A CRITICAL APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AYN RAND’S OBJECTIVIST PHILOSOPHY

This thesis offers a critical examination of the concept of human rights in light of Ayn Rand’s Objectivist theory. Applying philosophical and conceptual scholarship as well as comparative theoretical criticism, it examines Rand’s conception of rights in terms of rational individualism and negative liberty. This is compared with the positive and collective rights embraced in contemporary human rights theory, and major normative tensions are identified. The thesis also analyzes the application of individual rights in liberal democracies, welfare states, and authoritarian regimes, in comparison with Rand’s ideal conceptualization of the minimal state. Furthermore, it contrasts Rand’s views with influential traditions in political philosophy, such as classical liberalism, utilitarianism, and Marxism. The analysis in the following chapters discusses themes like altruism, social justice, and global normative standards. The findings show that Rand’s steadfast commitment to individualism and negative rights, represents a necessary challenge to the foundations of modern human rights theory. However, this study also encourages a deeper reconsideration of the dichotomy between universalist claims and individualist ethics and introduces an uncommon philosophical standpoint from which future human rights discourse may be approached.