The thesis analyzes strategic games within the framework of game theory, with particular attention to the main equilibrium concepts that describe the possible rational choices of agents. After a formal presentation of the strategic model, Nash equilibrium is examined in its various applications. In addition to the theoretical framework, the work provides illustrative examples that help to understand the strategic behavior of players in different contexts. The objective is to offer a clear and rigorous overview of the principal equilibrium notions in non-cooperative games.
La tesi analizza i giochi strategici nell’ambito della teoria dei giochi, con particolare attenzione ai principali concetti di equilibrio che descrivono le possibili scelte razionali degli agenti. Dopo una presentazione formale del modello strategico, viene esaminato l’equilibrio di Nash nelle sue diverse applicazioni. Oltre all’inquadramento teorico, il lavoro propone esempi esplicativi che aiutano a comprendere il comportamento strategico dei giocatori in diversi contesti. L’obiettivo è offrire una panoramica chiara e rigorosa delle principali nozioni di equilibrio nei giochi non cooperativi.
Giochi strategici e concetti di equilibrio
TESSARI, MARCO
2024/2025
Abstract
The thesis analyzes strategic games within the framework of game theory, with particular attention to the main equilibrium concepts that describe the possible rational choices of agents. After a formal presentation of the strategic model, Nash equilibrium is examined in its various applications. In addition to the theoretical framework, the work provides illustrative examples that help to understand the strategic behavior of players in different contexts. The objective is to offer a clear and rigorous overview of the principal equilibrium notions in non-cooperative games.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12608/92521