer is either having an experience that (qua the kind of experience it is) acquaints her with an existing physical object, or she is having an experience of some other kind. For the conjunctivist, by contrast, what makes the hallucinatory and veridical cases different does not concern the type of experience undergone, but the extent to which the environment is the way the experience represents it as being» (Overgaard 2017, pp. 5-6).

[44] Perceptions and hallucinations may have something in common, but they are not mental events of the same *fundamental* kind: «[O]n this formulation, the disjunctivist is committed to denying that whatever fundamental kind of conscious event occurs when one is veridically perceiving the world, that kind of event can occur whether or not one is veridically perceiving» (Soteriou 2020, pp. 5-6).

[45] For more about the 'Distinct Mental Feature' Formulation see also Logue 2012, 2013, and 2014. According to this view «the disjunctivist holds that veridical perceptions and hallucinations differ mentally in some significant respect—i.e., there are certain mental features that veridical perceptions have that hallucinations cannot have» (Soteriou 2020, p. 7). In fact, this formulation leaves open the possibility that veridical perceptions and hallucinations can share a common mental element.

Common-Mental-Element' Formulation.[46] He also defines disjunctivism as epistemological[47], about intentional content and about phenomenal character.

It is actually possible to identify two basic accounts of disjunctivism, a positive and a negative one. According to the positive one «saying that the subject of a hallucination perceptually represents her environment as being a certain way involves neither explicit nor implicit reference to veridical experience» (Logue 2012, p. 175) while according to the negative one «saying that the subject of a hallucination is in a state that is subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a certain kind involves explicit reference to a veridical experience of a certain kind» (Logue 2012, p. 175).

When considering the hypothesis for total hallucinations, Martin stands for the negative disjunctivism or the so called 'Negative Epistemicism' since he argues that hallucinations only possess negative properties of being indistinguishable by reflection alone from veridical perceptions. As he writes: «there are certain mental events, at least those hallucinations brought about through causal conditions matching those of veridical perceptions, whose only positive mental characteristics are negative epistemological ones—that they cannot be told apart by the subject from veridical perception» (Martin 2004, pp. 302–303). Also, in *On being alienated* (2006) «while there is a positive specific nature to the veridical perception, there is nothing more to the character of the (causally matching) hallucination than that it can't, through reflection, be told apart from the veridical perception» (Martin 2006, p. 370).

Furthermore, also Fish proposes an epistemic theory as Martin's but argues for a subjectively indiscriminability in which hallucinations, despite not having a phenomenal character at all, produce

[46] For more about the 'No-Common-Mental-Element' Formulation see also the proposal of Byrne and Logue (2008) of reserving the denomination of '*metaphysical disjunctivism*' only to those accounts that argue that veridical perceptions and hallucinations have no common mental element.

[47] According to Soteriou, «[T]hose advocating this form of disjunctivism place emphasis on the idea that when one veridically perceives the world one has a distinctive form of epistemic contact with the mind-independent world, and one's experience provides one with grounds for making knowledgeable perceptual judgements about the mind-independent world that would be lacking if one were merely hallucinating» (Soteriou 2020, pp. 12-13). Among the supporters of the epistemic conception of disjunctivism are Martin (2004, 2006) and Fish (2008, 2009).

the same cognitive effects and actions as perceptual veridical experiences in a subject. As he writes: «I submit, then, that a hallucination is a mental event that, while lacking phenomenal character, produces the same cognitive effects in the hallucinatory that a veridical perception of a certain kind would have produced in the same doxastic setting» (Fish 2009, p. 114). Even if the hallucination of something is still very different from its perception, it is possible for the subject to form, for example, the belief that he is actually seeing something. According to Fish «(...) a hallucination will be indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a certain kind if and only if it produces the same beliefs or judgments that a veridical perception of that kind would have produced» (Fish 2009, p. 94).[48]

2.2.2 Naïve realism

The disjunctivist position commits to a particular version of Direct Realism, the Naïve Realism, a view that rejects the CKC. Naïve Realism argues for a phenomenology of veridical experiences in which a subject perceives things (such as a pink elephant), and they appear to the subject with specific properties in virtue of the fact that the subject perceives some of their properties. In describing the Naïve Realism Martin writes:

> «[S]ome of the objects of perception—the concrete individuals, their properties, the events these partake in—are constituents of the experience. No experience like this, no experience of fundamentally the same kind, could have occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed» (Martin 2004, p. 273)

and later:

> «[T]aking sensory experiences to be events, [...] objects of perception are to be understood as constituents of the event in question. The naïve realist supposes it is an aspect of the essence of such experiential episodes that they have such experience-independent constituents» (Martin 2006, p. 357).

For example, according to the naïve realist view, when a subject has a veridical visual perception of a pink elephant, then the subject sees the pink elephant and has a direct presentation of the pink elephant, and it looks pink to him because he perceives the elephant's pinkness: his veridical

[48] See Siegel 2008 for objections to the account proposed by Fish.

perception of it is essentially constituted by the pink elephant itself. A veridical perception of a pink elephant is therefore considered as a relation of 'acquaintance' with the elephant (and some of its properties, such as the color pink). The perceptual relation determines the phenomenal character of the experience as well: the pinkness present in the phenomenal character of the subject's experience of the pink elephant is explained by the pinkness of the elephant itself.[49]

2.2.3 Objections to Disjunctivism

As Sturgeon (1998) points out, one of the first objections is that veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination share many properties. Sturgeon shows five features that are common to the three experiences, namely:

1. «Behaviourally Equivalent» (Sturgeon 1998, p.181) as a subject experiencing veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations can present similar behavioral effects and reactions in each of them without telling the situations apart.
2. «Rationally Equivalent» (Sturgeon 1998, p.181) as a subject who experienced veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations usually acts in response. His beliefs and actions are rational.
3. «Subjective» (Sturgeon 1998, p.181) as a subject who had an experience now has a Phenomenal Character or knows what-it's-like to have that experience, regardless of whether it was a veridical perception, illusion, or hallucination.
4. «Scene-Immediate» (Sturgeon 1998, p.182) veridical perception, illusion and hallucination seem to directly present the object before the mind.
5. «Indistinguishable» (Sturgeon 1998, p.182) as phenomenology alone is not sufficient to tell apart veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination. They are introspectively indistinguishable.

According to Sturgeon, all the following experiences need to involve mental states of the same kind to explain why they share these features.

[49] Naive Realism has several motivations, namely cognitive (Campbell 2022; Raleigh 2011), Epistemic (Johnston 2006, 2011; Logue 2012b), and phenomenological.

One of the central arguments against I Realism is raised by the so-called Argument from Hallucination (AFH). Together with the Argument from Illusion (AFI), the AFH animates the Problem of Perception.[50] Although there are many versions of the argument, it can be summarized by saying that it wants to prove how in ordinary veridical cases of perception the contents can be subjective images, or 'sense-data' and subjects do not have unmediated perceptual access to the world. As Crane and French show:

«The two central arguments have a similar structure which we can capture as follows:

1. In an illusory/hallucinatory experience, a subject is not directly presented with an ordinary object.

2. The same account of experience must apply to veridical experiences as applies to illusory/hallucinatory experiences.

Therefore,

3. Subjects are never directly presented with ordinary objects» (Crane and French 2021, p.10)

Another central argument is The Causal Argument for sense-data or against I Realism, a philosophical argument that supports the CKA and is usually employed to demonstrate the problems deriving from a I realist conception of perception. Although there are many ways to formulate it, the key point is in its rejection of Direct Realism while claiming that hallucinations and perceptions share both the same experiential kind and intentional objects.[51] A first reconstruction of the argument can be traditionally found in Price (1932), Moore (1957), Broad (1923), and Robinson (1994) and it is later developed by Martin (2004, pp. 53, 54) to endorse that «for certain visual

[50] As A.D. Smith writes «...they are the ones that...pose the most serious challenge to Direct Realism from within the Philosophy of Perception, and consequently raise the widest range of issues involved in a proper philosophical understanding of perception. Other arguments based on the facts of perception can, I believe, either be deflected ambulando or be independently answered without too much difficulty.» (Smith 2002, p. 15)

[51] For other discussions of the Causal Argument From Hallucination see Robinson (1994), Langsam (1997) Johnston (2004), Martin (2004), Snowdon (2005), Crane and French (2021).

experiences as of a white picket fence, namely causally matching hallucinations, there is no more to the phenomenal character of such experiences than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding visual perceptions of a white picket fence as what it is» (Martin, 2006, 369). Martin's response is to accept a form of I Realism that adheres to disjunctivism and to argue that veridical experiences and hallucinations are fundamentally different. But, at the same time, he believes the only solution would be to maintain that hallucinations share with veridical perceptions the property of being indiscriminable from some veridical perceptions.

2.3 INTERNALIST AND EXTERNALIST ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION

As Gertler (2012) shows in his reconstruction of the debate between Internalism and Externalism, «Since the work of Burge, Davidson, Kripke, and Putnam in the 1970's, philosophers of language and mind have engaged in extensive debate over the following question: Do mental content properties—such as *thinking that water quenches thirst*—supervene on properties intrinsic to the thinker? To answer affirmatively is to endorse internalism (or "individualism"); a negative answer is an expression of externalism» (Gertler 2012, p.1).[52]

Internalism and externalism are usually referred to as follows. On the one hand, Internalism argues that thought contents always supervene on properties intrinsic to the thinker. On the other hand, Externalism argues that thought contents do not always supervene on properties intrinsic to the thinker and, therefore, what happens in an individual's mind is not entirely determined by what happens in his body (including his brain). Externalism comes mainly in two forms: externalism about mental contents and externalism about the vehicles of those contents (also known as the 'Extended Mind').

[52] The debate is very articulate and complex and continues to this day. Among others, some useful references Gertler (2012), Farkas (2003, 2010) and Williamson (2000).

2.3.1 Phenomenal intentionality

At the heart of the contemporary analytical debate have recently arisen some theories that account for a form of total internalism of which also Husserl is sometimes interpreted as an exponent.[53] Among the main voices of internalism, I would like to focus on a case study, such as Mendelovici's thesis (2018) in which it seems possible to talk about intentionality without phenomenicity. This case study will be the starting point to try to analyze how and whether it is possible for intentionality (also called *Phenomenal Intentionality*) to arise from phenomenal consciousness.

The idea that phenomenal consciousness is the source of mental intentionality and that all other types of intentionality derive from phenomenal intentionality is becoming more and more prevalent in the field of philosophy of mind. In the days when Brentano and Husserl were writing, the fact that intentionality had an inseparable link with experience and thus with the phenomenal was almost taken for granted: intentionality had to do with experience and experience with the appearance of something, with the fact that something was felt and that one was in a certain state of consciousness in which something manifests itself to us. For Husserl it did not really make any sense to refer to an intentionality that was not 'conscious'.

Today, starting from a situation that is very different from that in which the Brentanian school and Husserlian phenomenology took hold, it seems that a return or recovery of the phenomenological in analytic philosophy of mind is needed. Intentionality was reintroduced into philosophy in order to talk about and understand the mental and the experience, it was then reduced to mechanisms of more or less 'intelligent' interaction with the environment that do not need experiential states and thus, after all, eliminate the phenomenal aspect. Now, there is a return to asserting the phenomenal as the central and essential moment of any intentional relation. Mendelovici (2018) emblematically represents this restoration of value to the phenomenal moment of intentional experience.

[53] See Loar (1990); Pitt (2004); Kriegel (2007, 2011, 2013); Montague (2010, 2016); Horgan (2013); Mendelovici and Bourget (2014) and Mendelovici (2018) among the other members of the so-called PIRP (Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program).

The position of Mendelovici adheres to a strong version of the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (PIT) and can be summed up as follows. The core idea of the PIT is that «[A]ll (actual) originally intentional states arise from phenomenal consciousness» (Mendelovici 2018, p. 84). We can identify two "levels": one concerning the Phenomenal Consciousness and one concerning the Phenomenal Intentionality, namely «[i]ntentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness» (Mendelovici 2018, p. 85). If we focus on the level of phenomenal consciousness, we can see that it is characterized by the presence of phenomenal states, (phenomenally) conscious mental states or (phenomenal) experiences, phenomenal properties, and phenomenal character. If we move on to phenomenal intentionality, we will see that it presents similarities with the phenomenal consciousness as it is described by phenomenal intentional properties, phenomenal intentional states, and phenomenal content.

A particularly important component of Mendelovici's proposal concerns the fact that the properties under scrutiny are those that belong to 'interior states' and correspond to how things are or could be. It seems the form of internalism in the meaning promoted by Kriegel and Mendelovici leads to considering secondary qualities as solely mental/subjective. If we were to endorse a strong form of internalism, we would consider hallucinations and perceptions as potentially indistinguishable. When a subject sees a pink elephant, the property is not that of the object itself, such as the color or the pinkness of the observed elephant, but rather the pinkness of the subject's state when it turns to an object and understands it as pink. Thus, according to Mendelovici, what actually appears is never something objective or external, but is always only an aspect of the intentional subject, or an aspect of the intentional state that occasionally occurs.

Mendelovici's perspective stands with an internalist position whereby the contents matter to the extent that they are internal to the mental act itself and, as a result, they are part of the experiencing subject. This can be in contrast with a Husserlian framework in which the content is not something that appears, but *the way in which* the object appears, as I will show in Chapter 4.[54]

[54]The debate regarding Husserl's position on internalism versus externalism is marked by a breadth of perspectives. Traditionally, there is a tendency to interpret him as an internalist. Dreyfus (1991; 1988), Dreyfus and Hall (1982), and McIntyre (1982; 1986) among others have leaned towards this view. On the other hand, A.D. Smith (2008) stands out as the main proponent of an externalist interpretation of Husserl.

2.4 INTERPRETATIONS OF THE HUSSERLIAN POSITION IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE ABOUT HALLUCINATIONS

Husserl's view of perceptual experience and perceptual error has been analyzed in the ongoing debate in order to determine whether he was a conjunctivitis or a disjunctivist (or neither of them, see for example Drummond (2012), Staiti (2015), Zahavi (2017) and Cimino (2021)).

Among others, D. W. Smith (2012), D. W. Smith and McIntyre (1982), B. Smith (1986), B. Smith and Mulligan (1986), Romano (2012) and Bower (2020) account for a conjunctivist reading. Although the main focus of these writers is on interpreting Husserl's viewpoint as presented in *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy I* [55] (Husserl, 1984), a comparable interpretation of the *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 2001) is also possible (as argued by Bower 2020).

On the other hand, there are some convincing accounts for a husserlian disjunctivist interpretation. For example, Mohanty (1992) appeals to a dyadic understanding of intentionality in which the perceptual experience is considered as inherently relational and object dependent. This idea is also held by Drummond (2012; 2015), Meixner (2016), and Zahavi (2017).

Generally speaking, we can say that the currently existing literature seems to lean towards a conjunctivist interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, even if it does not seem to be particularly detailed or linked to textual references. This was at least until the contribution in defense of a

---

In contrast to Dreyfus and McIntyre, Zahavi (2004) starts from his interpretation of Noema to argue that although according to him there are elements in Husserlian phenomenology that lean toward an externalist interpretation, in fact Husserl remains external to the debate. Zahavi's subsequent work in 2008 further complicates the issue, positioning him outside the conventional internalism/externalism dichotomy. Also, Alweiss (2009) focusing on *Logical investigations*, seeks to understand whether the consensus usually attributed in analytic philosophy that Husserl was an internalist and that his internalism should be understood alongside his methodological solipsism is justified. Alweiss does not believe that Husserl can be defined as a methodological solipsist and seeks to highlight how this makes it more difficult to define Husserl's place within the internalism/externalism debate. As I hope will emerge from the fourth chapter, I am more likely to consider Husserl as an externalist.

[55] From now on "Ideas I"

disjunctivist reading of Husserl by A. D. Smith (2008), which was later endorsed by Hopp (2011), Poellner (2007), Zahavi (2017) and Overgaard (2013; 2018).

THIRD CHAPTER

3. HALLUCINATIONS AND PSYCHIATRY

The distinction between conjunctivism and disjunctivism presented in the first chapter is a theoretical construction that relies on empirical phenomena. Although the goals of this master's thesis are purely philosophical, the purpose of the following analysis on the development of the hallucinatory symptom in psychiatry is two-fold. On the one hand, I believe it is necessary to show the empirical basis of the phenomenon while, on the other, I would like to draw attention to the fact that there is not a precise definition that can adequately encompass the hallucinatory phenomenon's complexity.[56] Therefore, after contextualizing and problematizing hallucinations within the contemporary debate, I believe it is worth analyzing how the term 'hallucination' was introduced into the psychiatric medical lexicon.

In scientific and clinical literature, hallucinations are often generically defined in the same way, i.e., as perceptions that occur in the absence of any appropriate external stimulus. With respect to their psychopathological classification, however, they are brought under the umbrella of perception disorders and are then distinguished into auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory according to the sensory area involved.

[56] For more about the phenomenology of hallucinations and their clinical implications see Gauntlett-Gilbert, J., & Kuipers, E. (2003) and Larøi, F. (2006).

3.1 SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF HALLUCINATORY PHENOMENA

One of the most difficult notions in psychiatry to identify and distinguish from other psychopathological concepts is the one of hallucination. The scientific and medical understanding of hallucinations didn't emerge until the seventeenth and eighteenth century.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the problem of the definition of hallucinations faced the psychiatric scene bringing with it several problematic issues. First, the French psychiatrist and scientist Jean Étienne Dominique Esquirol proposes a "basic" definition that is still used today. According to Esquirol: «[u]n homme qui a la conviction intime d'une sensation actuellement perçue, alors que nul objet extérieur propre à exciter cette sensation n'est à la portée de ses sens, est dans un état hallucinatoire: c'est un visionnaire» (Esquirol 1838, p. 159). Esquirol takes up the first simpler definition of "perception without object" stressing that hallucinations occur in the brain when the deceptive sensations that are independent from the sense organs present to the mind objects that do not exist and lead the patient to delirium. Thereafter a significant discussion on hallucinations was launched in French psychiatry. There were two distinct positions: the first wondered if hallucinations are the result of anomalies in the senses or if they are an uncontrollable use of memory and imagination; the second if hallucinations were always correlated to underlying pathologies or if they can also happen in absence of a mental disorder.

Shortly after, Baillarger in *Des hallucinations. Mémoires de L'Académie Royale de Médecine* (1846) examines the possibility of hallucination-like experiences in which 'sensoriality' is lacking and makes a distinction between psychosensorial and psychical hallucinations. Furthermore, he introduces the difference between psychosensory hallucinations and psychic hallucinations by arguing how psychical hallucinations result from «the involuntary exercise of memory and imagination and by the suppression of external impressions. The internal excitation of the sensorial system is not needed as the phenomenon is not related to the activity of this system» (Baillarger 1846, p. 470). In 1851 the French psychiatrist Michéa raised the idea of the “false hallucinations” understood as intermediates between an idea and true hallucinations. In *Du Délire des Sensations* (1851) he writes «[f]alse hallucination is more than an idea, since its object reveals a vivid and defined

shape, which is very close to the appearance of a physical element, but is less than a true hallucination, as it will never impose itself as a real perception, however vivid and defined it is» (Michéa, 1851, pp. 113–114).

In *Etudes cliniques. Traité théorique et pratique des maladies mentales considérées dans leur nature, leur traitement, et dans leur rapport avec la médecine légale des aliénés* (1852-1853) the french psychyatrist Bénédict Augustin Morel takes from Esquirol the idea of mental illness understood as 'alienation' and integrates it with more specific terms of the medical field: «[l]'hallucination et l'illusion sont des phénomènes dont la production nécessite le double concours des agents du monde extérieur, et de l'action du système nerveux. Toute modification apportée au système nerveux par des agents qui opèrent sur lui immédiatement, sont de nature à produire, comme nous l'avons vu, soit des hallucinations, soit des illusions» (Morel 1852-1853, pp. 463, 464). He specifically argues that the division between illusion and hallucination, where the first phenomenon is a perception corresponding to an object while the second is a perception without object, is no longer possible when studying the intellectual and physiological functions in the alienated subject. This is because, despite acknowledging that hallucinations are really perceived sensations, in the alienated subject they can fuel a delusional idea and turn it into a hallucination. Falret in *Des maladies mentales et des asiles d'aliénés, leçons Cliniques et considérations générales* (1864) writes «[t]he hallucination is a perception without object, as has been often repeated» (Falret 1864, p. 264).

Later on, in 1885, Kandinskiĭ focuses on pseudohallucinations describing them «subjective perceptions which in vividness and character resemble real hallucinations except that they do not have objective reality... my hallucinations are not just images generated by imagination or memory but are sensorially full and involuntary» (Kandinskiĭ 1885, p. 134). His definition of 'pseudo-hallucination' is particularly interesting because it would be taken up and commented on by the philosopher and psychopathologist Jaspers in 1911: «Kandinskiĭ in the year 1885 separated from true hallucinations a group of phenomena which he explained as a pathological subcategory of the sensory representations of memory and imagination...these are different from both representations (Vorstellungen) and from true hallucinations in that they have far more sensory content than the former...and lack in the fullness, objectivity and exteriority of the latter» (Jaspers, 1911, pp. 460-461). In 1922 in *L'origine et la nature des hallucinations* Bleuler defines hallucinations as

representations to which the subject attributes a perceptual value and as «perceptions without corresponding stimuli from without» and in 1958, Straus and Morgan in *Aesthesiology and Hallucination* describe them as «[h]allucinations originate in the medium of distorted modalities. They appear at points where the I-world relations are pathologically transformed» (Straus and Morgan 1958, p. 162).

