In the contemporary era, cyberspace has ceased to be a neutral zone of global interconnectivity, transforming instead into a crucial arena of geostrategic conflict, where states' cybersecurity choices yield direct impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the concept of international security in the digital age, framing cyber protection and response operations as instruments that affect deterrence, cooperation and crisis management. At the theoretical level, the research draws upon the framework of cyber-diplomacy and international law applied to cyber incidents, highlighting a structural instability between the legitimate defense of the State and obligations to protect fundamental human rights. The analysis underscores a clear correlation: the more cybersecurity is viewed as a priority political emergency, the higher the risk of controls that restrict individual freedoms, demonstrating that the way a government protects its network mirrors how it treats its citizens. To verify this dynamic empirically and challenge the rigid academic dualism between democratic systems and authoritarian regimes, the research adopts a qualitative comparative approach focused on the Indo-Pacific as a technological and infrastructural theater. In this region, physical infrastructure such as undersea cables and data centers become genuine diplomatic and political tools, fueling the phenomenon of the "Splinternet" – understood as the fragmentation of the global network into regulatory and technical segments aligned with opposing geopolitical blocs. Two distinct case studies are situated within this framework. On one hand, the thesis examines South Korea, a hyper-technological democracy exposed to recurring external cyber threats from North Korea; the study evaluates how authorizing stringent defense measures risks translating into invasive surveillance of civilian data when urgency becomes the standard operating criterion. On the other hand, it investigates the case of Thailand, interpreted as a "hybrid regime" where formal democratic institutions coexist with the veto power of traditional elites (the monarchy and the military). In this context, cybersecurity is articulated as "regime security" and deployed purposefully in domestic terms to silence dissent (through Article 112 on lèse-majesté and the use of spyware like Pegasus), despite a strong economic and media openness linked to tourism. In summary, the thesis aims to demonstrate the efficacy of political-diplomatic cybersecurity as a real indicator of the relations between State and society. The fragmentation into isolated and ideologically closed regional ecosystems sanctions the failure of the 1990s myth of the "global village." In conclusion, this work highlights that the digital security of the State can no longer neglect the safeguarding of personal rights, lest it risk sliding toward advanced forms of control and digital authoritarianism capable of destabilizing the diplomatic and international order.
Nell'era contemporanea, lo spazio cibernetico ha smesso di essere una zona neutrale di interconnessione globale per trasformarsi in un cruciale terreno di scontro geopolitico, in cui le scelte di cybersicurezza degli Stati producono effetti diretti su privacy e libertà di espressione. Il presente lavoro di tesi analizza l'evoluzione del concetto di sicurezza internazionale nell'era digitale, inquadrando le attività di protezione e risposta informatica come strumenti che incidono sulla deterrenza, sulla cooperazione e sulla gestione delle crisi. A livello teorico, la ricerca si appoggia al quadro della cyber-diplomazia e al diritto internazionale applicato ai cyber-incidenti, evidenziando una instabilità strutturale tra la legittima difesa dello Stato e gli obblighi di tutela dei diritti umani fondamentali. L'analisi mette in luce un legame molto chiaro: più la cybersicurezza viene vista come un'emergenza politica prioritaria, più aumenta il rischio di controlli che limitano la libertà dei singoli, dimostrando che il modo in cui un governo protegge la propria rete rispecchia il modo in cui tratta i propri cittadini. Per verificare sul campo questa dinamica e scardinare il rigido dualismo accademico tra sistemi democratici e regimi autoritari, la ricerca adotta un approccio comparativo qualitativo incentrato sull'Indopacifico come teatro tecnologico e infrastrutturale. In questa regione, le infrastrutture fisiche come i cavi sottomarini e i data center diventano veri e propri strumenti diplomatici e politici, alimentando il fenomeno dello "Splinternet", inteso come frammentazione della rete globale in segmenti normativi e tecnici allineati a blocchi geopolitici contrapposti. All'interno di questa cornice si collocano due casi studio differenti. Da un lato, viene esaminata la Corea del Sud, democrazia iper-tecnologica esposta a ricorrenti minacce informatiche esterne da parte della Corea del Nord: lo studio valuta come l'autorizzazione di misure di difesa severe rischi di tradursi, quando l'urgenza diventa criterio ordinario, in una sorveglianza invasiva sui dati della popolazione civile. Dall'altro, si indaga il caso della Thailandia, interpretato come "regime ibrido" in cui istituzioni democratiche formali coesistono con il potere di veto di élite tradizionali (monarchia ed esercito). In questo contesto, la cybersicurezza viene declinata come "sicurezza di regime" e usata miratamente in chiave interna per silenziare il dissenso (tramite l'Articolo 112 sulla lesa maestà e l'uso di spyware come Pegasus), nonostante una forte apertura economica e mediatica legata al turismo. In sintesi, la tesi mira a dimostrare l'efficacia della cybersicurezza politico-diplomatica come indicatore reale delle relazioni tra Stato e società. La frammentazione in ecosistemi regionali isolati e ideologicamente chiusi sancisce il fallimento del mito del "villaggio globale" degli anni Novanta. In conclusione, si vuole mettere in evidenza che la sicurezza digitale dello Stato non può più prescindere dalla salvaguardia dei diritti personali, pena il rischio di scivolamento verso forme avanzate di controllo e autoritarismo digitale capaci di destabilizzare l'ordine diplomatico e gli equilibri internazionali.
