On modes of being in Heidegger. Ontological pluralism and methodological challenges.

The concept mode-of-being is crucial to adequately understanding Heidegger's ontology. However, there is no consensus among Heideggerian scholars either on the status and ontological function that modes-of-being play in Dasein’s experience of entities, or on the meta-ontological conception that this notion demands. In this paper we offer an account of the concept mode-of-being that aims to (1) define the central role that this notion plays in Heidegger’s ontology, and (2) clarify the underlying reasons behind what we call the Heideggerian meta-philosophical thesis of ontological pluralism. To do so, we examine three contrasting interpretations of the notion mode-of-being: the first one –held by Taylor Carman– considers modes-of-being as categories of Dasein’s understanding of being that enable the interpretation of the ontic world of entities that is independent of Dasein ways of understanding it. In this view a single entity can be discovered in more than one mode-of-being. By contrast, the second position –held by Kris McDaniel– considers modes-of-being as categories that metaphysically distinguish different kind of entities, so that a single entity cannot have more than one mode-of-being. Finally, our proposal, conceives modes-of-being in terms of the intrinsic ontological possibility of the entity, which manifests itself in Dasein’s understanding of being. We frame this discussion within the debate between a monistic ontological conception –which Heidegger criticizes and attributes to the tradition– and an ontological pluralism of modes-of-being, which we attribute to Heidegger.