Kant's Transcendental Idealism and the Boundaries of Metaphysics

The present work deals with the problem of the boundaries of metaphysics within the context of Kant’s "Kritik der reinen Vernunft". The so-called “critical turn” in his thinking will be analyzed from the standpoint of his revolutionary philosophical position, i.e., transcendental idealism, as the new theoretical ground on which he builds his solution to the problem of the possibility of metaphysics, as well as the determination of its scope and limits. An attempt will be made to reach an effective interpretation of transcendental idealism and of its fundamental claims, namely the distinction between "Erscheinung" and "Ding an sich" and the uncognizability of the latter. The positive role of the first "Critique" to advance a "reform" of metaphysics, thanks to the theoretical resources provided by transcendental idealism, will be considered, both in its "generalis" and in its "specialis" section. After precisely settling its boundaries, the space for alternative epistemic modalities from that of "Wissen" will be explored as a possible extension of the theoretical limitation of human reason, considering the Kantian account of "Fürwahrhalten" in the "Kanon der reinen Vernunft". In particular, the role of "doktrinaler Glaube" will be investigated as a possible resource to “orient oneself in thinking”: in matters of greatest interest for human reason, Kant had to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith”.