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30 YEARS OF ANGOLA:  
A POST COLONIAL STORY SINCE  
1992

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## **30 years of Angola: a post-colonial story since 1992**

### *Abstract*

*Since gaining its independence in 1975, Angola has been at war, and its most valuable natural resource is oil. These two factors have unavoidable economic and social repercussions that suggest a symbiotic relationship between Angola and the rest of the world, both in terms of the foreign partners required for oil drilling and in terms of the international diplomatic community in general, which has been linked since 1990 with a purported peace process in Angola: The history of post-colonial Angola is the result of the country's 27 years of civil war, which influenced its political, economic, and social changes. Indeed, starting briefly with the history of the civil war in the country, the thesis work here aims to analyze the last 30 years of Angolan history from a political, economic and humanitarian point of view, to understand to what extent the civil war has affected and whether or not Angola has recovered positively from the major changes of those years.*

*To my sister*

*To my mother and my father*

*To my grandparents*

*To friendship*

*To Palermo, for shaping me*

*To Padua, for giving me wings*

*To Norway, for pushing me to fly*

*To me, an expatriate wanderer, bound and determined, with an unwavering  
thirst of knowledge about this world*

*“Amanhã*

*entoaremos hinos à liberdade quando comemorarmos  
a data da abolição desta escravatura*

*Nós vamos em busca de luz os teus filhos Mãe (...)*

*Vão em busca de vida.”*

*“Tomorrow*

*we will sing hymns to freedom when we commemorate  
the date of the abolition of this slavery*

*We go in search of light your children Mother (...)*

*Go in search of life.”*

Agostinho Neto, the first president of the Popular Republic of Angola  
from his poem *“Adeus à hora da largada”*, 1974, p. 35-36



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## **List of Abbreviations**

ADCDH: Association for the Development of Human Rights and Culture

ADPA: African Diamond Producers Association

AI: Amnesty International

ANC: African National Congress

ANGOP: Angola's Official News Agency

ANPG: National Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Agency

AU: African Union

AUCPCC: African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption

BP: British Petroleum

BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, China

BTI: Bertelsmann Transformation Index

CABGOC: Cabinda Gulf Oil Company

CNRIP: National Commission for the Restructuring of the Petroleum Sector

CPLP: Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries

DIAMANG: Companhia dos diamantes de Angola

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

ELNA: Army for the National Liberation of Angola

EU: European Union

FAA: Angolan Armed Forces

FALA: Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

FAPLA: People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

FESA: Eduardo dos Santos Foundation

FLEC: Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda

FNLA: Front of National Liberation of Angola

FOCAC: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

GDP: Gross Domestic Production

GURN: Government of Unity and National Reconciliation

HDI: Human Development Index

HRW: Human Rights Watch

IDP: Internally Displaced Persons

IMP: International Monetary Fund

JPMC/CCPM: Joint Political Military Commission/ Comissão Conjunta Político Militar  
KGB: Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (EN: Committee for State Security)  
MFA: Movement of the Armed Forces  
MISSANG: Angolan Military Mission in Guinea Bissau  
MONUA: United Nations Observer Mission in Angola  
MPLA: People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola  
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NDRC: National Development and Reform Commission  
NEC: National Electoral Commission  
NOC: Chinese' national oil companies  
OAU: Organization of African Unity  
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries  
PCUS: Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
PSA: Production sharing agreements  
SADC: Southern African Development Community  
SADF: South African Defense Force  
SOE: State-owned enterprise  
SWAPO: South West Africa People's Organization  
UN: United Nations  
UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Mission  
UNCAC: United Nations Convention Against Corruption  
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly  
UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola  
UNMA: United Nations Mission in Angola  
UNOA: United Nations Office in Angola  
UNSC: United Nations Security Council  
UNSCR: UN SC Resolutions  
URSS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
US: United States  
WWII: World War II  
ZAPU: Zimbabwe's African People's Union

## 1. Introduction

African states gained independence unexpectedly: democracy failed to take root due to a lack of experience with modern self-government. Instead of establishing good governance, powerful parties assumed or took power and implemented measures to keep it. Dynamics of conflicts and tensions between ethnic and religious groups were frequently caused by various factors, including state instability, corruption, inefficient provision of essential services, struggle over natural resources, inequality, and a sense of exclusion. Angola is one of such examples. In fact, the country gained independence from Portugal immediately in 1975. Shortly afterwards, the long civil war broke out, killing hundreds of thousands of people. As a result of the civil war, the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the country's current ruling party, dedicated the next three decades to maintaining centralised political control while ignoring the rest of the country's development. During the Cold War, newly formed African states gained independence as colonialism ended. The two superpowers sought allies worldwide, including many newly independent African states. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in proxy wars through client states in the developing world. These proxy wars served superpower interests but, like colonialism, did little to help African states achieve sovereignty and general prosperity<sup>1</sup>. A peace accord signed in 2002 put an end to the 27-year civil war in Angola. Although combat has stopped, the nation still faces significant post-conflict issues.

Angola's history has been characterised by internal pressures, seeking an end to the war, and external pressures, insufficient to help in the path towards peace. On the one hand, the colonial history of the country: since the sixteenth century, Portugal had settled in the territory of the current state, exploiting resources, location and population, until the advent of independence movements in the mid-nineties, which to the liberation of Angola and the decline of Portuguese colonialism. On the other hand, the country, victorious since independence, immediately began a civil war due to internal clashes between the main political parties, and external forces, such as the superpowers of the Cold War, who

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<sup>1</sup> Moe, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur T., *"The causes and dynamics of conflict in sub Saharan Africa"*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 10 may 2009, Program research project., 1-30

wanted to exploit the situation to have allies and resources<sup>2</sup>. Both sides of the Angolan story show how crucial can be the support of the population, the exploitation of resources and the management of the government. As a matter of fact, the main forces involved, the two political parties, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), have not been able to find a balance under a political and military point of view, and this internal struggle has led to failed solutions of power-sharing and the long civil war, which ended only in 2002.

The background: Angola under Portuguese's rules to the independence

Angola, a territory located in southern Africa, has been under Portuguese domination since the 15th century before becoming an overseas province of Portugal in 1951. At that time, the Portuguese regime in Angola was characterised by "*an archaic ultra-nationalism, justifying a system of total domination of the colonized similar to that of the pre-industrial period, based on working conditions close to slavery and the bloody repression of any attempt at opposition.*"<sup>3</sup> In addition, Portugal adopted a racial and cultural discrimination policy, which affected the country's social and political development after independence.

The Portuguese first arrived on the African continent in the late 1400s, when a Portuguese explorer made contact with what is now the Republic of the Congo, a country that had a functioning market system and active trade at the time.<sup>4</sup> The Portuguese, realising the region's wealth and strategic location, established what would become one of the largest slave-trading systems in the world until the 1960s, using Luanda as a trading colony, both enslaved and free. They began to develop a Creole culture in the native colony, where Africans coexisted with Portuguese colonizers and exchanged cultures and traditions. Meanwhile, the Atlantic Ocean slave trade, which involved all Central African societies,

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<sup>2</sup> Guimaraes, F.A "*The Origins Of The Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention And Domestic Political Conflict*", 1961-76, 2016, pp.1-57, Springer, Isbn 0230598269

<sup>3</sup> Neves, J.M. "*Frantz Fanon And The Struggle For The Independence Of Angola Interventions*", Routledge, Vol.17, No.3, 2014, p.419.

<sup>4</sup> Ball, J. "*The History of Angola*" in Oxford Research Encyclopedia, African History, Dickinson scholars, 2017, pp. 1-35

enriched the colony. Slaves were initially used for sugar plantations, but beginning in the twentieth century, with the consolidation of Portuguese rule in Angola, military campaigns were launched to suppress resistance and impose a new type of administration in Angola based on forced labour (called "native tax" as indigenous tax), and exploitation of the territory began by beginning diamond shipments in the territory, in which French, Belgian, and South African companies were also involved. Attempts were made to regulate forced labour through legislation; the Portuguese, in fact, argued that this would result in significant enrichment for Angola, which translated into total slavery for Africans and racism on the part of the Portuguese.<sup>5</sup>

After WWII, the Portuguese government began to invest in major infrastructure projects in Angola, citing economic growth in raw materials such as coffee, which was in high demand worldwide. By the mid-1950s, several mining operations had been established to extract iron ore, copper, and magnesium. The Gulf Oil Company discovered a vast oil field off Cabinda, an exclave separated from Angola and bordering The Republic of Congo, in 1966, which is now much debated for the presence of raw materials and contested by the world's largest oil companies.<sup>6</sup>

Various nationalist groups began to emerge around this time. After more than thirteen years of war, during which the Portuguese Armed Forces controlled the majority of Angola, the events in Lisbon finally brought Portugal and Portuguese officials, as well as Angolan nationalists, to the negotiating table. Portuguese colonialism created ruptures within society that eventually erupted in the tensions of liberation movements during the late 1990s, and still reverberate among minorities today<sup>7</sup>. Since the 1960s, anticolonial movements started demanding civil rights and human rights after centuries of exploitation of enslaved people's labour force and people suppression<sup>8</sup>. The decline of the Portuguese empire was also influenced by various social changes at the time, from a political, economic, and military standpoint: the colonial market began to be restricted, there was

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, 10

<sup>6</sup> Gomes Porto, J.G. "*Cabinda: Notes on a soon to be forgotten war*", Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 77, August 2003

<sup>7</sup> Meijer, G., and Birmingham, D. "*Angola From Past To Present*" Accord: From Military Peace To Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, London, Conciliation Resources, 2004, pp.10-15.

<sup>8</sup> Ball, *op.cit.* 19

opposition to the system of the then-dictator of Portugal, Marcelo Caetano, and the various wars against the liberation movements proved futile and costly in terms of men.<sup>9</sup> The revolution that was occurring evolved into a leftist revolution: indeed, the so-called Colonial War started in 1961 and lasted until 1974.

On the one hand, the Portuguese colonists; on the other, the three most significant nationalists' movements raised at that time:

- MPLA: the popular movement for the liberation of Angola: led by Agostinho Neto, who was supported by the Mbundu ethnolinguistic group situated in Luanda;
- FNLA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola, led by Holden Roberto and supported by the Kongo in the north part of Angola;
- UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi, supported by the Ovimbundu people, one of the largest ethnic groups in Angola.

The war ended with the so-called Carnation Revolution on 25th April 1974, a military coup d'état carried out in Lisbon by the left-wing military officers, the Movement of the Armed Forces MFA, against the Portuguese government, who was trying to suppress every liberation movement. The aim was to depose the conservative Estado Novo regime formed in Portugal in 1933.<sup>10</sup> The consequences of the war involved the political destabilisation of Portugal, the end of the Portuguese Colonial War, the independence of Angola in 1975, as well as the one of Cape Verde, Guinea- Bissau and Mozambique<sup>11</sup>. The three parties negotiated the peace by signing the Alvor Accord in January 1975, which formally ended the Angolan War of Independence. This Accord would guarantee that the nationalist movements would rule together the country and hold the elections before the date of independence. However, the situation collapsed because of the

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<sup>9</sup> Peddis, O.A, *Cap.6 "La crisi della decolonizzazione: Africa Meridionale- La guerra civile in angola"* , In "La guerra fredda globale. Gli Stati Uniti, L'Unione Sovietica e il mondo. Le relazioni internazionali del XX secolo", Il Saggiatore, Milano, Traduzione di Cristiano Peddis, Vol.973 of Cultura, 2015, 546 pp.

<sup>10</sup> Ball, *op.cit.*, 19

<sup>11</sup> Martins, B.S., "*Imperial Memory: The Home Of Silences In Portuguese Colonial War*", 5th European Conference On African Studies, 2014, African Dynamics In A Multipolar World Centro De Estudos Internacionais Do Instituto Universitário De Lisboa (Iscte-Iul)

ideological differences among the parties and the entrance of the superpowers of the Cold War into play<sup>12</sup>.

The domestic crisis developed into the international realm, in the Cold War battleground. Despite the common goal of independence, the MPLA and UNITA had different and incompatible roots, while the FNLA did not play a significant role in the civil war. While the MPLA was supported mainly by Cuba and the Soviet Union, UNITA was supported mainly by the US and South Africa. The MPLA, with the help of the Cubans, managed to prevail in the first part of the conflict. Then, the territory was divided, and MPLA took control over the capital Luanda and almost the rest of Angola. Instead, UNITA continued its war against the MPLA government, and immediately after the independence, the civil war broke out and lasted until 2002.

Like the other colonial powers, Portugal focused primarily wishing to get wealth from its colonies, by the mandatory collection of taxes, forced labour, and cultivation of commercially viable crops like cotton. Like most African nations, Angola was born out of a collection of groups and individuals, each with its own distinctive traditions and history. Gradual diminution Local states and countries interacted with one another. They were prompted by other historical processes to have a shared future under rising Portuguese influence, even though resistance to colonial control was never completely intense, armed resistance to British rule had just recently begun. After the Portuguese brutally suppressed an uprising in 1961, large-scale demonstrations against colonial rule in the north. dozens to hundreds of white traders and planters hundreds to a thousand) and tens of thousands of black farms. Several people died during work, and many more left the country, creating a favourable promotional environment for a new colonial opposition.

Since April 2002, Angola's mainland has been peaceful, but in Cabinda, the population makes about 60% up of the border region between the two Congo Republics. Sixty percent of Angola's population is included in the Republic of the Congo, and, despite Angola producing more oil than ever, the battle hasn't stopped. The administration has

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<sup>12</sup> Tvedten, I. *Angola : Struggle For Peace And Reconstruction*, Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1997, pp.35-67 / p.44-50/ Chapter 3

made an effort to use the same approach of famine and burned earth had demonstrated victory over UNITA. Nevertheless, many Cabindans continue to back the campaign for independence. The Angolan government, which wants to protect critical economic resources, could never agree to give the enclave some degree of provincial autonomy. A significant offensive against the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (FLEC) in October 2002 resulted in grave human rights claims.

A significant impact on Angolan society was made by the colonial regime during its century of rule. The Statute of the Portuguese Natives of the Provinces of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, in particular, was one of its discriminatory laws that kept the native population apart from a small elite of "civilised" people (known as *assimilados*) who got to enjoy some of the same rights as Portuguese citizens. The act was repealed in 1961, following the beginning of an armed independence war, although only minor revisions were made. A significant and long-lasting effect of Portuguese racial and cultural discrimination on the later social and economic political evolution of independent Angola country. Colonization-related social divisions continue to have a significant impact on the attitudes and ties between groups number of people. Conflicts between and difficulties within the liberation groups were manifestations of racial mistrust. The recent political history of Angola was significantly influenced by profoundly grained distrust. Another source of tension that independent Angola inherited from the colonial state is the competing interests of those who live in urban centers and those who live in rural areas. For the first time in African postcolonial history, a sizable number of people from a former colonial power in Europe are moving to an ex-colony in search of a better life. With an average oil-fueled growth rate of 4.8% per year between 2010 and 2014, Angola is frequently cited as one of modern Africa's economic success stories. Portugal, Angola's previous colonial master, saw negative growth during this time: as a result of this diverging trend, Angolans who had previously migrated to Portugal in quest of economic and personal security have now done the reverse, and there are currently between 100,000 and 150,000 Portuguese citizens living in Angola<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> Åkesson, L., "*Moving beyond the Colonial? New Portuguese Migrants in Angola*", *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 56(221/222), 2016, 267–285



The claim that Portugal governed Angola for five centuries is only partially true. In 1904, less than 10% of the region was still under Portuguese rule and the two decades prior to the country's independence in 1975 saw the most significant influx of white settlers. In order to bolster the notion that Angola was an overseas colony<sup>14</sup>, Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar pushed Portuguese settlement at a time when the majority of the rest of Africa was experiencing independence. In Angola in 1973, there were as many as 324,000 persons who could be described as "white," largely native Portuguese speakers. Following the revolution of April 25, 1974, and the rapid decolonisation that followed, some 300,000 returned to Portugal. Nearly 40% of them were recent immigrants to the country<sup>15</sup>. Many of the new immigrants to Angola are actually the offspring of tornadoes, and many were born there. After the war, Angolans had difficulty finding resources such as food, water, medical care, while life expectancy became very low. The end of hostilities led to significant population displacements, as in the majority of post-civil war contexts, with a high number of emigrations. Usually, following civil wars, a long emigration process begins in times of peace, linked to various factors. The reasons why they decide to flee and where, are influenced by the possible recurrence of war, by participation and political change and also by social and economic perspectives. However, finding a country where peace and socioeconomic differences coexist in peace is tough. In the case of Angola, the number of refugees has decreased as citizens have returned to their home countries<sup>16</sup>. In 2002, the Angolan government tried to help reintegrate displaced populations into society by ad hoc regulations. Many refugees, however, remained in the countries to which they had fled, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana<sup>17</sup>.

In the 40 years after winning their freedom, Angolans have witnessed enormous instability and bloodshed. As we've seen above, a few months before independence, the struggle erupted between several nationalists' movements. The Cold War, the campaign

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<sup>14</sup> Nascimento, W. s. "*Colonialismo português e resistências angolanas nas memórias de Adriano João Sebastião (1923-1960)*", Revista Tempo e Argumento, Florianópolis, v. 8, n. 19, 2016, p. 439 - 461.

<sup>15</sup> Lubkemann, S. "*Unsettling the Metropole: Race and Settler Incorporation in Postcolonial Portugal*", in C. Elkins & S. Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York-London: Routledge), 2005, p.257-270

<sup>16</sup> Haass, F. ; Kurtenbach S.; and Strasheim, J. "*Fleeing the Peace: Emigration after Civil War*", German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), May 2016

<sup>17</sup> United Nation Security Council "*Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Angola*" (S/2003/158)

against apartheid South Africa, the diamond and oil markets, and other global issues all contributed to the war's escalation. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, multiparty elections and a market economy were introduced. The first elections were held in 1992, and afterwards, combat erupted as MPLA, the ruling party at the time, refused to accept defeat from rebels from UNITA. After four decades of bloody hostilities, Angola finally achieved peace in 2002 following the murder of UNITA commander Jonas Savimbi. Since 2002, substantial infrastructural "reconstruction" has been a priority under President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has led the MPLA since 1979.

To assess what this thesis work aims to do, that is, to analyse the changes in Angola from a political, economic, and social standpoint, I will try to explain the civil war chapter by chapter, capturing how each event affected all spheres of analysis and what the responses have been over the past 30 years in the country. Therefore, the work thesis will be divided into four main sessions concerning politics, economy and social changes due to the civil war. This work will begin with an analysis of the political development in Angola, with an overview on the historic events that led to the creation of the major political parties in the country, followed by a deep dive into the two main characters of Angola's political show, dos Santos and Laurenço. Then I will analyse the repercussions that the long civil war had in Angola: this historical framework is crucial to understand how one of the potentially most prosperous countries in Africa is struggling to gain its rights and identity. Therefore, I will also analyse Angola's economy with a detailed study of oil and diamond's trade. All these elements will be important for the last part of this work, where I will try to link, all the historic changes occurred in the last 30 years with the civil societies and the human rights in Angola, to frame this country into an historic study that helps better understanding what decolonization means in this era.

## 2. Angola's political development since the civil war up to now

Since its independence, Angola's attempt to find shared solutions to peace failed in a series of agreements that were not useful for the purpose. After the Alvor Accord in 1975, the situation collapsed into a civil war in which MPLA and UNITA started to fight against each other, supported by the main superpowers of the cold war (the FNLA was considered a secondary actor, even though it played a significant role with its military army during the war). The period between the 1980s and 2000s is particularly relevant for understanding how the two parties tried to find a standard solution or, at least, pretended they could.

### 2.1 Main political parties in Angola

First, it is relevant to understand the nature of the two political parties. On the one hand, MPLA, founded in the 1950s by Agostinho Neto. It was the left-wing ruling party in Angola during the civil war and later on, and it had a deep Marxist-Leninist ideology<sup>18</sup>. This socialist ideology was also influenced by the international scenario with the allied countries, like Cuba and the Soviet Union. After the independence, Jose Eduardo dos Santos succeeded Neto in 1979. Dos Santos exacerbated the authoritarianism and the centralisation of the party. The MPLA was seen as a party that sought to eliminate rivals rather than negotiate, as it wanted to maintain the centralised system and the control over the party and the state administration<sup>19</sup>. During the war, the power was concentrated in the hands of president dos Santos, who was at the same time head of state and armed forces. Despite the centralisations Santos needed to negotiate to keep his power alive. As will see in the negotiations process, MPLA always played a prominent role in finding agreements and maintaining his political and military position within the country, showing that he was making efforts toward UNITA. Moreover, after winning the elections, the party has never wanted to change its structural arrangement, which dates back to before independence. The MPLA has never been open to dialogue or resource sharing with rival parties, especially after the Bicesse Accords, where even the international system sided against UNITA. The lack of resources, administrative capacity,

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<sup>18</sup> Tandon, Y "Good" MPLA vs "Evil" UNITA? Economic and Political Weekly, 23(49), 1988, pp.2605–2607

<sup>19</sup> Tvedten, *op.cit.*, pp.44-50

and mistrust between the party and its supporters fell to an environment of corruption at many levels in the society.

On the other hand, UNITA was founded around the 1960s, led by Jonas Savimbi, and it was supported by the Ovimbundu ethnic groups of the central area of Angola. The party rose as a movement for Ovimbundu independence as an ethnic group. However, Savimbi attempted to create a multi-ethnic nation and monopolise the cause beginning in 1975, only to gain the ethnic group's recognition and loyalty<sup>20</sup>. UNITA was seen as the main rival party to MPLA. At first, it was based on democratic centralism, with UNITA and Savimbi sharing the same political coherence, differently from MPLA ideology and practice<sup>21</sup>. The power was strongly centralised over Savimbi, who wanted the monopoly of forces from the economic sphere to the political and military ones. One of the party's most damaging aspects has been its monolithic and autocratic organization, which has led to the inability to adapt to electoral and structural changes. It has also never been able to face political changes: Savimbi continued to defy elections by not accepting the MPLA's electoral system and continued to remain at war<sup>22</sup>.

The mistrust between the two parties led to the failure of any attempts to end the civil war, as well as the agreements of power sharing that the factions tried to use. Since the late 1980s, MPLA has recognised UNITA as a party for making agreements, but in reality, the parties were willing to cede their power either militarily, politically or financially, which contributed to the prolongation of the war: the obstacle to the peace was the monolithic nature of the parties, which I have already mentioned above<sup>23</sup>. The difficulty in adapting and cooperating has been a significant obstacle in the implementation of power-sharing agreements, together with the mistrust between the two parties during the various agreements and after the 1992 election round. The election of 1992 is exemplary of this monolithic nature. Indeed, the elections would have been “who wins takes all”,

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<sup>20</sup> Heywood, Linda M. “*Unita and Ethnic Nationalism in Angola.*” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no. 1 (1989): 47–66.

<sup>21</sup> Tvedten, 1997, *op.cit.*, Chapter 3

<sup>22</sup> De Sousa, R. d. “*The Nature of the Parties on the Prospects of Power-Sharing in the Angola Peace Processes*” In Rodrigues Udelsmann, C., & Costa, A. B. d. (Eds.), *Poverty and Peace in the Portuguese Speaking African Countries*. Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Internacionais, 2009, p.30-33,

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

and after the first ballot in favor of dos Santos, Savimbi rejected the results and withdrew UNITA forces without demilitarizing, and the conflict restarted.

Among these two factions, a third is widely ignored, despite playing an important role in Cold War military forces and superpower support: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). The FNLA had been considered the movement with the strongest military capacity. Mobutu's Zaire and the United States both provided financial and military support to the FNLA, as well as the support from China in the form of military assistance and 450 tons of weapons. The FNLA's organizational capacity, as well as the establishment of its military wing, the ELNA, earned it international and continental recognition, as well as increased external support. Furthermore, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would soon recognize the FNLA as Angola's puppet regime and the true representative of Angolan nationalism. Holden Roberto, the FNLA leader, had family connection to Zairian President Mobutu, making him a good ally with Western ideologies<sup>24</sup>. Furthermore, Mobutu never concealed his interest in Angolan natural resources, which would later influence some of his decisions during the war. Adopting a center-right ideology, FNLA was seen as an ally in the fight against communist penetration of the African continent.

Meanwhile the MPLA and FNLA's political activity and organization as liberation movements resulted in the development of their armed forces, it was the formation of FALA that gave birth to the UNITA movement and its all-party activities<sup>25</sup>. Attempts to connect the FNLA and MPLA into a united front against the colonial power failed due to political, ideological, regional, and ethno-linguistic differences, as well as each organization's distinct support base and international alliances.

The UNITA-FNLA alliance was labeled as pro-Western in the American media, while the Chinese and many others saw it as Maoist<sup>26</sup>. Before the war, the USSR had abandoned the third group, the MPLA. When the war broke out, Moscow returned to help Cuba, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Denmark, and Nigeria, while the MPLA was labeled pro-Soviet. In

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<sup>24</sup> Leão, Rupiya, Chapter 1 “*A military history of the Angolan Armed forces from 1960s onwards- as told by a former combatants*” In “*Evolution & revolutions*”, Institute for Security Studies, 2005, ISBN: 1-919913-82-3, pp.10

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, 11

<sup>26</sup> Bender, Gerald J. “*Angola: Left, Right & Wrong.*” *Foreign Policy*, no. 43 (1981): 53–69. , pp.56

December 1960, the United States voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514<sup>27</sup>, which called on Portugal to decolonize its empire: this was interpreted as a show of support for the Angolans. Americans strengthened their alliance with the Salazar regime by secretly allowing NATO equipment to be used in Angola, seeing Portugal as a necessary bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence in southern Africa. The US, through the Central Intelligence Agency, rejected the possibility of a civil war settlement. Indeed, the CIA began supplying the FNLA with aid in January 1975, and UNITA with weapons in mid-summer 1975.

## 2.2 Attempts to reach the peace

In order to understand the current policy in Angola, it is useful to go back and analyze how the two parties tried to overcome the war and reach peace. During the civil war it is possible to identify a pre-negotiations stage and the actual negotiation period. The first one concerns the attempts that were conducted during the 80s. For instance, in 1981 with Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Angola started to hope for reconciliation: he aimed to reestablish a political relationship between the two parties, in a time in which they had to deal with both cold war influences and African internal conflicts. This aim was dropped in the next stage: the two parties were too far from finding a solution. The first part of the conflict, influenced by the cold war superpowers, was closed with the New York accord in 1988 (Or tripartite accord) between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa: the outcome was Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola<sup>28</sup>. Furthermore, in 1989 the two parties signed the Gbadolite Accords, the first attempt between Dos Santos and Savimbi to publicly solve the internal civil war<sup>29</sup>. By recognizing the Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko as the mediator of Angola, Dos Santos and Savimbi created a document for establishing the will of a ceasefire and a regional committee for its implementation.

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<sup>27</sup> Mc Whinney, E, "*Declaration On The Granting Of Independence To Colonial Countries And Peoples, New York, 14 December 1960*", United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, UN 2008

<sup>28</sup> UN, General Assembly Security Council, "*Forty third session agenda item 20 Question of Namibia*" 27 December 1988 A/43/989- S/20346

<sup>29</sup> Knudsen, C., Mundt, A. & Zartman, I.W. "*Peace agreements: the case of Angola*", African Centre of the Constructive Resolution of Disputies, 23 Oct 2000

During the pre-negotiation stage, it is common to resort to the intervention of a third actor to mediate the conflict and establish a relationship between the warring parties<sup>30</sup>. The mediator serves to facilitate agreements and restore order between the parties. However, this accord failed as the parties wanted to find an agreement quickly, without addressing the causes of the conflict and try to solve them. Between 1989 and 1991, several factors caused an external and internal change in Angola, affecting the roles of both MPLA and UNITA. The situation came to a military deadlock, perceived as damaging, partly due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had a significant impact on the MPLA and created a context for thinking of an actual bilateral agreement.

The negotiation phase opened in May 1991 with the Bicesse Accords: the agreements framed the ceasefire, the formation of a unified national army, and semi-presidential democratic elections to decree a single powerholder<sup>31</sup>. Furthermore, a joint political and military commission was created, and it seemed that the two parties were on the same side in this process. The UN was involved in this agreement with the UN Angola Verification Mission II, to monitor the election and the disarmament of troops and the demobilization of soldiers<sup>32</sup>.

The agreements contained military and political power-sharing provisions, which failed because of Savimbi, considered, as already mentioned, an “inside spoiler”<sup>33</sup>: in this case, the fear of losing the conflict constituted a disincentive to cooperation<sup>34</sup>.

In the elections held between September 29th and 30th 1992, Savimbi had perceived a defeat after the first round (in which he got 40.07 percent of the vote, while Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola candidate Jose Eduardo dos Santos got 49.57 percent). Savimbi then decided to withdraw troops from the national army created under the agreement, and the civil war was restored. The UN effort was ineffective in monitoring the demobilization and reintegration provisions of the Bicesse arrangements

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<sup>30</sup> Rothchild, D., “*On Implementing Africa's Peace Accords: From Defection to Cooperation*”, Africa Today, 1st Qtr. - 2nd Qtr., 1995, Vol. 42, No. 1/2, The Military and Democratic Transitions, pp. 8-38  
Published by: Indiana University Press

<sup>31</sup> May, R., Furley, O., “*Ending Africa's Wars Progressing to Peace*”, Published July 21, 2006 by Routledge, pp-137-147

<sup>32</sup> Knudsen, Mundt, Zartman, *op.cit.*, “Past attempts and failure of mediate”

<sup>33</sup> De Sousa, *op.cit.*, par.22

<sup>34</sup> Rothchild, *op.cit* 17

before the elections. Savimbi preferred to return to war rather than face a second runoff election and probable defeat at the polls. None of the two sides complied with the demobilization: the failed elections resulted in a bloody conflict with more than 120,000 people killed in 1992. Moreover, the parties negotiated only to gain and maintain their power, trying to control the different international realm to their advantage.<sup>35</sup>

The upcoming phase of the peace agreement was represented by the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. This protocol was a development of the previous accords and implied the effort by UNITA to accept the election of 1992, cooperate with MPLA under the UN sanctions<sup>36</sup>, and integrate UNITA's military forces into the Angola national army. However, the protocol failed to succeed because, after some initial progress for the demobilization, Unita's leadership position in the power-sharing arrangement seemed vague and ambiguous. The country was in a situation described as "nem guerra nem paz"<sup>37</sup> and the Protocol had limited success in its first year. In 1997, the ceasefire went into effect and, as a result, a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was established. The United Nations resorted to repeated threats of sanctions against UNITA, while Savimbi wanted to keep his army active. UN failed again in the monitoring goal and peacekeeping missions for the national reconciliation, even when a Security Council embargo on arms and oil was posed on UNITA in 1993. However, the embargo was not enforced in practice, as the parties openly continued to buy weapons throughout the process. In addition, UNITA was particularly unwilling to cede the diamond-rich territories under its control and this refusal eliminated the facade of cooperation between UNITA and the MPLA<sup>38</sup>. The sanctions did not fully restore the peace agreements, nor did they ultimately push Savimbi out of the process. The protocol was seen as a way to go against UNITA and make them back down, as some attacks were made toward cities where they had control<sup>39</sup>.

The international community watched helplessly as diamonds, oil and arms flowed out of Angola at a rapid pace. Critical to the failure of the protocol was the distrust present

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<sup>35</sup> Knudsen, Mundt, Zartman ,*op.cit.*, "The Bicesse Accords"

<sup>36</sup> Meijer, Birmingham, *op.cit.*, 20

<sup>37</sup> Spears, I. S. "Angola's Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord". International Journal, 1999, 54(4), 562-581, p.566

<sup>38</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Report on Angola "IV The Lusaka peace process"*, 1999

<sup>39</sup> Spears, *op.cit.*, 567



between the two parties. Issues such as the control of the country's natural resources (the most prosperous areas were under UNITA's control), and the presence of direct talks between the two parties remained unresolved. Both agreements failed because the international community and the other actors involved gave room for maneuver to Savimbi, who had the military and economic capabilities to continue the war<sup>40</sup>. The conflict would only end when MPLA won over Unita in 2002, Jonas Savimbi was killed and the two parties decided to sign the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, which encompassed the integration of Unita and soldiers into the national army as well as the demobilization of the rest of the army.