In 1913, Jaspers published the first edition of the *General Psychopathology*. On the one hand, he wants to provide a strict classification of the symptoms that make up the psychic phenomena, focusing on the subjective experience of the patient, On the other hand, he intends to reflect on the methodology and tools by which psychopathology approaches patients. He points out that the patient's feelings can be the fulcrum of the psychopathological experience if, once communicated, the psychopathologist succeeds in re-actualizing them in his own inner world. A first limitation of this process concerns the communication of psychotic experiences, primary delusions and hallucinations that cannot be internalized. With respect to hallucinatory phenomena, Jaspers takes up the distinction of Esquirol, defines illusions as coming from real perceptions and describes hallucinations as false perceptions that do not arise from the transformation of real perceptions, but in a completely new way, alongside and simultaneously with real perceptions.

After distinguishing between illusions of inattention, emotional illusions and pareidolies, he focuses on the phenomenon of the persistence of images in the retina, sensory memory, fantastic visual phenomena, and subjective optical images. In particular, he draws a clear profile of perceptions defining them as constant phenomena that have a body and objectivity character, that appear in the external objective space, have a defined pattern, are complete and extremely detailed, are constant, can be easily maintained in the same way and are independent of will: they cannot be evoked but only passively accepted. He then goes on to compare them with the representations describing them, on the contrary, as phenomena that have an imaginary and subjective character, appear in the subjective interior space of the representation, have an indefinite, incomplete pattern, are so inadequate that they lack details, even colors, and are dependent on will: they can be actively recalled and modified at will by the subject since they are actively produced.

In 1973 Ey defined hallucinations as related to sensory appearance of the experience, conviction of its reality and absence of a real object. In 2005, Tribolet distinguishes psychosensory hallucinations (objectified by one of the five senses; characterized by their spatiality; associated with the conviction of their objective reality) and psychic hallucinations (absence of sensoriality; absence of spatiality; exclusive mental representation) and refers to the hallucination as an experience close to a real perception having the same intensity and impact and which appears spontaneously and cannot be controlled. Oliver Sacks (2013) defines hallucinations as perceptions that originate in the absence of an external reality, whereby the subject is led to see or hear something that does not exist. However, to the person experiencing them, hallucinations feel absolutely real: they imitate every aspect of perception and are projected into the external world. They can be alarming because of their content or because of the lack of objective feedback when the subject realizes that something that he is perceiving as real, in fact does not exist.

In contemporary psychiatry, visual hallucinations are rarely considered as determinants for diagnosis and are rather associated with toxic and metabolic disorders, drug withdrawal syndromes and hallucinogen-induced states, focal central nervous system lesions and migraines and migraines coma. The psychiatric conditions hallucinations are usually related to are schizophrenia, psychotic mood disorders, narcolepsy-cataplexy syndrome, Parkinson's disease, Charles Bonnet syndrome (visual hallucinations of the blind), and epilepsy. Specifically, patients who experience them are often referred not to the clinical-psychiatric area as is the case, for example, with certain forms of neurodegenerative diseases or situations induced by chemical narcotics. To date, the DSM-V (2013) is conventionally used to define them in purely clinical terms.

3.2 COMMON GROUNDS BETWEEN PSYCHIATRY, PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

How can psychiatry help to distinguish hallucinations and perceptions? During the process of perception, we become aware of our surroundings through our senses, such as sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Perception, which is influenced by both the sensory input we receive and our prior knowledge and expectations, is typically thought of as a trustworthy and accurate representation of the outside world. Hallucinations, on the other hand, are sensory events that take place in the absence

of outside stimuli. By examining the subjective experience of the individual as well as the underlying neurological and cognitive processes involved in each experience, psychiatry can contribute to better understand the distinctions between perception and hallucination. In the case of auditory hallucinations, for instance, psychiatrists may question patients about the nature of the voices they hear, whether they recognize the voices, and whether they believe the voices are coming from inside or outside of their own heads. All these elements can aid in separating a hallucinatory experience from a veridical perception of external speech.

Clinical cases can provide us with valuable insights to understand hallucinations. We can refer to the hallucinations described by one of the patients of Sacks: Rosalie, a lady who suddenly started having hallucinations with a strong sense of reality. As Sacks writes:

> «"People in Eastern dress!" she exclaimed. "In drapes, walking up and down stairs ... a man who turns towards me and smiles, but he has huge teeth on one side of his mouth. Animals, too. I see this scene with a white building, and it is snowing—a soft snow, it is swirling. I see this horse (not a pretty horse, a drudgery horse) with a harness, dragging snow away ... but it keeps switching.... I see a lot of children; they're walking up and down stairs. They wear bright colors—rose, blue—like Eastern dress." She had been seeing such scenes for several days» (Sacks 2013, pp. 11).

Considered from a psychiatric perspective that focuses on clinical features, this patient's experience of seeing things that are not there is classified as a hallucination caused because she suffers from the Charles Bonnet Syndrome. From a philosophical perspective, the debate between conjunctivism and disjunctivism can also shed light on the relation between perception and hallucination in this clinical case.

The experience of visual hallucinations in this patient, according to a conjunctivist, can be interpreted as a complex combination of abnormal sensory input and activity in the visual cortex and mental states: the patient's experience of seeing things that aren't there is a distorted form of perception brought on by abnormal sensory information processed in the brain. Contrarily, a disjunctivist might claim that the experience of seeing things that are not there is fundamentally distinct from ordinary perception and cannot be limited to a conjunction of sensory input and mental states. The disjunctivist might suggest that having visual hallucinations is a subjective, non-veridical experience without an external reference, and this means that it is not a form of perception

at all, but rather a peculiar kind of experience that cannot be properly described by the traditional categories of perception. By integrating the different approaches of phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, it can be possible to gain insights into the underlying nature of perceptual experience and its relationship to mental illness.[57] But how can the phenomenological debate properly contribute to psychiatry and how can a husserlian perspective account for hallucinations?

[57] There is a vast literature that proposes interesting approaches that integrate phenomenology and psychiatry. See, among others, K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler e Giovanni Stanghellini (2013), Bornemark, J., & Wallenstein, S. O. (2015), Macpherson, F., & Platchias, D. (2013), Larsen, R. R., Maschião, L. F., Piedade, V. L., Messas, G., & Hastings, J. (2022), Summa, M. (2022), Zahavi, D., & Loidolt, S. (2022), Kyzar, E. J., & Denfield, G. H. (2023).

FOURTH CHAPTER

4. TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF HALLUCINATIONS

To briefly summarize what was said above and properly introduce the fourth chapter, it is possible to say that the conjunctivist and the disjunctivist positions disagree with respect to defining the nature of hallucinatory and perceptual experience. As the second chapter underlines, on the one hand, disjunctivism denies and, on the other, conjunctivism endorses that hallucinations and veridical perceptions can be experiences of the same fundamental kind. What they both seem to agree on is that the subject is unable to distinguish between a veridical perception and a hallucination. However, the fact that for the subject these two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable (even if only at first glance and given certain altered mental states) does not mean that they cannot be profoundly different. There are of course some aspects in which a hallucination can be distinguished from a veridical perception; otherwise, the distinction between the two would fall apart. Therefore, a definition of hallucinations that separates them from the realm of perceptions should be adopted: hallucinations can be similar to perceptions, but only in certain ways.

For this reason, to try to claim some further kind of distinguishability, I turned to psychiatry. The goal of the third chapter was to highlight how hallucinations are considered in the psychiatric field. Actually, as we have just seen, psychiatry does not offer particularly satisfactory answers. Indeed, it seems to relegate hallucinations to their manifestation as a 'symptom' of a more serious psychiatric condition and to stick to the definition historically adopted. While the transition from psychiatry to phenomenology may initially appear somewhat abrupt, I maintain that this shift is a crucial step in constructing the most comprehensive and articulate framework to thoroughly address the complexities of the problem. The phenomenological approach exposed in this chapter will be crucial to deepen the difference between hallucinations and veridical perceptions and bring out the

role of subjectivity within perception to explain, as a result, what happens within a hallucinatory process. It will also help us to better determine whether it is really possible to admit that the subject *in principle* cannot distinguish between hallucinations and veridical perceptions.

First, I will consider some of the main features of intentionality, perception, phantasy, and memory according to Husserlian phenomenology with particular attention to the definition of external perceptions and their objects to properly introduce and then focus on the features of the *Auffassung*. More specifically, the Husserlian position and the interpretations proposed by Hopp (2008) and Williford (2013) will offer us useful tools to understand why the role played by the *Auffassung* is so important to define hallucinations according to a phenomenological perspective without falling for such an idealized scenario as in perfect hallucinations.

4.1 INTENTIONAL ACTS AND INTENTIONAL OBJECTS

The object of phenomenology is the activity of consciousness investigated in its essential structure in a phenomenological reflection. Perception, phantasy, and memory are all different kinds of conscious intentional acts that are part of the activity of consciousness. All experiences share a fundamental feature, which is intentionality. Any conscious experience, when considered as a whole, will show intentionality, which is the directedness to an object, even though some parts of experiences might not themselves be intentionally directed. In the second of the *Cartesian Meditations* (1960), Husserl writes «[c]onscious processes are also called *intentional*; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness *of* something» (Husserl 1960, p. 33). To begin, we could start analyzing Husserl's position in the *Logical Investigations* and in *Ideas I* regarding intentional acts and intentional objects.

According to *Logical Investigations*, Husserl writes: «[i]n the descriptive content of every act we have *quality* and material as two moments mutually requiring one another» (Husserl 2001b). Every act of consciousness has inherent moments, namely the matter, the quality, and the intentional essence, that constitute the conditions for its intentionality.

- the matter of the act is the way in which an object is intended, described as:

«*That element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant*. The matter is that peculiar side of an act's phenomenological content that not only determines *that* it grasps the object but also *as what* it grasps it, the properties, relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributes to it. It is the act's matter that makes its object count as this object and no other, it is *the objective, the interpretative sense (Sinn der gegenständlichen Auffassung, Auffassungssinn)* which serves as basis for the act's quality (while indifferent to such qualitative differences). Identical matters can never yield distinct objective references, as the above examples prove» (Husserl 2001b, pp. 121, 122).

It is also defined as a moment of the objectifying act: «'Matter' was classed as that moment in an objectifying act which makes the act present *just this object in just this manner,* i.e., in just these articulations and forms, and with special relation to just these properties or relationships» (Husserl 2001b, p. 240).

- the quality of the act is a moment common to all intentional acts, it is «the general act-character, which stamps an act as merely presentative, judgmental, emotional, desiring, etc.» (Husserl 2001b, p. 119). The matter of the act needs to go with the quality of the act, since quality «(...) only determines whether what is already presented [*das vorstellig Gemachte*] *in definite fashion* is intentionally present [*gegenwärtig*] as wished, asked, posited in judgement etc.» (Husserl 2001b, p. 121)

- the union of quality and matter corresponds to the intentional essence [*Wesen*] of the act. In the *Ideas I* the intentional essence will be referred to as "noema", i.e., the intentional correlate

- the intentional object is intended through the matter of the act and is considered transcendent to the act that intends it

As Bernet, Kern, and Marbach (1993) underline, in *Ideas I* the development of the phenomenological analysis of intentionality improves with the determination of the intentional correlate (Noema), the forms of noematic givenness and function (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993, p. 96). After distinguishing between the sensory hyle, i.e., the sensory experiences, and the intentional morphé, i.e., the form that makes sensory contents stand for something beyond themselves (Husserl 1984, pp. 203f), Husserl opens the third chapter with the introduction of noesis and noema.

- Noesis is what is done noetically (so to speak on a mental or psychological level) with sensory data. It seems to combine two things: the articulation of sensory data (as it includes the *morphe*) and what in *Logical Investigations* was called quality of the act. Since noesis is a part of consciousness, Husserl also includes the hyletic data, which undergo a conferral of sense and contribute to the construction of a noematic sense. The Noetic moment is very complex, and Husserl does not provide an explicit accurate definition, but he writes:

  «[s]uch noetic moments are, e.g., directions of the regard of the pure Ego to the objects "meant" by it owing tosense-bestowal, to the object which is "inherent in the sense" for the Ego; furthermore, seizing upon this object, holding it fast while the regard adverts to other objects which appear in the "meaning" ["*Vermeinen*"]; likewise, producings pertaining to explicatings, relatings, comprisings, multiple position-takings of believings, deemings likely, valuings; and so forth. All of these are to be found in the mental processes in question, no matter how differently structured and varied they are. Now, no matter to what extent this series of exemplary moments refer to really inherent components of mental processes, they nevertheless also refer to what is not really inherent, namely by means of the heading of sense» (Husserl 1984, p. 214).

- «Corresponding in every case to the multiplicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent noetic content, there is a multiplicity of Data, demonstrable in actual pure intuition, in a correlative "*noematic content*" or, in short, in the "*noema*" – terms which we shall continue to use form now on» (Husserl 1984, p. 214). The noema takes the place of the Brentanian intentional object: here, it is the way in which the hyletic data are brought into shape by the intentional morphe and acquire meaning. As Bernet, Kern, and Marbach write «The intentional correlate or noema is thus introduced as a structure of being objectively intended or as an object of cognition "to the extent that and in the manner that" it may be laid claim to within the phenomenological reduction» (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993, p. 96). To take an example that Husserl also proposes in *Ideas I*, in a perception of a tree we find: the perceived as such (tree) where the real object (the tree) can be subject to a series of changes

and has real properties, while the noema (i.e., "the sense of this perception") has no real properties.[58]

4.2 PERCEPTION, IMAGINATION AND MEMORY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

Before we start going into detail with respect to perception, imagination, and memory, it must be emphasized the terminological difference that can be drawn between presentations and *re*-presentations. Perception is a presentation [*Gegenwärtigung*] and memory, phantasy, expectation[59] and image consciousness[60] are *re*-presentations [*Vergegenwärtigung*]. There are two basic forms of *re*-presentations: the reproductive one [*Reproduktive Vergegenwärtigung*], included by memory and

[58] «[T]he three simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense - the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence - cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties» (Husserl 1984, p. 216)

[59] Expectations are defined as the consciousness of what is future «by re-presenting a future act of perceiving in which an object will actually stand before me in person» (Brough 2005, p. XXXV).

[60] Although I will not deal extensively with image consciousness, I think a brief description may be useful. According to Husserl, image consciousness is a perceptual *re*-presentation that comes into play every time we look at something such as an image, a painting, a photograph, the screen of our computer or the television. In every image-consciousness, the *Bildsujet* must be distinguished from the *Bildobjekt,* and both must be considered present to the subject who must be aware of both aspects in order to believe he is dealing with an image and not the thing itself. Image consciousness is also said to have three objects, namely: «1) the physical image, the physical thing made from canvas, marble, and so on; 2) the representing or depicting object; and 3) the represented or depicted object. For the latter, we prefer to say simply "*image subject*" [*Bild-sujet*]; for the first object, we prefer "physical image" [*Bildding*]; for the second, "representing image" or "image object [*Bild-objekt*]» (Husserl 2005, p. 21). The three objects of the unitary depictive act are matched on the side of apprehensions with three distinct and inseparable apprehensions.

phantasy, and the perceptual one [*Perzeptive Vergegenwärtigung*], which Husserl usually refers to as image consciousness.[61]

4.2.1 Perception

The manner in which objects are given in and for consciousness can be considered the starting point for the phenomenological analysis of the perception of spatial objects. Perception has several fundamental determinations. In *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory* (2005)[62] Husserl describes perceptions according to some of their essential features which I will now sum up.

In a perception the subject is conscious of an object as *present*: «[t]he present, as primarily and actually given present, becomes constituted intuitively in the act of perceiving» (Husserl 2005, p. 109) and «factually existing» (Husserl 2005, p. 214).[63] Two other fundamental characteristics of perceptual givenness are the *in person* [*leibhaftig*] of its correlate and the modalities of the present and of the "just now".

As far as the *in person* is concerned, the phenomenological analysis of the perception of external objects moves from the conscious givenness of these objects. As Husserl writes: «[a]n individual is perceived in the strict sense when one is conscious of it in the originary mode, in the mode of actuality "in person," or, more precisely, of primal actuality "in person," which is called the present» (Husserl 2005, p. 601). Perception is a dynamic experience that involves both temporal presence (the object is perceived as now existing) and what we might call "spatial" presence (the object is not *re*-presented but is directly in front of the perceiver), which together give rise to presence

[61] In the first chapter of *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory* (2005) Husserl also distinguishes between phantasy presentations [*Phantasievorstellung*] and perceptual presentations [*Wahrnehmungsvorstellung*] (Husserl 2005, p. 1).

[62] The part dedicated to Phantasy and Image Consciousness can be found in the Husserliana XXIII, in the third section of the lecture course Husserl delivered at Göttingen in the winter semester of 1904–1905 on the "Principal Parts of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge".

[63] «The possibility of reflection belongs to the essence of perception: Instead of focusing my attention on the object, I can focus it on <the> act of perceiving the object, on the appearing of the object itself and on its being believed and taken to be factually existing» (Husserl 2005, p. 214)

in the flesh [*Leibhaftigkeit*], that is, the defining characteristic of perception. The perceived object is present and is in front of the perceiver in the first person, in the flesh.

As said before, the presence *in person* involves also a temporal presence that connects directly to time-consciousness.[64] In *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1964), Husserl distinguishes three moments: the «primal impression» (Husserl 1964, p. 50) or «primordial sensation» to which we simultaneously are given retention defined as a «further-consciousness [*zurückhaltendes Noch-Bewusstsein*]» (Husserl 1964 p. 106) that holds back and protention defined as anticipation and expectation of what is about to happen on the basis of the object of the retention consciousness, a "projected shadow" or a projection of the past, as an expectation, into the future. These three moments-primordial impressions, retention, and protention constitute for Husserl the concrete living present, that is, the «primordial temporal» (Husserl 1964, p. 24) or «originary temporal field [*originäres Zeitfeld*]» (Husserl 1964, p. 52). This field consists in a now with a "temporal fringe," that is, with a living horizon of the no-longer (the just past) and the not-yet (the now approaching) in various gradations. In this manner of modification and modification of modification, the retention:

> «is in itself a continuous modification which, so to speak, bears in itself the heritage [Erbe] of the past in the form of a series of shadings. It is not true that lengthwise along the flux each earlier retention is merely replaced by a new one, even though it is a continuous process. Each subsequent retention, rather, is not merely a continuous modification arising from the primal impression but a continuous modification of the same beginning point» (Husserl 1964, p. 51).

The physical object is given to us over time one-sidedly and partially by means of perspectival foreshadowings or adumbrations [*Abschattungen*]. In the visual perception of a pink elephant, for example, we see only certain "sides" or "aspects", while the other sides of the same pink elephant inevitably remain outside the visual field (e.g., the back side, the underside, a covered side, etc.). The

[64] To quote Husserl «it [the individual] is given retentionally as just having been perceived, as something that was just given immediately but in its flowing is still sinking into the past; or it is given protentionally as something that in its flowing is just now approaching, as something that is just about to be given immediately» (Husserl 2005, p. 601).

pink elephant as an external physical object will always be given partially through adumbrations [*Abschattungen*].

Strictly related to the temporal and spatial presence and the givenness through adumbrations is what Husserl calls 'horizon'. In *Ideas I* he writes:

> «Of necessity a physical thing can be given only "one-sidedly;" and that signifies, not just incompletely or imperfectly in some sense or other, but precisely what presentation by adumbrations prescribes. A physical thing is necessarily given in mere "modes of appearance" in which necessarily a core of "what is actually presented" is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of "co-givenness," which is not givenness proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness. And the sense of this indeterminateness is, again, pre delineated by the universal essence of this type of perception which we call physical-thing perception» (Husserl 1984, p. 94)

When a subject perceives something such as a red apple, there is an experience that is given to him as a real red apple present in the flesh before him. To say that it is a real red apple it is to prescribe certain further possible appearances that it will display: if the subject reaches out and touch it, he will feel something solid and smooth, if he walks around it, he will see something that looks similar to each side, if he lifts it up it will have some weight and so on. This set of presentations that can be ascribed to the red apple are what, according to Husserlian terminology, we can call 'horizon'. If any of those presentations fail (for example if he reaches out and touches it and his hand goes through or if they do not last), he has to revise the original content of his experience and admit it was an illusion or a hallucination. In the second of the *Cartesian Meditations* (1960), Husserl refers to horizons as «a potentiality of awakenable recollections» (Husserl 1960, p. 44)[65] and as «"predelineated" potentialities» (Husserl 1960, p. 45). He also writes:

> «We say also: We can *ask any horizon what "lies in it"*, we can *explicate* or unfold it, and "*uncover*" the potentialities of conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the *objective sense* meant *implicitly* in the actual cogito, though never with more than a certain

[65] «(...) to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception. Everywhere in this connexion an "I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing" plays its part - without detriment to the fact that this "freedom", like every other, is always open to possible hindrances» (Husserl 1960, pp. 44, 45)

> degree of foreshadowing. This sense, the *cogitatum qua cogitatum*, is never present to actual consciousness [*vorstellig*] as a finished datum; it becomes "clarified" only through explication of the given horizon and the new / horizons continuously awaked [*der stetig neu geweckten Horizonte*]. The predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its *indeterminateness*, it has a *determinate structure*» (Husserl 1960, p. 45)[66]

Thus, every consciousness of something has the essential property of being able to relate to new modes of consciousness of the same object according to horizon intentionalities. Although there is no particularly precise definition of the different ways in which the horizon is to be understood, it is possible to distinguish between the inner and outer horizon:

- Outer: although not being at the center of attention as the intended object, the outer horizon is perceived and co-intended. The consciousness of the outer horizon does not have a thing as its object, but the object submerged beyond what is at the center of attention.
- Inner: the inner horizon has as its object the set of determinations within the apprehensional sense. It includes an object's past experiences, potential future experiences regarding its aspects, as well as potential experiences in which the object might have been different, such as different perspectives.