LA CORTINA DI SILICIO: CYBERSICUREZZA POLITICO-DIPLOMATICA E DIRITTI UMANI TRA COREA DEL SUD E THAILANDIA
BRINZA, BEATRICE
2025/2026
Abstract
In the contemporary era, cyberspace has ceased to be a neutral zone of global interconnectivity, transforming instead into a crucial arena of geostrategic conflict, where states' cybersecurity choices yield direct impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the concept of international security in the digital age, framing cyber protection and response operations as instruments that affect deterrence, cooperation and crisis management. At the theoretical level, the research draws upon the framework of cyber-diplomacy and international law applied to cyber incidents, highlighting a structural instability between the legitimate defense of the State and obligations to protect fundamental human rights. The analysis underscores a clear correlation: the more cybersecurity is viewed as a priority political emergency, the higher the risk of controls that restrict individual freedoms, demonstrating that the way a government protects its network mirrors how it treats its citizens. To verify this dynamic empirically and challenge the rigid academic dualism between democratic systems and authoritarian regimes, the research adopts a qualitative comparative approach focused on the Indo-Pacific as a technological and infrastructural theater. In this region, physical infrastructure such as undersea cables and data centers become genuine diplomatic and political tools, fueling the phenomenon of the "Splinternet" – understood as the fragmentation of the global network into regulatory and technical segments aligned with opposing geopolitical blocs. Two distinct case studies are situated within this framework. On one hand, the thesis examines South Korea, a hyper-technological democracy exposed to recurring external cyber threats from North Korea; the study evaluates how authorizing stringent defense measures risks translating into invasive surveillance of civilian data when urgency becomes the standard operating criterion. On the other hand, it investigates the case of Thailand, interpreted as a "hybrid regime" where formal democratic institutions coexist with the veto power of traditional elites (the monarchy and the military). In this context, cybersecurity is articulated as "regime security" and deployed purposefully in domestic terms to silence dissent (through Article 112 on lèse-majesté and the use of spyware like Pegasus), despite a strong economic and media openness linked to tourism. In summary, the thesis aims to demonstrate the efficacy of political-diplomatic cybersecurity as a real indicator of the relations between State and society. The fragmentation into isolated and ideologically closed regional ecosystems sanctions the failure of the 1990s myth of the "global village." In conclusion, this work highlights that the digital security of the State can no longer neglect the safeguarding of personal rights, lest it risk sliding toward advanced forms of control and digital authoritarianism capable of destabilizing the diplomatic and international order.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Tesi Triennale - LA CORTINA DI SILICIO_ CYBERSICUREZZA POLITICO-DIPLOMATICA E DIRITTI UMANI TRA COREA DEL SUD E THAILANDIA - Beatrice Brinza 2112508.pdf
accesso aperto
Dimensione
1.52 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.52 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
The text of this website © Università degli studi di Padova. Full Text are published under a non-exclusive license. Metadata are under a CC0 License
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/117764