The agrifood industry lobbying in the European Union

Food labelling scandals, inclusion of harmful additives, conflicts of interest of regulating agencies are some of many controversies of the recent years that surrounded the agri-food industry and highlighted its ambiguous relations with the political sphere. This dissertation seeks to determine the foundations of agri-food lobbying and the specific interests they are based on, and to examine what differentiates food lobbying from other types of European lobbying. Which actors does it include? What are its targets and how are lobbyists organizing themselves to achieve their goals? Are there bodies capable to sustain regulations to limit the influencing actions of agri-food agents? The strength of the agri-food lobbies in the European Union lies in the unilateral nature of their interests and their subsequent unity and excellent organisation in promoting them; as well as in these lobbies’ ability to gain sympathy from policy-makers and consumers alike. To foster policies that are aligned with their interests, the agri-food lobbies are also efficient in convincing their interlocutors that agriculture has an irreplaceable role in society for the consumer as well as a non-negligible weight in the national and European economy. These relations sometimes find themselves in the grey area of conflict of interest. Such capacity to maintain the public’s support and influence policy-makers are both the expected strength of the agri-food sector, as well as the specific weaknesses of the yeast industry which will be discussed as a case study.