When it comes to perceptions as consciousness of what is actually present, sensations are a fundamental element constituted by an actual sensory datum experienced within consciousness. Sensations are defined in several different ways, for example as «the mark of reality; all reality is measured over against it; it is a primary, actual present» (Husserl 2005, p. 11). This means that when a subject sees a pink elephant there is something as "pink" that is a sensory content and is present in his consciousness that is interpreted (undergoes *Auffassung* as a perceptual apprehension of an elephant) and constitutes the perceptual appearance of the existing pink elephant in front of me.

[66] «For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already "construed" in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This leaving open, prior to further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the "horizon". As contrasted with mere clarification by means of anticipative "imaginings", there takes place, by means of an actually continuing perception, a *fulfilling* further determination (and perhaps determination as otherwise) - but with new horizons of openness» (Husserl 1960, p. 45)

Sensations can be also analyzed with respect to their equivalent in fantasy and memory: *phantasmata*. Husserl writes: «[s]ensations serve as the basis for perceptions; sensuous phantasms serve as the basis for phantasies. But one can then ask: Are phantasms identical in genus with sensations — speaking descriptively, of course, not genetically — or are they different?» (Husserl 2005, p. 11). The complex relationship between sensations and phantasmata introduced here deserves to be adequately deepened as it will be fundamental for the fourth chapter.[67]

Finally, another essential feature to perception is belief. As Husserl writes «[p]erception has a perceptual appearance (an originary appearance) in the *mode* of belief (also originary)» (Husserl 2005, p. 345). If the perception is uncontested, the subject is conscious of and believes in the objects he perceived: «[t]he uncontested perception is belief; specifically, originally intuitive belief that phenomenally constitutes what is actually present as present» (Husserl 2005, p. 88). However, the perception is always challenged and can be turned into doubt and corrected or canceled, as in the case of misperceptions or illusions, with what Husserl calls a «doubting apprehension» (Husserl 2005, p. 336).[68]

4.2.2 Phantasy (or Imagination)

Although phantasy (or imagination) pervades our everyday existence, determining its essence is a major phenomenological problem. One of the reasons behind these difficulties is that we often use the term 'imagination' or 'imagine that...' without really paying attention to it. And this naivety is clearly highlighted by Husserl in the first text *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory* in which he says that:

> Everyone knows what it means to re-present an object to oneself, to bring it forward in an internal image, to make it hover before one. Everyone uses the expression "to imagine"

[67] Cfr. par. 3.2

[68] The question of the conflict of interpenetrating apprehension will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4 and chapter 4, for now we can anticipate that Husserl opposes the 'contested present' to the uncontested perception as 'the conflict of an appearance belonging to the present with an uncontested appearance' (Husserl 2005, p. 88).

> [einbilden], and thus knows to some extent what is essential to the case. But only implicitly, I am sorry to say (Husserl 2005, pp. 17, 18).

In order to adequately account for phantasies, the phenomenological analysis must move away from common understandings that employ the concept of phantasy generically and ambiguously. We can imagine, taking up an example proposed by Husserl in the text, an artist who sees fantastic figures, for example a centaur or a mermaid: the artist would not believe that the centaur he is imagining is actually there in person or that he has ever perceived it in the past. We can define his internal presentification of anomalous experiences in which fantastic creatures appear as the «hovering of something before one in phantasy [*vorschweben*]» (Husserl 2005, p. 3)[69], which is opposed to the external manifestation of an object as present in perception.

Phantasy and perception can be directed toward the same object, but the crucial difference lies in that a subject who phantasies is able to "see" non-existing objects (as we just showed in the case of a centaur).[70] Although this is an important difference, the distinction between phantasy and perception does not lie solely in the ontological status of their object. Although the object of phantasy, unlike the object of perception, is not present in person or in the flesh, «[t]he phantasy appearance, the simple phantasy appearance unencumbered by any imaging built on it, relates to its object just as *straightforwardly* as perception does» (Husserl 2005, p. 92). As we have just seen, there are neat differences between the object of perception, which is relatively stable, present, and actually

[69] «[P]erhaps it is best to use the expression "*to hover before us*" [*vorschweben*] here. This is then suitable for every intentional content that we can find in reproductive acts; for example, the correlates that are certainly not objects and yet are "given in consciousness" [*bewusst*] in a manner different from objects. And [given] in reproductive acts in a way different from the impressional» (Husserl 2005, p. 405).

[70] It is possible to imagine both existing and non-existing objects: the focus is that in phantasy both are given as not actual and are apprehended as not really present.

[*wirklich*] given, and that of fantasy, which continuously fluctuates in form, color, and fullness of detail, is unstable, re-presented and inactually [*unwirklich*] given.[71]

However, following Husserl's explanation, it is possible to positively characterize the object of phantasy by three determinations: the "as it was" [*gleichsam*][72], whereby the subject is conscious of what he is phantasizing *as if it were* existing, the "as if" [*als ob*], the character whereby everything perceived can appear in phantasy, and the "quasi-"[73]. The second character listed, the "as if" seems particularly important to distinguish the phantasied object from the perceived one:

> «And correlatively, corresponding to this as-if experiencing, a concrete individual stands before our eyes as determined in such and such a way in content, but only in the as-if. In lively intuition we "behold" centaurs, water nymphs, etc.; they stand before us, depart, present themselves from this side and that, sing and dance, and so on. All, however, in the mode of the "as-if "; and this mode saturates all of the temporal modes and with them also the content, which is content only in temporal modes» (Husserl 2005, p. 606).

Therefore, perception is an «act in which something objective appears to us in its own person, as it were, as present itself» (Husserl 2005, p. 18) while in phantasy «the object itself appears (insofar as it is precisely the *object* that appears there), but it does not appear as present. It is only re-presented; it is as though it were there, but only as though» (Husserl 2005, p. 18). Without trying too hard, we can think of some everyday situations in which perception and phantasy coexist, so much so that Husserl even goes so far as to ask whether there can really be a «*pure phantasy*, hence a phantasy

---

[71] Since «[p]hantasms hover before me fleetingly, now making their appearance, now disappearing; they are not steady. They also change in content; they do not constantly maintain their colors, forms, etc.» (Husserl 2005, p. 13), therefore also «[t]he object can even hover before us in phantasy in an appearance exactly like the appearance in which it was perceived: it appears from the same side, as "seen from the same standpoint," in the same illumination, coloring, adumbration, and so on» (Husserl 2005, pp. 17, 18).

[72] According to Husserl «*Pure phantasy* does not have this character. To be sure, it is perception "as it were"; I see, as it were, "an object in a here and now." The seeing, however, is not seeing again and already having seen; and the object is not "past" and posited as past, with a past here and now» (Husserl 2005, p. 345)

[73] As Husserl writes: «[w]hat is phantasied is *quasi*-experienced as such and such, as "something existent" having a certain sense» (Husserl 2005, p. 659) and also «[t]he characteristic of phantasying, however, is such that something *quasi*-experienced together with its sense can be discarded; or its sense can be partially discarded and another sense, a modified sense, admitted in its place, perhaps voluntarily substituted for it» (Husserl 2005, p. 660).

outside all connection with acts of actual experience» (Husserl 2005, p. 610).[74] For example: I am in my room (i.e. my perceptual environment), sitting at my desk in front of my computer and I imagine a pink elephant. The elephant will never appear as part of my visual field as the pen (and thus a real object) next to my computer might. The pink elephant I am imagining «forms a realm of its own, the realm of shadows. I leave behind the ground of given fact and soar into an airy realm, transplanting myself into the "world of phantasies," of memories, of imaginings» (Husserl 2005, p. 180). As Husserl writes, there is a contrast that remains between perception and imagination:

> «The whole phantasy field conflicts with the whole perceptual field and there is no permeation. If we are wholly immersed in phantasy, then we certainly do not heed perceptual objects, though they do continually appear; they are there and show their discord with the corresponding phantasy field. The discord exists between the corresponding sense fields of perception and phantasy and between corresponding parts of these fields. Thus, if I am seeing things correctly, even here a kind of conflict defines the *figment* belonging to phantasy. The phantasy image becomes constituted as an appearance that holds its own for a time over against perception's field of regard but in this contrast receives the phenomenological characteristic that emerges as soon as we return to perception, and then return again from perception to the image» (Husserl 2005, p. 73).

Finally, as also Brough states, the object of phantasy disappears or at least «fades into the background» (Brough 2005, p. XXXIX) when we focus on the object of perception. Usually, when we turn to one the other disappears as «I cannot become absorbed in both simultaneously and cannot include both in the same intention» (Husserl 2005, p. 179, note 3).[75]

Unlike perception and memory (as we shall see in the next paragraph), phantasy has a special relationship with beliefs in that, usually, a subject is free to fantasize creating worlds, scenarios, and figures in which, however «[w]hat is phantasied is not accepted at all» (Husserl 2005, p. 172). Hence, a final important clarification. Even if a subject phantasies and the object of phantasia is given in an

[74] I consider phantasy as an emblematic case, but Husserl views experience as a continuous interaction of perceptions, memories, phantasies, judgments, and other elements.

[75] As Husserl also underlies, the two objects never completely bend: «[N]aturally, there is no phantasying "into" perception in the true sense, as if a mixture could truly arise there. If I phantasy the white chalk as red chalk, then for a moment I have a triumphant phantasy "red chalk," though immediately alternating with the perception "white chalk": both brought into a synthesis of conflict» (Husserl 2005, p. 83).

inactual manner, this does not mean that the subject immediately knows that what is phantasized is null, that «it is nowhere at all, not in any space, not in any time, and so on» (Husserl 2005, p. 309). While the subject is living in the phantasy consciousness, he has no consciousness of the nullity of its object, but «as soon as we direct our regard to the now and to actual reality as such and give to what is phantasied a relation to them, we surely do have such a consciousness» (Husserl 2005, p. 309).

4.2.3 Memory

Just like phantasy, memory and expectation have their foundational basis in phantasmata, they are a re-presentational type of consciousness and not presentation in that the object is not present in the flesh. In some respects, memory and expectation are close to perception as they refer to a past or a future of a world which, unlike that of fantasy,[76] is the same world in which we are also perceiving.

Not only that, but memory has its basis in perception precisely because what is remembered is remembered as it was perceived. It means, therefore, that if I remember the red apple I had for breakfast this morning, I am also remembering that this morning the red apple was present 'here and now in the flesh' and that I perceived it. I remember it as an earlier perception of the red apple, as something that stands in relation to me as having been present. This is why memory is also referred to as 'actual' consciousness. To quote Husserl:

> «The corresponding *memory* is perception as it were. It is consciousness not merely of the past object, but consciousness of the past object in such a way that I can say that it is consciousness of an object that has been perceived, that has been perceived by me, that has been given in my past here and now. I "see" the sunset that I remember; I now have the memory of having perceived it. I have a present act of believing that is related in a certain manner to a nonpresent act of believing, to "my" past act of believing» (Husserl 2005, p.345).

Memory in this sense is inseparable from the perception that originally gives what is actually present and is then remembered: the memory of an object (my red apple) is at the same time the memory of the previous act of perceiving that object (this morning, at breakfast, before eating it, I

[76] See also Husserl 2005 p. 172

perceived it).[77] But these are two different aspects of a single act and not two different acts. Therefore, in one act of memory of an object two aspects coexist at the same time:

- consciousness of a past object (or event) = *re*-presentation of an object
- consciousness of a past object (or event) as having been perceived by me in my past here and now = *re*-presentation of perception

Husserl refers to this as memory's 'double intentionality' and notes that although the memory object appears to be in the past and to be something that was experienced in a previous 'now', its appearance as the past is dependent on the present moment.[78] The memory act itself doesn't take place in the past; rather, it exists in the present and happens concurrently with my actual perception and any other actions I might be doing. As Husserl writes:

> «While I am *now* remembering, however, the appearance now exists. If I live in the memory, "the earlier appearance" appears to me, and through it, the remembered object. Or the earlier perception "is revived," "reproduced"; and in my living in this perception, its object stands over against me. I perceive it "again," as it were; I see it, as it were. I see it "in memory." "I am displaced into the past."» (Husserl 2005, p. 244).

Therefore, to briefly summarize, the act of my memory (which is not a past act and exists in the present moment) is directed towards a past object by re-presenting the fact that in the past I perceived that object and coexists with my actual perceiving (the perceiving I am having while remembering).

While perception presents its object in a well-defined manner, memory remembers its object with less clarity and vividness than something perceived. The remembered object seems to have specific characteristics, for example "I 'see' these varied things in differing 'freshness' and 'vividness,'

---

[77] See also Husserl 2005 p. 236; 603. Precisely by virtue of the representation not only of the object of memory but also of the previous act of perception, when we remember something, we are 'displaced into the past' (2005, p. 244).

[78] To show this peculiarity of memory, Husserl also presents this example: «[m]emory is a reproductive modification of perception, but it has remarkable peculiarity that it is also re-presentation of perception and not simply re-presentation of what was perceived. I remember lunch. "Implicit" in this memory, however, is also memory of the perception of lunch (irrespective of the direction of my act of meaning) » (Husserl 2005, p. 244).

in differing 'fullness' and 'fragmentariness,' much as if I were seeing through a sort of thick fog" (Husserl 2005, p. 241). One thing that will later be useful for the comparison with the confabulations in section 5.2.1 is that although Husserl seems to also admit the hypothesis that the fog might lift slightly and memory might break "through the haze" (Husserl 2005, p.345), he never goes so far as to confuse memory with perception. As he writes: "All of this is not there merely as phantasy. I see it before me again. It is "seen," and seen "again," even if with interruptions. Now it is seen as if hidden by a veil, then as breaking through the haze. It is seen again; it gives itself as past" (Husserl 2005, p.345).

Finally, as far as it regards the belief, Husserl writes that «[m]emories <are> also distinguished by belief» (Husserl 2005, p. 88). What is remembered is believed to have happened in the past: according to Brough, in Husserl's account memory still «displaces us into the past of the same world that we are presently perceiving. By contrast, phantasy, transports us into its own world in which what is phantasied is not believed to be actual at all» (Brough 2005, p. XXXIV). Therefore, if what appears in memory is uncontrasted by the present perception, then it is just believed to be existed and be accepted.[79]

[79] For more about the memory in Husserl see also Brough, J. B. (1975)

4.2.4 Perception, Phantasy and Memory: a comparison

	Perception	**Phantasy**	**Memory**
Type of experience	Presentation [Gegenwärtigung]	*Re*-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung]	*Re*-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung]
Object	Present Factually existing In person [Leibhafitgkeit]	Is not present in person or in the flesh Continuously fluctuates in form, color and fullness of detail, is unstable, re-presented and inactually [unwirklich] given It is given: "as it was", "as if it were existing", and "quasi-" The object is 'absent' but in the sense of 'never been' and 'irreal' since it has not been actual in the past, it is not actual now, and it will not be actual in the future	the object «stands before our eyes itself; it is not perchance something else there in person (as in the case of depicting) and of which we are conscious as the representant of something resembling it» (Husserl 2005, p. 604). It can appear «through a veil or fog» (Husserl 2005, p. 241) The object is 'absent' but in the sense of 'having once been' and 'having once been actual'
Sensory material	Sensations [Empfindungen]	*Sensuous* phantasms or *phantasmata*	*Sensuous* phantasms or *phantasmata*

Belief	«[p]erception has a perceptual appearance (an originary appearance) in the *mode* of belief (also originary)» (Husserl 2005, p. 345)	«what is phantasied is not accepted at all» (Husserl 2005, p. 172) «What presents itself is the following: To the extent that belief is still there, the phantasy attitude "sets itself free" from it. It takes the actual belief "as if" it were belief; the being actual turns into being-as-if (as if it were reality)» (Husserl 2005, p. 672) «pure phantasy neutralizes, modifies all belief » (Husserl 2005, p. 672)	What is remembered is believed to have happened in the past

4.3 SENSATIONS AND PHANTASMATA

According to Husserl, the difference between phantasy and perception can be found in both the characteristics of the apprehensions as well as the material that serves them.

- Perception: sensations [*Empfindungen*]
- Phantasy: *sensuous phantasms* or *phantasmata*

In the *Logical Investigations* (2001), in the lived experience of the perception of a pink elephant, sensory data have an ambiguous status, exhibit sensory qualities, and can be understood in different ways. We can say that sensory data are comparable to what will be called "hyle" or "hyletic

data" (i.e., sensations and phantasmata) in the *Ideas I*.[80] According to Husserl, the difference between sensations and *phantasmata* is «internal» (Husserl 2005, p. 11) and «essential» (Husserl 2005, p. 11). To better argue for a difference between perception and phantasy presentation (sensations and phantasmata) he refers to the following distinction between phantasy (phantasmata) and image consciousness (sensations):

> «When an imagining consciousness is brought about on the basis of sensations of whatever sort, this happens under the mediation of perceptual apprehensions that constitute a present, an image object standing before me as present. If we were to ask on what this depends, the answer would be: The sensation defends itself, so to speak, against the demand that it be taken as the mere image of something. It is itself the mark of reality; all reality is measured against it; it is a primary, actual present. But while it makes a present appear, it can at the same time direct consciousness to something analogous, and simultaneously permit us to see in what is present something else, something not present. On the other hand, the phantasm, the sensuous content of phantasy, gives itself as not present. It defends itself against the demand that it be taken as present; from the beginning it carries with it the characteristic of irreality. Primarily it has the function of being taken as something else. Only indirect reflection bestows on it an acquired present» (Husserl 2005, p. 87).

[80] In Husserl 1984, see par. 85, p. 203 f.

4.3.1 Perception (sensations) and Phantasy (phantasmata): a comparison

So, trying to draw a difference between the two, we could say that:

Perception: sensations	**Phantasy: *sensuous phantasms* or *phantasmata***
Sensations are animated by perceptual apprehension, leading to the appearance of external objects, such as a pink elephant. «The sensation defends itself, so to speak, against the demand that it be taken as the mere image of something. It is itself the mark of reality; all reality is measured against it; it is a primary, actual present» (Husserl 2005, p. 87) «It belongs to the essence of sensation that, without fail, it must be immediately apprehended presentatively (and that it can be apprehended re-presentatively only mediately, in the mode of imaging)» (Husserl 2005, p. 114, note 11)	Phantasmata are animated by phantasy apprehension and lead to phantasy experience, just as the remembering of the pink elephant previously apprehended would be animated by a memorial apprehension. «To every sensuous sensation-content, to the sensed red, for example, there corresponds a sensuous phantasm: the red *actually* hovering before me in the intuitive re-presentation of a red» (Husserl 2005, p. 11) Phantasmata are sensory contents «taken to be nothing by themselves, but . . . looked upon as actors for something else, which, again, precisely sensation would give» (Husserl 2005, p. 84) «The phantasm, the sensuous content of phantasy, gives itself as not present. It defends itself against the demand that it be taken as present; from the beginning it carries with it the characteristic of irreality. Primarily it has the function of being taken as something else» (Husserl 2005, p. 87) «it belongs to the essence of the phantasm that it can be immediately apprehended only re-presentatively; that is, in a modified apprehension — for example, as re-presentation of red, as re-presentation of a red house, and so forth» (Husserl 2005, p. 104, note 11)

The differences listed above justify the difference in the way perception and phantasy (or memory) present their respective objects. Furthermore, the differences can schematically amount to a difference in intensity:

> «A judgment actually made seems "more lively" than a judgment merely imagined a pleasure actually sensed seems more intense than a pleasure merely phantasied, and so on. In the case of many of these phenomena, one certainly does not speak of intensity in the same sense in which one speaks of it in connection with sensations» (Husserl 2005, pp. 102, 103)[81]

and the fact that the boundaries between phantasmata and sensations are not so strict: «(...) phantasms continuously pass over into sensations. One can also call this difference intensity, but then in the case of every analogy there would certainly be different sorts or dimensions of intensity» (Husserl 2005, p. 103)

Regarding differences in apprehension, «[t]he distinction between perceptual apprehension and phantasy apprehension is not and cannot be a mere distinction between two genera or classes of contents» (Husserl 2005, p. 107). Perception and phantasy are two apprehensions essentially different in kind, «distinctions of consciousness» (Husserl 2005, p. 107), which rely on two essentially different apprehensive contents and are respectively based on *perceptual* apprehension or interpretation and *phantastic* apprehension or interpretation.

4.3.2 *Vacillation over whether I am phantasying or perceiving*

What has been expounded so far also seems to find support in APPENDIX XI (to § 45) of Husserliana XXIII in which Husserl very briefly addresses the analysis of what he calls "Vacillation over whether I am phantasying or perceiving" (Husserl 2005, p.195). Specifically, I would like to focus briefly on the hypothesis of sensations that he calls 'weak' and that can be intermittent. He suggests we think about the stroke of a clock. Under certain circumstances, we may come to wonder whether the stroke of the watch was really perceived or only imagined. Husserl[82] addresses the issue as follows:

---

[82] Also: «[T]o make a judgment, actually to will, actually to wish, actually to be in a rage, is something different from phantasying a rage, from phantasying a wish, a volition, a judging» (Husserl 2005, pp. 104, 105).