In this case, as argued by Licklider (1995), the success of the deal "identifies how among civil wars that have ended, the settlements imposed by a conflict's victor prove more durable than negotiated agreements"<sup>41</sup>. The "soft guarantees" used as alternative ways of power-sharing during the Angolan civil war, have led on one side to the achievement of peace but on the other to a slow path bearing negative implications for the country<sup>42</sup>.

The agreements adopted to end the Angolan civil war were not effective and strong, but soft. Both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol failed. The former agreement demanded that UNITA accept the results of the 1992 elections, disarm and demobilize its forces, and hand over to the government the territory it controlled. Savimbi seemed unwilling to accept power-sharing, even when the MPLA included UNITA members in the parliament. The Lusaka Protocol called for a second round of the 1992 UN-supervised presidential election, but, the MPLA government ignored the protocol<sup>43</sup> and the election was never held until the end of the war.

After the defeat of Savimbi, the country switched from a one-party system ruled by the MPLA to a multiparty democracy with a new constitution which was adopted in 1992. The country held its first legislative elections in 1992, but since the civil conflict has resumed, there haven't been any more<sup>44</sup>. The Constitutional Law of 1992 established the

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<sup>40</sup> Knudsen, Mundt & Zartman, *op.cit.* "Redirection and redefinition at Lusaka"

<sup>41</sup> De Sousa, *op.cit.*, par. 25

<sup>42</sup> Brown, S, Zahar, M, "Committing To Peace: Soft Guarantees And Alternative Approaches To Power Sharing In Angola And Mozambique". *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 2008, 4(2), pp. 75–88.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 79

<sup>44</sup> People's Daily Online, "Angola invites AU to monitor parliamentary elections" July 22, 2008,

outlines of the state's structure as well as citizens' rights and duties. The legal system was weak and fragmented, based on Portuguese and customary law. Only 12 of the more than 140 municipalities had courts. The appellate tribunal was the Supreme Court; despite statutory authorization, a Constitutional Court with judicial review powers was never established. In practice, power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the President, who, aided by an ever-expanding staff, dominated parliament, government, judiciary.

### 2.3 dos Santos' absolutism

The legitimacy granted to MPLA and dos Santos following the defeat of unity was supposed to translate into a mandate to rebuild the country after a long civil war through using country's resources. The new government began accumulating wealth in order to support the militia, elites, and control state institutions at all levels. The reconstruction project that dos Santos foreshadowed from 2002 to 2013<sup>45</sup>, resulted in the collapse of institutions in favor of total dominance over Angola, with power concentrated in the hands of the president and his advisers. *Futungo* was called “a nebulous group of unelected official and businessman around President Eduardo dos Santos, became the key structure of the power in the 1980s, in tandem with the relative sidelining and formal state structures”<sup>46</sup> However, the *Futungo* was not to be confused with the action of dos Santos: it was both a part of the MPLA and a separate entity. During times when the state was failing to provide services and be efficient, dos Santos' strategy was to blame the government in order to maintain his own image as a peacemaker and reconciler. It is essential to understand that this presidentialism system has taken a long time to develop. The entire project revolved around Sonangol, the state-owned corporation in charge of the oil industry, over which President Dos Santos exercised personal control<sup>47</sup> (besides FESA, which he founded 20 years later). Throughout the war, even when the state only controlled a portion of the oil-rich Cabinda and Luanda, Dos Santos always gave Sonangol complete autonomy. Even when the state was unable to carry out its most basic

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<sup>45</sup> Ovadia, J “*State-Led Industrial Development, Structural Transformation and Elite-Led Plunder: Angola (2002-2013) as a Developmental State*”, *Development Policy Review*, February 2017

<sup>46</sup> de Oliveira, R.S., “*Business Success, Angola-Style: Postcolonial Politics and the Rise and Rise of Sonangol.*” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 45, no. 4 (2007): 595–619. cit p.606

<sup>47</sup> Bye, V., Inglês, P., Orre, A., *Angola after dos Santos: Change and continuity*, CMI Working Paper [2021, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2021:8)

functions, Sonangol maintained its reputation as a dependable, professional, and technologically advanced organization. The plan of dos Santos to rebuild the country through oil was unsustainable, as evidenced even by the oil price crisis, with most business investments focusing on distributing financial resources among the elite rather than creating opportunities for the people. Dos Santos decided to bring his own children into the organization with his reelection in 2012, Filomeno as his possible successor and Isabel as head of the economic branch. A change at the top was believed to create new opportunities, but this was not the case. The dos Santos family and name perpetuated the old Angolan oligarchy and corrupt elite.<sup>48</sup> Following Isabel dos Santos' defeat in administering Sonangol following the 2014 oil crisis, dos Santos began to consider Lourenço as her successor in order to avoid undermining the regime's legitimacy.<sup>49</sup>

A sliver of democracy and a political environment more accommodating of civil and social rights appeared in Angola after the civil war ended. The dos Santos administration attempted to maintain control over every element of country life, although it was predictable that the MPLA would win the 2008 elections. In reality, the peace did not materialize despite the 2002 memorandum of understanding indicated earlier. A highly divided and war-affected populace living in a war-torn nation with a largely oil-dependent economy and an opaque, "zero accountability" administration found solace in the MPLA's military win. When a battle is over, things could only become better. The following elections, held in 2008 after a gap of 16 years, were viewed as a step toward democratization.

The ruling MPLA won an unprecedented victory in the 2008 legislative elections, reaffirming its hegemony in the Angolan state. Considering the participation rate, these elections represented popular enthusiasm as the first multiparty elections in 16 years, but they also represented a vote for peace. Despite this, there were reports of official intimidation, corruption, and the presence of security forces at polling stations. The most embarrassing incident was that only 320 polling stations out of 2,584 were opened in Luanda because voter registration lists were not delivered despite a costly high-tech

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<sup>48</sup> BBC, *José Filomeno dos Santos: Son of Angola's ex-leader jailed for five years*, 14 August 2020

<sup>49</sup> Schubert, J. "Election unlikely to herald the change Angolans have been clamouring for", August 2017

process, necessitating a second day of voting<sup>50</sup>. According to those involved, this was the result of incompetence and inexperience rather than a conspiracy. Indeed, with a total of 81.6 percent of the vote, the party won the election and secured 191 of the 220 seats in the National Assembly. With only sixteen seats in the newly elected parliament, UNITA was unable to evolve into a political force that could serve as a legitimate challenger to the MPLA. The other parties shared the remaining seats. As a result, it took the assertion of his authority through democratic elections to complete the country's current power structure, which is primarily centered on the presidency. International observers, such as the EU, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the US, the AU, Southern African Development Community, were generally positive about the election, though they did point out irregularities. The EU mission was particularly critical of state-controlled radio, television, and the newspaper *Journal de Angola*.<sup>51</sup>

The 2008 Human Rights Watch report stated that Angolan elections “were marred by numerous irregularities”<sup>52</sup>. Human Rights Watch questioned the legitimacy of this outcome, although the European Commission, the US, and the Southern African Development Community lauded the elections as mainly fair. The international response was reluctant.

Indeed, the Southern African Development Community, a regional economic community, was founded in 1992 by Angola and 15 other African states (at the beginning it was part of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference created in Lusaka in 1980). Through effective and productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance, long-lasting peace and security, and efficient and productive systems, SADC seeks to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socioeconomic development so that the region becomes a competitive and successful player in international relations and the global economy.

Human Rights Watch highlighted that Angola's 2008 elections did not adhere to SADC standards; in fact, one would have anticipated respect for free, fair, and transparent

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<sup>50</sup> Vines, Weimer “*Angola: Thirty Years of Dos Santos, Review of African Political Economy*,” 36:120, 2009, 287-294, DOI: 10.1080/03056240903083417

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 288

<sup>52</sup> Human Rights Watch, “*Angola: Irregularities marred historic election: no independent oversight, Media bias*”, 2008

elections that were not controlled by the nation's most powerful party. SADC, on the other hand, said the elections were "credible, transparent and peaceful"<sup>53</sup>. There is an institution called "accreditation" inside the system of Angola. The acceptance of the election results depends critically on the participation of observers. Around 2000 accredited national and foreign observers will watch the elections. The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), led by Jorge Carlos Fonseca, a former president of the Republic of Cape Verde, represents the international organization. The National institution is the Angolan Electoral Observatory, which receives less funding but was accredited more quickly. The EU has two experts who monitor the proceedings and actions in courts. The citizens have lost faith in the independent body called CNE, National Electoral Commission, that provides that "special laws shall regulate the process of general elections"<sup>54</sup> and they are utilizing all measures to increase faith in the electoral result<sup>55</sup>.

According to the Report by ANGOP, Angola's Official News Agency, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) has invited the African Union (AU) to send observers to monitor the scheduled September 5 parliamentary elections. The invitation letter was delivered last weekend by the Angolan Ambassador to Ethiopia, Manuel Domingos Augusto, to the Chairman of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, on behalf of CNE Chairman Caetano de Sousa. According to the Angolan envoy, the AU has already shown that it is willing to deploy observers to Angola for the legislative elections. The senior ambassador for Angola claimed that the presence of AU observers in the second election since the country's independence in 1975 demonstrates transparency and good administration.<sup>56</sup> On August 14, MPLA spokesman Norberto dos Santos responded to the report, calling it "offensive and lacking any basis in reality." He charged Human Rights Watch for interference in the election and internal affairs in Angola.

Since 2004, Angola has experienced a boom, fueled by high government spending and rapidly increasing oil exports. between 2004 and 2007, recorded the greatest increase in oil production (beating Russia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Libya and Kazakhstan). President dos

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Constitution of Angola* 1992, art 3.3 National Electoral Commission

<sup>55</sup> Monteiro, J.P, Kundy, J. "Angola experts observer missions-ready to monitor the general elections", African News, 23/08/2022

<sup>56</sup> AU, "Preliminary Statement, African Union Election Observation Mission to the 24 August 2022 General Elections in the Republic of Angola, Luanda, 26 August 2022", African Union, 2022.

Santos has supervised the most significant change of government since 1997. He presented a cabinet of 33 ministers. The most significant changes are economic, with Jose' Pedro de Morais being replaced as finance minister by his former deputy Eduardo Severim de Morais. The appointment of Manuel Nunes Junior, the MPLA's former head of economic and social policy, to the new post of Minister of Economy is also significant because it suggests that the presidency wishes to reduce the Ministry of Finance's assertiveness in recent years. In addition to the private investment agency, former Deputy Prime Minister Aguinaldo Jaime has been appointed head of a new commission charged with increasing foreign investment in non-mining sectors.

Generally speaking, the new administration prioritized continuity over change. During the election the MPLA promised a second rebuilt phase, that would be more ambitious than the post-conflict reconstruction phase. This includes the development of two new towns, a new railway line along the coast from Namibia to the Cabinda enclave, and the construction of one million new homes across the country by 2012.<sup>57</sup> It is not certain yet how Angola will match this massive investment in physical infrastructure with investments in its citizens' health and education. Furthermore, as a result of the global recession and low oil prices, Angola may be under pressure to rebuild and develop its non-oil sector.

Dos Santos' goal was to consolidate bilateral relations and trade with other countries, considering the era of globalization in which markets also had to be 'liberalized' for Angola, accepting the principle of competition. Angola's so-called diversification strategy allows it to maintain advantageous economic arrangements with whomever it chooses, offering them both access to its rich oil fields, but also not allowing any foreign country to become too influential (although, as we shall see later, China has entered the Angolan imagination by offering aid for rapid postwar development). Angola's support for the Gulf of Guinea commission in 2006 was also part of dos santos' policy to mediate disputes over oil exploration and fishing in the region. The same year, Angola played a key role in the establishment of the African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA), with the goal of increasing employment and value addition in the country of origin.

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<sup>57</sup> Vines, Weimer, *op.cit.*, 289

Dos Santos announced in 2017 that he would not run for president again in the August elections that year. His greatest legacy, it could be said, was the widespread corruption in the political and economic systems.

#### 2.4 Lourenço's government

After 38 years of dos Santos government, dos Santos stepped down from power, and the new president elected in 2017 was Joao Lourenço<sup>58</sup>. Official results were announced by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and reported that the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) got 51.17 percent of the ballots compared to UNITA's 43.95 percent. The fight against corruption, widely regarded as Dos Santos' main legacy after 38 years in power, has been central to Lourenço's presidency. He brought charges against Dos Santos' top aides, including the former president's family.

Lourenço was already part of the Angolan political sphere during the last years of the civil war when he was only 20 years old, as serving the MPLA<sup>59</sup> and after the war served in the national assembly and as Angolan defense minister. Most important is the work he began in 1975 with a campaign for Cabinda province to remain under the Angolan guard, since, in 1975, on the eve of national independence, intense fighting took place in the Antó (Congo)/Iema (Angola) border battle against the joint border forces of the Front of National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Zairese Army. He was later posted to the Soviet Union, from where he returned with a degree in history. Lourenço's first years in politics were within the MPLA, as an officer responsible for keeping up the morale of guerrilla soldiers. After being appointed governor of Moxico province in 1984, he continued to climb the ladder of power within the party. This gave him an understanding of the realities of government outside of Luanda.<sup>60</sup> After performing in the Miconje-Cabinda campaign and in the battles of Antó-Iema and Morro do Chizo, he began fighting the guerrilla centers of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) in the Cabinda Conflict, being promoted to the position of Political Commissioner at various

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<sup>58</sup> De Alencastro, M.. "*Angola under Lourenço. Towards a Negotiated Hegemony*", IFRI: Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Notes de l'Ifri, February 2018.

<sup>59</sup> Remi Carlier, "*Angola: Après Dos Santos, "on peut s'attendre à une transition graduelle"*", France24.com, 2017.

<sup>60</sup> VOA, "*A ascensao politica de Joao Laurenc*", 2018

levels.<sup>61</sup> Between 1978 and 1982 he was sent to study in the union society where he went on to the military and public office career.

During the December 1998 elections he was elected secretary general of the MPLA and there it was already shown that he had a connection with Dos Santos and it was thought that he could be the president's successor in the next election (dos Santos had already declared that he did not want to run again as president)<sup>62</sup>, Lourenço openly expressed his interest in becoming the MPLA candidate, thus damaging his position vis-à-vis dos Santos, who apparently had no intention of leaving office but had tried to expose his political rivals. Lourenço's election coincided with a very critical time for Angola, which we will discuss in chapter two, namely an economic crisis and the collapse of oil prices in 2016<sup>63</sup>. What the current president promised was a fight against the political corruption that has been rampant in the country since the civil war years and an incentive for foreign investment. MPLA has traditionally exercised control over elections and state media, and concerns have been raised by civic groups about election transparency. In addition, many were afraid of the rise of Joao Lourenço, who had always served dos Santos, who for years consolidated power and control over the state by stealing money from oil revenues that went into his pockets and not to the state. As we have already seen, his career was not easy in fact the Angolan elections were criticized by HRW for lack of transparency, and control of media and resources. Dos Santos is accused of appointing family members and friends to key positions during his marathon rule, leaving the country with a legacy of poverty and nepotism. Lourenço has committed to battle corruption and rebuild Angola's oil-dependent economy by dismantling his predecessor's administration, with a particular focus on the former first family. He initiated anti-corruption investigations controlling dos Santos' children. As a consequence, dos Santos' sons accused Lourenço of a political "witch hunt."<sup>64</sup> However, due to his intervention within two years, Angola,

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<sup>61</sup> Embaixada Da Republica De Angola No Brasil: *Biografia do presidente da república*

<sup>62</sup> The New Humanitarian, "Dos Santos to bow out", 24 August 2001, IRIN News, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Politics and Economics News.

<sup>63</sup> Kevin Sieff, "An oil boom made it the most expensive city in the world. Now it's in crisis.", Inside The Washington Post, 2 August 2016

<sup>64</sup> Aljazeera, "Angola ruling party backs President Joao Lourenço for second term", 11/12/2021



on the west coast of southern Africa, recovered \$5 billion stolen from state coffers, according to authorities, largely from the sovereign wealth fund.<sup>65</sup>

Despite this, Angola's poverty rate is still very high at about half the country, as is the rate of youth unemployment.<sup>66</sup> The election of President Lourenço represented major steps forward and a break with dos Santos' authoritarian past. His presence demonstrated an opening toward a more reliable government. He opened the political space by meeting with critics of the Dos Santos government, including investigative journalist and human rights defender Rafael Marques de Morais. De Morais has dedicated his work “Diamantes de Sangue: Corrupção e Tortura em Angola [Blood Diamonds: Corruption and Torture in Angola]”, 2011, to trying to expose corruption in the country, especially in relation to the diamond industry, analyzing around 50 cases in which the old tool of death squads used by authoritarian dictators around the 20<sup>th</sup> century was reported in a similar way in Luanda. The report notes how the teams acted on the basis of different interests related to the economic reality of the city. Despite being rich in oil, Angola still has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world and millions of its citizens continue to live in poverty or are on the verge of it more than 15 years after the end of a civil war that was held responsible for all of the nation's problems. Due to the disparity between the ruling class, civil society, and the rest of the population it does not immediately affect the urban poor's daily lives in Angola. The leaders, who have themselves been charged with serious offenses, have not been subjected to harsh punishment.

Lourenço also criticized the violence suffered in peaceful anti-government demonstrations and urged the state media to report outside the party line of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Other measures taken include easing repression and creating a freer environment for the press and civil society, which have earned him significant political support from opposition parties and society at large. Despite four years since the 2022 elections, the people's confidence in the president has stalled. The fight against corruption and the management of the economy have stalled. The political and authoritarian system that has characterized Angola still cannot find a

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<sup>65</sup> Cascais, A. “*Angola: the fall of the dos santos clan*”, Deutsche Welle DW, September 2018

<sup>66</sup> Deminy, C, Cocks, T. “*Joao Lourenço, who surprised Angola with corruption crackdown, gets 2nd term*”, Reuters, 2022

turning point. Even from a resource management perspective, the economy has stalled and is in crisis. This is important because, as in the case of Zimbabwe, it shows that change in leadership does not necessarily mean political and economic change<sup>67</sup>.

Overall, Lourenço attempted to initiate reforms in Angola, both in terms of governance and economics, despite clashes with the dos Santos family's actions. Lourenço also needed to entice foreign investors who had fled the country following the oil crisis. In fact, he needed to return the country to more transparent and credible politics. Sonangol's autonomy was exacerbated by the fact that the company only followed President dos Santos' directives, which is why the company collapsed when the oil price crisis hit.<sup>68</sup>

## 2.5 The problematics of development' States in Africa

African states in recent years have been dominated by highly centralized governments in which political leaders promised change in political and military direction. The process of colonization and discovery of Western systems and rules of government have not affected the newly independent African states in a positive way. Why was and is it still so difficult for African states to improve? Usually, some authors use the discourse related to nationalism, try to tie themselves to states that are considered more developed, that know how to use resources in all areas including security<sup>69</sup>. Critics consider the condition afflicting African states pathological dating back to neo-Marxist ideas, in fact they speak of "'petty bourgeois state,' the 'neocolonial state' and the 'dependent state.'"<sup>70</sup>

Nowadays, it is impossible to talk about complete democratization in Africa without mentioning the tremendous political and social changes that have occurred since colonialism and inspired a desire for democratic norms, using Western governments as an example. The sheer fact that Angola was freed from Portuguese authority should have ushered in new democratic laws, but instead Marxist-Leninist alternatives were selected, in part due to the interference of external actors on a global scale.

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<sup>67</sup> African Center for Strategic Studies, *"The Challenge of Reform in Africa"*, 2020

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Mkandawire, T. *"Thinking about Developmental States in Africa."* Cambridge Journal of Economics 25, no. 3 (2001): 289–313, p.291

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 293

Traditions and a powerful centralized administration must be considered in a nation like Africa. Governments that were more independent in the 1970s and 1980s lost their legitimacy, and single-party systems were politically bankrupt. Africa has never experienced a straight progression toward more or less sophisticated democracies; the continent is still a long way from having a unified political system like that of Europe. Africa is full of young sovereign states, as defined by international law and acknowledged by other states.<sup>71</sup> Although existing boundaries are generally recognized as legal, there are considerable areas where they are disputed, and many states themselves may not have a centralized authority. States, despite being territorial, do not always appear to be 'sovereign' in many locations<sup>72</sup>. Throughout history, Africa has oscillated between exclusion and marginalization. In order to avoid the possibility of marginalization, African countries have been pushed to adapt to rapid globalization by growing their exports and integrating markets inside Africa. However, Africa lacks the fundamental components to successfully address the difficulties posed by globalization. For underdeveloped countries, globalization means nothing more than a process of recolonization of the economies of the Third World. It is seen as a new phase of capitalist expansion concerning accumulation, exploitation, inequality and polarization. It is seen as a manifestation of the thesis of imperialism without a great colonial empire<sup>73</sup>. Incorrectly adopting the European model, the African continent replied in a distinctive manner. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), which later changed its name to the African Union (AU) in 2000, was a prime example of this new regionalism movement. Across the continent, this change has sparked a lot of hope for a new age.

The African state may fall apart not because Africans have not adapted to the global economy, but rather because the state has grown insufficient to the demands of the global economy. Elites fighting for control of the state or to establish their own accelerated the breakdown of the state in Africa. Who controls whose region and which institutions

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<sup>71</sup> Warner, C.M “*The rise of the state system in Africa*”, Review of International Studies, Cambridge University. Vol. 27, Special Issue: Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics (December 2001), pp. 65-89, pp.87

<sup>72</sup> Lynch, G., Crawford, G, “*Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an assessment*”, Democratization, 18:2, 2011. 275-310, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.554175

<sup>73</sup> Amin, S., & Luckin, D “*The Challenge of Globalization.*” Review of International Political Economy, 3(2), 1996, 216–259

benefit whom, who has the power to draw distinctions between friends and enemies, and what is the identity of the political community and what are its constituent elements are still the subject of internal struggles. The obligations imposed on the modern state in Africa are too great. What is remarkable is that the state established alternative organizational structures even when it appeared to be at its pinnacle, including the empire and, after two World Wars' highlighted concerns about the serious consequences of a globe dominated by sovereign territorial states, the union economic or regional policy. The principle of extraterritoriality, according to some authors, "was the first specifically modern invention of diplomacy: possessive individualistic states found they could communicate with each other only by tolerating small islands of alien sovereignty within them," after so profoundly redefining and reorganizing the political space. As African nations gained their independence, a large number of transnational organizations were quickly established<sup>74</sup>. The current system present in Africa is characterized by numerous "states" in which "power based on violent accumulation creates networks of control and non-hegemony over a contiguous territory. Militarized elites play a pivotal role in countries like Africa: they have violated the borders of sovereign states, engaged in the deliberate destruction of states, and seem to ignore the benefits of borders and state sovereignty. They have been able to control the distribution of resources and have appropriated the right to identify enemies.

Africa has found the colonial experience to be catastrophic in terms of penetration and effects because it is a continent rich in natural resources and people. The colonial state, being an illegitimate state, relied on the illegal use of force in order to continue, in addition to retroversion and, occasionally, outright denial of African history<sup>75</sup>.

When we discuss democratization, the process that typically comes to mind is one that was inspired by the Western world, specifically by the ideas of state and nation. It is helpful to consider factors like religion, society, economics, political ideologies, and especially relationships between those in positions of power and those who do not, between those who control the state and those who do not, when examining the process

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<sup>74</sup> Warner, C.M, *op.cit.*, 80-83

<sup>75</sup> Omotola, J. S., "The Challenges Of Development In Africa: Globalisation And New Regionalism." World Affairs: The Journal Of International Issues, 14(2), 2010, 22-46/ p.29

of democratization in Africa following decolonization<sup>76</sup>. The ties that are forged in the villages and rural areas of Africa relate the nature of power to an imaginary that is not only realistic and tangible but also spiritual. In addition, unlike the experience of the West, authority in Africa is not perceived as a unitary power; rather, it is challenging to divide the power among several factions, as we have seen in Angola in the fight for peace.

In reality, attempting to distribute power among diverse ethnic groups with disparate aspirations and interests is more challenging. In fact, as Schatzberg asserts in his 1993 book “Power, Legitimacy and Democratization in Africa”, African culture is permeated by a patriarchal figure who must provide materially for his subjects and who must constantly seek legitimacy. The legitimacy of power is linked to these dynamics, to the cultural patterns around the main actors. Legitimacy is lost when authority is lost. Similar to the situation in Angola, where the parties, the MPLA and UNITA, garnered support from the many ethnic groups by promising to uphold political economy and social rights before turning to a cronyism and corruption system that is still difficult to eradicate.

## 2.6 Attempts to democratization

African political aspirations for change have been blocked by escalating authoritarianism, corruption, rising debt, economic deterioration, and different Cold War-era types of external intervention, such as South African invasion or increasingly dominating economic policy stances. The issue of legitimacy and form of government is also tied to the goals of people in power: if governments in African nations continue to hold a monopoly on resources and authority, there will be no shared power, no support from the general populace, and human rights violations will continue. The participation of elites is important as well; if they act in a way that excludes people and denies everyone equal access to power, it will lead to an electoral corruption and manipulation system that produces no beneficial outcomes. Another possibility is that, given the conquerors' history of exploitation and dependence, the new rulers will not use the wealth for the good of the populace but rather for themselves and their own interests. Without their protection,

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<sup>76</sup> Schatzberg, M. G.. “*Power, Legitimacy and “Democratisation” In.*” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 63(4), 1993, 445–461/ pp. 446

voice, or political and independent space, this results in ongoing repression of the social and civil rights of the most marginalized groups.

Poor outcomes were obtained throughout the 1990s sub-Saharan democratization movement for a number of reasons, including the above-mentioned corruption, restricted elections, violence, and insecurity. According to several scholars, the "missing key" to significant political transformation, legitimate administrations, and wholesome state-economic relations is civil society<sup>77</sup>. African civil societies frequently have small elite-founded ethnic and religious organizations. Civil society organizations have occasionally helped democratic processes; occasionally they haven't. The power to hold the government accountable and challenge it is significantly aided by civil society and the media. Additionally, this results in crime, violence during elections, and the failure of globalization and progress.<sup>78</sup>

Positively, the expansion of civil society and more independent media has been facilitated by the improved protection of civil and political rights in many nations. Even Nevertheless, when there are regional or ethnic pressures, independent civil society and political freedoms may not guarantee a democratic transition. Since the 2002 elections, the government has attempted to consolidate power and maintain control over the civil war by utilizing the rhetoric on democratization. In fact, political violence and the use of force and the media to manipulate the populace are pervasive in electoral processes; this is a holdover from the one-party rule that bred a climate of fear and rife corruption.

Furthermore, the government has encouraged and formed civil society organizations based on its own requirements. According to respondents, civic society is becoming increasingly divided. There are associations that have "grown from the bottom up," but they have difficulty getting money and are constrained in what they can do by a myriad of rules and laws. On the other hand, there are Angolan NGOs that have been established and financed by the government, either overtly or covertly, and "their major objective is to lighten the image of the president and his government" by doing services and charitable

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<sup>77</sup> Lynch, Crawford, *op.cit.*, 290

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, 291

work on their behalf<sup>79</sup>. The president's foundation, FESA, is the most well-known example. International oil firms generously donate to the foundation.

In Angola, for instance, when the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) was founded in 1996 during the dos Santos dictatorship, civil groups had detrimental impacts at a time when political elites and NGOs were linked. FESA's early years are characterized as being unremarkable and inconsequential. Its development is related to the desire of the moment to deal with the UNITA conflict, the social crises, and potential power competitors<sup>80</sup>. Though in theory it would be used to establish democratic institutions and advance social, cultural, and economic goals, in reality it served as the president's plan to establish a system of cronyism and privatization. FESA is an example of the developments in the real political economy of Angola as well as in how the public and private sectors interact and how privatizations are carried out. Dos Santos' strategy in a context of delegitimization and internal conflict was to support the image of the president and his cohorts, not necessarily to ensure the party's supremacy: the party and the institutions were tools to be used for convenience, not to achieve peace.<sup>81</sup>

Political, economic, and social discourses in the nation are intertwined, as we've already mentioned, and this system "taxes" major foreign corporations interested in doing business in Angola, including oil and oil service companies, diamond companies, major engineering and construction companies, etc. This system (which plays, like the Angolan state for the strategic management of its oil reserves) by requiring them to pay a start-up charge for their firm and requesting donations for other programs. Major Angolan public firms are also members or sponsors in addition to foreign businesses.

In addition to a number of smaller businesses, there are others who are interested in forging a relationship with the Foundation since it gives them access to the source of electricity as well as the opportunity to show their generosity. Many big businesses spent

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<sup>79</sup> Schubert, J. "Democratization" and the Consolidation of Political Authority in Post-War Angola." *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36(3), 2010, 657–672/ pp.665

<sup>80</sup> Messiant, Christine. "The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation: Or, How Angola's Regime Is Taking over Civil Society." *African Affairs* 100, no. 399 (2001): 287–309/ pp.287

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 304

money on side projects to their core activities, such as building roads, installing water, electricity, and other infrastructure, and building or equipping schools and clinics, all of which they previously carried out in their own names, prior to the creation of FESA, as the state abandoned any claim to provide public services. After four years, FESA can be understood as intricate ways in which the public and private spheres are connected<sup>82</sup>. This series of events contains a number of significant facts that shed light on the tactics employed not only by particular elite actors but also by the regime as a whole, within which the presidency rules while advancing its own agenda. The development of the clientelist system (of which FESA is an element) as a response to widespread economic marginalization and the levels of exclusion that come with the expense of a powerful security apparatus and corruption may enable social control, but it is insufficient. Also, it is a shame in and of itself. Only those Angolans or foreigners who are interested in sustaining this illusion will support the president's strategy of consistently denying any responsibility for Angola's social tragedy. The dictatorship will take advantage of the no-war/no-peace position and the strong public support it enjoys in the face of mounting discontent in peacetime, which is simply untenable in times of conflict.

While the change in leadership is viewed with optimism by civil and international society, it does not always result in a new wave of positive change for the country. This is the case we are examining after President Dos Santos stepped aside after 38 years of rule in 2017. Since the early 1990s, there has been a clear division between West and Southern Africa—which have remained relatively more open and democratic—and Central and East Africa, which are more closed and authoritarian. There is also some evidence that the average quality of democracy has continued to decline in East and Central Africa in recent years. Indeed, according to the BTI<sup>83</sup> Bertelsmann Transformation Index from 2006 until now, while Angola showed an upward trend for the level of democracy since 2008, since about 2012 the trend itself has stopped without showing significant improvement over the next 10 years.

