Between Revolutionary Rhetoric and Strategic Pragmatism: Soviet Foreign Policy in the Arab Israeli Conflict from 1948 to 1978

The Arab Israeli conflict represents one of the most complex and enduring conflicts of our contemporary era. Rooted in the twentieth century, it still represents a tragic and destabilising open confrontation. Starting from its primary phases, the analysis presented in this thesis aims to define the principal driving forces behind Soviet foreign policy towards the Arab Israeli conflict, from the establishment of the Hebrew state in 1948 to the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978. During the Cold War, the Levant occupied a pivotal place in the USSR’s strategic thinking, having long been regarded as a natural sphere of interest since the Tsarist era. Giving an in-depth and comprehensive examination of the Soviet strategy in the Middle East region, this dynamic experienced continuous ambiguities in the Soviet diplomatic and political efforts. Initially, the Soviets supported the birth of Israel since the beginning and never denied its right to exist. However, the evolving international situation progressively reshaped the subsequent developments. From the mid-1950s onward, Soviet attention increasingly shifted toward the Arab world, driven by growing ideological affinities centred on principles of self-determination, anti-colonialism, and opposition to Western influence. Within this framework and with the emergence of a strong Palestinian resistance movement, the Palestinian cause gradually emerged as a focal point of Soviet engagement, reflecting both ideological convergence and geopolitical calculation. The establishment of a structured relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organisation in the 70s marked a decisive step, as Moscow came to view the PLO as both a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and a strategic interlocutor in the regional balance of power. Ultimately, the Soviet support for Arab states consistently coexisted with, and was often subordinated to, concrete strategic interests, including regional influence and superpower competition. By tracing this interaction between ideological commitment and pragmatic calculation, Soviet policy toward the Arab Israeli conflict constantly evolved as a flexible and often contradictory response to changing geopolitical constraints.