This thesis dissertation analyses the trajectory of anti-corruption reform as an indicator of democratic consolidation in Georgia during the presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2012). This era was characterized by key institutional transformation, which was lauded internationally by the West, yet these transformations failed to fully consolidate democracy in Georgia, resulting in the subsequent democratic backsliding and erosion of previous reform, which have indirectly created the basis for the current crisis in the country. This study addresses the study of so-called ‘hybrid regimes’: how and why nominally democratic reforms may simultaneously advance integration internationally, while consolidating undemocratic governance domestically. The theoretical framework of the study bridges competing explanations for the reform processes and their efficacy in hybrid regimes. Through the analysis of external incentives models, domestic elite survival strategies and historical institutionalist frameworks, the thesis analyses and demonstrates the adaptation, implementation and co-optation of reform agendas by domestic elites within hybrid regimes. Through this analysis, three key hypotheses are developed, which allows for the testing of these frameworks. Firstly, the dissertation hypothesizes that reform adoption correlates with periods of intensive international conditionality; secondly, that implementation prioritizes visible but low-cost changes preserving executive authority; and finally, that reform quality declines as external leverage diminishes. A mixed-methods design is utilized, combining quantitative analysis of legislative timelines and international indices to establish patterns of reform adoption and regression, with a qualitative process-tracing approach through elite interviews. A focused comparison with Ukraine under President Yushchenko (2005-2010) provides additional analytical insight into the democratic transition and consolidation of other so-called ‘colour revolution’ former Soviet states. The findings of this study highlight a dualistic dynamic within Georgia under Saakashvili. The reforms while having genuine intention for democratization and modernization of the country initially, were also used as strategic signalling to its Western allies, in order to appear to be adhering to their conditionality, while also enabling institutional consolidation and co-optation domestically through tactics of state capture. Successes such as the police reform and corruption reform aligned with EU conditionality demands, and advanced Georgia’s position with the West yet the reforms carefully avoided yielding substantial power away from the central government, thus inhibiting horizontal accountability mechanisms. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and NATO's withheld Membership Action Plan, the gap between formal compliance and substantive practice in regard to quality of democracy widened significantly. Theoretically, this study, advances the understanding of how post-Soviet hybrid regimes instrumentalize reforms for competing international and domestic objectives. Empirically, it demonstrates the paradoxical nature of ‘performative’ reform, wherein anti-corruption successes may actually consolidate authoritarian governance. Practically meanwhile, it offers cautionary insights for Western engagement strategies, suggesting that external incentives may produce superficial compliance without genuine power-sharing in hybrid regimes if not tied to specific enforcement mechanisms.
This thesis dissertation analyses the trajectory of anti-corruption reform as an indicator of democratic consolidation in Georgia during the presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2012). This era was characterized by key institutional transformation, which was lauded internationally by the West, yet these transformations failed to fully consolidate democracy in Georgia, resulting in the subsequent democratic backsliding and erosion of previous reform, which have indirectly created the basis for the current crisis in the country. This study addresses the study of so-called ‘hybrid regimes’: how and why nominally democratic reforms may simultaneously advance integration internationally, while consolidating undemocratic governance domestically. The theoretical framework of the study bridges competing explanations for the reform processes and their efficacy in hybrid regimes. Through the analysis of external incentives models, domestic elite survival strategies and historical institutionalist frameworks, the thesis analyses and demonstrates the adaptation, implementation and co-optation of reform agendas by domestic elites within hybrid regimes. Through this analysis, three key hypotheses are developed, which allows for the testing of these frameworks. Firstly, the dissertation hypothesizes that reform adoption correlates with periods of intensive international conditionality; secondly, that implementation prioritizes visible but low-cost changes preserving executive authority; and finally, that reform quality declines as external leverage diminishes. A mixed-methods design is utilized, combining quantitative analysis of legislative timelines and international indices to establish patterns of reform adoption and regression, with a qualitative process-tracing approach through elite interviews. A focused comparison with Ukraine under President