The 1973 energy crisis showed Europe and particularly Italy a strong dependence on crude oil from the main producing countries. This gave rise to the idea that it was necessary to invest in alternative sources and an early energy conscience developed. The absolute protagonist in the Italian foreign policy scenario of the 1970s was the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, orphaned since 1962 of its founder and its most charismatic figure Enrico Mattei. The Italian economic and social situation called for a decisive effort on the part of the energy giant, so ENI's action to respond to the energy crisis was a reflection of the policy of the then Foreign Minister Aldo Moro. The study focuses mainly on the relationship between ENI and some of the major oil-exporting countries. In the first chapter, the relationship between Italy and Iran is analyzed, with an introduction to the Italian political scenario of the 1960s and 1970s. In the second chapter, the analysis shifts to the Mediterranean shore of OPEC, with an examination of the relationship between ENI and two countries fundamental to Italy's geopolitical strategies: Algeria and Libya. This is followed by an in-depth look at the Italian energy company's difficult negotiations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, two key pawns for Rome. Finally, the fourth chapter addresses the case of one of the main crude oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, and ENI's political weight from the 1971 Tehran Conference to the 1973 oil shock.
La crisi energetica del 1973 ha mostrato all'Europa e in particolare all'Italia una forte dipendenza dal greggio dei principali paesi produttori. Nasceva così l'idea che fosse necessario investire in fonti alternative e si sviluppava una prima coscienza energetica. Protagonista assoluto nello scenario della politica estera italiana degli anni '70 fu l'Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, orfano dal 1962 del suo fondatore e della sua figura più carismatica Enrico Mattei. La situazione economica e sociale italiana richiedeva uno sforzo decisivo da parte del colosso energetico, per cui l'azione dell'ENI per rispondere alla crisi energetica fu il riflesso della politica dell'allora Ministro degli Esteri Aldo Moro. Lo studio si concentra principalmente sul rapporto tra l'ENI e alcuni dei principali paesi esportatori di petrolio. Nel primo capitolo viene analizzato il rapporto tra Italia e Iran, con un'introduzione allo scenario politico italiano degli anni '60 e '70. Nel secondo capitolo l'analisi si sposta sulla sponda mediterranea dell'OPEC, con un esame del rapporto tra l'ENI e due paesi fondamentali per le strategie geopolitiche dell'Italia: Algeria e Libia. Segue un approfondimento sulle difficili trattative dell'azienda energetica italiana con Iraq e Arabia Saudita, due pedine fondamentali per Roma. Infine, il quarto capitolo affronta il caso di uno dei principali produttori di greggio dell'Africa subsahariana, la Nigeria, e del peso politico dell'ENI dalla Conferenza di Teheran del 1971 allo shock petrolifero del 1973.
Il ruolo dell'ENI nella politica estera italiana a cavallo della crisi energetica del 1973
POLLASTRI, GIACOMO
2023/2024
Abstract
The 1973 energy crisis showed Europe and particularly Italy a strong dependence on crude oil from the main producing countries. This gave rise to the idea that it was necessary to invest in alternative sources and an early energy conscience developed. The absolute protagonist in the Italian foreign policy scenario of the 1970s was the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, orphaned since 1962 of its founder and its most charismatic figure Enrico Mattei. The Italian economic and social situation called for a decisive effort on the part of the energy giant, so ENI's action to respond to the energy crisis was a reflection of the policy of the then Foreign Minister Aldo Moro. The study focuses mainly on the relationship between ENI and some of the major oil-exporting countries. In the first chapter, the relationship between Italy and Iran is analyzed, with an introduction to the Italian political scenario of the 1960s and 1970s. In the second chapter, the analysis shifts to the Mediterranean shore of OPEC, with an examination of the relationship between ENI and two countries fundamental to Italy's geopolitical strategies: Algeria and Libya. This is followed by an in-depth look at the Italian energy company's difficult negotiations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, two key pawns for Rome. Finally, the fourth chapter addresses the case of one of the main crude oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, and ENI's political weight from the 1971 Tehran Conference to the 1973 oil shock.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Pollastri_Giacomo.pdf
accesso riservato
Dimensione
1.38 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.38 MB | Adobe PDF |
The text of this website © Università degli studi di Padova. Full Text are published under a non-exclusive license. Metadata are under a CC0 License
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/63882