Many professors and professionals agree that M&A transactions, on average, destroy buyers' shareholders value. However, number and volume of M&A has been increasing during past decades. Does managerial opportunism help explaining such a counter intuitive combination of events?
Agency conflicts in M&A transactions
Cortese, Giuseppe
2019/2020
Abstract
Many professors and professionals agree that M&A transactions, on average, destroy buyers' shareholders value. However, number and volume of M&A has been increasing during past decades. Does managerial opportunism help explaining such a counter intuitive combination of events?File in questo prodotto:
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/28866