Some among the recent studies devoted to Nicolai Hartmann have indicated an interest in a comparison between the German philosopher and John McDowell. The present contribution aims to develop the cue and elaborate the parallel between the two authors from an anthropological angle. In "Das Problem des geistigen Seins", Nicolai Hartmann offers a perspective on the concepts of Human Being and Person, and the comparison with John McDowell's "Mind and World" offers an opportunity to measure the effectiveness of the Berlin professor's positions. The comparison results in a point of view that should be understood as a synthesis between the analyzed positions. In such a perspective, Human Being is one of the concepts employed by Persons engaged in an attempt to understand themselves; Nature explained by the natural sciences is to be understood as a section of a larger whole called the Real World; and animals present an enigma that from the point of view of Persons cannot be entirely solved, which leaves open the possibility that they have a way of being that is inconceivable to us. The latter perspective could provide the basis for developing a non-anthropocentric approach to our relations with other animals.
Alcuni fra i recenti studi dedicati a Nicolai Hartmann hanno indicato un interesse per un confronto fra il filosofo tedesco e John McDowell. Il presente contributo si propone di sviluppare lo spunto ed elaborare il parallelo fra i due autori in chiave antropologica. In “Das Problem des geistigen Seins” Nicolai Hartmann offre una prospettiva sui concetti di essere umano e persona e il confronto con “Mind and World” di John McDowell offre la possibilità di misurare l’efficacia delle posizioni del professore di Berlino. Il confronto sfocia in un punto di vista che va inteso come una sintesi fra le posizioni analizzate. In tale prospettiva l'essere umano è uno dei concetti impiegati dalle persone impegnate nel tentativo di comprendere se stesse; la natura spiegata dalle scienze naturali va compresa come sezione di un insieme più ampio chiamato mondo reale; e gli animali presentano un enigma che dal punto di vista delle persone non può essere risolto, e ciò lascia aperta la possibilità che essi abbiano un modo di essere per noi inconcepibile. Quest’ultima prospettiva potrebbe fornire la base per sviluppare un’approccio non-antropocentrico al nostro rapporto con gli altri animali.
Essere umano e persona: un confronto fra Nicolai Hartmann e John McDowell
GRILLO RITZBERGER, RIMAU MIHAR
2022/2023
Abstract
Some among the recent studies devoted to Nicolai Hartmann have indicated an interest in a comparison between the German philosopher and John McDowell. The present contribution aims to develop the cue and elaborate the parallel between the two authors from an anthropological angle. In "Das Problem des geistigen Seins", Nicolai Hartmann offers a perspective on the concepts of Human Being and Person, and the comparison with John McDowell's "Mind and World" offers an opportunity to measure the effectiveness of the Berlin professor's positions. The comparison results in a point of view that should be understood as a synthesis between the analyzed positions. In such a perspective, Human Being is one of the concepts employed by Persons engaged in an attempt to understand themselves; Nature explained by the natural sciences is to be understood as a section of a larger whole called the Real World; and animals present an enigma that from the point of view of Persons cannot be entirely solved, which leaves open the possibility that they have a way of being that is inconceivable to us. The latter perspective could provide the basis for developing a non-anthropocentric approach to our relations with other animals.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/43690