The Ambition-Participation Trade-Off in Global Environmental Agreements

International environmental agreements (IEAs) faces persistent challenges in achieving stability and effectiveness due to free-rider incentives. Traditional models often fail to explain observed cooperation patterns, suggesting the need to incorporate psychological factors. This thesis investigates the role of self-image. How countries perceive themselves relative to their environmental commitments in enhancing the stability of IEAs. Utilizing a game-theoretic framework that integrates self-image considerations into country utility functions, the research analyzes how psychological mechanisms like "naming and shaming" and "warm glow" influence participation and compliance decisions. The study examines the mathematical properties of self-image models, including the trade-off between agreement ambition and participation. The research also proposes extensions to the self-image model. This work contributes to a more nuanced understanding of international environmental cooperation by bridging economic modeling with psychological insights, offering practical implications for global environmental governance and national policy development.