Normativity of the Virtues: a Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

The thesis investigates the issues of normativity and action-guidance in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, aiming to challenge the misconception that virtue ethics, while providing valuable insights into the dimension of moral character, lacks practical guidelines for action. This work approaches the problem from multiple perspectives. It analyzes virtues and vices as 'thick concepts' that combine descriptive and evaluative content, and demonstrates that they are more foundational than abstract moral notions like 'right' and 'ought'. The study connects these concepts to the notion of natural goodness developed by Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse, which grounds ethical norms in teleological considerations concerning human nature. The thesis shows that virtues can serve as essential normative elements in a comprehensive moral theory. It further develops a virtue ethical account of right action through Hursthouse's 'v-rules' and establishes a framework for deriving deontic concepts of obligation, prohibition, and permission from virtue ethics.