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 298

<sup>83</sup> BTI Index, The Status Index, Southern and Eastern Africa, Retrieved [https://atlas.bti-project.org/1\\*2022\\*GV:SIX:REG5\\*CAT\\*TOPO:REGION\\*region:5](https://atlas.bti-project.org/1*2022*GV:SIX:REG5*CAT*TOPO:REGION*region:5)



### Trend Democracy 2005-2007

2008 | Angola

Trend Democracy shows changes in democratic development. It is calculated as the difference between the current (2008) and the preceding (2006) Democracy Status scores.

|                                |     |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| Strong improvement $\geq +1$   | 7   |
| Improvement $\geq +0.5$        | 8   |
| No significant changes         | 97  |
| Deterioration $\leq -0.5$      | 6   |
| Strong deterioration $\leq -1$ | 1   |
| Total Countries                | 119 |

Democracy vs. Autocracy

- Eastern Europe
- Latin America / Caribbean
- West and Central Africa
- Middle East / North Africa
- Southern and Eastern Africa
- Post-Soviet Eurasia
- Asia and Oceania



### Trend Democracy 2019-2021

2022 | Angola

Trend Democracy shows changes in democratic development. It is calculated as the difference between the current (2022) and the preceding (2020) Democracy Status scores.

|                                |     |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| Strong improvement $\geq +1$   | 1   |
| Improvement $\geq +0.5$        | 1   |
| No significant changes         | 120 |
| Deterioration $\leq -0.5$      | 10  |
| Strong deterioration $\leq -1$ | 5   |
| Total Countries                | 137 |

Democracy vs. Autocracy

- Eastern Europe
- Latin America / Caribbean
- West and Central Africa
- Middle East / North Africa
- Southern and Eastern Africa
- Post-Soviet Eurasia
- Asia and Oceania




According to the report of Nic Cheeseman “A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems? Regional Report Sub-Saharan Africa (2020), from 2006 to 2022 through the index it is possible to see how variation in democracy in various respects reflects the types of governments and power that have come to the states. For example, East Africa has a number of countries ruled by former rebel armies (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda). Here political control is supported by coercion. In Central Africa, political instability and long conflicts, as in Congo, have led to a slowdown in the evolution of governments. Some former military leaders have also ruled West African states, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo. But the percentage is lower and some countries, such as Senegal, have a long tradition of plural politics and civilian leadership. Similarly, southern Africa is characterized by a number of liberation movements created out of movements that valued political participation and civil liberties. In part, therefore, former


military or rebel leaders have had a less detrimental impact on the prospects for democracy in southern and western Africa. It is, however, relevant to remember that there are many differences within the same regions; it is not known whether convergence on the African democratic experience is expected as the years go by; on the contrary, the gap between the most democratic and the most authoritarian regions of the continent may become even wider.

As we have previously mentioned, Angola appears to have achieved political progress since the civil war, but the changes in the wider sub-Saharan region have not produced appreciable results in terms of democracy and governance. New economic and political hope has resulted from the leadership shift, as evidenced by the study, particularly in the wake of dos Santos. It is true that “the significance of leadership change to all of these processes is an important reminder of the extent to which power has been personalized in many African states.”<sup>84</sup>

The chart below shows how the country's autocracy has shifted over time from being a strong one to a moderate one. The authoritarian character refers to political parties that do not fully respect the citizens' civil and political rights and freedoms. In fact, in the countries where political changes have been observed, the level of difficulty in achieving democracy has not changed noticeably.



<sup>84</sup> Cheeseman, N. “A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems?” BTI 2020 - Regional Report Sub-Saharan Africa. p.4, 2020)



Despite the fact that the elections held in Angola were thought to be transparent, the outcome was decided by a group of electors who were distant from the entire country and aimed to create a pluralistic political system with civil leadership. In this regard, the Freedom Charter of 1955, which required the South African government to advance human rights and limit the power of the president and military forces, was helpful. The Freedom Charter gave terms like "freedom" and "self-determination" concrete meaning. In fact, "Freedom in our lives" was the collective voice of the congress that drafted the charter. The Congress Alliance's political standards, objectives, and guiding principles are listed in the charter. It acted as a democratic mobilization tool for a new South Africa after apartheid.<sup>85</sup>

Adalberto Costa Junior, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and an informal coalition of other opposition parties, posed a serious challenge to President J. Lourenço and the MPLA, the country's ruling party, in the general elections. Early on in his first term, President Lourenço won praise from all quarters for his efforts to combat systemic corruption and advance human rights. But in the last two years, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic downturn, and the emergence of a humanitarian crisis, opposition to the president and his government has risen. Due to the government's refusal to address these pressing issues, violent protests

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<sup>85</sup> SAHO, "Significance of the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter", 2021

and the arbitrary detention of countless individuals occurred<sup>86</sup>. Angola is categorized as being partially free in Freedom on the Net 2021 and not free in Freedom in the World 2022. For instance, in the mining town of Cafunfo in the province of Lunda Norte, security personnel shot and killed at least 10 demonstrators in January and February 2021. Police detained 22 activists in Luanda's capital in April 2022 as they peacefully protested the imprisonment of political prisoners and demanded free and fair elections. Authorities also made an effort to stop civic groups from assembling. Police made an effort to stop the Association for the Development of Human Rights and Culture (ADCDH) and Omunga from conducting a conference on peacebuilding in the Cabinda province in May 2022.

The chance of free and fair elections is related to the country's respect for human rights, which are still marginalized and restrict the liberties of citizens. The problem of ongoing violence throughout election season or during the counting of votes because of freedom of speech or association is real. During election season, authorities in Angola should uphold respect for human rights, however restrictions on domestic and international observers have a severe impact on citizens' ability to cast ballots. Additionally, on election day and in the days that follow, a setting should be established that supports a free and fair trial. The Angolan government must ensure that security forces don't harass, intimidate, or harm activists. The political parties must desist from inciting violence and condemn any act of violence that is observed, and those who are suspected of committing such crimes must be contacted to explain their actions.

Further, Angola's attempt at democracy is still impacted by the previous Portuguese administration because coups and outside reactions linked the two revolutionary events. To support the independence movement against the counterrevolutionary forces who had attempted to prevent it, democratic and progressive support would have been necessary. Following independence, both for one country and the other, the issue of democracy was brought up. Because Angola, a nation that remained between imperialism and neocolonialism and was attempting to provide the people with an answer on true self-

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<sup>86</sup> Freedom House, “*Angola: Government Must Uphold Human Rights during Election period*” August 23, 2022

determination, was on the other, there was a basic monopolist Portugal aiming to dominate the means of production and the labor force<sup>87</sup>. The potential for more than one political party to exist or the theoretical right to vote remained of secondary relevance by the late 1990s. Even the MPLA's defeat in Angola would give imperialists and their allies in Africa the ability to continue their savage exploitation of the local populations and natural resources.

## 2.7 Élite and corruption

Under Soviet and other international powers involved, Angola's civil war produced substantial problems, emerging as a centralized government with authoritarian tendencies that allowed the president and elites to own the nation's resources. As a result, the leaders in power have used the state system to provide itself and its client connections with a variety of legal and extra-legal options for extracting private profits, particularly from the country's economy. Angola's capacity to develop democratically has been constrained by a dysfunctional political economy, internal strife, and corruption. The failure to establish an effective independent media and the general slow growth of civil society have been two of the worst tragedies of Angola's failed democratic transition. This may have made a significant difference in reducing corruption. Regarding the media, Angola has one of the lowest global newspaper circulation rates.<sup>88</sup>

The ruling elite has used patron-client relationship networks for political control and financial gain. Despite the increase in oil wealth, the opportunity structure for the population has remained unchanged due to the failure to reinvest oil revenues in Angola's infrastructure. Corruption has bred corruption in Angola, with nascent patronage networks infiltrating a self-feeding system of bribery and fraud.

The political corruption that revolves around the power elites is also maintained by a certain level of violence used by the same elites. In a country like Angola, different solutions were used to solve the war, trying to aggregate all the leading players and create

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<sup>87</sup> The African Communist NO 63 Fourth quarter 1975, "*Vorster's Imperialist Strategy in Africa. Twenty Years of the Freedom Charter, National Unity or Secession in African States?*" , Inkululeko Publications. P.14

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 560

a shared government. The majority of the readings suggest that the role of the political parties and the history of violence in a specific country greatly influences the dynamic of solve conflicts and their outcome<sup>89</sup>. Borrowing the theory of Nic Cheeseman in his chapter from the book “Democratization in Africa: Challenges and Prospects” (2012) it is possible to identify four types of dynamics based on the distribution of violence among the parties and the cohesion of the political leaders: the politics of collusion, the politics of partisanship, the politics of distrust and the politics of pacting<sup>90</sup>. The author argues that the case of Angola relies on the politics of distrust, and I believe is the most reliable theory. When trust between elites is deficient and the distribution of violence is high, the parties involved will never be able to create an alliance; instead, they will decide to pursue their own interests and centralize power in their own favor<sup>91</sup>. The most likely outcome is the impossibility of achieving common deals and instability due to mistrust between elites. As was the case in Angola, the warring parties failed to create reforms. Rather, they tried to use their military forces to disarm opposing militias, not to find joint agreements to end the war. The capacity to promote democracy depends both on the military/political ability of the warring parties and the role of potential spoilers. In fact, an essential element of the case under examination is the presence of the so-called spoilers, “the most important barrier to the implementation of peace agreements”<sup>92</sup> and to reach political stability. Spoilers are those leaders or parties that perceive their power as threatened and use violence to maintain it. They are those who sabotage any attempt to reach peace negotiations, thus delaying the end of a civil war, as happened in the case of Angola with the UNITA party. The success of the spoilers also depends on the intervention of international actors in resolving disputes: if they fail, the spoilers will have more space to succeed in their enterprise<sup>93</sup>. In addition to this, other challenges in the attempt to reach a solution can interfere when: parties' strategies during elections, their political and military power, cooperation between groups, the willingness of one party to

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<sup>89</sup> Cheeseman, N. Chapter 3 “*The Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing in Africa*”, “into Crawford, Lync, “Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an assessment” 18:2, 2012, 30 pages, p.62

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 339

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> Mehler, Andreas. “*Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship.*” *African Affairs* 108, no. 432 (2009): 453–73./ p.455

<sup>93</sup> National Research Council, “*International Conflict Resolution After The Cold War*”, Washington, Dc: The National Academies Press. *Chapter 5, “Spoiler Problems In Peace Processes”* By Stephen John Stedman, 2000

cede power to the other, or to integrate into the political field<sup>94</sup>. Lack of trust between parties is an obstacle to democratic consolidation: the relationship between elites in countries like Angola is crucial in the path to peace. Furthermore, in cases of deep ethnic divisions, the elites try to create coalitions and avoid sharing power with other leaders, fearing that their power would be put at risk. If the parties to the conflict have different personal interests, reaching a peace agreement is almost unlikely. It has happened in the relationship between the MPLA and the UNITA, which initially based their strength on the consensus of the two ethnic groups, respectively Mbundu and Ovimbundu.

The Angolan government has made significant efforts to reduce violence at the conclusion of the conflict. Targeting the insurgency's leader, Savimbi, proved to be a successful strategy. In fact, UNITA disintegrated rapidly after his death. Following the cessation of violence, the Angolan government was able to concentrate on the country's oil and diamond resources and begin reconstruction.<sup>95</sup> Angola's economy benefited from the production of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day in 2007, ranking second only to Nigeria on the African continent. 35 The oil industry has benefited from massive investments by multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil, BP, and Chevron. Angola's oil production is comparable to that of major energy producers such as Kuwait. Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China's top oil exporter in 2006.<sup>96</sup> However, while Angola's rich oil resources have lifted the country and helped it rebuild its infrastructure, the concentration of this newfound wealth in the hands of a few has exacerbated the growing inequality between those with and those without access to government. Even in the second half of the 2000s, the population lived on less than \$2 per day, the majority of Angolans lacked access to basic health care, and a quarter of children died before reaching the age of five. Angola is still a poor and underdeveloped country that has seen a significant reduction in violence since the war's end, but it still has a long way to go to provide a better quality of life for those who lived and suffered during the most tumultuous times.

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<sup>94</sup> De Sousa, *op.cit.*

<sup>95</sup> Malaquias, A., "Making War & Lots of Money: The Political Economy of Protracted Conflict in Angola." *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 90 (2001): 521–36.

<sup>96</sup> Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena. "Angola (1992–2010)." In "Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations", Supporting Case Studies, 167–82. RAND Corporation, 2014.

Angola has the paradoxical situation of being one of the most challenging African nations while also being a wealthy nation rich in resources like oil and diamonds. Because national elites pillage the nation without regard for the people, rather than sharing resources, the protracted civil conflict resulted in collapse and instability. The postcolonial political economy identified a connection between kleptocracy, which is rooted on corruption and violence. The political action that aims to enrich elites and impoverish the populace is fundamentally corrupt. Agostino Neto's leadership-centered policies that marked the years leading up to independence have given place to a kleptocratic system where elites, the military, and businesspeople use petroleum and other resource resources as a source of income<sup>97</sup>. For instance, President dos Santos, who is the 20th richest person in Brazil, is thought to have put a sizeable percentage of his personal money there<sup>98</sup>. Although on a smaller scale, other members of the political elite have also benefited by being covered under the veil of laws and statutory bodies.

Since the MPLA party had a Marxist Leninist leaning against capitalist accumulation and private enrichment, it was originally difficult to understand this reversal. The elites manipulated under the guise of a democratic political system during the shift from one party to multiparty democracy, which was meant to safeguard the rule of law and human rights<sup>99</sup>. Angola suffers from widespread corruption since these ideals were abandoned with the country's revolutionary turn, which created a totally corrupt system of private citizens enriching themselves. The end of the civil war brought to light two issues that would plague the nation's reconstruction: first, the frailty of public officials who turn to corruption to stay in office, and second, the misuse of public funds by these officials. As a result of this practice's acceptance as the norm throughout time, bureaucratic ethics and the administration of community money have been abandoned. It is important to note that, in contrast to the first generation, the current leadership is more focused on nation-building economics than nation-building politics. These rely on economic expansion and

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<sup>97</sup> Saunders, G.M., *"The foreign policy of Angola under Agostinho Neto"*, 1983 Chapter III "The MPLA in the south: evolution of two track strategy", 53-95

<sup>98</sup> Munslow, Barry. *"Angola: The Politics of Unsustainable Development."* Third World Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1999): 551-68., pp.563

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 553



seem to see expansionary statistics favorably. Furthermore, compared to past nationalist leaders who had previously equated foreign control with privatization and the attraction of foreign capital, the new leadership appears to be far less focused on these issues.

Angola was immediately dropped into war following independence, so the formation of the postcolonial state never had the chance to be a true success. The reality has been more similar to creating an armed state. Conflicts exacerbated the state's already modest ability to administer and provide social services. Although government control of the oil industry has brought enough economic prosperity that internal inefficiencies have been dismissed as mere bureaucratic frustrations, economic management has been misguided. Numerous indicators point to significant administrative collapse. Everything revolved around oil access under dos Santos' government. Indeed, shortly after taking power, patronage networks were established that directed the country's political and economic norms of doing business. Oil money was used by rulers to create political networks of corporatism.<sup>100</sup>

Transparency International continues to rank Angola as one of the world's most corrupt countries. For the majority of Angolans, corruption was simply a fact. It became a way of life not only for the elite, but for anyone attempting to enter a commercial endeavor, large or small, legitimate or not. The corruption that has become commonplace during the conflict, which has lasted nearly three decades, has been difficult to overcome even after the conflict has ended. Even though there is no longer a warfare to fight, the Angolan government has resisted the majority of transparency efforts by instituting plenty of safeguards, including national security.<sup>101</sup>

## 2.8 The role of military forces

As already stated, military forces represented an important threat to the political stability in Africa and they played a crucial role during the decolonization and democratization process in Angola. In order to understand the current situation, it is useful to date back to

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<sup>100</sup> Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena, *op.cit.*, 179

<sup>101</sup> HRW, “*Transparency and Accountability in Angola*” April 13, 2010

the past. After the first decade of decolonization in Africa, around “215 coup attempts have been made across the continent”<sup>102</sup>.

Why therefore have militias played such a significant role in Africa, despite the fact that military assaults and insurgencies pose a threat to political stability and the journey toward democracy? One idea put forth holds that political violence largely stems from the ethnic divisions that exist in African nations. Leaders had a tendency to start violent cycles of coups when they made shared identity a requirement for military recruitment, promotion, and access to patronage. Military coups and military regimes were frequent in several African governments after the 1990s during the post-independence era; these events were opposed by African civilians and occasionally even by the elite.<sup>103</sup> This evolution was also evident in the work of the African Union (AU), continuing the efforts of the OAU's precursor, which made headway by prohibiting leaders who had been established through coups from attending meetings as early as 1999. In addition, the AU Assembly codified the rejection of unlawful changes to government in 2000<sup>104</sup>. The African Union's reaction to previous coups resulted in the interim suspension of AU membership; while this is a great development, it does not, regrettably, characterize the piloting and sliding elections as an unlawful change of government.

The story of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), now called Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) dates back in 1991 as a result of the collapse of the Bicesse Accord with the UNITA-affiliated Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA). As previously mentioned, the agreement mandated that both armies' personnel be demilitarized before being combined. Integration The FAA is seen as integrating each of the three major armed forces, respectively:

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<sup>102</sup> Harkness, K.A, “*The ethnic Army and the State: Explaining coup traps and the difficulties of Democratization in Africa*”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2016, Vol. 60(4) 587-616 , 2014, p. 588 DOI: 10.1177/0022002714545332

<sup>103</sup> Lynch, Crawford, *op.cit.*, 278

<sup>104</sup> Souaré, I.K, , “*The African Union as a norm entrepreneur on military coups d'état in Africa (1952-2012): an empirical assessment,*” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* , Vol. 52, No. 1 (MARCH 2014), pp. 69-94, Cambridge University, p.77

- The MPLA army: Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA);
- the FNLA: Army for the National Liberation of Angola (ELNA);
- UNITA: Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA).<sup>105</sup>

Ever since the declaration of independence, the three armies have engaged in solitary combat, most likely as a result of racial and political prejudices. Since the coup that granted independence in 1974, movements have changed significantly. At the time, there were few significant opponents because Western allies had interests in certain regions of Africa due to the Cold War. Despite the coup in Alvor, civil war was unavoidable due to the conflicting objectives of the freedom movement. However, it can be deduced from looking at international intervention and Cold War-era interests that the three movements received significant armed assistance against Angola's national interests.

The three movements never considered power-sharing arrangements for the eventual independence of Angola throughout the colonial war. Following the Alvor Accords, the movements were more focused on preparing their military wing for the capture of Luanda than they were on carrying out the agreements. It was believed that the party in power in Luanda in 1975 would also rule the rest of Angola. UNITA was a particularly interested party in the Alvor Accords since it was a younger participant in the Angolan war and did not have a significant foreign supporter, its lack of military influence; it had everything to gain from a political solution. The other two participants, the FNLA and MPLA, were drawn to a military solution to the war rather than the peaceful and democratic approach represented by power sharing due to the foreign support they received. At the time of independence, the FNLA and MPLA were jointly attacking Luanda, which was held by the MPLA. The FNLA's military strength was destroyed during the struggle for Luanda, and UNITA, supported by the West, replaced it as the only military foe of the Angolan government. The two main Cold War participants (the West and the Soviet Union and its satellites) had a vested interest in the result of the fight given the abundance of natural resources in Angola: international interests fought in Angola for control of the government and regime change. UNITA viewed the Angolan peace process as a chance

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<sup>105</sup> Leão, Rupiya, *op.cit.*

to obtain access to domestic resources, namely diamonds, that would more than make up for the lack of outside assistance.<sup>106</sup> The geostrategic situation at the time is possibly the greatest justification for the part opportunities played in how conflicts changed over time. In contrast, the MPLA, which had preferred a military solution in 1975, had everything to gain from a peaceful solution in the 1990s. Peace would have allowed the MPLA to rebuild the country and implement development policies. However, UNITA, which had everything to gain from a diplomatic solution in 1975, used the different rounds of peace processes to rebuild the country and its military capacity. This position undermined the international efforts to achieve peace and was meant to reinforce the government's belief that only a military solution would end the Angolan conflict. It reduced the influence of the international community pressing for peace, ended up dragging Angola into the regional Great Lakes conflict, and finally led to the end of the war with a military victory for the government when in February 2002, Jonas Savimbi was killed. His death brought to the defeat of UNITA's forces. A short time after Savimbi's passing, the military leadership of both sides agreed to the terms of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. The party was still there and would have to take on the duties assigned to it in regards to the unfinished implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, even though the unit was completed militarily. Reintegrating former combatants and demobilized troops (FAPLA and FALA) in line with the Alvor, Bicesse, and Lusaka processes is currently Angola's challenge<sup>107</sup>. Reintegration will be a long-term process that depends on the political will of the Angolan government and, to some extent, the assistance of the international community.

The FAA still follows the same organizational structure it did during the battle, despite calls for a more defensive strategy. As a result, the Bicesse and Lusaka Agreements, which contain the fundamental guidelines for its development, serve as the foundation for the existing institutional and legal framework<sup>108</sup>. The FAA should still proceed with its metamorphosis into a peacetime armed force by altering the goals of its missions as well

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<sup>106</sup> Leão, A, "*Different opportunities, different outcomes : civil war and rebel groups in Angola and Mozambique*" Ana Leão. – Bonn : Dt. Inst. für Entwicklungspolitik, 2007. – (Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ; 24/2007) ISBN: 978-3-88985-367-7

<sup>107</sup> Leão, Rupiya, *op.cit.*

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

as the organization's structure, training, preparedness, and mentality. We will discuss the relationship between Angola and the Cold War superpowers later.

In general, the current political state of chaos in Angola is partly the result of a deepening rift between the government, which has been ruled by an exclusive group until its independence, and a society that has been severely damaged by colonial history and long-running civil war. The initial hopes that the MPLA would maintain its promises to rule as a movement of the masses have gradually given way to the reality of a corrupt and elitist government. The Angolan society, which emerged from a difficult conflict with colonialism and has been marked by repression and war in recent years, was not prepared to find constructive alternatives to postcolonial violence. Angolan society was not prepared to discover nonviolent, constructive alternatives to postcolonial violence since it had just emerged from a hard experience with colonialism, whose final years were marked by repression and war. Consequently, the result is the search for personal security and other necessities of life became the focus of the common citizen's existence as a result, and a sense of helplessness quickly spread. The majority of society was prone to withdraw from political activity as the state, having been taken over by the new, acquired qualities of violence—both physical, administered by the security apparatus, and structural due to growing corruption and a lack of accountability. In the 1997 World Development Report, the causes of state collapse were examined. The first was the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, followed by the leaders' corruption, carelessness, and incapacity, and the third was the fragmentation brought on by civil war, with neither side able to reassert central authority. Despite Lourenço's assertions, the country's development is nevertheless hampered by this complex matrix. As we will see in the next chapters, the abundance of the nation's natural riches is precisely what has stoked the conflict on a national and worldwide level.

### **3. Foreign rivalry during the Civil War: the repercussions for Angola**

Before analyzing the current aftermath of the civil war from an economic point of view and the country's role today at the international economic level, it is interesting to look back in time to understand the logic behind the alliances originating from the Cold War, within the Civil War, and what these alliances led to. Although the conflict in Angola is referred to as a civil war, it was never contained within the newly independent state. Various international actors have been involved in the conflict since its inception by assisting liberation movements. Indeed, civil wars can be defined as international events.<sup>109</sup> These interventions are not incidental, or peripheral to relations between states, but instead constitute a central process in the politics of conflict and war. International rivalry, it is argued, is an ongoing strategic relationship in which the pull of the past and the pull of the future generate defensive and balancing behavior toward third-party civil conflicts<sup>110</sup>. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States was undoubtedly the most important international rivalry of the twentieth century: the internationalization of the Cold War started around during the 70s. In the case that we are analyzing USSR, US, South Africa played a significant role in influencing the political and economic behavior of Angolan governors, motivated by self-interest. This is due to the fact that Angola has always been surrounded by both domestic and foreign interests due to its strategic location and resources. Furthermore, the UN and the AU were only observers of a war that ravaged a nation and a population for 27 years while keeping an eye on the conflict in Angola and the moves of other international actors around it. Let us examine it in details.

Since the end of the Cold War, the war in Angola has been crucial for the superpowers as a proxy or war of convenience. In an effort to gain political and military assistance from the African bloc, the USSR and the US, respectively, allied with political movements. The international community has denounced one of the fighters and imposed modest

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<sup>109</sup> John Logan Mitton “*Rivalry intervention in civil conflicts: Afghanistan (India–Pakistan), Angola (USSR–USA), and Lebanon (Israel–Syria)*”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol 23(6), 2017, p. 1-15  
DOI <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2017.1348957>

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

sanctions in reaction to the conflict. The UN's attempt to play a meaningful role in peace discussions, however, was hindered by the ambiguities in its response, which left it open to exploitation. In addition, it's thought that the superpowers, especially the United States and later the UN, abandoned the nation during its most crucial time in history.

The civil war of Angola could be defined as a “conventional” among the superpowers of the Cold War. As already stated, the civil war stopped Angola’s social and economic progress, being driven by the following:

- Agostinho Neto’s MPLA: Soviet Bloc (especially Cuba as the strongest ally) and some African countries;
- Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA: United States and South Africa (even if they received assistance from China as well);
- the Roberto’s FNLA, whose ideology was nationalist, anticommunist, and anti-west, decided to have as ally the Zaire with the power in the hand of Mobutu Sese Seko, and for a small period by the People’s Republic of China.

### 3.1 Between 70s-80s

The United States was initially hesitant to support UNITA. The FNLA had allied with Mobutu, whereas UNITA was a newcomer with limited military capabilities. UNITA appeared to be the only beneficiary of a political settlement among the parties that signed the Alvor Accords, but as tensions between the other two parties grew, UNITA declared war on the MPLA in 1975. The MPLA was considered politically and diplomatically strong in the post-independence period, whereas UNITA did not have such strong external support and would have preferred to gain something from a political solution. Instead, after international actors entered the picture, the other two movements were more concerned with finding military solutions to control the country rather than sharing power and finding a peaceful solution. Following decolonization, a situation of distrust between Angolan forces, ideological differences, and Angola's huge natural wealth pushed foreign rivals to form alliances. The Soviet Union supported MPLA even before the independence in 1970, giving aid and political training to MPLA. Furthermore, the USSR may take sides in Angola due to the country's geographic location, which is remote with

few immediate geopolitical implications and thus of less or obvious interest than other countries.<sup>111</sup> On the contrary, due to the fear of the influence of the Soviet Union in Angola, the United States started to provide post-independence support alongside South Africa for UNITA and, to a lesser extent, the FNLA in order to halt the MPLA's advance on Angola's control. The Soviet decision to back the MPLA and intervene in Angola was part of a broader African foreign policy, prompted in part by Soviet concerns about growing Chinese influence in the region. This corresponded to concurrent competition with the US in countries such as Zaire, Mozambique, and South Africa. Some authors believed that “*United States backed the [FNLA] and UNITA only “because the Soviets are backing the MPLA.*”<sup>112</sup>

Indeed, external military and economic aid has begun in 1975, when the US started funding the FNLA and the Soviet Union sent military aid to the MPLA: the party that had been interested in a political solution since then, UNITA, was now on a military equal level with the other two rivalries.<sup>113</sup> The MPLA (with massive support from Cuban troops) controlled Luanda at the beginning of independence, due to massive attacks from the FNLA in the north, supported by Zairean army, and UNITA in the south, supported by South African troops. South Africa's aid for UNITA delegitimized the movement, resulting in the MPLA's immediate consolidation as the sovereign state of independent Angola. For the MPLA, the conflict shifted from a power struggle to a foreign invasion: it was now the legitimate government with the noticeable necessity protect its country. The war that followed Angola's independence transformed the MPLA and UNITA into military factories that fought for almost 30 years.

*“In late January [1975], a high-level United States government policy-making body authorised a grant of US\$300,000 to the pro-Western FNLA, which at the time seemed to be the strongest of the three movements. In March the Soviet Union countered by increasing arms deliveries to the MPLA, and by mid-July that group had become*

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<sup>111</sup> Mitton, *op.cit.*, 8.

<sup>112</sup> Blum, William. Killing Hope, “*U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II.*”, Ch. 41: “Angola, 1975 to 1980s: The Great Powers Poker Game”, 2004, Monroe, Me. :Common Courage Press, 2004.

<sup>113</sup> Leão, Ana, 2007, *op.cit.*



*appreciably stronger militarily. Alarmed, the United States increased funding to the FNLA and, for the first time, funded UNITA. Cuba, which had been aiding the MPLA since the mid-1960s, sent military instructors in the late spring of 1975. By early October, more Cuban military personnel had arrived, this time primarily combat troops; their total then probably reached between 1,100 and 1,500. (..)*

*A. Leão, 2007, p.17<sup>114</sup>*

Despite military support, the MPLA defeated the FNLA, which controlled smaller areas of the country in 1976, through a Cuban-USSR alliance. In fact, by 1979 it was out of the internal war. The defeat was caused by the support of external actors, who were unable to equalize those supporting the other two factions. As a result of the internal struggle in US with President Ford, in 1976 the Clark Amendment was signed, which precluded open U.S. support for UNITA and the Angolan war. However, the Carter administration may allow Angola to be under the Soviet influence. Indeed, the US supported UNITA, illegally, politically and diplomatically, supplying the party with weapons through third parties; the weapons came not from the US, but from client states such as Belgium, Switzerland, and Israel, with funding from Saudi Arabia and other Western partners<sup>115</sup>. China provided weapons, equipment, and advisors to the MPLA, and began training FNLA rebel units in 1973 with the assistance of military experts from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.<sup>116</sup> UNITA survived because of its alliance with the United States from 1979 until the Bicesse Agreement. Furthermore, despite having the opportunity, the US was unable to match military aid to the threats the FNLA faced. One critical aspect of this failure was the United States's underestimation of another international actor involved: Cuba.

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<sup>114</sup> Taken From "*Angola Foreign Intervention*" - Flags, Maps, Economy, Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System, October 10, 2022

<sup>115</sup> Leão, Rupiya, *op.cit.*

<sup>116</sup>De Araújo, J. S, "*THE CUBAN AIR CAMPAIGN IN ANGOLA 1988-1989*". BRAZILIAN JOURNAL, 7(13), 2022, p.152

There is evidence according to Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were the instigators of Soviet intervention in Angola.<sup>117</sup> The involvement of Havana within African borders dates back to the 1960s, with the failure of the Congo crisis and success in Algeria against the French, as well as other failed revolutionary movements. In fact, when Neto asked for assistance in 1974, Castro was initially undecided about his own involvement in Angolan affairs, despite the fact that he had not expressed any contrary views. Only after some of Castro's closest advisers had visited Angola on a fact-finding mission to get an understanding of the country's situation, he was willing to back the MPLA in the upcoming civil war. Despite initial tensions between the MPLA and the USSR<sup>118</sup>, Neto and later José Eduardo dos Santos managed to improve relations with Moscow in the late 1970s, but Neto knew that the alliance would be fragile and that the MPLA would lose without Soviet assistance. As a result, the MPLA president decided to seek another country with a history of intervening in Africa. After Castro's exploratory mission, Cuba began funding lost Angola just before independence, causing a reaction from the United States and the President Ford, who increased their support for the FNLA initially, and then UNITA.

Castro sent a letter to the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (PCUS), Leonid Brezhnev, in which he stressed the need for more support for the MPLA. So far Cuba had sent only military equipment and advisers, but as Castro received information about the impending UNITA and FNLA attack, he was considering deploying regular troops. The Kremlin was not convinced that the conflict in Angola had deteriorated enough to warrant reinforcement and refused Castro's request. Moreover, Moscow was still skeptical of Neto and the MPLA, and the Soviet leader did not want to jeopardize détente, which had reached a crucial stage where between Moscow and Washington they were in the middle of SALT II negotiations. Direct Moscow involvement in Angola would certainly have upset superpower relations. the invasion of

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<sup>117</sup> C.R Stephens, "Complementary tools for studying the Cold War in Africa", *Journal of Black Studies*, Sage Publications January 2012, Vol.43, No 1, Special Issue: 1960s Africa in Historical Perspective (JANUARY 2012), p.96

<sup>118</sup> Tensions dating back to 1972 when Neto decided to sign an alliance agreement with FNLA- Roberto to create a common front so that the MPLA would remain at the center of the country's affairs. Only in late 1974 did Moscow decide to restore confidence in the MPLA and send military aid. – V. Shubin, *A.Tokarev, War in Angola : A soviet Dimension*, p. 611

South Africa in October 1975 and then a direct attack on the MPLA that changed the destiny of the MPLA and Cuba.