> «If I vacillate over whether the stroke of the clock is heard or imagined, then I vacillate over whether it is an "actual" or imagined stroke. Here we have the apprehension content in the field of sensation, just as we do in a hallucination. We do not have a phantasm, something severed from the nexus of sensations (and, as a phantasm, necessarily severed from it)» (Husserl 2005, p. 195).

In this sense, Husserl seem to admit the possibility of sensations that, being very weak, can be detached from the field of sensation and assigned to a phantasy and that, likewise, it is possible to fit some kind of phantasmata into the field of sensation.[83]

> «When we believe that we are hearing a stroke of the clock, we have sensation and perception. If we suddenly doubt whether we are hearing it, we can very well continue to have the sensation, the same sensuous content. However, we are in doubt about whether or not it is a subjective appearance (a hallucination) to which nothing corresponds objectively» (Husserl 2005, p. 196).

4.4 AUFFASSUNG AND SENSORY DATA

If we recall here what can be considered the Husserlian apprehensive or intentional model, we end up with:

- the object [*Gegenstand*] the subject is intending through the act, which is external to the act itself
- the content [*Inhalt*] → i.e., how something appears [*erscheint*] to a subject, the result of the way in which the sensory material is apprehended, which correspond to what Husserl, in *Ideas I*, will call "hyletic data"
- the apprehension [*Auffassung*]

Organizing sensory data in relation to the matter of the act as adumbrations of the intended object is the task of interpretation or apprehension [*Auffassung*]. Sensory data are «in a certain manner 'interpreted' or 'apperceived', and ... it is in the phenomenological character of such an animating interpretation of sensation that what we call the appearing of the object consists» (Husserl 2001b, p.

[83] In this passage, Husserl seems to abandon the correspondence between imagination - phantasmata and perception - sensations. This is obviously problematic and would need further exploration, but in line with this master thesis work, I will adhere to the initial fundamental distinction that considers phantasmata as the sensory material of hallucinations and sensations as the sensory material of perceptions.

84). The "material" serving the apprehension are the sensations [*Empfindungen*] in the case of perception, and phantasmata in the case of phantasy (to which Husserl refers as *Auffassunginhalte*). Therefore, according to what we said before, the perception of an object will be given when sensations undergo *perceptual* interpretation, and the phantasy of an object will be therefore given when phantasmata undergo *phantastic* interpretation. As we have seen before:

- sensory data are what differentiate seeing a pink elephant in the flesh from just phantasizing or thinking of one.
- the same sensory data can be animated in several different ways and can have different intentional correlates.

Apprehension is recognized as a real moment [*reell*] experience and fulfills a particularly important task since, in the case of perception, it animates sensory data into presentations of sense-perceptible qualities allowing there to be knowledge of reality. Every perceptual act, therefore, consists of an intentional essence (given by the union of the matter of the act and the quality of the act) and the interpreted sensory data. As we said before (3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.2), according to Husserl, the manifestation of sensory data includes not only perception and sensations but the sensory sphere in its totality and, therefore, also memory and imagination and what Husserl calls 'sensuous phantasmata' (i.e., the equivalent of sensations in imagination), so this dynamic develops both at the level of perception and imagination.

Two authors who have focused on the role of *Auffassung* are Hopp (2008) and Williford (2013). As they point out, in the normal perceptual situations in which, according to Husserl, hyletic contents are "interpreted," the way something appears does not appear to be something mental or psychological and is not a property that is lost when the object appears to no one. There is, however, a possibility of error, and the subject's judgments about how things appear can be wrong: there is the possibility that the subject is out of touch with the way things are objectively (although he may come to realize this if presented with adequate reasons). That one can think of a difference of some kind between the way things really are and the way things appear to and are interpreted by the subject is clearly explained by an example provided by Husserl and recalled by both Hopp and Williford. Let's

say the case where someone thinks he is seeing a woman when, in fact, it is a mannequin. According to Husserl:

> «If I see a human being in the mannequin, I have a perceptual appearance. As soon as I become aware of the deception, I may still have the same appearance, I may continue to make the sensuous contents appear to me as a human being, but I then have a conflict with reality: what is actually *present* is determined here by the surroundings and by the figure seen (though seen as a *wax mannequin*), which shares objective unity with the surroundings. If I interpret it otherwise, then I feel precisely the "*otherwise*." I feel the conflict; I have the appearance of a *nothing*. This human being is a *nothing*. If, however, the figure presents a well-known person by virtue of its resemblance to him, the situation changes again. The person in the now, in the present in which the person finds a place fictitiously — that is, on the one hand, as appearing, and, on the other hand, as in conflict — is *nothing*. But the person in the present does represent a resembling existing person, though not someone existing here, not someone existing presently» (Husserl 2005, p. 52).

At first, the subject may think he is really seeing a woman, but then he will probably begin to wonder whether it's a mannequin. This is where Husserl draws our attention to underline the fact that it is possible to temporarily suspend judgment and that there are always two ways to interpret appearances. As the subject continues to look at and approach the man or mannequin, he will try to grasp as much information as possible that will guide his judgment in one direction (mannequin) or the other (man). As Williford writes:

> «But while one is in this process of "gathering more data," the competing interpretations are both hovering in the air, so to speak. One does not commit to either one. Husserl notes that once you come to the conclusion that it is, say, a mannequin and not a man, your conclusion "by a regressive ray" immediately comes to reconfigure your interpretation of your just-past experience: "Ah, it was a mannequin all along!" you find yourself suddenly thinking» (Williford 2013, p. 506).

A similar process also applies in instances of corrected misperception.

In this case, the sensible material does not change (in the sense that retroactively one realizes that what was intended in one way is learned in another) but is from time to time subjected by the subject to different interpretations, and therefore also of matter of act, given by a change with respect to which the sensory data emerge (I approach the mannequin-woman, I see details that I did not see before, for example that it does not move or interact with me as a human being would do...), refuting the first apprehension (woman) and proposing a different one (mannequin) to which a different

horizon of expectations will correspond (I see that 'the object' is not a human being but a mannequin, so I expect that it is not alive, does not move, does not talk to me…).

Thus, the subject will see different objects depending on the 'change of apprehension' (*Auffassungswechsel*) while starting from the same sensible material. As Williford writes: «[t]he same profiles were at play whether the interpretation of them changed or not. The fact that profiles and systems of profiles can come apart from their animations is our phenomenologically intuitive evidence that hyletic data do not demand a unique intentional animation» (Williford 2013, p. 506). In the Husserlian perspective, such an example allows us to understand how it is possible that, as the intended object changes, the sensory data remain the same and that, therefore, what allows us to see a mannequin, or a person is the change of apprehension (because it binds to certain sensory data and manifestations).

FIFTH CHAPTER

5. A NEW POSSIBLE ACCOUNT FOR HALLUCINATIONS

In the following chapter I will try to fulfill the goal of this master's thesis. In this chapter I will take up the main problem presented in chapter two, i.e., the one underlying the conjunctivist and disjunctivist positions, in order to propose a solution involving the application of Husserlian phenomenology, introduced in chapter four, to some cases of real psychiatric hallucinations. I will stand with a disjunctivist position, arguing that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are not experiences of the same fundamental kind and that if hallucinations and veridical perceptions are to share something, that something might be at most sensory data.

I will mainly focus on the case of hallucinations not recognized by the subject as such, on the case of the so-called 'illusions on the verge of hallucinations', and on 'unmasked' hallucinations. The analysis of these different types of hallucinations will help us enlighten how the subject is always conscious of more than what he is actually given and how the content of perceptual experience is always surplus to sensory data.

5.1 PERCEPTION, ILLUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY

In some respects, hallucination could be considered one of the experiences in which the subject emerges the most, so much so that we could hardly talk about it without stressing the value of subjectivity that determines it. Let us think of a subject who undergoes the hallucinatory episode of a pink elephant that is subjectively indistinguishable from a perception: there are several elements on which indistinguishability might depend, and there are several elements that might bring out the role of the subject. Taking up the analysis offered by Husserl, Hopp, and Williford, we may try to develop the dynamics of *Auffassungswechsel,* and different interpretations operated by the subject with

respect to the case of hallucination, hypothesizing a definition of hallucinations as intentional states 'exceeding sense'.

5.1.1 Veridical Perception

If we take up schematically what was presented in the fourth chapter, we can say that in the dynamics of a perception surely there must be some form of sensory stimulus that is always interpreted by the subject when there is an object appearance. But there is always consciousness of more than what is actually given: the content of perceptual experiences is always surplus to sensory data. In a veridical perception, we say that the subject continuously correctly interprets the sensory data (sensations).

In a veridical perception of a mannequin:

OBJECT	Mannequin
SENSORY DATA	sensations
AUFFASSUNG	Mannequin
DOUBT	Perception is dynamic and has a horizon that is amenable to new determinations but remains by essence indeterminate
NEW AUFFASSUNG	The perception of the mannequin is confirmed

5.1.2. Illusion

In the case of a perceptual error, such as an illusion or an ambiguous figure, the subject misinterprets the sensory data (sensations) but can correct his first *Auffassung* with a new *Auffassung* (such as in the case of the perceptual error mannequin-woman).

In an illusion of a woman:

OBJECT	Mannequin
SENSORY DATA	sensations
AUFFASSUNG	Woman
DOUBT	I approach the mannequin-human being and I see, for example, that it does not move or interact with me as a human being would... I start to suspect it is a mannequin
NEW AUFFASSUNG	Mannequin

In an illusion such as the well-known case of the stick partially submerged in water:

OBJECT	There is a stick partially submerged in water
SENSORY DATA	sensations
AUFFASSUNG	I perceive the stick as having certain physical characteristics. I project expectations with respect to the qualities of the stick that are not perceived: I see it 'broken' or somehow deformed, I expect that by touching it I will feel a curve, that by pulling it out of the water it will remain curved...
DOUBT	I pull it out of the water, touch it and see that, in fact, the stick is not broken, bent, or deformed
NEW AUFFASSUNG	The stick without the optical effect of distortion caused by water

A further, much more complex example could be that of the Muller-Lyer illusion[84]:

OBJECT	 Two lines of the same length, one with the ends pointing inwards and the other with the ends pointing outwards

[84] I thought it was appropriate to propose a possible interpretation of this kind of illusion even though it does indeed leave open some problematic questions that need to be contextualized within a broader debate. See among others Gregory (1997), Day (1989), Sekuler and Erlebacher (1971), Segall *et al*. (1963), Pollack (1963); Pollack and Silvar (1967), Jahoda (1971), Stewart (1973), McCauley and Henrich (2006). For a general overview of the discussion also see Macpherson (2017b). However, since it is a certain type of illusion and not a hallucination, it does not end up being an excessively problematic case for this thesis.

SENSORY DATA	sensations
AUFFASSUNG	 The line with the ends pointing inwards appears to be shorter than the line with the ends pointing outwards
DOUBT	I realize that, in fact, the lines have the same length (e.g., because I already know this kind of illusion, because someone explained it to me, because I get a ruler and measure the length of the two lines without considering their extremes...)
NEW AUFFASSUNG	 Although we are aware that the two lines have the same length, this specific type of optical illusion seems to be 'resistant' to a new Auffassung. What we can say is that the subject will certainly have a different awareness of the length of the lines, although he may still have some difficulty in recognising it.

This kind of illusion resistant to correction can also be addressed as a conflict of appearances. When taken on their own, these two lines do not seem to present any problems: we simply see two segments that end differently. The problem, however, arises when we try to compare them and, therefore, to put them in relation: we know that they have different lengths, but we cannot see it

without covering their ends and their relation appears problematic and conflicting to us. There are other cases in which we experience conflicting appearances, such as that of the waterfall illusion. Overgaard points out: "[i]f you look out the rear window of a moving underground train and watch the tunnel continuously 'flow away' into the distance, the strangest thing happens when the train stops. It will seem as if the tunnel is now moving slowly towards you even though nothing appears to actually change position" (Overgaard 2010, p.277).

5.1.3. Hallucination

My thesis is that a hallucinated subject might misinterpret sensory data (sensuous phantasmata) and, for a number of reasons, be unable to correct his interpretation. In a hallucination:

OBJECT	X
SENSORY DATA	'sensuous phantasmata' (i.e., the equivalent of sensations for perceptions: they are the basis for phantasies)
AUFFASSUNG	The subject takes over with his **subjective** (altered) interpretation and has difficulties correcting his interpretations
DOUBT	/
NEW AUFFASSUNG	/

The reasons underlying the difficulties in correcting the first Auffassung are manifold. For example, it may be an introspective limit: the subject may not be able to determine how the kind of experience he is undergoing differs from what another person would consider a perceptual experience and, therefore, he is not able to distinguish *by introspection alone* the perceptual state from

the hallucinatory state.[85] This does not mean that it is impossible to access the content of what he is experiencing, only that at first it might be difficult. This is why the subject may appeal to a number of elements that confirm his beliefs and help him to provide a sense of the contents of his hallucinations.

Finding himself in an altered state due to the hallucinatory episode, the subject may no longer be able to reason lucidly and, therefore, may not be in a position to distinguish between the hallucinatory and perceptual states, so much so that he appeals to a number of elements that confirm his beliefs and make sense of the contents of his hallucinations. One might think that those undergoing psychiatric hallucinations have "obsessions" and also unconsciously select elements from their sensory environment that support their beliefs from time to time to "express" their anxiety to explain what they see.[86]

In hallucination there is an element of irrationality that is often uncontrolled and chaotic and that causes the subject to be inclined to reject what is actually happening. Also, according to the picture that the psychiatric context gives us, in hallucinations it seems that subjects are able to pass over certain "inconsistencies" between external reality and what they think they perceive and that they are often able to attribute a coherent meaning or sense to it. At this point, it might be possible

[85] For example, when Sacks describes the case of Mrs. B., he focuses on how «[w]hen her hallucinations started, Mrs. B. was understandably terrified, and took them for reality— "I did not even know the word 'hallucination,'" she said. Then she found herself more able to distinguish hallucinations from reality, but this did not prevent her from being frightened when they occurred. She always looked to her husband for reality testing; she would ask him whether he saw, heard, felt, or smelled some of the things she did» (Sacks 2012, p.74).

[86] The object of the hallucination may be vague, or it may not. Does one who individuates the hallucinated object have the ability to reconsider the belief of what is being hallucinated? Hallucination has to do with interpretations, but it also has to do with fixations. One may hallucinate a horse or the horse Beatrice. Precisely in relation to these 'obsessions' that the subject vents by seeking confirmation in the surroundings, if one hallucinates the horse Beatrice, he will probably not be willing to question the existence of Beatrice. For example, the case of a 22-years-old girl hallucinating during maniacal episode reported by Chakrabarty, A., & Reddy, M. S. (2011) states that : «This scene of the grandmother's death on other hand was (as if) happening in reality, where she clearly saw all the people and objects in the room in full detail and could interact with them. This disturbed the patient as she realized her grandmother was still alive and lead her to believe that her grandmother would die by the end of the week» (2011, p. 72).

to hypothesize a 'detachment' between the sensory stimulus and the apprehension of the object. This means that, in certain altered mental states, subjects would detach themselves from sensory data as such, take over with their subjective interpretation and 'produce' some form of hallucination in which they believe.[87]

Compared to the conjunctivist and disjunctivist approaches, the phenomenological analysis allows us to better explain some particular cases of hallucination, such as the illusions "on the verge" of hallucinations and the unmasked hallucinations.

5.2 ILLUSIONS 'ON THE VERGE' OF HALLUCINATIONS

We can now consider some cases of real psychiatric hallucinations to try to see if they can be analyzed through this possible phenomenological integration. Consider the particular case of a patient from Sacks in *Hallucinations* (2012). This patient claimed to have illusions 'on the verge' of hallucinations:

> «He often feels himself "on the verge" of hallucination, and he may be pushed over the threshold at night, or if he is tired or bored. When we had lunch one day, he was having all sorts of what he calls "illusions." My blue pullover, draped over a chair, became a fierce chimerical animal with an elephant-like head, long blue teeth, and a hint of wings. A bowl of noodles on the table became "a human brain" (though this did not affect his appetite for them). He saw "letters, like teletype" on my lips; they formed "words"—words he could not read. They did not coincide with the words I was speaking. He says that such illusions are "made up" on the spot, instantaneously and without conscious volition. He cannot control or stop them, short of closing his eyes. They are sometimes friendly, sometimes frightening. For the most part, he ignores them» (Sacks 2012, pp. 66-67).

[87] A similar problem regarding the 'interpretative excess' is also addressed by a recent paper of Bergamin (2020) with respect to the conceptual over-interpretation in confabulation and schizophrenia. He suggests thinking of the schizotype-spectrum disorders as an excess of interpretation «detecting patterns in the 'random noise' of ordinary sensory and emotional stimulation» (Bergamin 2020, p. 172). According to Kapur, this perspective allows us to account for hallucinations in schizophrenic psychosis as «exaggerated, amplified, and aberrantly recognized internal percepts» (Kapur 2003, p. 15) (also cfr. Grossberg 2000; Bentall 1990). Also, as he suggests: «[f]or many patients it evolves through a series of stages: a stage of heightened awareness and emotionality combined with a sense of anxiety and impasse, a drive to "make sense" of the situation, and then usually relief and a "new awareness" as the delusion crystallizes and hallucinations emerge» (Kapur 2003, p. 15). The account proposed by Parnas and Sass (2011) seems to support this «hyper-reflexivity» (2011, p. 537).

We can actually think of a case like Ed's. For example, I am perceiving something (e.g., the keyboard of the computer I am typing on) but I also begin to imagine it. When I begin to imagine it, the sensory data can no longer play the same role and be of the same type as when they were in perception (and, therefore, were sensations), otherwise I would remain anchored to perception. I can use these new sensory data as something from which to base another, imagined keyboard (and, thus, move onto the realm of phantasmata).

Ed's case is particularly interesting precisely because it seems to confirm the hypothesis that it is possible for the subject to start from a minimal amount of sensory data given by an object present in the flesh in front of him and then to process it spontaneously through a pattern of imagination. In illusions 'on the verge' of hallucinations the hallucinated subject is presented with sensory data (sensations) that he correctly interprets until he is overwhelmed by 'uncontrolled' illusions that are made up on the spot and take over. He just waits for them to stop. Therefore, we would have a structure like the following one:

OBJECT	A blue sweater
SENSORY DATA	Sensations
AUFFASSUNG	A monster elephant
DOUBT	Ed W. knows they are 'uncontrolled' illusions: they are made up on the spot, instantaneously, without conscious volition
NEW AUFFASSUNG	He cannot control or stop them: he ignores them until they fade.

The same process applies to the bowl of noodles:

OBJECT	A bowl of noodles on the table
SENSORY DATA	Sensations
AUFFASSUNG	A human brain. His sense of appetite is not affected
DOUBT	Ed W. knows they are 'uncontrolled' illusions: they are made up on the spot, instantaneously, without conscious volition
NEW AUFFASSUNG	He cannot control or stop them: he ignores them until they fade.

5.3 'UNMASKED' HALLUCINATIONS

Considering some of the cases set forth by Sacks, we are faced with another type of hallucinations: the so-called 'unmasked' hallucinations. Before seeing how the Auffassung framework would apply to the case of 'unmasked' hallucinations, it should be pointed out that this assumption whereby a subject can hallucinate in full awareness of the hallucinatory character of his experience can be found also in Husserl. In *Thing and Space* (1973) Husserl writes:

> «It is the essential character of perception to be "consciousness" of the Object's presence in the flesh, i.e., to be the phenomenon of it. To perceive a house means to have the consciousness, to have the phenomenon, of a house standing there in the flesh [leibhaft dastehenden]. How matters stand with the so-called existence of the house, with the true Being of the house, and what this existence means – about all that nothing is said. [...] The matter at issue will be clear if we forthwith bring out the distinction between presence in the flesh and belief. [...] The perception, the phenomenon, of the house as standing there in the flesh is at once the belief that it is standing there. If we presentify the example of an unmasked hallucination, then we find in place of belief disbelief. Moreover, other examples offer themselves, ones in which we are at first perceptually doubtful whether it is a case of perception or hallucination. Here both belief and

> disbeliefs are lacking, and instead of them we have doubt [...]. Yet in all these cases the phenomenon of the standing there of the Object in the flesh persists or can persist» (Husserl 1973, pp. 14–16 [12–13])

A subject may legitimately and meaningfully question whether an experience he is having is veridical or hallucinatory while he is currently undergoing that experience. As Husserl also underlines, we can have an 'unmasked' hallucination that continues to present an object as if it were present in the flesh. Returning to consider the case of Ed presented by Sacks, we see how at some point hallucinations appear but are recognized by the subject:

> «Sometimes he moves from "illusions" to frank hallucinations. One such was a hallucination of his cat, which had gone to the vet for a few days. Ed continued to "see" her at home, several times a day, emerging from the shadows at one end of the room. She would walk across the room, paying no attention to him, and then disappear into the shadows again. Ed realized at once that this was a hallucination and had no desire to interact with it (though it aroused his curiosity and interest). When the real cat came back, the phantom cat disappeared» (Sacks 2012, pp.66-67)[88]

In the case of *'Unmasked' hallucinations*, the hallucinated subject is presented with sensory data (sensuous phantasmata), he takes over with his subjective (altered) interpretation and has difficulties reflecting on the content of what he is experiencing. He understands that what he was (or is) having were (or are) hallucinations and experiences them in full awareness of their hallucinatory character. He can re-interpret 'sensuous phantasmata' by a regressive ray. Therefore, in 'Unmasked' hallucinations:

[88] Ed's case is not the only one. For example, there is another patient who is well aware of her hallucinations: «She also sees a cat—a gray cat with "beautiful" eyes which wears a serene, "beautiful expression" on its face and seems to be of a most friendly disposition. To her own surprise (for she has never liked cats), she enjoys visits from the gray cat and worries that "something may happen to him." Though she knows the cat is a hallucination, he seems very real to her: she can hear him coming, feel the warmth of his body, and touch him if she wishes» (Sacks 2012, pp.75-76)

OBJECT	X
SENSORY DATA	'Sensuous phantasmata'
AUFFASSUNG[89]	The subject takes over with his **subjective** (altered) interpretation and has difficulties reflecting on the content of what he is experiencing
DOUBT	The subject understands he is hallucinating because he remembers his cat is gone to the vet for a few days. Ed realized at once that this was a hallucination, and had no desire to interact with it
SENSORY DATA	'Sensuous phantasmata'
NEW AUFFASSUNG	'Sensuous phantasmata' re-interpreted

Unmasked hallucinations open up the discussion to a number of very interesting issues and questions. According to Collerton et al. (2005) about half of the people who regularly hallucinate are aware that they are hallucinating either because they realize that hallucinations lack the 'sense of reality' that perceptual experiences would have[90], or because hallucinations are caused by certain specific conditions that allow this state of awareness, e.g., Charles Bonnet syndrome[91]. It would also be very interesting to understand what grounds the process of 'unmasking' of hallucination: in the

[89] The content consists of sensory data and Auffassung together.

