This thesis examines the evolution of the international development agenda in the Sahel from the drought crises of the 1970s through the end of the 1980s, investigating the relationship between external intervention, geopolitical interests, and the strategies of Sahelian states. It asks why the expansion of international assistance and the creation of increasingly sophisticated mechanisms of cooperation failed to produce a comparable reduction in the region’s structural vulnerabilities and dependence on external resources. Combining historical analysis with perspectives from international relations and development studies, the research reconstructs the transformation of the Sahel from an area of humanitarian emergency into a permanent object of international development planning. It examines the emergence of a multilateral architecture involving the World Bank, the OECD and the Club du Sahel, United Nations agencies, and the CILSS, alongside the bilateral policies of the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. Through the cases of Mali, Niger, and Senegal, the thesis analyses how development assistance intersected with Cold War competition, economic interests, recipient governments’ strategies, and the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s. It also considers African attempts to formulate alternative approaches to development, including the Lagos Plan of Action and the experience of Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso. The thesis argues that international intervention produced significant institutional and administrative changes, but did not overcome the structural conditions that made continued external assistance necessary. Rather than resulting solely from environmental adversity or domestic governance failures, these limitations emerged from the interaction between international priorities, domestic political choices, economic constraints, and unequal relationships of dependence. The study thus shows how development in the Sahel became simultaneously an instrument of transformation, a field of geopolitical negotiation, and a mechanism through which external dependence could be reproduced.
La tesi esamina l’evoluzione dell’agenda internazionale dello sviluppo nel Sahel dalle crisi siccitose degli anni Settanta fino alla fine degli anni Ottanta, analizzando il rapporto tra intervento esterno, interessi geopolitici e strategie degli Stati saheliani. La ricerca si interroga sulle ragioni per cui l’espansione dell’assistenza internazionale e la creazione di meccanismi di cooperazione sempre più articolati non produssero una corrispondente riduzione delle vulnerabilità strutturali della regione e della sua dipendenza dalle risorse esterne. Combinando l’analisi storica con prospettive proprie delle relazioni internazionali e degli studi sullo sviluppo, la tesi ricostruisce la trasformazione del Sahel da area di emergenza umanitaria a oggetto permanente della pianificazione internazionale dello sviluppo. Esamina la formazione di un’architettura multilaterale che coinvolse la Banca Mondiale, l’OCSE e il Club du Sahel, le agenzie delle Nazioni Unite e il CILSS, insieme alle politiche bilaterali di Stati Uniti, Francia, Italia e Giappone. Attraverso i casi di Mali, Niger e Senegal, la tesi analizza come l’assistenza allo sviluppo si intrecciò con la competizione della Guerra fredda, gli interessi economici, le strategie dei governi beneficiari e i programmi di aggiustamento strutturale degli anni Ottanta. Vengono inoltre considerate le iniziative africane volte a formulare approcci alternativi allo sviluppo, tra cui il Piano d’Azione di Lagos e l’esperienza di Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso. La tesi sostiene che l’intervento internazionale produsse significativi cambiamenti istituzionali e amministrativi, senza tuttavia superare le condizioni strutturali che rendevano necessaria la prosecuzione dell’assistenza esterna. Tali limiti non derivarono esclusivamente dalle avversità ambientali o dalle debolezze della governance interna, ma dall’interazione tra priorità internazionali, scelte politiche interne, vincoli economici e rapporti diseguali di dipendenza. Lo studio mostra quindi come lo sviluppo nel Sahel sia divenuto contemporaneamente uno strumento di trasformazione, un terreno di negoziazione geopolitica e un meccanismo attraverso il quale la dipendenza esterna poteva riprodursi.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL DURING THE 1980s: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, GEOPOLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENT
PAOLI, MARTINA
2025/2026
Abstract
This thesis examines the evolution of the international development agenda in the Sahel from the drought crises of the 1970s through the end of the 1980s, investigating the relationship between external intervention, geopolitical interests, and the strategies of Sahelian states. It asks why the expansion of international assistance and the creation of increasingly sophisticated mechanisms of cooperation failed to produce a comparable reduction in the region’s structural vulnerabilities and dependence on external resources. Combining historical analysis with perspectives from international relations and development studies, the research reconstructs the transformation of the Sahel from an area of humanitarian emergency into a permanent object of international development planning. It examines the emergence of a multilateral architecture involving the World Bank, the OECD and the Club du Sahel, United Nations agencies, and the CILSS, alongside the bilateral policies of the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. Through the cases of Mali, Niger, and Senegal, the thesis analyses how development assistance intersected with Cold War competition, economic interests, recipient governments’ strategies, and the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s. It also considers African attempts to formulate alternative approaches to development, including the Lagos Plan of Action and the experience of Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso. The thesis argues that international intervention produced significant institutional and administrative changes, but did not overcome the structural conditions that made continued external assistance necessary. Rather than resulting solely from environmental adversity or domestic governance failures, these limitations emerged from the interaction between international priorities, domestic political choices, economic constraints, and unequal relationships of dependence. The study thus shows how development in the Sahel became simultaneously an instrument of transformation, a field of geopolitical negotiation, and a mechanism through which external dependence could be reproduced.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/118538