South Africa closely monitored developments in Angola's emerging civil war, which threatened the apartheid regime's security. As a result, South Africa began to provide limited support to Roberto's FNLA and Savimbi UNITA, both of which were regarded as less evil than the MPLA because neither had publicly condemned racial discrimination. When it became clear that UNITA and FNLA would not be able to defeat MPLA, the operation known as Savannah began: a South African invasion of Angola in 1975-76 with the goal of capturing Luanda before independence. Savannah's initial success catalyzed the support network for both sides of the war. The invasion of South Africa pushed the Angolan issue to the top of the Kremlin's priority list. Because the invasion of South Africa was organized by the US, the USSR felt obligated to rush to the aid of its Angolan ally. In summary, Operation Savannah was a shot in the foot for South Africa: the attack triggered a chain of events that left UNITA weakened and without international assistance. The MPLA, in turn, had triumphed, thanks to life-saving assistance from Havana and then Moscow.<sup>119</sup> Up until the Lusaka Accords in 1984, the civil war was characterized by a complex process of reshaping and strengthening alliances on both sides. Washington reassessed its African policy in response to several international changes, including Jimmy Carter's election as president in 1977, new Cold War tensions, and stalled SALT-II negotiations.

The essence of the Cold War shifted: *“A strategic, geopolitical or diplomatic loss for Washington no longer equaled a win for Moscow or vice-versa”*<sup>120</sup>. The Reagan administration could have adjusted its foreign policy, but it chose to ignore Angola's war, at least during his first term. The president's hardline stance and his administration viewed international politics almost entirely through bipolar lenses. The Soviet Union was an evil empire and the United States should have eliminated them. This position also had an

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<sup>119</sup> Schwärzler, Thomas, *“The Angolan Civil War – A Cold War Microcosm?”* In: Thomas Spielbuechler/Markus Wurzer (Hg.): *Afrika – Zugänge und Einordnungen*. Afrikaforschung in Österreich, Linz 2017, S. 85–111.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 92

enormous impact on African policy. According to Reagan, the Western world's top priority regarding Africa should be to get the Soviets and Cuba out of Africa.

Because of the civil war, the MPLA spent the next three decades focusing on maintaining centralized political control while neglecting other activities. decades have been devoted to maintaining centralized political control while ignoring the development of other branches of government The MPLA won the early stages of the war and took control of the capital. However, fighting became more intense in the mid- and late 1980s, culminating in the Battle of Cuito- Cuanavale in 1988, with both sides claiming victory. After a succession of heavy losses, including the failure of Operation Saudando Outubro, which aimed to expel the unit from its major fortress, Mavinga, the Angolan government sought assistance from Cuba in November 1987. Fidel Castro has promised to assist dos Santos by sending airborne military personnel. In action, the Cuban air force attempted to prevent an advance by UNITA and SADF troops by attacking them.

This battle is seen as one of the most important outcomes of Soviet intervention during Angola's civil war, despite the fact that the effect in the region remained controversial. In fact, started. Fidel Castro declared that the history of Africa would be divided into two parts: before and after Cuito-Cuanaval. The Cuban victory compelled South Africa and the United States to sign the New York accord in 1988 (Or tripartite accord) between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa: the outcome was Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola<sup>121</sup>.

### 3.2 The 90s

From 1975 to 1992, the conflict was fought as a proxy conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the Cold War's end, the MPLA and UNITA were forced to fund their respective organizations through what Michael Ross refers to as "booty futures," or the sale of precious commodity rights.<sup>122</sup> Peace treaties signed between the MPLA and UNITA in 1991 and 1994 were shattered by hostilities and ended only with

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<sup>121</sup> UNGA, 1988, *op.cit.*

<sup>122</sup> Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena,, *op.cit.*

UNITA's military defeat in 2002. Angola's development path has been described as highly inequitable and vulnerable to oil price volatility and limited reserves, owing to a rapid increase in oil revenues over the last decade.

It has been estimated that most Soviets in the 1990s went to Angola to teach military academy and train units. The majority of Soviet military members in Angola served in the Angolan government army, but some also served in the South Africa's African National Congress (ANC), Namibia's South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and, earlier, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Many Western and South African authors have distorted their role, either through ignorance or reliance on intelligence sources.

*“Over 1,000 Soviet military visited Angola for 'shorter periods of time' while 6,965 Angolans underwent military training in the Soviet Union (Ngongo, 2001). Figures, provided by the Moscow Institute of Military History are even higher: 'up to 1 January 1991, 10,985 Soviet military advisors and specialists visited Angola, including 107 generals and admirals, 7,211 officers, 1,083 warrant-officers and midshipmen, 2,116 sergeants, petty officers and privates and 468 civilian employees of the Soviet Army and Navy'; 6,985 Angolans were trained in the Soviet/Russian 'military educational institutions' up to 1 January 1995”<sup>123</sup>*

According to Anatoly Adamishin<sup>124</sup>, the deputy secretary of state, Washington's "maximum program" at the peace talks included not only the withdrawal of the South Africans and Cubans from Angola and therefore the independence of Namibia, but also an additional prize, namely bringing Savimbi to power or a minimum of to share power. However, the United States had to "lower the stakes." Some scholars speak of the Soviet withdrawal from Angola, tracing it back to the New York Accords. However, Moscow's military assistance continued for at least two and a half years, to a lesser extent. Its end almost coincided with the dissolution of the USSR after the conclusion of the Bicesse

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<sup>123</sup> V.Shubin, A.Tokarev, *“War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension”*, : Review of African Political Economy , Dec., 2001, Vol. 28, No. 90, Patrimonialism & Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the Economics of War in Angola (Dec., 2001), pp. 607-618 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., p.614

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 617

Agreement, which was about to be taken over by the government of Russia, when, on the one hand, Savimbi's refusal to honor his obligations became evident and, on the other hand, when in the mid-1990s, Russia's foreign policy became motivated by national interest and not by the desire to please the West at the expense of old friends in other parts of the world.

Foreign policy shifts and military victories in Angola facilitated the country's transition from an autocratic to a more moderate regime. South Africa's threat to the MPLA was eliminated when Namibia gained independence. With the departure of the last Cuban troops in 1991, the National Assembly passed Law 12/91<sup>125</sup>, which established Angola as a democratic state based on the rule of law and a multiparty system. Following that, Dos Santos and Savimbi signed the Bicesse Accords and a cease-fire was established until 1992, and the new multiparty democracy should be supervised by the UN. The MPLA won, but Savimbi declared the results fraudulent and rejected them, and fighting resumed. The fighting ended only ten years later, in 2002, when Savimbi was killed by government troops. Without the USSR's financial and military support, as well as Cuba's military intervention, it is unlikely that the MPLA would have been capable of controlling Luanda and build a government.

### 3.3 The role of UN

During the Angolan War, the United Nations played several roles. This is an enlightening case for two reasons: the first one concerns the evolution of the United Nations mission, which created political space in relation to the conflict. The second regards the work of the UN in relation to humanitarian interventions, which we can be questioned. UN operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda are frequently interpreted as implying that by the early 1990s, human rights concerns had overtaken international concerns about sovereignty. More than 300,000 people UNAVEM II killed over 300,000 people in Angola in 1993, making it the second deadliest civil war (after Rwanda) between 1992 and 1996. The international community, however, did not authorize a "humanitarian intervention." This meant that the conflict between state sovereignty and human rights

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<sup>125</sup> *Amendments to the Constitutional Law introduced in March 1991 through Law No. 12/91*

norms had not been resolved. From 1988 to 1991, the phases of UN missions in Angola could be divided into four parts:

- UNAVEM I (1988)
- UNAVEM II (1991-1995)
- UNAVEM III (1995-1997)
- MONUA, UNOA and UNMA (1998-2003)

Security Council Resolution 626 established the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) composed of 70 military observers and 20 civilian officials from ten countries.<sup>126</sup> As we have seen, after many years of stalemate, a UN-led tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa was signed on December 22, 1988: it triggered Namibia to become independent as well as the departure of over 50,000 Cuban forces from Angola. UNAVEM I was concluded with the signing of the Bicesse Accords between the Angolan government and UNITA in May 1991. According to the UN Security Council, the success of UNAVEM demonstrated the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in international cooperation.

Following the Accords, the Security Council established with the Resolution 696<sup>127</sup>, the UNAVEM II on March 30, 1991, with the sole goal of verifying the disarmament process and establishing a single national army. The mission was neither monitoring nor peacekeeping. The countries involved desired a quick resolution to the conflict, particularly between the two Cold War powers, resulting in a marginal UN role and ineffectiveness. UN was also called to monitor the results election of September 1992, which were declared by the UN fair and transparent, but fighting has erupted once more between MPLA and UNITA forces. With no space for a cease-fire, the UNSC decided to withdraw UNAVEM II, and UNITA blamed the UN for the failure of the respect of the Bicesse Accords.

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<sup>126</sup> United Nations, *UNAVEM I, Prepared for the Internet by the Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI)*. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of DPI in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (c)United Nations 2000

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

After the renewal of the war between the two parties, the UN special representative Alioune Blondin Beye agreed on a meeting of the two parties and sign the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. The agreement established a new phase in Angola' peace agreement and defined the UN's role in assisting the parties, with the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GUNR), the end of the electoral process of 1992, the start of a new administration, the demobilization of former combatants, and a ceasefire. The UN Security Council established UNAVEM III in 1995, with 7,000 Blue Helmets present, to ensure a cease-fire between the Angolan and UNITA armies.<sup>128</sup> Angolans, on the other hand, saw the UN as ineffective, unable to deal with UNITA's relentless quest for power or to stop violations of agreements and rearmament.

On June 30, 1997, the mission was replaced by MONUA by Resolution 1118, a much more comprehensive mandate than the previous mission, “*to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country*”<sup>129</sup>. MONUA was formed with a significantly reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict were hampered by Angola's rapidly deteriorating military situation. In 1999 both MPLA and UNITA called for the closure of MONUA. The United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) continued to stay active to explore measures to restore the peace.

After April 2002 with the Luena Memorandum, the UNSC established the Resolution 1433 creating the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) and replacing the previous UNOA. UNMA was responsible for monitoring quartering areas and coordinating the humanitarian efforts of all other UN agencies. The United Nations' failures in the past have harmed its ability to play a leading role. From the start, UN activities in Angola have been jeopardized. In such a country, it was impossible to maintain peace or completely disarm a guerrilla army. As a result, the UN's role gradually narrowed to humanitarian and then human rights operations.

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<sup>128</sup> Meijer, G. “*Accord From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace process*”, Conciliation Resources, an international review of peace initiatives, Issue Editor, London, 15/2004, 1-100, p.30

<sup>129</sup> United Nations, “*United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) (1997-1999)*”, UN Archives and Records Management Section, 1946-1999



As a result, the UN peacekeeping mission in Angola began in the traditional manner, as following the principle of nonintervention, and gradually started to acquire more authority than before, especially into the humanitarian field. Although the conflict had obvious global, regional, and domestic dimensions, the United Nations' role was initially entirely limited to the interstate dimension of the crisis, despite the influence of Cold War constraints. The original mandate of UNAVEM included verifying the redeployment and withdrawal of Cuban troops, inspecting and supervising ports, airports, and bases where Cuban troops were stationed, and conducting ad hoc inspections at the request of the Security Council or the United Nations. A joint commission was established to ensure liaison between the parties and the UN, consisting of the chief military observer as chairman and two senior officers, one appointed by Angola and the other by the UN. The UNAVEM was founded on a genuine agreement between Angola and Cuba, two friendly countries. In Angola, at least at first, the UN was not involved in the intrastate dimension of the conflict.<sup>130</sup> The Estoril Protocol, eventually signed by the government and UNITA on May 1, 1991, was the first concrete example of the United Nations' exclusion from the peace process. The Protocol called for a cease-fire to be monitored by a Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC) comprised of the MPLA, UNITA, and Portuguese representatives. The UN was not to be the primary monitor, according to Provision II.5, which established the composition of the CCPM. With the Bicesse Accords the UN's role were kept to an absolute minimum. On May 17, 1991, the Angolan government requested UN involvement in monitoring the implementation of the peace treaties. Angola was effectively inviting the UN to actively participate in the country's internal affairs, regardless of how minor the tasks the UN was supposed to perform: indeed, the role of UNAVEM II, even if it marked a transition from the UNAVEM I, was merely as a peacekeeping observer. After Lusaka the UN maintained the main role thanks to the Malian foreign minister Beye: the threat of further sanctions against UNITA was used to assert UN authority and bring it to the negotiating table. The UN's coercive action from that point forward was a relatively new element. Because of the deteriorating situation in the theater of conflict, African countries lobbied for an expanded role for UNAVEM, which led to the creation of the third mission: In this third phase, a clearer operational

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<sup>130</sup> Aksu, E. Chap. “*The UN in the Angola conflict: UNAVEM*”, Book “The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change”, 155-178, Manchester University Press, 2003, p.159

link was established between the UN peacekeeping mission's military and non-military functions. Indeed, the Special Representative, who was also in charge of a military presence, would carry out UN political and peacebuilding activities.

Today, Angola is taking center stage in the debate over African peacekeeping and interventionism<sup>131</sup>. In fact, it is attempting to re-enter the international scene with several actions, as we can see in the nomination, along with Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, and Venezuela, as non-permanent members of the Security Council for two-year terms beginning January 1, 2015<sup>132</sup>. Angola's seat on the Security Council provided an opportunity for the country to learn how to collaborate strategically with the Security Council's five permanent members. Angola, a key battleground during the Cold War, understands international politics. Angola should have used its Security Council mandate to help maintain peace and security commitments at a time when "African solutions to African problems" are no less problematic. If the country was once viewed as a state that prioritized nationhood over security and human rights, things are slowly changing. Angola's admission to the Security Council has increased scrutiny of its ability to uphold international standards.

Its foreign policy shift began in 2010 with the so-called Angolan Military Mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG in Portuguese), which was tasked with establishing a roadmap for reform in Guinea Bissau. Angola was the financial principal and led the bilateral campaign with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and CPLS. Despite skepticism, given Angola's history of autocratic governments and violations of human rights<sup>133</sup>, the country set out to implement structural rehabilitation measures and new construction within the police and armed forces. Angola provided training to Guinea Bissau police officers in Luanda, some of whom would later take on the role of trainers in Bissau. This was Luanda's first deployment of troops to a foreign country since the late 1990s. It was not intended to help change the political landscape in neighboring countries,

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<sup>131</sup>Crisis Group, *"Ambitious Angola takes to world stage"*, November 09, 2016

<sup>132</sup> United Nations, *"Angola, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain and Venezuela elected to serve on UN Security Council"* IUN News, 16 October 2014

<sup>133</sup> Kohl, C *"Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau. In The Reform of Guinea- Bissau's Security Sector: Between demand and practice"*, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 2014 (pp. 5–12), p.9

but rather to assist in the development of broader reforms to stabilize Guinea Bissau. Moreover, during the five-year period 2008-2013, Angola had the highest military spending in Sub-Saharan Africa and ranked third on the continent, trailing Egypt and Algeria.<sup>134</sup> However, Angolan troops, trained and equipped by Russia, Cuba, and Israel, will have to figure out how to operate in a multilateral context while adhering to an internationally recognized security mandate.

### 3.4 The 2000s: which are the interests now?

Angola gradually lost its strategic position in the global landscape at that time, as the superpowers were facing internal changes such as the Soviet Union's fragmentation, Cuba's isolation, and a general regional *détente*. The global liberal landscape had also forced the United States to lose control of aid to Savimbi. Since the end of the Cold War to the present, countries' interests in Angola have shifted to military and economic: its abundance of natural resources, as well as its strategic location in the South Atlantic, have helped it reclaim its global role for both traditional and emerging states, as United States, Russia, China, Brazil.

- URSS/Russia

When the Soviets arrived in Africa during the decolonization period, their goals were strongly influenced by Cold War ideologies and rivalries, which challenges the history of Western racism and colonization (in fact, Russia was never a colonizer on the continent). While Cold War studies on Soviet involvement in Africa frequently emphasized its ideological thrust, some subsequent studies have emphasized the importance the Soviets placed on geopolitical and economic realism, which was sometimes hidden behind Marxist-Leninist rhetoric.<sup>135</sup> In the early 1970s, the majority of Soviet trade with Sub-Saharan Africa was directed toward nations that were hardly socialist or "progressive." This euphoria in Soviet relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, however, did not last long: an attempt by the Soviets to intervene in the Congolese conflict had only weakened the position of Nationalist Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who was already in trouble,

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<sup>134</sup> *Global Security, Angola Military Spending*

<sup>135</sup> Shubin, V. Tokarev, A, *op.cit.* 609

accelerating his downfall. The Soviets had effectively lost ground as the new African military regime showed little interest in any socialist experiment. Until the mid-1970s, Soviet efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa stalled.

With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union's engagement on the African continent essentially faded, a victim of the same attempt at social and political reform that would culminate in the collapse of the Union of Soviet Social Republics. The end of the Soviet Union also meant the end of most Soviet commitments on the continent. As Russia struggled to rebuild and reassert itself in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, its presence and influence in Africa appeared marginal at best. Factions of the Soviet leadership were divided over the nation's future role in Africa, and some Soviet negotiators opposed Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos' concessions to the United States on the issue of "linkage." The region's intractable political problems and the cost of maintaining Cuban troop support and MPLA equipment weakened Soviet commitment to building a Marxist-Leninist state in Angola. Angolan leaders, in turn, complained of Soviet neglect: low levels of assistance, poor quality personnel and equipment, and inadequate responses to complaints. Angola shared the costs of the Cuban military presence and sought to reduce these expenditures, in part because many Angolan citizens felt the immediate drain on economic resources and increased tensions in areas occupied by Cuban troops. In addition, dos Santos complained that the Soviet Union was treating Angola opportunistically--buying Angolan coffee at a low price and reexporting it at a significant profit, overfishing Angolan waters, and driving up local food prices<sup>136</sup>.

On the other hand, the Soviets often expressed support for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and aligned themselves with Africans to vote on issues of common concern (e.g., liberation of southern Africa, resolutions against apartheid and denunciations of Western imperialism and neocolonialism) at the United Nations and in other international bodies, becoming, "*sub-Saharan Africa's de facto ally in protest*".<sup>137</sup> Overall, the Soviet Union was more interested in independent African nations for their geopolitical value,

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<sup>136</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, *Angola - Communist Nations*

<sup>137</sup> Matusevich, M. "Revisiting the Soviet Moment in Sub-Saharan Africa" Article in *History Compass* · 7(5):1259 – 1268, July 2000, DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-0542.2009.00626.x, p.5

potential for economic cooperation, and willingness to side with Moscow, even if only occasionally, in its ongoing Cold War conflict with the West.

In reality, the Soviets did more than just provide moral and diplomatic support: they actively supplied and trained anti-apartheid militants from ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU. In this regard, the Soviets had a clear moral advantage over the Americans and Europeans, who had frequently chosen to side with such unsavory "allies" as South Africa's racist regime at the height of the Cold War.

The Soviets were involved in a challenging civil war in Angola involving three liberation movements. Angola gained independence in 1975, but even before that, the conflict had become internationalized. From then until the introduction of Gorbachev's reforms in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union maintained cooperative relations with the MPLA-ruled Angola and another Lusophone Marxist regime in Mozambique. During this time, today's Russian oligarchs like Igor Sechin established themselves in the KGB for assignments in Africa. As the CEO of Russia's largest oil company, Rosneft, he has emerged as one of the country's most formidable political figures.<sup>138</sup> In the 1980s, in fact, he traveled to Angola and Mozambique as a military translator (a common cover for intelligence agents, although Sechin has never confirmed that he was one).<sup>139</sup>

It was in this role that, according to diplomats, he began working with the KGB, the Soviet security service. Sechin was appointed deputy head of the administration, overseeing security services and energy issues. Sechin served as deputy head of Putin's presidential administration. He is considered a key member of the "siloviki," former members of the Russian security services who are believed to wield significant power in the country. He worked in Putin's office in the 1990s and became deputy head of the prime minister's first administration in 1999. In 2004 Putin appointed him head of Rosneft's board of directors.<sup>140</sup> In 2008, Sechin was appointed deputy prime minister, with authority over energy policy, establishing him as the ultimate arbiter of Russia's oil

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<sup>138</sup> Foy, H. *'We need to talk about Igor': the rise of Russia's most powerful oligarch* The Financial Times, March 2018

<sup>139</sup> Jolly, J. *"Igor Sechin: the epitome of power in Putin's Russia"* The Guardian, March 2022

<sup>140</sup> The Economist, *"Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft, is powerful as never before Russian oil king, former aide to Vladimir Putin, and friend of Rex Tillerson"*, December 2016,

and gas resources. Then, after Putin reclaimed the presidency in 2012, Sechin became CEO of Rosneft. He was one of the president's most trusted problem solvers and was sanctioned by the United States following Russia's annexation of Crimea. He now owns 0.127 percent of the company's shares, worth approximately \$83 million, and was paid approximately \$11 million in 2015.<sup>141</sup>

Until Russia's recent resurgence, Africa was on the periphery of Russian foreign policy. The number of African students in Russia was drastically reduced, and those who stayed or came to study often encountered a climate of xenophobic hostility and open racism that would manifest itself in the post-Soviet period. Russia's renewed interest in Africa coincided with the first decade of the twenty-first century's oil boom, which bolstered Russian expansionism. Trade between Russia and Angola today is small compared to the Soviet era.<sup>142</sup>

Africa, then, is a "theater" for Russia's geostrategic interests rather than a destination in its own right, as evidenced by the means Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia does not make significant investments in traditional *realpolitik* in Africa, such as economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia maintains control through a variety of asymmetric (and frequently illegal) means, including mercenaries, arms-for-resources deals, opaque contracts, electoral interference, and disinformation.<sup>143</sup> There was genuine concern about Russia's alleged plans to resurrect itself in Africa, where it once played a leading role.

When then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev embarked on a multinational tour of Africa in 2009, some Western analysts were concerned, seeing his visits to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia, and Angola as the start of a major diplomatic offensive aimed at scoring both economic and symbolic points. The tour laid out the parameters for the next engagement, which will primarily focus on securing large arms contracts (Egypt and Sudan), cooperating in the oil and gas extraction industries (Nigeria and Angola), and

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<sup>141</sup> Foy, *op.cit.*

<sup>142</sup>WITS (World Integrate Trade Solution) Data- "*Russian Federation Products Exports by country 2019*"

<sup>143</sup> Siegle, J. "*The future of Russia-Africa relations*", Africa in Focus, Brookings Institution, February 2022

expanding Russia's presence in telecommunications (Angola) and even space exploration (Angola and Nigeria) Relations with the oil-rich countries of South Africa and Angola have also improved. These gains are fueled by a variety of factors, the most notable of which is Moscow's post-ideological and contractual approach to foreign policy.<sup>144</sup>

In recent years, Putin has attempted to reestablish close Soviet-era ties with Africa by carving out spheres of Russian influence across the continent. Angola, for example, would play a key role in the inaugural Russia-Africa summit on October 2019 in Sochi, which was intended to counter traditional Western influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia's involvement in Angola's mines can be seen as a growing counterweight to the century-old presence of Western companies, such as the Anglo-American Group, in the region. Under current President Joao Lourenço, who succeeded 38-year predecessor Jose Eduardo dos Santos in 2017, the MPLA has diversified foreign affairs and opened the country to the West.<sup>145</sup> Nevertheless, the government of President Joao Lourenço in March abstained from supporting a United Nations Resolution which condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, while the opposition UNITA openly criticized Moscow. Lourenço has been trying to improve relations with Washington and shortly before the election asked to join a trade agreement with the European Union and southern African states, effective in 2016. It is believed that Lourenço, as much as he has held an open view to the West, will not actually benefit Angola: although he has been successful in terms of international relations this has not had positive consequences for Angolans. Lourenço has also pledged to pursue economic reforms, including privatization and encouragement of the non-oil sector.<sup>146</sup>

In 2019 Putin and Joao Lourenço signed an agreement on economic and military cooperation, pertaining to the exploitation of diamond mines in the part called Catoca in Angola of which Russia holds 32.8%<sup>147</sup>. Angola, according to Lourenço, is a major buyer

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<sup>144</sup> Mutasevich, M. *"Russia in Africa"*, Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 1, A New Scramble For Africa? The Role Of Great And Emerging Powers (Winter 2019), pp. 25-40, SET VAKFI İktisadi İşletmesi, SETA VAKFI

<sup>145</sup> Smith, E, *"Russia's influence is at risk in the Southern African nation of Angola as voters head to the polls"*, CNBC LLC, August 2022

<sup>146</sup> Euractive, *"Angolans to vote in tight race that could affect pro-Russia ties"*, August 2022

<sup>147</sup> Milo, J. *"Russia's relationship with Angola in the spotlight again as Lavrov visits Luanda"*, Foreign Brief 2018, August 2019

of Russian arms, and his country wants to "not only buy but also produce them."<sup>148</sup> There is also a possibility that the country may want to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems, but there is currently no data on this. The Angolan armed forces are accustomed to working with Russian weapons, which is why military cooperation between the two countries will last forever. The "partnerships" that Russia seeks in Africa are not based on the state but on the relationship with elites. By helping these often illegitimate and unpopular leaders retain power, Russia consolidates Africa's debt to Moscow. Nonetheless, Russia is increasingly looking to Africa to build influence and power. It is clear that Russian incursions into this region would be much more limited were it not for the power gaps created by the lack of Western political attention to Africa in recent years. This state of affairs offers Russia (and other outside powers) an opportunity to curry favor with the continent's elites and populations. More than anything else, it is opportunism that drives Russia to implement low-cost, low-risk strategies to try to increase its clout and unnerve the West in Africa, just as in Latin America, Middle East or Europe.

In the mid-2000s, Russia's awareness was primarily directed at South Africa and the African Union, which it hoped would serve as partners in advancing its vision of a multipolar world.<sup>149</sup> Russia's reappearance in Africa is a sincere attempt to resume relations where they were left when the Soviet Union left. For much of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a powerful player in Africa. It backed postcolonial independence movements and decided to seek to exploit the colonial legacy to undermine Western influence on the continent and beyond as part of its ideological confrontation with the West. The Soviet Union sponsored massive military, cultural, and educational exchange programs throughout Africa, fostering relationships with political, economic, and academic elites. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union's ties to Africa were very different from those of modern-day Russia. The Soviets provided substantial economic assistance, including infrastructure development, agricultural development, security cooperation, and health-care cooperation. The provision of weapons and equipment, training, advisers, and security assistance to postcolonial militaries in Joint manufacturing and repair facilities could help Russia maintain African militaries' reliance on Russian arms. These

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<sup>148</sup> Oteng, E, "*Russia, Angola sign cooperation deals in Moscow*", Africa News, April 2019

<sup>149</sup> Stronski, P. "*Late to the Party: Russia's return to Africa*", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2019



facilities represent an opportunity for Russia's African customers to boost industrial production and create jobs. President Joao Lourenço announced plans to establish a manufacturing and repair facility for Russian arms in his country during a visit to Moscow in April to attend an Angolan-Russian business forum. Lourenço, by the way, attended a Soviet military academy from 1978 to 1982. Russia has signed 19 military cooperation treaties with African countries since 2014, including Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. These activities range in size and scope, and include things like information sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, military sales, and security training. The vast majority of them, however, appear to be “symbolism over substance”

Africa, as well as the promoting of intelligence relationships, left a lasting legacy of Soviet hardware and operational culture throughout the continent. The Soviet Union placed security personnel and advisers in the military, intelligence, and political structures of several countries. Some of these bonds have survived the Cold War. Today, Russia is attempting to rekindle and strengthen these legacy relationships in order to reclaim a foothold in Africa. Russian diplomats frequently look to it for potential partners in efforts to reduce the influence of the US and its allies in international bodies. The African Union (AU), the Organization of Islamic Conference (which has a large African membership), and African development organizations such as the African Import-Export Bank are all in the same boat.

By far the most important arena for Russian diplomatic efforts is the United Nations (UN). Africa accounts for roughly a quarter of the member states, which helps to explain the impetus behind senior Russian officials' frequent visits to Africa, the numerous "strategic partnership agreements" signed with African countries, and debt relief offers. For example, the 2014 General Assembly resolution condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea. Twenty-nine African countries voted against or abstained from the resolution, and six did not vote. Russia has also relied on African allies to back its position in key UN votes on Syria, as well as in a December 2018 resolution condemning Russia's militarization of Crimea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov <sup>150</sup>. Russia has fostered

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<sup>150</sup> Seldin, J. “US, NATO Slam Russian Plan to Block Parts of Black Sea.” VOA, April 2021

authoritarian regimes in Africa as potential allies in its efforts to stymie international efforts to promote human rights and democratic governance through UN-affiliated organizations and agencies. During the apartheid struggle, the Soviet Union played a critical role, forming alliances with the African National Congress (ANC) and other militant groups. Putin has made three trips to Africa since 2006, and the political rise of Jacob Zuma, former ANC intelligence chief, has created a honeymoon period.

The African Union (AU) has been an important target of Russian diplomatic and security activities in Africa, as well as a tool of Russian diplomacy to counterbalance US and European influence in Africa. Russia's support for African peacekeeping solutions to African conflicts within the AU strengthens its defense of the principle of non-intervention and the primacy of state sovereignty in the United Nations, as well as its criticism of the US for violating these principles in other parts of the world. Participating in African peacekeeping missions or training exercises has facilitated Russia's relations with African armed forces and arms sales, with security relations potentially opening the door to broader political relations and commercial access to natural resources. However, Russia's actual participation in African peacekeeping operations is less than half of what it could be.<sup>151</sup> As a result, Angolan regional policy in the post-Cold War era has been focused on situations that are directly related to internal state problems. Participation in the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville wars (related to regional border enlargement), alliance with Namibia, and incursion into Zambian territory (to expand regional borders) appear to support this. Furthermore, the partnership between China and the United States has reflected this current path of pragmatically using diplomacy as a facilitator of state-building, which is currently based on economic growth. This idea converges with the notion that "a type of marshal plan for the reconstruction of the country that must involve the participation of the international community is required." Because distrust has been a feature of Angolan history, actions in the regional system must aim at the stability and survival of the regional system.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> *Stronski, op.cit.*

<sup>152</sup> Da Silva, I.C., "Angola's regional foreign policy: changes facing the systemic order (1975-2010)", *Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* e-ISSN 2238-6912 | ISSN 2238-6262 | v.4, n.7, Jan./Jun. 2015 | p.132-164 , p.153

- US

Angola and the United States have maintained diplomatic relations over time, which are now more focused on economic matters. The MPLA had declared the Angolan government by 1975, date of independence, but the US did not recognize it. Nonetheless, their participation was compelled by the presence of USSR and Cuban troops on the territory. Indeed, as we have seen above, the main reason for US support in Angola was the antagonism during the Cold War as support for factions opposing the Soviet regime. The U.S. has supported Unita rebels and has been involved economically in Angola, on the one hand through interests in the oil industry, and on the other by blocking the country's membership in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (until September 1990), and subsequently the agreements necessary for the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Program<sup>153</sup>.

In reality, formal diplomatic relations with Angola began in 1993, following President Clinton's election victory in the 1992 multiparty elections. Clinton formally recognized Angola's government in May 1993, with the goal of persuading UNITA to accept a peace solution.<sup>154</sup> Clinton found himself in a Cold War-style war, in which the previous administrations of Kissinger (secretary of state) and Reagan attempted to destabilize the MPLA government in order for Savimbi to take power. Although the previous Carter administration promised to recognize Angola diplomatically, it did not do so due to Cold War militarist pressures. Only with Bush from 1988 there have been glimmers of reconciliation, with the Bicesse accords and the 1992 multiparty elections (in which Bush hoped Savimbi would win).

