This thesis explores the phenomenon of court-packing and its implications for judicial independence, with particular attention to the ongoing rule of law crisis in several European states. The research begins by outlining the historical and conceptual foundations of judicial autonomy and identifying its main contemporary threats, notably political interference. The central analysis focuses on court-packing as a means of institutional manipulation, involving changes to the composition or operation of judicial bodies to serve political interests. A comparative examination of the cases of the United States, Hungary, and Poland reveals the diverse forms this tactic can assume and its destabilizing effects on democratic governance. The final chapter assesses the role of the European Union in protecting judicial independence, drawing on the standards set by international bodies and the jurisprudence of both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. The thesis concludes with a critical evaluation of the current legal and institutional safeguards, offering reform proposals aimed at enhancing the resilience of democratic systems against authoritarian drift.
La presente ricerca analizza il fenomeno del court-packing e la sua incidenza sull’indipendenza del potere giudiziario, con particolare riferimento alla crisi dello Stato di diritto in alcuni Paesi europei. Dopo aver delineato i fondamenti teorici e storici dell’indipendenza giudiziaria, vengono individuate le principali minacce che ne compromettono l’autonomia, con un focus sulle interferenze politiche. Il capitolo centrale è dedicato allo studio del court-packing, inteso come strumento di manipolazione istituzionale attraverso la modifica della composizione e del funzionamento degli organi giudiziari. Attraverso un'analisi comparata dei casi di Stati Uniti, Ungheria e Polonia, si evidenziano le modalità con cui questo fenomeno è stato attuato, mostrando come tali pratiche abbiano inciso sulla tenuta complessiva dello Stato di diritto. L'ultima parte dell'elaborato esamina il ruolo dell'Unione europea nella tutela dell'indipendenza giudiziaria, alla luce degli standard elaborati da organismi internazionali, della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia dell’UE e della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. La ricerca si conclude con una riflessione critica sui limiti degli strumenti attuali e sulle possibili riforme per rafforzare la resilienza degli ordinamenti democratici contro derive autoritarie.
Il court packing e la crisi dello Stato di diritto in Europa: un’analisi comparata
MORETTO, GIULIA
2024/2025
Abstract
This thesis explores the phenomenon of court-packing and its implications for judicial independence, with particular attention to the ongoing rule of law crisis in several European states. The research begins by outlining the historical and conceptual foundations of judicial autonomy and identifying its main contemporary threats, notably political interference. The central analysis focuses on court-packing as a means of institutional manipulation, involving changes to the composition or operation of judicial bodies to serve political interests. A comparative examination of the cases of the United States, Hungary, and Poland reveals the diverse forms this tactic can assume and its destabilizing effects on democratic governance. The final chapter assesses the role of the European Union in protecting judicial independence, drawing on the standards set by international bodies and the jurisprudence of both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. The thesis concludes with a critical evaluation of the current legal and institutional safeguards, offering reform proposals aimed at enhancing the resilience of democratic systems against authoritarian drift.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/101355