Yushchenko (2005-2010) provides additional analytical insight into the democratic transition and consolidation of other so-called ‘colour revolution’ former Soviet states. The findings of this study highlight a dualistic dynamic within Georgia under Saakashvili. The reforms while having genuine intention for democratization and modernization of the country initially, were also used as strategic signalling to its Western allies, in order to appear to be adhering to their conditionality, while also enabling institutional consolidation and co-optation domestically through tactics of state capture. Successes such as the police reform and corruption reform aligned with EU conditionality demands, and advanced Georgia’s position with the West yet the reforms carefully avoided yielding substantial power away from the central government, thus inhibiting horizontal accountability mechanisms. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and NATO's withheld Membership Action Plan, the gap between formal compliance and substantive practice in regard to quality of democracy widened significantly. Theoretically, this study, advances the understanding of how post-Soviet hybrid regimes instrumentalize reforms for competing international and domestic objectives. Empirically, it demonstrates the paradoxical nature of ‘performative’ reform, wherein anti-corruption successes may actually consolidate authoritarian governance. Practically meanwhile, it offers cautionary insights for Western engagement strategies, suggesting that external incentives may produce superficial compliance without genuine power-sharing in hybrid regimes if not tied to specific enforcement mechanisms.
The Saakashvili government’s anti-corruption reforms in the context of Georgia’s Western Rapprochement.
DUDAS HJELMS, KRISTIAN
2024/2025
Abstract
This thesis dissertation analyses the trajectory of anti-corruption reform as an indicator of democratic consolidation in Georgia during the presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2012). This era was characterized by key institutional transformation, which was lauded internationally by the West, yet these transformations failed to fully consolidate democracy in Georgia, resulting in the subsequent democratic backsliding and erosion of previous reform, which have indirectly created the basis for the current crisis in the country. This study addresses the study of so-called ‘hybrid regimes’: how and why nominally democratic reforms may simultaneously advance integration internationally, while consolidating undemocratic governance domestically. The theoretical framework of the study bridges competing explanations for the reform processes and their efficacy in hybrid regimes. Through the analysis of external incentives models, domestic elite survival strategies and historical institutionalist frameworks, the thesis analyses and demonstrates the adaptation, implementation and co-optation of reform agendas by domestic elites within hybrid regimes. Through this analysis, three key hypotheses are developed, which allows for the testing of these frameworks. Firstly, the dissertation hypothesizes that reform adoption correlates with periods of intensive international conditionality; secondly, that implementation prioritizes visible but low-cost changes preserving executive authority; and finally, that reform quality declines as external leverage diminishes. A mixed-methods design is utilized, combining quantitative analysis of legislative timelines and international indices to establish patterns of reform adoption and regression, with a qualitative process-tracing approach through elite interviews. A focused comparison with Ukraine under President Yushchenko (2005-2010) provides additional analytical insight into the democratic transition and consolidation of other so-called ‘colour revolution’ former Soviet states. The findings of this study highlight a dualistic dynamic within Georgia under Saakashvili. The reforms while having genuine intention for democratization and modernization of the country initially, were also used as strategic signalling to its Western allies, in order to appear to be adhering to their conditionality, while also enabling institutional consolidation and co-optation domestically through tactics of state capture. Successes such as the police reform and corruption reform aligned with EU conditionality demands, and advanced Georgia’s position with the West yet the reforms carefully avoided yielding substantial power away from the central government, thus inhibiting horizontal accountability mechanisms. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and NATO's withheld Membership Action Plan, the gap between formal compliance and substantive practice in regard to quality of democracy widened significantly. Theoretically, this study, advances the understanding of how post-Soviet hybrid regimes instrumentalize reforms for competing international and domestic objectives. Empirically, it demonstrates the paradoxical nature of ‘performative’ reform, wherein anti-corruption successes may actually consolidate authoritarian governance. Practically meanwhile, it offers cautionary insights for Western engagement strategies, suggesting that external incentives may produce superficial compliance without genuine power-sharing in hybrid regimes if not tied to specific enforcement mechanisms.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/98700