[90] For further discussion of the sense of reality, see among others Dorsch (2010) and Farkas (2013).

[91] See Menon et al 2003.

case that was just mentioned, for example, the consideration that grounds the belief that one's hallucinating is external to the experience itself (i.e., the subject remembers that the cat is at the vet's).

So, a general scheme would be:

OBJECT	X
SENSORY DATA	'sensuous phantasmata' (i.e., the equivalent of sensations for perceptions: they are the basis for phantasies)
AUFFASSUNG	The subject takes over with his **subjective** (altered) interpretation and has difficulties reflecting on the content of what he is experiencing
DOUBT	The subject understands that what he was (or is) having were (or are) hallucination. A hallucination can be experienced in full awareness of its hallucinatory character
NEW AUFFASSUNG	'Sensuous phantasmata' re-interpreted by a regressive ray

The case of hallucinations that start from a certain kind of misperception and the case of the 'Unmasked' hallucination are, therefore, particularly interesting, and well suited to be analyzed phenomenologically. A particularly important point of this structure concerns the fact that the doubt and the new Auffassung of the sensory data are what make it possible in a regressive manner to re-interpret as 'sensuous phantasmata' what the subject initially thought were sensations.

Following the approach I suggested, the relationship between phantasy and hallucinations should certainly be deepened. The main point is that, when hallucinating, a subject may be presented with sensuous phantasmata (since hallucinations have no object) that he can interpret by detaching himself from what is actually presented to the senses and indulging in a particular type of altered mental state and, ultimately, be unable to correct his first apprehension by introspection alone.

Can we say that hallucinations and veridical perceptions have something in common? Yes, we can say that they both partially share sensory material, but I think this is the only thing that can be said 'in favor' of a conjunctivist perspective. However, the conjunctivist perspective does not merely state that there might be something they share but specifies that they are mental events of the exact same type. Returning to the question I addressed with respect to the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind, what we might conclude by considering a phenomenological approach is that hallucinations and veridical perceptions would remain two very different kinds of mental experiences and events, and that, therefore, this kind of proposal would go in favor of a disjunctivist position.

SIXTH CHAPTER

6. HALLUCINATIONS AND *RE*-PRESENTATIONS

6.1 HALLUCINATIONS AND PHANTASY

Does there exist in hallucinations a form of judgment whereby someone considers as perception what is actually imagination? Are there any forms of imagination involved in hallucinations? In certain mental states, could it be the presence of phantasmata that allows the subjects to see and believe that they are seeing something as present in flesh, even if it is not? If so, it would be wrong to consider hallucinations as perceptions. Perhaps, as we just saw, it would be more appropriate to analyze them with respect to imagination.

The idea that hallucinations are types of imagination seems to provide a good answer to many real cases of hallucinations. Hallucinations may be thought of as kinds of imagination over which subjects lack direct voluntary control. According to Allen (2015), there are several reasons why this interpretation would work. Firstly, real hallucinations have a phenomenal character much more similar to that of imagination than to that of perception. A second similarity concerns their content: hallucinations frequently involve *familiar* content. According to Bentall:

> «[h]allucinators do not hallucinate random events. Auditory hallucinators often experience threatening voices, and visual hallucinators see visions of dead ancestors or other persons of psychological significance to them. Presumably, the contents of patients' hallucinations are related in important ways to their personalities and to the stresses that precipitate their psychoses» (Bentall 1990, p. 292)

If, on the one hand, in perception we experience familiar objects "in the flesh" and, therefore, the familiar content of perceptual experience is explained by its objects; on the other hand, in hallucination there is no external object that can be the cause of this sense of 'familiarity'. Since on the other hand, imagination usually allows the subject to recall, modify, and vary at any time the

information "stored" and in his possession, the idea that hallucination is a type of imagination would provide a more plausible explanation of the presence of familiar content in hallucinations. Thus, according to Allen, the familiarity of the contents of hallucinations could build another point in favor of their being juxtaposed with imagination rather than perception.[92] Finally, hallucinations and imagination would be similar with respect to their «non-psychological conditions necessary for their occurrence» (Allen 2015, p. 292). As Allen writes:

> «[s]pecifically, like sensory imagination, hallucination is essentially a mode of consciousness of that which is absent or merely possible: dead relatives, angels, pink rats, and so on. Both hallucination and sensory imagination contrast in this respect with perception» (Allen 2015, p. 292).

Although, as we have just seen, there are some interpretations that consider hallucinations as phantasies[93], from a phenomenological point of view to say that hallucinations and phantasies are composed of the same sensory material (as in 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) might imply some difficulties in distinguishing them. Actually, there are some elements that can be considered to discern them.

First of all, perception presents its objects as given 'in the flesh' (*leibhaft*); imagination does not. The objects of imagination are given 'as if' and this is one of their essential characteristics. Secondly, hallucinations and phantasies have different causes. Imagination is also usually considered a voluntary process, while hallucination is not. We can decide to start imagining a pink elephant now, right now, next to the computer, just as we can decide when to stop imagining it. We are in control. In contrast, those who suffer from hallucinations do not have the same degree of control over what appears to them and at what time it appears to them.

[92] As we shall see in the next section of the chapter, there is an undeniable relationship between hallucinations and memory that, although currently almost unexplored, needs to be further studied. Such a relationship would also explain why, for example, patients subject to hallucinations often hallucinate 'familiar' content, closely related to their personal experiences, to events (probably also traumatic events) that they have experienced and can remember. This obviously does not exclude the role of imagination in relation to the contents of hallucinations.

[93] See also Nanay (2016a) for a slightly different account of hallucinations as mental imagery.

Furthermore, while sharing the same sensory material as imagination, hallucinations would be quite different in that they are so much more resistant to correction that subjects often just wait for it to pass, whereas imagination, on the other hand, is by definition something that the subject can usually control. All that said, the main point is that to posit something as *unreal* or *not to posit* something as real are two very different issues. In fantasy, the subject does not posit the object as unreal but is conscious of not positing it as real. For what we have seen, Husserl moves within an active and conscious imagination that allows the subject to place the phantasized objects according to the determinations of the 'as if', 'quasi-', but there is a dimension of phantasy that is a-thetical. In the hallucination, on the other hand, due to altered mental states, the subject does not have the same awareness.

It is worth remembering what I quoted earlier from Husserl, namely that sensations are the index of *reality*:

> «The sensation defends itself, so to speak, against the demand that it be taken as the mere image of something. It is itself the mark of reality; all reality is measured against it; it is a primary, actual present» (Husserl 2005, p. 87)

If we start from what Husserl said above and if we consider that in phantasy, there are no sensations but only phantasmata:

> «Sensations serve as the basis for perceptions; sensuous phantasms serve as the basis for phantasies» (Husserl 2005, p. 11).

Then, the hallucinated subject might actually turn out to be one who, in particular altered mental states, no longer pays attention to part of his sensations as such.[94]

[94] I am aware that this consideration is very problematic because the hallucinating subject is usually regarded as being 'assaulted' by hallucinations. But, perhaps, certain specific psychiatric cases such as those of 'illusions on the verge of hallucinations' can help us to consider them under a different light.

6.2 HALLUCINATIONS AND MEMORY

6.2.1 Successful and unsuccessful remembering

As we have seen, the premises on which disjunctivists and conjunctivists agree are that veridical perceptions may be indistinguishable, from the subject's point of view, from unsuccessful or non-veridical ones. Can we say the same for 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' memories?

Distinguishing between cases in which the subject remembers *successfully* and cases in which he remembers *unsuccessfully* resulting in memory errors is central to the theories of remembering. Successful remembering implies the retrieval of information aligned with real events or experiences where the memory process culminates in an authentic and accurate recollection, while unsuccessful remembering may involve inaccuracies, distortions, and the creation of false memories, such as misremembering or confabulation (see Hirstein 2009, Michaelian 2016, 2022; Robins 2016a, 2017, 2020b). If we were to consider a broader structure considering 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' memory cases of veridical and non-veridical perceptions (i.e., hallucinations), then we could imagine something like this:

	Successful	**Unsuccessful**
Veridical Perceptions	Remembering	Objectless memory experiences, misremembering, confabulation Forgetting
Hallucinations	Remembering the experience of hallucinating; remembering the content of hallucinatory experiences (both in hallucinations as such and in unmasked hallucinations)	Forgetting

According to Robins, it is possible to make a comparison between errors in perception (illusion and hallucination) and in memory (misremembering and confabulation).[95] We would end up with something like this:

	Perception	**Hallucination**
Error 'with an object'	Illusion	Misremembering (inaccurate representation and retention of information)
Error 'without an object'	Hallucination	Confabulation (inaccurate representation and no retention of information)

6.2.2 'Successful' remembering of hallucinations

When the subjects recall their hallucinatory experiences and share them, they can describe them as hallucinations in which they still believe, as unmasked in the moment in which they were having them or unmasked during the recollection of the experience.

In the first scenario, the subject might narrate the hallucinations while maintaining a form of belief or recognition in the reality of what they have experienced, as if the experience is still present in their current perception. In the second case, the subject has gained a critical awareness of these experiences, recognizing their illusory nature or distance from reality. This may indicate a process of reflection or introspection that leads the subject to remember the hallucinations with a more objective or detached perspective. In the third scenario, the subject may be able to recognize that

[95] According to Robins, «[m]isremembering errors are those that result from distortions of retained information. They are, in this way, comparable to perceptual illusions. Confabulation errors, on the other hand, are wholly inaccurate, reflecting no influence of information retained from a particular past event. Confabulations are thus akin to perceptual hallucinations» (Robins 2017, p. 2148).

what he had in the past was a hallucination but only during a present recollection of the experience. I will try to analyze these experiences with regards to a distinction between *what* is hallucinated and *how* it is hallucinated.

6.2.2.1 Hallucination not recognized as such

In the case of the memory of hallucinations that are not recognized by the subject but only 'suffered,' something like this happens. In the present moment, the subject remembers and believes that the day before he saw a pink elephant that was in front of him in the flesh. If we maintain a distinction between what is hallucinated and how it is hallucinated we see that:

***What* is hallucinated**	***How* it is hallucinated**
You hallucinated a pink elephant. Now you are remembering that you were presented with something (a pink elephant) you still think you perceived it and it was before you in the flesh	You hallucinated a pink elephant. The elephant is extremely veridical, and, for a variety of reasons, you did not recognize that it was a hallucination. When asked about it, you talk about the experience of the pink elephant as if it were a normal veridical perception.

6.2.2.2 Unmasked Hallucination

In the case of the memory of hallucinations that are 'unmasked' by the subject, something like this happens. In the present moment, the subject remembers the day before he saw a pink elephant that was in front of him in the flesh. But not only that, he also remembers that at some point he realized that it was a hallucination and that what he thought were perceptions were, in fact, hallucinations. If we maintain a distinction between what is hallucinated and how it is hallucinated we see that:

What is hallucinated	*How* it is hallucinated
You hallucinated a pink elephant. The elephant is extremely veridical and, for a number of reasons (e.g., you have been hallucinating for a long time and by now you know how to recognize it, your hallucinations are linked to a psychiatric condition that allows you to realize that you are hallucinating, etc.), you recognized that it was a hallucination. Now you are remembering that you were presented with something (a pink elephant) you thought was before you in the flesh but, in fact, it was not.	You hallucinated a pink elephant. The elephant is extremely veridical and, for a number of reasons (e.g., you have been hallucinating for a long time and by now you know how to recognize it, your hallucinations are linked to a psychiatric condition that allows you to realize that you are hallucinating, etc.), you recognized that it was a hallucination. When asked about it, you can describe the hallucinatory experience.

6.2.2.3 A posteriori unmasked hallucination

In the case of the memory of hallucinations that are 'unmasked' by the subject in a posteriori, something like this happens. In the present moment, the subject remembers seeing the day before a pink elephant that was in front of him in the flesh. Yesterday, he did not realize that it was a hallucination: according to him, the elephant was there in the flesh. Now, as he tells this to his psychiatrist, for example, he realizes for a number of reasons (no one but him saw it, there are no pink elephants,...) that it is very unlikely that yesterday he actually had a perception of a pink elephant. At this point, what happens? Can a subject acknowledge a posteriori the apprehensive quality of his 'perception'? He may not be able to correct it radically, but he may begin to question it. If we maintain a distinction between what is hallucinated and how it is hallucinated we see that:

What is hallucinated	*How* it is hallucinated
Giovanni tells Leonardo that he saw and petted a pink elephant at the circus yesterday. Leonardo is very surprised: he is sure there are no pink elephants at the circus Giovanni went to, there is no way he could have seen and petted one yesterday. Let's say this makes Giovanni doubt and he realizes at that very moment that it was a hallucination. Maybe he also changes the memory of the hallucination and sees elements that he was not able to see at the time (for example, that the elephant was grey, that there was no elephant).	What happens at this point? Does the subject learn how to visualize it better as well (thus re-visualizing it)? When the subject discovers a posteriori that he hallucinated something he thought he had perceived, can he better understand what had happened to him? In fact, since they are different qualities, now that the subject begins to question his previous "perception," he may also be able to correct it. It is not always the case that something as radical as a 'correction' happens; the subject might even just reinterpret them differently.

6.2.3 'Unsuccessful' remembering of veridical perceptions

6.2.3.2 Misremembering

Those experiences in which the subject had a veridical perception of something, but he remembers it incorrectly and represents some of its aspects both accurately inaccurately = the distortion of retained information. According to Robins: «*Misremembering* is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event. When a person misremembers, her report is inaccurate, yet this inaccuracy is explicable only on the assumption that she has retained information from the event her representation mischaracterizes» (2006a, p. 434).

6.2.3.3 Confabulation

Unlike misremembering cases, «[c]onfabulations are not simply false memory reports, but reports that lack any substantive contact with information retained from a particular past event. To confabulate is to claim memory of a past experience that is false in its entirety, not only in detail» (Robins 2017, p. 2149)[96] and also «[c]onfabulation occurs when there is no relation between a person's feeling as if they remember a particular event/experience and any event or experience from their past—either because there is no such event in their past or because any correspondence to such an event is entirely coincidental» (Robins 2020, p. 125). Although it is possible to discuss their phenomenology, it is very challenging to define them in a unified manner. Usually, definitions are divided into narrow (i.e., definitions that are mainly based on that of 'false memory'. See Schacter, 1995; Fotopoulou, Conway, Solms, Kopelman, & Tyrer, 2008) and broad: «[i]n the broad sense confabulations are usually defined as false narratives or statements about world and/or self due to some pathological mechanisms or factors, but with no intention of lying» (Örulv & Hydén, 2006, p. 648).

First of all, they can be regarded as both distortion of contents of past memories and distortion in the temporal frame of the events. While varying in content, all confabulations have a number of fundamental characteristics in common such as the fact that they are spontaneously produced and are *usually* upheld in the face of contradictory facts. Confabulations are persistent: confabulators are not aware of their confabulating, it is very difficult for them to realize that their memories are false and, even once they have recognized the falsity of their memories, they find it very difficult to believe it.[97] To quote a discussion reported by DeLuca (2000, p. 121):

> «Doctor: You indicated that last night you were working on a number of projects at home. ... What would you say if I told you, you were actually here in the hospital last night?

[96] Robins (2017) stresses the need to keep misremembering and confabulation cases distinct.

[97] Although delusions, agnosia and confabulations are often regarded as overlapping phenomena, Langdon and Turner (2010) draw a distinction between confabulated content and the persistence of belief in the content.

Patient: I'd be surprised, because my experience, what I learn from my eyes and ears tells me differently... I'd want some evidence. I'd want some indication that you knew about my private world before I gave any cognizance.
Doctor: Would you believe me?
Patient: Not out of the blue, especially since we haven't even met (an illustration of the patient's amnesia).
Doctor: What if your wife was here and she agreed with me, what would you think at that point?
Patient: I'd continue to resist, but it would become more difficult»

Although their persistence is a fundamental character of their nature, there are cases in which patients manage to 'unmask' their confabulations. Burgess and McNeil (1999) focus on analyzing the case of a patient who confabulated following an anterior communicating artery aneurysm. Some examples of B.E.'s post-operative confabulations:

- He thought that many staff members (both inpatients and visitors to the ward) were celebrities.

- He thought that the doctors had told him that there was no longer any reason for him to stay in the hospital, and he was confident that he had informed the staff members of his decision to leave the hospital. On this occasion, he then escaped from the ward in his pajamas and attempted to take the train home.

Once he returned home, the confabulations continued as well: his wife reports that in the mornings she would find him getting out of bed dressed in formal clothes, thinking he had to go out performing stock takes together with his business partner. Even when his wife would point out that he had just returned from the hospital and had no work obligations, his confabulations would not cease. Only when he had arrived at the door after getting dressed did he realize that he could not think where he was going. These kinds of confabulations happened every day throughout the post-surgery period, and he showed no other confabulatory behavior.

However, there were also instances of reasoning in which B.E. was able to reflect and have introspection on his confabulations. For example, at one point, he couldn't remember where he had parked his car, «but further questioning revealed that B.E. did not actually have a memory of parking

the car but was wrestling with the problem that he remembered having recently performed a stock take, to which he would have driven, but at the same time he knew that he was prohibited from driving since his operation. He reasoned that if he could find where his car was parked this might confirm or disconfirm his 'memory'» (Burgess and McNeil 1999, p. 166). To manage the sense of 'conflict' between what he seemed to 'remember' and what he thought it was true, B.E. implemented various reasoning and verification actions. As Burgess and McNeil report, he:

- «Describes trying to resolve the conflict between what he "remembered" and what seemed likely to be true» (Burgess and McNeil 1999, p. 167)
- «Describes deciding that his (erroneous) memory was untrue» (Burgess and McNeil 1999, p. 167)
- «Disconfirmed his confabulations by checking for "supporting evidence" in the real world» (Burgess and McNeil 1999, p. 167)
- «Reports being able to remember real events which conflicted with his confabulations if he was given "cues" by his wife» (Burgess and McNeil 1999, p. 167)
- Keeps a diary to provide «evidence for his reasoning about his own memories» (Burgess and McNeil 1999, p. 168)

The peculiarity of B.E.'s case is that, for once, we see a clear list and description of the behaviors, practical actions, and reasoning implemented by the patient to 'unmask' the confabulations.

I would say confabulation can be distinguished between clinical and non-clinical (or 'voluntarily caused'). First of all, in psychiatry confabulations are regarded as a symptom that is found across several different pathologies[98] and that develops in the involuntary production of false

[98] The notion of confabulation was first and foremost a term used to designate a psychopathological symptom. As far as it regards the psychiatric field, it can be traced back to Misidentification syndromes (Capgras' syndrome, Illusion of subjective double, Fregoli's syndrome, Cotard's syndrome, Intermetamorphosis, DeClerambault's syndrome); Auto-attributions of thoughts following a brain bisection; Anosognosia in many neurological conditions such as Hemiplegia, Unilateral hemineglect, Homonymous hemianopsia, Anton's syndrome (visual anosognosia); False memory symptomes, such as schizophrenia (for

memories and the recall of past episodes that never happened.[99] They can be both fantastical, i.e. some forms of confabulation that do not require an appeal to a particular past event that has been distorted and that tend toward the incredible, or they can be fitting the events but incorrect, i.e. Robinson (2017) quotes the example of a man who thinks he remembers what he had for lunch but, although he is sure, he is mistaken (it is a plausible and 'fitting' memory but incorrect). Thus, either the subject ends up with a completely invented 'memory' (Bonhoeffer, K. 1901; van der Horst, L., 1932), or the subject has a confabulatory memory based on real events, then temporally 'displaces' a real event that occurred in his life and adds some elements to it (Talland, 1965; Schnider, Gutbrod, Hess and Schroth, 1996; Ptak and Schnider, 1999).

