This thesis aims to analyze in depth the evolution of Syrian domestic politics under the Assad dynasty, focusing specifically on the critical period leading up to the outbreak of the crisis in 2011. The research intends to understand how both leaders, Hafez al-Assad (1970–2000) and Bashar al-Assad (2000–2011), contributed through their governance choices to the erosion of legitimacy and the accumulation of structural crisis factors that rendered the uprising inevitable. Despite their generational gap and differing political rhetorics, the central question is whether the policies of the two Assads acted in a complementary manner to destroy the regime's consensus. The central hypothesis of this work is that the collapse of stability did not occur due to a single event, but was rather the result of the complementarity of two opposing political strategies: the repressive and authoritarian continuity inherited from Hafez, and the neoliberal economic rupture promoted by Bashar. The latter, while promising modernization, effectively dismantled the pre-existing state welfare system without offering adequate social alternatives. The first chapter examines the construction and consolidation of the authoritarian apparatus under Hafez al-Assad, exploring the interaction between the Ba'th Party, the security services (Mukhābarāt), and the strategic management of the populist social contract, sectarian divisions, and radical oppositions. The second chapter analyzes the complex generational transition of 2000, highlighting the early illusions of democratic opening during the "Damascus Spring" and the subsequent reaffirmation of institutional and repressive continuity under Bashar al-Assad. The third chapter focuses on the process of "authoritarian upgrading" and neoliberal economic liberalization (2006–2011), demonstrating how the emergence of a new business oligarchy and the impact of a devastating agrarian crisis undermined the historical foundations of the regime's consensus, acting as catalysts for the 2011 uprising. The conclusions will reaffirm that the regime's fragility in 2011 was the direct and cumulative result of these specific domestic policies and their failure to address growing inequalities. The methodology is based on a critical analysis of specialized academic literature, including authoritative monographs and peer-reviewed articles focusing on political economy and dynastic authoritarianism in Syria.
Il presente lavoro di tesi si propone di analizzare in profondità l'evoluzione delle politiche interne siriane sotto la dinastia Assad, focalizzando l'attenzione sul periodo critico che precede lo scoppio della crisi nel 2011. La ricerca intende comprendere in che modo i due leader, Hafez al-Assad (1970–2000) e Bashar al-Assad (2000–2011), abbiano contribuito, tramite le loro scelte governative, all'erosione della legittimità e all'accumulo dei fattori di crisi strutturale che hanno reso inevitabile la rivolta. Nonostante la distanza generazionale e le diverse retoriche politiche, la domanda centrale è se le politiche dei due Assad abbiano agito in modo complementare nel distruggere il consenso del regime. L'ipotesi centrale del lavoro è che il collasso della stabilità non sia avvenuto per un singolo evento, ma sia stato il risultato della complementarietà di due strategie politiche opposte: la continuità repressiva e autoritaria ereditata da Hafez e la rottura economica neoliberista promossa da Bashar. Quest'ultima, pur promettendo modernizzazione, ha di fatto smantellato il sistema di welfare statale preesistente senza offrire adeguate alternative sociali. Il primo capitolo esamina la costruzione e il consolidamento dell'apparato autoritario sotto Hafez al-Assad, approfondendo l'interazione tra il Partito Ba'th, i servizi di sicurezza (Mukhābarāt) e la gestione strategica del contratto sociale populista, delle divisioni settarie e delle opposizioni radicali. Il secondo capitolo analizza la complessa transizione generazionale del 2000, evidenziando le precoci illusioni di apertura democratica della "Primavera di Damasco" e la successiva riaffermazione della continuità istituzionale e repressiva sotto Bashar al-Assad. Il terzo capitolo si focalizza sul processo di "upgrading autoritario" e liberalizzazione economica neoliberista (2006-2011), evidenziando come l'emergere di una nuova oligarchia d'affari e l'impatto di una devastante crisi agraria abbiano scardinato le basi storiche del consenso del regime, agendo da catalizzatori per la rivolta del 2011. Le conclusioni riaffermeranno che la fragilità del regime nel 2011 fu il risultato diretto e cumulativo di queste specifiche politiche interne e della loro incapacità di affrontare le crescenti disuguaglianze. La metodologia si basa sull'analisi critica della letteratura accademica specialistica, includendo monografie autorevoli e articoli peer-reviewed incentrati sulla political economy e l'autoritarismo dinastico in Siria.
L'impatto della dinastia Assad in Siria: dal colpo di Stato di Hafez al governo di Bashar, fino alla crisi del 2011
ZAGHI, RICCARDO
2025/2026
Abstract
This thesis aims to analyze in depth the evolution of Syrian domestic politics under the Assad dynasty, focusing specifically on the critical period leading up to the outbreak of the crisis in 2011. The research intends to understand how both leaders, Hafez al-Assad (1970–2000) and Bashar al-Assad (2000–2011), contributed through their governance choices to the erosion of legitimacy and the accumulation of structural crisis factors that rendered the uprising inevitable. Despite their generational gap and differing political rhetorics, the central question is whether the policies of the two Assads acted in a complementary manner to destroy the regime's consensus. The central hypothesis of this work is that the collapse of stability did not occur due to a single event, but was rather the result of the complementarity of two opposing political strategies: the repressive and authoritarian continuity inherited from Hafez, and the neoliberal economic rupture promoted by Bashar. The latter, while promising modernization, effectively dismantled the pre-existing state welfare system without offering adequate social alternatives. The first chapter examines the construction and consolidation of the authoritarian apparatus under Hafez al-Assad, exploring the interaction between the Ba'th Party, the security services (Mukhābarāt), and the strategic management of the populist social contract, sectarian divisions, and radical oppositions. The second chapter analyzes the complex generational transition of 2000, highlighting the early illusions of democratic opening during the "Damascus Spring" and the subsequent reaffirmation of institutional and repressive continuity under Bashar al-Assad. The third chapter focuses on the process of "authoritarian upgrading" and neoliberal economic liberalization (2006–2011), demonstrating how the emergence of a new business oligarchy and the impact of a devastating agrarian crisis undermined the historical foundations of the regime's consensus, acting as catalysts for the 2011 uprising. The conclusions will reaffirm that the regime's fragility in 2011 was the direct and cumulative result of these specific domestic policies and their failure to address growing inequalities. The methodology is based on a critical analysis of specialized academic literature, including authoritative monographs and peer-reviewed articles focusing on political economy and dynastic authoritarianism in Syria.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/117890