The phenomenology of imagination. From descriptive analysis to conceptual clarification

In my thesis I use the phenomenological method in order to describe the experience of imagination. First, I take into consideration the famous analyses of volume XXIII of the Husserliana, “Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung” (1898–1925), where Husserl analyses the act of “phantasie” compared with other acts, such as perception, image-consciousness, and memory. I then focus on the peculiarity of the imaginative “presentation” or experience, thanks to Casey’s descriptions in his book “Imagining: A Phenomenological Study” (2000), and I try to show how – thanks to the phenomenological clarification of this experience – we can better grasp the metaphysical notion of possibility implicated in this act. Finally, I show how we can draw a difference between imagination and memory based on these analyses, in particular using a “model of consciousness” derivable from Husserl’s phenomenology.