The MPLA would have had to support the following promises in order for the US to recognize it: the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country, acceptance of multiparty elections, and completion of those elections.<sup>155</sup> Angola was still not recognized by the

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<sup>153</sup> Tvedten, I. "U.S. Policy towards Angola since 1975", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Mar., 1992, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 31-52, Cambridge University Press, p.31

<sup>154</sup> U.S Embassy In Angola, "*History of U.S-Angola*"

<sup>155</sup> Wright, G. "*The Clinton Administration's Policy Toward Angola: An Assessment*". *Review of African Political Economy*. (2001), 28 (90): 563–576. doi:10.1080/03056240108704566. ISSN 0305-6244., p.565

US when the Bush administration did nothing to limit UNITA's resumption of the war following its electoral defeat.

Following Clinton's arrival, the international community would wonder when the cycle of violence in Angola would end and whether the United States would bring about peace in the country. On May 19, 1993, the Clinton administration granted diplomatic recognition to the government of Angola led by President dos Santos. Clinton's decision to back the MPLA was viewed as a calculated move by UNITA and Savimbi<sup>156</sup>. Clinton's action was not a policy shift, but rather an attempt to persuade Savimbi to participate in a new round of negotiations. The US goal was to pursue a "balanced" policy in order to persuade the Angolan government and UNITA to negotiate through UN mediation. As a result, Clinton began to put pressure on UNITA to cooperate. All of this chaos and instability in Angolan territory was critical in establishing US priorities and interests, beginning with the diamond industry and progressing to oil and ending with arms trafficking. Even the United States' call for national reconciliation and a democratic multiparty system was used to persuade nationalist regimes to accept electoral cooperation with a secondary ally (in this case, UNITA) in order to gain political legitimacy and stability.

Following the 1994 Lusaka Accords, Savimbi maintained a military presence throughout the country and implemented terrorism. The president then obtained support for a peacekeeping mission, and in the years since, he has met with dos Santos to discuss economic relations and Angolan national reconciliation.<sup>157</sup> The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the diamond trade with UNITA in 1998, after declaring that UNITA was responsible for the fighting. Meanwhile, US-Angola relations improved, with a trade mission to Angola in 1997, the formation of a Bilateral Consultative Commission in 1998, and a \$350 million Export-Import Bank loan to US oil equipment exporters to Angola.<sup>158</sup> By the late 1990s, Angola was the third largest US trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the US consistently ranking among the top three import and export markets. This

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<sup>156</sup> *Ibid*, 563-564

<sup>157</sup> Lippman, T.W, "Angolan Leader Pledges To Reinforce Peace Plan", The Washington Post, December 1995

<sup>158</sup> Wright, *op.cit*, 573

trade relationship was centered on Angola's massive oil industry: the US received 90% of Angolan oil exports, which accounted for 7% of US oil imports. Angola was the second-largest destination for US investment in Sub-Saharan Africa by 1999, with the majority of it concentrated in the oil sector.<sup>159</sup> Angola, along with Nigeria and South Africa, was designated as one of the United States' three key strategic partners in Africa by President Barack Obama's administration in 2009<sup>160</sup>.

Angola is an important partner in the promotion of peace and stability in Central and Southern Africa. President Lourenço hosted a quadripartite summit earlier this month with his counterparts from Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to reduce tensions in the Great Lakes region. Angola sent peacekeepers to the Southern African Development Community's stabilization mission in Lesotho in 2017. After signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Angolan Ministry of Defense in 2017, the US Department of Defense improved its relationship with Angola's security institutions, focusing on improving Angolan maritime security, medical preparedness and health management programs, English language training, professional military education, and other technical training. The United States and Angola signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Public Safety and Order in July 2019, which facilitated law enforcement cooperation, opened new avenues for training, and accelerated information sharing between the US Departments of State and Justice and the Angolan State Security and Information Service, as well as the Ministry of Interior, which includes the Angolan National Police.

Today, the United States has a strong commitment to Angola, based on shared values, mutual support for regional peace and stability, and expanding bilateral economic opportunities. Angola marked a pivotal point in its democratic transition by electing its first new president in 38 years in September 2017. President Lourenço's efforts to combat corruption and implement economic and political reforms are supported by the United States. The United States assists Angola in its fight against corruption through a variety of initiatives, including a program launched by the United States Department of the

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<sup>159</sup> *Ibid*, 568

<sup>160</sup> Sullivan, "*Trump Staying the Course with Angola*", From African Transition, Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2017, August.

Treasury in March 2019 to improve Angola's ability to implement the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing regime.<sup>161</sup>

- New global order: China

China's involvement in Angola dates back to the anti-colonial struggle's early years, through its support for the three liberation movements that were fighting for the independence. At the time, China was undergoing the Cultural Revolution, and relations were shaped by Cold War politics.<sup>162</sup>

The MPLA relied on Chinese political and military assistance in the early 1960s, but after the then Organization of African Unity recognized the FNLA and UNITA as legitimate liberation movements, this support ceased, and China took a special interest in the two rival movements.

China was particularly interested in the two opposing movements. Holden Roberto of the FNLA met with Foreign Minister Chen Yi in 1963. He met with Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Nairobi, and China agreed to supply the majority of armaments to the two opposing movements. Similarly, in 1964, UNITA's Jonas Savimbi traveled to China to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, where he received military training and became a Maoist disciple: UNITA adopted Mao Zetong's guerrilla tactics. In the 1960s, UNITA President Jonas Savimbi and many of its commanders received guerrilla training in China. Savimbi quickly got to work in Angola, establishing the first phase of Mao Zetong's guerrilla warfare strategy- the mobilization of popular support.<sup>163</sup> China provided military training to MPLA commanders and guerrillas after the Cultural Revolution ended in the early 1970s. Internal schisms within the MPLA, as well as China's desire to balance the USSR's strong support for the MPLA, made this assistance temporary. China's allegiance has shifted once more to the two main rival liberation movements. Although UNITA received some sporadic assistance, China's primary focus

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<sup>161</sup> The Japan Times, “*Angola*”, Global Insight- Angola, August 2019

<sup>162</sup> Hutchison, Alan. “*China and Africa.*” Africa Spectrum 10, no. 1 (1975): 5–12.

<sup>163</sup> James III, W.M. “*A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974–1990*”, Routledge, (1st ed.). (2011), 4 May 2020, p.314 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315083292>

was on the FNLA. In 1974, the FNLA received 450 tons of weapons and the assistance of 112 Chinese instructors stationed in former Zaire.

China's foreign policy of aid to the three rival groups failed badly when the Soviet-backed MPLA took power and declared Angola independent in November 1975. The Chinese initially refused to recognize Angola's independence, and formal diplomatic relations were only established between Beijing and Luanda in 1983. The first trade agreement was signed in 1984, and the Joint Economic and Trade Commission was established in 1988, but its first meeting occurred in December 1999, with a second meeting in May 2001.<sup>164</sup>

As a result, Angola's official bilateral contacts with China are not as long as those of other countries. China has only been a serious player in Angola in this so-called new type of China-Africa strategic partnership since 2004. China has played a significant role in Angola's long civil war. Indeed, China's disastrous involvement in Angola's internal conflict could be blamed for the late development of official diplomatic relations. Both UNITA and MPLA and many other liberation movements have received support from China, as described by Taylor (2006)<sup>165</sup>. Despite China's initial support for UNITA, China provided the MPLA with its first critical, albeit limited, funding. The MPLA leadership was effectively forced to choose between allying with the Soviet Union and China. Angola gained independence in 1975, but it did not establish formal diplomatic relations with China until 1983.

Angola is currently China's largest African trading partner, owing to its thirst for crude oil. Angola-China relations gradually improved in the 1990s, and by the end of the decade, Angola had become China's second-largest trading partner in Africa (after South Africa), owing primarily to defense cooperation. 14 For example, during a visit to Angola in October 1997, Yang Wesheng, China's deputy minister of economy, trade, and cooperation, announced that trade had increased significantly over the previous six months. President dos Santos also visited China in October 1998, with the goal of

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<sup>164</sup> Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, "*Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation*," December 5, 2007 Indira Campos and Alex Vines Chatham House, London March 2008

<sup>165</sup> Corkin, L. "*Uneasy allies: China's evolving relations with Angola*", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 2011, 29:2, 169-180, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2011.555192

"expanding bilateral ties" in meetings with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and other officials. 15 Following the end of the conflict in 2002, China's relationship with Angola quickly shifted from one of defense and security to one of economic cooperation.

China's previous role in Angola as UNITA support in an unwitting alliance with apartheid South Africa (and the "imperialist" United States) has cost China dearly in diplomatic terms. China's de facto alliance with apartheid South Africa has tried to draw harsh criticism from even China's closest allies on the continent, in addition to violating China's sacrosanct principle of non-interference. Such Chinese foreign policy failures were caused by an excess of ideology and the complexities of the African context. This historical context could have influenced the Chinese government's willingness to reach an economic agreement with Angola years later to compensate for China's haphazard involvement in the Angolan civil war. However, the turn of the century heralded a new era in bilateral interaction, with a focus on increasingly economic and pragmatic relations, particularly in relation to Angola's post-conflict reconstruction plans. The next chapter would explain this current relations better.



#### 4. Angola's economy: between oil and diamonds' trade

Africa is host to five of the world's top oil producers: Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. Oil production peaked between 2005 and 2010<sup>166</sup>, but since 2015 oil industry has since fallen due to political instability and violence in the majority of these countries. The presence of natural resources within the country is undoubtedly one of the main reasons why the civil war has lasted so long and has involved so many international actors.

Since the 1960s, Angola has emerged as the country with the highest concentration of natural resources, especially in the Cabinda area. The clash between MPLA and UNITA became a clash over resources beginning with the 1992 elections when MPLA controlled the government and oil production while UNITA controlled the areas that produced diamonds. According to some studies, there is a link between resource exploitation and a country's political development: Angola is one of those countries considered "resourced cursed"<sup>167</sup>: the boom in the oil sector has been a curse for the country, leading to absolute poverty, probably due to a government that has failed to exploit natural resources and cope with external pressures, and that today it is still centralized and monopolistic. It is worth noting that Angola is a very rich country on the one hand, but the population lives in constant misery and poverty on the other. It was reported that "about 70 percent of the population lives in poverty and perhaps as many as 30 percent live in extreme poverty"<sup>168</sup>. This duality stems from the colonial period's violence in the political and economic spheres, which continued through the war for independence. The MPLA, with its one-party system, created a patronage network with a centralized economy in which censorship and repression of thought were and still are among the country's main problems<sup>169</sup>. President dos Santos has ruled the country since 1979 by securing oil revenues for the country's elites and his loyal militia<sup>170</sup>, and he has been adept at extracting and exploiting resources for the country to survive, even if it means "prioritized

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<sup>166</sup> Carpenter, J. William. "The biggest oil producers in Africa." Investopedia, New York (2015). P-1-4

<sup>167</sup> Amundsen, I. *Drowning in Oil: Angola's Institutions and the "Resource Curse."* Comparative Politics, 2014, 46(2), pp.169–189, p.173

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*, 174

<sup>169</sup> Amnesty International, *Angola, Amnesty International Report 2021/2022: the state of the world's human rights*, 72-75

<sup>170</sup> Ball, *op.cit.*

regime survival over the growth of the country”<sup>171</sup>. The war economy raised amid the Angolan civil war advanced the extraction of resources but crippled the country economically and socially, due to the lack of a system of checks and balances and strong power sharing arrangements.

Today, Angola's continued relevance in regional geopolitics is due to its economic potential and strategic geographic location, which includes a large coastal area and numerous links that complement the interior: the country has significant amount of oil, gas, diamonds, and water. Its weather and land allow for great agricultural fertility, which is reflected in coffee production. Despite the attempt at democratization and because of international players such as China, the country has experienced some of the most rapid economic growth. Some authors believed that the national oil company, the Sonangol (Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola); the military and civilian houses, the two highest ruling entities directly dependent on the presidency; and the MPLA party were responsible for Angola's reconstruction after the war.<sup>172</sup> Despite this, mining is a profitable industry for the country: Angola is the third largest producer of diamonds in Africa, but attracting foreign investment has been difficult due to corruption, human rights violations, and diamond smuggling.<sup>173</sup> Exploiting the two resources not only funded and motivated internal and external warfare, but it also influenced the legitimacy of the government (as the MPLA) and the economy. International corporations and foreign powers, which had previously stayed away to avoid being directly affected by the conflict, played a supporting role in the warring parties' strategy and in the involvement that many states continue to have in the Angolan economy to this day.

#### 4.1 Discovering and exploiting resources during the 90s

During the colonization, Portugal began diamond mining in Angola with the establishment of the Diamond Company of Angola in 1917; it increased coffee

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<sup>171</sup> Kopinski, D., “*A Successful Failed State After All? The Case Of Angola*” , Politeja Vol. 56, The Problem Of Africa’s Dysfunctional States (2018), 15(56): pp.67-84, DOI: 10.12797/Politeja.15.2018.56.05, p. 72

<sup>172</sup> Udelsmann-Rodrigues, C. “*Book Reviews, “Angola Since the Civil War”*”, De Oliveira, RS “Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola Since the Civil War” (London, Hurst, 2015), xviii + 292 pp., paperback, p.1112-1114 ISBN 978-1-84904-284-0

<sup>173</sup> Rahman, K., “*Overview of Corruption in the diamond Sector in Angola*”, U4 Helpdesk Answer, Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Transparency International, 29 June 2022

production, fishing, manufacturing, and other crops. Oil production, on the other hand, increased beginning in the 1950s, and foreign companies began to invest in the sector in the 1960s.<sup>174</sup> Salazar opened Angola to foreign investment in an attempt to accelerate development and gain the Angolan people's support. The economy was revived by the opening of the economy to foreign investment, the discovery of oil, and the arrival of tens of thousands of Portuguese troops. Indeed, between 1961 and 1966, industrial output increased by an average of 15% per year, owing to a combination of foreign and domestic investment, high export prices for commodities such as coffee, diamonds, and oil, and the liberalization of exchange controls between the colonies and the metropolis.

Since the independence in 1975, the ruling MPLA established the National Commission for the Restructuring of the Petroleum Sector (CNRIP) to manage the country's oil resources.<sup>175</sup> Sonangol, the state national oil company, was established in 1976 by this commission to monitor the state's oil production and distribution interests and hope for the state's economic growth. It was believed that the company was the vital instrument which served the interests of the Presidency<sup>176</sup>: indeed, Sonangol was able to become a highly capable and efficient company in 2013, becoming Africa's second largest multinational corporation with interests in various economic sectors worldwide. With the exception of the oil sector, which was protected during the civil war, the state and the Angolan economy collapsed completely during these years. The struggle for state control between MPLA and UNITA was based on the desire to hold the country's wealth, oil and diamonds.<sup>177</sup> Since the presidency has sole control over the country's oil revenues, it has been able to centralize political and economic power outside of the purview of formal state institutions<sup>178</sup>. Because of the civil war that followed independence, the MPLA recognized the importance of the oil industry in financing the party's armed forces. It is worth noting that coalitions in the post-independence order have shifted from free anti-colonial to Marxist-Leninist-style parties. For radical groups seeking to consolidate their hold on political power, Marxist-Leninism established patterns for internal party

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<sup>174</sup> Da Silva, *op.cit.*, 137

<sup>175</sup> Corkin, L., "The Role of Sonangol, After the Boom: Angola's Recurring Oil Challenges in a New Context", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2017, pp.11- 15

<sup>176</sup> De Oliveira, 2007, *op.cit.*, 606

<sup>177</sup> Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Chad C. Serena, *op.cit.*, 170

<sup>178</sup> Amundsen, *op.cit.*, 170

organization, party-state relations, and the relationship between the party and the masses, such as carrying out an ideology that enjoyed prestige<sup>179</sup>. The MPLA's attitude to petroleum was characterized by 1970s resource nationalism: the party declared that companies operating offshore or inland would be driven out and their infrastructure and capital taken away. However, the mass migration during the war, and proxy wars all made it clear that oil production would be the primary source of income for the Angolan economy. The Commission has been in charge of planning the return of Angola's primary oil operator, Gulf Oil, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC), which was in control of the majority of the nation's oil revenues, ever since Angola gained its independence. The Gulf had left Angola at the start of the war in 1975, and the Commission was successful in making the US company a new enemy of the US. Despite Kissinger's opposition, Gulf had paid a part of the profits to the MPLA by March 1976, identifying it as the nation's legitimate state. Professional Angolan interlocutors encouraged other companies operating in Angola to return as well. The nationalization of the oil industry was rejected.

Prior to Sonangol, there was another company, ANGOL (Portuguese), which was being acquired by the leftist government in Lisbon at the time.<sup>180</sup> It was always a light political body with no competition. Sonangol, on the other hand, would reject the central planning and state-led economic policies that had characterized Angola until the Cold War's end: its operations would be driven by an international oil economy rather than domestic politics. The MPLA actively worked to normalize relations with foreign investors and ensure the continued operation of Sonangol, the state's main source of revenue.<sup>181</sup> Angola's oil area was divided into blocks, which were then offered for foreign participation, and contracts were managed through the negotiation of complex production sharing agreements (PSAs). Sonangol was the sector's sole contractor and a stakeholder in oil rights. Foreign oil companies were required to work with Sonangol to explore Angolan oil blocks. Sonangol represented a turning point in Angolan economic management; the oil sector would be detached from Marxist and postcolonial economics

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<sup>179</sup> Young, T., “*The Politics of Development in Angola and Mozambique*”, *African Affairs*, Apr., 1988, Vol. 87, No. 347 (Apr., 1988), pp. 165-184, Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society P.172

<sup>180</sup> de Oliveira, 2007, *op.cit.*, p 598

<sup>181</sup> Corkin, 2017, *op.cit.*, 12

and managed according to modern and pragmatic criteria.<sup>182</sup> Sonangol also recognized that with a government backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, it would not appear trustworthy to Western oil investors. Recognizing the complexity of the oil industry and the lack of human resources in Angola, Sonangol gave contract negotiations with oil corporations first priority. The last would continue to be in charge of production and exploration<sup>183</sup>.

Because it required large amounts of foreign investment, the post-colonial state adopted a very pragmatic oil policy. Angola and Sonangol sought to expand cooperation with foreign companies through the creation of so-called "joint adventures" strategy and production sharing agreements. SONANGOL and its foreign partners can share both investment costs and oil revenues through joint ventures. Foreign companies must bear the full cost of exploration and development and are compensated with a share of the oil produced under production sharing agreements. Despite this, Angola has become a classic "rentier" state, owing to the prominence of the oil sector since independence, which expanded almost continuously during the civil war.<sup>184</sup>

In order to win the support of elites that range from the military to members of civil society and well-connected urban and provincial elites, President José Eduardo dos Santos has governed by dispersing oil income, public service positions, and even urban housing since 1979<sup>185</sup>. This patronage provided dos Santos with enough support to suppress opposition and create an apparent consensus for the MPLA. Because of the economy's precarious state as a result of the war for independence and the subsequent civil war, attempts had been made to implement a centrally planned economy. However, due to a lack of bureaucratic capacity and reduced economic support from the communist bloc, this attempt failed. The Western economy's influence on oil companies, banking, and food processing grew in the mid-1980s.<sup>186</sup> Natural resource availability has created both opportunities and challenges for state-building. Following the end of the civil war in 2002, the Angolan economy benefited directly from the rise in oil prices as the Iraq war

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<sup>182</sup> de Oliveira, 2007, *op.cit.*, 598

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid*, 600

<sup>184</sup> Malaquias, A, "Angola's wealth and poverty", "Inside Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post Colonial Angola", Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2007, Chapter 5 The problematic post colonial State, p.121

<sup>185</sup> Ball, *op.cit.*, 22

<sup>186</sup> Da Silva, *op.cit.*

approached. Diamonds also contributed to the Angolan economy, particularly after the Kimberley Process approved the ore origin certification system in 2003 (introduced by UNGA Resolution 55/56/2003). Nonetheless, the availability of natural resources has also posed challenges to state-building, such as the persistence of armed conflicts and the availability of "easy" resources, both of which have slowed the process of diversifying the economy and increasing capital accumulation.<sup>187</sup> Oil financed central government action, while diamonds ensured the continuation of Savimbi's operations for nearly three decades, generating approximately \$4 billion in revenue between 1992 and 2000.

In 1998, the oil demand dropped significantly. The government's financial crisis as it launched a new military campaign resulted in debt renegotiation, access to the International Monetary Fund, and the distribution of oil block shares to small companies unknown to the industry and possibly linked to arms dealing. The recovery of oil prices in 1999, combined with \$900 million in bonuses for new oil sales, alleviated the financial crisis, allowing for the acquisition of arms in 1999.<sup>188</sup>

As far as concerns diamonds, in 1917 was founded the DIAMANG, Companhia dos diamantes de Angola, with the aim of overseeing mines operations. However, after independence, the government desired to nationalize the company, which was controlled by Portugal. Since the end of 70s, the Angolan government increased its control over DIAMANG by nationalizing 30.85 percent of the company's shares, which were held by small shareholders, mostly expatriates who had fled the country at the start of the civil war. Following the nationalization of shares belonging to Portugal's largest companies in December 1979, the government's controlling stake in DIAMANG increased to 77.21 percent. The Angolan government passed the "General Law on Geological and Mining Activities" in April 1979, establishing the conditions for mining activities in Angola<sup>189</sup>. Another decree, issued in 1981, established the state-owned national mining company ENDIAMA, to which the government transferred 77.21 percent of the majority stake. Following that, this state enterprise obtained the exclusive and non-transferable rights to prospect, search, survey, exploit, process, and market diamonds in Angola. At first, the

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<sup>187</sup> Ibid., 150

<sup>188</sup> Billon, P.L., "Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000." African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001): 55-80, p.64

<sup>189</sup> Malaquias, 2007, *op.cit.*, 122

Angolan government attempted to develop the diamond industry using the same formula that had proven successful in the oil sector. As a result, the known diamond deposits were divided into several blocks to be exploited under production-sharing agreements. Despite the fact that major international diamond companies obtained permits, the ongoing civil war and the government's inability to wrest control of the diamond fields from UNITA hampered the diamond industry's development. UNITA moved to southeastern and central Angola, to the diamond-producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Malange, because it could no longer rely on external support from Cold War positive factors. The strategy of forcing newly displaced civilians to leave diamond-producing areas and relocate to government-controlled territory served two functions. First, by compelling civilians to flee these areas and relocate elsewhere, UNITA could gain unrestricted access to the mines while avoiding the political and administrative costs of governance. Second, this strategy had the unintended consequence of overwhelming the government and further depleting its already limited resources.<sup>190</sup> UNITA insurgents could buy food and weapons with the proceeds from these diamonds. In addition, UNITA illegally controlled a significant portion of Angola's diamond industry. The diamonds from Angola fueled the war, allowing the rebels to prolong the conflict. They also provided additional opportunities for illicit enrichment for members of the ruling elite while the majority of the population remained impoverished.<sup>191</sup> The ruling elites' continued pursuit of rents hampered the country's growth by incentivizing the ruling elites' personal growth. UNITA insurgents could buy food and weapons with the proceeds from these diamonds. They continued to build their forces into a conventional army with the money they made from controlling the diamond trade. UNITA saw the illegal diamond trade as a significant economic opportunity to purchase and supply its army. UNITA controlled Angola's most profitable diamond deposits between 1993 and 1997, accounting for 10% of the world's diamond production by value.<sup>192</sup>

In conclusion, during the civil war we have seen two different attitudes, connected to the natural resource in Angola, which have still influenced the economy of the country nowadays. On one hand, the MPLA, which took power in the worst-case scenario of the

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<sup>190</sup> Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Chad C. Serena, *op.cit.*, 172

<sup>191</sup> Malaquias, 2001, *op.cit.*, p.525

<sup>192</sup> Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Chad C. Serena, *op.cit.*, 173

country's independence and subsequent civil war, has dragged the country to drown in oil, failing to use the industry's proceeds positively and make the country and society recover economically. Despite international support, MPLA failed to establish a market economy and a strong state. Internal conflicts over race and ethnicity, as well as an overall inability to handle the logistical difficulties of postcolonial governance, all contributed to making this more challenging. In fact, the colonial regime's demise resulted in a mass migration of the settler community, which had a near monopoly on key economic and administrative positions.<sup>193</sup> Instead of staying close to society, ruling elites broke away in order to maintain their privileged position and attract oil revenues to themselves. These large sums of money from the oil industry have fostered corruption in a politically unstable state.<sup>194</sup> Actually, the majority of this profits was exclusively managed by the presidency. It was reported that around \$1 billion per year in revenue collected from oil production simply vanished in so-called "Bermuda Triangle": this term here refers to the relationship between the state oil company Sonangol, the central bank, and the presidency of Luanda.<sup>195</sup> Due to a lack of transparency in Angolan economic management, the ruling class has undertaken to steal public funds in order to exploit them in their favor. For example, in 1999, the Angolan rulers spent roughly half of the \$900 million proceeds from the sale of oil exploration rights on weapons, many of which were purchased solely for bribes. There are also reports that Angolan government officials "stole a significant portion of what they did not spend on weapons." Unfortunately, because the \$900 million was not recorded in the country's published budget, Angolan political and military elites have been able to pay little or no attention to issues of accountability and transparency.<sup>196</sup> On the other, despite having control of the diamond deposits, the UNITA, which emerged as a spoiler during the war against the MPLA government, had a profoundly negative impact. The UNITA rebels used the diamonds to fund the war with weapons and continue the long and bloody war until Savimbi's death.

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<sup>193</sup> Malaquias, 2001, *op.cit.*, 527

<sup>194</sup> Gillies, A, "*Corruption and the Competition for Power*", *Crude Intentions: How Oil Corruption Contaminates the World* (New York, 2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 23 Jan. 2020), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190940706.003.0003>

<sup>195</sup> Malaquias, *op.cit.*, 14

<sup>196</sup> Malaquias, *op.cit.*, 529



## 4.2 The 2000s

Angola became one of the richest countries in Africa in the years following the war, almost entirely due to oil financing. Its GDP increased by an average of 17% per year between 2004 and 2008, exceeding 22% in 2007. Foreign investment has also increased at a rate of over \$ 10 billion per year.<sup>197</sup>

However, it is important to recall that Angola inherited some characteristics from the civil war, such as authoritarianism and inter-group conflict, which resulted in underdevelopment, wealth disparity, and political instability.<sup>198</sup> All of these are the reasons why, as stated at the beginning of the chapter, it is considered cursed. The institutions were designed after the president, the army, and the economic elites (other reasons why we cannot refer to Angola as a democracy, but a competitive authoritarian regime).

When the UNITA disintegrated after Savimbi's death in 2002 and the violence subsided, the Angolan government was able to concentrate on the country's oil and diamond resources and begin rebuilding. Angola had reached a reasonable level of political stability, and dos Santos would like to reshape the party in order to maintain peace and stability, employing privileges, access to state funds, media control, opposition intimidation, and electoral manipulation to win the 2008 elections and remain in power. Dos Santos became increasingly interested in economic monopolization: Angola's economy benefited from the production of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day in 2007, ranking second only to Nigeria on the African continent. Massive investments by multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil, BP, and Chevron have benefited the oil sector. Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China's top oil exporter in 2006. However, while Angola's rich oil resources have lifted the country and helped it rebuild its infrastructure, the concentration of this newfound wealth in the hands of a few has exacerbated the growing inequality between those with and those without access to

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<sup>197</sup> Cain, A. “*The Private Housing Sector in Angola: Angola’s tentative development of a private real-estate market*”, Centre for Affordable housing finance in Africa, February 2017, Development workshop Angola

<sup>198</sup> Andrade, S; Morales, J., “*The Role of the Natural Resource Curse in Preventing Development in Politically Unstable Countries: Case Studies of Angola and Bolivia*”, Development Research Working Paper Series, No. 11/2007, Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD), La Paz

government. Already in the second half of the 2000s, the population was living on less than \$2 per day, the majority of Angolans lacked access to basic health care, and a quarter of children died before reaching the age of five. The country is still a poor and underdeveloped petrostate that has seen a significant reduction in violence since the war's end, but it still has a long way to go to provide a better quality of life for those who lived and suffered during the most tumultuous times. The profound economic and social changes that have occurred since 2014, primarily as a result of the precipitous drop in oil prices, are once again radically transforming the country.

When Lourenço took over as president, one of the main themes of his policies was fighting corruption, which went against the interests of the dos Santos family, such as firing Isabel (accused of embezzling funds) and Jose Filomeno (dos Santos' sons) from their positions as heads of the Sonangol oil company and Angola's sovereign wealth fund.

Nonetheless, the general public believes that the president is using the fight against corruption to target political opponents. Furthermore, concerns have been raised about the diversity of Angolan media due to the confiscation and nationalization of several private media outlets prior to Lourenço's anti-corruption campaign.<sup>199</sup> Certainly, Angola is still reliant on oil revenues and is dominated by private and elite interests. The GAN Integrity's Risk and Compliance Portal stated that the patronage system govern how business is conducted in Angola.<sup>200</sup> Many Angolan companies serve as front organizations for government officials, the integrity and accountability of whom are frequently called into question by observers. Even if the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) have both been signed and ratified by the country, the oil and mining sectors, in particular, are still identified as high areas for corruption in the country. Foreign purchasing, a long-standing Angolan practice, is now common for state-owned Angolan enterprises. Sonangol has recently become a major shareholder in energy, banking, and media companies in Portugal. The goal is not necessarily to maximize financial returns; rather, some observers believe that the Angolan elite wishes to lord it

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<sup>199</sup> Rahman, *op.cit.*, 4

<sup>200</sup> GAN Integrity's Risk and Compliance Portal, Retrieved from Rahman, K., "Overview of Corruption in the diamond Sector in Angola", U4 Helpdesk Answer, Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Transparency International, 29 June 2022

over the former colonizer. After Spain, Germany, and France, Angola has emerged as the fourth most important market for Portuguese exports. Meanwhile, Angolan business interests are growing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and other Gulf of Guinea countries.<sup>201</sup>

The state's treasury received more than 450 billion petrodollars between 2002 and 2014, and Luanda underwent a remarkable rate of change<sup>202</sup>. Therefore, the years 2003 to 2008 are known as the “mini golden age” era of Angola: the term was coined by the economist Manuel Alves da Rocha, referring to that period under dos Santos in which the nation went through a significant oil boom and rapid economic expansion, and had an average annual economic growth rate of 15%. Oil profits helped finance extensive infrastructure projects and government rehabilitation, with the capital city of Luanda serving as their focal point. For example, a new project called “Proyecto Nova Vida”, a large-scale housing initiative, was launched in 2003, aimed at construct 2,500 homes with governmental funding and the help of the private enterprise Imogestin<sup>203</sup>. Housing costs rose as new cities of offices, warehouses, shopping centers, and condominiums sprouted up, earning Luanda the distinction as one of the most expensive cities in the world.<sup>204</sup> However, many Angolans found that urban renewal and restoration also required them to abandon their homes, relocate, and endure worsening living circumstances. Despite concerns about its human rights record, Western nations desire Luanda as an ally. Sonangol, which serves as a sovereign wealth fund, has projected the nation's oil wealth overseas, increasing its international power.

