The thesis aims to analyze the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 6 November 2003, concerning the dispute between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America over oil platforms; in particular the attention is focused on self-defense and its possible limitations that could be interpreted in this specific case. The lawsuit is brought by Iran following the destruction of three Iranian oil platforms' complexes by the US Navy. The first chapter, after describing the historical circumstances that contributed to the birth of the controversy, analyzes Iran's action towards the United States, subsequently focusing on the Court's ruling, from the proceedings to the ruling on the merits. Analyzing the case, I first turned my attention to the 2003 ruling on the merits, the 1996 ruling on jurisdiction, and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and the United States, to have a complete vision of the matter in question: starting from the facts that gave rise to the dispute, to the jurisdiction on which the Court is based, up to the Court's decision on the merits. In particular, it exams the 1955 Treaty between Iran and the United States, the problem of jurisdiction regarding the art. XX, par. 1 of the Treaty, and the 1996 ruling on jurisdiction. Regarding the latter, the application of the Treaty and international law on the use of force is also discussed. Subsequently, I specifically examined the Court's interpretation of self-defense, trying to highlight the limits that the latter assumes compared to those present in current international law. The second chapter addresses the central aspect of the sentence: the exercise of legitimate defense invoked by the United States and the requirements to be respected to be considered as such. Particular attention is also paid to the dissenting opinions of some judges, and to the comments made by the doctrine, which has widely criticized the sentence. The legal analysis of the case demonstrates how the Court tries to highlight the limits of the use of force. The Court's interpretation is considered particularly restrictive by some judges and by the doctrine. The United States does not assume that the Court intends to contradict firm principles established in international law; however unintentionally, self-defense could be interpreted differently than under current law.
La tesi si propone di analizzare la sentenza della Corte Internazionale di Giustizia del 6 novembre 2003, riguardante la controversia tra la Repubblica islamica dell'Iran e Stati Uniti d'America sulle piattaforme petrolifere; in particolare l'attenzione si concentra sulla legittima difesa e i suoi eventuali limiti che potrebbero essere interpretati nel caso specifico. La causa è intentata dall'Iran a seguito della distruzione di tre complessi di piattaforme petrolifere iraniani da parte della marina statunitense. Il primo capitolo, dopo aver descritto le circostanze storiche che hanno contribuito alla nascita della controversia, analizza l’azione dell’Iran verso gli Stati Uniti, concentrandosi in seguito sulla sentenza della Corte, dal procedimento fino alla sentenza di merito. Analizzando il caso, ho rivolto l’attenzione innanzitutto alla sentenza sui meriti del 2003, alla sentenza sulla giurisdizione del 1996, e al Trattato di Amicizia del 1955 fra Iran e Stati Uniti, per avere una visione completa riguardo la vicenda in esame: a partire dai fatti che hanno dato origine alla controversia, alla giurisdizione su cui si basa la Corte, fino ad arrivare alla decisione della Corte nel merito. In particolar modo, si prende in esame il Trattato del 1955 fra Iran e Stati Uniti, il problema della giurisdizione riguardo l’art. XX, par. 1, del Trattato e la sentenza sulla giurisdizione del 1996. In merito a quest’ultima viene anche discussa l’applicazione del Trattato e del diritto internazionale sull’uso della forza. Successivamente, ho esaminato in modo specifico l’interpretazione della Corte riguardo la legittima difesa, cercando di evidenziare i limiti che quest’ultima assume rispetto a quelli presenti nel diritto internazionale vigente. Il secondo capitolo, affronta l’aspetto centrale della sentenza: l’esercizio della legittima difesa invocato dagli Stati Uniti e i requisiti da rispettare per essere considerata come tale. Si pone particolare attenzione anche alle opinioni dissenzienti di alcuni giudici, e sui commenti da parte della dottrina, che ha ampiamente criticato la sentenza. L’analisi giuridica del caso dimostra come la Corte cerchi di rimarcare i limiti dell’uso della forza. L'interpretazione della Corte è considerata particolarmente restrittiva da alcuni giudici e dalla dottrina. Gli Stati Uniti non assumono che la Corte voglia contraddire i solidi principi affermati nel diritto internazionale; tuttavia involontariamente, la legittima difesa potrebbe essere interpretata diversamente rispetto al diritto vigente.
I limiti della legittima difesa secondo la sentenza sulle piattaforme petrolifere
GIOVANNINI, SOFIA
2024/2025
Abstract
The thesis aims to analyze the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 6 November 2003, concerning the dispute between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America over oil platforms; in particular the attention is focused on self-defense and its possible limitations that could be interpreted in this specific case. The lawsuit is brought by Iran following the destruction of three Iranian oil platforms' complexes by the US Navy. The first chapter, after describing the historical circumstances that contributed to the birth of the controversy, analyzes Iran's action towards the United States, subsequently focusing on the Court's ruling, from the proceedings to the ruling on the merits. Analyzing the case, I first turned my attention to the 2003 ruling on the merits, the 1996 ruling on jurisdiction, and the 1955 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and the United States, to have a complete vision of the matter in question: starting from the facts that gave rise to the dispute, to the jurisdiction on which the Court is based, up to the Court's decision on the merits. In particular, it exams the 1955 Treaty between Iran and the United States, the problem of jurisdiction regarding the art. XX, par. 1 of the Treaty, and the 1996 ruling on jurisdiction. Regarding the latter, the application of the Treaty and international law on the use of force is also discussed. Subsequently, I specifically examined the Court's interpretation of self-defense, trying to highlight the limits that the latter assumes compared to those present in current international law. The second chapter addresses the central aspect of the sentence: the exercise of legitimate defense invoked by the United States and the requirements to be respected to be considered as such. Particular attention is also paid to the dissenting opinions of some judges, and to the comments made by the doctrine, which has widely criticized the sentence. The legal analysis of the case demonstrates how the Court tries to highlight the limits of the use of force. The Court's interpretation is considered particularly restrictive by some judges and by the doctrine. The United States does not assume that the Court intends to contradict firm principles established in international law; however unintentionally, self-defense could be interpreted differently than under current law.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/84034