There may be some differences between the two cases. For example, fantastical confabulations that are often 'spontaneous,' pathological and associated with high conviction coexist with the possibility of less elaborate confabulations that are more like false statements 'provoked' by the interviewer in subjects with memory deficits. This second type of confabulations would seem to find an explanation in the need of subjects to answer as soon as possible questions they do not know or have forgotten the answer to cover any memory deficits.

On the other hand, if we consider the possibility for a non-clinical subject to form and recall false memories that never happened, we can consider the case of suggestibility or the memory implantation studies. As shown by Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995) who introduced a new paradigm for false memory research addressing the question of whether it is possible to implant a completely false memory of something that never happened. As they show with the "lost-in-the-mall effect", suggestions can alter memory and people can be induced to have different memories of their past and may even 'remember' and describe in detail events that never happened. Building on the

confabulations with fantastic content) and ACoA aneurysm (for confabulations with ordinary content, see DeLuca & Diamond, 1995)

[99] There are some who consider confabulations not only pathological distortions that occur in clinical contexts, but also any 'false memory' that occurs in non-clinical cases (see, for example, the work of Loftus with respect to 'suggestibility' in participants that are influenced by easily imaginable events in Loftus and Pickrell 1995).

experiments of Loftus & Ketcham (1994) and Loftus & Coan (1996), Loftus and Pickrell conduct a series of experiments that aim to introduce invented but plausible events into the participants' lives. In collaboration with their families, they write a journal of events from their childhood in which one false but plausible event (i.e., getting lost in a mall when they were children) is included. The participants are then asked to read and process the events at different time periods from the initial diary presentation. In the original study and in the replications (Wade & Garry, 2005; Scoboria et al., 2016), about one third of the participants process the memory of the event as their own, begin to remember an increasing number of details, and have extreme difficulty recognising it as being fictional, even when they are clearly told that it is an implanted memory.

Focusing on the confabulation - hallucination relation according to which, being a mental/cognitive error, mnemonic confabulation is analogous to hallucination in perception, it is possible to make a distinction between two kinds of confabulations. Recently, confabulations have started to be referred to as veridical (in which the remembered event exists, but the event and the content are not connected: i.e., cases where subjects get things right by mere accident. See Robins 2020; Michaelian 2016; Bernecker 2010) or falsidical, i.e., cases in which the falsity of the memory is considered to be an essential feature of confabulation.[100]

Veridical Hallucination → Veridical confabulation

Real Hallucination → Falsidical Confabulation

[100] According to Michaelian: «Confabulation... occurs when the subject's episodic memory system function unreliably. When the system functions unreliably, it will usually produce an inaccurate representation. In cases where an unreliably functioning memory system produced an inaccurate representation, the subject can be said to confabulate falsidically... In cases where an unreliably functioning memory system produces an accurate representation, the subject can be said to confabulate veridically» (Michaelian, 2016b, p. 6).

6.2.4 Towards a phenomenological interpretation of confabulations: Confabulations as 'hallucinations in the past'

Having explained in what sense confabulations can be considered a phenomenon similar to hallucinations, we can question whether it is possible to provide a phenomenological explanation of confabulations as well.

From a phenomenological point of view, memory is usually considered to be rooted in perception, since it is perception that has originally given what was actually present, which is what memory intends. What about confabulations? What happens if in the act of memory, we are directed towards something that did not happen? Since from a phenomenological point of view, they involve the same sensory material, is it possible to consider confabulations as errors in which the subject misinterprets the sensory material of memory (phantasmata) and mistakes it for the sensory material of perception (sensations)? There is a fantasy basis that I interpret as a perception in the past and that in the present moment I think I remember as if it were not fantasy, as if I had actually experienced it: it is an imagining that I have in the present moment with respect to a past event that never happened and in which I believe and that I cannot distinguish from memories that actually happened.

The connection between confabulations and hallucinations highlighted earlier is quite linear. We can ask ourselves if it is possible that in the same way in which during a hallucination a subject can see a pink elephant on the desk and fail to realize that there is not a pink elephant on the desk, he can also remember an event (for example his wedding) and fail to realize that this event did not happen. If we try to apply the act-object structure to confabulation we see that there is no 'object' (the remembered experience), that the sensory data are phantasmata (i.e., the same sensory material as the imagination) that are misinterpreted by the subject resulting in confabulations (i.e., 'hallucinations in the past') that, just like hallucinations, are very difficult to correct.

OBJECT	X
SENSORY DATA	'sensuous phantasmata'
AUFFASSUNG	In the present moment the subject misinterprets memory phantasmata as sensations, resulting in confabulation
DOUBT	you may or may not correct the confabulation, depending on a number of elements (e.g. your mental state in that moment)
NEW AUFFASSUNG	(...)

6.2.4.1 Clinical Confabulations

If we reflect on the confabulations I earlier called 'clinical', we can analyze the same process with fantastical confabulations and those that fit the events but incorrectly. Let us take an example of fantastical confabulations in which imagination seems to make its appearance in a very similar way to what happens in hallucinations. For example, as shown by Kraepelin (1919), in patients with schizophrenia false memories tend toward the incredible:

> «A patient reported that he had dug up an amputated human arm, but then was compelled by his neighbor with a revolver in front of him to eternal silence; nevertheless, he gave information and an inquiry was really made. Another went into a brothel in order to convince himself whether cannibals lived there. People were aiming at his life, but he escaped, though later human flesh was put before him in a restaurant» (1919, p. 310).

In this case, they are clearly fantastical confabulations: we have no object (i.e., experience) that actually happened in the past. Both objects are absent; both patients are presented with sensuous phantasmata that they interpret as either remembering digging up an amputated human arm and being forced by their neighbor with a revolver in front of them to keep quiet forever; or remembering

entering a brothel to convince themselves that cannibals lived there. This quote does not let us know whether they questioned their confabulations and managed to re-interpret them. It seems implausible or at least very difficult that they realized they were confabulating because most subjects experiencing confabulations continue to believe these accounts, some fading over time while others continue to be enriched with details (McKenna et al. 2009). Therefore, in this case, real memories are revised by current contexts and can be confused with imagined events.

OBJECT	X
SENSORY DATA	'sensuous phantasmata'
AUFFASSUNG	remembering digging up an amputated human arm and being forced by their neighbor with a revolver in front of them to keep quiet forever
DOUBT	(...)
NEW AUFFASSUNG	(...)

6.2.4.2 Non-Clinical Confabulations

If we talk about non-clinical confabulations, however, we can analyze the case of the 'lost-in-the-mall effect' exposed by Loftus and Pickrell (1995). In that case the object (experience) is absent: the participants had never been lost in the supermarket. Chris was never lost in the University City mall in Spokane, Washington. His memory of the University City mall where he often went with his family is true. All other details are falsidical: he is told that he was crying and that he was rescued by an old man who brought him back to his parents. The sensitive material that interprets are phantasmata: indeed, there seems almost to be an interpretive 'excess'. Chris not only remembers the fabricated experience but started to 'remember' the episode he got lost in a more and more detailed

way: he added details about the man who rescued him, his state of mind at the time, the toy shop he got lost in, and his parents' reactions.

There is no 'spontaneous' moment of doubt and Chris does not recognize on his own that the memory is false: the moment he is told that the memory is false, he struggles to even believe it: «Chris was soon told that one of the memories was false. Could he guess? He selected one of the real memories. When told that the memory of being lost was the false one, he had trouble believing it» (Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. 1995, p. 2). Once someone from the outside (in this case the experiment leaders) explained to him that the memory was fake and he was influenced, while having some difficulty, Chris has the opportunity to interpret the phantasmata as phantasmata (and no longer as sensations) by a regressive ray. According to this second type of confabulation, we find that false memories are reinforced by a richness of confabulated details such that they are difficult to clear.

OBJECT	X
SENSORY DATA	'sensuous phantasmata'
AUFFASSUNG	Chris interprets the memory as if it was his own and reinforces it with confabulated details
DOUBT	the experiment leaders) explained to him that the memory was fake, and he was influenced
NEW AUFFASSUNG	Chris has the opportunity to interpret the phantasmata as phantasmata (and no longer as sensations) by a regressive ray

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the relationship between memory and hallucinations is not much explored. Taking into consideration what I exposed in this chapter, it appears unlikely that this is the conclusive statement on the issue, but the goal of the last part of this chapter was to

highlight some interesting but problematic issues, focusing on possible research horizons that need further exploration.

6.3 IMAGINATION AS A COMMON GROUND BETWEEN HALLUCINATIONS AND CONFABULATIONS

How is it possible to distinguish between hallucinating now with respect to the past (confabulation) and remembering having actually hallucinated something in the past? These are two conceptually different things, but at the phenomenological level, is it possible to distinguish them? Probably not, from a phenomenological point of view, it is very difficult to distinguish confabulations and hallucinations because in both cases, although the genesis of the experiences might be different, the source is strictly linked to the ability to imagine.

Considering the imagination as a shared source between hallucinations and memory begins with experiments like 'imagination inflation,' from which we can derive a high degree of confidence in false memories (Garry et al., 1996). The point in these experiments was to draw on the 'memory trace' left by our imagination of something to show that there is a higher probability of remembering incorrectly as real experiences things we have already imagined or dreamed about. In a study demonstrating this phenomenon, participants were given simple action statements (like 'break the toothpick') and, at times, they either acted out or imagined performing the action (Goff and Roediger, 1998). The more they imagined the action, the higher the likelihood of misremembering it as something they actually did.[101]

[101] These results need to be counter-balanced by experiments showing that subjects have the (metacognitive) capacity to distinguish memories of imaginings and memories of perceptual experiences. See also Marcia Johnson's work (1984, 1981, 1988, 1991, 1998, 2006) on source- and/or reality-monitoring. One interesting account on the capacity to distinguish perceptual experiences and imaginings comes from Dijkstra, N., and Fleming, S. M. (2023). Within their account, hallucinations are understood as events partially caused by hyperactivation of sensory areas, namely when the internal activity in subjects is so strong that it surpasses a 'reality threshold.' This is in accordance with the framework on hallucinations proposed by Allen, P., Larøi, F., McGuire, P. K. & Aleman (2008) and Zmigrod, L., Garrison, J. R., Carr, J. & Simons, J. S. (20169.

From a phenomenological point of view, it is very difficult to distinguish confabulations, hallucinations, and the remembering of hallucinations because in each case, although the genesis of the experiences might be different, the source is strictly linked to the ability to imagine. It seems therefore plausible that both are based on imagination and that phantasmata might be interpreted in different ways according to the different situations and mixed with sensations. Let's consider some examples.

If we examine an example of confabulation: It's 8:00 in the morning, Giuseppe wakes up and starts getting dressed for the office based on a false memory (confabulation) of a phone call the night before where Giulia supposedly said, "Tomorrow at 9, we'll meet at the office for a coffee." Now, Giuseppe creates a false memory, with phantasmata rooted in the past but arising in the present.

The phenomenological approach allows us to consider the 'successful' remembering of hallucinations in the same way. Moving to consider an example of the successful remembering of a hallucination: It's 7:00 in the evening, Giuseppe hallucinates a call where Giulia tells him, "Tomorrow at 9, we'll meet at the office for a coffee." Based on the *successful* memory of this hallucination, the next day Giuseppe gets dressed for work. In this case, there are phantasmata that haven't been interpreted as such but rather as sensations, resulting in the hallucination. He later remembers them successfully, thinking they were sensations. By examining the sensory material in this way, it would leave open the possibility of discovering that the event from the previous night was, in fact, a hallucination.

This phenomenological interpretation seems to confirm the resemblance between hallucinations and confabulations and the successful remembering of hallucinations. It also allows for a similar analogy to be established between an episode of misremembering and an illusion. Considering an example of misremembering: It's 7:00 in the evening, and Giuseppe indeed received a call where Giulia was firing him. The next morning, he actually remembers receiving the call the night before, but interprets it incorrectly, manipulating it and mixing sensations with phantasmata.

Conclusions

The aim of this master's thesis work was twofold. I wanted to clarify the understanding of hallucinations in many of the opposing positions in the panorama of contemporary philosophy of mind by arguing that perceptions and hallucinations are mental events of different kinds in some respects, to deepen the role of the subject, and to try to understand whether it is true or not that in principle a subject cannot subjectively distinguish between perceptual and hallucinatory experiences. To do so, I started from a problem that animates the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind and tried to solve it by combining a psychiatric perspective and the Husserlian-phenomenological approach. First of all, let's recall the definitions of veridical perception, hallucination, and illusion:

- Veridical perception: when there is a pink elephant that can be perceived by the subject and he sees the pink elephant, then he is having a veridical perception of the pink elephant.
- Illusion: when there is a pink elephant that can be perceived by the subject, but he misperceives some of its properties.
- Hallucination: when there is no pink elephant to be perceived but the subject has a perceptual-like experience of a pink elephant that he believes to be a veridical perception.

If we return to the problem presented in the second chapter, we can schematically end up with the following positions:

1. Conjunctivism: a veridical perception and a hallucination are subjectively indistinguishable; perceptions and hallucinations are mental events of the very same essential kind.

- Representationalism: when a subject has a veridical visual perception of a pink elephant, his experience fundamentally consists in visually representing that there's a pink elephant before the subject's eyes.
- Sense-data theory: when a subject has a sensory experience of a pink elephant, then there is something which is presented to him as pink.

- Adverbialism: when a subject has a veridical experience of a pink elephant, this means he is visually sensing pink-elephantely and that something like pink-elephantiness is instantiated in the experience itself.

2. Disjunctivism: a veridical perception and a hallucination are subjectively indistinguishable; perceptions and hallucinations are mental events of different kinds in some respects

- Naive realism: when a subject has a veridical visual perception of a pink elephant, then the subject sees the pink elephant and has a direct presentation of the pink elephant, and it looks pink to him because he perceives the elephant's pinkness: his veridical perception of it is essentially constituted by the pink elephant itself.

To say that the subject, given certain altered mental states, is in principle unable to subjectively distinguish them is very different from saying that they are two experiences of the same mental nature and does not mean that they cannot be profoundly different. To outline the aspects in which a hallucination can be distinguished from a veridical perception and to try to claim some further kind of distinguishability, I turned to psychiatry. The goal of the third chapter was to highlight the history of the concept and to show how hallucinations are regarded in the contemporary psychiatric field. To address this problem by looking at its empirical basis first of all means considering the extremely peculiar role that hallucinations play in the contemporary psychiatric context and, moreover, dealing with the fact that they often tend to be underestimated. According to the current definition:

- Hallucinations: «[h]allucinations are perception-like experiences that occur without an external stimulus. They are vivid and clear, with the full force and impact of normal perceptions, and not under voluntary control. They may occur in any sensory modality, but auditory hallucinations are the most common in schizophrenia and related disorders» (American Psychiatric Association 2013, pp. 87, 88).

From the psychiatric framework, therefore, we can only draw the fact that they have the 'impact of normal perceptions', but nothing with respect to whether or not they are mental events of the same nature. On the contrary, we can see that from an empirical research point of view, it would almost make more sense to speak of disjunctivism rather than conjunctivism.

This is where the value of phenomenological integration becomes evident. The Husserlian phenomenological proposal assumes that we cannot presuppose the existence of the object and helps us to define perception in the following way:

- Perception: «The perceptual appearance of a reality and perceptual belief are always already there as the foundation for everything else» (Husserl 2005, p. 342).
- Sensations: Sensations are animated by perceptual apprehension, leading to the appearance of external objects, such as a pink elephant.
- Phantasy: Phantasy and perception can be directed toward the same object, but the crucial difference lies in that a subject who phantasies is able to "see" non-existing objects. It is possible to imagine both existing and non-existing objects: the focus is that in phantasy both are given as not actual and are apprehended as not really present.
- Phantasmata: Phantasmata are animated by phantasy apprehension and lead to phantasy experience, just as the remembering of the pink elephant previously apprehended would be animated by a memorial apprehension.
- Unmasked hallucinations: «If we presentify the example of an unmasked hallucination, then we find in place of belief disbelief. Moreover, other examples offer themselves, ones in which we are at first perceptually doubtful whether it is a case of perception or hallucination. Here both belief and disbeliefs are lacking, and instead of them we have doubt» (Husserl 1973, pp. 14–16 [12–13]).
- *Auffassung*: is recognized as a real [reell] moment of experience and fulfills a particularly important task since, in the case of perception, it animates sensory data into presentations of sense-perceptible qualities allowing there to be knowledge of reality.

All of these distinctions not only highlight the complexity of the Husserlian phenomenological panorama but can also be extremely helpful in coming up with a possible distinction between hallucination and perception. If we focus on the role played by sensory data and *Auffassung*, we see that we can define veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations in the following way:

- Veridical perception: the subject continuously correctly interprets the sensory data (sensations).

- Illusion: the subject misinterprets the sensory data (sensations) but can correct his first Auffassung with a new Auffassung (such as in the case of the perceptual error mannequin-woman).
- Hallucination: the hallucinated subject might misinterpret sensory data (sensuous phantasmata interpreted as sensations) and, for a number of reasons, be unable to correct his interpretation.

On the one hand, veridical perceptions and illusions are characterized by sensations, «the mark of reality» (Husserl 2005, p. 87), while on the other hand hallucinations, as well as fantastic presentations, are characterized by the presence of sensuous phantasmata. As far as the two other cases are concerned:

- Illusions 'on the verge' of hallucinations: the hallucinated subject is presented with sensory data (sensations) that he correctly interprets until he is overwhelmed by 'uncontrolled' hallucinations that are made up on the spot and take over. He just waits for them to stop.
- 'Unmasked' hallucinations: the hallucinated subject is presented with sensory data (sensuous phantasmata), he takes over with his subjective (altered) interpretation and has difficulties reflecting on the content of what he is experiencing. He understands that what he was (or is) having were (or are) hallucinations and experiences them in full awareness of their hallucinatory character. He can re-interpret 'sensuous phantasmata' by a regressive ray.

The main point is that, in hallucinations, a subject may be presented with sensuous phantasmata that he can interpret by detaching himself from what is presented to the senses and indulging in a particular type of altered mental state and, ultimately, be unable to correct his apprehension by introspection alone. Something similar may happen in the case of confabulations:

- Confabulations: experiences in which there is no remembered 'object', and the sensory data are phantasmata (i.e., the same sensory material as the imagination) that are misinterpreted by the subject as sensations, resulting in confabulations (i.e., 'hallucinations in the past')

The delineations articulated above serve to elucidate the divergence between hallucinations and perceptions, offering a novel perspective in support of the disjunctivist stance. Can we argue for any

common ground between hallucination and perception? Admittedly, there is a partial sharing of sensory material between the two phenomena. However, this shared element stands as the sole aspect that could be argued 'in favor' of a conjunctivist viewpoint. Notwithstanding, it is imperative to note that the conjunctivist stance goes beyond acknowledging a potential commonality, but asserts hallucinations and perceptions are mental events of the exact same type. Contrary to this perspective, the difference between these two phenomena persists.

References

- Addams, R. (1834). An account of a peculiar optical phaenomenon seen after having looked at a moving body, &c. *London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science*, 5, 373–374.

- Alcaraz-Sánchez, A., Demšar, E., Campillo-Ferrer, T., & Torres-Platas, S. G. (2022). Nothingness is all there is: An exploration of objectless awareness during sleep. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *13*, 901031.

- Alcaraz-Sánchez, A., Demšar, E., Campillo-Ferrer, T., & Torres-Platas, S. G. (2022). Nothingness is all there is: An exploration of objectless awareness during sleep. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *13*, 901031.

- Alderson-Day, B., Moseley, P., Mitrenga, K., Moffatt, J., Lee, R., Foxwell, J., . . . Fernyhough, C. (2023). Varieties of felt presence? Three surveys of presence phenomena and their relations to psychopathology. *Psychological Medicine, 53*(8), 3692-3700. doi:10.1017/S0033291722000344

- Allen, K. (2015). Hallucination and imagination. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *93*(2), 287-302.

- Allen, P., Larøi, F., McGuire, P. K., & Aleman, A. (2008). The hallucinating brain: a review of structural and functional neuroimaging studies of hallucinations. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, *32*(1), 175-191.

- Alston, W. P. (1999). Back to the Theory of Appearing. *Philosophical perspectives*, *13*, 181-203.

- Alweiss, L. (2009). Between internalism and externalism: Husserl's account of intentionality. *Inquiry*, *52*(1), 53-78.
- American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric publishing, Washington, DC London, England (Tr. it.: Manuale diagnostico e statistico dei disturbi mentali, Quinta edizione, DSM-5, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, 2014)
- Arcangeli, M., & Dokic, J. (2018). 7 Affective Memory. *New directions in the philosophy of memory*.
- Arzy, S. (2013). *Feeling of a presence. Epilepsy & Behavior, 28(2), 305.*
- Arzy, S., Seeck, M., Ortigue, S., Spinelli, L., & Blanke, O. (2006). Induction of an illusory shadow person. *Nature*, *443*(7109), 287-287.
- Ayer, A. J. (1940). The foundations of empirical knowledge.
- Baillarger. (1846). Des hallucinations. Mémoires de L'Académie Royale de Médecine
- Barkasi, M. (2020). Some hallucinations are experiences of the past. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *101*(3), 454-488.
- Barlow, H.B., Hill, R.M. (1963). Evidence for a physiological explanation of the waterfall phenomenon and figural aftereffects. *Nature*, 200, 1434–1435.
- Baysan, U. (2018). Memory, confabulation, and epistemic failure. *Logos & Episteme*, *9*(4), 369-378.
- Bennett, G., & Bennett, K. M. (2000). The presence of the dead: An empirical study. *Mortality*, *5*(2), 139-157.
- Bentall, R. P. (1990). The illusion of reality: a review and integration of psychological research on hallucinations. *Psychological bulletin*, *107*(1), 82.