From 2003 through few years ago, there was an average growth rate of 11% due to high crude oil prices, but the business is fueled by corruption, which is no longer kept a secret. According to World Bank research, the number of businesses naming corruption as their

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<sup>201</sup> Sogge, D., “*Angola: reinventing past and futures*”, Review of African Political Economy, March 2011, Vol. 38, No. 127 (March 2011), Taylor & Francis, Ltd. pp. 85-92

<sup>202</sup> Engebretsen, R. “*How long can Angola hold on with low oil prices?*” African Arguments, December 2015

<sup>203</sup> Ku Lueven, “*Displacing lives in 21<sup>st</sup> century in Angola*”, Urban African Lab, March 2022

<sup>204</sup> García-Rodríguez, José León, Francisco J. García-Rodríguez, Carlos Castilla-Gutiérrez, and Silvério Adriano Major, “*Oil, Power, and Poverty in Angola.*” African Studies Review 58, no. 1 (2015): 159–76. p.172

top business challenge increased significantly between 2006 and 2010.<sup>205</sup> Elites in diamond fields controlled by generals and local partners secretly owned by top authorities and assigned to oil corporations with international groups mix state, personal, and private interests. Even while oil accounts for 97 percent of export revenues and 75% of government revenue, it only employs 1% of the labor force. A once-prosperous producer nation with arable land imports at least 70% of the products it needs to survive.<sup>206</sup> Some information on oil production is kept under wraps, such as the connection with the China International Fund, which is owned by an unknown group of investors from Hong Kong. Public assessments of Angola's expenses are not also carried out. According to UN Human Development Index of 2020, Angola represents a country's failure to enhance living standards from high national income. As a matter of fact, it has one of the lowest index among 185 countries.<sup>207</sup>

Therefore, after the golden age and the rapid economic expansion, Angola's economy has experienced a systemic decline. In the international market the price of a barrel of oil dropped from roughly \$110 to \$62 in 2014 and varied between \$60 and \$35 throughout the majority of 2015 to 2017. This fall caused a severe recession in the nation, even if oil exports continued to account for approximately 95% of the country's export value and half of its GDP. Indeed, Angola's GDP trends almost always follow changes in oil prices. The country has reverted to being one of the 10 worst African nations to conduct business in terms of rankings, and it is unlikely that it will be "rescued." However, despite the sporadic ups and downs in oil prices, the situation for the people of Angola has not changed.<sup>208</sup>

After 2014, the flaws in Angola's oil-based development paradigm were made clear. Since Angola's independence, the country has operated under the laws of the market, which has never been free or transparent due to socialist ideals and the enrichment of the country's corrupt leaders. The crisis offered elites room to pursue accumulation while disguising it

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<sup>205</sup> García-Rodríguez, José León, Francisco J. García-Rodríguez, Carlos Castilla-Gutiérrez, and Silvério Adriano Major, *op.cit.*, p. 168

<sup>206</sup> Burgis, T, White, D., *Nation dominated by a rich elite*, *Financial Times*, July 2012

<sup>207</sup> The Global Economy, *Human Development Index*

<sup>208</sup> Grigoli, F., Herman, A., Swiston, A., "A Crude Shock: Explaining the Impact of the 2014-16 Oil Price Decline Across Exporters", IMF Working Paper, WP/17/160, July 2017, pp.26

as neoliberalism<sup>209</sup>, along with an intra-party-political shift. From July 2014 to January 2015 the oil prices have decreased by more than 50%. In reaction to the crisis, the affected nations, particularly Angola and the oil-dependent nations of sub-Saharan Africa, had to review their budgets in order to reduce spending. The predicted rate of expansion slowed down but did not stop entirely.<sup>210</sup> For the majority of the countries in the region, maintaining rapid economic growth is a top concern. The oil price shock made it clear that their economies needed to be more diversified. To achieve this, policies to lower impediments to private sector activity and enhance the business climate will be needed. Despite being an oil exporter, Angola imports 50% of its fuel due to its insufficient capacity for refining. As a part of its efforts to relieve budgetary pressure, the government has stopped giving out fuel bonuses.<sup>211</sup>

The severe decline in oil prices in 2014 and 2020 had a significant impact on Angola's economy. Sonangol has been a leader in assisting the nation's economic recovery after the end of the Civil War, although it was always acting in President dos Santos' and his interests. Given that oil has always been the mainstay of the economy but is also a finite resource that must be used to support other activities, the country would have faced a problem in attempting to diversify its sources of income. During the last ten years of post-conflict recovery, Angola's economy grew among the fastest in the world. However, the African Development Bank reports that it still has the least diversified economy on the continent, despite the enthusiasm of foreign investors for its huge potential. In fact, the African Development Bank itself is attempting to implement programs that cover areas like infrastructure or agriculture<sup>212</sup>

Lourenço took a different approach than dos Santos, focusing on the corruption and lack of transparency in Angolan institutions, especially after the 2014 crisis. In 2018 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved \$3.7 billion for a deal into the Extended Fund Facility for Angola, requiring the government to improve governance, diversify the economy to promote economic growth and the private sector, and monitor the country's

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<sup>209</sup> Schubert, J., “*Disrupted dreams of development: neoliberal efficiency and crisis in Angola*”, Division of Urban Studies, University of Basel, Switzerland, IAI Africa (2022), 92, 171–190

<sup>210</sup> Kambou, G, *The impact of low prices in Sub Saharan Africa*, World Bank Blogs, August 2015

<sup>211</sup> De Sousa P.A., Oliveira, J.M., “*Angola: Changes in oil and gas sector accelerate economic diversification*”, June, 2021

<sup>212</sup> African Development Bank Group, “*Angola and the AfDB*”, 2022

transparency.<sup>213</sup> In order to lower trade obstacles, Lourenço brought the country to join the Continental Free Trade Area in 2018. This is viewed as a significant advancement for Angola and Africa overall, particularly to create the conditions for private investments and to increase trade with Europe, which had previously been limited.<sup>214</sup>

Moreover, since the crisis of 2014, a process of change of oil companies has begun in the country. According to the International Trade Administration of 2022<sup>215</sup>, the main international active companies, which have their activities in the country's offshore fields off the coast of Cabinda, as well as deep-water fields in the Lower Congo basin, are:

- the French *Total*, with a market share of 41%, it is considered Angola's leading oil operator<sup>216</sup>;
- the American Chevron with a market share of 26%;
- the American *Exxon Mobil* with 19% market share and BP with 13% market share;
- the Italian *ENI* and the Norwegian *Equinor*.

A significant change in the composition of oil companies in the country is underway, moving away from the large U.S. and British companies, and closer to European companies. This change is affecting Angola's new foreign policy priorities, which are oriented toward southern Europe and the EU. The oil sector in Angola is clearly in decline, and national oil production would almost definitely never come back to pre-crisis levels. Its oil production climbed in 2010 at just over 2 million bpd. Since according to the most recent IEA report, oil prices will fall to \$30 per barrel in 2030 and \$24 in 2050<sup>217</sup>, Angola would face other challenges in the next years, which would require an oil price of \$55 per barrel to achieve fiscal balance by 2021, according to IMF estimates.

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<sup>213</sup>IMF, “*IMF Executive Board Approves US\$3.7 Billion Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility for Angola*”, December 2018

<sup>214</sup> BBC, “*Africa agrees deal for Continental Free Trade Area*”, March 2018

<sup>215</sup> International Trade Administration, *Angola- Country Guides- Oil and Gas*, Official website of the international trade administration August 2022

<sup>216</sup> Total energies, *Total and Sonangol Strengthen their cooperation in Angola*, May 2018

<sup>217</sup> IEA, International Energy Agency, “*Net Zero by 2050, A roadmap for the Global Energy Sector*”

In 2019, the Angolan government transferred the rights of the dealers from the national oil company Sonangol to the National Petroleum, Gas, and Biofuels Agency (ANPG), the regulatory body for operations in offshore and onshore exploration and production. Sonangol has begun restructuring in order to focus on its core operations as an operator<sup>218</sup>. This means that Angola is now a true oil minister, a position that was previously marginalized in comparison to the Sonangol state that existed under dos Santos. Despite these changes, as previously stated, the regulator operated under the command of the party and the president rather than an independent authority. Certainly, the regime of Lourenço is more willing to negotiate with foreign investors, particularly in the oil sector. Instead, the previous regime's choice for local partners was non-negotiable, often with secret deals applied to international investors.<sup>219</sup> This shift is due, in part, to Angola's weakened negotiating position since 2014: without the capital to invest in the maintenance and development of the oil industry, Angola desperately needs foreign capital to finance it.

Going back to corruption in Angola's economic area, this has had a negative impact in the Cabinda enclave, where there is still no protection or balance.<sup>220</sup>

#### 4.3 The enclave of Cabinda

The Cabinda enclave has been a territorial, but especially economic, challenge in Angola's history. It is located in the country's north, separated from Angolan territory by the Congo River, and is particularly rich in natural resources. Despite its small size (a 7,283 km<sup>2</sup> of enclave), its onshore and offshore deposits in the Gulf of Guinea account for more than half of Angola's total output. Despite this wealth, railways and imports are still underdeveloped there. There is no direct route from Angola to the enclave; some parts of the Congo River are inaccessible, requiring high air transportation and labor costs.

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<sup>218</sup> International Trade Administration, *op.cit.*

<sup>219</sup> Bye, Ingles, Orre, *op.cit.*

<sup>220</sup> Sogge, *op.cit.*, 87



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The Cabinda enclave was formally incorporated in late 1885 with the Simulambuco Treaties<sup>221</sup> as a protectorate of Portugal, even if Portuguese government abandoned the territory without call for the self determination of the population living that part. The treaty was part of Portugal's attempt to expand its empire during the late-nineteenth-century European race for Africa. The main cause of the centuries-old tensions is that Cabinda province was eventually merged with Angola, even without asking to the government of the enclave. The Organization of the African Union (OAU) confirmed Cabinda's autonomy in 1963, declaring that part as an independent state with its own anti-colonial movement<sup>222</sup>. The region's independence struggle became more bitter after Angola's independence, because this part received a lot of attention from the country and other international players for its natural resources, but the people of that area lived in

<sup>221</sup> UNPO “Resolution Concerning the Cabinda Enclave”, July 7, 2005.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*



extreme poverty. It is the richest province in the country, but it is also the least developed. Cabinda is an interesting case because of the province's struggle for independence as well as the fact that, since the price drop, it has become a very important onshore oil reserve resource in the region. It is one of Africa's longest-running insurgencies.

The Portuguese government authorized the first oil concession in Angola in 1910, however the industrial exploitation did not start until 1956, when the PETRANGOL (Companhia de Petróleos de Angola) started extracting petroleum in the Kwanza River Basin.<sup>223</sup> Afterward, this company found oil in the Congo River Basin in close cooperation with American Texaco and Portuguese-owned Angol and became the main operator of most inland fields. Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of US-owned Gulf Oil, began exploration in the northern province of Cabinda in 1954 and began production in 1968. The Portuguese government ceased to be the protector of the region in 1956, handing over the territory to Angola's administration without first negotiating with Cabinda's political leadership. As a result, the people of Cabinda gave rise to militant groups that fought intermittently with Luanda's military forces in what has historically been framed as a struggle for self-determination based on sovereignty assertion. As a matter of fact, since 1956, there has been a secessionist war, culminating with the formation of the Cabinda Liberation Front (FLEC) in 1963<sup>224</sup>. FLEC represents one of the African's longest rebel groups, formed in the aftermath of the independence war and moved by the desire for oil. After 1993, Cabinda and Angola were considered separate and distinct parts of Portugal due to the Constitution that established the Estado Novo. Today, economic interests are driving several separatist movements supported by other countries and even some oil companies, but fought by the Angolan army, which arose following the province's independence from Portugal and incorporation into Angola.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the Cabinda fields were producing close to ten million tons of oil annually. More than 40% of Portugal's foreign earnings from Angola between 1971 and 1974 came from oil.<sup>225</sup> Since Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975, Cabinda

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<sup>223</sup> García-Rodríguez, León, J. García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, and Silvério Adriano Major, *op.cit.*

<sup>224</sup> Anstee, M.J., "*Orphan of the Cold War, The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process 1992-93*", MacMillian Press LTD, United States of America, 1996, 1-14

<sup>225</sup> Ball, *op.cit.*, 14

separatists have waged a guerrilla war for the territory's independence, led by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). The FLEC claimed independence because of a geographical and historical issue: first, because of Cabinda's location, wedged between the two Congos and not bordering Angola. Second, the 1885 treaties whereby the enclave was administered as a separate colony until it was incorporated into Angola in 1956. the Angolan government has taken several steps to reconcile the groups, including encouraging FLEC personnel to surrender their weapons and join the administration, which has been at least partially successful.

However, Cabinda was invaded on November 11 ,1975, when MPLA troops entered the country through Pointe Noire. Chevron, the oil giant, provided financial support to the troops by paying the MPLA to seize Cabinda's oil fields. The US oil company joined the occupation forces alongside the MPLA. Sonangol currently produces over 980,000 barrels per day, generating more than \$8,000,000 per day and accounting for 90 percent of Angola's GDP. Since the Communist Armed Forces of Angola occupied Cabinda country in 1975, one-third of the population has fled to other countries. Angola's first Marxist government after independence dispatched forces backed by Cuba to Cabinda. During the war, Cuban troops were sent to Cabinda to protect oil installations, including Chevron's, from UNITA rebels backed by South Africa and the US. Even during the election period, the MPLA government received no support from Cabinda, where anti-government sentiment has traditionally manifested itself with separatist tendencies, indicating disillusionment with the established parties.<sup>226</sup>

Despite the fact that it has been at peace since 2002, it remains a conflict zone: the government has attempted to replicate the strategy that was successful against UNITA. The Angolan government, determined to protect key economic resources, could only offer the enclave a form of provincial autonomy. In October 2002, a major offensive was launched against the FLEC. After some FLEC defeats in late 2003, the Luanda government signaled its willingness to talk peace or even consider a referendum.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> Pearce, Péclard, de Oliveira, “*Angola’s elections and the politics of presidential succession*”n, African Affairs, Volume 117, Issue 466, January 2018, Pages 1-15, p.10 <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx045>

<sup>227</sup> Meijer, Birmingham, *op,cit*, p.15

António Bento Bembe, president of the Cabindano Forum for Dialogue and Peace and vice president and executive secretary of the FLEC, announced in 2006 that Cabinde separatist forces were ready to declare a cease-fire following cease-fire negotiations in the Republic of Congo. The Cabindan Forum for Dialogue is a non-profit organization that represents the majority of Cabindan groups. The United States, France, Portugal, Russia, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and the African Union all recognized the peace treaty. The cease-fire agreement was signed in exchange for Angolans' acceptance of Cabinda's special status.<sup>228</sup> The situation is critical because France, which supports the FLEC-FAC armed movement, believes that Bembe lacked the authority or mandate to negotiate with the Angolans and that total independence is the only acceptable solution. The conflict between the Angolan government and the rebel group FLEC-FAC, which is fighting for the exclave's independence, has resurfaced since 2008.<sup>229</sup> Angola is determined to secure Cabinda's 470,000 barrels per day of mostly offshore oil production. Armies are stationed on the Congolese border for this purpose, and there have been reports of alleged abuses and increased military repression in the interior by the FLEC.<sup>230</sup> Angola, Nigeria, and the new oil players in the Gulf of Guinea are central to the United States' plans to reduce its reliance on volatile Middle Eastern oil supplies. In fact, the majority of the investment is made by US companies that also operate in Cabinda. This connection can be interpreted as Cabindans' hope for U.S. support for self-determination.<sup>231</sup> Following the death of FLEC's historic leader H.T Nzita in 2016, the movement claims responsibility for some actions and attacks each year. They believe the Angolan army is still isolating the area in search of FLEC fighters and is frequently accused of abuses and arbitrary detentions. As a result, the FLEC has called for a boycott of the August 24, 2022 general elections, stating that it will not vote for the new government.<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Tsoumou, C, “*Angola: Cabinda separatists say ready to sign ceasefire*”, Thomson Reuters Foundation 10 July 2006, Retrieved 2 November 2007.


<sup>229</sup> Harbom, L., Wallensteen. P “*Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009.*” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (2010): 501–9.

<sup>230</sup> Cropley, E., “*Rebels alive and kicking in Angolan petro province, oil workers say*”, Reuters, June 2016

<sup>231</sup> Reuters, “*Cabinda remains threat to Angola's rising profile*”, Thomson Reuters Foundation, December 2014,

<sup>232</sup> Toulemonde, M. “*Angola: Cabinda, an unsolvable problem*”? *The Africa Report*, August 2022

Cabinda's offshore fields account for up to 60% of Angola's oil exports, a significant portion of Luanda's annual revenue. that the state cannot give up, despite the opposition of the residents of the region.<sup>233</sup> The long-standing conflict between Cabinda and Luanda is motivated by the need to extract the necessary economic gain from the valuable oil reserves and gain access to socioeconomic benefits. The province remains marginalized by the central Angolan government, and the people of Cabinda do not reap the full benefits of their territory's oil wealth. As a result, the conflict will not be resolved; the FLEC is motivated by demands for management and access to Cabinda's oil resources, as well as political independence from Luanda and eventual secession from Angola.



*Credits to the Africa Report*<sup>234</sup>

In order to have a direct control, the Angolan government established a ferry link between Luanda, Soyo (Angola's municipality), and Cabinda in 2022, which should help improve the transfer of labor, goods, and services. Under Lourenço's administration, the Angolan

<sup>233</sup> Ojakorotu, Victor V. "The Paradox of Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Natural Resources: An Analysis of Cabinda in Angola" Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, No. 3/4, Special Double Issue on Terrorism and Political Violence in Africa (September 2011), pp. 96-109, p.102

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

parliament passed a statement for a more advantageous tax regime for the geographically isolated province in July 2022. Cabinda remains an unresolved problem and a land without peace or war for the following reasons: its colonial history linked to that of Angola, the humanitarian history linked to the people's right to self-determination, and, last but not least, the presence of oil, which has an impact internationally, regionally, and locally.

#### 4.4 China's interests on Angola

As a result of rising oil prices and a changing international environment, Angola's rise, diversification, and internationalization were marked by the emergence of a new player, which aided in financing and post-war reconstruction: China.<sup>235</sup> Africa is China's primary oil supplier: China's developing relations with the African nation are now being driven by oil. Chinese investments in Angolan construction and credit for oil are the key facets of relations among the two States.<sup>236</sup> Angola is currently China's largest African economic partner, with total trade relation exceeding \$120 billion in 2010.<sup>237</sup>

It took until 1983 for Beijing and Luanda to establish formal diplomatic relations since the Chinese first refused to recognize Angola's independence<sup>238</sup>. Due to the signing of the first trade agreement in 1984 and the creation of the Joint Economic and Trade Commission in 1988, diplomatic ties between the two States became closer at the end of the 1980s; yet, it is only recently that the two nations have started to experience an improvement in economic activity. The partnership between the two states was difficult throughout the civil war and primarily centered on power and the military. For instance, the Chinese government supplied the unit with weaponry in the early 1990s until the

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<sup>235</sup> Sylvia Croese, Review of Oliveira, R.S, *Magnificent and beggar land: Angola since the civil war*, Auckland Park, Jacana, 2016, 291 pp., ZAR 280 (paperback), ISBN 978- 1-4314-2229-6, p.57

<sup>236</sup> Zhao, S., *The China- Angola Partnership: A case study of China's Oil Relations in Africa*, China Briefing, May 2011

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>238</sup> Campos, I., Vines, A., "ANGOLA AND CHINA: a Pragmatic Partnership", Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, "Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation," December 5, 2007", Center for Strategic and International Studies, London, March 2008

situation improved. Since the early 2000s, the collaboration between China and Angola has been established as nothing more than opportunism driven by necessity (in fact, it is referred to as an id marriage of convenience<sup>239</sup>) and bilateral trade has grown significantly.

However, a lot of events, most notably the decline in oil prices in 2014 and the election of Lourenço as president in 2017, have changed the scenario in which China entered Angola.<sup>240</sup> These features have given Angola's political economy and ties with China new vigor.

After 30 years under dos Santos, Lourenço's new administration has vowed to change the situation in a variety of areas and restore the unequal relations between China and Angola. However, other authors contend that Lourenço's actions are simply rebuilding the party from within. In the past, Futungo was able to establish its agency and project its interests onto the world stage because to the large volume of oil cash. This was especially evident in Luanda's 2002 decision to decline assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when the organization demanded changes to the way its accounts were managed and more transparency. In fact, it is believed that Lourenço's reform initiatives harmed China's relations with Angola. Furthermore, in order to create a framework for collaboration with all African nations, China established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as early as 2000. But Angola's relations with China didn't change significantly until talks with the IMF broke down. The primary post-conflict goals for Angola were infrastructure development, human capital development, and the restoration of public services in the areas of infrastructure, sanitation, health, and education. Long-term solutions for Angola would also include housing, urbanization, and significant development initiatives. The government looked for a different source of funding for rehabilitation when the IMF negotiations fell down. China's presence filled the void left by the absence of backing from the Bretton Woods institutions and the West.

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<sup>239</sup> De Carvalho, P., Kopinski, D., Taylor, I., “*A Marriage of Convenience on the Rocks? Revisiting the Sino–Angolan Relationship*”, *Africa Spectrum* 2021 57:1, 5-29

<sup>240</sup> Kopinski, D. “*Sino-Angolan relations: old oil and new politics*”, *DIA, Democracy in Africa*, Nov 2021

Despite the close ties that grew, Angola initially kept a certain amount of space and refused to join China's African entourage.<sup>241</sup> Since China had aimed to prevent the MPLA from seizing power after independence, the Sino-Angolan relationship was always one of convenience, established out of necessity at a time when both countries needed one other.<sup>242</sup> China was not one of Angola's options when looking for finance from overseas; instead, when the peace deal was signed in 2002, Angola looked to the donor world for assistance with the nation's development and rehabilitation. Chinese investment came and was welcomed despite the country's inability to recover economically from it.<sup>243</sup>

After South Africa was displaced, Angola started to be China's biggest trading partner in Africa in 2006. From \$190 million in 1998 to \$25.3 billion in 2008, trade volume has dramatically expanded. Construction supplies and equipment make up 45% of Angola's purchases from China, while crude oil still makes up 99.9% of its exports to China.<sup>244</sup>


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<sup>241</sup> De Oliveira, 2007, *op.cit.*

<sup>242</sup> De Carvalho, P., Kopinski, D., Taylor, *op.cit.*, 12

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, 10

<sup>244</sup> Alves, A.C., “*The Oil Factor in Sino– Angolan Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*”, SAIIA, China in Africa Project, February 2010, Occasional Paper NO 55, p.8



**Figure 1.** Angola–China bilateral trade (US\$, billion). *Source:* UN Comtrade.

The growth of China trade may be seen in the two countries' flows, which intensified when China received a \$2 billion line of credit from Angola in 2004, the biggest post-war economic deal between the two countries. In search of financial aid for development, Angola moved east and started to build closer ties with other significant emerging nations<sup>245</sup>. With the exception of a slight decline brought on by the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, trade continued until 2014. Exports to China decreased as a result of the downturn in oil prices that started in 2014. China received 60.6 percent of Angola's exports in 2020 (although only 18.7 percent of Angolan imports came from China). Importantly, petroleum products made for 97.6% of Angola's exports to China. Post-war reconstruction projects were entirely funded by loans, the majority of which were Chinese and backed by oil. The Kilamba development and other housing initiatives followed a similar path.<sup>246</sup>

The "Angola mode" is called this system of exchanging resources for services, in which natural resources are used as repayment for infrastructure development.<sup>247</sup> Angola has

<sup>245</sup> De Carvalho, P., Kopinski, D., Taylor, *op.cit.*

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>247</sup> Alex Vines, Lillian Wong, Markus Weimer and Indira, "Thirst of African Oil, Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola", a Chatham House Report, Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 2009, Cap.2.3 "China's Growing Interest" Campos



agreed to at least two oil-backed loans since 2004 for Chinese financial support to public investment projects in transport, telecommunications, and farms under the National Reconstruction Program, in addition to supplying funds to Chinese oil businesses. Loans from Angola backed by oil are nothing new. It all began in the late 1980s when Angola required funding for Sonangol's portion of Cabinda's growth. Angola constructed a series of loans throughout time that got bigger and bigger, not just for Sonangol but also for the entire government.<sup>248</sup> The Angolan presidency found greater success in securing spending priorities with oil-backed loans. As a result, increasing oil prices did not increase revenue but instead hastened loan payback. These loans came with high fees. For a while, a sizable chunk of the government's oil output share was subject to loan repayment. With the help of its oil, Angola was able to obtain credit lines from Portugal, Brazil, Spain, and more recently, China.<sup>249</sup> Chinese loans signify a dramatic increase in Angola's reliance on these types of agreements, partly due to size but also because the conditions are more favorable in terms of the grace period and the duration of payback. Since the collateral and repayment terms are longer, less Angolan oil is required. Additionally, none of these loans have ever been refinanced, unlike commercial loans.

Angola and China have had strong political ties during the past years, as evidenced by the frequent exchange of delegations and the signing of agreements. In June 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao traveled to Angola, and in November 2010, Vice President Xi Jinping did the same. Dos Santos traveled to Beijing in December 2008 during the height of the financial crisis to ask President Hu Jintao, his Chinese counterpart, to reassure China of his financial support. Chen Deming, China's minister of commerce, and Chen Yen, the managing director of the Chinese Development Bank, visited Angola in January 2009 and March 2009, respectively.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> Zhao, S. *op.cit*

<sup>249</sup> Corkin, 2011, *op.cit*.

<sup>250</sup> Kiala, Ngwenya, Carine Kiala & Nomfundo, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries", South African Foreign Policy and African drivers Programme (SAIIA), Occasional Paper NO 85, May 2011, p.15

## 4.5 Angola and the BRICs

Although since its independence, Angola has had tight connections with its allies. To satisfy current international and commercial objectives, foreign policy has evolved. During the colonial period and for a large portion of the post-independence period until the end of the civil war in 2002, military and security initiatives were important areas of collaboration. Particularly since the financial crisis of 2008, the nation has started down a path of economic growth and diversification. The development of Angola's bilateral ties with BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—in the new millennium reflects this strategy. With the help of China's \$10 billion oil and infrastructure deal, Angola has established itself as a destination for investment from the BRIC nations.<sup>251</sup> Angola now employs a varied strategy in its international interactions with every BRIC nation: the international ties with the different global and new markets are distinctive in that they are based both on fresh ideas of collaboration and on historical connections. The price of oil has fallen due to the impact on crude oil prices. Angola increased its attempts to enhance the business environment and draw foreign direct investment after the civil war was over. The strategy worked, and more investors have since entered the market. Because to the size of their economies, demographics, and trading markets, the BRICs are regarded as potential leaders in the global economy. After the United States, China already has the second-largest economy in the world. The BRIC countries' entry into Angola is crucial for the future development of the nation. Public and private businesses from the BRIC nations, which have excelled at home, have entered worldwide markets where they have grown to be fiercely competitive and even dominant. The BRIC nations' potential for Angola is increasing as a result of their sustained economic expansion. The Office of the Presidency, in collaboration with the Council of Ministers, oversees Angola's foreign policy. The nation does not necessarily have a targeted foreign policy toward the BRIC nations; rather, diplomatic ties have been built up bilaterally and gradually over time, and they now stand in for cooperative strategic alliances.

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<sup>251</sup> Carine & Nomfundo, *op.cit.*

In the State of the Nation speech on October 15 of 2010, President dos Santos emphasized China and Brazil as two of Angola's four strategic development partners.<sup>252</sup> Portugal and the United States as the other. Angola is attempting to speed up the diversification of its economy through strategic alliances with BRIC nations. These nations are now looking for more prospects within the Angolan market as a result of the "Angola mode" that has emerged as a result of its interaction with China. The long-term effects of Angola's decision to pursue a BRIC-focused foreign policy are debatable. Their financial support for Angola's development and reconstruction is largely provided through lines of credit that ultimately benefit the respective BRIC nations. In a free market where standards are determined by the degree of competition, this decreases the amount of accountability.

#### 4.6 China over US

The United States was the biggest user of Angolan crude prior China started importing it in the early 2000s. Resources-based relations between the US were established when the American administration gave UNITA significant backing against the MPLA during the civil war. The MPLA used oil revenue from Gulf Oil Corporation, a subsidiary of American Chevron, to fund its military operations against the UNITA-backed UNITA. In the meanwhile, the Chevron was extracting Angolan oil while being protected by Cuban and MPLA soldiers, giving the Soviet-backed administration in Luanda the ability to fight UNITA.<sup>253</sup> The Angolan civil war's end and China's acceptance of its exit strategy in 2002 played key roles in this new beginning. For China, what was at best a very mild cooperation at the end of the civil war evolved into a full-fledged relationship in the 2000s. However, Angola is the third-largest commercial partner of the United States, and American exports to Angola include steel, machinery, and airplanes.

Angola became the 12th full member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on January 1, 2008. This established Angola as a major player in the world's energy markets, and the government exploited its newfound clout to compete with foreign businesses seeking for oil exploration concessions. With the next OPEC

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<sup>252</sup> Kiala, Ngwenya, *op.cit.*, 6

<sup>253</sup> De Carvalho, P., Kopinski, D., Taylor, I., *op.cit.*, 15

presidency in mind, Angola's participation in OPEC is a signal of the nation's desire to strengthen its regional influence as well as a reflection of its expanding global influence.<sup>254</sup> Angola is seen as a growing geo-strategic partner in terms of energy security by both China and the United States, particularly to diversify oil interests from the Middle East and other politically unstable African oil states like Nigeria (Niger Delta) and Sudan (Darfur). In addition, investments are largely shielded from political volatility because the majority of Angola's oil riches resides offshore.

In 2010, the US and Angola agreed to set up the US-Strategic Partnership Dialogue.<sup>255</sup> Approximately two years before, Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state of the United States, declared that multiple American businesses will invest more than \$2 billion in Angola's oil and gas industry. Through this cooperation, the United States also hopes to help the Angolan people and the incoming President Lourenço fight corruption. Clearly, the relationship between the two countries has endured because to the support provided throughout the conflict and the U.S. desire to remain Angola's ally in order to thwart efforts by other countries to exploit the country's natural resources.

#### 4.7 China's strategy and the Chinese national oil companies (NOCs)

China, Angola's biggest buyer of crude oil, imported 45% of the nation's output in 2009, meeting up to 15.8% of the giant's energy requirements. In exchange, the nation gave new loans for the exploitation of oil and the repair of war-devastated infrastructure, two industries run by Chinese firms using Chinese personnel. Because of this, China is now Angola's top trading partner instead of the United States. The China-Angola alliance must be viewed in the perspective of the emerging "South-South" dynamic enabled by China's hegemonic position in the world. While interactions are managed by a solely commercial ideology that precludes topics like human rights and corruption from consideration, this alliance's benefits include projects costing less and being completed more rapidly<sup>256</sup>.

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<sup>254</sup> Corkin, L. "Angola's Current Economic Prospects: Oil Curse or Blessing?", Real Instituto Elcano-Royal Institute (ARI), January 2009

<sup>255</sup> Swira, J, *USA to Invest More Than U.S \$2 Billion in Angola's Oil, Gas Sector*, African Mining Brief, February 2020

<sup>256</sup> García-Rodríguez, José León, Carlos Castilla-Gutiérrez, and Silvério Adriano Major, *op.cit.*, 172

The main focus of China's African policy is resource acquisition. The government continues to be the dominant force working to protect oil and other resources. China's oil policy in Africa is being developed by a number of State Council commissions and ministries because it is integral to both national security and economic prosperity. Plans for economic growth are administered and created by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), formerly known as the State Development Planning Commission.<sup>257</sup> It administers China's oil reserves, organizes policies, and grants permission to import foreign resources (for instance, the Global Times recently reported that the NDRC granted permission for the Wuhan Iron Ore Company to import 2 billion tons of iron ore). The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which also has a responsibility in authorizing investment, aid, and loan packages for Africa, develops trade strategy. The Department of West Asian and African Affairs and the Department of Foreign Aid collaborate to coordinate policies for Africa. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concentrates on diplomacy and seeks to strengthen China's bilateral relations with African nations, MOFCOM also coordinates with the Export-Import Bank for loans and projects in Africa. Among the biggest oil firms in the world, China's national oil corporations are powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that control the country's oil sector. These SOEs are managed by the State Council, which also appoints the leadership of the NOCs, through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd., China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) are the three principal NOCs. While the smaller CNOOC is more interested in international acquisition, CNPC and Sinopec concentrate on a variety of production and exploration activities (Sinopec more downstream).

