Analyzing the Influence of 'Interesting' on the Illusory Truth Effect: Insights into Encoding Processes

The Illusory Truth Effect, a cognitive bias in which the repetition of a statement increases its perceived truthfulness, has significant implications for decision-making and belief formation. This thesis explores the influence of evaluative adjectives, specifically focusing on the adjective "interesting," during the encoding phase of the Illusory Truth Effect. The study utilizes data from Greatti et al. (2021) experiment which examin the impact of context on reducing the Illusory Truth Effect. Results indicate a notable proportion of true statements for the adjective "interesting," though not statistically significant when compared to the control adjective "obvious." The thesis also reveals similarities between statements categorized as "Unable to Judge" and unknown filters used in Greatti's experiment, suggesting a natural dimension for analysis. Despite encountering challenges such as a high number of statements marked as "Impossible to Judge" and "Unable to Judge," the study suggests that the adjective "interesting" does not introduce a significant bias in the Illusory Truth Effect paradigm. Recommendations for future experiments include compensating participants based on the quantity of judgable statements and ensuring clear and incentivized instructions. The findings contribute to a better understanding of the role evaluative adjectives play in truth judgments during the encoding phase of the Illusory Truth Effect, emphasizing the need for careful consideration of experimental design elements.