- Bergamin, J. A. (2020). An excess of meaning: Conceptual over-interpretation in confabulation and schizophrenia. *Topoi*, *39*(1), 163-176.Bull 107:82–95
- Bernecker, S. (2010). *Memory: A Philosophical Study*. Oxford University Press
- Bernecker, S. (2017). A causal theory of mnemonic confabulation. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *8*, 1207.
- Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (1993). *Introduction to Husserlian phenomenology*. Northwestern University Press.
- Berrios, G. E. (1998). Confabulations: a conceptual history. *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences*, *7*(3), 225-241.
- Bhavsar, V., & Bhugra, D. (2008). Religious delusions: finding meanings in psychosis. *Psychopathology*, *41*(3), 165-172.
- Bleuler. (1922). L'origine et la nature des hallucinations
- Blom Jan Dirk. (2009). A Dictionary of Hallucinations, Springer-Verlag, New York
- Bonhoeffer, K. (1904). Der Korsakowsche Symptomenkomplex in seinen Beziehungen zu den verschiedenen Krankheitsformen. *Allgemeine Zeitung Psychiatrie*, *61*, 744-752.
- Bornemark, J., & Wallenstein, S. O. (2015). *Madness, Religion, and the Limits of Reason*. Södertörns högskola.
- Bortolotti, Lisa and Rochelle E. Cox, 2009, "'Faultless' Ignorance: Strengths and Limitations of Epistemic Definitions of Confabulation", *Consciousness and Cognition*, 18(4): 952–965. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.08.011
- Bouso, J. C., Ona, G., Kohek, M., Dos Santos, R. G., Hallak, J. E., Alcázar-Córcoles, M. Á., & Obiols-Llandrich, J. (2023). Hallucinations and Hallucinogens: Psychopathology or Wisdom?. *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry*, *47*(2), 576-604.

- Bower, M. (2020). Husserl on hallucination: A conjunctive reading. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 58(3), 549–579.
- Bower, M. E. (2020). Husserl on hallucination: A conjunctive reading. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, *58*(3), 549-579.
- Broad, C. D. (1923). Scientific Thought, 66–7. *London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co*.
- Brough, J. B. (1975). Husserl on memory. *The Monist*, 40-62.
- Brugger, P. (2008). The phantom limb in dreams. *Consciousness and cognition*, *17*(4), 1272-1278.
- Burge, T. (2010). *Origins of objectivity*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Burgess, P. W., & McNeil, J. E. (1999). Content-specific confabulation. *Cortex*, *35*(2), 163-182.
- Butchvarov, P. (1980). Adverbial theories of consciousness. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, *5*, 261-280.
- Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. *The Philosophical Review*, 110(2), 199-240.
- Byrne, A. and Logue, H. (2008). "Either/Or", in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57–94.
- Cairns, D. (1960). *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Hague: M. Nijhoff.
- Campbell, John 2002. Reference and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Casey, E. S. (1976). Comparative phenomenology of mental activity: Memory, hallucination, and fantasy contrasted with imagination. *Research in Phenomenology*, *6*, 1-25.
- Casey, E. S. (2003). Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory.

- Castelnovo, A., Cavalloti, S., Gambini, O., & D'Agostino, A. (2015). Post-bereavement hallucinatory experiences: A critical overview of population and clinical studies. *Journal of Affective Disorders*, 186, 266–274.
- Chakrabarty, A., & Reddy, M. S. (2011). Visual hallucinations in mania. *Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine*, 33(1), 71-73.
- Chalmers, D. (2005). The Matrix as metaphysics, from the philosophy section of the official Matrix website, [Online], http://whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com/ rl_cmp/phi.html. Also in Grau, C. (ed.) Philosophers Explore the Matrix, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chesterman, P., & Boast, N. (1994). Multi-modal hallucinations. *Psychopathology*, 27(6), 273-280.
- Cheyne, J. A. (2001). The ominous numinous. Sensed presence and 'other' hallucinations. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, *8*(5-6), 133-150.
- Cheyne, J. A. (2012). Sensed presences. Hallucinations: *Research and practice*, 219-234.
- Cicogna P. C., Bosinelli M. (2001). Consciousness during dreams. *Conscious. Cogn.* 10, 26–41.
- Cimino, A. (2021). Husserl's philosophical estrangement from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 20(4), 743-779.
- Crane T. and Craig F. (2021). "The Problem of Perception", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
- Crane, H. D., & Piantanida, T. P. (1983). On seeing reddish green and yellowish blue. Science, 221, 1078–1080.
- Crane, T. (2006). "Is there a Perceptual Relation?", in *Gendler and Hawthorne* (eds.) 2006, 126–46.

- Crane, Tim (2001). Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1995). Are we aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex?. *Nature*, 375, 121-123.
- Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1998). Consciousness and neuroscience. *Cerebral cortex*, 8(2), 97-107.
- Currie, G. (2000). Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. *Mind & language*, *15*(1), 168-183.
- D'Agostino, A., & Limosani, I. (2016). Hypnagogic hallucinations and sleep paralysis. *Narcolepsy: a clinical guide*, 81-93.
- Dalla Barba, G. (2009). Temporal consciousness and confabulation: Escape from unconscious explanatory idols. *Confabulation: Views from neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology and philosophy*, 223-260.
- Dalla Barba, G., 2002, *Memory, Consciousness and Temporality*, Boston: Kluwer.
- Dalla Barba, G., 2016, "Temporal Consciousness and Confabulation: When Mental Time Travel Takes the Wrong Track", in Kourken, Klein, & Szpunar 2016d: 119–134. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0006
- Dancy, J. (1995). "Arguments from Illusion", The Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 421–38
- Davidson, D. (1986). A coherence theory of truth and knowledge, in Lepore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Daw, N. W. (1962). Why afterimages are not seen in normal circumstances. *Nature*, 196, 1143–1145.
- DeLuca, J. (2000). A cognitive neuroscience perspective on confabulation. *Neuropsychoanalysis*, *2*(2), 119-132.
- Dennett, D. C. (1993). *Consciousness explained*. Penguin uk.

- Descartes, R. (2006). *Meditations, objections, and replies*. Hackett Publishing.
- Dijkstra, N., & Fleming, S. M. (2023). Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination. *Nature Communications*, *14*(1), 1627.
- Dokic, J. (2010). Perceptual recognition and the feeling of presence. *Perceiving the world*, 33-51.
- Dokic, J. (2014). Feeling the past: A two-tiered account of episodic memory. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, *5*(3), 413-426.
- Dokic, J. (2016). Toward a unified account of hallucinations. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 23(7-8).
- Dokic, J. & Jean-Rémy, M. (2012). Disjunctivism, hallucinations, and metacognition. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science*, 3(5), 533-543.
- Dokic, J. & Martin, J.-R. (2015). 'Looks the Same but Feels Different', A Metacognitive Approach to Cognitive Penetrability. In Zemeckis, J. & Raftopoulos, A. (eds.), *The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception, New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Dokic, J., & Martin, J. R. (2017). Felt reality and the opacity of perception. *Topoi*, *36*, 299-309.
- Dorsch, Fabian 2010. The Unity of Hallucinations, Phenomenology, and the Cognitive Sciences 9: 171-191.
- Dreyfus, H. L. (1984). Husserl, intentionality, and cognitive science.
- Dreyfus, H. L. (1988). Husserl's Epiphenomenology", en *HR Otto-JA Tuedio* (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Dordrecht, Reidel.
- Dreyfus, H. L. (1990). Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger's being in time, division I. Mit Press.

- Drummond, J. J. (2012). Intentionality without representationalism. In Zahavi, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, 115–33.
- Drummond, J. J. (2015). The Doctrine of the Noema and the Theory of Reason. In Staiti, Commentary on Husserl's Ideas I, 257–71.
- Eldridge, P. (2020). The act of forgetting: Husserl on the constitution of the absent past. *Continental Philosophy Review*, *53*(4), 401-417.
- Eldridge, P. (2021). False Remembrance: Husserl's Account of the Distortions of Memory. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, *52*(1), 1-15.
- Esquirol E. (1838). *Des maladies mentales, considérées sous les rapports médical, hygiénique et médico-légal,* J.-B. Baillière, Parigi
- Ey, H. (1973). *Traite des hallucinations*: I-II.
- Falret J.P. (1864). *Des maladies mentales et des asiles d'aliénés, leçons cliniques et considérations générales*
- Farkas, K. (2003). What is externalism?. *Philosophical Studies*, 112, 187-208.
- Farkas, K. (2010). The subject's point of view. *OUP Oxford*.
- Farkas, K. (2013). A Sense of Reality. *Hallucination: Philosophy and psychology*, ed. Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchais, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 399415.
- Ffytche DH, Blom JD, Catani M. (2010). Disorders of visual perception. *J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry*;81(11):1280–1287.
- Ffytche DH, Howard RJ, Brammer MJ, David A, Woodruff P, Williams S. (1998). The anatomy of conscious vision: an fMRI study of visual hallucinations. *Nat Neurosci*.;1(8):738–742.

- Fish, W. (2008). Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination. In A. Haddock & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge (pp. 144–167). Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Fish, W. (2009). *Perception, hallucination, and illusion*. OUP USA.
- Fotopoulou, A. (2008). False-selves in neuropsychological rehabilitation: The challenge of confabulation. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18(5/6), 541–565.
- Fuchs, T. (2017). Collective body memories. In C. Durt, T. Fuchs, & C. Tewes (Eds.), Embodiment, Enaction, and culture: Investigating the constitution of a shared world (pp. 333–352). Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Fuchs, T. (2018). Presence in absence: The ambiguous phenomenology of grief. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 17, 43–63.
- Fulford, K. W. M., Davies, M., Gipps, R., Graham, G., Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G., & Thornton, T. (Eds.). (2013). *The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry*. OUP Oxford.
- Galton, F. (1883). *Inquiries into human faculty and its development*. Macmillan.
- Garry, M., Manning, C.G., Loftus, E.F., and Sherman, S.J. (1996). Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred. *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review,* **6**, 313–318.
- Gauntlett-Gilbert, J., & Kuipers, E. (2003). Phenomenology of visual hallucinations in psychiatric conditions. The Journal of nervous and mental disease, 191(3), 203-205.
- Gearing, R. E., Alonzo, D., Smolak, A., McHugh, K., Harmon, S., & Baldwin, S. (2011). Association of religion with delusions and hallucinations in the context of schizophrenia: Implications for engagement and adherence. *Schizophrenia research*, *126*(1-3), 150-163.
- Genone, J. (2014). Appearance and illusion. *Mind*, *123*(490), 339-376.

- Genone, J. (2016). Recent work on naïve realism. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 53(1), 1–25.
- Gertler, B. (2012). understanding the Internalism-Externalism debate: what is the boundary of the thinker?. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 26, 51-75.
- Goff, L.M. and Roediger, H.L. (1998). Imagination inflation for action events: Repeated imaginings lead to illusory recollections. *Memory & Cognition,* **26**, 20–33.
- Gregory, R. L. (2015). *Eye and brain: The psychology of seeing*(Vol. 80). Princeton university press.
- Gregory, R.L. (1981). *Eye and brain. Third revised edition*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Grossberg, S. (2000). How hallucinations may arise from brain mechanisms of learning, attention, and volition. *Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society*, *6*(5), 583-592.
- Gurney, E. (1888). Hallucination of memory and telepathy'. *Mind*, *13*(51), 415-417.
- Haddock, A., & Macpherson, F. (2008). *Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Hall C., Van de Castle R. (1966). *The Content Analysis of Dreams.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts
- Hatfield, G. (2021). "Sense Data", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
- Heller, R. H. (1972) Edvard Munch: The Scream. New York, NY: Viking Press
- Henderson, W. R., & Smyth, G. E. (1948). Phantom limbs. *Journal of neurology, neurosurgery, and psychiatry*, *11*(2), 88.

- Hirstein, W., (ed.), 2009, *Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hirstein, W., 2005, *Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hofmann, A., & Schultes, R. E. (1979). *Plants of the gods: Origins of hallucinogenic* use. Hutchinson
- Hopp Walter (2008). Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 38(2)
- Hopp Walter (2011). *Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account*, Cambridge University press, Cambridge
- Hopp, W. (2020). *Phenomenology: A contemporary introduction*. London: Routledge
- Horgan, T. (2013). Original intentionality is phenomenal intentionality. *The Monist*, 96(2), 232–251
- Hurley, S. (1998). Consciousness in Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Husserl E. (1973). *Experience and Judgment*. L. Landgrebe, ed., J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, trans. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
- Husserl E. (1984). *'Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy'*. First book: *'General introduction to a pure phenomenology'*. William, R. M. trans.
- Husserl E. (1991). *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893–1917). J. B. Brough, trans. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Husserl E. (2005). *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory* (1898–1925). J. Brough, trans. Dordrecht: Springer
- Husserl, E. (1964). *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*.(ed.) Heidegger.

- Husserl, E. (1973). Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907. U. Claesges (Ed.). The Hague: Nijhoff; Thing and space: Lectures of 1907. R. Rojcewicz (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997
- Husserl, E. (2001a). *Logical Investigations*, Vol. 1 translated by JN Findlay and edited by Dermot Moran. London: Routledge, 1911, 249-9.
- Husserl, E. (2001b). *Logical Investigations*, Vol. 2 translated by JN Findlay and edited by Dermot Moran. London: Routledge, 1911, 249-9.
- Ings, S. (2007). *The Eye: A Natural History*, London: Bloomsbury
- Jackson, F. (1975). On the adverbial analysis of visual experience. *Metaphilosophy*, 6(2), 127-135.
- Jackson, F. (1977). *Perception: A Representative Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32: 127–136.
- Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary Didn't Know, *Journal of Philosophy*, 83: 291–295.
- Jahoda, G., (1971). Retinal pigmentation, illusion susceptibility and space perception. *International Journal of Psychology*, 6 (3). pp.199–207.
- James, S. P. (2014). Hallucinating real things. *Synthese*, *191*, 3711-3732.
- James, W. (1887). *The consciousness of lost limbs*.
- Jardri R, Thomas P, Delmaire C, Delion P, Pins D. (2013). The neurodynamic organization of modality-dependent hallucinations. *Cereb Cortex*.;23(5):1108–1117
- Jaspers K. (1968). General Psychopathology (7th edition) (J. Hoenig & M.W. Hamilton, Trans.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press;

- Jaspers, K. (1911). Zur Analyse der Trugwahrnehmungen (Leibhaftigkeit und Realitätsurteil). *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, *6*(1), 460-535.
- Johnson, M. K. (1988). Reality monitoring: An experimental phenomenological approach. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *117*(4), 390.
- Johnson, M. K. (1991). Reality monitoring: Evidence from confabulation in organic brain disease patients. *Awareness of deficit after brain injury: Clinical and theoretical issues*, 176-97.
- Johnson, M. K. (2006). Memory and reality. *American Psychologist*, *61*(8), 760.
- Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. *Psychological review*, *88*(1), 67.
- Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1998). False memories and confabulation. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, *2*(4), 137-145.
- Johnson, M. K., Kahan, T. L., & Raye, C. L. (1984). Dreams and reality monitoring. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *113*(3), 329.
- Johnston, M. (2004). The Obscure Object of Hallucination, *Philosophical Studies*, 103: 113–83.
- Johnston, M. (2014). The Problem with the Content View. In *Does Perception Have Content?* Oxford University Press.
- Kandinskiĭ, V. K. (1885). *Kritische und klinische Betrachtungen im Gebiete der Sinnestäuschungen: 1. und 2. Studie*. Friedländer.
- Kapur S (2003) Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. *American journal of Psychiatry* 160:13–23

- Kapur, S. (2003). Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. *American journal of Psychiatry*, 160(1), 13-23.
- Keen, C., Murray, C., & Payne, S. (2013). Sensing the presence of the deceased: A narrative review. *Mental Health, Religion and Culture*, 16, 384–402.
- Kourken, M. (2020). Confabulating as unreliable imagining: In defence of the simulationist account of unsuccessful remembering. *Topoi*, 39(1), 133-148.
- Kraepelin, E. (1919). *Dementia praecox and paraphrenia*. Livingstone.
- Kriegel, U. (2007). Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality. *Philosophical perspectives*, 21, 307-340.
- Kriegel, U. (2011). *The sources of intentionality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kriegel, U. (Ed.). (2013). *Phenomenal intentionality*. Oxford University Press.
- Kyzar, E. J., & Denfield, G. H. (2023). Taking subjectivity seriously: towards a unification of phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience. *Molecular Psychiatry*, 28(1), 10-16.
- La Barre, W., RK, S., & LJ, W. (1975). Hallucinations. Behavior, experience, and theory.
- LaBerge S. P. (1985). *Lucid Dreaming: The Power of Being Awake and Aware in Your Dreams.* Ballantine
- LaBerge S. P., DeGracia D. J. (2000). "Varieties of lucid dreaming," in *Individual Differences in Conscious Experience.*eds. Kunzendorf R. G., Wallace B. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins;), 269–307.
- Langdon, R., & Bayne, T. (2010). Delusion and confabulation: Mistakes of perceiving, remembering and believing. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry*, *15*(1-3), 319-345.

- Langdon, R., & Turner, M. (2010). Delusion and confabulation: Overlapping or distinct distortions of reality?. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry*, *15*(1-3), 1-13.
- Langsam, H. (1997). "The Theory of Appearing Defended", *Philosophical Studies*, 120: 33–59.
- Larøi, F. (2006). The phenomenological diversity of hallucinations: some theoretical and clinical implications. *Psychologica Belgica*, 46(1-2), 1-2.
- Larsen, R. R., Maschião, L. F., Piedade, V. L., Messas, G., & Hastings, J. (2022). More phenomenology in psychiatry? Applied ontology as a method towards integration. *The Lancet Psychiatry*, *9*(9), 751-758.
- Leaning, F. E. (1924). An introductory study of hypnopompic phenomena. *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research,* 35, 289-41I.
- Leaning, F. E. (1925). Hypnagogic phenomena. *Jour. Soc. Psych. Res*, 22.
- Levine J. (2003). "Experience and Representation." In Smith, Q., & Jokic, A. (Eds.). (2003). *Consciousness: new philosophical perspectives*. OUP Oxford.
- Lewis, C. S. (1966). *A Grief Observed*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Lewis, C. S. (2015). *A Grief Observed*. (with contributions from Hilary Mantel, Jessica Martin, Jenna Bailey, Rowan Williams, Kate Saunders, Francis Spufford and Maureen Freely). London: Faber & Faber.
- Lewis, D. (1980). Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 58(3), 239–249.
- Liddon, S. C. (1967). Sleep paralysis and hypnagogic hallucinations: Their relationship to the nightmare. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, *17*(1), 88-96.
- Lim, A., Hoek, H. W., Deen, M. L., Blom, J. D., Bruggeman, R., Cahn, W., ... & Wiersma, D. (2016). Prevalence and classification of hallucinations in multiple sensory modalities in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. *Schizophrenia research*, 176(2-3), 493-499.

- Lloyd D. M., Lewis E., Payne J., Wilson L. (2012). A qualitative analysis of sensory phenomena induced by perceptual deprivation. *Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci.* 11, 95–112.
- Loar, B. (1990). Phenomenal states. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4, 81–108.
- Loftus, E. F. (1996). *Eyewitness testimony*. Harvard University Press.
- Loftus, E. F. (1997). Memory for a past that never was. *Current directions in psychological science*, *6*(3), 60-65.
- Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. *Psychiatric annals*, 25(12), 720-725.
- Loftus, E. F., Goan, J. A., & Pickrell, J. E. (2014). Manufacturing false memories using bits of reality. In *Implicit memory and metacognition* (pp. 207-232). Psychology Press. (First published in 1996)
- Loftus, E. F., Levidow, B., & Duensing, S. (1992). Who remembers best? Individual differences in memory for events that occurred in a science museum. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, *6*(2), 93-107.
- Loftus, E., & Ketcham, K. (1994). The myth ofrepressed memory New York: St. *Martin's Griffin*.
- Logue, H. (2012). "What should the naïve realist say about total hallucinations?", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 26(1): 173–199.
- Logue, H. (2012). Why Naıve Realism? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 112: 11137.
- Logue, H. (2013). "Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 86(1): 105–133.
- Logue, H. (2014). "Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconcilliation", in Berit Brogaard (ed.), *Does Perception Have Content?* Oxford: Oxford Unicersity Press, pp. 220–241.