The three largest oil corporations in China are supported financially and are owned by the government. The role of the government in relation to NOCs has generated a lot of discussion and interest. NOCs act like private businesses and pursue their own goals while the government pushes for the acquisition of energy resources. It's an interesting dynamic when the state-party and NOCs work together since the actors can exert influence and put pressure on one another. NOCs have a great deal of autonomy and don't always follow

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<sup>257</sup> Zhao, *op.cit.*

orders from the government. The International Energy Agency found that NOCs had a high degree of independence in a report from February 2011. NOCs have commercial objectives that prioritize profit. Chinese NOCs are formidable political advocates who frequently receive the NDRC's "sympathetic ear" in advancing their business objectives. Researchers have drawn attention to conflicts between NOCs and the government as well as within NOCs. Although NOCs were established to secure the nation's oil needs, the state has promoted the pursuit of economic objectives. Chinese NOCs are likewise vying with one another for control of resources and domestic influence. NOC leaders must balance their governmental and corporate responsibilities since they wear "two hats," according to the IEA research. Due to their comparatively limited interests, NOCs' actions may unintentionally affect Chinese foreign policy. In Angola and Sudan, for instance, NOC activities may have a negative impact on how the world sees China's involvement in Africa. These concerns may also have a negative impact on China's political and diplomatic ties with its African allies. NOC has the ability to benefit and challenge the Chinese government because it is a self-interested, foreign investment-oriented entity and an autonomous interest group.

Regarding Angola, China has taken a "non-interference" position.<sup>258</sup> The Angolan government continues to be drawn to China's low-interest, unconditional, and infrastructure-friendly loans due to their relative advantages. China's footprint in Angola is still small in comparison to the Western superpowers. Oil-for-oil credit deals with Angola, which go beyond the percentage shareholding, show China's expanding influence and many unspoken implications. Chinese loans are a desirable substitute for loans from international institutions, which can place restrictions on the advancement of democracy. One popular criticism of China's economic strategy is that it is resource-driven and goal-oriented; as a result, its no-interference, use-what-you-have attitude may undermine Western nations' ambitions for democratic advancement in Angola. There are disagreements over this tactic, including whether China has a moral obligation to act responsibly or whether oil deals are merely business transactions.<sup>259</sup> Undoubtedly,

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<sup>258</sup> US Government Publishing Office, "China's Foreign Policy And 'Soft Power' In South America, Asia, And Africa", April 2008, 110<sup>th</sup> congress, 2d Session, Congressional Research Service Lybraery of Crongress

<sup>259</sup> Zhao, *op.cit*

Angola needs to grow its GDP output in order to improve its standard of living, but oil-rich nations like Saudi Arabia and Oman that receive "windfall profits" from oil may take longer to respond. Additionally, China builds much-needed infrastructure in Angola at the expense of potential improvements in transparency and corruption that are frequently necessary in order to receive aid from the International Monetary Fund.

#### 4.8 Current developments on oil and diamonds

As the season for refinery maintenance comes to an end in October, it is anticipated that Chinese demand for Angolan oil, which is less expensive and thought to guarantee a reliable supply, would increase. Additionally, Angola was China's third-largest supplier in the first nine months of 2016. According to data, imports increased 17.7 percent year over year to 34.39 million tons (916,229 bpd). China became the world's largest importer of crude oil last month, surpassing the United States, as Beijing's state reserves shipped affordable crude to fill new storage tanks. As the largest program the IMF has ever had with a sub-Saharan African nation, the IMF's program in Angola is a noteworthy development.<sup>260</sup> This agreement is likely to have a significant impact on Luanda's lending practices going forward, which will reduce the risk of the country racking up further debt to China. The IMF's demands also serve as a blocking mechanism for Angola's fiscal openness (this is the first time the country's official debt data have been made public) and appear to put an end to oil-backed loans, which make up around two-fifths of its foreign debt. The new deal between Angola and the IMF can be considered as Luanda's effort to win acceptance from international organizations as the post-Dos Santos government strives to put the old regime behind it.

After a period of quite tensions with the World Bank, things have recently heated up, which shows that Angola has diversified its financial sources away from Chinese lines of credit, which it now views as a danger.<sup>261</sup> Additionally, it shows a broader change in the way that international financial institutions now handle Angola, which was formerly frequently used as an example of corruption and poor leadership. While the Bank approved \$712 million worth of projects between 2003 and 2013, from 2015

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<sup>260</sup> Reuters, "Angola becomes China's biggest oil supplier in Sept", October 24, 2016

<sup>261</sup> De Carvalho, P., Kopinski, D., Taylor, *op.cit.*

approximately \$4 billion in new loans have been pledged, of which \$2.91 billion has been given since Lourenço took office.

Therefore, the change from Dos Santos to Lourenço was significant and has changed the course of Sino-Anglo relations since 2018. In fact, Lourenço wants to separate itself from China, acquire loans from other nations, and broaden its international network. While China is the major borrower, it also has loans from Brazil and Israel. Lourenço had presumed that the man does not want to owe China any more money. The majority of Angola's onshore resources are maturing and being phased out, therefore deep-water and ultra-deep-water areas will be the primary sources of oil production in the future. In this area, Western businesses easily outperform their Chinese competitors and are adamant about their competitive advantage. Chinese enterprises will still need a lot of time before they can "manage" and run blocks in deep and ultra-deepwater, and they are forced to collaborate with Western businesses since they lack the necessary technological capabilities to do it on their own: In any case, given the unique entry strategy and ownership structure of Chinese operators, the Chinese presence in Angola is problematic. With around 8 billion barrels of known reserves, Angola is currently in competition with Nigeria to become Africa's top oil producer. Angolan oil, which is currently Africa's fastest-growing oil producer due to its low sulfur content, is highly prized on international markets. Although recent excessive price volatility has complicated budget planning, the rise in oil prices in recent years, driven by expanding Chinese and Indian demand, has helped government income.

After Iraq, Angola has the second-least diverse economy in the world<sup>262</sup>, with more than 90% of export profits and 60% of government revenue coming from crude oil production. Not because Angola has been particularly successful, but because the regime has been able to infiltrate society and take and appropriate resources, the country has even gained a reputation as a "successful failed state." Understanding the country's power structure and the conundrum of being both strong and weak at the same time requires an understanding of the figure of Dos Santos<sup>263</sup>.

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<sup>262</sup> International Monetary Fund (2019) *Angola IMF Country Report No. 19/170*, June.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*



However, the oil markets destroyed this system and the trust in the regime. Additionally, this has happened when Angola's oil fields have reached their peak output maturity. Angola had generated more than 2 million barrels per day; today, it only produces slightly more than half that amount. The change under Lourenço was evident on the streets of Luanda, though it is unclear whether the change was for the better or worse. It is still debatable whether the fight against corruption was merely a show, a political vendetta against former party allies, a genuine change in policy, or all of the above. As they constitute an existential threat to the viability of the Angolan economy, the president has frequently advocated for the "Angola model" of Chinese oil-backed loans to be abandoned.<sup>264</sup> In the last period the public debt increased to more than 120% of GDP, inflation above 20%, the Kwanza currency continued to depreciate quickly, and unemployment levels approached those of the 2006 "bad economic times."

The Covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing instability in oil prices dragged the Angolan economy to its knees once more, just when it was believed that the political and financial reforms implemented in 2017 would give it new life. Angola was hard-hit by the pandemic. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Angola has been a member since 2007, mandated output cuts at a time when the Angolan economy was still struggling. As a result, global commerce and investment fell dramatically. It would be necessary to make an effort to further exploit the mining sector. In reality, mining is a top priority in the short term due to the rise in demand for mineral resources, and new investors are especially keen on the extraction of mineral resources important to the global energy transition. The National Geological Plan and the National Development Plan 2018–2022 strategically focus on the mining industry and anticipate a significant increase in diamond production in 2022, amounting to 13.8 million carats. In addition, the development of new technologies will undoubtedly join the ranks of long-term investors in the diamond industry.<sup>265</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Kopinski, *op.cit.*

<sup>265</sup> De Sousa, Oliveira, 2021 *op.cit.*

Clearly, China and Angola have a strategic and practical partnership. Natural resources are required by China, whereas development is required in Angola: Chinese donors finance critical post-war infrastructure projects that are not funded by Western donors. It is still unclear if this combination of economic interests constitutes a "perfect marriage" or, as other scholars have already stated and agreed with, just a union of convenience. The fact is that Angola has entered the global economy and is drawing the attention of Western countries, primarily because of its Chinese creditors.

Chinese investments have helped Angola's poverty rate decline, despite the fact that they are difficult to measure. The fact that the country is economically wealthy but that its people nevertheless experience high rates of poverty and flagrant human rights violations, on the other hand, continues to be a major issue even on a worldwide scale (particularly in light of condemnation from international organizations). As a final analysis, we shall now examine what is occurring in the nation and its causes.

## 5. Angola's civil society and human rights: the impact of the civil war and oil revenue

Like most of the civil wars, the Angolan one had severe consequences for the population's human rights, generating one of the biggest humanitarian crises of those years. Due to its lengths, the presence of the spoilers and opposing military forces, the war exacerbated the problems of the country. As one of the largest oil producers in Africa, it remains one of the poorest countries. In fact, around one million seven-hundred thousand people coming from rural areas have found themselves displaced<sup>266</sup> after the long conflict between MPLA and UNITA. Many violations have been committed, including harassment, killings and abuses, particularly in areas where the state administration has been weak<sup>267</sup>. After the war, Angolans had difficulty finding resources such as food and water, medical care, while life expectancy became very low. The end of hostilities led to significant population displacements, as in the majority of post-civil war contexts, with a high number of emigrations. Usually, following civil wars, a long emigration process begins in times of peace, linked to various factors. The reasons why they decide to flee and where, are influenced by the possible recurrence of war, by participation and political change and also by social and economic perspectives. However, finding a country where peace and socio-economic differences coexist in peace is tough. In the case of Angola, the number of refugees has decreased as citizens have returned to their home countries<sup>268</sup>. In 2002, the Angolan government tried to help reintegrating displaced populations into society by ad hoc regulations. Many refugees, however, remained in the countries to which they had fled, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana<sup>269</sup>. According to a State Department report on human rights practices in Angola, serious human rights violations have been committed, in which military forces, such as those of the UNITA party, have also been involved. In fact, killings, torture

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<sup>266</sup> Bertini, C, "*A Crisis Neglected: The Growing Humanitarian Tragedy in Angola*", by the CB Executive Director of the World Food Programme to the Security Council-September 3, 1999, informal consultations on Angola

<sup>267</sup> UNSC, *op.cit*

<sup>268</sup> Haass, Kurtenbach, Strasheim, *op.cit*.

<sup>269</sup> UN SC, *op.cit*.

especially in the poorest areas of the country have been reported<sup>270</sup>, together with attacks from MPLA.<sup>271</sup> According to Amnesty International:

*"UNITA forces have been responsible for a massive death toll through the practice of deliberate and arbitrary executions of government officials and supporters or internal dissidents and indiscriminate shelling of civilian targets"*<sup>272</sup>

The costs to the civilian population of resumed fighting were extremely high, as is often assumed at the end of armed conflicts. Angola's humanitarian crisis was not only caused by the war but also by the struggle for natural resources within the country by the antagonistic factions. Angola is one of the main oil producers on the African continent. Significant is the situation in the enclave called Cabinda, an oil-rich province fighting for indemnity for years. Being Angola's major oil-producing region, Cabinda has been at the center of much debate both for its demand for self-determination and for its economic and strategic importance. With the Alvor Treaty in 1974, the three main parties of that time recognized Cabinda as part of Angola<sup>273</sup>. However, the agreement was rejected by the movement for the liberation of Cabinda (FLEC, which aimed to obtain political autonomy and administrative access to the resources<sup>274</sup>). Despite being considered a province of Angola, since that moment, Cabinda has fought for its independence, as well as for the end of the atrocities against its civilians. Many NGOs are still dealing with the situation in the region, reporting violations of rights, including torture and inhuman treatment by the military forces<sup>275</sup>.

After the independence, inhumane treatments and violations to freedom of expression were reported, particularly by Amnesty International<sup>276</sup>: elections in the country have been held only three times since Angola became independent. As a result, power remained

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<sup>270</sup> United States Department of State, *1999 Country Reports*, February 25, 2000, p.1-2.

<sup>271</sup> United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, "*Angola: Current political and human rights conditions in Angola*", AGO01003.EXM, 4 December 2000

<sup>272</sup> Amnesty International, "*Angola: Independence celebrations marred by crackdown on human rights*" Report November 11, 2015, p.1-2

<sup>273</sup> United States State Department, "*2009 Human Rights Report: Angola*" (11 March 2010)

<sup>274</sup> Ojakorotu, V. *op.cit*

<sup>275</sup> Human Rights Watch (2020), "*Angola Events of 2019*"

<sup>276</sup> AI, *op.cit*

centralized in the hands of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who, from 1979 until 2017, had served as president of the MPLA<sup>277</sup>.

Angola's population was severely affected by the war; at its height in early 2002, more than four million people had been internally displaced, and over 450,000 were housed in camps for refugees in nearby nations. Forced relocation was exacerbated by rising violence brought on by rebel attacks and counterinsurgency efforts by the government, which resulted to one of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes of the 1990s. The system behind payments from oil and mining companies to governments, which has all been kept secret for years, and a lack of transparency that serves as the perfect cover for corruption and misappropriation by ruling elites are at the root of the well-known Angolan paradox of the rich-but-poor state.<sup>278</sup>

The country of Angola's hard-won peace could be jeopardized by growing poverty and the government's lack of transparency about citizens' civil and human rights, with the exception of Cabinda. Human rights concerns include:

- high levels of government corruption government corruption;
- the armed conflict in Cabinda;
- the lack of respect for women's human rights;
- the repatriation and resettlement process;
- the violations of citizens' human rights;
- The violations of freedoms of expression, association and assembly;
- the expulsions of foreign migrant workers.<sup>279</sup>

Despite the fact that American oil firms have also made investments in the nation, corruption and poor management of its oil revenues are rampant. Despite the enormous benefits from oil, the bulk of the population of the country is still in absolute poverty even 20 years after the end of the civil war. Angola has one of the highest rates of child

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<sup>277</sup> Aljazeera, "Timeline: Angola elections" Al Jazeera Media Network, September 2008

<sup>278</sup> Taylor, S., International Herald Tribune, "Third World Dispossession: Corporate secrecy oils the wheels of poverty", The New York Times, June 2002

<sup>279</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Angola, Country Summary*, January 2005

mortality in the world, and according to the UN's Human Development Index, it is one of the lowest developed nations.

### 5.1 Global Witness

One of the biggest organizations for finding connections between natural resources, conflict, and corruption is Global Witness. Since its creation in 1993, environmental and human rights violations in the mining, oil, and wood industries have come to light, with the sources of the violations being illegal funds and political and financial influence. One of the main objectives of this organization was to launch a global campaign to compel businesses to disclose the payments they make to governments in exchange for the resources they consume. Since the war, they have chosen to concentrate on Angola because even though the nation makes \$3 to \$5 billion from oil each year, three-quarters of the population must live in utter poverty on less than a dollar per day. As we discussed in earlier chapters, the conflict the nation has experienced is not the only factor contributing to these government failings, and this has served as a justification for both public losses and private benefits. The state's coffers have reportedly lost at least \$1 billion annually for the past five years, or nearly a third of all government revenue.

The multinational oil firms like Chevron-Texaco, ExxonMobil, and Total that have been operating in Angola for years and their refusal to provide any information regarding the payments they make to governments for the resources they exploit, are at the crux of this paradox of abundance. Investigations by Global Witness reveal that states disobey the ban imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the sale of diamonds from Angola that aren't authorized by the country's diamond parastate, Endiama. In addition, the absence of any thorough investigation into corporate criminality has allowed many diamond businesses to continue operating without concern that their activities may be questioned by customers due to the government's lack of knowledge and control over the operation of the diamond trade.

Global Witness has not identified many participants in the trade for security reasons. Additionally, it is a failure on the part of the international community to acknowledge that the functioning of the diamond trade, especially that of those from regions formerly

governed by UNITA, is outside of the purview of the king. On the other side, Global Witness found that Sonangol, the national oil corporation, which still does not disclose audited financial statements, had authorized a private business whose stockholders share senior government officials' names to submit a bid for oil and gas licenses. The U.S. State Department referred to official corruption in Angola as a "severe" issue in its 2008 human rights report.

The agency then encouraged Clinton not to minimize corruption issues in the nation merely because the U.S. was worried about the country's resources and economy<sup>280</sup>. The US should be able to assist Angola in establishing public control so that money is used for all citizens instead of just a small group of elites, as they should not be exploited at the expense of the continent's poorest people.

The level of lack of accountability and transparency among citizens is very high; they don't know where the money from oil profits goes and the administration of public resources is terrible. By failing to disclose the value of the resources, which they regularly do in industrialized nations, oil companies contribute to the disempowerment of common people. However, mentioned oil, gas, and mining companies should be required by national securities regulators, like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to publish a breakdown of net royalties, fees, and other payments made for products in each country in which they operate, as a condition of being listed on international stock exchanges and financial markets, asserts Global Witness. This would help raise awareness of transparency.

## 5.2 The dynamic of “oil violence”: a focus on Cabinda

The warring divisions of the warring parties have consistently exploited the Angolan people for business and personal gain. The Angolan people have suffered as a result of the war, which has actually benefited the oil and diamond industries as well as the MPLA dictatorship. Approximately 500,000 people are estimated to have died and over 4 million were internally displaced between 1992 and 2002. The ability of the people of Angola to create their own stable communities has been hampered by corporate involvement in

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<sup>280</sup> Global Witness, *Resource Curse should be key focus of Clinton's Africa visit*, 5 August 2009

corruption, a lack of transparency, and the acquisition of military hardware by both sides of the conflict. It might be argued that during the civil war, corporate profits and the interests of the political elite subverted the human rights of the Angolan people. However, Cabinda province, Angola's primary oil-producing region, has been the scene of protracted battles between the locals who sought self-determination and the central government who was safeguarding the enclave's economic and geohistorical legacy. The FLEC sections, in the forefront of secessionist demands, have battled for independence against the government in Luanda for the Angolan Armed Forces<sup>281</sup> (FAA), subjecting the Cabindans to low-intensity guerrilla warfare<sup>282</sup>.

A fresh discussion on the dynamics of oil violence in the area has been sparked by FLEC's actions against Luanda in the Cabinda region. One of the biggest worries is that militia organizations in the area have committed and continue to commit terrorist activities, which in turn fuels more instability that could have bad effects on the nation and more instability for state security.

- The “terrorism” of FLEC

Angola's colonial history is where the continuous hostilities between Cabinda and Luanda first began. As a result, the residents of Cabinda established militant organizations that have been fighting with Luanda's armed forces on occasion. Historically, this conflict has been presented as a battle for self-determination based on the assertion of sovereignty. The FLEC, created in 1963 as a result of the union of three organizations, has been at the forefront of militant acts and diplomatic negotiations aimed at achieving Cabinda's independence and self-determination ever since.

The numerous grievances of the people of the province, including historical-legal claims, universal rights to self-determination, and perceived denial of the economic advantages of being a region rich in valuable resources, have given the separatists the motivation to

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<sup>281</sup> HRW, *op.cit*, 2005

<sup>282</sup> Low-intensity guerrillas are those localized military conflicts in which the intensity of Warfare is inferior to that of conventional Warfare. The term was coined by the US Army in 1990, *Retrieved: United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20: Military Operations in LowIntensity Conflict, December 1990, GlobalSecurity.org*



adopt a "by any means necessary" line of attack, including voicing their grievances through the FLEC's actions, in the hope of achieving the desired results.<sup>283</sup>

Despite the fact that FLEC's call for secession is based on this history of political exclusion and the ensuing desire of Cabinda people for regional autonomy and self-determination, the group's militancy has also been primarily motivated by economic concerns. Strategically denying the residents of the enclave access to essential oil resources that are native to the province The Portuguese successfully synchronized the management of their colonial outposts after the discovery of oil in Cabinda in 1956 and the beginning of exploration by the Gulf Oil Company in 1966, and eventually to Angola, with little interference from the province's independence movements, while marginalizing and excluding the politics of the province and attempting to suppress Cabinda's right to self-determination.<sup>284</sup>

The Cabinda people do not sufficiently profit from the oil wealth obtained from their area since the province is still treated poorly by the Angolan national government. As a result, the FLEC's militancy is motivated by demands for control over and access to Cabinda's de facto indigenous oil resources, as well as for political independence from Luanda and eventual secession from Angola.

### 5.3 Diamond exploitations

It is well known that natural resources, like as oil and diamonds, played a significant role in financing the country's descent into a new civil war following the collapse of the 1992 elections. At least 500,000 Angolans have died in the war, and thousands more have been injured by landmines, a scourge that still plagues the country. According to a number of widely recognized social indicators, the majority of the population has experienced economic chaos, which has caused a significant deterioration in the nation. UNITA was in charge of 60–70% of Angola's diamond production between 1992 and 1998; this allowed them to fund the war effort with \$3.7 billion.<sup>285</sup> Through a global diamond sector

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<sup>283</sup> Ojkoruty, *op.cit.*, 97

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, 101

<sup>285</sup> The New Humanitarian, "Angola: Diamond sales fuel the war", News and Press Release, Dec 1998

that was transparent or under the supervision of the international community, UNITA's diamonds were able to reach significant international markets.

The role diamonds played in supporting UNITA's military effort during the previous ten years is well known and generally accepted. The importance of diamond income has increased for a number of reasons, including the post-Cold War political shifts. The majority of UNITA's funding came from diamonds, although other sources included gold, coffee, and, especially in the late 1980s, wildlife products and timber. Other sources of income and interest from foreign bank accounts are not included in this sum. Any potential progress toward peace had been hampered by the worldwide diamond trade.<sup>286</sup>

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 1173 and 1176, which forbid the direct or indirect export of unofficial Angolan diamonds, defined as those not accompanied by a certificate of origin (CO) issued by the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) in Luanda, in response to the lack of progress in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The execution of UNSCR 1176 seems at best symbolic, despite reducing UNITA's income somewhat.<sup>287</sup> Investigations show that diamond shipments, usually by air and in small amounts, through nations like Zambia, continue to be unlawful. The majority of diamonds are sold in Antwerp and other nations on the free market. The greatest diamond market in the world is located in Belgium, thus that country shares some of the blame. This unlawful transaction is made feasible by a combination of lax monitoring and auditing by the COs of the GURN and the absence of source verification requirements for diamond imports from nearby nations. The latter condition offers the ideal opportunity for UNITA-obtained diamonds to be laundered through Angola's neighbors and into the global market, especially given the involvement of corrupt officials.

The weapons are employed in UNITA's conflict with the Angolan government and aid in violations of human rights, such as the murder and maiming of people. Human rights abuses have been committed by both UNITA and government forces. However, the

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<sup>286</sup> Global Witness, *"A rough Trade: The Role of Companies and governments in the Angolan Conflict"*, Global Witness Ltd, UK, ISBN 0 9527593 5 7, 1998

<sup>287</sup> Ibid, 9.

government uses other funding streams to buy military hardware in order to finance military action against UNITA. UNITA was subject to sanctions issued by the UN in 1998 that make selling or purchasing diamonds from UNITA unlawful. Sanctions on UNITA's diamond trade have been lessened, but they have not been removed. has not ceased, and there are still murders, tortures, and kidnappings.<sup>288</sup>

Investigative journalist Rafael Marques de Morais faced charges relating to his 2011 book *Blood Diamonds*, in which he claimed that two mining firms and military generals were engaged in violating human rights in the Lundas area of Angola's diamond resources. Amnesty International thinks that this case is politically motivated and intended to silence a campaigner who is committed to exposing corruption, power abuses, and violations of human rights in Angola.<sup>289</sup>

Miners who are paid to exploit and extract diamonds are also a part of the diamond trafficking in Angola. The informal nature of the industry causes miners to be paid significantly less than the worth of the diamonds by middlemen. Miners are slaves, generally young men, and receive no money for the labor rendered.<sup>290</sup> Since the sector is so unregulated, miners frequently receive payments from brokers that are far lower than the worth of the gems. value assigned to diamonds by brokers. The value of the diamond may be unknown to the miners, or they may be forced to sell to collectors because they owe money to them. For instance, just 5% of the 80,000–100,000 artisanal miners in the Central African Republic are properly recognized as miners with the government. As a result, intermediaries, who are occasionally even government employees, play a significant role in the diamond supply chain, potentially pushing miners into debt cycles that render them more susceptible to being subjected to forced labor.

These alleged crimes in Angola were committed by security firms working for diamond companies in the Cuango region.<sup>291</sup> Five diamond businesses have been requested by the

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<sup>288</sup> Amnesty International, “*Where do diamonds come from?*”, 2021

<sup>289</sup> Amnesty International, “*Angola must abandon defamation charges against ‘Blood Diamonds’ journalist*”, May 2015

<sup>290</sup> Verité, “*Diamonds, Trafficking Risk in Sub-Saharan African Supply Chains, Summary of Key Trafficking in Persons Risk Factors in Diamond Production*”, United States Governments, 2018

<sup>291</sup> Business and HR Resource Centre, “*Angola - diamonds: Responses by diamond companies to report on abuses related to diamond mining in Cuango*”, Angola, September 2006

Business & Human Rights Resource Center to address these claims. Diamonds are a significant potential source of money for nations and miners, but there is a chance that they will be used to pay lawless individuals or armed groups. Diamond mining, particularly in Africa, has a long history of being linked to war, bad governance, and the idea of the "resource curse," which describes the circumstance in which a nation's ownership of a precious natural resource actually poses a threat to its stability and growth. According to the 2016 U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, Angola uses child labor that is either forced or required for the production of diamonds.<sup>292</sup>

Before, the diamond industry was underutilized, and the focus was solely on oil. However, starting in 2022, efforts are being made to increase mining and foreign investment in the diamond industry, particularly from the De Beers Group<sup>293</sup>. There are efforts being made to utilize those deposits in the country's south (in the Catoca region), particularly with Lourenço, and the industry is now forced to seek for more diamonds as a result of supply disruption caused by Western sanctions against Russian miner Alrosa and the Ukraine crisis. The EU's interest in Africa is also shown in its desire to replace Russian gas imports by working with Angola; Italy, for instance, has agreements with both countries to sever ties with Russia<sup>294</sup>. Angola is one of the nations with the best chances for large-scale diamond resources in the world, but it also poses one of the biggest hurdles due to difficult access to locations without roads, trains, or other connections.

#### 5.4 Human Rights Watch

The Angolan situation has also been examined by Human Rights Watch, from 1997 until the present. Angolans' ability to exercise their human rights is negatively impacted by the serious issue of public financial mismanagement. The report produced between 1997 and 2002 reveals how \$4.2 billion, or virtually all of Angola's social and humanitarian spending during the same period, vanished from government coffers. International donors refused to offer fresh help unless the government became more accountable, forcing the

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<sup>292</sup> U.S. Department of State. "Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report". 2016

<sup>293</sup> Garnett, H., "Angolan Diamonds sparkle again as reforms put mining back on track", African Business, May 2022

<sup>294</sup> African News, "Italy signs gas deal with Angola in a bid to boycott Russia", April, 2022

government to take action to increase openness. For the first time, it was revealed that ChevronTexaco had paid a sizable bonus of over \$300 million for the extension of the Block 0 oil concession in May 2004's complete oil study report, which tried to calculate the amount of Angola's oil income deposited in the central bank.<sup>295</sup>

The government started auditing Sonangol in October 2004, however despite these actions, the state has not implemented procedures to account for its spending. Due to the Angolan government's limited efforts, organizations like the International Monetary Fund had a circumspect stance toward the government and declined to start a formal lending program or participate in talks with it until there was better transparency in both revenues and expenditures.

### 5.5 The Case of “Angolagate”

The "Angolagate" series of scans revealed that Sonangol had a major involvement in the acquisition of warfare armaments paid for with future oil production<sup>296</sup>. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the start of the second phase of the conflict (1992–2002), the Angolagate scandal in France started.

Since the 1950s, French-owned oil giant Total has operated in Angola and is currently the second-largest oil extractor in the nation as a result of multiple successful contracts in recent years. All agreements were written and negotiated in Paris, granting French judges jurisdiction even if the weaponry transfers at the center of Angolagate did not occur on French land. France experienced a period of "cohabitation" with a government made up of socialists and conservatives in the early 1990s. Right-wing politicians like Pasqua and Marchiani were drawn to dos Santos for different reasons than Socialist Party stalwarts Mitterrand and Curial, who supported him ideologically: France was eager to deepen its economic connections with the formerly colonized territory of Portugal. When it surfaced in 1999, the Angolagate scandal shook the French political establishment.

Between 1992 and 1995, following Bicesse Accords and dos Santos' election victory in 1992, the MPLA demanded French armaments until 1998. The French media hears of

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<sup>295</sup> HRW, *Angola Events of 2004*

<sup>296</sup> De Oliveira, 2007, *op.cit.*

accusations of tax evasion against France-Afrique-Orient and then-interior minister Chartes Pasqua. As investigations progress, it becomes clear that unauthorized payments were made to enable the transit of armaments to Angola. 42 people are charged by the French criminal court for their involvement in the arms transfers after the conflict is over. The incident is referred to as "Angolagate" in French media.<sup>297</sup>

The large oil businesses, service and construction firms, and law firms that support Sonangol's foreign policy are compelled to comply, in part because Angola is an oil province that is too valuable to ignore and in part because they are exempt from the true costs of the monopoly push. When Sonangol's strategy raises concerns among foreign partners, they must contend with ferocious nationalism and defenses of the business's "secrecy." In response to BP's sudden decision to disclose the amount of its signing bonus in 2001, Sonangol threatened to evict the company from Angola. Sonangol took a number of aggressive actions against French commercial interests in 2004, including declining to renew its concession for the 3/80 oil block in what appears to have been revenge for the French "Angolagate" investigation. Prior to Lourenço, Sonangol's standards—which are also those of its political masters—were the only ones that applied to how commerce in Angola was to be done. It doesn't seem likely that Sonangol's strategies will lead to a really open and productive economy, despite the fact that the seeds of capital success are not always attractive to look at.

The incident exposed a scheme involving several prominent French political personalities to covertly supply Angola's government with weapons for use in its current conflict with UNITA rebels while avoiding an arms embargo. Angolagate involved bribing of Angolan political and military personnel as well as reverse bribes, purportedly in support of French political campaign money, in addition to the illegality of the arms transactions itself. 36 individuals were found guilty of various offenses in connection with the scandal by a French court in 2008; however, some of these convictions were reversed on appeal in 2011.

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<sup>297</sup> Allen, E P., Intalan, N. "Anatomy Of A Scandal: Angolagate" World Policy Journal 27, no. 1 (2010), pp.14–15.

The trial is primarily a French affair involving the settling of scores between members of the French political elite, including notables like Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of former French President François Mitterrand, who was dubbed "Monsieur Afrique" for his extensive interactions with African leaders; Charles Pasqua, a former French interior minister whose 2002 presidential bid was effectively derailed by the investigation; and Jacques Attali, a former adviser to President.

The protracted probe has exacerbated a bad patch in French-English ties. The French government has long been eager to strengthen ties with the rising force in sub-Saharan Africa, which, since early 2008, has surpassed Nigeria as the continent's top exporter of crude oil. The Angolan government has expressed displeasure by endangering the interests of France's largest company in Angola, the multinational oil company Total. The Angolan government is outraged by the constant stream of embarrassing revelations and frustrated by the French government's inability to monitor investigations.

