Politics and economics are deeply interconnected. The history of international economics can record several instances in which the course of the events was steered by the policies enacted by governments/nation-states. Liberalist measures are usually associated with better economic growth, which in turn is associated with less government change. This thesis investigates the relationship between political instability, defined as the propensity of a government collapse because of conflicts or the incidence of political upheaval and violence in a society and international trade policies, as a proxy for economic growth. To this aim, the degree of protectionism implemented by a national government is assessed against the socio-political background of the country. The analysis is based on three case studies: Nicaragua, Colombia, and Argentina. The findings presented in the thesis proved my initial hypothesis: there is indeed a correlation between political stability and economic performance. However, it is hard to establish a causal link on which one of the two causes the other. Regardless, the literature proved that a country plagued by political instability, which often results in social violence, can hardly thrive economically, and very often it will resort to the implementation of trade barriers to insulate its economy. The research has been conducted in a qualitative way. The extensive literature review conducted has led to gathering in-depth insights on the topic. The sources consulted were mainly secondary, except for few – but relevant – primary sources (i.e., Senate hearings) which gave a more punctual recollection of some moments in history.
When Political Instability Dictates International Trade Policy: Case Studies from Latin America
MUMENI URBANI, IRENE
2021/2022
Abstract
Politics and economics are deeply interconnected. The history of international economics can record several instances in which the course of the events was steered by the policies enacted by governments/nation-states. Liberalist measures are usually associated with better economic growth, which in turn is associated with less government change. This thesis investigates the relationship between political instability, defined as the propensity of a government collapse because of conflicts or the incidence of political upheaval and violence in a society and international trade policies, as a proxy for economic growth. To this aim, the degree of protectionism implemented by a national government is assessed against the socio-political background of the country. The analysis is based on three case studies: Nicaragua, Colombia, and Argentina. The findings presented in the thesis proved my initial hypothesis: there is indeed a correlation between political stability and economic performance. However, it is hard to establish a causal link on which one of the two causes the other. Regardless, the literature proved that a country plagued by political instability, which often results in social violence, can hardly thrive economically, and very often it will resort to the implementation of trade barriers to insulate its economy. The research has been conducted in a qualitative way. The extensive literature review conducted has led to gathering in-depth insights on the topic. The sources consulted were mainly secondary, except for few – but relevant – primary sources (i.e., Senate hearings) which gave a more punctual recollection of some moments in history.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/37548