- Logue, H. (2017). Perception first? In J. A. Carter, E. C. Gordon, & B. Jarvis (Eds.), *Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*. Oxford University Press.
- Lowe, E. J. (2000). *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lycan, W. (2001). The case for phenomenal externalism, in Tomberlin, *J.E. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives*, 15, pp. 17–35, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
- Lycan, W. (2019). "Representational Theories of Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/consciousness-representational/>.
- Macpherson F. and Dimitris P. (2013). *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*, edited by F. Macpherson and D. Platchias, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Macpherson, F. (2017a). "Positive Afterimages" in F. Macpherson (ed.), The Illusions Index. Retrieved from https://www.illusionsindex.org/i/positive-afterimages
- Macpherson, F. (2017b). "Müller-Lyer" in F. Macpherson (ed.), The Illusions Index. Retrieved from https://www.illusionsindex.org/ir/75-mueller-lyer
- Macpherson, F., & Batty, C. (2016). Redefining illusion and hallucination in light of new cases. *Philosophical Issues*, *26*, 263-296.
- Martin M.G.F. (2006). On being alienated. In: Gendler TS, Hawthorne J, eds. *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 354–410.
- Martin, M.G.F. (2002). The transparency of experience. *Mind Lang*, 17:376–425.
- Martin, M.G.F. (2004). "The Limits of Self-Awareness", *Philosophical Studies*, 120: 37–89
- Masrour F. (2020). On the Possibility of Hallucinations, *Mind*, Volume 129, Issue 515, July 2020, Pages 737–768,

- Mather, G., Verstraten, F., Anstis, S. (1998). *The motion aftereffect: A modern perspective*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Matthen, M. (2005). *Seeing, doing, and knowing: A philosophical theory of sense perception*. Clarendon Press.
- Matthen, M. (2010). Two visual systems and the feeling of presence. *Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems*, 107-24.
- Maury, A. (1848). Des hallucinations hypnagogiques, ou des erreurs des sens dans l'état intermédiaire entre la veille et le sommeil. *Ann Med Psychol*, *11*, 26-40.
- Mavromatis, A. (1987). Hypnagogia: The unique state of consciousness between wakefulness and sleep. *(No Title)*.
- McCauley, R.N. and Henrich, J., 2006. Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, theory-neutral observation, and the diachronic penetrability of the visual input system. *Philosophical Psychology*, 19(1), pp.79-101.
- McCloskey M, Zaragoza M. Misleading postevent information and memory for events: Arguments and evidence against memory impairment hypotheses. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*: General, 114, 1-16, 1985.
- McDONALD, C. A. R. R. I. C. K. (1971). A clinical study of hypnagogic hallucinations. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, *118*(546), 543-547.
- McDowell, J. (1994). *Mind and world*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McIntyre, R. (1982). Intending and referring. *Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science*, 219-235.
- McIntyre, R. (1986). Husserl and the representational theory of mind. *Topoi*, 5(2), 101-113.
- Meixner, U. (2016). Husserl's classical conception of intentionality–and its enemies.
- Mendelovici, A. (2018). *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, New York: Oxford University Press.

- Mendelovici, A., & Bourget, D. (2014). Naturalizing intentionality: Tracking theories versus phenomenal intentionality theories. *Philosophy Compass*, 9(5), 325–337.
- Merabet L. B., Maguire D., Warde A., Alterescu K., Stickgold R., Pascual-Leone A. (2004). Visual hallucinations during prolonged blindfolding in sighted subjects. *J. Neuro-Ophthalmol.* 24, 109–113.
- Mercer, B., Wapner, W., Gardner, H., & Benson, D. F. (1977). A study of confabulation. *Archives of neurology*, *34*(7), 429-433.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). *Phenomenology of perception* (DA Landes, trans.).
- Metcalf, K., Langdon, R. and Coltheart, M., 2007. Models of confabulation: A critical review and a new framework, *Cognitive Neuropsychology*, 24 (1): 23–47.
- Michaelian, K. (2016). Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 7:1857.
- Michaelian, K. (2022). Towards a virtue-theoretic account of confabulation. *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory*, 127-144.
- Michéa, C. F. (1846). *Du délire des sensations*. Labé.
- Mitchell, S. W. (1970). Injuries of nerves and their consequences. *Archives of Neurology*, *22*(1), 90-94.
- Mogk, L. G., & Mogk, M. (2003). *Macular degeneration: The complete guide to saving and maximizing your sight*. Ballantine Books.
- Mohanty, J. N. (1992). Noema and essence. In *The phenomenology of the noema* (pp. 49-55). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
- Mohr, S., & Pfeifer, S. (2009). Delusions and hallucinations with religious content. *Religion and spirituality in psychiatry*, 81-96.
- Montague, M. (2010). Recent work on intentionality. *Analysis*, 70(4), 765–782.

- Montague, M. (2016). *The Given: Experience and its contents* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, G. E. (1905). The nature and reality of objects of perception. In *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Vol. 6, pp. 68-127). Aristotelian Society, Wiley.
- Moore, G. E. (1909–10). The Subject-Matter of Psychology, Proc*eedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 10: 36–62.
- Morel, C. (1853). *Études cliniques: traité théorique et pratique des maladies mentales considérées dans leur nature, leur traitement, et dans leur rapport avec la médecine légale des aliénés* (Vol. 2). Grimblot.
- Moscovitch, M., & Melo, B. (1997). Strategic retrieval and the frontal lobes: Evidence from confabulation and amnesia. *Neuropsychologia*, *35*(7), 1017-1034.
- Myers, F. W. H. (1903). *Human personality and its survival of bodily death* (Vol. 2). Longmans, Green, and Company.
- Myers, F. W., Gurney, E., & Podmore, F. (1886). Phantasms of the Living. *Vol. II, London*, 164.
- Nabokov, V. (2012). *Speak, memory: An autobiography revisited*. Penguin UK.
- Nanay, B. (2016a). Hallucination as mental imagery. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 23 (7-8), 65-81.
- Nanay, B. (2016b). Imagination and perception. In *The Routledge handbook of the philosophy of imagination* (pp. 124–134). Routledge.
- Nanay, B. (2021). Unconscious mental imagery. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 376 (1817), 20190689.
- Nichols, D. E. (2004). Hallucinogens. *Pharmacology & therapeutics*, *101*(2), 131-181.
- Noë, A. (2005). Real presence. *Philosophical Topics*, 33(1), 235-264

- O'Regan, J. K. (2011). *Why red doesn't sound like a bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness*. OUP USA.
- O'Shaughnessy, B. (1980). The Will, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oertel V, Rotarska-Jagiela A, van de Ven VG, Haenschel C, Maurer K, Linden DEJ. (2007). Visual hallucinations in schizophrenia investigated with functional magnetic resonance imaging. *Psychiatry Res*.;156(3):269–273.
- Ohayon, M. M., Priest, R. G., Caulet, M., & Guilleminault, C. (1996). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations: pathological phenomena?. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, *169*(4), 459-467.
- Ommen, M. M., van Laar, T., Renken, R., Cornelissen, F. W., & Bruggeman, R. (2023). Visual Hallucinations in Psychosis: The Curious Absence of the Primary Visual Cortex. *Schizophrenia Bulletin*, 49 (Supplement_1), S68-S81.
- Ortega, D. F. (1984). Hypnosis in the Treatment of Hypnopompic Hallucinations: A Case Report. *American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis*, *27*(2), 111-113.
- Örulv, L., & Hydén, L.-C. (2006). Confabulation: Sense-making, self-making and world-making in dementia. *Discourse Studies*, 8, 647–673.
- Overgaard, S. (2013). Disjunctivism and the urgency of scepticism. In *Disjunctivism* (pp. 86-102). Routledge.
- Overgaard, S. (2013). Motivating disjunctivism. *Husserl studies*, 29(1), 51-63
- Overgaard, S. (2018). Perceptual error, conjunctivism, and Husserl. *Husserl Studies*, 34, 25-45.
- Parkes, C. M. (1975). Psycho-social transitions: comparison between reactions to loss of a limb and loss of a spouse. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, *127*(3), 204-210.V. S.

- Parnas J, Sass LA (2001) Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions. *Philos Psychiatry Psychol* 8:101–120
- Parnas, J., & Sass, L. A. (2011). The structure of self-consciousness in schizophrenia in Gallagher, S. (Ed.). (2011). *The Oxford handbook of the self*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Pautz, A. (2010). Why explain visual experience in terms of content?. *Perceiving the world*, 254-309.
- Pautz, A. (2011). What are the Contents of Experiences?. *The admissible contents of experience*, 114-138.
- Perry, E. K., & Laws, V. (2010). Plants of the gods and shamanic journeys. *New horizons in the neuroscience of consciousness*, *79*, 309.
- Perry, E. K., Ashton, H., & Young, A. H. (Eds.). (2002). *Neurochemistry of consciousness: Neurotransmitters in mind*(Vol. 36). John Benjamins Publishing.
- Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition, or, what is it like to think that P? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 69(1), 1–36.
- Poellner, P. (2007). Consciousness in the world: Husserlian phenomenology and externalism. In The *Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy*, edited by Brian Leiter and Michael Rosen, 409–62. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Pollack, R.H. (1963). Contour detectability thresholds as a function of chronological age. *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 17, pp.411-17.
- Pollack, R.H. and Silvar S.D., 1967. Magnitude of the Müller-Lyer illusion in children as a function of pigmentation of the Fundus oculi. *Psychonomic Science*, 8, pp.83-4.
- Price, H. H. (1932). *Perception*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London.
- Ptak, R., & Schnider, A. (1999), Spontaneous confabulation after orbitofrontal damage: The role of temporal context confusion and self-monitoring. *Neurocase, 5:243-250.*

- Putnam, H. (1981). *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Raleigh T. (2014). A new approach to "perfect" hallucinations, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 21, No. 11–12
- Ramachandran, V. S., & Hirstein, W. (1998). The perception of phantom limbs. The DO Hebb lecture. *Brain: a journal of neurology*, *121*(9), 1603-1630.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2008) *Feelings of being. Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2013). The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life. In P. Goldie (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion* (pp. 349–372). Oxford: Oxford University Press;
- Ratcliffe, M. (2017). *Real hallucinations: Psychiatric illness, intentionality, and the interpersonal world*. MIT Press.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2019). Grief and phantom limbs: A phenomenological comparison. *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, XVII*, 77-96.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2021). Sensed presence without sensory qualities: a phenomenological study of bereavement hallucinations. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 20(4), 601-616.
- Reed, P., & Clarke, N. (2014). Effect of religious context on the content of visual hallucinations in individuals high in religiosity. *Psychiatry Research*, *215*(3), 594-598.
- Rees, W. D. (1971). The hallucinations of widowhood. *British Medical Journal*, 4, 37–41.
- Roberts G: The origins of delusion. *Br J Psychiatry* 1992; 161: 298 – 308
- Robins, S. (2016a). Misremembering, *Philosophical Psychology*, 29(3): 432–447. doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1113245

- Robins, S. (2016b). Representing the Past: Memory Traces and the Causal Theory of Memory, *Philosophical Studies*, 173(11): 2993–3013. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0647-x
- Robins, S. (2017). Memory Traces, in *Bernecker & Michaelian* 2017: ch. 6.
- Robins, S. (2018). Confabulation and epistemic authority. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *41*.
- Robins, S. (2020). Confabulation and Constructive Memory, *Synthese*, first online 6 February 2017. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1315-1
- Robins, S. (2020). Mnemonic confabulation. *Topoi*, 39(1), 121-132.
- Robinson, H. (1985). The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism, In *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration, J. Foster and H. Robinson* (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 163–186.
- Robinson, H. (1994). Perception, London: Routledge. Moran, A. (2022). Disjunctivism and the causal conditions of hallucination. *Erkenntnis*, 1-24.
- Robinson, H. (2013). The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with 'Philosophers' Hallucinations.' In *Hallucination*, edited by Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias, 313–30. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Roediger III, H. L. (1996). Memory illusions. *Journal of memory and Language*, 35(2), 76-100.
- Rogawski, MA. (2008). Common pathophysiologic mechanisms in migraine and epilepsy. *Arch Neurol*.;65(6):709–714.
- Romano, C. (2012). Must phenomenology remain Cartesian?. *Continental Philosophy Review*, *45*, 425-445.
- Rowlands, M., Lau, J., & Deutsch, M. (2020). Externalism about the mind.

- Royce, J. (1888). Hallucination of Memory andTelepathy'. Mind, 13(50), 244-248.
- Russell, B. (1914). The relation of sense-data to physics. Scientia, 16(16).
- Russell, B. (1997). The Problems of Philosophy, With a New Introduction by John Perry.
- Sacks, O. (2012). *Hallucinations*. Pan Macmillan.
- Sant'Anna, A. (2022). Unsuccessful remembering: A challenge for the relational view of memory. *Erkenntnis*, *87*(4), 1539-1562.
- Santhouse a. M, Howard RJ, Ffytche DH. (2000). Visual hallucinatory syndromes and the anatomy of the visual brain. *Brain*.;123:2055–2064.
- Schacter, D. (Ed.). (1995). *Memory distortions*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press
- Schneck, J. M. (1968). An evaluation of hypnagogic hallucinations. *Psychiatric Quarterly*, *42*, 232-234.
- Schnider, A., Gutbrod, K., Hess, C. W., & Schroth, G. (1996), Memory without context: Amnesia with confabulations after infarct of the right capsular genu. *J. Neurol., Neurosurg. & Psychiatry, 61:186-193.*
- Scoboria, A., & Pascal, L. (2016). Dissociating appraisals of accuracy and recollection in autobiographical remembering. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, 42(7), 1068.
- Segall, M.H., Campbell, D.T. and Herskovits, M.J., 1963. Cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions. *Science*, 139, pp.769-71.
- Sekuler, R. and Erlebacher, A., 1971. The two illusions of Müller-Lyer: Confusion theory reexamined. *The American Journal of Psychology*, pp.477-486.
- Sherwood, S. J. (2002). Relationship between the hypnagogic/hypnopompic states and reports of anomalous experiences. *The Journal of Parapsychology*, *66*(2), 127.

- Sherwood, S. J. (2012). A web survey of the content, sensory modalities, and interpretation of hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences. *The Journal of Parapsychology*, *76*(1), 27.
- Shoemaker, S. (1996). *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Siegel, S. (2006). Which properties are represented in perception? In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), *Perceptual experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Siegel, S. (2008). The epistemic conception of hallucination. *Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge*, 205-224.
- Siegel, S. (2021). The Contents of Perception, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
- Silbersweig A. D., Stern E, Frith C, et al. (1995). A functional neuroanatomy of hallucinations in schizophrenia. *Nature*.; 378 (6553): 176–9179.
- Simmel, M. L. (1958). The conditions of occurrence of phantom limbs. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, *102*(5), 492-500.
- Smith, A. D. (2002). *The Problem of Perception*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Smith, A. D. (2008). Disjunctivism and Discriminability in A. Haddock and F. Macpherson (eds.) *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, and Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press),181-204.
- Smith, A. D. (2008). Husserl and externalism. *Synthese*, 160(3), 313-333.
- Smith, B. (1984). Acta cum fundamentis in re. *Dialectica*, *38*(2-3), 157-178.
- Smith, B. & Mulligan, K. (1986). A relational theory of the act. *Topoi*, 5(2), 115-30.
- Smith, D. W. (2012). Perception, context, and direct realism. In Zahavi, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, 134–57.

- Smith, D. W. (2013). *Husserl*, London: Routledge.
- Smith, D. W., & McIntyre, R. (1982). *Husserl and intentionality: A study of mind, meaning, and language* (Vol. 154). Springer Science & Business Media.
- Snowdon, P. F. (2005). Some reflections on an argument from hallucination. *Philosophical Topics*, 33(1), 285-305.
- Soteriou, M. (2020). The Disjunctive Theory of Perception, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
- Sperling, O. E. (1957). A psychoanalytic study of hypnagogic hallucinations. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, *5*(1), 115-123.
- Sprigge, T. L., & Montefiore, A. (1971). Final causes. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 149-192.
- Staiti, A. (2015). On Husserl's alleged cartesianism and conjunctivism: A critical reply to Claude Romano. *Husserl Studies*, 31, 123–141.
- Stammers, S., & Bortolotti, L. (2020). Introduction: Philosophical Perspectives on Confabulation. *Topoi*, 39, 115-119.
- Steffen, E., & Coyle, A. (2011). Sense of presence experiences and meaning-making in bereavement: A qualitative analysis. *Death Studies*, 35, 579–609.
- Steffen, E., & Coyle, A. (2012). 'Sense of presence' experiences in bereavement and their relationship to mental health: A critical examination of a continuing controversy. In C. D. Murray (Ed.), Mental health and anomalous experience (pp. 33–56). New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Stewart, V.M., 1973, Tests of the 'carpentered world' hypothesis by race and environment in America and Zambia. *International Journal of Psychology*, 8, pp.83-94.
- Straus, E. W., & Morgan, B. T. (1958). Aesthesiology and Hallucinations.

- Strawson, G. (1989). "Red and 'Red'", *Synthese*, 78:193-232.
- Strawson, G. (1994). *Mental reality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Sturgeon, S. (1998). "Visual Experience", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (New Series), 98: 179–200.
- Sturgeon, S. (2006). Disjunctivism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 80 (Suppl. Vol.), 185–216.
- Sturgeon, S. (2008). Disjunctivism about visual experience. In A. Haddock & F. Macpherson (Eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Suhail, K., & Ghauri, S. (2010). Phenomenology of delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenia by religious convictions. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, *13*(3), 245-259.
- Summa, M. (2014). Spatio-temporal intertwining. *Husserl's Trascendental Aesthetic*.
- Summa, M. (2022). Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology. *Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences*, 1-23.
- Takeuchi, T., Miyasita, A., Inugami, M., Sasaki, Y., & Fukuda, K. (1994). Laboratory-documented hallucination during sleep-onset REM period in a normal subject. *Perceptual and motor skills*, *78*(3), 979-985.
- Talland, G. A. (1965), *Deranged Memory.* New York: Academic Press.
- Thompson, E. & Varela, F.J. (2001). Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness, *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 5, pp. 418–425.
- Thompson, P. (1880). Optical illusions of motion. *Brain*, 3, 289–298.
- Thomson, G. and Macpherson, F. (2017). *Negative Afterimages* in F. Macpherson (ed.), The Illusions Index. Retrieved from https://www.illusionsindex.org/ir/negative-afterimages

- Tribolet, S., & Shahidi, M. (2005). *Nouveau précis de sémiologie des troubles psychiques*. Heures de France.
- Turnbull, O. H., Jenkins, S., & Rowley, M. L. (2004). The pleasantness of false beliefs: An emotion-based account of confabulation. *Neuropsychoanalysis*, *6*(1), 5-16.
- Turner, M., & Coltheart, M. (2010). Confabulation and delusion: A common monitoring framework. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry*, 15(1-3), 346-376.
- Tye, M. (1995). *Ten Problems of Consciousness*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tye, M. (2000). *Consciousness, Color and Content*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Valentine, C. (2008). *Bereavement narratives: Continuing bonds in the twenty-first century*. Routledge.
- Van der Horst, L. (1932), Die Psychologie des Korsakowsyndroms. Monatschr. *Psychiatr. Neurol.*, 83:65-84.
- Wade, K. A., & Garry, M. (2005). Strategies for verifying false autobiographical memories. *The American journal of psychology*, 118(4), 587-602.
- Waters, F., Blom, J. D., Dang-Vu, T. T., Cheyne, A. J., Alderson-Day, B., Woodruff, P., & Collerton, D. (2016). What is the link between hallucinations, dreams, and hypnagogic–hypnopompic experiences?. *Schizophrenia bulletin*, *42*(5), 1098-1109.
- Williamson, T. (2002). *Knowledge and its Limits*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Williford, K. (2013). Husserl's hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness. *Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences*, 12, 501-519.
- Yung AR, McGorry PD: The prodromal phase of first-episode psychosis: past and current conceptualizations. *Schizophr Bull* 1996; 22:353 – 370

- Zahavi, D. (2004) Husserl's noema and the internalism-externalism debate, *Inquiry*, 47, pp. 42–66.
- Zahavi, D. (2008) Internalism and externalism and transcendental idealism, *Synthese*, 160(3), pp. 355–74.
- Zahavi, D. (2017). *Husserl's legacy: Phenomenology, metaphysics, and transcendental philosophy*. Oxford University Press.
- Zahavi, D., & Loidolt, S. (2022). Critical phenomenology and psychiatry. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 55(1), 55-75.
- Zmigrod, L., Garrison, J. R., Carr, J., & Simons, J. S. (2016). The neural mechanisms of hallucinations: a quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, *69*, 113-123.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Andrea Altobrando, who for the past five years has kept reminding me every day why I enrolled in philosophy and taught me phenomenology *in the flesh*. To thank you for your trust and support would not be enough.

I would like to thank the Centre de recherches phénoménologiques (Creph), the organizers and the participants at the 17th annual seminar on *L'importance de la subjectivité* for their helpful suggestions and feedback that helped improve the thesis. Especially Professor Denis Seron for his encouraging comments and efficient supervision throughout the writing of this work, Professor Olivier Dubouclez and Professor Arnaud Dewalque.

The organizers and the participants of the Copenhagen Summer School in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind for the great discussions that followed my presentation of part of this thesis.

Professor Jerome Dokic for his help during my stay at the Jean Nicod research center in developing the section on hallucinations and memory, and for the willingness and enthusiasm with which he agreed to supervise my project.

A special mention goes to the students at the Galilean School of Higher Studies in Padua who have been my family for the past five years and to the International Students at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris.

Finally, I would like to thank Susanna, Paolo, Camilla, Francesca, Giulia M., Giulia P., Jacopo, Jessica, Ramon, Teresa, and Vincenzo for the emotional support, but mostly for everything else.

And Giuseppe, Giovanni, and Leonardo with whom I feel at home in the world.