A number of Portuguese banks were connected to the transmission of illegal commissions in the "Angolagate" incident, which featured illicit arms deliveries to Angola worth \$790 billion that were arranged by prominent members of the French political elite. A total of around 70 transfers totalling \$54 billion were made. Fifty of these transfers, totalling \$21 million, were placed in banks in Portugal. The most enormous payments were to the two biggest banks in the nation, Caixa Geral de Depositos (CDG) and Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), both of which are owned by the government. Along with the banks Nacional de Credito, Nacional Ultramarino, Comercio e Industria, Totta and Azores, Pinto and Sotto Mayor, other financial institutions listed in the indictment include the Portuguese divisions of Britain's Barclays and Spain's Banco Bilbao<sup>298</sup>.

Considering Angola has abundant natural resources and shallow socioeconomic indicators, the oil business is significant from a social, political, and economic perspective. This makes Angola a model for the resource curse theory. Since big global oil firms have worked in Angola from the beginning of the industry to the present, the only way the country's colonial administration and post-independence governments' oil

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<sup>298</sup> Willett, Susan. "Defence Expenditures, Arms Procurement and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 121 (2009): 335–51

extraction techniques varied was in the person who granted the concessions. In terms of raising the population's standard of living over this extended period, the industry has made little difference. High percentages of people in Angola continue to live below the poverty line and, at times, have even had to rely on international aid to survive despite the country's oil riches, which have been concentrated in the hands of a select group with connections to the military and political power.

## 5.6 Ethnic groups

The majority of Angola's population is made up of Bantu ethnic groups, the three largest of which are Ovimbundu (37%) Mbundu (25%) and Bakongo (25%); this is a factor that has not yet been addressed and should not be understated (13 percent). Twenty-two percent of the population comprises other ethnic groups (Tchokwe, Ngangela, Herero, Ovambo)<sup>299</sup>. Angola is a multi-ethnic country. Some scholars claim that the fundamental reason for the civil war that ensued after independence was due to ethnicity, not politics, as it was among the three liberation forces. In actuality, the MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA each represented one of the three major ethnic groupings in the nation: the Mbundu, Ovimbundu, or Bakongo. Colonial control caused the politicization of ethnicity, which in turn caused the many ethnic groups to develop a sense of cultural and even political self-preservation. This was accomplished by creating artificial borders and uniting the various ethnic groups under one centralized regime. It was challenging to get past racial and ethnic barriers.

Along with ethnicity, racial and economic inequalities also become more pronounced between the various nationalist groupings. UNITA and FNLA's discourse concentrated on the exploitation of Angola and Angolans by Portuguese settlers because the MPLA was predominantly backed by the urban people and had a leadership made up of Portuguese descendants and privileged local Angolans.<sup>300</sup> This was because they drew their support primarily from the peasants in the interior countryside. The MPLA argued

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<sup>299</sup> Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Angola*, 2007

<sup>300</sup> Saraly, A., Morales, J., *The Role of the Natural Resource Curse in Preventing Development in Politically Unstable Countries: Case Studies of Angola and Bolivia*, Development Research Working Paper Series, No. 11/2007, Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD), pp.1-119



that class, not race, was the fundamental factor in the Angolan war and that it was caused by the ruling party's refusal to share wealth and power within an inclusive multiethnic and multiracial political system.

Therefore, despite having a part to play, ethnicity cannot be seen as the only explanation for the civil war in Angola and Africa as a whole. In fact, there are examples of other equally ethnically divided countries that have not experienced civil war for every ethnically divided nation that has, as in the case of Angola, the DRC, or Sierra Leone (all resource-rich nations). Political violence is more likely to be explained by the state's inability to carry out some of its primary functions, such as sharing money equally among the entire population, than by ethnicity. In the instance of Angola, the Mbundu supported the MPLA's choice to impose a one-party system, which caused other ethnic groups to become politically alienated and, as a result, deprived them of access to riches. Thus, the escalation of political violence in Angola may be explained by the poor redistribution strategy employed by the ruling elites.<sup>301</sup>

### 5.7 Poverty in rural areas

The effects of the war have also been much more severe in Angola's rural areas. These areas and the agricultural industry have suffered greatly due to forced relocation. Due to forced emigration, the rural economy lost a significant portion of its work population, and trade between rural and urban areas was severely disrupted. The population of several communities, where communication with the outside world was virtually absent, was subsisting on very little. The IDPs not only lost the one thing they had—their land—but they also imposed stress on the locals' coping strategies when they relocated, forcing low-income families to spread their little resources among more people. Traditional communal structures were also severely eroded during the same period. Rural Angola still experiences hardships even after the civil war is gone. IDPs who were able and willing to return to their home regions really encountered a variety of issues. First off, Angola is now one of the most fragile nations in the world after more than 27 years

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<sup>301</sup>Saraly, Morales, *op.cit.* 40

of war. People and cattle continue to perish as a result of mines and UXOs, but more crucially, they restrict communities from exploiting the land and advancing agriculture.

Regarding urban violence, it appears crucial to note that a high degree of militarisation of society, with substantial arming of the civilian population, is another significant consequence of civil war. Therefore, it is simple to grasp how poverty combined with an armed populace might result in extremely violent circumstances, especially in congested cities. One of the essential components of national wealth redistribution, inequality reduction, stability, and development is social sector policy. The war has had a significant negative impact on the social sectors. Basic infrastructure was destroyed, but there was also little money left over to invest in areas like education, health, and rudimentary sanitation because a large portion of public funds was diverted to pay for the war. Nearly all social work during the war, i.e., the bare minimum of emergency assistance, was funded and carried out by international NGOs rather than the government. Even after the civil war was finished and the economy began to recover, the social indicators for the nation were still at shockingly low levels. This supports vertical relationships, where leaders are held to a higher standard by their "clients" as opposed to the general public. In this system, the client network includes all significant economic participants. The issue is that these networks are very expensive for the state and do nothing to reduce poverty and inequality in the nation. Because these networks demand patrons to continuously feed their customers, ruling elites are significantly more motivated to fund projects that will provide annuities for their clients than they are to fund long-term growth.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs asserts that there is a prevalent conception of how government systems support national development. It might be characterised as fast economic development focusing on public infrastructure investment and borrowing from the outside world.<sup>302</sup> It is an example of central planning and is based on the notion that the state may use the profits from natural resources to address the challenges facing the country. The core of this kind of strategy is strengthening the efficiency of the state while also advancing higher education and technological transfer. The issue is that the poor, who are frequently viewed as obstacles to rather than significant contributors to national

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<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, 62

progress, have little room in this vision. Their route out of poverty involves working in the official sector. For instance, proponents of this viewpoint contend that incentive and development programs for small-scale agriculture are preferable to large-scale agribusiness operations.

### 5.8 UN and Human Rights failure

The African Convention on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are among the human rights instruments to which Angola is a state party.

During the war the international community has undertaken enormous humanitarian efforts, e.i. imposing sanctions on UNITA by the UN Security Council, and it worked to advance and defend human rights. However, the inadequate political backing from donor nations and the character of the governing regime have made human rights initiatives less effective. Angola is a case study of failure when it comes to human rights, despite some minor victories. This is because both the international community and the Angolan government failed to adequately protect their citizens from severe and pervasive human rights abuses while the country was engaged in a bloody civil war. In general, it is believed that the UN was unsuccessful in actually improving human rights in Angola. The experience in Angola demonstrates the value of human rights field operations for effective UN interventions in complicated conflicts and should, over time, strengthen the crucial role that human rights play in peacebuilding and peacekeeping initiatives. There have been three significant UN missions in Angola since 1988, as already mentioned in chapter two, but there has never been a clear mention of human rights<sup>303</sup>.

In the resolution establishing UNAVEM III, the Security Council expressed appreciation for the Secretary-General's decision to include human rights specialists in the

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<sup>303</sup> Howland, Todd. *"UN Human Rights Field Presence as Proactive Instrument of Peace and Social Change: Lessons from Angola."* Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 26 no. 1, 2004, p. 1-28. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/hrq.2004.0004.

political component of UNAVEM III to supervise the implementation of provisions connected to national reconciliation<sup>304</sup>. The Security Council approved the strengthening of the Human Rights Unit six months later (HRU). In successive resolutions, it urged the parties to uphold human rights, but it never spelled out how the HRU was to help achieve this objective. Despite being in existence for over fifty years, the UN has less than ten years of experience planning and implementing UN human rights operations. These missions' goals continue to be hotly contested. Each presence has its own operational and legal framework, even though lessons can be learnt from prior missions and similar fields of endeavor. There is no single strategy that applies to all circumstances. In light of this discussion and as a result of the experimentation and invention that fuel this emerging field of work, HRD has been working to establish appropriate field methodologies. The Bicesse Agreement emphasizes elections with universal suffrage. The Lusaka Protocol emphasizes power distribution. Human rights are not emphasized as a major theme in either document. Neither text makes human rights a primary issue, and neither treaty gives much attention to creating the institutions required to establish lasting peace via fostering respect for human rights. The negotiation parties have overlooked the human rights' capacity for transformation in favor of concerns that are directly connected to the power structure and demobilization procedures.

The 166 articles of the Angolan Constitution include 34 articles on human rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights is incorporated into Angolan law by Article 21 of the Constitution.<sup>305</sup> Angola has made virtually no reports to UN human rights agencies, and several laws do not properly adhere to the Constitution, despite the human rights-oriented constitutional framework and multiple treaty responsibilities.

In the past, neither the MPLA administration nor the UNITA rebel movement have explicitly cited human rights as a driving force behind their existence and conflicts. Although each movement includes elements related to human rights in its platform, such as the fight against colonial power, neither movement has designated its conflict as a struggle for human rights. They may also apply to other Angolan parties or movements.

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<sup>304</sup> HRW, *Chap.X The United Nations*, In Angola Unravels: The rise and fall of the Lusaka peace process, September 1999

<sup>305</sup> *The Constitution of Angola*, 2010

All Angolan political parties have recently incorporated human rights language into their platforms. Citizens have historically had the right to bring legal claims against their governments based on violations of their human rights. The obligations that the governments of those citizens have to provide certain protections are comparable to the rights that citizens have to those protections. Given this understanding of human rights, it seems sense that social and political movements in Angola have not placed human rights at their core.

Direct presidential elections were banned under the 2010 Constitution. Instead, without any confirmation by the elected legislative body, the leader of the national list of the political party receiving the most votes in the general election takes office. The vice president, cabinet, and province governors can all be appointed directly by the president, who is permitted to hold office for a maximum of two five-year terms. The General Elections Law amended in late 2021 by the MPLA, established the centralizing vote counting. It has drawn criticism from the opposition and organizations representing civil society who claimed it would weak electoral openness and does not implement anti-fraud safeguards.<sup>306</sup>

Citizens of Angola have not historically demanded that their rights be upheld or taken part in political choices that impact them. Citizens of Angola must be aware of their rights and how to exercise them. The general lack of formal education in Angola is primarily to blame for the absence of a human rights culture. A society where participation in governmental choices is essentially nonexistent and where government representatives and officials are not seen as serving the people is also produced by the absence of municipal or local elections. Higher educated individuals are more aware of their rights, but they also rarely exercise those rights. This behavior is influenced by institutional skepticism and the fear of or memory of political persecution. The Angolan constitution and laws guarantee the right to seek remedy when these rights are violated as well as legal protection for a broad range of social and economic rights<sup>307</sup>. The courts themselves,

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<sup>306</sup> Freedom House, *Angola*, Freedom in the World 2022

<sup>307</sup> Isaksen, J., Amundsen, I., Wiig, A. with Cesaltina Abreu, “*Budget, State and People. Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola (2007)*” Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Report R 2007: 7) 87 p., P.14

though, are in a terrible position, and there is a big gap between the constitutional rights guaranteed to individuals and how those rights are really upheld. A Human Rights Report claims that there is widespread corruption and impunity, as well as arbitrary imprisonment and arrest, as well as prolonged pre-trial custody, a lack of due process, and an ineffective and overburdened legal system.

### 5.9 Criticism over Angola's HR

Human rights abuses in Angola have drawn attention for a long time. Major human rights violations in Angola were listed in a 2012 report by the US State Department. This included corruption, limitations on the rights to freedoms of assembly, association, speech, and the press, and cruel and excessive punishment, including reported instances of torture and unlawful killings by state police. Other human rights abuses included harsh and potentially lethal prison conditions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, protracted pre-trial detentions, impunity for human rights violators, a lack of judicial processes and the judiciary's inefficiency, violations of citizens' privacy rights and forced evictions without compensation, limitations on nongovernmental organizations, violence and discrimination against women, child abuse, human trafficking, and discrimination against people of color.<sup>308</sup>

Landmines, oil, and diamonds are only a few of the country's mysteries; others include polio, poverty, and repressive regimes. Even after a 27-year civil war came to an end in 2002, the former Portuguese colony still had plenty of issues. With two-thirds of its 18.5 million citizens surviving on less than \$2 a day, it is still one of the world's poorest nations despite being one of Africa's largest oil producers today. 38 residents of the Cabinda enclave were arbitrarily detained, according to Human Rights Watch. While in military prison, the majority suffered from extended incommunicado confinement, torture, and other cruel or inhumane treatment while also being denied their right to due process.

Human rights groups have criticized Angola for its treatment of political detainees. Amnesty International recently released a statement in which it expressed grave concern for the health of 37 political detainees at Conduege Prison in Dundo, province of Lunda

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<sup>308</sup> US Department of State, *2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

Norte: due to enduring unhygienic conditions, a lack of food and water supplies, and inadequate medical care, their health was getting worse. Since being detained, the majority, if not all, have experienced periodic illnesses.<sup>309</sup>

The adoption of the new penal law in 2021 marked a significant improvement in the state of human rights in Angola. In addition to criminalizing genital mutilation and sexual harassment, the code also decriminalizes gay activity, safeguards the rights of children who are in legal trouble, and broadens the situations in which abortion is authorized. However, the government hasn't done much to advance more general human rights concerns<sup>310</sup>. The use of excessive force against peaceful protestors, summary killings, arbitrary detentions, and other grave human rights violations have all been committed by state security personnel. Authorities have also employed through media restrictions to limit journalists' ability to do their jobs. There have been more instances of child sexual abuse and more than 1.3 million people were hungry in the South part of the country as a result of the worst dryness of the last decade, and many of them crossed the border into Namibia in search of food.<sup>311</sup>

Angola has seen a number of protests in 2021, the most noteworthy of which occurred in January in the province of Lunda Norte and culminated in the execution of peaceful protesters by the nation's security forces during a protest about the high cost of living in the mine base town of Cafunfo.<sup>312</sup> Along with other international human rights organizations, HRW investigated the incident and found that Angolan security forces had fired indiscriminately at demonstrators who had gathered peacefully in the diamond-rich town of Cafunfo to call for improved public services, such as the provision of water and electricity.<sup>313</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> Amnesty International, *Angola: Deteriorating health of Muatxihina Chamumbala and other political detainees in Conduege Prison: Health Professional Action*, August 2010, AFR 12/010/2010

<sup>310</sup> HRW, *Angola, Events of 2021, 2022*

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>312</sup> HRW, “*Angola: Security Forces Kill Protesters in Lunda Norte Province Independent, Thorough Investigation Needed*”, February 2021

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*

Six individuals were confirmed to be dead, more than 20 were injured, and 16 were detained by the Angolan security forces after they put an end to what they claimed was an armed uprising led by a movement called Lunda Tchokwe Protectorate Movement<sup>314</sup>. They did not offer any evidence to support this conclusion or specifics about what prompted the cops to use live ammunition. Numerous NGO's have urged the government to conduct a fair investigation of the Angolan police's use of excessive force against the demonstrators that evening. Paulo de Almeida, the head of the Angolan police, claimed that the demonstrators were secessionists who intended to raid a police station in the town of Cafunfo. When the country's sovereignty is threatened, the police in Angola retaliate violently, the police head claimed, rejecting calls for an investigation into the alleged disproportionate use of force. At least a dozen protesters were killed and numerous others disappeared during the crackdown on protesters in Lunda Norte province by Angolan security forces in January, while local human rights organizations claim that the true death toll is substantially higher. Following the crackdown, two senior officers involved were sacked. The other demonstrations, which took place in the same year in February and May, were also in opposition to possible police abuse, especially in the Cabinda district, where police had detained and arrested numerous demonstrators after forcibly obstructing their procession and seizing their goods. The protest was a part of a broader one against the high cost of living, hunger caused by the drought, and unemployment that took place in five provinces.

Rights advocates and journalists often criticized the government's assault on political dissent throughout the year. During these protests, there have reportedly been numerous instances of arbitrary detentions and physical abuse by police against journalists and protestors; in other instances, security personnel have forcibly stopped activists and youth leaders from leaving their homes to take part in these protests. In this regard, Amnesty International and HRW are particularly active in seeking prompt, thorough, impartial, independent, transparent, and effective investigations into all killings and holding suspected perpetrators accountable in fair trials; ensuring access to justice and effective

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<sup>314</sup> Grombir, J., “*United Kingdom of Lunda Tchokwe (Angola), Movement seeking autonomy*”, CRW Flags, April 2021



remedies for victims and their families; and bringing to justice in fair trials all security force members accused of using excessive and lethal force against peaceful protesters.

Angola is regarded as a non-free country in 2022 even by the most recent Freedom House data, even 30/100 compared to 2021 when it was 31<sup>st</sup> <sup>315</sup>. In conclusion, we may state that the country's political and social liberties are still at the bare minimum. Since Angola's independence, the same party has held power, and political dissent has been brutally suppressed by the government. Corruption, disregard for the law, and abuses by security forces are still prevalent. Following the election of President Lourenço in 2017, certain constraints on the press and civil society initially eased. However, progress has stopped, and problems still exist.

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<sup>315</sup> Freedom House, *op.cit.*, 2022

## 6. Conclusion

Angola is one of the newest African nations to achieve independence from colonial rule in the previous 30 years. Having significant agricultural, mineral, and oil reserves in the Cabinda province, which is isolated from the rest of the nation by Zaire, it is also one of the richest countries in the world. The MPLA, UNITA and FNLA have been the three competing armed groups fighting for control of the state and its vast resources in Angola. The conflict in Angola began with the war of independence against the Portuguese (1961–1974), and after the Cold War, the MPLA and UNITA were compelled to continue funding their respective groups in an ongoing struggle for dominance and control over the weapons used to fight it.

Angola today displays two trends: first, despite being the world's second-largest oil producer, it is one of the worst-governed nations, with low levels of social spending, widespread sickness, corrupt leaders, and a civil service. Angola's position of 160th out of 180 countries in the world on the UN's Human Development Index is not a coincidence; in many ways, it is a very weak state that even civil society considers to have failed. On the other hand, Angola's incredibly influential leaders have successfully resisted significant internal and external threats, built the military of a regional powerhouse, and formed broad and varied international support networks that are certain to last for years to come.

According to this study, Angola is what may be described as a successful failed state. Angola suffers from the ills of the petrol-state and communist governance along with the pathologies of the colonial and postcolonial African state. It is difficult to overstate the impact that the decline of state institutions, the privatization of power, and the abandonment of tasks by state elites that they no longer deem proper for the state, particularly the provision of public goods, have had on Angolans' lives over the past fifteen years in particular. The Angolan state is preserved by the oil fields, which alters the equation for state existence.

Power sharing has remained the most alluring option for settling conflicts and creating temporary peace and stability on the continent, notwithstanding the difficulties of discussions in the region. Angola is a notable example, and to understand why power-sharing arrangements have failed there, it is necessary to examine the history of the nation and the personalities involved. The relationship between elites in nations like Angola is essential in the path to peace, and a lack of trust between the parties is a barrier to democratic consolidation. Furthermore, elites avoid power-sharing with other leaders in areas with significant ethnic tensions because they are worried about having their position threatened. If the parties involved in a conflict have divergent interests, obtaining a settlement is almost improbable. The MPLA and UNITA, who first derived their power from the agreement of the two ethnic groups, the Mbundu and the Ovimbundu, respectively, experienced it in their relationship. In the example under our attention, we could see how the lack of external pressure to coerce the rivals into cooperation and the presence of peace-promoting spoilers like UNITA made the discussions unsuccessful and prolonged the civil war. Even the UN's attempts with peacekeeping missions and the agreements that have defined the 27 years of civil war have failed to end the mistrust between the parties. On the diplomatic front, it is clear that Angola is working to strategically expand its markets and is concentrating on establishing relationships. The departure of Dos Santos and the actions of the new president do not appear to have altered the country's strong ties with Brazil, China, Portugal, and Russia (with the possible exception of China, as we have already seen, which tends to be more distant from Lourenco). On the defense front, the United States continues to be a significant ally; the US' third-largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa is Angola. Additionally, relationships have been expanded, as in the case of South Africa and France, and others have been created, like with Morocco and Rwanda, for a variety of objectives, such as regional stability, economic integration, and the development of stronger ties with Africa and Europe.

The stability of Angola has not been impacted by the election of a new president. Improvements in governance, accountability, and reforms are still needed for socioeconomic progress. Many global actors are coming together due to political statements and continuing changes. The army, intelligence, police, and Cabinda enclave

governorate have all seen significant changes as a result of the administration's increased vigilance to control threats from the outside and ensure internal peace.

The government must manage the transition without unilaterally seizing authority or merely responding to the old system at a time when the political game is under scrutiny. Positive, albeit infrequent, indicators in support of fundamental liberties include the tolerance of protests that were formerly brutally quashed, the raising of civil officials' pay through various decrees, and of course. Despite the recent increase in oil prices, the new administration continues to place a high priority on economic recovery, especially through initiatives to diversify the fishing and agricultural industries. Reform implementation, however, is slow because it is dependent on ineffective governmental institutions and frameworks that give little room for flexibility.

According to what has been said before, the new President Lourenco has prioritized oil in order to draw in investors. Sonangol is undergoing reforms to become more agile and to focus on its core business, which will likely involve selling off its real estate, services, and telecommunications operations. Lourenço might be able to reunite them around reforms started since the postwar era by challenging the MPLA's dominance and bringing back the major opposition parties to the political scene. Given that many of the older dos Santos' supporters are MPLA members, this scenario obviously bears the possibility of a political impasse; yet, if Lourenco's reforms are successfully implemented, it would provide him more credibility than the MPLA party now enjoys on its own.

Despite the instability, there will be a mutually beneficial partnership between the Angolan government and the oil industry. The establishment of a parallel economic structure that shields oil corporations from unpredictable local conditions and has its own acceptable legal framework and logistical effectiveness is a requirement for foreign investment in the oil business. The establishment and upkeep of two state organizations that are exempt from the deterioration taking place elsewhere is also crucial for elite survival and financial delight. The first entails coercive tools including one of Africa's largest armies, many police units, and a successful and well-funded intelligence network operating in Angola and abroad. The second option is related to company like Sonangol,

which is capable of effectively articulating state interests in the oil industry. A possible regime change would occur from within the current state elite following UNITA's loss and the MPLA's overtly intransigent challenge to the state. Although there is disagreement over how to split the spoils, there is broad agreement on political economy issues, therefore few significant changes would be made (it is unlikely that Sonangol's senior technical team would be replaced because to the lack of human resources).

From the perspective of corruption, we have seen that it is a pervasive practice in Angola. It happens when the elites utilize their positions of authority to transfer funds from the government to private organizations. In order to enable a variety of legal and illegal chances to extract private gains from Angola's economy, President dos Santos had consistently placed his allies in positions of authority throughout state institutions and businesses: these associates subsequently made choices in public space. The direct misappropriation of oil revenues has given way over time to a variety of schemes involving businesses run by the party elite and its patronage networks, which have steadily appropriated the resources of the Angolan state by controlling loans made by state-owned financial institutions, obtaining concessions over land and resources, monopolizing trade and import licenses, etc. Because of the concentration of power in the government's key agencies and the economy, control over all of this has been achievable for such a long time. These institutions' powerful players have access to patronage and exercise control in accordance with the personal interests of the regime dos Santos.

Angola is a tremendously attractive prize for its major political (and fighting) factions, several international firms, and the governments of their home nations because it is a country rich in minerals. All of these actors are obviously more concerned with getting a piece of Angola's wealth than with the wellbeing of the Angolan people, as evidenced by their willingness to put up with or ignore the ravages of corruption and resource-financed conflict. The protracted peace process, which has resulted in almost 500,000 fatalities since 1989, is once more coming apart. In such case, a conflict between UNITA and the MPLA over control of the diamond-rich region will result from the MPLA's control of the offshore oil resources. Only the MPLA can legally benefit from such control, but UNITA, as it has done throughout the conflict, will undoubtedly find eager consumers

for its diamonds. The international community is already aware of this situation and has put a ban on UNITA's diamond trade through the UN. In reality, important UN members like Belgium aren't doing much to enforce the ban. By doing this, they give the diamond industry the tools it needs to take advantage of legal weaknesses and continue a multimillion-dollar business, whether they intend to or not. They acknowledge in their own yearly reports that they purchased diamonds from Angola in the 1990s for hundreds of millions of dollars each. Meanwhile, a large portion of Angola's diamond-producing land was controlled by UNITA. In addition, it appears that individual diamond merchants and trading firms, who serve as the primary conduit between diamond producers and consumers, give little thought to the moral or legal ramifications of purchasing diamonds from combatants.

Oil great wealth frequently has a negative impact on democratic representation and the standard of governance; this problem is likely to get worse during times of conflict. Despite the fact that Angola was a Portuguese colony, American capitalists gained the most; Gulf Oil, for instance, had control over the Cabinda oil reserves. To keep Portugal's colonial hegemony over the nation, the United States government continuously gave military and economic assistance to Portugal. Despite Portugal's disappearance, the ruling class of the United States has no intention of giving up this prize. After Portugal was defeated, the US shifted its strategy and began trying to install a government that would be open to American influence and investment. However, the US faced opposition. The USSR's new ruling capitalist class aimed to expand its economic hegemony over Africa by assuming the role of "Big Brother" to African peoples. Angola was prized by the two giants not just for its wealth. Because of its geographical position, it has a significant impact on what happens in Namibia and other republics that are fighting to oust colonizing governments in the southern tip of Africa. The rivalry was much more extensive and intended to establish global dominion. This encompassed the populace of developing nations, and evangelism was thought to be especially effective in the newly formed African states. A perspective of society that would eventually be capitalist, democratic, or socialist was being expanded throughout the Cold War. Thus, ideological, social, and geostrategic objectives drove superpower engagement in Africa. During the late 1950s and the entirety of the 1960s, the Soviet Union attempted to indoctrinate the

African leadership with Marxist-Leninist ideology and to impart basic direction to the organization and role of government in the new African governments. The Soviets attempted to persuade the African leadership to accept the concepts of one-party rule and central state planning for economic development through the efforts of Russian advisors and planning professionals throughout the African countries. Although less aggressive, the U.S. strategy was similarly focused on persuading African leaders to support Western capitalism as a form of government and economic organization. A small but more direct experiment in ideological persuasion was represented by the so-called policy development efforts carried out by American organizations operating in African nations. The US wanted to introduce Western liberal democratic ideals to the newly independent African nations.

Unavoidable social repercussions resulted from the start of the civil war; in fact, violence against civilians is a constant aspect of civil wars. In reality, numerous studies have discovered a rise in civilian mortality even in conflicts in recent decades. Rebel organizations and governments that have used indiscriminate violence against civilians have become the focus of in-depth investigation. This case study's description of this kind of violence can be explained by the use of resources or a particular battle plan. One assaults in order to frighten, deny the opponent assistance, and reap material benefits. The group's ideology, however, may occasionally serve as a secondary factor in determining a group's combat strategy and policy toward civilians. Actually, ideology is a major factor in shaping the nature of groups and how they wage combat. In the Angolan Case, the three factions actually sought support first from the ethnic groups residing in Angola, then from the Cold War superpowers, and after the war ended and peace was restored, both Dos Santos and to a lesser extent Lourenco sought to find international support from allies they believed to be more ideologically similar.

The panorama of human rights in Angola has been significantly altered by the end of the military conflict between UNITA and the MPLA in April 2002 and the subsequent transition toward a more stable scenario throughout the majority of the country. The lack of war means that many of the issues from the past few years, particularly violations of international humanitarian law, will diminish in importance over time, with the exception

of the low intensity fighting that is still going on in Cabinda. The absence of conflict therefore eliminates a significant justification for widespread resource theft and tolerance of pervasive corruption. Access to economic and social rights will become even more important in light of Angola's enormous natural resources and increased opportunity to harness those resources in an environment of peace. However, the international community still struggles to exert pressure on the Angolan government where widespread rights breaches persist, such as the recent forcible evictions of foreigners from diamond-rich regions in northeast Angola or the ongoing crimes in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave. However, the increased debt levels that Angola accepted in order to win the war and current attempts to access IMF funds can offer a significant leverage point, both in relation to human rights abuses in locations like Cabinda and in relation to further reform of administrative, financial control, and budgetary systems to ensure greater transparency in the use of state revenues (particularly oil). Additionally, Angola aspires to be seen as a leading nation in southern Africa, as demonstrated by its most recent chairmanship of the Southern African Development Community and its stint as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council, which concluded in late 2004. (SADC). Even while these appointments signify significant achievements for Angola's foreign policy and might be seen as external validation at the regional and international levels, such leadership positions might provide for some room for lobbying.

A convergence of historical and contemporary reasons and interests that must be separated has led to the current human rights scenario. For far too long, it has been assumed that whenever peace is won, human rights will somehow automatically advance. It is significant to highlight that this concept has numerous supporters. Government and military leaders have observed a rising understanding that respect for human rights can assist establish the conditions necessary for lasting peace, and HRD has played a role in influencing this widely held belief. Neglecting unresolved human rights issues would only prolong social instability. The use of excessive and unwarranted force by the security forces has continued to result in egregious abuses of human rights, including dozens of unlawful killings. Breaching on the right to free speech, police unlawfully detained and imprisoned peaceful protestors. Land belonging to pastoral people has been taken away so that commercial growers might exploit it. Insufficient action has been taken by the



government to provide victims of land expropriation, drought, and displacement with food and water. The government's capacity to address the failing health system and alleviate widespread economic distress has been weakened by the misuse of state monies. The stunning contrast between images of people hungry in rural areas, particularly in the southern region, and the richness of the capital, Luanda, has increased public awareness of inequality, especially among young people.

Forced relocation was exacerbated by rising violence brought on by rebel attacks and counterinsurgency efforts by the government, which resulted to one of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes of the 1990s. The international community reacted by enacting sanctions on UNITA through the UN Security Council, engaging in extensive humanitarian efforts, and working to advance and defend human rights. Humanitarian concerns, the character of the governing regime, and a lack of strong political support from donor nations have all hindered the success of human rights efforts. Despite a few minor victories, Angola is an example of human rights failure because both the international community and the Angolan government failed to sufficiently protect their inhabitants from flagrant and persistent breaches of human rights while the country was engaged in a bloody civil conflict.

The capacity of the government to uphold the full range of human rights directly affects how long Angola can remain at peace. Angola has the means to eradicate diseases that can be prevented, to give every child a decent education, and to have a functioning judicial system all around the nation. Therefore, just because the combat has stopped, the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, should not disregard their human rights. Building the capacity of Angolan civil society to assert their rights and the government's ability to create the institutions required to uphold them would be a serious challenge. When there would be a commitment on this, we will be able to see effective lobbying leading to the active use of oil, diamond, and other natural resource revenues to respect and uphold all Angolans' rights.

It is undeniable that Angola has to advance in many different ways, including by strengthening the rule of law and implementing the appropriate systems to address

violations of human rights. The state and society should interact more, with the patronage networks dismantled, civil society engaged, and the tremendous wealth of the nation used to end crippling poverty and improve living conditions for the population. In the future, it would be interesting to look more deeply into how Angola's refugee status has changed and to examine the country's present relationship with Portugal, which could not be the focus of the current analysis due to space and time constraints. Angola is one of Portugal's major commercial partners until today, and the two countries are connected by the aforementioned CPLP. This is precisely the reason why it would be intriguing to carry on with the research on Angola in relation to Portugal and this global society with a shared tongue.

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