The world witnessed the worst systemic banking crisis since the great crash of 1929. The global financial crisis of 2008, originally developed in the US, led to the collapse of the British banking system and the near-collapse of the US financial sector, as well as deeply affecting other European states. In the wake of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, the eurozone crisis followed, which in 2010 led to disadvantages in Ireland, Portugal and Greece, as well as the bailout of the entire banking system in Spain and Cyprus. The crisis emerged mainly in countries where budget deficits and sovereign debts grew, with bond yield spreads widening and risk insurance on credit default swaps between these countries and other EU members, mostly Germany. In 2010, the eurozone prime ministers approved the EUR 750 billion recovery package with the aim of ensuring financial stability in Europe by creating the European Financial Stability Facility. Among EU countries, Italy faced the lowest economic growth (its debt rose to around 119 % of GDP from 116 %). On the other hand, Italian public debt has a longer average residual maturity and a large share of it is owned by residents. This makes the country more resistant to financial shocks. Spain had a relatively low debt level among advanced economies before the crisis. The debt was largely avoided thanks to tax revenues inflated by the housing bubble, which contributed to a decade of increased public spending without debt accumulation. When the bubble burst, Spain spent large amounts of money on bank bailouts. In 2012, regulators reported that Spanish banks required EUR 59 billion in additional capital to compensate for losses from real estate investments. The 2010 euro crisis was a crisis in which European politics determined its course. Although the lack of institutions equipped to deal with a systemic financial crisis was quite evident, the creation of such institutions and new policies would seem to have restored the credibility of the eurozone and ended the crisis. However, the direction in which the euro will head will depend on its still evolving structure.
Il mondo è stato testimone della peggiore crisi bancaria sistemica dai tempi del grande crollo del 1929. La crisi finanziaria globale del 2008, sviluppatasi originariamente negli Stati Uniti, ha portato al crollo del sistema bancario britannico e quasi al tracollo del settore finanziario americano, oltreché a colpire profondamente altri stati europei. Sulla scia della crisi statunitense dei mutui subprime, ha fatto seguito la crisi dell’eurozona che nel 2010 è stata causa di svantaggi in Irlanda, Portogallo e Grecia, nonché del salvataggio dell’intero sistema bancario di Spagna e Cipro. La crisi emerse soprattutto in paesi in cui il deficit di bilancio e i debiti sovrani crebbero, con l'ampliamento dei differenziali di rendimento dei titoli e l'assicurazione di rischio sui credit default swap tra questi paesi e gli altri membri UE, per lo più la Germania. Nel 2010 i primi ministri dell’eurozona approvano il pacchetto di recupero di 750 miliardi di euro con l'obiettivo di assicurare la stabilità finanziaria in Europa creando il Fondo europeo di stabilità finanziaria. Tra i paesi dell’Unione europea l’Italia si è confrontata con la crescita economica più bassa (il suo debito è salito a circa il 119 % del PIL dal 116%). D’altra parte il debito pubblico italiano ha una scadenza residua media più lunga e una grande quota di esso è posseduta da residenti. Questo rende il paese più resistente agli shock finanziari. Parallelamente la Spagna aveva un livello di debito relativamente basso tra le economie avanzate prima della crisi. Il debito è stato in gran parte evitato grazie alle entrate fiscali gonfiate dalla bolla immobiliare, che ha contribuito a un decennio di aumento della spesa pubblica senza accumulo di debito. Quando la bolla è scoppiata, la Spagna ha speso grandi quantità di denaro per i salvataggi delle banche. Nel 2012, le autorità di regolamentazione hanno indicato che le banche spagnole hanno richiesto 59 miliardi di euro di capitale aggiuntivo per compensare le perdite da investimenti immobiliari. La crisi dell’euro 2010 è stata una crisi in cui la politica europea ha determinato il suo corso. Nonostante la mancanza di istituzioni attrezzate per affrontare una crisi finanziaria sistemica fosse del tutto evidente, la creazione di tali istituzioni e di nuove politiche sembrerebbe aver ripristinato la credibilità dell’eurozona e posto fine alla crisi. Tuttavia la direzione verso cui si dirigerà l’euro dipenderà dalla sua struttura ancora in evoluzione.
LA CRISI DELL'EUROZONA: ITALIA E SPAGNA A CONFRONTO
TITO, CARLOTTA
2023/2024
Abstract
The world witnessed the worst systemic banking crisis since the great crash of 1929. The global financial crisis of 2008, originally developed in the US, led to the collapse of the British banking system and the near-collapse of the US financial sector, as well as deeply affecting other European states. In the wake of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, the eurozone crisis followed, which in 2010 led to disadvantages in Ireland, Portugal and Greece, as well as the bailout of the entire banking system in Spain and Cyprus. The crisis emerged mainly in countries where budget deficits and sovereign debts grew, with bond yield spreads widening and risk insurance on credit default swaps between these countries and other EU members, mostly Germany. In 2010, the eurozone prime ministers approved the EUR 750 billion recovery package with the aim of ensuring financial stability in Europe by creating the European Financial Stability Facility. Among EU countries, Italy faced the lowest economic growth (its debt rose to around 119 % of GDP from 116 %). On the other hand, Italian public debt has a longer average residual maturity and a large share of it is owned by residents. This makes the country more resistant to financial shocks. Spain had a relatively low debt level among advanced economies before the crisis. The debt was largely avoided thanks to tax revenues inflated by the housing bubble, which contributed to a decade of increased public spending without debt accumulation. When the bubble burst, Spain spent large amounts of money on bank bailouts. In 2012, regulators reported that Spanish banks required EUR 59 billion in additional capital to compensate for losses from real estate investments. The 2010 euro crisis was a crisis in which European politics determined its course. Although the lack of institutions equipped to deal with a systemic financial crisis was quite evident, the creation of such institutions and new policies would seem to have restored the credibility of the eurozone and ended the crisis. However, the direction in which the euro will head will depend on its still evolving structure.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/74699